North Korea conducted its second nuclear test May 25, prompting international condemnation for violating UN demands and raising tensions in the region. The test comes a month after North Korea declared that it would no longer participate in multilateral talks on its denuclearization and would carry out nuclear and missile tests to strengthen its deterrent capability. (See
ACT, May 2009.) After the test, Pyongyang's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) struck a similar note, saying the blast was "part of the measures to bolster up [North Korea's] nuclear deterrent for self-defense." (Continue)

Peter Crail

North Korea conducted its second nuclear test May 25, prompting international condemnation for violating UN demands and raising tensions in the region. The test comes a month after North Korea declared that it would no longer participate in multilateral talks on its denuclearization and would carry out nuclear and missile tests to strengthen its deterrent capability. (See ACT, May 2009.) After the test, Pyongyang's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) struck a similar note, saying the blast was "part of the measures to bolster up [North Korea's] nuclear deterrent for self-defense."

U.S. statements responding to the test focused particularly on the consequence of Pyongyang's increasing isolation following its actions and on Washington's intention to coordinate a response both within the UN Security Council and with other countries in the region previously involved in six-way negotiations with North Korea. The morning after the test, President Barack Obama said that, in response to the nuclear test, the United States and its four partners in the regional talks-China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea-"have all come to the same conclusion: North Korea will not find security and respect through threats and illegal weapons."

Moscow and Beijing issued their own condemnatory statements immediately after the test. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu said May 26 that China "resolutely opposed" the test and that, in carrying it out, North Korea had "ignored [the] universal opposition of the international community."

Russia said the test undermined the nuclear nonproliferation regime, as well as regional security. Russian officials expressed particular concern over the continued development of North Korea's nonconventional military capabilities. "Particularly disturbing is the fact that North Korea's nuclear program is carried out in conjunction with the development of missile technologies," Presidential Press Secretary Natalia Timakova said May 27.

Following a May 26 emergency meeting called by Japan, the UN Security Council responded to the test by issuing a statement declaring it to be a "clear violation" of Resolution 1718. Council members also indicated that they would begin work "immediately" on a new resolution.

Resolution 1718, which the council adopted in 2006 following North Korea's explosion of a nuclear device earlier that year, prohibited Pyongyang from carrying out any further nuclear tests.

The United States will be seeking a new Security Council resolution "with teeth," Susan Rice, U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations, said during a May 26 press briefing. "Those teeth could take various different forms. There are economic levers-there are other levers that we might pursue," she added.

China's Response

Although China strongly condemned the test, it is unclear how far North Korea's closest ally and most significant benefactor is willing to go in imposing penalties on Pyongyang for violating the council's demands. In his May 26 comments, Ma said that "relevant parties" must respond to the launch in a "coolheaded and appropriate way." China used similar language in April when it agreed to a stern Security Council statement responding to North Korea's rocket launch but opposed a more legally binding resolution. (See ACT, May 2009.)

Current and former U.S. officials and politicians seemed to be hopeful of China's cooperation in crafting a strong response. White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs told reporters May 28 that Beijing has been "very helpful" in discussions at the UN on North Korea.

Speaking to reporters in Beijing following meetings with senior Chinese officials there, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry (D-Mass.) said that Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi "agreed with us that North Korea's actions were wrong and that there need to be consequences."

According to Dennis Wilder, former senior National Security Council director for East Asian affairs, "We are seeing the Chinese beginning to move to a stronger position on this nuclear test." Speaking to a Brookings Institution audience May 27, Wilder said China has used its political and economic leverage over North Korea in the past with positive results, including in 2003 to encourage Pyongyang to join in six-party talks and in 2006 in response to the first nuclear test.

South Korea Joins PSI

The day following the test, South Korea announced that it would formally join the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a U.S.-led effort that focuses on interdiction and coordinated information-sharing to prevent the proliferation of nonconventional weapons and materials. Seoul previously was an observer to the informal group, which comprises about 96 participants.

Outlining Seoul's rationale for joining the initiative, Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan told the South Korean National Assembly May 26 that the North Korean nuclear test "proves the threats of proliferation of dangerous weapons have increased" and that endorsing the PSI was Seoul's "duty as a member of the international community."

A South Korean diplomat told Arms Control Today May 27 that although Seoul is prepared to inspect and interdict suspect shipments, participation in the PSI is primarily intended to deter North Korea from using the South's territory to proliferate or acquire sensitive technologies.

South Korea was already considering joining the PSI following North Korea's rocket launch last month but delayed making an announcement because of apparent divisions within the South Korean government and concerns about North Korea's reaction. (See ACT, May 2009.)

Pyongyang had previously stated that Seoul's participation in the PSI would constitute an act of war. Following through on this threat, KCNA said May 27 that the North Korean army "will not be bound to the [1953] Armistice Agreement any longer" and that North Korea would "deal a decisive and merciless retaliatory blow" in response to the inspection of its ships by South Korea.

The Armistice Agreement ended hostilities following the Korean War. A formal peace agreement has never been concluded.

Test Analysis Under Way

Early estimates indicate that the test was at least more successful than North Korea's first nuclear detonation in 2006. Siegfried Hecker, former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, estimated May 26 that the yield was between two and four kilotons.

In comparison, North Korea's 2006 test was estimated to be about 0.5 kilotons and at best a partial success. (See ACT, November 2006.) Prior to that test, Pyongyang reportedly informed Beijing that it expected a yield of four kilotons. It is unclear what yield North Korea intended to achieve with the May test.

Preliminary estimates of the yield of the test have been based solely on seismic data generated by the shockwaves that emanated from the test site, located a few kilometers from the 2006 test near the village of P'unggye. According to a May 25 press release by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, analysis of the noble gases released from the underground explosion will proceed in the coming days.

Kimball and Rademaker Debate the CTBT at CSIS

Description

ACA Executive Director Daryl Kimball and Former Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker debate the merits of ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

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ACA Executive Director Daryl Kimball, and Stephen Rademaker, former Assistant Secretary of State, debated the merits of U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) during the 3rd Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) Debates the Issues.

PONI Debates the Issues: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

May 13, 2009

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During his 2000 presidential campaign, Gov. George W. Bush pledged to "leave the Cold War behind [and] rethink the requirements for nuclear deterrence." Today, the United States and Russia each still deploy about 3,000-4,000 strategic nuclear warheads, many of which are primed for launch within minutes in order to deter a surprise attack by the other. The Cold War may technically be over, but the practical reality is that the weapons and outdated nuclear deterrence thinking of that era persist.

Although the United States is on track to deploy no more than 1,700-2,200 strategic warheads by 2012 as mandated by the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), the agreement's limit expires the day it takes effect. It also allows each side to store thousands of reserve warheads and missiles as a hedge against unforeseen threats. The treaty fails to establish new verification mechanisms, relying instead on those contained in the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). (Continue)

Daryl G. Kimball

During his 2000 presidential campaign, Gov. George W. Bush pledged to "leave the Cold War behind [and] rethink the requirements for nuclear deterrence." Today, the United States and Russia each still deploy about 3,000-4,000 strategic nuclear warheads, many of which are primed for launch within minutes in order to deter a surprise attack by the other. The Cold War may technically be over, but the practical reality is that the weapons and outdated nuclear deterrence thinking of that era persist.

Although the United States is on track to deploy no more than 1,700-2,200 strategic warheads by 2012 as mandated by the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), the agreement's limit expires the day it takes effect. It also allows each side to store thousands of reserve warheads and missiles as a hedge against unforeseen threats. The treaty fails to establish new verification mechanisms, relying instead on those contained in the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

Worse still, the White House and the Kremlin have failed to come to terms on a follow-on to START, which is due to expire in December 2009. Without START's far-reaching verification system, neither side would be able to confidently assess the size and location of the other's nuclear forces, adding another dangerous irritant to strained U.S.-Russian relations.

The new president can and must do better. With the START deadline looming, his administration must work expeditiously with Russia to negotiate and conclude an agreement to dramatically and irreversibly cut their still-bloated nuclear stockpiles.

The good news is that, during the campaign, both presidential candidates called for deeper reductions through a new agreement with Russia. In a September 2008 response to Arms Control Today questions, Sen. Barack Obama (D-Ill.) called for "real, verifiable reductions in all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons.... [T]his process should begin by securing Russia's agreement to extend essential monitoring and verification provisions of START." Obama also pledged to "immediately stand down all nuclear forces to be reduced under [SORT]," which could involve hundreds of currently deployed warheads.

To be sure, implementation of these long-overdue steps is easier said than done. The new administration will be working overtime from day one to address multiple other foreign policy challenges. Yet, charting the future for START and a saner nuclear relationship with Russia cannot wait.

Soon after Inauguration Day, the new president should invite senior Russian leaders to resume nuclear arms talks. The goal should be to conclude a new START-plus deal that achieves dramatically deeper reductions of U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads­, deployed and nondeployed, to 1,000 or less by 2012. If necessary, the U.S. and Russian presidents should agree to extend START until they can bring into force a new agreement.

To succeed, the new administration must adopt new approaches to resolve key issues that have stalled progress. Russia has shown interest in deeper reductions: less than 1,500 warheads each along with specific limits on delivery systems. Unfortunately, the Bush administration has rejected lower ceilings on deployed warheads and further limitations on missiles and bombers.

Indeed, as Obama, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), and others have argued, deeper warhead reductions are possible and prudent. Two decades after the end of the Cold War, there is no plausible reason for U.S. and Russian leaders to maintain thousands of strategic nuclear weapons with large numbers on high alert. Besides the United States and Russia, no state possesses more than 300 nuclear warheads. China currently only has about 20 nuclear-armed missiles capable of striking the continental United States.

Massive arsenals capable of annihilating entire nations within an hour are more of a liability than an asset because they breed mistrust and worst-case assumptions among other states and perpetuate the risk of accidental or unauthorized launch, nor do U.S. nuclear weapons serve a necessary or practical role in deterring threats from non-nuclear adversaries or in response to non-nuclear attacks.

Washington and Moscow also should establish lower limits on nuclear-capable delivery systems, including caps on how many warheads each system may carry. This would increase confidence that neither side could quickly reconstitute and field a far larger force. A schedule and process for verifiable warhead dismantlement should be addressed in a subsequent agreement.

Such an approach is feasible and practical. As outlined in a 2007 Arms Control Association report by physicist Sidney Drell and Ambassador James Goodby, the United States could quickly downshift to a strategic triad of some 288 warheads on a fleet of three or more Trident submarines on patrol, 100 warheads on 100 land-based Minuteman missiles, and about two dozen nuclear-capable strategic bombers. Comparable numbers of nondeployed warheads and delivery systems could serve as a "responsive" force.

Yesterday's nuclear doctrines and arsenals do not fit today's realities. The next president must seize his opportunity to dramatically reduce the number and salience of nuclear weapons, restore U.S. credibility on disarmament, and open a conversation with the world's other nuclear-armed states on joint measures to reduce and eventually eliminate global stockpiles.

Stephen Bunnell

A recently declassified report from a Department of Defense review panel calls on the government to provide more political and financial support to a Pentagon agency that is tasked with defending the United States from weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The report, which was originally authored in March, was produced by a review panel headed by Robert Joseph, who served as undersecretary of state for arms control and international security under President George W. Bush, and Ashton Carter, assistant secretary of defense for international security policy during the Clinton administration.

The report finds that the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), established a decade ago, “has not been given the means required to meet all of its current responsibilities, let alone to realize its full potential for the U.S. Government in combating” weapons of mass destruction. It lists two overarching recommendations: “strong advocacy and commitment by senior [Defense Department] leadership” and “a detailed strategic plan for combating” weapons of mass destruction. The report calls on the Pentagon to treat preparations for WMD threats by adversaries as a top priority.

The report recommends a restructuring of the top levels of DTRA leadership in order to provide the senior-level advocacy needed for the agency. The panel calls for creating a new assistant secretary of defense for WMD issues reporting directly to the secretary or deputy secretary. They further recommend that the DTRA director be a three-star military officer if the new assistant secretary for WMD issues position is created. These recommendations aim to give the DTRA strong advocates within the Pentagon, in order to win the agency greater funding and budget flexibility.

In addition, the report recommends a closer relationship between the DTRA and regional combatant commands and a much more active and involved role for Strategic Command (STRATCOM) within the military in such areas as planning and exercises. The report characterizes the current mandate for STRATCOM as “overly ambiguous and appears to allow [combatant commands] to choose when, how, and whether to involve STRATCOM…in their planning processes, exercises, theater security cooperation programs, and the like.”

Moreover, the report calls for a closer interagency relationship between the DTRA and the rest of the government, describing the DTRA as “a national asset.” It recommends that representatives of the agency participate in meetings of interagency initiatives on counterproliferation and homeland security as well as in international negotiations, such as those seeking nuclear disarmament of North Korea.
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