July/August 2026
By Libby Flatoff

Inspectors from the Organisation for the Prohibition on Chemical Weapons (OPCW) uncovered a significant cache of undeclared chemical weapons and documentation in Syria after the new government of Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa pledged to help the agency resolve outstanding issues relating to the arsenal amassed by deposed leader Bashar al-Assad.

In a briefing June 4, Undersecretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu told the UN Security Council that the cache included rockets of the same type used in the 2013 sarin gas attack in Ghouta that killed an estimated 1,400 people. “These findings are a momentous discovery, not just for Syria, but for international security and the global disarmament regime,” she said.

According to a UN press release, Syria’s UN ambassador, Ibrahim Olabi, described the discoveries as a “decisive turning point” and a “major leap forward in delivering accountability.” He said that his government had facilitated 32 visits by OPCW inspectors and handed over more than 60,000 pages of documents.

The OPCW has been unable to confirm Syria’s chemical weapon declaration since it was submitted in 2014 by Assad’s government, which was ousted in 2024 after a civil war.

In 2017, Damascus used sarin to attack civilians in Khan Shaykhun. In April 2018, chlorine gas was used in Douma. The United States responded with airstrikes both times.

Mohamad Katoub, Syria’s ambassador to the OPCW, told Arms Control Today in May that it was important to confirm and take accountability for these stockpiles because, “Accountability is a measure of nonrecurrence.” (See ACT, May 2026.) “The Syrian people suffered from those chemical weapons, and part of justice is the destruction of the remnants of chemical weapons,” he said. “Without holding perpetrators accountable and bringing justice for the victims, the peace in Syria will keep being fragile.” However, Katoub acknowledged that he doesn’t “believe that we’ll be able to have a 100-percent accurate declaration.” He said that ferreting out remnants of the CW arsenal had been complicated partly by “the Israeli airstrikes [and] what’s happening now in the region.” He noted that the OPCW Technical Secretariat team had to be evacuated from Syria March 17 over security concerns after the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran began Feb. 28.

After the 2024 collapse of the Assad regime, Israel undertook several airstrikes against known Syrian chemical weapon stockpiles.

According to Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar, “We attacked strategic weapons, the residual chemical weapons capabilities, [and] long-range missiles and rockets, so they won’t fall into the hands of radicals.”

In December 2024, the OPCW affirmed its “commitment to clarifying gaps, discrepancies, and inconsistencies in Syrian chemical weapons declaration amidst political transition.”

The UN Security Council press release said that Nakamitsu “stressed that the newly discovered weapons must now be formally declared and destroyed under OPCW verification, and that further inspections of additional sites are needed.”

During the Security Council briefing, France cautioned that this was “only just beginning to reveal the extent of the programme hidden from the international community.”

July/August 2026
By Mia Clarke

The Department of Energy announced the list of companies selected to participate in an unprecedented program under which they would receive weapons-grade plutonium recycled from U.S. nuclear weapons for use in nuclear power plants.

The five companies tapped to begin advanced negotiations on plans for transferring and securing the plutonium are Oklo, Standard Nuclear, Exodys Energy, Shine Technologies, and Flibe Energy, the department said June 22 in a written statement. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright was previously on the board at Oklo but divested his shares before joining the Energy Department.

“Surplus plutonium was once viewed solely as a nuclear liability and a multi-billion-dollar financial drain on taxpayers—but it doesn’t have to remain one,” Josh Jarrell, the deputy assistant secretary for the nuclear fuel cycle, said in a statement June 22. “[W]e are redirecting this Cold War legacy to serve as a vital energy asset, powering the next generation of American nuclear innovation.”

In the same press release, the Office of Nuclear Energy stated that the “Surplus Plutonium Utilization Program was … formed to broaden domestic nuclear fuel supplies, spur innovation on American recycling technologies, and unlock private sector funding to fuel America’s nuclear renaissance.”

Although department officials and other advocates say the program will harness the private sector to deliver national energy independence, some members of Congress and nonproliferation experts have expressed concerns that it could create new security risks. “It raises serious weapons proliferation concerns, makes little economic sense, and may adversely affect the nations defense posture,” Sen. Ed Markey (Mass.) and Reps. Don Beyer (Va.) and John Garamendi (Calif.), all Democrats, wrote in a September letter to the department.

In May 2025, President Donald Trump initiated a new nuclear energy policy that aims to promote a “nuclear renaissance” in order to increase domestic energy stability and independence by building new nuclear power reactors.

In October, the Energy Department reported that it had approximately 20 tons of weapons-grade plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons to make available to U.S. power companies.

As the Energy Department dismantled Cold War-era nuclear weapons over the years, it accumulated more than 50 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. The department managed it by blending some stocks into mixed-oxide fuel, and later by diluting and disposing of other stocks.

A May 2025 executive order instructed the energy secretary to stop the dilute-and-dispose program and explore alternatives, including recycling, for surplus plutonium. Another executive order that month called for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to simplify the licensing process for new reactors.

At that time, Ernest Moniz, a former U.S. energy secretary, warned that allowing companies to use plutonium-based fuels could “Encourage states without nuclear weapons to develop and deploy technologies that are usable in nuclear weapons programs” and “Produce new radioactive waste streams that must be managed, at considerable cost and risk.”

When coupled with pressure on the NRC, this program “could lead to the hasty deployment of advanced reactors with safety and security flaws,” Moniz said. “Additionally, reorganizing and reducing the independence of the NRC could lead to the hasty deployment of advanced reactors with safety and security flaws. A major event would, like those in the past, increase regulatory requirements and set back nuclear energy for a long time.”

In their letter, Markey, Beyer and Garamendi voiced concerns that giving weapons-grade plutonium to private entities would damage the U.S. nonproliferation strategy. Citing policies dating to the Ford and Carter administrations, they highlighted the contradiction in discouraging other states from reprocessing plutonium while doing so itself on domestic soil and noted the potential dangers of rogue states or terrorists accessing this material.

July/August 2026
By Xiaodon Liang

Defense policy committees in both houses of Congress have proposed expansions to the U.S. nuclear arsenal in their respective drafts of the key annual defense policy bill, ahead of floor votes expected later this summer.

The Senate Armed Services Committee recommended June 10 in its approved draft of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2027 that the full chamber authorize two new nonstrategic nuclear weapons—also known as “theater” or “tactical” nuclear weapons—despite the fact that the departments of Defense and Energy have yet to request funding for them.

If Congress also appropriates funding for the programs, the proposed authorizing language would allow the departments to begin developing one new surface-launched and air-launched nuclear weapon each.

Writing in Real Clear Defense May 26, five former nuclear policy officials from Democratic and Republican administrations called for development of a standoff nuclear-capable missile to pair with the F-35 combat jet, a delivery platform currently only certified to deliver the B-61 gravity bomb.

The unusual proposal to preauthorize new nuclear weapons programs comes as the Pentagon reviews the nuclear strategy internally, following the Trump administration’s decision not to pursue a full interagency nuclear posture review. (See ACT, April 2026.)

In a move that would provide insight into any changes that would result from this review, the House Armed Services Committee proposed an adjustment in its draft of the defense policy bill to the existing requirement that the president publish a report on the nuclear employment strategy of the United States following a nuclear posture review 60 days before implementing any changes.

The proposed change would mandate such a report—known as a “491 report,” after the relevant section of Title 10 of U.S. Code—after an evaluation “similar” to a full nuclear posture review. (See ACT, December 2024.)

The House committee also expressed interest in expanding U.S. nuclear forces but took a different approach from the Senate in its draft bill, as approved by the committee June 5. The bill proposed that the full House ask the Pentagon to conduct a study on potentially recertifying the B-1B bomber for nuclear missions.

The B-1B bomber was decertified following the George W. Bush administration’s 2002 Nuclear Posture Review. (See ACT, January/February 2002.)

The House committee also proposed granting the Pentagon increased flexibility to move funds across research and development, procurement, and operations and maintenance accounts for the Sentinel and Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Although the new authority comes with notification requirements, it will likely diminish Congress’s ability to specify how the Pentagon uses appropriated funds for the land-based leg of the triad.

Plutonium pit production requirements also would change, according to the House committee’s draft bill. The panel would modify the law to require that the National Nuclear Security Administration be capable of producing 180 plutonium pits per year by 2050. This goal builds upon the existing ambitious requirement that the agency be able to produce 80 pits per year by 2030.

Both committees continued to express concerns with the Pentagon’s plan for space-based missile-defense interceptors, with the House panel proposing that Congress ask the Pentagon’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office for an independent lifecycle cost estimate.

The Senate panel seeks to ring-fence travel funding as long as the department fails to submit a similar report from the Institute for Defense Analyses, as directed by Congress in its fiscal 2024 policy bill.

Senate committee members voted, however, against rescinding funding appropriated by Congress last year for space-based interceptors. Several Democrats joined the Republican majority to defeat the measure, 18-9.

The same committee did not take up any amendments related to nuclear testing.

Congressional sources had informed Arms Control Today earlier this spring that certain Republican offices in the Senate were considering sponsoring language that would seek to improve the readiness of the Energy Department to resume extremely low-yield explosive nuclear testing.

July/August 2026
By Michael T. Klare

UN member states and nongovernmental organizations met in June to discuss artificial intelligence in the military domain and its implications for international peace and security, the first such gathering under UN auspices.

The June 15-17 “informal exchange” in Geneva was organized by the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 80/58 of Dec. 5, 2025, which proposed the consultation to address the risks and opportunities posed by the accelerating application of AI to military targeting and decision-making tools.

Participants were encouraged to reflect on a report on this topic released by the UN secretary-general in June 2025 and to consider possible next steps that the General Assembly could take at its fall 2026 meeting. The United States was among the countries that did not attend.

At the three-day meeting, participants heard from a number of governmental and academic experts on the ways in which AI is being applied to military operations and the resulting implications for international peace and stability. The applications include automatic targeting systems, such as the Maven Smart System used by U.S. forces to help identify targets in Iran for attack during U.S.-Israeli airstrikes in February-April 2026, and AI-enabled decision-support systems, used by some militaries to provide combat commanders with recommended courses of action. (See ACT, May 2026.)

Many governmental and civil society participants noted that the military use of these technologies increases the risk of unintended escalation in a military conflict and unnecessary civilian casualties by accelerating the pace of combat decision-making—leaving less time for informed human judgment—and by maximizing the potential for AI errors and malfunctions. Participants also expressed concern that the use of these technologies could undermine compliance with international humanitarian law.

Although most of the discussion in Geneva focused on the use of AI in conventional military operations, some participants warned of escalatory dangers arising from the integration of AI in nuclear weapons command and control. Numerous participants stressed that decisions involving the use of nuclear weapons must be made by humans, not machines.

In a session on possible responses to these challenges, participants considered various measures, ranging from a legally binding ban on the use of AI in targeting systems to a variety of nonbinding measures, such as information exchanges and a voluntary pledge to exclude AI from decisions involved in killing humans. No consensus was reached on this matter—Russia’s representative, for example, was adamantly opposed to any binding measures—but participants largely agreed that further consultations on the topic would be useful.

South Korean Ambassador Song Si-Jin proposed that states use the coming months to consider possible follow-up steps for the General Assembly to discuss at its meeting this fall.

July/August 2026

A May 17 drone strike on a nuclear power plant in the United Arab Emirates prompted an emergency response from the UN Security Council amid renewed concerns about the risks that escalating regional armed conflicts pose to civilian nuclear facilities.

According to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi, the attack struck an electrical generator outside the inner security perimeter of Barakah Nuclear Power plant in Abu Dhabi. No injuries were reported and radiation levels remained normal. But the strike caused a fire and temporarily disrupted offsite power to Unit 3, requiring operators to rely on emergency diesel generators for about 24 hours until external power was restored. This is the first known case of an operating commercial nuclear reactor losing off-site power as a result of a military attack.

UAE defense officials said that the drones originated in Iraq, suggesting that Iran-backed militias targeted the UAE because of its close security ties with the United States. Responsibility has not been independently verified. The Barakah facility supplies about one-quarter of the country’s electricity.

The Security Council convened an emergency meeting May 19 to discuss the attack. Addressing the Council, Grossi warned that a direct strike on reactors or spent fuel facilities could result in a “very high release of radioactivity to the environment,” potentially requiring evacuations, sheltering orders, iodine distribution, and long-term food restrictions.

Grossi said that attacks disabling power supplies could increase the risk of reactor core damage and meltdown. On May 26, the Council condemned the strike “in the strongest terms,” calling it a “flagrant violation of international law” and warning of grave risks to civilians, infrastructure, and the environment.

The incident comes amid heightened regional tensions and follows previous IAEA warnings about the dangers posed by military operations near nuclear facilities. Grossi reiterated that attacks on nuclear facilities dedicated to peaceful purposes are against international law. “Attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes are unacceptable … Zaporizhzya NPP, Kursk NPP, Bushehr NPP, Barakah NPP or any other nuclear power plant. Nuclear Power Plants are protected under international humanitarian law,” he said in a statement.

Grossi also told the Security Council that “the only sustainable path forward to peace, stability, and cooperation is one grounded in dialogue and diplomacy.” He stressed that durable agreements concerning nuclear activities require robust IAEA verification and international engagement.—SHAGHAYEGH CHRIS ROSTAMPOUR

July/August 2026
By Daryl G. Kimball

The U.S.-Israeli war on Iran has proven to be a disaster that has failed to advance U.S. strategic goals, including nonproliferation objectives, and inflicted widespread humanitarian consequences on untold millions of people in Iran, its region, and beyond.

This expensive war of choice has already likely incurred more than $100 billion in direct military costs. U.S. President Donald Trump has just put forward an $88 billion supplemental war spending request to Congress in addition to his record $1 trillion military budget request, while claiming there are not enough federal dollars to fund basic needs of ordinary Americans.

The June 17 Islamabad memorandum of understanding (MOU) to halt the war and reopen the Strait of Hormuz is a flawed but welcome development. Importantly, it creates a pathway for resuming negotiations to verifiably curb Iran’s nuclear program, which continues to pose a medium-term proliferation risk.

The MOU calls for significant sanctions relief and sets a 60-day timeline for negotiating limits on Iran’s sensitive nuclear activities as part of a broader agreement. These talks will not be easy, but if both sides are serious and pragmatic, and if Trump can refrain from gratuitous threats, a meaningful nuclear nonproliferation deal is possible. The U.S. negotiating team needs to be backstopped by nonproliferation experts to avoid the egregious mistakes of Trump and his negotiators in past rounds of talks.

To verifiably neutralize the proliferation risk posed by Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU), particularly the 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent U-235, a near-weapons-grade level, the parties should agree to excavate the HEU under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervision, down blending the material in Iran to less than 5-percent levels of U-235, then ship the material for supervised storage in Kazakhstan or Russia.

To address the risks posed by a resumption of uranium enrichment in Iran, the two sides should agree to detailed verifiable, terms including: a 10-15-year suspension of uranium enrichment; verifiable limits on centrifuge research and production; strict limits on low-enriched uranium stockpiles, and possible limits on uranium mining and milling activities. Iran currently does not have industrial-scale enrichment capacity or a practical need to do so for nuclear energy requirements, but it does have the know-how and the capacity to reconstitute its centrifuge manufacturing and operations.

Such steps, combined with meaningful compliance incentives, would provide significant confidence that Tehran could not dash for a bomb if it so decided in the future.

Before resuming enrichment, Iran would have to demonstrate a practical need for domestic fuel production for nuclear energy purposes, and if it does, Iran must agree to cap enrichment at reactor-grade levels and continue the highest forms of IAEA monitoring.

An essential element of any effective agreement must be the swift return of IAEA inspectors to Iran and an intrusive, agency-led monitoring regime to verify compliance with the terms of any new deal. It is in both sides’ interests to allow IAEA inspectors to access all nuclear sites in Iran without unwarranted restrictions. This is vital to establish a new baseline regarding Iran’s nuclear program and verify compliance with the terms of any new nuclear agreement.

To prevent future compliance problems, Iran should, as it did under the jettisoned 2015 nuclear deal, agree to more intrusive IAEA safeguards standards under the terms of the IAEA additional protocol and Code 3.1, a provision in the IAEA’s comprehensive safeguards agreements requiring states to submit preliminary design information for new nuclear facilities to the IAEA as soon as the decision to construct is made. This will provide greater assurance that Iran is meeting its nuclear obligations and not engaging in covert nuclear weapons-related activities.

If Iran and the United States reach a new nuclear deal in the coming months, it should be measured against what is necessary and technically feasible to block Iran’s pathways to nuclear weapons, including whether it includes the necessary IAEA monitoring and verification measures to ensure compliance and detect any prohibited nuclear activities.

Comparisons with the 2015 nuclear deal are understandable but are not useful. What was necessary and possible to secure a strong nonproliferation agreement in 2015 is not the same as what is necessary for an effective nonproliferation agreement in 2026.

Trump’s first-term decision to withdraw from the 2015 nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, was nonproliferation malpractice. It opened the door for Iran to reconstitute its nuclear program and severely curtail IAEA access.

Trump’s effort to end his disastrous 2026 war with Iran and resume negotiations on new nuclear deal are a tacit admission that his “maximum pressure” policies and military misadventures did not and cannot destroy Iran’s nuclear weapons capacity, nor its determination to pursue what it sees as its right to engage in dual-use nuclear activities.

In the coming weeks, Trump cannot afford to squander—for a third time—this diplomatic opportunity to reach an effective, verifiable, and durable deal to block Iran’s nuclear weapons potential, prevent the renewal of large-scale war, and reduce the dangers of onward proliferation in the Middle East.