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ACA’s journal, Arms Control Today, remains the best in the market. Well focused. Solidly researched. Prudent.

– Hans Blix,
former IAEA Director-General

Maggie Tennis

U.S.-Russian Arms Control At Risk: An Assessment and Path Forward

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The global nonproliferation order is weakening. It cannot afford continued noncooperation between the world’s two largest nuclear powers.

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By Maggie Tennis
January 2018

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In March 2017, Gen. Paul Selva, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) that Russia had deployed a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) violating the “spirit and intent” of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.1 Selva warned the committee that Russia is “modernizing its strategic nuclear triad and developing new nonstrategic nuclear weapons.” His testimony illustrates the new normal of U.S.-Russian relations, wherein historic nuclear cooperation is profoundly at risk.

Russia’s alleged INF Treaty violation has soured already strained relations between the world’s largest nuclear powers. Yet, the United States and Russia continue to share a common interest in ensuring nuclear stability worldwide. Together, the countries possess over 90 percent of the planet’s roughly 15,000 nuclear weapons. This power carries a responsibility to rejuvenate cooperative initiatives that reduce nuclear risks dating back to the depths of the Cold War.

To effectively evaluate the opportunities and challenges involved in that objective, U.S. policymakers must understand Russia’s current nuclear force policy and strategy. This policy paper examines Moscow’s nuclear doctrine, capabilities and modernization efforts, the status of U.S.-Russian arms control treaties, and the primary obstacles to cooperation. It concludes by offering a set of recommendations for both mitigating threats to strategic stability and resuming a productive U.S.-Russian arms control dialogue.

Background

The longstanding tradition of U.S.-Russian dialogue and cooperation to reduce the dangers posed by nuclear weapons—dangers that their rivalry and possession of nuclear weapons created—has been critical to global security and the health of bilateral relations in general. Indeed, during the Cold War, collaboration on nuclear matters was often the only tether holding the relationship together. The global nonproliferation order is weakening. It cannot afford continued noncooperation between the world’s two largest nuclear powers.

Current pressures on the U.S.-Russian relationship

Perhaps the greatest source of tension between Moscow and Washington is a fundamental difference of perspective on the post-Cold War European and international order. The Kremlin views its loss of superpower status following the Soviet Union’s collapse, and subsequent exclusion from international decision-making, as a root cause of many global problems. Under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin, the country is focused on regaining regional and global influence. Russian possession of nuclear weapons is a crucial component of these ambitions.

Moscow feels entitled to a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space at the same time that Washington maintains an orbit in Europe through NATO and its European alliances. As part of a quest to strengthen its influence in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Russia is expanding and deepening its information warfare and foreign economic activities to further weaken Western liberal democracy in these regions. There is clear evidence of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, as well as in recent elections in France, the Netherlands, and Germany, with the intention of swaying the vote in favor of nationalist, populist candidates sympathetic to Russia.

Furthermore, Moscow is supporting pro-Russia authoritarian and oligarchic-style regimes and political movements throughout Eastern and Central Europe and Central Asia. Perceived attempts by Washington to interfere in that zone are sure to have exacerbated tensions with Moscow. An example is the eastward expansion of NATO, which Russia fears perhaps more than any other geopolitical threat.

Russia’s most recent military doctrine, published in 2014, explicitly identifies NATO expansion as a major threat to Russian national security. Russia has viewed the eastward expansion of NATO as a menace since before the Soviet Union fell—and especially since the 1999 NATO bombing of Kosovo. Moscow is highly critical of U.S. intervention in past conflicts in the Balkans and Middle East, and remains suspicious that NATO intends to destabilize incumbent regimes in the post-Soviet space. The Kremlin directly blames Washington for inciting uprisings in Georgia, Ukraine, and the Middle East.

In Ukraine, Moscow blames the Obama administration for encouraging the Maidan revolution and views U.S. policy toward Crimea as hypocritical. In Syria, Russia and the United States have disagreed on a range of issues, including the use of airspace, the future of the Bashar al-Assad regime, Syria’s use of chemical weapons, Iran’s role, how to fight the Islamic State, and which parties to the conflict constitute terrorist organizations.2

Finally, Moscow has amplified its muscular military signaling in recent years. In Ukraine and Syria in particular Russia has exercised nuclear sabre rattling and dangerous brinksmanship. Both countries have engaged in increased military exercises and force buildups on the NATO-Russia border.3

Arms control is not dead, but it’s wounded

Arms control is an area where Russia and the United States must cooperate, despite numerous tensions in their relationship. Yet, disagreements over treaties, missile defense, and approaches to nonproliferation have created additional challenges.

The INF Treaty is at the center of a significant and ongoing arms control treaty dispute between Moscow and Washington. In 2014 the United States accused Russia of testing a GLCM that violates that agreement. Then, in 2017, Washington alleged that Moscow had deployed the system. The Kremlin denies the allegations, and instead accuses the United States of violating the agreement. Mounting distrust on the treaty threatens to affect other hallmark agreements, such as the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Agreement Treaty (New START).

New START requires that the United States and Russia each reduce their strategic nuclear forces to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads, 700 deployed delivery systems, and 800 deployed and non-deployed delivery systems by February 2018. The treaty is slated to expire in February 2021 but can be extended for another five years by mutual agreement by the two presidents. Since New START went into force in 2011, bilateral talks on further reductions have been put on hold amid a litany of U.S. and Russian disagreements in both the nuclear and non-nuclear realms.

Moscow is troubled by the expansion of U.S and NATO missile defenses, particularly the Aegis Ashore system in Romania and another planned site in Poland. While NATO argues that the intention of the system is “to protect European NATO allies, and U.S. deployed forces in the region, against current and emerging ballistic threats from the Middle East,” Moscow views the system as directed against Russia.4 Moscow’s perception is underscored by the fact that U.S. missile defense deployment planning did not change following the achievement of the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement, which curtailed the Iranian nuclear threat.

On the U.S. side, there is concern that Russia is lowering its threshold for nuclear use, thereby increasing the potential that regional conventional conflicts could escalate into catastrophic nuclear collisions. While it is certainly possible to interpret Russian nuclear doctrine in this way, American and Russian analysts debate whether Moscow has indeed incorporated limited strikes as part of its official military doctrine.

Despite these irritants, past cooperation between the two powers on New START and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to limit and roll back Iran’s emerging nuclear program indicates that future cooperation is possible.5 However, statements by the Trump administration suggesting that the United States might pull out of the JCPOA, as well as withholding a certification to Congress tied to the deal, have seriously harmed this potential and led Moscow to question Washington’s commitment to arms control and nonproliferation.

Furthermore, the bilateral risk reduction enterprise is under siege. Since the end of the Cold War, Washington and Moscow have worked in partnership to combat the threat posed by non-state actor access to nuclear weapons, but recently that collaboration has stalled.

Trump-era developments

Immediately following Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential victory, some believed that U.S.-Russian relations would rebound due to Trump’s admiration of Putin, his stated desire to improve ties, and Putin’s clear preference for Trump over Clinton. Yet, evidence of Russian election interference and support for Assad in Syria soon led Trump administration officials to expand their criticisms of Moscow. Congress has taken additional steps to put economic pressure on Moscow and constrain the president’s ability to engage.

Trump has yet to articulate a clear policy toward Russia, including on arms control. In January 2017, the administration announced plans to conduct a comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear weapons policy, posture, and planning. The release of this document, called the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), is expected in February 2018. While Trump has expressed a desire to improve relations with Moscow, and on occasion professed that global nuclear weapons inventories should be significantly reduced, he has also publicly pledged to strengthen and expand U.S. nuclear capabilities. In a January 2017 phone call with Putin, Trump reportedly denounced New START and rebuffed Putin’s suggestion to extend the treaty.

In May 2017, White House and Kremlin officials stated that they would pursue resumed talks on strategic stability. The two sides held a first round of talks on September 12 in Helsinki, Finland, led by Thomas Shannon, undersecretary of state for political affairs, and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov, but the specific agenda has not been disclosed, nor has a date for the next round of talks been scheduled.

Congressional action could undermine U.S. relations with Russia

Republican hawks in Congress have introduced provisions that could jeopardize key arms control treaties, including the INF Treaty and New START. In an attempt to counter Russia’s INF Treaty violation, the fiscal year 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) would provide funding for research and development on a new U.S. road-mobile GLCM with a range prohibited by the treaty.6

Nuclear policy of the Russian Federation

Russia published its most recent military doctrine in 2014. Although it discusses nuclear weapons and use, it is not meant to be the last word on Russian nuclear policy.

What the latest military doctrine says

The most recent version of Russian military doctrine identifies the past, present, and future expansion of NATO, and NATO activities “in violation of international law,” as a primary threat to Russian national security. Other main threats include the “creation and deployment of strategic missile defense systems,” which the doctrine argues “violate the balance of forces in the nuclear-missile sphere,” and the “deployment of strategic non-nuclear systems” and precision weapons. The document also references the weaponization of space and cyber and electronic warfare.7

Although Russia’s military doctrine demonstrates a view of the United States and NATO as aggressors in an evolving security environment, it also highlights the value of the arms control architecture and exhorts the military to “conclude and implement agreements in the area of nuclear-missile arms limitation and reduction.”8

The doctrine states that the purpose of Russia’s nuclear forces is to serve as a broad deterrent, and adds that Russia reserves the right to use:

“nuclear weapons in response to use against it and (or) its allies of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is
under threat.”9

Earlier versions of the doctrine described a lower standard for nuclear use, which prompted debates on concepts of de-escalation and pre-emption.10 There is now a near consensus view in Washington that Russian doctrine includes a so-called “escalate to de-escalate” strategy, whereby Moscow would use nuclear weapons on a limited basis to bring a conflict with a conventionally superior opponent to a halt.

Yet, the 2014 version does not mention de-escalation or legitimize pre-emptive strikes, and it is vague or silent about many aspects of nuclear use, including the scale of a nuclear response to an existential threat. It also does not include a no-first-use declaration, a policy Moscow abandoned in 2000.11

What the Russian government is saying and doing

The words and actions of the Kremlin and military officials provide additional context and insight into Russia’s military doctrine. In recent years, officials have emphasized the role of nuclear weapons in Russian defense strategy. Many recent prominent Russian military drills have included simulated nuclear strikes, including the September 2017 Zapad exercises, which featured two tests of the RS-24 Yars intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

Kremlin leaders frequently draw attention to the strength of the arsenal in their public statements and, on occasion, have referenced it when issuing warnings to the West, such as the time Putin praised Russian nuclear weapons and said, “it’s best not to mess with us.”12 In 2009, Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said, “we will certainly resort to using nuclear weapons in certain situations to defend our territory and state interests.”13 The 2003 Report of the Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation, known as the “Ivanov Doctrine” after then Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, defined de-escalation as “forcing the enemy to halt military action by a threat to deliver or by actual delivery of strikes of varying intensity with reliance on conventional and (or) nuclear weapons.” The state press also regularly features headlines announcing the augmentation or improvement of an aspect of the nuclear arsenal.

These statements generate confusion among analysts as to whether Russia is truly lowering its threshold for nuclear use. Such ambiguity may ultimately be Moscow’s objective.

What analysts think about Russian doctrine

Western analysts frequently speculate on the conditions that would prompt Moscow to employ nuclear weapons. As noted above, military doctrine states that an existential threat would prompt Russia to employ its nuclear arsenal. However, it is unclear precisely what conditions Russia considers as constituting a threat to the existence of the Russian state, or how to measure the circumstances that would motivate Russia to escalate a conflict with limited nuclear strikes.14 Paul Bernstein, senior fellow for the National Defense University Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, wrote in a 2016 report that Russia likely views any conflict involving NATO as posing an existential threat.15

Alexander Velez-Green of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) argues that rapid technological advances, which “give far greater advantage to the side that escalates first,” have made it likely that Moscow would consider a first strike in a conflict situation.16 After analyzing Russia’s robust nuclear modernization program, some analysts note that many of its systems being upgraded have the capabilities needed to carry out “limited nuclear strikes against both military and non-military targets of value to the Western Alliance.”17 Russia has also improved its advanced non-nuclear capabilities, including theater-range precision strike systems,18 which could indicate a “pre-nuclear level of deterrence.”19

Then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work testified before Congress in 2015 that Russian nuclear doctrine contains a de-escalation strategy.20 But because the concept of de-escalation is not mentioned in public military doctrine, analysts debate whether the concept is formally part of Russian nuclear policy.

Eldridge Colby, currently Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development, argued in a 2016 report for the Foundation for Strategic Research that Russia’s possession of the capabilities necessary for limited nuclear strikes, coupled with reports of limited nuclear strikes in recent military exercises, signal that Russia is lowering its nuclear threshold.21 Although de-escalation is not explicitly mentioned in military doctrine, the fact that senior military officials often reference the concept suggests it is part of Russian defense planning.

Conversely, Olga Oliker, senior adviser and director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for International and Strategic Studies, argues that because the purpose of military doctrine is to apprise adversaries of intention, it would be only logical to mention a lowering of threshold in the document if that were truly Moscow’s intention.22 Beyond doctrine, Oliker writes that there is “unconvincing” evidence that Russia invokes such a strategy, instead arguing that Moscow is more concerned with reminding the world that Russia has the power and capabilities to escalate—without actually intending to do so. The point is to keep NATO and Washington on their toes.23 Oliker says that recent Russian military exercises are meant “to test the readiness and command and control of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces,” and not as a “preparation for tactical use.”24

Russian nuclear capabilities in 2017: current status and modernization plans

While it is difficult to make a precise assessment of the size and composition of Russia’s nuclear stockpile, experts have been able to provide estimates using New START aggregate data and data from monitoring sources. Analysis from Hans Kristensen, Robert Norris, and Pavel Podvig indicate that, as of 2017, Russia owns a total military stockpile of operational forces of 4,300 nuclear warheads. Of these, 1,960 are deployed on ballistic missiles and at heavy bomber bases, and 500 strategic warheads and 1,850 non-strategic warheads are in storage.25 The military’s Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) manages ICBMs, the Navy manages sea-based systems, and the Aerospace force manages air and missile defense systems.

Modernization plans and the State Armaments Programme (SAP)

Russia has pursued a major upgrade of its nuclear forces over the past decade. The vast scale of the program seems designed to counter perceived threats from the United States and NATO and maintain strategic stability.26 The program includes an emphasis on modernizing strategic nuclear and aerospace defense forces. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu said in 2017 that the military would “continue a massive program of nuclear rearmament, deploying modern ICBMs on land and sea, [and] modernizing the strategic bomber force.”27

Russia commenced the State Armaments Programme 2020 (SAP-2020) in 2011 to expand and upgrade the technology of the Russian Federation’s Armed Forces from 2011-2020. The stated goal of the SAP-2020 is to modernize 70 percent of Russian arms and equipment by 2020. But sanctions on Russia, a punishment for Russian aggression in Ukraine, have slowed the Russian economy­—and with it, progress on the SAP. Despite economic concerns, Russia is modernizing all three legs of its nuclear triad.28 In a 2017 speech before the Ministry of Defense, Putin extended the deadline to 2021. In this address he stated that the Russian nuclear triad was 79 percent modernized, and that by 2021 ground-based nuclear forces would be 90 percent modernized.”29

Russia frequently justifies its nuclear force posture by signaling a need to defend against U.S. missile defense and conventional strike capabilities and keep up with the pace and scope of U.S. nuclear modernization. Russian Foreign Ministry Director of Nonproliferation and Arms Control Mikhail Ulyanov remarked in 2014 on ongoing U.S. modernization plans, declaring that Russia would “take corresponding countermeasures to ensure our security.”30 Regarding modernization, it should be noted that the Russian program began before that of the United States.

Putin said in 2016, “It is necessary to strengthen the combat potential of the strategic nuclear forces, primarily for missile systems capable of and guaranteed to overcome the existing and future missile defense system [of the U.S.]”31 Russia is building new ICBM systems equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and maneuverable warheads to counter the U.S. missile defense program.

Budget and cost estimates of Russia’s nuclear program

According to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, Russia plans to spend approximately $28 billion by 2020 on upgrades to its strategic nuclear triad. The budget for SAP-2020 was initially planned with a much higher GDP growth rate than was actually achieved. When oil prices fell from the expected $50 per barrel to under $35 per barrel and GDP stalled, the military was forced to make budget cuts of up to 10 percent for each ministry. These cuts hampered modernization plans.32 At the same time, the defense budget continues to grow at a higher rate than the national GDP, likely due to the lobbying power of the Russian defense industry and the government’s strong commitment to modernization.33 However, U.S. defense spending still far outpaces that of Russia.

Russia announced plans to spend approximately 20.7 trillion rubles ($704 billion) on the SAP-2020 in 2011, although Western analysts believe 19 trillion rubles to be a more realistic figure.34,35 First Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin, who oversees the SAP, said that the bulk of the funding would go to developing eight nuclear-powered strategic submarines equipped with the Bulava missile system, modernizing ICBMs, purchasing precision weapons, and building a heavy-liquid ICBM.36 By 2015, Russia had procured only 30 of 400 desired ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), two of eight desired ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), 11 of 56 S-400 missile defense systems, and two of 10 desired Iskander-M tactical ballistic missile brigades.37 Actual Russian spending in 2015 for the nuclear complex was roughly 44 million rubles. In 2016, it was 46 million.38

The Defense and Finance Ministries put forward competing proposals to fund the SAP-2025 for the years 2018-2025. The Defense Ministry proposed a 24 trillion ruble budget, while Finance proposed a budget of half that amount, at 12 trillion.39 The two ministries will need to reconcile these figures to produce a budget for approval.40

The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force

As of March 2017, Russia’s stockpile includes an estimated 316 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) carrying 1,076 warheads. Russia is increasing its arsenal of ICBMs equipped with multiple warheads, possibly to account for a smaller ICBM force than that of the United States. By the early 2020s, most mobile Russian ICBMs are expected to carry ballistic missile payloads containing multiple warheads.

The Russian ICBM force includes the Topol (SS-25), Topol-M (SS-27 Mod 2), RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2), UR-100NUTTH (SS-19), and R-36M2 (SS-18). The latter two are the oldest ICBMs in the arsenal. The R-36M2 is likely to remain in service until 2022, when it will be replaced by a new silo-based liquid-fuel ICBM, called Sarmat. Development of the RS-24 Yars began after the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) expired in 2009. It is a MIRVed variation of the Topol-M. The RS-26 Rubezh (no SS- designation), Sarmat (no RS- or SS- designation), and Barguzin are in development.41

The Russians are retiring Soviet-era ICBM systems in order to gradually replace older systems with newer systems by the early-to-mid 2020s.42 The new ICBMs are MIRVed, road-mobile, and silo-based—mainly variants of the Topol-M/RS-24 Yars missile. The road-mobile RS-26 Rubezh is planned for deployment in late 2017 and the Sarmat will replace the RS-20V in 2019 or 2020, although it is behind schedule. The Sarmat is expected to be a liquid-fueled missile equipped with as many as 10 MIRVs, and may carry a hypersonic maneuvering warhead. It will be able to attack U.S. targets by multiple trajectories, thereby allowing it to overcome U.S. missile defense systems.43

The Defense Ministry had announced the development of five regiments of a rail-based ICBM, called “Barguzin.” Testing was planned for 2019, and deployment, by 2020.44 Each regiment was to contain six missiles. An ejection test was reported in November 2016.45 However, it was reported in December 2017 that the program had been canceled.46

The ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force

The Russian force contains 11 operational submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) across three classes, including the Delta III and Delva IV classes, with a total of 176 missiles carrying 768 warheads. Each submarine can carry 16 SLBMs, for a total of almost 800 warheads. Russian SLBMs include the R-29R (RSM-50, SS-N-18 Stingray), R-29RM Sineva (RSM-54, SS-N-23), RSM-56 Bulava (SS-N-32), and, according to some sources, a version of the RSM-54 known as the R-29RMU2 Lanier.

Russia is developing eight Borey-class submarines to replace the ageing Delta III and IV submarines in the mid-2020s, three of which have already been built. The first three are Borey and the additional submarines are Borey-A. The fourth submarine will be introduced in 2019 and the last should join the fleet sometime in 2021. Each will be loaded with sixteen Bulava SLBMs carrying up to six warheads per missile.47

The bomber force

Russia maintains a bomber force of approximately 68 aircraft. Only 50 of the deployed nuclear-cable bombers carry assigned nuclear weapons. Of the estimated 68 planes, approximately 25 are TU-95 MS6 (Bear-H6) long-range bombers, 30 are TU-95 MS16 (Bear-H16) long-range bombers, and 13 are Tu-160 (Blackjack) supersonic long-range bombers. They are capable of carrying nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). As strategic heavy bombers they are subject to New START limitations. The Russian air force also operates a multipurpose medium-range supersonic bomber, the Tupolev Tu-22M, which is considered a tactical nuclear delivery platform for various types of cruise missiles. It is not limited by New START.48

Russia is reportedly replacing its current fleet of Tu-95’s, Tu-160’s, and Tu-22M’s with a new generation of strategic bombers by the early 2020s. These fleets are being upgraded to increase their conventional capabilities. In 2015, the Defense Ministry revealed plans to resume production of the Tu-160M2, an upgrade to the Tu-160, in the mid-2020s.49 It reportedly signed a $103 million contract to upgrade three of the 10 Tu-160 bombers slated for modernization.50 Over the next decade, Russia is also developing a new generation bomber called the PAK-DA.

Nonstrategic nuclear weapons

The Russian nonstrategic arsenal totals 2,000 weapons, including short-range surface-to-surface missiles, air-to-surface missiles and bombs, nuclear-armed torpedoes, depth charges, and surface-to-air missiles for air defense. At least 760 warheads are used by the Russian Navy.51 About 570 nonstrategic weapons are used by the air force.52

Moscow currently has a far larger arsenal of non-strategic weapons than the United States, although Moscow might say that it is more accurate to count U.S. non-strategic weapons in combination with those of France and the United Kingdom, thus reducing the asymmetry. None of these forces are limited by treaties. The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, co-chaired by former Secretaries of Defense William Perry and James Schlesinger, found this imbalance to be “worrisome to some U.S. allies in Central Europe.”53

Russia is developing dual-use systems, weapons that can be deployed in nuclear and conventional variants. Both the Kalibr sea-based cruise missile, which has an intermediate range, and the Iskander ground-based ballistic missile represent this type of weapon. Moscow is nearing full deployment of the potentially nuclear-capable Iskander-M system, which comprises short-range ballistic and cruise missiles, to replace Tochka-U missiles.

According to Pavel Podvig, director of the Russian Nuclear Forces Project, the development of dual-use systems is worrisome from a stability perspective. He writes that the systems are capable of “blurring the line between nuclear and nonnuclear weapons.”54 The U.S. European Command 2017 Posture Statement declared that “Russia’s fielding of a conventional/nuclear dual-capable system that is prohibited under the INF Treaty creates a mismatch in escalatory options with the West.”55

Early-warning system upgrades

Russia is upgrading its strategic force support systems, such as early-warning launch detection satellites and ballistic missile early-warning radars. The SAP called for as many as 10 new early-warning satellites by 2020. These had fallen behind U.S. capabilities after the Soviet collapse.56 Three new early-warning radars were planned to become operational in 2017 as part of an upgrade program to Russian early-warning systems. Russia began deployment of a new early-warning space-based system, known as EKS, in 2015. Satellites of these systems can transmit information in real time to command centers at western and eastern locations.57 According to Shoigu, in 2017 Russia will achieve full coverage of its perimeter through a “continuous radar field of warning systems for missile attack on all strategic air and space directions and on all types of trajectory of ballistic missile flights.” This achievement is a result of the three new radars beginning combat duty, as well as upgrades to three older radars.58

Russia’s missile defense capabilities and modernization

Despite Moscow’s fierce criticisms of the U.S. missile defense program, Russia is expanding and upgrading its air and missile defense systems. Russia exports many of these systems abroad. The A-135 ballistic missile defense system has been operational around Moscow since 1995, after replacing the 1970s-era A-35 Galosh system. Russia operates several families of air defense systems, each consisting of multiple variants and upgrades. These include the S-300P, S-300V, and S-400 systems. The S-500 system is in development.59

The S-300P (SA-10 Grumble/ SA-20 Gargoyle) is comparable to the U.S. Patriot PAC-3 system. The PMU-2 version introduced the 58N6E2 missile, which is capable against short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs).60,61

The S-300V (SA-12/SA-23) is also comparable to the U.S. Patriot PAC-3 system. It can intercept both SRBMs and MRBMs. An unknown number of systems were deployed to Syria beginning in 2015.62

The S-400 “Triumph” (SA-21 Growler) was designed as an upgrade to the S-300 family. It entered service in 2007, but production has been slow. The system is purportedly capable of intercepting ballistic missiles with a range of around 3,000 km; however, the intercept would have to take place in the atmosphere, making its defense capabilities limited. An unknown number of these systems are deployed in Syria.63

The S-500 “Prometheus” is in development to be a comprehensive anti-ballistic missile system that works in conjunction with the S-400. This system extends the engagement envelope of Russian air defenses beyond an altitude of 30 km, making it an “air / space defense system.” It is currently undergoing testing. Russian defense officials claim that the system will be capable of defending against ICBM attacks.64

The A-135 Moscow missile defense system was designed to protect Moscow. It comprises the Radar Don-2NP, a stationary, all-around, multi-purpose surveillance centimeter-range radar station, the command-and-control center, shooting complexes including 12-16 silo launchers of anti-missiles, and high-speed 53T6 interceptors that operate at the terminal trajectory phase and are nuclear-armed.65 The A-135 is aimed at intercepting ICBMs and SLBMs. The system’s upgrade project, called the A-235 Nudol, will employ a new, conventional version of the 53T6 missile with a longer range and higher accuracy.66 As part of the missile defense system, Russia has located 68 nuclear-tipped ballistic-missile interceptors near Moscow. For comparison, the United States deploys 44 anti-ballistic missile interceptors in Alaska and California.67,68,69

Obstacles to arms control

The INF Treaty dispute

The INF Treaty required the United States and Soviet Union to eliminate and permanently forswear all nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. The treaty led the countries to destroy a total of 2,692 short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles by the 1991 deadline.70 Yet, beginning in 2014 Washington has accused Russia of violating the treaty by testing, and as of 2017, deploying, a GLCM with a prohibited range.

The Trump administration says the Russian system of concern is the SSC-8 ground-launched cruise missile, which, according to the U.S. government, uses the Russian designator 9M729. Because Washington has not been transparent to the public about the violation, very little is known about the noncompliant system. Some have speculated that it is a ground-based version of the Kalibr missile, while others believe that the illegal missile is a follow-on to the R-500/SSC-7 Iskander missile. The SSC-8 is likely capable of targeting major European and east Asian cities, respectively, from Russia’s far western and eastern bases.71

Analysts have suggested various possible rationales for Russia’s development and deployment of the noncompliant system. Analysts point to a desire to enhance theater strike capabilities, increase the survivability of its forces, and destabilize NATO. Moscow’s concern over a security environment in which other nuclear-armed countries are not party to the INF Treaty may also be fueling the violation.72 That disadvantage is a main reason why Moscow has sought to multilateralize the INF Treaty.

In addition to denying U.S. allegations, Moscow has raised its own concerns about Washington’s compliance with the agreement. Russia charges the United States with the following practices: placing a missile defense launch system in Europe that can be used to fire cruise missiles, employing targets for missile defense tests that have similar characteristics to treaty-prohibited intermediate-range missiles, and developing armed drones that are seemingly equivalent to ground-launched cruise missiles.

In November 2016, the United States called a meeting of the Special Verification Commission (SVC), an implementing body established by the INF Treaty to resolve compliance issues. The meeting in Geneva was attended by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States. There, the United States provided detailed information to Moscow about its allegations of Russian noncompliance.73 The meeting yielded little progress toward resolving the compliance dispute. A second meeting of the SVC took place from December 12-14, 2017, but little information from that session has so far emerged.

The 2017 State Department compliance report repeats past accusations of Russian treaty noncompliance. It claims that the United States has provided Russia with information on the offending missile, such as details regarding the internal designator for the mobile launcher chassis, names of companies involved in developing and producing the missile and launcher, history and coordinates, and documented Russian efforts to obfuscate the program.74 The Russian Foreign Ministry responded to that report by reiterating a complaint it has made in the past that Washington had provided only “odd bits and pieces of signals with no clarification of the unfounded concerns.”75

Washington’s reluctance to provide explicit detailed evidence—including evidence it claims to have already given to Russia—has stymied productive discussion around resolving the compliance dispute. Ultimately, compliance concerns only heighten feelings of distrust on both sides. Without a solution for adequately addressing each side’s concerns—and returning Russia to compliance—it will be difficult for Moscow and Washington to make progress on other arms control issues.

On December 8, 2017—the 30th anniversary of the signing of the INF Treaty—the Trump administration announced what it called an integrated strategy for dealing with the Russian violation. The strategy reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to preserving the treaty and said the United States would (1) continue efforts to seek a diplomatic settlement of the Russian violation, including through the Special Verification Commission; (2) begin research and development on options for conventionally-armed intermediate-range ground-launched missile systems; and (3) impose economic sanctions on Russian entities that had taken part in development and production of the SSC-8.76

To extend or not to extend New START?

Aggregate data from September 2017 demonstrates that Russia has decreased its deployed strategic warheads by 235 in the past 12 months. Russia now has 501 deployed delivery systems and 1,561 deployed strategic nuclear warheads—only 11 warheads over the New START limit of 1,550 warheads.

Both countries are on track to fulfill New START limits by the February 5, 2018 implementation deadline, and there are no indications of either side straying from their obligations. In December 2017 Russian Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Antonov confirmed that Russia would meet its New START limits on schedule.77 As the deadline approaches, Russia has signaled interest in commencing talks on extending the treaty. The Trump administration has yet to respond to these overtures.

Trump’s ambivalence toward New START and efforts by Congressional Republicans to link its extension to resolution of the INF Treaty dispute mean that the treaty could expire in 2021 with nothing to replace it—a dire result.

Third-Country nuclear forces

Although other nuclear-armed countries have arsenals amounting to less than five percent of the size of the Russian and American arsenals, Russia still seeks the institution of limits on these arsenals and the inclusion of other nuclear countries in the arms control regime. In fact, even during INF Treaty discussions, Moscow strongly advocated for extending negotiations to UK and French forces, and continued to call for the inclusion of France and the United Kingdom in subsequent arms control talks with Washington.78 In 2013, the Kremlin advocated for the multilateralization of future arms reductions. At the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2015, the Russians stated that multilateral negotiations among all nuclear-armed states are necessary to make progress on disarmament.79 Russia has yet to table a specific proposal for expanding the arms control process.

The United States does not believe that the relatively small size of third-country nuclear forces warrants inclusion in the next round of arms reductions. It is possible that the United States would be open to multi-lateralization in the future, if and when the size of U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals has been more significantly reduced. But at the present time, this issue is yet another on the list of disputes hampering U.S.-Russian cooperation.

U.S. missile defense in Europe

Russia has expressed strong objections to U.S.-NATO missile defense systems in Europe. Moscow worries that the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) could challenge the strength of Russia’s nuclear deterrent, especially after future modernization projects are completed.

Putin remarked in 2016 that “we were assured that the missile defense system and its European segment were designed to protect against Iranian ballistic missiles. However, we know that the situation with the Iranian nuclear issue was resolved…and nevertheless, work on a [U.S.] missile defense system continues.”80 Kremlin officials have also claimed that U.S. missile defense systems lower the threshold for nuclear use. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in 2017, “the anti-missile umbrella may increase the illusion of invulnerability and impunity and lead to temptation of taking unilateral steps in the resolution of global and regional problems, including the reduction of threshold of nuclear weapons use.”81

Incentives for Russian engagement on arms control

The current tensions in the U.S.-Russian relationship would seem to preclude agreement on a major new arms control accord in the near term. But resuming an arms control dialogue with Washington should be attractive to Moscow for many reasons.

First, participating in arms control efforts with the United States cements Russia’s status as a great power. By being party to treaties that enshrine Russia and the United States as equal actors, Russia can portray itself as a global influencer on par with the United States.

Secondly, the verification provisions contained in treaties like New START allow Russia to monitor U.S. nuclear forces and then factor that knowledge into nuclear planning. If Washington and Moscow were to fail to agree to extend New START, Russia would likely be displeased with the loss of limits and transparency on U.S. forces.

Thirdly, active participation in the arms control regime benefits Moscow during a time of economic uncertainty and unrest at home. Arms control reduces the need to finance expansive nuclear modernization projects, which frees funds for use elsewhere.

Finally, Russian military doctrine explicitly declares a commitment to arms control and nonproliferation. To be true to its doctrine and legacy of bilateral nuclear cooperation, Russia must reengage with the United States on nuclear risk reduction.

Recommendations for U.S. policy

The poor state of the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship demands prioritizing measures that are feasible in the near-term in order to build a productive, durable dialogue on arms control. These measures include improving the NATO-Russian relationship, resolving the INF Treaty dispute, and extending New START. Ultimately, engaging in meaningful talks on strategic stability between the United States and Russia must be a priority for Washington if it wishes to heal its nuclear partnership with Moscow.

Strengthen the NATO-Russia relationship

Russia is undeniably anxious about the expansion and conventional force superiority of NATO, which may be driving increased Russian sabre rattling, emphasis on nuclear weapons, and even the decision to test and deploy a GLCM prohibited by the INF Treaty. The NATO-Russian question begs for resolution.

Reviving and expanding channels for NATO-Russian communication could mitigate Russian unease. Communication is essential in order to prevent dangerous military incidents, especially in the Baltic region where tensions are extremely high. Preventing incidents will help to prevent unintended escalation—a critical need, given concerns about the possible Russian use of nuclear strikes to turn the tide of conventional conflicts. Establishing direct military contacts and independent bodies that assess and respond to military confrontations could help prevent conflict.82

Russia and NATO must implement mutual restraint measures, such as those laid out in the NATO-Russia Founding Act (NRFA),83 which could alleviate concerns on both sides of the border. The NRFA should be reviewed and updated to address current needs. The NATO-Russia Council is one possible forum for dialogue, but it might be more useful to establish a similar body that is solely focused on nuclear-related matters. Either way, it is critical that there be a space for Russian and NATO representatives to openly discuss the factors affecting security and strategic stability.

The two sides should prioritize options to resolve destabilizing force imbalances, particularly in the common border area. Their discussions should also explore regulations on tactical nuclear weapons, which have not yet been included in the bilateral arms control process. NATO could also reaffirm its commitment under the NRFA to carry out defense activities by “ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.” Finally, a decision by Washington to unilaterally reduce the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal could push Moscow to reevaluate the size and scope of its next SAP.84

Resolve the INF Treaty dispute

The preservation of the INF Treaty is a crucial safeguard against the advent of a destabilizing arms race in the region. Therefore, Washington and Moscow must urgently address their disagreement regarding the treaty compliance of both countries. The United States should prioritize a diplomatic approach while working to ensure that Russia does not gain a military advantage from its violation.

The Deep Cuts Commission, a group of nuclear experts from the United States, Russia, and Germany, recently published a plan of action for addressing the INF Treaty dispute.85 The plan requests that Russia allow U.S. experts to examine the disputed Russian GLCM. If the United States concludes that the missile is indeed violating the treaty, the paper recommends convening the SVC or a similar independent panel of U.S. and Russian experts to discuss destroying the illegal missiles and launchers to return Russia to compliance.

The Deep Cuts Commission proposal suggests that Washington address Moscow’s concerns over U.S. compliance by negotiating revisions to the treaty language to account for drones and the use of booster stages in target missiles for ballistic missile defense. To satisfy Russian concerns, the authors recommend that the United States alter the land-based version of the Mk-41 launcher to clearly differentiate it from the Mk-41 systems placed on U.S. warships, and institute transparency mechanisms that allow Russia to verify that the launchers in Romania and Poland only contain SM-3 interceptors.

If the INF Treaty does collapse, Washington must ensure that Russia shoulders the blame. This means avoiding steps—such as building a new U.S. missile—that would simultaneously raise red flags among NATO allies and enable Russia to claim that the United States is cultivating nuclear instability.

Extend New START as soon as possible

Given the value of New START to U.S., Russian, and global security, the Trump administration should waste no time in accepting Russia’s offer to extend the treaty. If the treaty is allowed to lapse with nothing to replace it, there will be no limits on Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. Furthermore, the United States will lose the important monitoring and verification measures that allow Washington to keep an eye on the size and composition of Russia’s nuclear stockpile.

The deterioration of the U.S.-Russian relationship has only increased the value of New START. By verifiably capping U.S. and Russian deployed nuclear forces, the treaty bounds the current tensions between the two countries. This is especially important because other key pillars of the U.S.-Russian arms control architecture, like the broader bilateral relationship, are under siege. Failing to respond to Moscow’s invitation to discuss an extension of New START would be a major missed opportunity to ensure continued stability and predictability in the strategic relationship.

Make the most of strategic stability talks

During the Cold War, the Americans and Soviets understood “strategic stability” to mean a security environment in which neither side had an incentive to launch a nuclear first strike. To achieve that end, they collaborated on implementing measures to govern strategic nuclear weapons, missile defense, and air defense.

It is urgent that Washington and Moscow resume such discussions, beginning by agreeing on a shared definition of “strategic stability” to meet the current threat environment. To do so likely entails expanding the agenda of the talks, which should feature key arms control agreements, namely the INF Treaty and New START, as well as missile defense, third-country nuclear forces, and advanced conventional weapons. Without a renewed commitment to strategic stability talks, it will be difficult to improve nuclear cooperation between Russia and the United States.

The first round of renewed U.S.-Russian strategic stability talks began September 12, 2017 in Finland. Following the meeting, U.S. State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert said that “the discussions provided both sides with an opportunity to raise questions and concerns related to strategic stability and also to clarify their positions on that matter.” The two delegations agreed to continue implementing New START arms reductions to meet the February 2018 deadline. Conversations focused on extending New START will need to follow quickly if such an extension is to be achieved.

It is important that this round of talks yield other rounds in the near future. Although Lavrov commented pessimistically in October 2017 that the global community should not expect “considerable results in the foreseeable future”86 from the U.S.-Russian strategic stability talks, the very resumption of dialogue is a significant step forward. An important outcome of the talks would be a reaffirmation by the leaders of Russia and the United States of the 1985 declaration made by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”

Conclusion

The United States and Russia must commit to continual dialogue if they wish to address the different perceptions and misperceptions on both sides of the relationship that are harming nuclear cooperation. Even in the bleakest moments of the Cold War, Washington and Moscow were able to cooperate on arms control. If both countries put aside their differences to embark on further nuclear force reductions, they could reduce threats and save billions of dollars. Healing relations and enhancing national and global security requires productive discourse and true dedication to reducing nuclear weapons.

Washington cannot control Moscow, but it can formulate smart policy in regard to its nuclear forces and diligently seek tough and pragmatic cooperation with the Kremlin. To make that possible, the Trump administration must articulate a clear policy toward Russia, as well as strategies to reduce nuclear risks. Congressional support will be necessary to achieve these goals. Rather than hasten the unraveling of several longstanding nuclear risk reduction efforts, the Trump administration and Congress should maintain and reinforce existing arms control and nonproliferation measures.

Finally, American and Russian officials must tone down harsh rhetoric and capitalize on issue areas where they do agree. Unfortunately, the internal politics and foreign policies of both countries continue to shrink potential areas of cooperation. But the relationship has weathered hazardous tensions and even near-catastrophes in the past, with Washington and Moscow able to maintain nuclear cooperation during their darkest days. Today’s leaders must learn from their predecessors and prioritize nuclear risk reduction, or face a more uncertain and dangerous future.

ENDNOTES

1 Michael Gordon, "Russia Has Deployed Missile Barred by Treaty, U.S. General Tells Congress," The New York Times, Mar. 8, 2017.

2 Rajan Menon, "What’s Russia Doing in Syria and Why," Huffington Post, accessed September 7, 2017. Mythili Sampathkumar, "Syria war: Tensions between America and Russia escalate as countries clash over drones and airspace," Independent, June 20, 2017. Bryony Jones and Nic Robertson, "Syria talks: What Russia and the US agree and disagree on," CNN, Sep. 8, 2016.

3 Thomas Frear and Denitsa Raynova, "Russia-West Military Incidents: Skirting the Law," European Leadership Network, December 7, 2016.

4 "What You Need to Know About Aegis Ashore Romania," U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/ U.S. 6th Fleet, May 11, 2016, http://www.c6f.navy.mil/news/what-you-need-know-about-aegis-ashore-romania

5 Kelsey Davenport, Daryl G. Kimball, and Greg Thielmann, "Solving the Iranian Nuclear Puzzle: The Join Comprehensive Plan of Action," Arms Control Association Briefing Book, August 2015, https://www.armscontrol.org/reports/Solving-the-Iranian-Nuclear-Puzzle-The-Joint-Comprehensive-Plan-of-Action/2015/08/Section-3-Understanding-the-JCPOA

6 Kingston Reif, "Hill Wants Development of Banned Missile," Arms Control Today, December 2017.

7 "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation," December 25, 2014.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Olga Oliker, "Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine: What We Know, What We Don’t, and What That Means," Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2016.

11 Serge Schmemann, "Russia Drops Pledge of No First Use of Atom Arms," The New York Times, Nov. 4, 1993. Vladimir Mamontov, "Меняется Россия, меняется и ее военная доктрина (Russia is changing, and its military doctrine is also changing," Izvestia, Oct. 14, 2009.

12 Colin Freeman, "Vladimir Putin: Don’t mess with nuclear-armed Russia," The Telegraph, Aug. 29, 2014.

13 David Nowak, "Russia reserves right to conduct preemptive nuclear strike: Say US, NATO pose threat of aggression," Boston Globe, Oct. 15, 2009.

14 Paul Bernstein, "Countering Russia’s Strategy for Regional Coercion and War Workshop Report," National Defense University, March 2016. Elbridge Colby, "Russia’s Evolving Nuclear Doctrine and its Implications," Center for a New American Security, January 12, 2016. https://www.frstrategie.org/publications/notes/russia-s-evolving-nuclear-doctrine-and-its-implications-2016-01

15 Paul Bernstein, "Countering Russia’s Strategy for Regional Coercion and War Workshop Report,"National Defense University, March 2016

16 Alexander Velez-Green, "The Unsettling View from Moscow: Russia’s Strategic Debate on a Doctrine of Pre-emption," Center for a New American Security, April 27, 2017.

17 Elbridge Colby, "Russia’s Evolving Nuclear Doctrine and its Implications," Center for a New American Security, January 12, 2016, https://www.frstrategie.org/publications/notes/russia-s-evolving-nuclear-doctrine-and-its-implications-2016-01, Dave Johnson, "Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s approach to conflict," Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique, November 2016.

18 Johnson, 2016.

19 Bernstein, March 2016.

20 Adm. James Winnefeld and Robert Work, Statement Before the House Committee on Armed Services, June 25, 2015.

21 Colby, 2016. https://www.frstrategie.org/publications/notes/russia-s-evolving-nuclear-doctrine-and-its-implications-2016-01

22 Oliker, 2016.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris,"Russian nuclear forces, 2017."

26 Mark B. Schneider,"Russian Nuclear Weapons Policy," RealClearDefense, April 28, 2017. 

27 Schneider, 2017. Putin urges Russian navy to prioritize nuclear force buildup," New China, April 26, 2017.

28 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency,"Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations.""Рогозин заявил о подготовке новой госпрограммы вооружений к сентябрю (Rogozin announced the preparation of a new state arms program by September)," Lenta, July 3, 2017.

29 President Vladimir Putin, Address at expanded meeting of the board of the Ministry of Defense, December 22, 2017.

30 Alexei Druzhinin,"Russia developing new nuclear weapons to counter ‘potential threats to military security’ from NATO," National Post, Jan. 24, 2015.

31 President Vladimir Putin, Address at expanded meeting of the board of the Ministry of Defense, December 22, 2016.

32 Steven Pifer,"Pay Attention, America: Russia Is Upgrading Its Military," The National Interest, Feb. 3, 2016. Science and Technology Committee,"Russian Military Modernization," NATO Parliamentary Assembly, October 11, 2015.

33 Gudrun Persson et al.,"Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective—2016," Swedish Defence Research Agency, December 2016.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid. Yuri Gavrilov,"‘булава’ к концу года (Bulava by the end of the year)," The Russian Newspaper, Feb. 25, 2011.

36 Gavrilov, 2011.

37 Science and Technology Committee,"Russian Military Modernization," NATO Parliamentary Assembly, October 11, 2015.

38 Gudrun Persson et al., 2016.

39 "СМИ: Минобороны требует увеличить вдвое финансирование вооружения (Media: Defense Ministry demands doubling the financing of weapons)," Red Line, July 4, 2016. Keir Giles,"Assessing Russia’s Reorganized and Rearmed Military," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 4, 2017.

40 Gudrun Persson et al., 2016.

41 Correspondence with Pavel Podvig. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris,"Russian nuclear forces, 2017.""Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Russia," Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, updated March 2017, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/russiaprofile. U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency,"Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations," 2017

42 Hans M. Kristensen,"Russian Nuclear Weapons Modernization: Status, Trends, and Implications," Federation of American Scientists, September 29, 2014.

43 Ibid. Kristensen and Norris, 2017. Malcolm Davis,"Russia’s New RS-28 Sarmat ICBM: A U.S. Missile Defense Killer?," The National Interest, Feb. 15, 2017. Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen,"Trends in World Nuclear Forces, 2016," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), June 2016.

44 Pavel Podvig,"Flight tests of Barguzin rail-mobile ICBM are said to begin in 2019," Russian strategic nuclear forces blog, Jan. 19, 2017. Schneider, 2017."Russia to Conduct Flight Tests of Missile for ‘Nuclear Train’ in 2019," Sputnik, Jan. 19, 2017.

45 "Эксперт: Ракета БЖРК «Баргузин» успешно стартует с железнодорожной платформы (Expert: Barguzin BZHR rocket successfully starts from the railway platform)," Defence.ru, Nov. 21, 2016.

46 Pavel Podvig,"Barguzin rail-mobile ICBM is cancelled (again)," Russian strategic nuclear forces blog, Dec. 4, 2017.

47 Kristensen, 2014. Kristensen and Norris, 2017.

48 Kristensen and Norris, 2017.

49 Kristensen, 2014. Kristensen and Norris, 2017.

50 "Russian Defense Ministry Signs $100 Mln Deal to Overhaul 3 Tu-160 Bombers," Sputnik, July 26, 2013.

51 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency,"Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations."

52 Kristensen and Norris, 2017.

53 William J. Perry and James R. Schlesinger,"America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States," United States Institute of Peace, 2009.

54 Pavel Podvig,"Blurring the line between nuclear and nonnuclear weapons: Increasing the risk of accidental nuclear war," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 3, 2016. Amy F. Woolf,"Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons," Congressional Research Service, February 21, 2017. Matthew Kroenig,"The Renewed Russian Nuclear Threat and NATO Nuclear Deterrence Posture," Atlantic Council, February 2, 2016.

55 United States European Command, EUCOM 2017 Posture Statement, March 23, 2017.

56 Kroenig, 2016.

57 Pavel Podvig,"Early warning," Russian strategic nuclear forces blog, Aug. 15, 2017."Шойгу: по периметру России создано сплошное радиолокационное поле систем предупреждения" (Shoigu: a continuous radar field of warning systems has been created along the perimeter of Russia)," Defence.ru, Dec. 22, 2016.

58 Pavel Podvig,"No gaps in early-warning coverage as three radars to begin combat duty in 2017," Russian strategic nuclear forces blog, Dec. 23, 2016.

59 "Основная продукция военного назначения (Major military products)," Концерн ВКО «Алмаз – Антей. http://www.almaz-antey.ru/catalogue/millitary_catalogue/

60 Correspondence with Pavel Podvig

61 "Основная продукция военного назначения (Major military products)," Концерн ВКО «Алмаз – Антей. http://www.almaz-antey.ru/catalogue/millitary_catalogue/

62 "Основная продукция военного назначения (Major military products)," Концерн ВКО «Алмаз – Антей. http://www.almaz-antey.ru/catalogue/millitary_catalogue/

63 Correspondence with Pavel Podvig

64 Ibid.

65 Dmitry Gorenburg,"Valdai Club 3: Touring the Don-2N Radar Facility," Russian Military Reform blog, June 2, 2011.

66 Pavel Podvig,"Russia Tests Nudol Anti-Satellite System," Russian strategic nuclear forces blog, April 1, 2016.

67 Hans Kristensen,"Targeting Missile Defense Systems," Federation of American Scientists, July 19, 2007.

68 Alex Lockie,"Why Russia’s ballistic-missile defense works and the US’s kinda doesn’t," Business Insider, July 21, 2017.

69 "The last frontier of defense: what is strategic missile defense in Russia capable of," Ria Novosti, March 30, 2017.

70 "The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a Glance," Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, updated June 2017. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty

71 Steven Pifer,"Multilateralize the INF Problem," Brookings Institution, Marcy 2017.

72 Paul N. Schwartz,"Russian INF Treaty Violations: Assessment and Response," Center for Strategic and International Studies, Oct. 16, 2014.

73 "The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a Glance," Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, updated June 2017, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty

74 U.S. Department of State,"2017 Report on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments," April 2017.

75 Maggie Tennis,"INF Dispute Adds to U.S.-Russia Tensions," Arms Control Today, June 2017.

76 U.S. Department of State,"Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance Factsheet INF Treaty: At a Glance," Dec. 8, 2017.

77 Steven Pifer (@Steven_Pifer)."Amb Antonov says #Russia will meet New START limits, which take effect in Feb 2018. New START = positive item on troubled US-Russia agenda." Dec. 1, 2017, 5:35 PM. Tweet.

78 Steven Pifer and James Tyson,"Third-Country Nuclear Forces and Possible Measures for Multilateral Arms Control," Brookings Institution, August 2016.

79 "Nuclear Disarmament Russia," Nuclear Threat Initiative Factsheet, updated Apr. 6, 2017. Pifer and Tyson, 2016.

80 President Vladimir Putin, Address at Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board.

81 Tom O’Connor,"Russian Officials Say U.S. Global Missile Defense Could Lead to Nuclear War in Europe," Newsweek, Apr. 27, 2017. Olga Oliker,"U.S.-Russian Arms Control: The Stakes for Moscow," Arms Control Today, May 2017. Alexey Arbatov,"The Hidden Side of the U.S.-Russian Strategic Confrontation," Arms Control Today, September 2016.

82 Wolfgang Richter,"Sub-regional Arms Control for the Baltics: What is Desirable? What is Feasible?," Deep Cuts Commission Working Paper no. 8, July 2016.

83 "Founding Act," North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), May 27, 1997, last updated Oct. 12, 2009.

84 Kingston Reif and Victor Mizin,"A Two-Pronged Approach to Revitalizing U.S.-Russia Arms Control," Deep Cuts Commission Working Paper No. 10, July 2017.

85 Hans Kristensen, et al.,"Preserving the INF Treaty" Deep Cuts Commission Special Briefing Paper, April 2017.

86 Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to media questions at the Moscow Nonproliferation Conference, October 20, 2017.

Country Resources:

Posted: January 31, 2018

Russia Showcases Military Capabilities

The Zapad exercise scenario was a border conflict with NATO countries.


November 2017
By Maggie Tennis

A large-scale Russian military exercise last month triggered new questions about NATO security and European conventional arms control. The week-long Zapad 2017 exercise, which simulated a Russian military response to a confrontation at the border with a NATO-allied country, displayed a range of technologies and maneuvers seemingly targeted at U.S. and NATO capabilities.

Military jets fly during the joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises Zapad 2017 at a training ground near the town of Borisov on September 20. (Photo credit: SERGEI GAPON/AFP/Getty Images)The September exercises occurred against the political backdrop of worsening relations between Russia and NATO countries since the 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea. Russia showcased integrated maneuvers, such as those seen in Crimea and Syria, as well as improved technologies involving drones and electronic warfare, demonstrating the transformation of its military over the past decade into a modern, sophisticated force capable of challenging NATO and the United States.

Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Western analysts have commented on NATO’s neglect of European defense amid growing Russian aggressiveness. The governments of the Baltic states and Poland have pressed NATO to strengthen its presence and capabilities on their territories. Over the past few years, NATO has implemented a number of deterrence-by-punishment measures aimed at bolstering defense at the border, including increased troop rotations in the front-line nations that have, in turn, raised Russian anxiety. U.S. and NATO military officials worry alliance forces are underprepared to respond to Russian capabilities for rapid troop mobilization.

The Zapad 2017 scenario envisioned Russian and Belarusian military forces defending against military incursions by a hostile neighboring state labeled “Veyshnoria,” at the Belarusian border with Poland and Lithuania, two NATO members. Throughout the week, drills illustrated how, in Moscow’s perception, a conflict with NATO would unfold. An emphasis on concealing large force movements and utilizing air defense capabilities, such as the S-300 and S-400 missile systems, Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft systems, and Iskander-M ballistic missile complexes, indicated a Russian preoccupation with the strength of NATO air capabilities. Drills also featured enhanced command and control, coordination of air support and naval forces, and anti-submarine warfare.

Although Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu described Zapad as a “purely defensive” exercise against a hypothetical invading alliance, the exercise transitioned after a few days into a counteroffensive campaign against an advanced conventional military, presumably representing NATO and U.S. forces. In fact, many of the drills featured defense operations against technologies that only the United States would possess, such as high-speed drones. An exercise element featuring a large number of units from Russia’s Northern Fleet, a force intended for strategic deterrence and the maritime defense of northwest Russia, indicates that Moscow envisioned the war games reflecting a conflict with NATO over the Baltic states.

Zapad also featured a test launch of the nuclear-capable Iskander-M missile at a maximum range just short of the 500 to 5,500 kilometer range prohibited by the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The missile was launched from the Kapustin Yar range in the southern Astrakhan region and hit its target in the Makat range in Kazakhstan after traveling 480 kilometers. In addition, the Russian military twice test-fired its new RS-24 Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles, the first a few days before and another during the Zapad exercises. Gen. Lori J. Robinson, head of the Pentagon’s Northern Command, told The New York Times that Russia’s stock of medium- and long-range missiles allows Moscow “to hold targets at risk at ranges that we’re not used to.”

Belarusian surface-to-air missile launchers and S-300 anti-aircraft systems move to firing positions during the joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises Zapad 2017 at a training ground near the village of Volka, about 200 kilometers southwest of Minsk, on September 19, 2017. (Photo credit: SERGEI GAPON/AFP/Getty Images)Zapad indicated a preparedness on the Russian side to raise the stakes in a conventional clash with NATO, meaning that NATO will need to evaluate whether it has the ability to maintain a deterrent with Moscow. The wake of the exercises could also bring attention to the possibility of renewing conventional arms control efforts between NATO and Russia.

Experts such as Ulrich Kühn at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace are revisiting conventional arms control as an additional instrument of European security. Although Moscow suspended its participation in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in 2007, prior to the 2008 Russian occupation of Georgia, Kühn believes Moscow’s existential concerns about U.S. conventional strike capabilities and the security of Kaliningrad could make renewed talks on conventional arms control attractive to the Kremlin, despite Russian awareness that the “global balance of power” advantages the United States.

In a Sept. 27 article for the blog War on the Rocks, Kühn proposed extending CFE Treaty counting rules to include heavy weaponry and limiting further troop deployments to the Baltic region. Yet, even if current tensions and European ambivalence make conventional arms restrictions difficult to coordinate, Kühn suggests implementing a range of confidence- and security-building measures that could improve communication and transparency among NATO members and between NATO and Russia.

An official at the German Foreign Ministry told Arms Control Today, "We want to keep the channels of communication open. We seek a more constructive and predictable relationship with Russia and we encourage Russia to act within the norms and rules of the international community."

To achieve such results, according to Kühn, measures could include updating the Vienna Document, a security agreement among the participating states of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which requires advance notice for military exercises exceeding 9,000 troops and observers for those involving 13,000 troops. Russia circumvents the rules and has opposed efforts to tighten them, he wrote. Ahead of the exercise, the Belarusian Defense Ministry said Zapad would involve fewer than 13,000 personnel, while Western analysts estimated the number of personnel involved to be as high as 100,000. In the end, Western governments conceded that the number of troops involved was likely closer to the official figure.

During the weeklong Zapad exercise, Dominik Jankowski, the head of the OSCE unit in the Polish Foreign Ministry, told the German broadcasting agency Deutsche Welle, "We need to continue efforts to modernize the Vienna Document, even if we are still waiting for a Russia willing to engage in that issue." He said there are “numerous vital proposals on the table ranging from greater transparency regarding snap exercises to risk reduction mechanisms and incident prevention efforts.”

Kühn noted that both sides have contributed to an increased risk of an accidental confrontation at the NATO-Russian border. “NATO’s current deterrence approach in the Baltic region also creates dangers of inadvertent escalation that could be addressed through improved communication,” he wrote. Both the OSCE and German government have called for expanding conventional arms control. But to be effective, conventional arms negotiations with Russia would necessitate agreement by all 29 NATO member-states.

Although NATO holds military drills in Europe regularly, it has never performed a multicorps event on the scale of Zapad 2017. In early October, NATO held its annual Steadfast Noon nuclear strike exercise, The Wall Street Journal reported. The exercise practices NATO’s nuclear strike mission with dual-capable aircraft and the B61 tactical nuclear bombs that the United States deploys in Europe. —MAGGIE TENNIS

Posted: November 1, 2017

Putin Slams U.S. on Nonproliferation Deals

Russian leader warns of “immediate and reciprocal” response if the United States withdraws from the INF Treaty.


November 2017
By Maggie Tennis

Russian President Vladimir Putin blasted the United States for failing to meet nonproliferation commitments and warned that Russia would have an “immediate and reciprocal” response if the United States withdraws from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

Russian President Vladimir Putin gestures as he speaks during the annual Valdai Club conference of international experts in Sochi on October 19. (Photo credit: ALEXANDER ZEMLIANICHENKO/AFP/Getty Images)In the speech Oct. 19, Putin praised U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation in the 1990s and early 2000s, but blamed the United States for derailing that progress. Addressing the annual meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club in Sochi, Putin cited the U.S. delay to 2023 in eliminating its chemical weapons stockpile, while noting that Russia completed its elimination Sept. 27. Further, he noted a shift and delays in the U.S. method for surplus plutonium disposal, which Moscow claims violates the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) between the two countries.

Putin questioned whether such delays are “proper” for “a nation that claims to be a champion of nonproliferation and control.” He cited additional grievances, including U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, failure to ratify the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and halting of implementation of a 123 agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation. President George W. Bush froze that agreement in September 2008, just four months after it was signed, in response to Russia’s war with neighboring Georgia. It was revived in 2010 as part of President Barack Obama’s diplomatic “reset” with Russia.

Putin called nuclear cooperation “the most important sphere of interaction between Russia and the United States, bearing in mind that Russia and the United States bear a special responsibility to the world as the two largest nuclear powers.”

In his remarks, Putin portrayed the United States as the unreliable partner in nonproliferation efforts. He cited Washington’s decision to push back the deadline for destroying the U.S. chemical weapons arsenal from 2007 to 2023, an effort that has been hindered by rising costs and stringent environmental restrictions. Under U.S. Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, the United States provided financial and technical support to help Russia in destroying its chemical weapons arsenal, which was completed 10 years after the original 2007 deadline set for both countries.

Putin also took aim at the troubled U.S. effort to eliminate surplus plutonium, which he called “perplexing and alarming.” He criticized the United States for canceling plans, made in agreement with Russia, to eliminate its weapons-grade plutonium by turning it into mixed-oxide fuel for nuclear power reactors.

Putin condemned the unilateral U.S. decision, saying that Moscow only learned about it after seeing a “budget submission to the Congress” seeking funding for an alternative disposal method. (See ACT, March 2016.) Alteration of the terms of the PMDA requires agreement by both parties, which the United States did not obtain when it decided to pursue the cheaper “dilute-and-dispose” method. Moscow suspended its participation in the PMDA in October 2016. (See ACT, Nov. 2016.)

Further, Putin noted apparent U.S. ambivalence toward extending the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), as permitted under the terms of the accord. “Now we hear that New START does not work either,” he said, seeming to reference a January phone call with President Donald Trump in which Trump called New START a “bad deal.” The Russians have declared a readiness to negotiate an extension of the treaty, but the U.S. position remains unclear.

Putin stated that Russia would not withdraw from the treaty, which runs through February 2021.

Putin dismissed U.S. allegations of Russian noncompliance with the INF Treaty. He said that Russia might be “tempted” to violate the treaty if it did not possess air- and sea-based missiles, such as Kalibr cruise missiles, that match U.S. capabilities. The INF Treaty, which eliminated U.S. and Russian land-based cruise missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers, left both countries free to deploy air- and sea-launched missiles with that range.

“You can see how effective the Kalibr missiles are, from the Mediterranean Sea, from the Caspian Sea, from the air or from submarines, whatever you wish,” said Putin. “Besides Kalibr, with an operational range of 1,400 kilometers, we have other airborne missile systems, very powerful ones with an operational range of 4,500 kilometers.”

He warned that Moscow would offer an “immediate and reciprocal” response to a U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty, a step advocated by some Republican lawmakers such as Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.). Putin did not specifically address U.S. accusations that Russia has deployed a ground-launched cruise missile with a treaty-prohibited range. (See ACT, Oct. 2017.)

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, speaking at an Oct. 20 nonproliferation conference in Moscow, criticized the United States for “refusing to specify” its allegations of Russia’s INF Treaty violations. The United States provided some specifics to Russia at a meeting of the treaty’s Special Verification Commission in November 2016, according to U.S. officials.

Lavrov expressed certainty that the “bilateral dialogue between Russia and the United States on strategic stability will continue,” but doubts that the bilateral format would be sufficient for negotiating future nuclear weapons reductions. (See ACT, Oct. 2016.) Russia has stepped up calls in recent years for multilateral arms reductions.

Lavrov emphasized the need to “prevent a spiral of confrontation” between Washington and Moscow over arms control from becoming “unstoppable.”—MAGGIE TENNIS

Posted: November 1, 2017

Senate Approval Threatens INF Treaty

Defense authorization bill includes money to develop treaty-banned missiles.


October 2017
By Maggie Tennis

Legislation that could undermine the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty moved closer to becoming law Sept. 18, when the U.S. Senate passed its defense authorization bill for fiscal year 2018. The bill includes a provision that would establish a program to begin development of a missile system that could violate the treaty.

Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) speaks to reporters in the Senate subway Sept. 18 before the Senate takes up the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2018. (Photo credit: Mark Wilson/Getty Images)The Senate measure provides $65 million for a nuclear-capable, road-mobile ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range prohibited by the treaty. The House passed its version of the bill July 14, which authorizes spending $25 million for a non-nuclear intermediate-range GLCM, a system that would also violate the treaty. Further, the House bill would require the president to submit a report on Russian INF Treaty compliance within 15 months of enactment and would prohibit funding for an extension of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) if Russia continues to violate the INF Treaty.

The INF Treaty required Russia and the United States to eliminate permanently their nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. The treaty does not prohibit activities related to research and development of this category of weapons.

Since 2014, Washington has accused Moscow of violating its commitment “not to possess, produce, or flight-test” a GLCM having a range prohibited under the INF Treaty. In the past year, the Pentagon has alleged that Russia is fielding a noncompliant system, which Moscow denies.

In an effort to increase pressure on Russia in light of the alleged violation, Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) and Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Ala.) proposed legislation in February to authorize funds for developing a GLCM system with a prohibited range. These measures provided much of the text for the section in the authorization bills on the treaty.

Many Senate Democrats opposed the INF Treaty provision in the underlying bill, and two Democratic members unsuccessfully sought amendments.

Sen. Ed Markey (D-Mass.) filed an amendment that would authorize funds for R&D, test, and evaluation of military capabilities to counter Russian violations of the treaty but remove the specific reference to a GLCM from the bill’s funding table.

Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) offered two amendments to modify the INF Treaty provision. One would “prohibit the use of funds for actions not permitted” under the treaty, such as developing and testing a new GLCM.

Warren filed a second, bipartisan amendment co-sponsored by Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah) to require “a report on the military and security ramifications” of the new Russian GLCM. The report also would have mandated an assessment of the willingness of NATO and allies in Europe to “host a ground-launched intermediate-range missile with a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers” and “whether such a missile is the preferred military response” to Russian treaty violations before funds could be authorized to develop such a system.

In a press release, Warren said the United States “cannot risk a new round of nuclear escalation without seriously studying the potential impacts of developing these dangerous weapons.” She criticized the Republican initiative in the underlying bill that “would cost American taxpayers millions of dollars, while laying the groundwork for our withdrawal from a vital treaty that has ensured global security for three decades.”

Lee said the proposed amendment would “set the precedent that the U.S. should not immediately react to an adversary’s treaty violation by violating the same treaty ourselves. That’s not how working in good faith in the international community is done.”

The three amendments were among the vast majority of amendments not debated or voted on in the Senate due to a stalemate over four controversial proposals to the authorization bill.

The Senate version of the defense bill passed with bipartisan support by a vote of 89–8. It will go to a conference committee to reconcile differences between the House and Senate versions and then to the White House, where President Donald Trump is expected to sign it into law.

Although the Sept. 7 White House Statement of Administration Policy on the Senate bill “objects” to the INF Treaty-related provisions as too prescriptive, it nevertheless states that the Trump administration would support R&D on such prohibited missile systems.

Asked about the ramifications of the Senate vote, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Sept. 19, “We need to understand what it means and analyze that information. Russia maintains its commitment to all international agreements.”

The INF Treaty marked the first time the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals, eliminate an entire category of nuclear weapons, and conduct extensive on-site verification inspections. As a result, the two countries destroyed a total of 2,692 short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles by the treaty’s implementation deadline of June 1, 1991.

Arms control experts warn that U.S. pursuit of a new GLCM could alienate European allies anxious about a prospective new nuclear arms race affecting their terrorities. Thomas Graham Jr., who was President Bill Clinton’s special representative for arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament, warned recently in The National Interest that developing a noncompliant missile system could “release all limits on Moscow’s intermediate-range nuclear forces that have strengthened U.S. and allied security for three decades.”

“Congress risks making matters worse by opening the door to Russian deployment of intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe.”—MAGGIE TENNIS

Posted: October 1, 2017

Republicans Aim to Produce Banned Missile

Republicans Aim to Produce Banned Missile


By Maggie Tennis
September 2017

Republicans in Congress are advancing legislation to have the United States develop a cruise missile prohibited by the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, an action that would escalate a dispute with Russia over alleged violations of the only treaty to successfully eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons.

House and Senate versions of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2018 each contain provisions that threaten the integrity of the INF Treaty by establishing research and development programs for a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range prohibited by the treaty. The treaty required the two countries to eliminate permanently their nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. It does not prohibit activities related to research and development of this category of weapons.

Ambassador Eileen Malloy, the then-chief of the arms control unit at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, is pictured May 11, 1990 at the destruction site in Saryozek, (former Soviet Union) Kazakhstan, where the last Soviet short-range missiles under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty were eliminated in spring 1990. (Photo credit: American Foreign Service Association) Since 2014, the United States has accused Russia of violating its INF Treaty commitment “not to possess, produce, or flight-test” an intermediate-range GLCM. Those accusations expanded this year after the United States determined that Russia is fielding the noncompliant system. Moscow denies the allegations.

The House and Senate bills authorize programs and funding for research and development of a road-mobile GLCM with a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. The House version provides $25 million to develop a conventional system, while the Senate version would provide $65 million for a nuclear-capable system.

The House version, which passed on July 14 by a vote of 344–81, also requires the president to submit a report on Russian INF Treaty compliance within 15 months of enactment. According to the bill, if the president’s report finds that Russia is still violating the treaty, then the United States will no longer be bound by it.

The legislation has strong support among Republican lawmakers. Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) introduced the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Preservation Act of 2017 in the Senate in February. Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Ala.) introduced a companion bill in the House. These pieces of legislation provided much of the text for the section in the authorization bill on the treaty. “The only way to save the INF Treaty is to show the Russians that we will walk away from it if they don’t come back into compliance,” Cotton said July 17 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

Yet, Cotton questioned whether to remain a party to the treaty even if Moscow does return to compliance. Specifically, Cotton expressed concern about China’s “complete freedom to deploy intermediate-range missiles” because it is not party to the INF Treaty. The United States needs a ground-based intermediate-range missile system given an “increasingly aggressive China with more than 90 percent of its missile forces falling into the intermediate range,” he said.

Many Democrats and experts in the arms control community say that the legislation puts at risk bipartisan nuclear cooperation and the security of European allies. Steven Pifer, nonresident senior fellow in the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative at the Brookings Institution, wrote in an April 26 blog post, “U.S. allies and other countries in Europe and Asia would find themselves under threat from an unlimited number of Russian intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles.” Furthermore, Pifer warns that an end to the INF Treaty would “virtually ensure that no new U.S.-Russia arms control treaty could secure the Senate votes needed for consent to ratification.”

In a July 11 statement on the House legislation, the White House criticized the congressional initiative, saying it “unhelpfully ties the administration to a specific missile system, which would limit potential military response options” and “would also raise concerns among NATO allies.”

Christopher Ford, senior director for weapons of mass destruction and counterproliferation on the National Security Council staff, has stated that the Trump administration is discussing with allies a “very broad” range of measures to pressure Russia into compliance. Further, lawmakers in Congress do not appear to have considered the question of whether European allies, given public opinion, would be willing to host U.S. nuclear-capable intermediate-range GLCMs were they produced.

Soviet inspectors and their American escorts stand January 14, 1989 among several dismantled U.S. Pershing II missiles as they view the destruction of other missile components. The missiles are being destroyed in accordance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. (Photo credit: MSGT Jose Lopez Jr./U.S. Department of Defense)The House bill may exceed congressional authority by declaring that the United States would no longer bound by the treaty if Russia does not return to compliance after 15 months. Cotton’s office did not return a request for comment.

Top U.S. military officials say there is not a specific military need for such a GLCM. Responding to Cotton’s comment that U.S. treaty obligations create an “offensive imbalance” with Russia and China, Air Force Gen. Paul Selva, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the United States under the treaty is “not restricted from fielding ballistic missile or cruise missile systems that could be launched from ships or airplanes.”

In Moscow, Mikhail Ulyanov, director of the nonproliferation and arms control department in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, described the INF Treaty-related measures as “provocative” in comments to the Russian newspaper Kommersant on Aug. 5. He dismissed “the strange fuss on Capitol Hill” on this issue as having “more to do with PR than real politics.”

“I would like to hope that after consideration of the bill in the Senate and connection to this process by the U.S. administration, the final version of the document will become more reasonable and acceptable,” Ulyanov said.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov told Kommersant on July 18 that Russia has “no reason to question the viability” of the INF Treaty and “we are very worried by the attempts of the American side, under far-fetched pretexts, under the charge of accusing Russia of alleged deviations from the requirements of the treaty, to question the expediency of its preservation.”

The House legislation ties funding for an extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) to Russian INF Treaty compliance. Cotton said on July 17 that by threatening New START and the Open Skies Treaty, two accords that Russia hopes to preserve, the United States demonstrates a “firm and unyielding response” to Russian noncompliance.

Democratic lawmakers say that linking INF Treaty compliance to cooperation on other key treaties jeopardizes U.S. national security and further strains the bilateral arms control relationship, especially because Moscow has expressed a commitment to discussing a New START extension.

In an email to Arms Control Today, Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT) wrote, “Tying a treaty limiting strategic weapons designed to decimate all life to compliance with a treaty that governs short- and medium-range weapons with serious, though limited, regional impacts is reckless.”

Posted: September 1, 2017

Moscow is ready to discuss New START, but where is Washington?

In a July 18 interview with Kommersant , Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov reiterated Russia’s offer to begin talks with the United States on extending the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) . Ryabkov’s comments echoed previous statements he and other Russian officials—including President Vladimir Putin—have made in support of starting talks on an extension. The option of extending New START had been broached by the Obama administration in late-2016, but Russia was noncommittal at the time. In a January phone call with President Donald Trump, Putin reportedly...

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policies: A Conversation with Michèle Flournoy

Michèle Flournoy is co-founder and chief executive officer of the Center for a New American Security. She served as undersecretary of defense for policy from February 2009 to February 2012. The interview was conducted May 25 by Kingston Reif and Maggie Tennis. This transcript has been edited for length and clarity.


July/August 2017
Interviewed by Kingston Reif and Maggie Tennis

Michèle Flournoy (Photo credit: Erin Scott/Erin Scott Photography)Michèle Flournoy is co-founder and chief executive officer of the Center for a New American Security. She served as undersecretary of defense for policy from February 2009 to February 2012. The interview was conducted May 25 by Kingston Reif and Maggie Tennis. This transcript has been edited for length and clarity.

ACT: The Defense Department announced in April that the Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) had commenced. Each president since the end of the Cold War has undertaken such a review. President Donald Trump has declared his ambition to “greatly strengthen and expand” U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities, and he has also criticized the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with Russia. Do you think the NPR is likely to set in motion significant changes in U.S. policy or is likely to reflect more continuity than change?

Flournoy: I don’t think we know yet. What we can say is that some of the president’s early statements on these issues are not based in any deep policy review or any in-depth briefings he’s received. He hasn’t really focused on this set of issues yet as far as I know. I think we’ve also learned in other areas that as he dives into an issue, he can evolve his position, he can learn and refine his views. So, I wouldn’t put too much emphasis on some of his initial statements or first gut reactions to topics as they have come up.

That said, I do think this NPR will be very consequential because it’s coming at a time when we face major decisions about how much and how to reinvest in the nuclear triad. So many systems are up for modernization. Do we modernize everything that we have, which is essen­tially the current plan, or do we use the opportunity of the NPR to ask some more fundamental questions about what we need for deterrence in the future? I think this NPR has the potential to be very consequential.

On arms control, the administration will need to decide, along with Russia, whether to extend New START and its monitoring regime for five years beyond its February 2021 expiration date as allowed by the treaty, to negotiate some kind of follow-on agreement, or to go forward without legally binding, verifiable limits on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals. What would be the consequences if the United States withdraws from New START or did not seek to extend it? How do you think the administrations should seek to engage Russia on arms control?

If we withdrew or failed to extend New START, it would be an unforced error on our part. An easy win is to pursue an extension of the treaty as is. It buys us predictability. It buys us transparency and verification measures. It buys us a lot that contributes to stability at a time when the other dimensions of the relationship with Russia are both in flux and under tremendous scrutiny. It’s probably unrealistic to expect, based on what [Russian President Vladimir] Putin has said and what Russia is actually doing, that we can negotiate a new arms control framework anytime soon. I think politically that would be a tough thing on our side until we get to the bottom of questions like Russia’s role in our elections and in campaigns to undermine other Western democracies. My view is that we should pursue an extension to buy some time and to buy some stability and then see what’s possible in the future.

Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy testifies with General David Petraeus, commander of the U.S. Central Command, at a House Armed Services Committee hearing April 2, 2009. (Photo Credit: Tim Sloan/AFP/Getty Images)Shifting to another arms control agreement, the United States has accused Russia of deploying a ground-launched cruise missile with a range prohibited by the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Do you think it’s possible to convince Russia to return to compliance, and how should the United States respond to Russia’s alleged violation?

It’s pretty clear that they are violating the treaty. I think we should respond in a multidimensional way. First, press them through diplomatic channels to come back into compliance. I think this could be a multilateral diplomatic effort to put some pressure on Russia to come clean. There’s been some precedent for this. Back in the day when we believed that the Krasnoyarsk radar was violating the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, they denied it, they denied it, they denied it for years; and then finally, as the political context changed, they eventually admitted it and stopped the construction. We have some track record of Russia coming back into compliance. Do I think that’s likely anytime soon on the INF Treaty? No. But the last thing we should do is say we’re going to walk away from the treaty because then the failure of the treaty regime would be on us and not them.

The second key dimension of this is that we need to do a clear-eyed analysis of the military relevance of this new system and what are the ways that we can counter it. I think people are too quick to jump to a symmetric response: “Oh, well this means we need to redeploy U.S. nuclear intermediate-range missiles in Europe.” Well, not necessarily. Let’s take a look at how significant these systems are. What is the full range of countermeasures that we might adopt? I suspect there are a range of conventional countermeasures and other asymmetric approaches that might be used to make this militarily not a huge problem for us.

According to some estimates, the United States is on track to spend more than $1 trillion over the next 30 years to sustain, replace, and refurbish nuclear delivery systems, warheads, and supporting infrastructure. Numerous Pentagon officials in recent years, as well as outside experts, have warned about the affordability problem posed by the current approach. Are tough trade-offs going to have to be made in the military budget to accommodate the current modernization plans? Do you think there are options to potentially alter the pace and scope that would be more cost effective while still providing a strong deterrent?

While we need to invest in ensuring we maintain a strong, stable, effective nuclear deterrent, we also have to make sure that it’s one that we can afford and sustain. If you look at the full range of challenges we’re going to face in the future and the need to modernize other aspects of our military, there’s a lot of competition for a limited amount of dollars—limited even under the increases that are being projected by this administration. So, trade-offs do have to be made. I think that rather than automatically modernizing every single nuclear program on the books, we should use the NPR as an opportunity to say, “Can we get to a stronger, more enduring, more sustainable nuclear deterrent with a different mix of systems and capabilities?” I do think we need to debate that in looking at the broad architecture of the triad, but also looking at specific systems and what is the most cost-effective approach to creating a more modern set of capabilities.

(Photo credit: Mark Wilson/Getty Images)The NPR will almost certainly review the existing U.S. nuclear force structure, which currently includes a triad of sea-, land-, and air-based delivery systems. In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in January 2015, James Mattis, now the defense secretary, raised the question, “Is it time to reduce the triad to a dyad, removing the land-based missiles? This would reduce the false-alarm danger.” What contribution do you believe that intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) make to deterrence today? Has the rationale for the ICBM leg changed since the end of the Cold War?

In the middle of the Cold War when the risk of a bolt-from-the-blue strike was real or we believed it to be real, I think the ICBM leg was pretty critical to deterrence. In the world we live in now and given the advance of other technologies, I think that it’s a question as to (a) whether we need an ICBM leg and (b) if we do need some ICBM leg, how big does it really have to be to serve the purpose. I think that is one of the fundamental questions that the NPR should take on, whether we should move to a dyad and, even if you believe we should stay at a triad, can the balance change. I think everybody agrees that the most survivable leg, where we have the most competitive advantage, is the submarine leg. The bomber force, we’re going to get for both conventional and nuclear purposes.

From a triad perspective, the focus is going to really be on the future of the ICBMs, what’s strategically necessary and what’s most cost effective. In particular, I think the Defense Department should more seriously consider further extending the life of the existing Minuteman III ICBMs as a cheaper near-term alternative to the current plan to build an entirely new ICBM system.

Moving to the bomber leg, Mattis at his confirmation hearing declined to affirm the need for a new fleet of nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), stating that he’d have to study the rationale in more detail. Critics argue that retaining nuclear-armed ALCMs is redundant given current plans to build the stealthy, nuclear-capable B21 “Raider” long-range bomber, armed with the upgraded B61 nuclear gravity bomb, as well as to modernize the other two legs of the triad. There is also the growing lethality of conventionally armed air- and sea-launched cruise missiles. In your view, do ALCMs make a unique contribution to the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent?

This is one where, honestly, I am studying the issue because I haven’t made up my mind. I think if the B21 is everything we hope it will be, you may not need this. But if adversary anti-access, area-denial capabilities, particularly sophisticated air defenses, continue to progress—and perhaps there are issues with the ability of our current and future bombers to penetrate those defenses—you might want a cruise missile in your arsenal. That’s not so much from a war-fighting perspective but more from the perspective of an assured ability to hold targets at risk and therefore deter your adversary.

Do you have any indication from your time in government or since that there are questions about whether our submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) or our ICBMs would be able to reach even the most well-defended targets?

No, no, so you do have the options from ICBMs and SLBMs as well. As I said, I’m working my way through this, but I don’t have a definitive answer.

The Trump administration’s NPR may also reconsider the declaration in the 2010 NPR Report that life extension programs for nuclear warheads “will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities.” Is there a military requirement for new or, in particular, low-yield warheads that don’t currently exist in the U.S. nuclear stockpile?

I think you have to add to that question, is that unique requirement worth all that that would mean in terms of starting to design, test, build, and deploy new nuclear weapons? Let’s put it this way, I have yet to hear a case for a new nuclear warhead that is compelling enough to take on both the investment costs and the political costs of going down that road.

As you also know, nuclear weapons figured very prominently in the 2016 presidential election campaign. Many Americans relearned or learned for the first time that the president alone has the ability to launch, particularly ICBMs and SLBMs, within minutes of a decision to do so and that the military retains and exercises the ability to launch ICBMs under attack. In your view, does vesting the power to use nuclear weapons in the hands of one person still make sense? Are there steps that you believe could be taken to reform current U.S. nuclear launch protocols?

With the current construct, the potential for your ICBMs to be under attack or taken out within minutes creates enormous time pressure in the decision-making process if you’re going to launch under attack. As a practical matter, it means that the president has to make a decision with very little information and very little time. He has advisers on the call with him to help. But it is, having gone through the rehearsals for these things, a very compressed timeline for a very momentous decision. I would like to see measures taken to increase the decision-making time. This has been part of what has motivated people like Bill Perry, Sam Nunn, George Shultz, and others to question whether we need to keep launch under attack as a practice. This is part of what their concern has been, along with the risk of accident or miscalculation.

I’m not ready to completely rewrite the decision-making structure of our government on this question, but I do think there’s real value to increasing the decision-making time because, by definition, you’re going to have more knowledgeable experts able to advise the president meaningfully if you give him more time in that circumstance.

Michèle Flournoy stands with other senior members of President Barack Obama’s national security team as he speaks about Afghanistan in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building March 27, 2009. (Photo credit: Mark Wilson/Getty Images)Can you envision a scenario where a president of the United States would make the most consequential decision a president will have ever made in a matter of minutes?

It’s hard to imagine. When I think of the presidents I’ve worked for, like Barack Obama, it would be hard for such a deliberative, careful, decision-maker to make that kind of decision absent being 1,000 percent sure that we were actually under attack and a nuclear explosion was going to happen on U.S. soil. The whole launch-under-attack scenario assumes a president is willing to make that decision in the absence of certainty. I think that’s an open question in some cases. Would Trump make that decision? Maybe. We don’t know. Let’s hope we never find out. But I think we are failing the president, any president, at some level to put them in that position. There have to be better ways to provide more time to verify information and make a fully informed decision. Because of our history with false alerts and mistakes made where training tapes were thought to be real, we have to be very careful not to miscalculate given the consequences.

Last year, it was reported that the Obama administration considered but ultimately rejected changing U.S. nuclear declaratory policy to state that the United States would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Are there circumstances under which the benefits of first use of nuclear weapons would outweigh the costs, and if nuclear weapons are used by one nuclear-armed adversary against another, what guarantee do we have that such use would not escalate to a full-scale nuclear exchange with the United States or against a U.S. ally?

I think if you have nuclear use by one nuclear power against another, the risk of full-scale escalation is there. The case that has, in recent years, stopped presidents from fully embracing [a] no-first-use [policy] has been the potential for catastrophic weapons of mass destruction [WMD] attacks of a different nature—for example, a successful, massive bio-attack that would have consequences on the order of a nuclear attack in terms of people killed and so forth. It’s that exceptional case that has kept people from making the full statement.

I personally believe that we should emphatically state that the purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter the use of other nuclear weapons. Period. In a real world instance, if a president felt that there was an exceptional case where he had no other option to respond to a catastrophic WMD attack that was non-nuclear, okay, then that’s a presidential decision at that point. But I think there’s benefit to declare that we don’t believe these weapons are for war-fighting and that we stand in opposition and in contrast to countries like Russia who talk in a very cavalier manner about escalating to nuclear use in order to try to stop conventional war, which is incredibly irresponsible and incredibly dangerous. I think there’s room to strengthen U.S. declaratory policy in this area.



'Tremendous Experience'

ACT: One of your first jobs in Washington early in your career was as a senior analyst at the Arms Control Association, working on nuclear weapons policy and defense issues. Could you tell us how that experience impacted your career path?

Flournoy: It was a tremendous experience and opportunity. It was really the first time where I was able to develop a real depth of expertise in a given area and to build a body of work as a young analyst. That became important for a number of reasons. One is, it attracted a very important mentor to me. Based on an Arms Control Today article I had written, Ted Warner reached out to me and introduced himself and said, “I agreed with every word of your article. I’m working on the same thing over at RAND [Corp.] We should meet.” As my career unfolded later, Ted was the person who hired me and gave me my first job in the Pentagon.

The other thing I would say is that there were wonderful mentors within the organization. People like Spurgeon Keeny and Jack Mendelsohn invested enormously in the young people they had working for them and helping ensure that we were developing as professionals. I owe them and the organization a debt of gratitude for helping me get started.

Posted: July 10, 2017

U.S. May Act on Russian INF Violation

U.S. May Act on Russian INF Violation


July/August 2017
By Maggie Tennis

The Trump administration is considering actions to take in response to Russia’s violation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, according to senior national security officials.

Christopher Ford, senior director for weapons of mass destruction and counterproliferation on the National Security Council staff, and Robert Soofer, deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy, signaled in recent comments that the White House may move beyond talks to military measures intended to pressure Russia to return to compliance with the INF Treaty.

Christopher Ford, senior director for weapons of mass destruction and counter­proliferation on the National Security Council staff, addresses the annual meeting of the Arms Control Association on June 2 in Washington. The White House is considering a “very broad” range of options in response to Russia’s violation, he said. (Photo credit Terry Atlas/Arms Control Association)Addressing the Arms Control Association’s annual meeting June 2, Ford said that the White House is considering a “very broad” range of options that go beyond just reconvening the Special Verification Committee, the body established by the treaty for dispute resolution. That group, convened most recently in November 2016, has failed to resolve the issue.

“You would be wrong to conclude that this is an administration likely to be content just with another round of finger waving,” Ford said.

U.S. countermoves could add new strains to the U.S.-Russian relationship, already taxed by Moscow’s military action against Ukraine, Russian involvement in the U.S. elections, and NATO’s buildup of defenses in allies closest to Russia, such as the Baltic states. Russia has disputed the U.S. claim that it has developed and deployed a missile banned under the INF Treaty and has countered with complaints of U.S. violations tied to missile defenses in Europe.

The United States will consult with allies in developing a response, according to Ford, who said a resolution of the issue is needed because of the importance of the INF Treaty to “the future of the arms control enterprise.”

Addressing Russia’s treaty violation is a “top priority” for the Trump administration, Soofer said in testimony June 7 to the Senate Armed Services Committee. He said the United States needs to understand the military capability that Russia gains from fielding the SSC-8 ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), which the United States says violates the treaty ban on ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

“We came to the conclusion that there must be some military capability that outweighs the political repercussions of actually violating the INF Treaty,” he said. “So, for Russia, this has a meaningful military capability, and we need to assess what that is and how to address it.”

Soofer noted two reviews underway, one by the Pentagon as part of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the other by the National Security Council. The latter is examining “steps to place more meaningful pressure on Moscow, both in terms of diplomatic and military measures, to return them to compliance,” according to Soofer.

U.S. Air Force Gen. Paul Selva, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified at a congressional hearing in March about the NPR, at which time he publicly confirmed the U.S. view that Russia had deployed the SSC-8 missile. (See ACT, April 2017.)

The Obama administration considered a military response to the Russian violation in 2014, after the State Department initially assessed Russia as having de­veloped and tested a noncompliant GLCM.

In 2014, Brian McKeon, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, described three possible categories of military action at a hearing held by the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services committees. These consisted of “active defenses to counter intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles, counterforce capabilities to prevent intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile attacks, and countervailing strike capabilities to enhance U.S. or allied forces.” Only some of these options would comply with the treaty.

In February, Republican Sens. Tom Cotton (Ark.), Ron Johnson (Wis.), and Marco Rubio (Fla.) and Republican Reps. Ted Poe (Texas) and Mike Rogers (Ala.), introduced legislation called the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) Preservation Act. It lists measures that the United States could take to pressure Russia to return to compliance, including funding counterforce, active-defense, and countervailing-strike activities; creating a program for and testing a dual-capable road-mobile GLCM within INF Treaty limits; expanding missile defense assets in the European theater; and coordinating the transfer of INF Treaty-range systems to U.S. allies.

But even if the Pentagon had the budget for these activities, it is not clear that NATO allies, Japan, or South Korea would cooperate with placing these systems on their territory.

Some experts and politicians support developing a long-range standoff cruise missile, capable of penetrating Russian air defense systems and being armed with nuclear or conventional warheads, to re­place the aging U.S. air-launched cruise missile.

In April, the State Department released its annual assessment of Russian compliance with arms control agreements, in which it repeated its accusation that Russia is violating the INF Treaty and stated that it had submitted “detailed information” to Moscow on the nature of the violation. The Russian Foreign Ministry refuted the allegation and maintained that the United States has not provided adequate evidence to back up the claim. (See ACT, June 2017.)

In remarks at the Arms Control Association meeting, Ford noted the administration’s intent to “re-engage on matters that relate to strategic stability” with Russia. He referred to recent talks on that topic between Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

“On the positive side, in terms of the future of dialogue and engagement on these topics, I believe you probably have seen from the aftermath of the Tillerson-Lavrov meeting in Moscow that there is agreement in principle upon some kind of strategic stability dialogue between the United States and the Russian Federation,” said Ford.—MAGGIE TENNIS

Posted: July 10, 2017

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At Trump-Putin Meeting, Start with New START

News Source: 
Defense One
News Date: 
July 5, 2017 -04:00

Posted: July 6, 2017

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