January/February 2025
By Mike Albertson

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) will expire on February 5, 2026, with little likelihood that any of its provisions will remain in force. Accepting this fact should allow for clear-eyed thinking about the realities of what follows.

There will be short-term pressures as the treaty enters its endgame over the next year and in the anticipated interregnum thereafter. These largely will distract from the serious homework needed to determine what arms control, if any, comes next. The early 1980s, a period of deterrence competition and arms control stalemate, offers insights into how an interregnum can generate useful ideas, but pouring current complexities into the old bottle of “peace through strength” attempts to recreate a past that cannot be recreated. Unpleasant questions must be faced: What does the United States want, what do China and Russia want (and fear), and what is the U.S. strategy for getting them to the table? With the end of New START and a host of other agreements over the last decade, many people have said the world should move on from arms control. Yet, after considering alternatives, a legally binding approach may be the least implausible option for what comes next.

Recognizing the Inevitable

Some analysts express hope that New START can be retained somehow or extended further beyond its expiration deadline. Ideas have surfaced. Unfortunately, these alternatives range from impossible to implausible.

One alternative is extending the treaty. The 1968 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was negotiated and ratified with a provision on future extension beyond its initial duration. The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty had an unlimited duration. Simply put, New START cannot be extended. It was concluded with a 10-year duration that began in 2011 and a single five-year extension that was exercised in 2021.

The duration rationale was simple. Policymakers expected that the treaty would be replaced by some future agreement, following the natural progression of strategic arms control agreements over previous decades. Replacement was prevented, however, by Russia’s refusal to engage substantively on U.S. terms, set by Democratic and Republican administrations, for a successor to New START.

Another alternative is continuing just the New START verification provisions, such as inspections and notifications, after the treaty expiration. In this way, the two sides would have at least some transparency into what the other was doing with its strategic modernization programs. Unfortunately, such provisions are largely dependent on the legally binding agreement. Due to Russian domestic laws on state secrets, Moscow would argue that it cannot provide classified nuclear weapons-related information via notifications or data declarations to the United States absent a legally binding agreement. The United States would not host Russian military inspectors at their bases willingly without a treaty directing them to do so. Cost payments, protections, and immunities are the gears of complex agreements. All are extremely difficult to implement absent the forcing function of New START.

Replacement by an entirely new treaty or agreement theoretically is another alternative, but it has proven impossible even in better geopolitical times. One year remains before New START expires. Even achieving New START, in an era when there was mutual desire, a long history of work, and a precedent document in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), proved difficult to negotiate in this time frame. The next year looks far less promising for rapid action. There is a lack of focus and goals in Moscow and Washington. Arms control is hostage to Russian hostilities in Ukraine. Even a short negotiated treaty, such as the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, would lack an underlying agreement such as START I or New START on which to base verification obligations. A bilateral fig leaf can be agreed anytime, but it would not substitute for the comprehensive agreement that is about to disappear.

The last alternative would be a mutual agreement to stay below New START limits.¹ This is what Russia and the United States have stated as a possibility over the last several years, despite all the challenges in the bilateral relationship. In engineering terms, this is a point of unstable equilibrium.² Internal or external factors could lead either party to upend such an agreement by declaring a unilateral willingness to exceed or by concretely exceeding New START limits. Russia has tried numerous ways through its nuclear rhetoric to deter Western military support to Ukraine. Moscow lacks other bilateral mechanisms or dialogues to take hostage or rip up to signal displeasure and attract U.S. attention. Threatening to bust New START limits probably is too tempting an eventual target for Moscow to ignore.

Moreover, China’s growing nuclear arsenal is spurring talk of the United States needing to move beyond New START limits. The 2023 Strategic Posture Commission report described the U.S. nuclear program as being “necessary but not sufficient” to deter potential adversaries.³ Pranay Vaddi, senior director for arms control at the U.S. National Security Council, remarked that “absent a change in the trajectory of adversary arsenals, we may reach a point in the coming years where an increase from current deployed numbers is required and we need to be fully prepared to execute if the President makes that decision.”⁴ Vipin Narang, acting assistant defense secretary for space policy, commented that this process was underway: “We have begun exploring options to increase future launcher capacity or additional deployed warheads on the land, sea and air legs that could offer national leadership increased flexibility, if desired, and executed.”⁵

Navigating the Coming Endgame

As New START enters its endgame, competing short-term pressures of urgency and worry can be expected. The United States needs to lead on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation issues even if expectations should be set appropriately low. There is a moral imperative to do so and downsides to not doing so, primarily in letting adversaries dictate the boundaries of future negotiations.

Some analysts and legislators argue that the United States needs to get out of the treaty as soon as possible because Russia is in violation and the United States is held back from taking the necessary deterrence steps to respond numerically to China and Russia. Weighing the pros and cons, this late in the game there appears to be little strategic advantage gained by withdrawing. The treaty is not holding back the United States because it probably cannot do much concretely this year to move beyond the New START limits. The United States can take steps while the treaty is in force to prepare for the future because U.S. advantages that were negotiated into New START make it easier for Washington to increase the size of its arsenal, for example by reconverting launchers that were taken off the books and uploading warheads from the uncounted reserve onto deployed systems. Yet, executing these steps still takes time and money, likely pushing their completion and thus an increase in the number of deployed weapons beyond the treaty limits past the February 2026 expiration.

How treaties end matters for what deals come next. New START’s natural death offers a clean slate. Conversely, a U.S. decision to prematurely terminate the agreement would incur costs. China and Russia would occupy the global high ground on arms control and nonproliferation matters. The United States would face challenges in pushing its own agenda if it must spend time responding to the criticisms of others. Other states would have difficulty trusting the political whims of U.S. nuclear deals. It would be more difficult for Washington to set the table for what comes after New START.

Whether the treaty ends naturally or abruptly, the focus inevitably will be on the numbers of weapons as the New START limits end. The expert discourse will focus on the dangers unleashed by unrestrained nuclear competition. Talk of arms racing will grow. Buildups, whether in China, Russia or the United States, will be termed “rapid,” “unnecessary,” “mindless,” and “costly.”

The end of New START will not usher in a new arms race. The nuclear competition will not arrive when the treaty ends or because it ends. The new arms race is underway. Competitive contours among the Chinese, Russian, and U.S. nuclear programs already are set; and it will be Chinese force expansion, a factor not even captured by New START, that will be the dominant factor after the treaty expires.

What unfolds post-New START is unlikely to seem much of a race. If so, it will be a 10-kilometer race over the next decade rather than a dash in 2026. Only China is really racing to some unknown point. Russia has hot warhead and missile production lines, but has completed much of its modernization program. It suffers from a host of economic and military challenges, which may be prioritized before another major nuclear weapons expansion. Although the United States can increase the size of its arsenal by doing reconversions and uploading, its nuclear infrastructure challenges are well understood.⁶ The near-term U.S. nuclear question is less “How much is enough?” than “What can be done?”

In the decade after New START expires, the players likely will move to higher numbers of weapons. Numbers will dominate the headlines, but the real loss will be the intangibles that the strategic arms control process provides, the little things that are taken for granted when agreements are in place and that have deeper impacts when they are missing. Without New START data, both sides will rely more on national technical means, that is, intelligence gathering by satellite, radar, and other remote technology, to estimate what the other side is doing. Where national technical means are more difficult, these estimates will have greater uncertainties and broader ranges. Theories and assumptions about an adversary’s capabilities will have fewer checks. People-to-people engagements, involving treaty implementers, inspection teams, host-nation escorts, and technical experts, will end as well, leaving all sides less prepared to sit down and seriously engage on what comes next.

The Temptations of ‘Peace Through Strength’

Given the near-term challenges post-New START, some arms control interregnum should be anticipated.⁷ It will be an uncomfortable period without guardrails. The desire of those seeking to avoid the dangers and costs of competition will be for quick fixes, such as political agreements; but deep systemic problems have caused the interregnum; and they will require more reflection to diagnose and a stronger prescription to cure.

The last major interregnum was almost four decades ago. The Soviet-U.S. détente ended after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. That is when, after a decade of work, the agreement reached during the second round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) was withdrawn from U.S. Senate ratification. Both sides stated their commitment to the SALT II limits, but there was little confidence it would last. Serious Soviet-U.S. military incidents occurred. Gerontocracy and economic stagnation created domestic political problems in Moscow. Negotiations were curtailed as NATO deployed countermeasures to Soviet nuclear deployments. Western governments faced domestic pressure from anti-nuclear protests.

A romanticized story has coalesced to explain what happened next. The United States was weak. There was consensus among the United States and its allies on how to fix the problem. The United States built more nuclear weapons. It worked with allies to deploy them. The Soviets grew worried and returned to the negotiating table. The United States bargained from a position of newfound strength. Agreements favoring the United States were reached. The Cold War was won. When faced with an arms control stalemate and nuclear competition again, the prescription seems to be that the United States should revisit this 1980s “peace through strength” formula.

In reality, little from roughly 1980 to 1985 was easy or straightforward. It was a time of contentious soul-searching in the U.S. deterrence and arms control community.⁸ Many articles were written.⁹ Many workshops and discussions were convened.¹⁰ There was little consensus among top policymakers and experts on what to do next. Some wanted to revive the SALT process. Others saw arms control as lost or at a dead end. Some wanted to build new nuclear delivery systems or deploy more warheads. Others proposed cuts. Some wanted to emphasize non-nuclear systems such as the Strategic Defense Initiative to break the nuclear stalemate.

Attempting to create a “peace through strength” redux after New START lacks necessary elements. Peace requires a willing and desirous negotiating partner. Russia and China today lack a counterpart to the reform-driven Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, and the next people in charge of those political systems are unlikely to be one either. Strength requires a robust U.S. defense industrial base to build the systems that the adversary cares about limiting. The U.S. industrial base today is far reduced from its 1980s equivalent. “Through” involves understanding the use of competition and cooperation together to leverage a desired outcome. The “redux” formula suggests that mere repetition will duplicate results. It oversimplifies the challenges and complexities with allies, adversaries, and domestic politics that it took to get from strength through to peace in the 1980s.¹¹

There are useful lessons from the intellectual discussions on arms control in the 1980s that have applicability to the upcoming questions to be faced. First, determining the place of arms control in broader U.S. policy requires understanding bigger strategic objectives vis-à-vis adversaries. Lawrence Freedman was blunt and correct when he wrote in 1983 that “[a]rms control has become an incompetent and inadequate alternative to the reappraisal of strategic objectives and an honest confrontation of political differences.”¹² In addition, the United States must know what it wants arms control to accomplish. Concepts such as risk reduction are uncontroversial in arms control discussions, but they have proven to be unhelpful in finding concrete ways forward. In 1981, U.S. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft stated, “Unless we get below this level of ethereal abstraction that everyone can agree on, and decide in fact what we want arms control to achieve, we’re not going to get anywhere.”¹³

Arms control must balance complacency and alarmism. Advocating for a reassessment of the 1980s arms control discourse, Thomas Schelling challenged arguments that nuclear war was imminent or inevitable and made more so by the absence of formal arms control. “There is no prudential wisdom in exaggerating the danger of nuclear war by an order of magnitude, as both sides of the political spectrum in this country have been doing for half a dozen years,” he wrote.¹⁴

Moreover, the desired balance between competition and cooperation is not about finding absolute comfort, but some degree of mutually acceptable discomfort. James Schlesinger wrote in 1985, “Although I am a strong proponent of arms control, it can never reduce the Soviet threat to a point at which we would be comfortable…. There is no conceivable set of arms control measures that would persuade the Soviet Union to ease the discomfort that the United States feels in bearing risk. For to do so means that the Soviets would be obliged to accept what would appear to them to be an intolerable level of risk.”¹⁵

Arms control should be asked to do less rather than more in times of flux. Although some U.S. experts in the aftermath of SALT II advocated for a “a new set of grandiose goals for a new round of negotiations,” Richard Burt, later chief START I negotiator, saw value in 1981 in “asking arms control to do less instead of more.”¹⁶ A goal could be as simple as “registering and codifying an existing balance of forces,” a useful outcome given the uncertainties that plagued U.S. political leaders and military planners during the early 1960s.¹⁷

Finally, the United States must articulate a simple proposal grounded in the realities of strategic modernization cycles. George Kennan wrote a short article in 1981 titled “A Modest Proposal,” in which arms control negotiations were conceived as “not a way to escape from the weapons race; they are an integral part of it.”¹⁸ Kennan’s proposal was geared to his moment: immediate, across-the-board 50 percent reductions of nuclear arsenals, affecting in equal measure all parts of their delivery.

The Least Improbable Option

The end of New START represents an important moment, asking arms control and deterrence experts to avoid temptations toward alarmism and silver bullets. If something is to take the place of this treaty, it needs to be a meaningful proposal. It needs to reflect an understanding of why New START itself was meaningful.

New START worked for several reasons. It was suited for the moment, when each side was set on its strategic modernization track and when New START knew where it was headed over the next 15 years. In the United States, the treaty represented a bipartisan consensus, balanced between the desire for a follow-on agreement and for a nuclear recapitalization program. It was well constructed and durable, providing needed predictability and dialogue for a problematic relationship over 15 years. It was limited in scope to what it could do well and left thornier issues to other dialogues.

What then should replace it? Arms control can take many forms. Legally binding treaties are difficult, risky, and time consuming. Unsurprisingly, lengthy searches have been made to find easier paths. Yet, making political agreements with Beijing and Moscow have been just as difficult as legally binding ones. Those states have shown little interest in following U.S.-proposed norms. U.S. conceptions of transparency, strategic stability, and risk reduction have largely failed as organizing principles. Curbing non-nuclear technologies has proven challenging amid competition for advantage.¹⁹

As a result, alternative paths to legally binding agreements have not been found. There is the famous Sherlock Holmes line, “[W]hen you have eliminated all which is impossible, then whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.” The truth is that legally binding arms control remains improbable in the short term and yet likely the best path forward in the long term.

The value is due to process. Process forces agencies to do their homework on what systems to limit and what the limits should be. Process creates mutual buy-in within the U.S. interagency bureaucracy, between the U.S. executive and legislative branches, between the United States and its allies, and between the countries participating in the negotiation. Process encourages the sides to table and agree on a framework before real negotiations begin, forcing a balance between desirable and achievable goals. Process generates the formation of a group of people who participate in something tangible that solders deterrence and arms control together.

After New START ends, the United States should take the lead in proposing a new legally binding agreement. It should be on the one thing where the contours of nuclear competition are clear: Over the next decade, China, Russia, and the United States will move together toward a multilateral world at higher levels of nuclear weapons. At the end of this road, they will all be at higher numbers but with the same deterrence challenges as today. The goal would be to offer a U.S.-proposed vision of how to manage the transition to this new point and what we should do when we get there.

The U.S. vision should be developed in consultation with Congress because nothing meaningful can be done without its support. There is a new bipartisan consensus to build between those preparing for the complexities of the “two-peer” deterrence environment, those desiring to focus on China and its nuclear expansion, those seeking renewed diplomacy with allies and partners, and those wanting to limit the costs of defense spending or nuclear modernization. With limited means, the United States must decide on what to focus, and a sound arms control policy plays a role in this choice.

The United States should make the framework of the negotiation clear: it is prepared to talk about numerical limits grounded by its own internal calculations of U.S. deterrence requirements if China and Russia come to the table and are clear about what they have in their arsenals and where they are going with those weapons systems. The parties then can talk about how best to manage this process together. If only one of those two adversaries comes to the table, the United States should be willing to discuss an information-based agreement without numerical limits. The United States should not constrain itself numerically if one of the other major parties is not constrained.

The United States also should bring France and the United Kingdom to the table. They should be unafraid to come. A united effort among these three allies would create more leverage on China and Russia. It would improve bipartisan consensus in Washington. It would highlight France and the UK as independent centers of nuclear decision-making. It would transform the P5 format recognized under the NPT into a productive venue for discussing this framework.

The United States also should be willing to discuss non-nuclear weapons systems of concern to the nuclear balance and bring its own list of concerns to the table. There is no harm in listening, in seeing what adversaries fear, and in discerning how much they are willing to pay in other areas to alleviate those fears. The United States should make clear that this is an agreement centered on nuclear weapons. Progress on other issues, if proven fruitful, can be spun off onto their own tracks.

Many policymakers and analysts are likely to judge such a modest proposal as too limited. Yet, it is meaningful and realistic, something the moment requires. This legally binding agreement can be criticized as codifying the anticipated future status quo at higher numbers, but such a future is likely beyond the power of arms control to alter. If arms control is asked to do less, it can help make the probable transition to higher numbers more stable.

Such a proposal also is probably too vague for many people. An agreed proposal takes real time, bandwidth, and energy to develop and execute. Specifics cannot be anticipated in advance or exist independent of internally calculated deterrence requirements. They also will take time to negotiate. The most important point after an end is where 
to begin.

China and Russia might very well dismiss this modest proposal. The United States should not chase after them. It simply should make clear that absent a finished agreement, it will continue with its nuclear modernization program. It will cooperate closely with London and Paris. When other countries press Washington for further action, it should point to its post-New START proposal and suggest that their diplomats engage Beijing and Moscow directly. If nothing else, the United States will have put out its marker on what should follow New START.

ENDNOTES

1. New START central limits are 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments; 1,550 nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments; and 800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

2. Science Direct, “Unstable Equilibrium,” n.d., (accessed December 31, 2024).

3. Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, “America’s Strategic Posture,” October 2023.

4. “Adapting the U.S. Approach to Arms Control and Nonproliferation to a New Era,” remarks 
at the Arms Control Association meeting, June 7, 2024.

5. Theresa Hitchens, “DoD ‘Exploring’ Options for Nuclear Buildup as Part of Strategic Review,” Breaking Defense, August 1, 2024.

6. Brad Roberts and William Tobey, eds., “The Inflection Point and the U.S. Nuclear Security Enterprise,” Center for Global Security Research, October 2023.

7. For a discussion on the arms control interregnum topic, see Mike Albertson, “Facing the Coming Arms Control Interregnum: Workshop Summary,” Center for Global Security Research, n.d., (workshop held August 9-10, 2022).

8. This insight is increasingly finding its way into speeches by U.S. officials. See Alexandra Bell, “The Future of Arms Control,” U.S. Department of State, September 19, 2023.

9. For one excellent compilation of essays from this period, see Bernard F. Halloran, ed., “Essays on Arms Control and National Security (25th Anniversary Edition),” U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, No. 123, 1986.

10. A notable one took place at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in May 1981. For the conference discussions, see Warren Heckrotte and George C. Smith, eds., Arms Control in Transition: Proceedings of the Livermore Arms Control Conference (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983).

11. For an excellent recent publication, see Susan Colbourn, Euromissiles: The Nuclear Weapons That Nearly Destroyed NATO (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2022).

12. Lawrence Freedman, “Arms Control: No Hiding Place,” SAIS Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Winter-Spring 1983): 4.

13. Heckrotte and Smith, Arms Control in Transition, p. 11.

14. Thomas Schelling, “What Went Wrong With Arms Control?” in Bernard F. Halloran, ed., “Essays on Arms Control and National Security (25th Anniversary Edition),” U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, No. 123, 1986, p. 336.

15. James Schlesinger, “Maintaining Global Stability,” in Bernard F. Halloran, ed., “Essays on Arms Control and National Security (25th Anniversary Edition),” U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, No. 123, 1986, p. 395.

16. Richard Burt, “Defense Policy and Arms Control: Defining the Problem,” in Bernard F. Halloran, ed., “Essays on Arms Control and National Security (25th Anniversary Edition),” U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, No. 123, 1986, p. 201.

17. Ibid., pp. 200-201.

18. George Kennan, “A Modest Proposal,” in Bernard F. Halloran, ed., “Essays on Arms Control and National Security (25th Anniversary Edition),” U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, No. 123, 1986, p. 133.

19. For an excellent recent analysis, see Anna Peczeli, “Recalibrating Arms Control for Emerging Technologies,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 4 (2024): 155-175.

January/February 2025
By Alexander Kmentt

Advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) promise to benefit humanity, making tasks faster, easier, and more accessible. Yet, like all innovations, AI poses serious risks, especially in life-and-death decisions, such as those involving autonomous weapons systems. Many experts and developers urge caution, calling for reflection and regulatory measures. Integrating AI into weaponry will alter fundamentally how conflicts are fought and call into question the role of humans within them. Early examples in Ukraine and Gaza reveal this shift, but the future holds even greater change. Militaries want these systems for their speed, efficiency, and ability to minimize soldier casualties, fueling global investment. Their widespread adoption appears imminent, with costs expected to drop and their use likely to proliferate across conflicts worldwide.

This trajectory raises urgent ethical questions and presents challenges to compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights law. Experts warn of an arms race in autonomous weapons systems, especially amid rising geopolitical tensions, with significant risks of proliferation, unwanted escalation, and difficult-to-predict shifts in global power dynamics. Although AI offers extraordinary potential, the arrival of these systems demands immediate action to ensure legal norms, ethical boundaries, and global security.

There is no agreed definition of autonomous weapons systems, but in essence these are weapons systems that once activated by a human, select and engage targets without further human intervention. These weapons systems make “decisions” over life and death based on preprogrammed algorithms. These systems might be built on AI elements that cannot be understood fully by their human operators, and so really their actions cannot be predicted by those who should be responsible. This makes the arrival of autonomous weapons systems a watershed moment for our entire species.

This critical juncture demands urgent political leadership to create regulations and safeguards. Yet, the contrast between the rapid development of AI-powered weapons and the slow pace of regulatory discussions is stark. Mistrust among states and a potentially flawed confidence in technological solutions hinder progress. If the global community fails to act swiftly, the opportunity to establish legal guardrails will be lost before autonomous weapons systems become widely deployed, potentially leading to devastating consequences.

A Decade of Discussions

The issue of autonomous weapons systems first formally appeared on the agenda of the international community in a report by Christof Heyns, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, to the Human Rights Council in 2013.¹ In 2016 the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) established a group of governmental experts to explore regulatory options. The group has met regularly since 2017, fostering greater understanding of the challenges posed by these systems, largely thanks to the contributions from civil society and academia.

In 2019, the CCW agreed on 11 guiding principles, including the full applicability of international humanitarian law to these systems and the need to retain human responsibility for decisions on the use of these systems and human accountability across their entire life cycle.² Discussions within the expert group have focused largely on ensuring compliance with international humanitarian law, a body of law that was designed around humans and human decision-making. Autonomous weapons systems challenge the legal requirements to distinguish between civilians and combatants, assess proportionality, and take necessary precautions in attacks. Systems that are not understood sufficiently, whose behaviors cannot be predicted reliably, or that cannot be limited contextually pose challenges for ensuring the level of control required for compliance with international humanitarian law as well as for retaining human legal accountability in the decision-making processes of increasingly autonomous systems.

One proposed response to these problems is the so-called two-tier approach, which has garnered growing support albeit no consensus yet. This framework combines prohibitions on systems that cannot be used in accordance with international humanitarian law with strict regulations for other systems to ensure adherence to legal standards. Central to this debate is defining the nature and level of “meaningful human control” and “appropriate human judgement.” Defining adequate human involvement, however, is contentious. Disagreements persist over what constitutes adequate predictability, understanding, and control, so there is disagreement also as to where any lines of prohibition should be drawn. A small group of states would prefer not to draw any lines at all.

In 2023, the experts group mandate was extended until 2026, with a slightly expanded focus to develop by consensus “a set of elements of an instrument, without prejudging its nature.” The group chair, Robert In den Bosch of the Netherlands, compiled a “rolling text” summarizing possible regulatory elements and offering a foundation for potential agreement. The group is engaged in these discussions, and if the rolling text³ from November 2024 is the measure, then progress appears to be made on the substance.

Yet, beneath the surface, the picture is less encouraging. The scope of the group discussions is limited, hampered by substantive disagreements and ineffective working methods imposed by CCW rules. Most importantly, the geopolitical backdrop has stymied decisive action. Rising tensions, mistrust, and diverging priorities among states have resulted in alarmingly slow progress.

Despite a decade of discussions, the global community has little to show in terms of concrete outcomes. The mismatch between the rapid development of autonomous weapons systems technologies and the sluggish pace of international regulation is troubling. Strong political leadership, guided by ethical principles and a commitment to international humanitarian law, is essential to meet this unprecedented challenge.

The Challenge of Comprehensive Regulation

The Martens clause of international humanitarian law calls for the public conscience to guide consideration of what is acceptable and unacceptable in warfare. The law needs to be responsive to wider societal needs. The regulation of autonomous weapons systems is demanded by factors and considerations that extend beyond the law and armed conflict. Although international humanitarian law remains central, broader concerns related to human rights, ethics, and global security also need attention.

These systems raise critical questions under international human rights law, particularly regarding the “right to life” and legal accountability. Their development and use likely will extend beyond warfare, where these rules tend to be applicable, and encompass law enforcement and border control. New rules that might be sufficient from an international humanitarian law perspective are not aligned necessarily with human rights law requirements. The potential for systems to make lethal decisions without human oversight amplifies concerns about who bears responsibility for errors or unlawful killings. Ethically, the automation of force challenges core principles of human dignity.

One of the most pressing areas of ethical concern is the direct targeting of individuals. This risks depriving humans of their dignity, dehumanizing the use of force, and violating the right of nondiscrimination. Key protections, such as the need to distinguish combatants from civilians or to protect soldiers wounded in combat, may be lost if they are inconvenient to the drive for automation. Systems programmed to distinguish between demographic groups risk having societal biases embedded in their datasets, disproportionately affecting marginalized communities. Errors stemming from such biases could lead to severe violations of rights and exacerbate inequalities.

In addition to presenting moral hazards at the level of human targeting, the systems may pose risks to global peace and stability. Where they reduce the risks to a state’s own soldiers, they may reduce the political threshold for deploying or using force. They promise operational speed, but this often comes at the expense of meaningful human control. These factors can heighten the risk of conflict escalation through rapid, machine-driven interactions. The systems are likely to feature prominently in asymmetric conflicts, potentially becoming weapons of choice for terrorists and nonstate actors. Controlling their proliferation will require coordinated legal, political, and technical measures.

All this is to say that there are important aspects of the issue that go beyond the international humanitarian law dimension that has been the focus of discussions thus far. Even if the experts group rapidly fulfills its international humanitarian law-focused mandate, only one set of challenges from autonomous weapons systems is likely to be addressed. The wider ethical challenges of targeting people and the proper limits on systems in border security or policing, for example, look unlikely to be fully explored or addressed. Many states have voiced the need to expand discussions, but opposition from certain actors has prevented meaningful action.

The 2016 decision to address autonomous weapons systems within the CCW framework, emphasizing international humanitarian law, reflected the urgency of tackling these legal challenges swiftly. It also was promoted by a few states that know that the CCW working method can be exploited to block progress. After nearly a decade of discussions and rapid technological development, it is fair to question the wisdom of this decision. The experts group has yet to transition from discussions to negotiations, and its narrow mandate has curtailed the comprehensive approach required to address challenges posed by autonomous weapons systems. The current mandate presents an important test.

A key issue is consensus-based CCW decision-making, which allows individual states to block progress. Russia, for example, has employed procedural tactics to delay discussions and reject progressive proposals or expressions of urgency in the group reports. Other states actively developing systems also have shown limited interest in advancing negotiations of a legally binding agreement, leaving the experts group in a cycle of substantive annual discussions without substantive outcomes.

This failure reflects a troubling procrastination. As technology evolves, the gap between regulation and reality widens further. Comprehensively regulating autonomous weapons systems requires a holistic approach that integrates international humanitarian law, human rights, ethics, and security considerations. Yet, the group is blocked from effectively addressing only the international humanitarian law considerations in the CCW, and there is also not yet a sufficient partnership for taking up discussions elsewhere.

The political landscape of the group risks perpetuating a Groundhog Day dynamic of stalled discussions. States must now prioritize building shared recognition of what a legal instrument could look like in the near term and expanding the scope of dialogue to promote a comprehensive, long-term response. It is a global priority to ensure that the international legal framework develops in step with technological advancements; the procedural barriers are, in the end, excuses for political choices.

Geopolitical Rule

The unsatisfactory state of affairs is frustrating for those who recognize the urgency of this issue. Yet, states developing such systems, along with their allies, vigorously defend the experts group process as the only suitable venue for discussions. Proposals to broaden the focus beyond international humanitarian law or involve other forums are met with skepticism. A common argument is that all militarily significant states must participate to ensure effective regulation. Although there is general agreement on the need for rules governing these systems, geopolitical tensions and eroded trust make many states reluctant to adopt regulations that their competitors might ignore.

This hesitancy is particularly evident among certain Western states, which share frustrations about the lack of progress but remain wary of initiatives that they fear could exclude major powers and lead to legal instruments that do not align with their perceived military interests. This caution, however understandable on the surface, is probably shortsighted.

First, the experts group’s proposed two-tier approach aims to prohibit autonomous weapons systems that do not align with the requirements of international humanitarian law and to regulate the use of others to enable compliance with that law, emphasizing understandability, predictability, and spatial-temporal limits on use in order to exert human control. The military advantage of systems beyond human judgment and control remains unclear at best. Many likely would argue that there would be no advantage; after all, the rules being discussed in the CCW have had more than 10 years of military interests being vocally represented. At a practical level, clarity of international legal rules also allows for clarity and direction for operational military commanders and private sector stakeholders.

From a legal perspective, the corollary of not accepting rules unless all states participate means accepting for themselves or their adversaries systems that they believe would violate international humanitarian law. Can states committed to international humanitarian law and universal values agree to delegate life-and-death decisions to systems lacking capacity for compliance, control, and accountability? Arguably, these principles are vital and must be upheld, regardless of universal participation, to maintain international humanitarian law and shared values. At a time when international rules and norms are in a critical condition, giving power to only the most militarized states is a political failure.

Relying on universal consensus before taking regulatory steps is ultimately a disingenuous stance that invites inertia. Few international issues today enjoy universal agreement, and insisting on unanimity in regulating autonomous weapons systems effectively guarantees standstill. This approach allows states to appear committed to multilateralism while shifting blame for inaction to others.

Such procrastination ignores the narrowing window of opportunity to establish legal and normative safeguards before these systems become widespread. The longer regulatory efforts are delayed, the more difficult it will be to reverse course once these systems proliferate globally. Democratic states, in particular, must recognize that this delay is against their own long-term interests and the broader interests of humanity.

The Road Ahead

The immediate priority should be to bring the experts group’s work to a successful conclusion. The group must recommend the initiation of negotiations for a legally binding instrument based on the two-tier approach, encompassing prohibitions and regulations for autonomous weapons systems. Although it does not tackle concerns regarding antipersonnel systems effectively, the group chair’s rolling text of November 2024 shows that many states are close to agreeing on the key rules needed to preserve human control.

The group mandate extends to 2026, with the CCW review conference set as the deadline for a final report, but progress should be accelerated to conclude by the end of 2025. Substantive recommendations on prohibitions and regulations are on the table. Continuing discussions ad infinitum without committing to action would represent a failure of political responsibility, especially for states that claim to uphold international humanitarian law and universal values.

In parallel, efforts to generate political momentum for regulating these systems must intensify. Participation in the experts group remains limited. Many countries of the Global South are notably absent, despite the inevitable future global impact of these systems once they become cheap and accessible. Moreover, despite active civil society participation and input, the group’s work receives very limited public attention, and there is little critical focus on those blocking progress.

Encouragingly, there are some signs of change. UN Secretary-General António Guterres and the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Mirjana Spoljaric-Egger, have called urgently for international rules to regulate autonomous weapons systems to be negotiated by 2026.⁴ Regional conferences in Costa Rica,⁵ the Philippines, Trinidad and Tobago,⁶ and Sierra Leone⁷ have consolidated positions in support of regulation. Austria hosted a large international conference on these systems in April 2024.⁸ The chair’s summary⁹ of that conference has garnered endorsements from 40 states, signaling growing support for action.

In 2023, Austria, on behalf of 27 co-sponsoring states, introduced the first UN General Assembly resolution on lethal autonomous weapons systems,¹⁰ backed by 164 states. The resolution mandated the secretary-general to compile a comprehensive report on the issue, incorporating input from states, international organizations, civil society, and the private sector. Published in 2024 after a record number of states provided submissions, the report underscored the pressing humanitarian, legal, security, technological, and ethical challenges posed by autonomous weapons systems.¹¹ It also highlighted widespread support for a legally binding instrument and called for the experts group to fulfill its mandate. A follow-up resolution in December 2024 again received strong support, with 166 states in favor.¹² In 2025, the General Assembly will hold informal discussions to further address the issue.

The quest for regulating autonomous weapons systems continues to be hindered by geopolitical tensions, procrastination, and insufficient political momentum. Although there is growing recognition of the need for action, the necessary leadership to navigate these challenges remains elusive. The situation has been referenced as an “Oppenheimer moment.” There are indeed parallels to the post-1945 era when Manhattan Project scientists advocated for nuclear weapons regulation. Their warnings were overshadowed and ultimately ignored because of Cold War politics, resulting in a protracted nuclear arms race and an existential threat enduring to this day.

Despite loud warnings from experts, geopolitical tensions again are thwarting vital international action to regulate these systems, thus risking a new arms race and posing an existential challenge for humanity. Negotiation of international rules and limits on autonomous weapons systems is more urgent than ever. States cannot allow geopolitical rivalries to continue obstructing these efforts. They need to continue building a cross-regional partnership of states, international organizations, and civil society with the confidence to break out of the procedural deadlock because a greater good demands it.

ENDNOTES

1. See UN General Assembly, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Christof Heyns,” A/HRC/23/47, April 9, 2013.

2. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, “Report of the 2019 Session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems,” CCW/GGE.1/2019/3, September 25, 2019, p. 13.

3. See “GGE on LAWS, Rolling Text, Status Date: 8 November 2024,” n.d.

4. International Committee of the Red Cross, “Joint Call by the United Nations Secretary-General and the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross for States to Establish New Prohibitions and Restrictions on Autonomous Weapon Systems,” News release, October 5, 2023.

5. “Communiqué of the Latin American and Caribbean Conference of Social and Humanitarian Impact of Autonomous Weapons,” Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, Costa Rica, n.d.

6. “CARICOM Declaration on Autonomous Weapons Systems,” Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, n.d.

7. “Submission of the Government of Sierra Leone Towards the UN Secretary-General’s Call Outlined in Resolution 78/241 on ‘Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems,’ Adopted by the General Assembly in December 2023, Drawing From a Conference of Member States of Economic Community of West African States on the Peace and Security Aspect of Autonomous Weapons Systems, 17-18 April 2024,” May 23, 2024.

8. Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, “2024 Vienna Conference on Autonomous Weapons Systems,” n.d., (accessed December 18, 2024).

9. See “Humanity at the Crossroads: Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Challenge of Regulation; Chair’s Summary,” April 30, 2024.

10. UN General Assembly, “Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems,” A/RES/78/241, December 28, 2023.

11. UN General Assembly, “Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: Report of the Secretary-General,” A/79/88, July 1, 2024.

12. UN General Assembly, “Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Ireland, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Switzerland and Trinidad and Tobago: Draft Resolution; Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems,” A/C.1/79/L.77, October 18, 2024.

January/February 2025
By Almuntaser Albalawi

The risk of a regional war in the Middle East is now at its highest in decades, with the threat of further escalation, proliferation, and even the use of nuclear weapons or attacks on nuclear installations a real possibility. A direct confrontation between Israel and Iran could trigger major shifts in the nuclear doctrines of regional states and, beyond that, further undermine nonproliferation norms in the region and the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime more generally.

The prospects of a return to the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal remain remote, and regional arms control issues are rarely on the agenda of ongoing, high-level political and security talks. Moreover, nuclear rhetoric among elites in the region who advocate for the development of nuclear weapons, their use in conflicts, or the targeting of nuclear infrastructure further exacerbates the situation.

This alarming scenario is becoming more plausible due to the stagnation of the international nonproliferation regime and regional arms control diplomacy. Internationally, bilateral and multilateral disarmament and arms control regimes are in danger of becoming dysfunctional. Geopolitical tensions, threats of nuclear use, the expansion of nuclear stockpiles among nuclear-armed states, noncompliance issues, and a lack of progress in honoring past commitments and advancing beyond them have resulted in a loss of credibility and deadlocks within these regimes.

For years, NPT states-parties have discussed nuclear risks in the Middle East extensively, but failed to reach consensus on a final document at their last two NPT review conferences, reflecting widening global disagreements on the path forward for the global nonproliferation regime. The chances for a different outcome at the next review conference in 2026 also look bleak.

More robust and creative efforts are needed to go beyond the traditional nonproliferation tool kits and to facilitate and revitalize regional arms control initiatives in the Middle East. Against this backdrop, the five-year-old conference mandated by the UN General Assembly on the establishment of a Middle Eastern zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is the only existing forum where regional states currently discuss regional arms control.

Although this conference’s relevance should be higher than ever, it has received too little attention in the policy domain. The conclusion of the fifth annual session of the conference in November provides a timely opportunity to reflect on what has been achieved so far toward establishment of the zone, what challenges have emerged over the past five years, and how the conference impacts global nonproliferation and disarmament diplomacy.

Despite some noteworthy progress, including fostering dialogue among participating states on reducing WMD risks in the region, more work still is needed to sustain momentum in the future. This includes steps that the conference could take to strengthen its work and draw absent parties into the process. It is also essential that the conference explore potential implications for the NPT review process, given the interlinkages and interdependencies between the two processes.

The Middle Eastern Zone Conference       

Since the UN General Assembly adopted decision 73/546 in 2018 to negotiate a legally binding treaty establishing a Middle Eastern zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, five sessions have been held. The first session, in 2019, issued a political declaration emphasizing the inclusivity of the process. The declaration also included nonbinding political commitments, such as refraining from measures that prevent the achievement of the treaty’s objectives.¹ Although adherence by states is uneven, these commitments still carry political and normative weight.

By extending an open-ended invitation to all states in the region to join, conditioning the adoption of the treaty to the consent of all invited states, and committing them to pursue negotiations on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by consensus—a principle that Iran and Israel regard as essential—the conference participants attempted to alleviate some concerns about the process, including of states feeling outnumbered in such a regional forum or disadvantaged in decision-making.

Participating states hoped the decision regarding modalities would encourage Israel’s participation and ensure the continued participation of other key states and observers from the five nuclear-weapon states recognized under the NPT. Yet, the outcome was not realized for Israel or the United States. Israel’s main objections to the process are that it is held under UN auspices, is limited to weapons of mass destruction, and precludes discussion on regional security. Israel also noted that the Arab Group did not consult it before submitting the proposal on establishing the conference to the General Assembly.

In its second session, held in 2021 after the 2020 session was postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the conference adopted rules of procedure and formally established that decisions on substantive and procedural matters would be made by consensus.² Recognizing the complexity of issues that the conference would have to discuss and the additional time needed for deliberations, the second session also created a working committee and an intersessional process between annual sessions. The working committee may report its work to the conference, but its outcomes are not binding.³

The informal status of the working committee, with its closed-meeting format and voluntary reporting requirements, provided some advantages. It allowed for deliberations to continue in depth between annual sessions, including engagement with external experts and scheduling technical briefings for delegates. It also allowed for informal discussion on technical and contentious topics, even in the absence of key relevant parties, without prejudice to the future work of the conference, positions, or options.⁴

Evolving Discussions and Views

During the second session, Kuwait, the session president, proposed initiating thematic discussions based on a comprehensive list of elements relevant to the future treaty.⁵ The ensuing exchange on contentious issues served as an informal guide for the topics discussed in subsequent sessions. States have used the annual sessions and working committee meetings to exchange views and build proposals, gradually forming their preliminary positions on elements of the treaty. Yet, participating states have stated consistently that conference discussions and statements should not be considered final positions or conclusions on any topic, given Israel’s absence.

The conference outcome documents show initial agreement on the future treaty’s general obligations and its ultimate objective of “enhancing regional and international peace and security through the complete elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons and other [weapons of mass destruction].”⁶ To maintain consistency with their existing obligations, states mostly agree that the proposed zone treaty should be based on the three bedrock WMD treaties: the NPT, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).⁷

Using these existing treaties as a basis has helped the conference identify unexplored, region-specific issues for further consideration. Many of these issues, such as additional obligations and verification measures, institutional arrangements, and entry into force, are topics that still need further discussion in subsequent sessions.⁸

Verification is one of the most discussed topics in the ongoing deliberations. The conference agreed to build on existing international organizations, namely the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for verification mechanisms to avoid duplication. The unique scope of the zone treaty mandate and regional circumstances, however, have raised the issue of supplementary verification mechanisms to increase confidence in compliance. States have different views on the level of verification required to ensure compliance. Although some states hold that the regional circumstances require additional verification measures, others oppose adopting any measures that exceed those under the NPT, BWC, and CWC.

Such differences highlight the need for more technical and policy advice to supplement the states’ views and proposals, which could bridge gaps and advance negotiations. For example, technical advice could build a better understanding among states about the advantages and disadvantages of including regional verification measures to the BWC or the IAEA additional protocol as an obligation under the treaty.

Meanwhile, although most states recognize in principle the need for ratification of the NPT, BWC, and CWC by all states invited to the conference prior to the zone’s entry into force, views differ on timelines and implementation modalities, including for nuclear disarmament. One school of thought, raised by Iran, holds that disarmament and dismantlement should take place before states join the treaty and before the treaty enters into force. Proponents of the other school of thought, led by Egypt, advocate for more flexibility in considering different arrangements for dismantlement, including after the treaty enters into force or before it is ratified.⁹

Given regional nuclear energy plans as well as economic and development needs, peaceful uses and technical cooperation remain another heavily discussed issue. Participating states were explicit about avoiding a politicization of obligations that could restrict access to these technologies. Several proposals were put forward to promote and facilitate international, regional, and subregional cooperation, including a proposal for a fuel production consortium. There is convergence around the importance of creating regional mechanisms for promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy and cooperation, but opinions diverge on their model and scope.

In the same context, the topic of unilateral coercive measures, such as sanctions, continues to create disagreement among states. Iran holds that the future treaty should provide assurances against such measures.¹⁰ Other states, although recognizing the illegality of these measures, feel that the conference is not the right forum to address this matter.¹¹

The Impact of Regional Crises

The fourth and fifth conference sessions, in 2023 and 2024, respectively, took place during an especially difficult time in the region. Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023; the subsequent Israeli wars in Gaza and Lebanon; and the risk of wider regional escalation added to existing challenges for the conference. Some observers say the Hamas attack is likely to solidify Israel’s positions, including a belief that the conference in its current scope harms Israeli security interests and thus makes Israel far less likely to engage with the conference any time soon.¹² Some states disagree, arguing that participation is without prejudice to national security interests because the conference’s current modalities protect against such undesired outcomes.¹³ Others say that the catastrophic loss of civilian lives and prolonged humanitarian suffering in Gaza and Lebanon, coupled with implicit and explicit threats by Israeli officials to use nuclear weapons in Gaza,¹⁴ make it difficult for Arab states to engage with the current Israeli government in the conference work and not to condemn its actions despite seeing the urgent need to bring Israel into the conference process.¹⁵

Despite the regional volatility, the last two conference sessions witnessed notable procedural and substantive progress. The conference improved its working methodology by appointing the incoming presidents at the end of the previous annual session. This allows them, with input from participating states, to set the agenda of the working committee or any other intersessional body from the start of their term, culminating in the annual conference.¹⁶

The fourth session adopted for the first time a substantive summary of the working committee’s work, reflecting views and deliberations on elements of a future treaty. Yet, the fifth session reversed course and only accepted reporting in an informal “president’s summary” format. Such a format impacts other associated outcomes of the intersessional work, such as the index of topics developed to guide future annual sessions, which currently lacks official status because it was only annexed to the president’s summary. Some states supporting such an informal reporting format may be concerned about making substantive views and outcomes of the committee’s work binding, but this approach could advance the conference work by establishing institutional memory.

Another first during the fourth session was a closed-door regional meeting held in June 2024 in Doha to support the conference’s work. The meeting brought together senior representatives of the participating states to discuss the challenges and the way forward for the conference. Held alongside the third Arab Forum on Non-Proliferation, Disarmament and Arms Control, one of the largest regional nonproliferation and disarmament forums in the region, it enabled delegations to engage with senior officials and experts from regional capitals, the NPT nuclear-weapon states, and international organizations on various zone-related issues.

Building on the insights gained during the Doha meeting, the fifth session resumed the discussion on reviewing the conference work and exchanging ideas for future sessions. The conference identified Israel’s absence as the key challenge to the process and discussed options for engagement, including establishing a contact group to communicate with absent parties and tasking successive presidencies to work on this with the UN secretary-general. Additionally, the conference explored proposals for strengthening its work, such as improving substantive reporting, documenting agreements to serve as building blocks for future negotiations, and establishing a group of former conference presidents to advise on promoting structured discussion and progress in future sessions.

Future Conference Sessions

Despite the slow pace, the conference process serves the fundamental goal of keeping the zone initiative alive during declining multilateralism, high distrust, and conflict. It also has created an ongoing formal dialogue among regional states about elements, concepts, and architecture of the future Middle Eastern WMD-free zone. Such a dialogue fosters a better understanding of states’ positions and concerns while also providing a platform for ideas that could alleviate some of the regional tension around WMD risks. Still, successful conclusion of the treaty remains uncertain as long as key challenges remain unresolved, such as Israel’s rejection of the conference and disagreements over strengthening the conference’s substantive work, ongoing regional noncompliance issues, and unsafeguarded WMD activities.

Discussing these challenges during the fifth session was a positive step, but the proposals for tackling these issues still need further clarification and formalization. For instance, proposals focused on sequencing discussion based on the index of topics and documenting agreements as building blocks for the treaty text need to be negotiated further to decide how they will be incorporated into the working methods and practices.¹⁷ Some elements might need to be adopted as decisions by the conference.

Strengthening substantive work is also linked to the broader question of how to advance negotiations in the absence of key parties. Ideas raised so far include starting to negotiate text elements of a future treaty or even drafting the preambular elements and general provisions known as the “draft zero,” which can be put forward before formal negotiations start and was recently suggested by some states.¹⁸ Mauritania’s remarks during the fifth session alluded to the option of drafting the treaty without the participation of absent parties.¹⁹

In the absence of a decision on this matter, states may focus on making the current substantive discussions more efficient and targeted, allowing the conference to continue laying the groundwork for negotiations. For example, the conference could encourage an open discussion about any concerns regarding topics left over from past sessions that may be considered when negotiations reach the drafting stage and identify possible solutions for these contentious topics.

Another idea involves including experts from relevant governmental agencies at the conference sessions and working committee meetings. This would strengthen delegations’ capacities and the level of instruction, coordination, and authority. The proposal made during the fifth session to establish a sponsorship program and encourage voluntary contributions to support wider participation by specialists and officials from states with limited resources could support these efforts.

Israel’s absence and, to some extent, the United States’ absence as an observer are viewed as a key challenge to the process. The treaty will hold little value without the participation of all regional states, especially those believed to possess weapons of mass destruction or those aspiring to acquire them.

Regional circumstances may not be conducive to significant progress now. Nevertheless, the conference could still take steps to make its work more appealing to Israel by providing it and the United States clarity on two issues that traditionally have been of utmost importance to Israel. First is the level of guarantee that the future treaty will provide concerning compliance and enforcement, including verification measures and compliance and enforcement mechanisms. Second is the scope of the treaty, particularly whether delivery systems will be included, and the extent to which the conference is willing to broaden the range of discussions to include other threats of relevance to Israel and the conference’s mandate. The conference also could consider inviting nonofficial experts from Israel and the United States to the informal working committee meetings. The aim would be to better understand the positions of absent parties and help identify venues and opportunities for engaging their officials in the future.

The conference should also consider enhancing civil society participation to expand regional participation and expert representation. Accredited nongovernmental organizations currently can attend the opening, closing, and general debate sessions but not the thematic debate, which comprises the majority of conference time. Furthermore, there are no segments designated for their statements during the conference, making it unappealing and financially unattainable to travel to New York merely to attend open sessions that are live streamed.

As a precedent, the president of the fourth session held an informal open meeting with civil society representatives on the margins of the conference. Two youth regional civil society representatives were also invited to share their perspectives during the Doha meeting in 2024. Another precedent was holding the first side event, open to both delegates and civil society, held by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research on the margins of the fifth session.²⁰ More of these efforts are needed to enhance the process by increasing transparency, inviting civil society to support the process, and developing ideas to address current challenges.

The NPT Review Conference

The fifth session called for increased engagement with relevant international forums and their members, including the NPT, to promote the conference goals and request the inclusion of relevant issues in the outcome documents of the NPT review conferences and preparatory committee meetings.²¹ This involves mobilizing political support and urging NPT states, including the three NPT depositary states, to uphold their responsibilities toward the establishment of the zone. This renewed attention to the interlinkages between the conference and other parallel processes, mainly the NPT, has possible implications for the review cycles.

Since the first zone conference session, in 2019, participants have been optimistic that disagreements over the language in the NPT final document concerning the zone could be prevented as a reason for breaking or preventing consensus during NPT review conferences. This was the case during the 10th NPT Review Conference, in 2022, when compromise language on the zone was agreed.

Two factors make it challenging, however, to predict how the zone and Middle Eastern issues will impact the dynamics of the future review conference negotiations. First, discussions on nuclear risks in the Middle East during the review conference are tied closely to the ever-changing political and security situation in the region, particularly regarding Iran and Israel.

Second, although the Middle Eastern resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference serves as the terms of reference for the zone conference, participating states have not clearly defined the relationship between the zone conference and the NPT. Most participating states view the two as parallel processes or the conference as a venue for discussing the implementation of the 1995 resolution rather than replacements for one another. They affirm that past commitments made by the NPT conferences remain valid and that NPT states are still expected to contribute to the establishment of the zone. Yet, it remains unclear how or what exactly these expectations entail.

During the 2026 review conference, it can be expected that the Arab Group and Iran will seek language in the outcome document that endorses the zone conference process and calls for full participation by all regional states. Some states, particularly Iran, which expressed dissatisfaction with the language agreed by the United States and Egypt during the 2022 review conference, may push for stronger language, including explicit condemnation of Israel’s nuclear threats.²² Such a push is likely to receive support from the Arab Group, given the current regional dynamics.

Although it is impossible to decouple the NPT negotiations from regional politics, clarifying expectations ahead of the conference could reduce risks for both processes. One way to do that is to decide that substantive deliberations related to the zone would take place at the zone conference while the NPT continues to serve as a venue for seeking political support and consultations on broader challenges to the process. Delegating contentious substantive matters to the zone conference would preserve the time at the NPT review conference for negotiating all the other regional and nonregional specific issues and reduce the likelihood of disagreements.²³

ENDNOTES

1. UN General Assembly, “Report of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Work of Its First Session,” A/CONF.236/6, November 28, 2019, p. 5.

2. The rules of procedures allow for voting in three limited cases: rulings on procedural motions related to the suspension of meetings, adjournment or closure of debate, and points of order as outlined in rules 10, 14, and 15. UN General Assembly, “Rules of Procedure,” A/CONF.236/2021/3, December 3, 2021.

3. UN General Assembly, “Establishment of a Working Committee to Continue Deliberations Among Members of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction During the Intersessional Period of the Conference,” A/CONF.236/2021/DEC.3, December 3, 2021, p. 1.

4. For example, the United Arab Emirates noted that the working committee serves as an avenue for discussing the steps required for making progress. Sudan emphasized that it could be utilized to discuss the concerns of all countries, and Kuwait remarked that it assisted in expanding Kuwait’s perspectives on how to move forward. For additional examples of how states referred to advantages of the working committee method and other related conference issues, see UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) Middle East WMD-Free Zone Compass, “Working Methodology of the UNGA-Mandated Conference: Working Committee,” n.d., (accessed January 1, 2025).

5. See UNIDIR, “Organization Meeting of the Working Committee of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other WMD in 2022,” n.d., (accessed January 1, 2025).

6. UN General Assembly, “Report of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Work of Its Second Session,” A/CONF.236/2021/4, December 3, 2021 (hereinafter second session report), p. 4.

7. For more detailed views and statements by states on obligations, see UNIDIR Middle East WMD-Free Zone Compass, “Obligations,” n.d., (accessed January 1, 2025).

8. Some of these elements were highlighted in the second session’s report as issues the conference agreed to discuss further in subsequent sessions, also known as “Issues under Paragraph 51.” Second session report.

9. See Heidar Ali Balouji, Statement before the Fourth Session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, n.d., p. 1; Amir Saeid Iravani, Statement before the Fourth Session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, November 13, 2023, p. 4, ; Arab Republic of Egypt, Statement at the Third Session of the Conference on Establishing a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, November 15, 2022, pp. 6-10, 
(in Arabic).

10. See Heidar Ali Balouji, Statement on inalienable right to use technology for peaceful purposes and unilateral coercive measures before the Third Session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, n.d.

11. UN General Assembly, “Report of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Work of Its Third Session,” A/CONF.236/2022/3, November 21, 2022, pp. 5-6.

12. Ariel Levite, “An Israeli Vision of a Middle East NWFZ,” in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., “A Middle East Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Utopia?” Nonproliferation Policy Education Center Occasional Paper, No. 2307, November 2023.

13. See “Inclusivity Versus Self-Isolation: The Pressing Issue of the United Nations Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction; Working Paper Submitted by the Russian Federation,” A/CONF.236/2024/WP.1, September 30, 2024.

14. Michael Bachner, “Far-Right Minister Says Nuking Gaza an Option, PM Suspends Him From Cabinet Meetings,” The Times of Israel, November 5, 2023; Sam Sokol, “Far-Right Minister Eliyahu: ‘Even in the Hague They Know My Position,’” The Times of Israel, January 24, 2024.

15. For example, the national statement by Kuwait during the fourth and fifth sessions of the conference rejected engaging the current Israeli government and supported the League of Arab States and Organization of Islamic Cooperation decision to document possible war crimes. See Statement of Kuwait, November 13, 2023, p. 7, (in Arabic).

16. UN General Assembly, “Report of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Work of Its Fourth Session,” A/CONF.236/2023/4, November 20, 2023, p. 3.

17. UN General Assembly, “Report of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Work of Its Fifth Session,” A/CONF.236/2024/3, November 22, 2024 (hereinafter fifth session report).

18. See Statement of Qatar during the fifth session on behalf of the GCC, n.d., p. 4, 
(in Arabic).

19. See Statement of Mauritania during the fifth session, n.d., p. 3, (in Arabic).

20. The event featured a demonstration of UNIDIR tools for supporting the zone. See Almuntaser Albalawi, “UNIDIR Tools for Supporting the Middle East WMD-Free Zone,” November 19, 2024, posted December 13, 2024, by UNIDIR, YouTube.

21. Fifth session report.

22. 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, “Main Committee II: Summary Record of the 11th Meeting,” NPT/CONF.2020/MC.II/SR.11, October 25, 2022, paras. 75-76 (referencing 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, “Draft Final Document,” NPT/CONF.2020/CRP.1/Rev.2, August 25, 2022).

23. Almuntaser Albalawi, “A Balanced Approach to Addressing Nuclear Risks in the Middle East While Preserving the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Peace Review, Vol. 36, No. 2 (2024): 238-250.

January/February 2025

The Foundations of Modern Arms Control: An International History, 1815-1968
By Robert M. Blum
Routledge
2024

The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the broader bilateral arms control relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War often are heralded as the crowning achievements of nuclear arms control. Yet, there exists a long history that was crucial in laying the groundwork for these successes. Author Robert M. Blum explores this history from the end of the Napoleonic wars to the negotiation of the NPT, not as an inevitable trajectory but rather as a process by which a diverse set of actors gradually shifted international attitudes over time through varying historical and relational contexts. He traces this process from the early advocacy of mechanisms for arbitration to the international community’s embrace of “total and complete disarmament” and finally to the climate of compromise that shrouded the NPT negotiation process, which remains a hallmark of conventional wisdom surrounding modern arms control agreements. Crucially, Blum highlights the contribution of civil society and peace movements led by women and people of color. Their pressure campaigns often played a key role despite the widely varying levels of openness among government officials to such groups in negotiation processes. This concise history proves a valuable resource for anyone who seeks to better understand the modern day arms control landscape.—GARRETT WELCH

A Farewell to Wars: The Growing Restraints on the Interstate Use of Force
By Hans Blix
Cambridge University Press
2023

In the wake of the unprecedented Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, many have concluded that the era of great-power competition has returned. Despite the heightened international context, author Hans Blix contests the traditional realist framework of writers such as Hans Morgenthau, Francis Fukuyama, and Azar Gat that views armed interstate conflict as an inevitable consequence of human nature. Instead, Blix presents a competing narrative that centers on the successes of international law and global diplomacy in limiting warfare. He leverages his decades of experience as a Swedish diplomat to contextualize evolving norms and legal frameworks, including the establishment of the UN system, the International Criminal Court, and various treaties and conventions that have been instrumental in constraining the use of force between and among states. Based on this, he argues that Russia’s war in Ukraine is a “major aberration” that constitutes a grave breach of binding international norms but that the norms themselves remain intact. This perspective carries significant implications for states, diplomats, and civil society attempting to shape an increasingly uncertain environment.—GARRETT WELCH