“Promoting Nuclear Disarmament in East Asia”

International Civil Society Forum to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

Daryl G. Kimball, February 8, 2025

Thank you to our esteemed hosts for the invitation to this important gathering at this critical time.

On behalf of the Arms Control Association, I want to congratulate Nihon Hidankyo, the well-deserved recipients of the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize, and thank all of the Hibakusha for sharing their stories and for reminding the world why we must pursue and achieve a nuclear-weapons free-world.

Over the decades, civil society organizations around the globe have successfully pushed governments to take steps to reduce the nuclear danger, agree to cut the number of nuclear weapons, halt and then ban nuclear explosive testing, curb the spread of nuclear weapons, and to conclude the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

But as we approach the 80th anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear risks are growing once again.

Human civilization remains precariously tethered to the existence of nuclear weapons and the threat they might be used again—in South Asia, in Europe, between the United States and Russia, or here in East Asia between the United States and China or on Korean Peninsula.

Dangerous, nuclear deterrence relationships exist between and among the world's nine nuclear armed states.

At some point, it is likely the dangerous nuclear balance of terror will fail.

If there is a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan, it is currently U.S. policy to use nuclear weapons first if necessary, which would likely lead to a massive U.S.-Chinese nuclear exchange. It is also not clear whether, in such a conflict, China would respect its no-first-use policy.

If NATO-Russian forces engage directly, or if Russia were to use nuclear weapons in the conflict in Ukraine, it too could lead to all out nuclear war and kill or injure hundreds of millions of people in the first hours and days.

Making matters worse progress on nuclear disarmament is stalled and an unconstrained three-way nuclear arms race is on the horizon.

A special UN Security Council meeting on nuclear disarmament issues convened by Japan in 2024 underscored agreement among all 15 members that the risk of nuclear war and arms racing is higher than at any point since the end of the Cold War.

But the meeting also highlighted chronic differences among the nuclear-armed states about how to reduce the danger.

The five nuclear-armed states recognized under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) have failed to engage in constructive nuclear disarmament and risk reduction diplomacy for more than a decade. Instead, they are spending tens of billions of dollars annually to modernize, upgrade their nuclear weapons.

As the Japanese foreign minister warned: “The world now stands on the cusp of reversing decades of declines in nuclear stockpiles.”

In a June 3 presentation to the Arms Control Association, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres said the states with the largest arsenals “must find a way back to the negotiating table He said, correctly, that Russia and the United States “must reengage” to reduce nuclear stockpiles, prevent nuclear use, stop nuclear saber-rattling, and reaffirm support for the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

To help promote nuclear disarmament in East Asia and globally, civil society must:

1. Push harder on governments to head-off an unconstrained nuclear build-up and press for bilateral U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Chinese disarmament diplomacy.

2. Urge leading nuclear-armed and nonnuclear states to create new fora to engage in a sustained, multilateral dialogue on nuclear disarmament.

3. Encourage leading governments, particularly Japan, to provide greater leadership to highlight the devastating human consequences of nuclear war.

1. Foster Disarmament Diplomacy to Head-Off a Three-Way Nuclear Arms Race

For decades, Washington and Moscow have negotiated nuclear arms control and reduction agreements to constrain and verifiably eliminate their nuclear forces. But deteriorating relations and the Russian war on Ukraine have stymied progress for years.

And on February 5, 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) will expire.

In response, Congressional Republicans and some Trump advisors want Washington to spend even more than the current $756 billion, ten-year price tag for nuclear modernization in order to increase the number and diversity of the arsenal.

Without some new form of mutual restraint, Russia and the United States could double the number of deployed warheads—from about 1,550 each to more than 3,000—by uploading additional warheads on their land- and sea-based missiles.

Such a buildup would reverse 35 years of Russian-U.S. reductions. More nuclear weapons would not "enhance deterrence" and are not necessary to deter nuclear attack. It would divert resources from other defense and human needs. It would prompt China and Russia to match any U.S. increase.

On Jan. 23, President Trump while addressing the World Economic Forum in Davos said that he wants to hold talks with Russia and China about reducing nuclear weapon stockpiles.

"We want to see if we can denuclearize, and I think that’s very possible,” Trump said.

It might be possible, but a new, comprehensive framework agreement will be difficult and would take months if not years to achieve.

Furthermore, hopeful presidential statements alone do not constitute an effective nuclear arms reduction strategy. And Trump's recent proposal to expand U.S. research and development on a wide array of strategic and space-based missile defense technologies will only encourage Russia and China to build up their offensive capabilities to ensure they can deter U.S. nuclear attack.

History shows there is no feasible missile defense technology that can make a nation invulnerable to nuclear attack. It simply gives nuclear-armed adversaries incentives to expand and adapt their offensive nuclear forces to ensure that they’re able to assure their ability to retaliate.

In order to succeed on "denuclearization" Trump will need a more practical and effective approach and he will need a more realistic plan for engaging China in bilateral talks that could lead to limits on long-range nuclear and conventional weapons on each side.

To start, we recommend that the United States and Russia could reach a simple, informal deal to maintain the existing caps on their strategic arsenals as long as the other side agrees to do so.

Leading states, including Japan, have an important role to play by pressing Washington and Moscow to conclude a simple, bilateral understanding that neither side shall increase their arsenals beyond the New START limits of 1,550 deployed warheads each.

This would remain in force until they can conclude a more comprehensive, durable framework to limit and reduce their deadly nuclear arsenals.

As long as Russia and the United States agree to cap their strategic deployed nuclear arsenals and work to negotiate a new nuclear arms reduction framework, Washington, along with leading non-nuclear-weapon states, should call on China, France, and the United Kingdom to freeze the overall size of their nuclear arsenals, negotiate a ban on fissile material production for weapons, and recommit to pursue negotiations on reductions in their offensive nuclear stockpiles.

NPT member states should make it their highest priority at the NPT preparatory committee meeting in July to press Moscow and Washington to observe the New START limits on deployed warheads until a more permanent, comprehensive nuclear arms control arrangement is concluded.

To promote disarmament globally and in East Asia, the United States and China also need to resume a bilateral nuclear dialogue on issues of mutual concern.

China is now estimated to possess some 600 nuclear weapons, including more than 300 on long-range systems. China could build up its force to 1,000 total warheads by 2030, apparently in response to concerns about growing U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities.

Since the buildup began around 2018, both the Trump and Biden administrations sought to engage China on arms control and risk reduction with limited success.

To promote a more substantive dialogue with China, the White House should agree to seriously discuss China’s proposal on a joint no first use agreement as a first step toward a broader understanding about their respective nuclear postures and strategic stability.

Trump should also assure President Xi Jinping that United States does not plan to threaten nuclear coercion against China, and Xi should extend the same assurance.

Such a shift could reduce tensions and lead to more concrete measures designed to prevent a Chinese-U.S. nuclear arms race.

For its part, China needs to elevate the underperforming "P5 Process," the dialogue on nuclear risk reduction involving the NPT’s five nuclear-weapon states, that has been underway since 2010.

China, which now chairs the group, should increase the frequency of these meetings; raise the level of participation; expand the topics of discussion, including exchanges on nuclear postures and joint pledges not to use nuclear weapons first and not to resume nuclear testing.

In addition, the five states could expand on their 2022 joint declaration that “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” by adopting a statement in the 1973 U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War that pledges that the nuclear powers will “refrain from the threat or use of force against the other party, against the allies of the other party and against other countries.”

2. Launch a New, High-Level Nuclear Disarmament Summits Initiative

The five major nuclear-armed states have a special responsibility to follow through on their disarmament obligations. But ultimately, the other nuclear-armed states also need to be drawn further into the nuclear disarmament process, or else these states—the DPRK, India, Israel, and Pakistan—will continue to build up their capabilities.

Unfortunately, the current nuclear disarmament architecture has proven to be inadequate in facilitating the progress and actions necessary to address new challenges to disarmament, which include more competitive and less cooperative relations between major nuclear-armed states and a lack of political will to pursue the bold, creative steps to reduce nuclear risks and further reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons.

For example, the 60-nation Conference on Disarmament has not been able to overcome political differences that has blocked consensus decisions that are required to begin talks on new measures for more than a quarter century.

To overcome this problem, the Arms Control Association has proposed that a group of leading states, possibly including Japan, work together to launch a new, high-level series of disarmament summits to inject momentum into global efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.

Modeled after the highly successful nuclear security summits, these high-level nuclear disarmament summits could involve a group of 20 to 30 leaders from nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon states. If designed properly, such an approach could help overcome existing obstacles of disarmament diplomacy, increase pressure for action, and complement existing forums designed to advance progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

These summits would put the global spotlight on the issue, put pressure on leaders to deliver on promises and commitments, and could foster constructive dialogue on practical, balanced nuclear risk reduction and disarmament proposals.

The risk of nuclear war exists as long as there are nuclear weapons, but we can reduce the risk of nuclear war by making steady progress toward a nuclear weapon free world.

3. Increase Global Awareness of the Risks and Consequences of Nuclear War

For decades, the Hibakusha have provided the world with powerful reminder of the devastating human impacts of nuclear weapons use, development, production, and testing, and ongoing risks of nuclear war.

At the 2023, G7 summit in Hiroshima, former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida wisely observed:

"Conveying the reality of the nuclear attack is important as a starting point for all nuclear disarmament efforts."

Indeed, in this era of heightened nuclear risk, it is imperative that global leaders have a deeper appreciation and understanding of the impacts of nuclear weapons testing, production, and use.

This is all the more important as the number of Hibakusha with direct memories of the atomic attacks continues to dwindle.

As we look forward, we must all seek bold new ways to ensure that their experience and memories are not lost so that future generations fully understand why a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.

Japan—the only nation that has experienced the unspeakable horrors of a nuclear weapons attack—is uniquely positioned to take the lead for a high-level international conference on the impacts of nuclear weapons.

This conference, organized by Japan's most important NGOs, is an important step in this direction that the Japanese government might build upon in order to engage government leaders from around the world on the issue.

A two- to three-day, head of state-level conference on the health and environmental impacts of nuclear weapons and war would be consistent with Japan's history of leadership in building the global arms control and nonproliferation system.

This gathering should not only recall the devastation and legacy of the atomic bombings of 1945 and honor the "hibakusha," but underscore the devastating global effects of more than 2,000 nuclear test explosions and the toxic legacy of nuclear weapons production activities by the world's nine nuclear weapon states.

A Japan-convened Nuclear Weapons Impacts Conference could also indirectly encourage the leaders of Washington, Moscow, and Beijing to engage in direct talks to reduce nuclear risks and to reach new agreements to halt and reverse the arms race.

It is also an essential way to push our leaders our fellow citizens to re-consider the risks and the immorality of nuclear deterrence strategies, and to away from the dangerous and unsustainable reliance on threatening the use of nuclear weapons.

The conference, which would likely follow this year's 80th anniversary, would also help maintain pressure in Japan and around the globe for further action to put us back on the path to the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.

If the world is to halt and reverse the cycle of spiraling nuclear tensions, it will require new, bolder global leadership and sustained public pressure in the weeks, months, and years ahead.

Thank you for your attention.

For Immediate Release: January 24, 2025

Media Contacts: Daryl Kimball, executive director (202-463-8270 x107); Xiaodon Liang, senior policy analyst (202-463-8270 x113)

(Washington, D.C.)— The Arms Control Association welcomes President Donald J. Trump’s comments yesterday at the Davos World Economic Forum on the potential for nuclear arms control talks with Russia and China.

In response to a question about U.S.-China relations, President Trump said: “Tremendous amounts of money are being spent on nuclear, and the destructive capability is something that we don’t even want to talk about today, because you don’t want to hear it.”

“So, we want to see if we can denuclearize, and I think that’s very possible,” he said, regarding the potential for talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping.

“We welcome President Trump’s interest in negotiating a deal to limit and reduce the massive nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia, which could head off a costly and dangerous unconstrained nuclear arms race,” said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association.

“However, hope alone is not an effective nuclear arms reduction strategy,” Kimball said. “To start, the United States and Russia could reach a simple, informal deal to maintain the existing caps on their strategic arsenals as long as the other side agrees to do so,” he added.

“In order to succeed on ‘denuclearization,’ Trump will need a more practical and effective approach than he attempted in his first term with Russia, and he will need a more realistic plan for engaging China in bilateral talks that could lead to limits on nuclear weapons and long-range conventional systems of concern to each side,” Kimball said.

In 2020, Trump tried and failed to launch three-way talks involving the United States, Russia, and China. Trump then refused to agree to a simple extension of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia, leaving it for former President Joe Biden to do so in his first days in office in 2021.

In response to Trump's remarks, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said this morning that Russia wants to resume talks “as soon as possible.”

“Negotiating any new nuclear arms control agreement with the Kremlin would be difficult to hammer out and a new comprehensive framework deal could require sustained talks over many months, if not years, to achieve,” noted Kimball.

“And time is of the essence because the last remaining U.S.-Russian agreement limiting their long-range nuclear arsenals, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), will expire in just over a year, on February 5, 2026,” he said.

“We suggest, as a practical first step, that Trump propose a straightforward, informal deal with President Putin pledging each side not to exceed the current limits set by New START on their strategic nuclear arsenals as long as the other does the same,” Kimball said.

“Such a deal would reduce tensions, forestall a costly arms race that no one can win, and buy time for talks on a broader framework deal to reduce strategic, intermediate, and shorter-range nuclear weapons and the systems that carry them,” he said.

“In the absence of a new arrangement to limit these deadly weapons, the United States and Russia could potentially substantially increase the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads above the 1,550 each permitted under the treaty by uploading additional warheads on existing land- and sea-based ballistic missiles,” Kimball warned. “Any U.S. and Russian buildup would very likely accelerate China’s nuclear buildup and increase global nuclear risk.”

Trump’s statement in support of nuclear reductions are notable for other reasons. As former U.S. assistant secretary of state and ACA’s Board Chair Tom Countryman wrote in December: “Within the United States, the political impulse of many Republican national security leaders remains to expand rather than constrain the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Actors who are likely to have influence in the new administration already are pushing for new weapon types, a much larger nuclear weapons budget, and perhaps even the resumption of nuclear explosive testing.”

“Yet, there is no serious analysis suggesting that either side would thus enhance deterrence of the other or improve its own national security,” Countryman wrote.

“A deal that would keep Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear arsenals at or below current levels would also give Trump new diplomatic leverage to curb the buildup of China’s arsenal, which is now estimated to total 600 nuclear warheads, and includes those assigned to around 400 long-range missiles,” Kimball suggested.

“While Russia and the United States agree to cap their strategic deployed nuclear arsenals and work to negotiate a new nuclear arms reduction framework, Trump, along with other global leaders, could press his counterparts in China, France, and the United Kingdom to freeze the overall size of their nuclear arsenals and negotiate a ban on fissile material production for weapons,” Kimball proposed.

“Halting the cycle of spiraling nuclear tensions is in every nation’s interest and is every nation’s obligation,” Kimball said. Under Article VI of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Russia and the United States, along with China, France, and the United Kingdom, are legally obligated to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.”

“We urge President Trump to rise to the occasion and follow through with meaningful nuclear arms control and disarmament diplomacy with Russia, and separately with China,” Kimball said.