March 2026 
By Mark Goodman

The peaceful use of nuclear energy is a central element of nuclear nonproliferation policy and will feature prominently in the 2026 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference April-May in New York. It  
can be a unifying issue when it is recognized as a shared benefit that rests on shared principles, but it can become divisive when it leads to disputes over rights.

Developing countries often complain that their legal rights to the peaceful use of nuclear technology are being infringed by export controls applied by technology holders. Such disagreements raise questions about the nature of those rights and whether they have, in fact, been infringed and practical questions about how to bridge differences between nuclear suppliers and developing countries.

Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy

In the context of nuclear nonproliferation policy, peaceful use of nuclear energy refers not just to nuclear reactors that generate electricity, but also to the non-power applications of nuclear science and technology in areas such as radiation therapy for cancer and food preservation in agriculture. Unlike nuclear power, which is currently used in 31 countries, these non-power applications are nearly ubiquitous.

The NPT is the legal foundation of efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It recognizes five states—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—as nuclear-weapon states and commits all other parties to forsake nuclear weapons. As part of the bargain, the treaty recognizes the right of states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and its parties agree to facilitate exercise of that right.¹

The treaty addresses this issue primarily in Article IV (see Figure 1), stating in its first paragraph that the NPT does not affect the right of states to develop and use nuclear energy. The treaty does not grant this right; it recognizes it as part of the broader sovereign right of states to use natural resources to serve their national interests. The NPT also does not expand this right; it says it must be exercised in conformity with the nonproliferation obligations in Articles I and II and subject to the international monitoring required by Article III. A nuclear program inconsistent with those articles—one that operates in secret or involves the production or transfer of nuclear weapons—is not protected by this right.

The second paragraph of Article IV expresses the right of states to engage in nuclear cooperation and commerce by participating in “the fullest possible exchange” of material, equipment, and information for peaceful use of nuclear energy. This provision does not just recognize rights; it also establishes specific obligations: that all NPT parties facilitate that “fullest possible exchange” and that states “in a position to do so” contribute to the further development of peaceful applications of nuclear technology “with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.” These two obligations provide concrete benefits for all NPT parties, recognizing the particular needs of developing countries.²

Article III, which provides for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to apply safeguards to monitor the peaceful nuclear programs of non-nuclear-weapon-states, contains a related provision. It states that “safeguards … shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities.” Although IAEA safeguards should not impede peaceful nuclear programs, this provision does not limit the ability to impose penalties if a state fails to comply with its safeguards obligation, or if the IAEA cannot verify that its nuclear program is entirely peaceful.

Differing Interpretations

Since the NPT was negotiated in the 1960s, there have been disagreements over specific rights to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The disputes center on what the rights in the NPT mean and, beyond what the NPT specifically provides, what rights states should have. Developing countries often complain that nuclear export controls,³ which reinforce the NPT but go beyond its requirements, infringe their rights, although there is little empirical evidence to support this.⁴

Some states have asserted not only the sovereign right to make decisions about their nuclear energy and fuel cycle programs, but also the obligation of other states to respect those decisions. Iran, in particular, claims that international sanctions imposed over its nuclear program and attacks on its nuclear facilities violate its rights under the NPT. When the nature of these rights is in dispute, it can clarify matters to focus on what the NPT requires, what it permits, and what it prohibits.

During the NPT negotiations and since, some states have sought explicit recognition of a right to all parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing. Uranium enrichment can be used to produce nuclear reactor fuel as well as highly enriched uranium for weapons, while reprocessing of spent fuel can be used to produce plutonium for weapons. The NPT is silent on this issue. Although the treaty does not establish an explicit right to any specific nuclear technology,⁵ it generally permits enrichment and reprocessing if these technologies are not used to produce nuclear weapons.

The NPT negotiating record and the U.S. NPT ratification record both support this understanding. The United States told other states during the NPT negotiations that enriching uranium and stockpiling enriched uranium were not prohibited if the enrichment process and the enriched uranium product were placed under IAEA safeguards to verify that the process was not misused and the product was not diverted for weapons. The Lyndon Johnson administration told the U.S. Senate the same thing during NPT ratification hearings in 1968.⁶

Although there is a presumption that nuclear activities carried out under IAEA safeguards are peaceful, that presumption is not absolute. If a state violates IAEA safeguards, either by diverting nuclear material or by carrying out nuclear activities in secret, that presumption would no longer be justified. In 2003, for example, the IAEA confirmed allegations that Iran was pursuing nuclear activities it had not declared to the agency, and its Board of Governors subsequently found Iran in noncompliance with its safeguards obligations.⁷ The United States concluded that Iran’s undeclared nuclear program was intended to produce nuclear weapons,⁸ a violation of its NPT Article II obligation, and the IAEA later reported information on the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program.⁹ The Iranian case shows that the question of whether specific nuclear fuel cycle activities are permitted depends not on the rights expressed in Article IV but on the specific prohibitions and requirements in Articles I, II, and III.

Right of Access to Nuclear Technology

Developing countries also have asserted that third parties’ efforts to limit access to nuclear technology violate their right to develop all elements of the nuclear fuel cycle. They argue that the “fullest possible exchange” should entail giving states full access to nuclear fuel cycle technology. They object to restrictions on “sensitive” fuel cycle technologies, arguing that the NPT does not distinguish between “sensitive” and other nuclear technologies.

But Article IV does not spell out a right of access to any specific nuclear technology, nor does it impose an obligation on countries that hold such technology to provide it to others. The negotiating record shows that this lack of specificity was deliberate.¹⁰ Several countries proposed amendments that would have spelled out rights to fuel cycle technology and obligations to supply nuclear fuel, but those amendments were not adopted. The United States made clear that the undertaking to “facilitate the fullest possible exchange” of nuclear technology would not override existing laws, policies, or regulations, including intellectual property rights and export control policies, and was not intended to compel suppliers to provide nuclear material or technology.¹¹

Over the years, developing countries have charged that some nuclear export controls and sanctions measures violate Article IV. They do not object to all export controls, as the NPT itself requires IAEA safeguards controls on exports of nuclear material and specialized nuclear equipment, a form of export control.¹² The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has developed export control guidelines that go beyond what the NPT requires.¹³ The guidelines cover dual-use equipment and technology and impose stricter controls on sensitive nuclear technologies, including enrichment and reprocessing.

Although some countries object that these controls impede nuclear cooperation, most recognize that the NSG multilateral export control guidelines reinforce the NPT nonproliferation goals. Suppliers argue that export controls facilitate cooperation by building confidence that the fruits of that cooperation will not be misused or diverted to make weapons.¹⁴ The NPT does not bar states from imposing such controls or from entering into agreements that lay out the terms for nuclear cooperation between governments, as most NSG members do.

Sanctions have been used as a nonproliferation enforcement tool in cases of noncompliance. The UN Security Council imposed sanctions against Iraq, North Korea, and Iran in response to findings of noncompliance by the IAEA board. Those sanctions—based on provisions of the UN Charter giving the Security Council responsibility for maintaining international peace and security—imposed restrictions on nuclear activities and cooperation. The IAEA similarly suspended the rights and privileges of membership in cases of noncompliance. The UN and the IAEA predate the NPT, and the NPT did not affect their ability to impose those sanctions.

UN sanctions often begin with nuclear constraints but later expand to include broad economic measures designed to pressure a country to comply. States have also imposed sanctions that go beyond the UN requirements. Complaints about sanctions generally focus on their economic and humanitarian impact and their unilateral nature, rather than on the limits they place on nuclear cooperation.

Leading nuclear suppliers have sought to limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing through export controls and  also by providing incentives for states to rely on international markets for nuclear fuel. They argue that reliable supplies of enriched uranium, backed by formal supply assurance mechanisms, would enable states to avoid the cost and technical challenge of developing domestic enrichment capabilities.¹⁵

However, when U.S. President George W. Bush proposed in 2004 to provide reliable access to nuclear reactor fuel to countries that would renounce enrichment and reprocessing,¹⁶ some reacted with suspicion that this was an attempt to deprive them of their right to nuclear fuel cycle technology. Yet voluntary participation in fuel supply assurances can contribute to nonproliferation and can help resolve cases of noncompliance.¹⁷

Practical Impacts

The historical record shows steady expansion of international cooperation that helps NPT parties enjoy the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science, and technology. Although it predates the NPT, the IAEA has been one of the main vehicles for developing peaceful nuclear energy applications and providing assistance to help NPT members use nuclear technology to meet their national development needs in energy, health, agriculture, industry, and resource management.

Since the NPT opened for signature in 1968, the IAEA’s annual expenditures for such assistance have risen steadily from $2.5 million in 1968 to $156 million in 2024. This increase is about 50 percent more than can be explained by increases in prices, population, and IAEA membership; it is also roughly 50 percent more than the increase in global GDP.

The NPT helped drive this growth. Donors have given additional funds to IAEA projects that assisted NPT parties as a tangible benefit of joining the treaty and a concrete demonstration of their commitment to the NPT bargain. At the NPT Review Conference in 2010, the United States and Japan helped launch the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative and other donors have since contributed.¹⁸

Successive IAEA directors-general have launched a series of flagship initiatives to meet development needs using nuclear technology. For example, the Rays of Hope initiative is expanding access to radiation therapy to treat cancer in low- and middle-income countries.¹⁹ Another example is the sterile insect technique, which uses radiation to sterilize male insects and suppress diseases that plague people and livestock, such as sleeping sickness in Africa and screwworm in the Americas.²⁰

Most nuclear cooperation takes place through agreements between governments and contracts between companies. This type of cooperation spurred the expansion of nuclear power from just six countries in 1968 to over 30 countries today. In 2025, more than 30 countries set a goal of tripling nuclear power use by 2050 as a way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and limit climate change.²¹ The use of nuclear research reactors for research, training, and the production of radioisotopes for medical and other uses has spread to all corners of the globe, and the use of radioisotopes and other radiation techniques is practically universal.

Debates over the scope and nature of rights to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes tend to be both bitter and pointless. Some states will object to text that asserts a right of access to certain technologies, just as others will object to text calling for constraints on such access. Expressions of rights have no practical effect, and the only text that can gain consensus is one that quotes or refers to provisions of the NPT without elaboration.

Rather than debating rights in the abstract, the 2026 NPT Review Conference would do well to focus on practical actions that help further realize those rights. In the multilateral context, the record is quite strong. NPT review conferences have provided the impetus to make additional resources available to meet developing countries’ needs. The last treaty review cycle saw a new focus on ways to better align the application of nuclear technology cooperation with development needs and to mobilize international development assistance to make that technology more widely available.²²

To reach consensus, the next review conference will need to navigate a few potential sticking points. Iran will likely assert that Israeli and U.S. attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities last June violated the NPT because they infringed upon Iran’s right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Many countries, but not all, consider attacks on nuclear facilities to violate the laws of war. The 2022 NPT Review Conference foundered because Russia blocked consensus over text critical of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine that year, including its attacks on and seizure of Ukrainian nuclear facilities. As with past review conferences, reaching consensus will depend on finding a formulation that treats this issue in a generic manner rather than insisting on text that explicitly criticizes any one of the participating countries.

Another delicate issue is how to address the uses of nuclear energy and nuclear technology for sustainable development in light of the U.S. positions on those issues. The United States sought to delete or limit references to the UN Sustainable Development Goals and climate change in the resolutions adopted by the IAEA General Conference in 2025. There is no path to consensus by isolating the United States, so negotiators will need flexibility to replace specific terms with more general references to international development assistance and national development needs, and to replace endorsement of disputed points with factual statements.

The upcoming review conference will face many issues on which views are divided, but there are time-tested ways to bridge those divisions if the parties have the political will to find them.

ENDNOTES

1. Mark Goodman, “Common misconceptions about the NPT: A practitioner’s guide,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 14, 2025.

2. The preamble to the NPT contains similar text, expressed in terms of principles rather than legal requirements.

3. Giovanna Maletta, Mark Bromley, and Kolja Brockmann, “Non-Proliferation, Nuclear Technology and Peaceful Uses: Examining the Role and Impact of Export Controls,” EU Nonproliferation Consortium, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Papers, No. 95 (April 2025).

4. Goodman, 2025.

5. Henry Sokolski and Sharon Squassoni, “Actually, the NPT doesn’t guarantee a right to make nuclear fuel,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 15, 2025.

6. Mohamed Shaker, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation 1959-1979, Vol. I (1980), p. 251. The United States and the Soviet Union co-chaired the NPT negotiating committee, jointly drafted its text, and jointly decided how to respond to amendments proposed by other countries, so U.S. statements on this matter can be considered authoritative.

7. IAEA Board of Governors, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Resolution adopted September 24, 2005 (GOV/2005/77).

8. U.S. Department of State, “Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” August 2025, p. 80; Gregory F. Treverton, “CIA Support to Policymakers: The 2007 NIE on Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities,” CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, May 2013, p. 16.

9. IAEA Director-General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” November 8, 2011.

10. Shaker, 1980, pp. 293-338.

11. U.S. Department of State, “The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency During the Johnson Administration,” Vol. II, Part II.B: “Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” FOIA Library case M-2018-04281, pp. 378, 426.

12. The Zangger Committee was established in 1971 to develop a common understanding of the NPT Article III.2 requirement to apply safeguards for exports of specialized nuclear equipment. It published its control list in 1974 and provides regular updates.

13. The Nuclear Suppliers Group was established in 1974 following India's nuclear test. It published export control guidelines in 1977 and provides regular updates to its control lists and guidelines, responding to changes in technology and proliferation-related events.

14. Kolja Brockmann, Mark Bromley, and Giovanna Maletta, “Implications of the UN resolutions on ‘international cooperation on peaceful uses’: Balancing non-proliferation and economic development,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, December 11, 2024.

15. IAEA, “Nuclear fuel assurance,” webpage accessed February 13, 2026.

16. The White House, “President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD,” remarks to the press by President Bush at the National Defense University, February 11, 2004.

17. Frank von Hippel, Alexander Glaser, Zia Mian, and Seyed Hossein Mousavian, “A nuclear consortium in the Persian Gulf as a basis for a new nuclear deal between the United States and Iran,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 2, 2025.

18. IAEA, Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI), webpage accessed February 13, 2026.

19. IAEA, Rays of Hope, webpage accessed February 13, 2026.

20. IAEA, Sterile Insect Technique, webpage accessed February 13, 2026.

21. IAEA spokeswoman Mary Albon, “Two More Countries Join Global Pledge to Triple Nuclear Energy by 2050,” November 24, 2025.

22. UN Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, “Update on the Sustained Dialogue on Peaceful Uses to Support Enhanced Cooperation as Envisioned under Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” working paper submitted by 37 countries, August 1, 2023 (NPT/CONF.2026/PC.I/WP.29).

March 2026
By Georgi Ivanov

A growing narrative within U.S. strategic circles frames the deepening partnership between China and Russia as a monolithic, coordinated threat, particularly in the military domain. This perspective finds support from various analysts who posit the two nations as a single challenge and explore ways to counter their alignment. More importantly, this view is embedded in official U.S. strategic documents, notably the 2022 National Defense Strategy focus on a “near-simultaneous conflict with two nuclear-armed states,” a concept that the Atlantic Council discusses as “collaborative Chinese-Russian aggression in both theaters.”¹

This might be a misleading construct, however. A closer examination reveals that Beijing and Moscow are not a joint military peer but separate and distinct competitors whose differing doctrines and competing strategic objectives prevent any meaningful integration of their strategic military capabilities.

The perception of a combined threat serves as a valuable political narrative. It rationalizes the U.S. military buildup by framing the separate modernization efforts of China and Russia as a unified challenge, which in turn justifies a significant portion of U.S. defense spending and the need to maintain its dominant military position. One example is the U.S. development of expensive hypersonic weapon programs such as the Army’s Long-range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), which is positioned as a necessary counterweight to China’s growing medium-range systems (including the Dongfeng-17 and the latest Dongfeng-26 variants) and Russia’s medium-range hypersonic missiles, such as the Zircon and Oreshnik.

Yet these Chinese and Russian systems were designed to provide attack options against potential regional adversaries, not the United States itself. Both countries already have intercontinental ballistic missiles to hold the U.S. homeland at risk. In contrast, according to a Congressional Research Service report, the Army’s new Multidomain Task Force, in which the LRHW is a key component, is explicitly structured to counter China and Russia.² It is planned that the second task force, which supports the European theater of operations, will be deployed in Germany, while the first, third, and fourth task forces will be deployed to the Indo-Pacific region.

‘Us versus Them’

This “us versus them” framework allows the United States to further set agendas and rally resources effectively at both domestic and international levels. At the same time, this perception also introduces substantial dangers. It can misguide policymakers, lead to unrealistic strategic assessments, and deepen distrust in the strategic environment, ultimately undermining arms control and escalating risks to strategic stability.

The core of the narrative is the overstated potential for nuclear cooperation between China and Russia. Their nuclear doctrines are fundamentally misaligned: Russia employs a nuclear first-use strategy backed by a nuclear-sharing policy that asserts the right to use tactical nuclear weapons,³ while China adheres to a strict no-first-use policy, viewing its arsenal as a minimal deterrent. Although China’s nuclear modernization program prompts speculation about a future doctrinal shift, no concrete evidence suggests that such a change is currently under consideration by Beijing.

Crucially, there is no integration of both states’ command-and-control systems—the most sovereign of military functions—thus precluding joint operational planning in the strategic nuclear domain. For both states to be considered a dual threat, the last requirement necessarily must be met. Relying on concepts such as sequential nuclear deterrence, the process of testing each other’s boundaries step-by-step, is a risky strategy. Rather than reinforcing stability, it undermines arms control and acts as an obstacle to strategic predictability. Furthermore, Chinese and Russian nuclear postures reflect different stages of development: Russia possesses a mature, large-scale arsenal built over decades, while China has just begun expansion of its strategic forces. This adds to the problem of differing military capabilities, which inform different strategies and make it more complicated for further cooperation in the military sphere.

The operational divide between Beijing and Moscow is compounded by divergent and often competing foreign policy priorities. Militarily, Russia remains predominantly oriented toward Europe and Ukraine, despite its claimed “pivot to the East.”⁴ China, on the other hand, directs its resources and attention to the Indo-Pacific region as the primary theater of competition with the United States. This divergence is evident in the Chinese and Russian approaches to regional disputes: China maintains a position of neutrality on the military conflict in Ukraine, seeking to preserve a relative status quo in economic relations with the European Union, while Russia is deepening cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,⁵ some of whom, such as the Philippines, are in a confrontation with China in the South China Sea.

Russia’s Own Agenda

These factors demonstrate that Russia’s goal in the region is not to support China’s strategic interests but to pursue its own agenda of diplomatic and economic cooperation.⁶ The same could be said for China regarding its European interests. Beijing actively avoids formal obligations of a potential military alliance with Moscow, understanding that such a pact would demand significant resources and run the risk of having Western sanctions imposed on its business affairs.⁷ Thus, a defense agreement, essential for conducting joint military operations in any domain, automatically would raise the question of entangling both states in each other’s regional issues.

Simultaneously, a military alliance between the two states would not only include integrated planning of potential conventional military scenarios but would carry a nuclear dimension. The last issue remains an area where both states are far from agreement, as it would raise the question of hierarchy and directly infringe upon their sovereignty. A formal alliance would also impose legal and policy constraints that are difficult to reconcile with the need to preserve consensus, not only on external conflict issues, but also on cooperation with third parties. Taken together, these factors risk undermining their longstanding separate identities as autonomous centers of power.

A more precise interpretation would be to consider the two countries not simply as a cohesive counterweight to the West, but rather as autonomous strategic players with often divergent interests. That is not to say that China and Russia do not share similar trajectories or interests in countering and deterring U.S. influence. Still, it would be a significant misinterpretation to present them as interconnected, dependent forces, informal military, or even nuclear-weapon allies. They enjoy close political ties, perform joint military drills, exchange technologies, and cooperate economically, yet they also harbor hidden insecurities about each other. As highlighted in a 2022 Center for Strategic and International Studies report, these underlying weaknesses, including enduring historical distrust and a significant power imbalance, fundamentally define their relationship.⁸

Acknowledging that strategic overextension resulting from a dual-threat policy is unsustainable, U.S. President Donald Trump´s administration has shifted from a “Pax Americana” to a “Pact Americana” framework.⁹ Although the core U.S. strategic objective of deterring two competitors on two fronts is retained, the operational and tactical approaches to its implementation were revised. This new model entails a deliberate delegation of military and economic responsibilities to allied and partner nations.

Consequently, deterrence within the dual-threat framework would be maintained not primarily through direct, unilateral U.S. engagement, but via a network of empowered regional collaborators, meaning that alliances must deliver measurable benefits rather than rely predominantly on U.S. commitments. European NATO allies offer a notable example, as they are now increasing defense spending and making concerted efforts to assume greater responsibility for their own security.

The August 2025 U.S.-Russia summit produced slight signals of a shift away from the U.S. dual threat policy toward diplomatic engagement between the two nuclear-armed states. Nonetheless, these overtures remained circumscribed to the diplomatic domain and did not alter core military posturing. Concurrent military modernization initiatives, such as the Trump administration’s “Golden Dome” missile defense program, continue unabated. As specialists note, such programs could alter the foundational calculus of strategic deterrence, indicating that military preparedness for dual-front engagement remained an overriding priority for the United States.¹⁰

Similarly, recent developments such as heightened diplomatic engagement among China, North Korea and Russia, including public pledges for deeper ties, are cited sometimes as evidence of a consolidating bloc.¹¹ Yet, a symbolic demonstration of unity also should not automatically be interpreted as a sign of underlying strategic unanimity. States can show strength and cooperate closely in certain areas while maintaining fundamental conceptual disagreements on core issues of foreign policy and military strategy. This is evident even within established alliances. One example is NATO, where members Hungary and Slovakia have diverged from consensus on issues such as support for Ukraine, thus prioritizing distinct national interests over bloc solidarity.

No Guarantee of Strategic Alignment

In other words, an alliance is not a guarantee of strategic alignment and readiness for coordinated action, let alone a strategic partnership without any formal military obligations. Although ties between China and North Korea, and between North Korea and Russia may be deepening, the foundational bilateral concerns between China and Russia persist. A show of strength is precisely that—a diplomatic and strategic signal; it does not automatically resolve inherent divergences in national interest or fully integrate complex security architectures. A true military integration between China and Russia would require binding measures far exceeding their current cooperation, compelling them to act as a single entity. At the moment, such a development remains doubtful, given political and economic circumstances.

To frame Beijing and Moscow as a monolithic threat rather than independent strategic actors is to engage in a strategic overassessment, one that risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy by driving policies that push these separate competitors closer together than their natural interests would dictate. Formulating national strategies through a dual‑threat lens, constructing adversarial narratives, and operationalizing them in policy produces precisely the expected result. The adversaries constructed by such discourse are compelled to respond to the measures enacted against them.

Recent developments, such as missile defense consultations between China and Russia in November 2025,¹² illustrate this dynamic. These discussions, meant as a signal to Western policymakers, can plausibly be traced to prior U.S. deployments of strategic and tactical offensive missile systems in proximity to both states’ borders—most notably, the Typhon Missile System deployed in the Philippines and Denmark in 2024, followed by deployments in Australia and Japan in 2025; the LRHW system in Australia in 2025; and M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System sales to the Baltic States and Taiwan.

No comparable deployments of Chinese or Russian systems exist near U.S. borders. The hypothetical reaction of the United States to such developments, were they to occur, would be unimaginable, underscoring the profound asymmetry inherent in this dynamic. Yet the subsequent protests to U.S. missile deployments issued by Beijing and Moscow,¹³ coupled with their joint declaration to undertake coordinated countermeasures,¹⁴ are often dismissed or ignored, further exemplifying the operational logic of the dual-threat approach. Within this cycle, the initial state actor’s decisions and anticipatory framing provoke responsive actions from the targeted states. These actions are then cited as confirmation of the original threat narrative—despite the first actor’s foresight regarding the likely consequences of its own measures.

The Russia-North Korea case serves as a counterexample that fundamentally calls into question the dual-threat notion. Moscow’s alliance treaty with Pyongyang includes an explicit military clause (Article 4), promising immediate assistance by any means disposable to the parties, in the event of an armed attack on either of them.¹⁵ This provides a factual basis for analyzing a nascent alliance between two nuclear-armed states. In contrast, the status of the China-Russia relationship remains a strategic partnership, lacking any formalized military obligations. Understanding this critical distinction between a binding military commitment and enhanced situational cooperation is essential for crafting pragmatic and effective policy grounded in reality.

ENDNOTES

1. Greg Weaver and Amy Woolf, “Requirements for nuclear deterrence and arms control in a two-nuclear-peer environment,” Atlantic Council, February 2, 2024.

2. Congressional Research Service, “The Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF),” Library of Congress, December 17, 2025.

3. Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight, “Russian nuclear weapons,” 2025. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 81, No. 3, 2025, p. 213.

4. Nivedita Kapoor, “Russia’s Pivot to Asia – A 10-Year Policy Review,” Valdai Discussion Club, March 21, 2022.

5. Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, “Russia and ASEAN countries to sign new Strategic Cooperation Program in September 2025,” August 22, 2025.

6. Richard J. Heydarian, “Fallout: Ukraine Crisis Upends Russia’s Role in the South China Sea,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 25, 2022.

7. Vita Spivak, “How Sanctions Have Changed the Face of Chinese Companies in Russia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 18, 2023.

8. ChinaPower Project, “What Are the Weaknesses of the China-Russia Relationship?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, accessed February 24, 2026.

9. Jahara Matisek and James Farwell, “Trump’s national security strategy: from Pax Americana to Pact Americana,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 2, 2025.

10. Daryl G. Kimball, “Golden Dome: Doubling Down on a Strategic Blunder,” Arms Control Today, June 2025.

11. Nectar Gan, Yoonjung Seo, and Yong Xiong, “Xi and Kim pledge deeper ties a day after unprecedented show of unity with Putin at Chinese military parade,” CNN, September 5, 2025.

12. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Russia and China held consultations on missile defense and missile aspects of strategic stability,” November 11, 2025.

13. President of Russia, “Joint statement by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on deepening comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation entering a new era in the context of the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries,” May 16, 2024.

14. President of Russia, “Joint Statement by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on further deepening comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation in a new era in commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War, the Victory of the Chinese people in the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the formation of the United Nations,” May 8, 2025.

15. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “North Korean-Russian Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” December 4, 2024.