January 28, 2025
Recommendations for Congressional Priorities on Nuclear Weapons & Arms Control Policy During the 119th Congress
U.S. Senate/House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20510
Dear Member of Congress,
The risk of nuclear war, nuclear arms racing, and nuclear proliferation is greater than at any point since the Cold War. At the same time, the guardrails to reduce global nuclear dangers, including the bedrock 1968 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), are under severe stress. In the months and years ahead, the new Trump administration and members of Congress will make key choices that could help determine whether the situation improves or deteriorates.
The American people know and are deeply concerned about these risks. Congress has the opportunity to provide responsible and sober leadership to reduce the existential threats posed by nuclear weapons.
The undersigned organizations and individuals respectfully urge you to prioritize the following policies, which we believe will reduce the nuclear threat and help the United States emerge stronger and safer in a period of renewed global competition and increased nuclear risk.
1. As the War On Ukraine Continues, Condemn Threats of Nuclear Use to Avoid
Escalation
President Vladimir Putin's illegal war against Ukraine has not only re-shaped the European security environment, but it has increased the risk of direct conflict between the United States and our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and Russia. Putin’s brash threats of nuclear first use have -- as both President Trump and former President Biden warned -- increased the danger of nuclear war.
We encourage you and other members of Congress to use every opportunity to reinforce statements from the G-20 and other global leaders that threats of nuclear first use are "inadmissible" and encourage U.S. and allied leaders to refrain from engaging in similar, irresponsible nuclear rhetoric.
Congress, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in particular, can also help resist Putin's attempts at nuclear coercion and underscore that the United States is supporting efforts to reduce the nuclear threat by ratifying the protocols to three nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties (for Africa, Central Asia, and the South Pacific). The United States signed the protocols more than a decade ago and is the only NPT-participating nuclear weapon state that has yet to do so.
For non-nuclear states and U.S. partners in these zones, many of whom live in the shadow of Russia and China, U.S. ratification is important because it would establish a legally binding guarantee against nuclear use or threats of use against any NWFZ state from all of five major nuclear-armed states.
2. Reinforce the Global Moratorium on Nuclear Explosive Testing and the CTBT
No state, except North Korea, has conducted a nuclear test explosion in this century. For the United States, nuclear explosive testing is technically and militarily unnecessary. The sufficiently funded and proven Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) maintains the existing U.S. nuclear warheads.
On Dec. 20, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, Dr. Marvin Adams, said “based on purely technical considerations, we are confident that we can get the information we need [through] subcritical” experiments and other elements of the SSP.
Nevertheless, some have proposed spending hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars to shorten the time (to six months) needed to resume U.S. nuclear testing in Nevada. A renewal of nuclear explosive testing would be a self-inflicted disaster that violates the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and opens the door to Chinese, North Korean, and Russian testing at a time of heightened nuclear danger. Nuclear testing would not demonstrate strength or resolve but would squander a hard-won advantage at a time of heightened nuclear danger.
We urge you to reinforce the bipartisan opposition to accelerate or facilitate the resumption of U.S. explosive nuclear weapons testing.
3. Encourage President Trump to Maintain a Cap on U.S. and Russian Strategic Nuclear Weapons After New START Expires and Pursue a New Framework Deal
For decades, Republican and Democratic administrations negotiated nuclear arms control and reduction agreements to constrain and verifiably eliminate Russian and U.S. nuclear forces. However, deteriorating relations and the Russian war on Ukraine have stymied progress for years.
On February 5, 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) will expire. This critical U.S.-Russian agreement limits each side to no more than 1,550 treaty accountable strategic nuclear weapons. Despite severe strains in all other aspects of the bilateral relationship the two sides have stayed below the limits set by the treaty since entry into force in 2011.
After the treaty expires, there will be no constraints on the number of nuclear warheads Russia and the United States can deploy to strike each other’s homelands. Each side could double the number of deployed warheads by uploading additional warheads on land- and sea-based missiles. If Washington and Moscow fail to reach a deal to maintain the current limits on their arsenals, China will almost certainly build-up its nuclear force even further based on a worst- case assessment of U.S. intentions.
On Jan. 23, President Trump while addressing the World Economic Forum in Davos said that he wants to hold talks with Russia and China about reducing nuclear weapon stockpiles.
"We want to see if we can denuclearize, and I think that’s very possible,” Trump said.
With support from you and other members of Congress, President Trump should try to achieve what President Biden could not: a simple, informal deal with President Putin committing the United States and Russia to the existing caps on their strategic nuclear arsenals as long as the other does. This would allow the U.S. nuclear enterprise to focus on maintaining the existing force, buy time for formal talks to limit and reduce strategic, intermediate, and tactical nuclear weapons and the systems that carry them, and forestall a costly, unconstrained arms race that has no winner.
4. Encourage Engagement with China on Risk Reduction and Nuclear Arms Control
China is now estimated to possess some 600 nuclear weapons, including more than 300 on long-range systems. China could build up its force to 1,000 total warheads by the end of the decade, apparently in response to concerns about growing U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities. Since the buildup began around 2018, both the Trump and Biden administrations sought to engage China on arms control and risk reduction with limited success.
Congress should encourage the new administration to engage with Chinese counterparts bilaterally on mutual nuclear risk reduction measures and mutual arms control options, as well as through the "P5 Process" involving working consultations between senior U.S., UK, French, Russian, and Chinese officials.
5. Block Proposals for an Unnecessary Buildup of U.S. Nuclear Forces
The United States has more than enough nuclear firepower to deter a nuclear attack despite recent Chinese actions. More deployed U.S. nuclear weapons would not enhance deterrence and would likely prompt Russian and Chinese countermeasures. Proposals to build up the size of the U.S. nuclear force through warhead "uploading" or by adding new nuclear systems to the inventory would be premature, counterproductive, and cost prohibitive.
President Trump's nominee to be Undersecretary for Defense Policy, Elbridge Colby, addressed this in 2024, stating: "We're going to be lucky to just replace our existing nuclear force. We're not in a position to pursue dramatic expansions."
We respectfully urge you to oppose legislative initiatives that seek to build up the size of the U.S. nuclear force. Congress should examine whether build-up proposals would influence adversaries' decisions about whether or not to use nuclear weapons and how they might counter any additional U.S. nuclear weapons deployments.
6. Direct the Pentagon to Re-Examine the Current Nuclear Modernization Program
Over the past 15 years, the United States has spent hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars to "modernize" the existing arsenal of nuclear warheads and associated delivery systems. Costs have soared, milestones have been missed, and not enough was done to re-evaluate programs. The current $756 billion, 10-year price tag for so-called modernization will likely grow further. We urge Congress to hold hearings, critically review and reassess the modernization plan in its entirety and re-examine spending priorities.
For example, the new Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile ICBM has grown to an estimated $214 million per unit. Unlike submarine-based ballistic missiles, land-based ICBMs are vulnerable to attack and not essential to deter attacks on the U.S. homeland. This leg of the triad could be phased out to pursue a broader strategy to limit adversary nuclear weapons systems through arms control diplomacy.
The NNSA reports production capabilities stretched beyond capacity already. It is important that Congress desist from adding new nuclear programs to the agency’s list of priorities. At present, the NNSA is designing, building, or updating seven nuclear warheads and proposing a costly, and in our view unnecessary, expansion of nuclear weapons production capacity. Rather than setting unrealistic goals or adding more funding and projects to an organization that is already struggling with cost overruns, Congress should press for independent, updated NNSA budget estimates and realistic assessments of challenges.
7. Ensure Adequate Checks on Any Decision to Use Nuclear Weapons
It is important that Congress place sufficient checks on any decision to launch nuclear weapons. Last year, Congress endorsed the Biden Administration’s policy that “in all cases, the United States will maintain a ‘human in the loop’ for all actions critical to informing and executing decisions by the president to initiate and terminate nuclear weapons decisions.”
The Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act stated artificial intelligence should not “compromise the integrity of nuclear safeguards, whether through the functionality of weapons systems, the validation of communications from command authorities, or the principle of requiring positive human actions in execution of decisions by the President with respect to the employment of nuclear weapons.”
Congress should press the Pentagon to explain the operationalization of this concept. This includes building "firebreaks" to avoid the potential risks that integration of artificial intelligence into nuclear command and control and other decision-support systems could create.
Also, the U.S. President has sole authority to order the launch of nuclear weapons, seemingly subverting Congress’s constitutional authority to declare war. We respectfully encourage you to critically examine nuclear command and control procedures and potential points of failure, as well as the legal underpinnings for U.S. nuclear targeting and the need for checks and balances regarding any decision to order the use of nuclear weapons.
Congress is uniquely situated to guide the United States safely through a period of renewed nuclear rivalry and danger. Each one of our organizations stand ready to support your staff’s work in this area. We encourage you to engage with other members of Congress on these issues, including through the bicameral congressional Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Working Group. The working group is a forum for discussing and coordinating action on these critical issues.
Sincerely,
Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association
Peter Wilk, Administrative Chair, Back from the Brink Coalition
John Tierney, Executive Director, Council for a Livable World
Brian Volsky, Policy Director, Foreign Policy for America
Bridget Moix, Executive Director, Friends Committee on National Legislation
Kevin Martin, President, Peace Action
Brian Campbell, PhD, Executive Director, Physicians for Social Responsibility
Dr. Emma Belcher, President, Ploughshares
Sarah Streyder, Executive Director, Secure Families Initiative
Scott Yundt, Executive Director, Tri-Valley Communities Against a Radioactive Environment
Jacqueline Cabasso, Executive Director, Western States Legal Foundation
Tara Drozdenko, Program Director, Global Security, Union of Concerned Scientists
Bishop Julius C. Trimble, General Secretary, The United Methodist Church – General Board of Church and Society
Sara Haghdoosti, Executive Director, Win Without War
Dr. Frank N. von Hippel, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University*
Tong Zhao, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*
*Organization listed for identification purposes only
