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The newly-elected president, Masoud Pezeshkian, faces immense pressure to revive Iran's economy.
October 2024
By Sina Azodi
After Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi died in a helicopter crash in May, Masoud Pezeshkian, a reformist politician and a heart surgeon, was chosen his successor in a runoff election. This development has reignited hopes for a revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and the permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) plus Germany is known.
Since 2019, when Iran initiated “remedial measures” in response to U.S. President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the agreement and the subsequent failure of the European signatories to alleviate the impact of U.S. sanctions, Iran’s nuclear program has expanded significantly. In addition, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification mission in Iran has been hampered severely, primarily due to Tehran’s lack of adequate cooperation with the agency. Despite this impasse, there is now an opening for Iran and the world powers to potentially reach a new agreement that addresses Iran’s nuclear expansion in return for relief from U.S. sanctions.
Prior to Raisi’s victory in the controversial June 2021 elections, Iran and the other negotiators almost reached a draft agreement to revive the JCPOA, although details still needed to be worked out. According to the framework of the proposed agreement, the outcome of negotiations would have involved a resolution adopted by the JCPOA Joint Commission, which aimed at reviving the JCPOA, and the subsequent return of the United States to the agreement. The resolution had three appendixes, on lifting sanctions, Iran’s nuclear actions, and an implementation plan that addressed the sequencing of steps to be taken by each side. Because of the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA, the resolution would be passed without U.S. participation; but after the lifting of sanctions, the United States would return as a participant. In response, Iran would roll back its nuclear program to the JCPOA limits.1
Despite this progress, the Iranian president at the time, Hassan Rouhani, could not finalize the agreement; and his top negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, now foreign minister, was not given the authority to sign the draft document. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, apparently had decided that the task of reviving the agreement should be left to the next administration, headed by Raisi. Some reports from Iran indicate that Rouhani had urged that he be allowed to sign the agreement so that the next administration could reap the benefits. Still, his request was denied, most likely by Khamenei.2
Once in office, Raisi initially expressed interest in the nuclear talks, but several factors greatly reduced the possibility of reviving the JCPOA. The new president was a hard-liner and an opponent of the JCPOA who previously criticized the deal for failing to deliver economic benefits and compared it to an “uncashed check.”3 Ironically, Raisi’s chief nuclear negotiator also criticized the JCPOA, questioning its benefits for Iran and its dispute resolution mechanisms.4 In essence, the people who oversaw negotiations to revive the deal did not even believe in it and its benefits for the country.
Furthermore, the new negotiation team came to the table with a new set of demands, including a renegotiation of the previous draft. Although that request was rejected categorically, the Iranian team’s maneuver squandered precious time. The outbreak of Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine further complicated the process of reviving the JCPOA by souring the relationship between Russia and other negotiating parties. Meanwhile, the death of Mahsa Amini in Iranian police custody in September 2022 and the ensuing political protests within the country severely restrained the negotiating parties’ space to maneuver and to give concessions.
Concurrently, the Raisi administration rapidly expanded Iran’s nuclear program, leveraging it as a diplomatic tool against the United States and other Western powers. An IAEA report in September 2021 indicated that as of August 2021, Iran had a total stockpile of 2,441.3 kilograms of enriched uranium, of which 10.0 kilograms was enriched to 60 percent uranium-235.5 As of October 28, 2023, however, the IAEA reported that the total stockpile of Iran’s enriched uranium had increased to 4,486.8 kilograms, including 567.1 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20 percent U-235 and 128.3 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent U-235.6 By July 2024, when Pezeshkian was elected, Iran’s breakout time (the period needed to produce enough weapons-grade fissile material for one nuclear warhead) had been reduced to between one and two weeks.7
Defeating ‘Talibanism’ in Tehran
During the campaign, Pezeshkian used the opportunity to criticize the handling by Iranian hard-liners of the country’s nuclear file and vowed to resolve Iran’s issues with the IAEA and engage with the outside world.8 “My foreign policy aims to normalize relations with the world. I support the implementation of Financial Action Task Force and JCPOA” demands, Pezeshkian said on July 1.9 A former health minister, he also acknowledged that sanctions have had a devastating effect on the country and that they need to be lifted. “I consider sanctions a serious detriment” because they cause “prices [to] inevitably rise, and we cannot make purchases, leaving the government to dip into people’s pockets,” he said.10 On reviving the JCPOA, Pezeshkian asserted that if the United States fulfills all its commitments, Iran will return to the JCPOA. “We are never supposed to lift all sanctions, but we have to wait and see what we give [to them] and what concessions they will give [to us],” he said.11
Pezeshkian was careful not to antagonize Khamenei by repeatedly emphasizing his obedience and fealty to the supreme leader. Not even that could stop Khamenei from pushing back and criticizing politicians who sought relations with the United States. “Those who are attached to America and think that without America’s favor, nothing can be achieved in the country will not be good partners for you,” Khamenei said.12 Yet, he did not interfere with Pezeshkian’s election victory, a fact that Pezeshkian would recognize. “Without Supreme Leader Khamenei…I do not imagine my name would have easily come out of these [ballot] boxes,” Pezeshkian said after being elected.13 During the cabinet selection, Pezeshkian went even further, ensuring that Khamenei approved his appointments.
Pezeshkian ultimately secured the presidency in the runoff elections by convincing skeptical Iranian voters that the hard-line alternative presented by candidate Saeed Jalili, the former secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, would exacerbate the country’s domestic and international standing. As an Iranian journalist told the author, comparing Jalili’s worldview with that of the Taliban, “Iran was only a few hours from Taliban’s takeover of the country.”14 Despite his victory, winning nearly 54 percent of the 30.5 million votes cast, Pezeshkian now faces the daunting task of navigating a political minefield.15
The new president faces immense pressure to revive Iran’s economy, which is buckling under the pressure of U.S. unilateral sanctions, while steering the nation through unprecedented regional tensions, particularly the war in Gaza. Also, his administration must strive to prevent the extension of UN sanctions on Iran, scheduled to expire in October 2025 under Security Council Resolution 2231, as the JCPOA European signatories grow increasingly frustrated with Iran’s expanding nuclear program, lack of cooperation with the IAEA, and material support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.16 Iran’s relationship with the IAEA has deteriorated significantly in the last year, and the agency director-general, Rafael Mariano Grossi, repeatedly has criticized Iran’s lack of cooperation.17 On June 5, 2024, the IAEA adopted a censure resolution that called for Iran’s further cooperation with the agency. If Iran does not comply, this resolution has the potential to take Iran’s nuclear file back to the Security Council.18
Pezeshkian’s Message to the World
Shortly after his election, Pezeshkian published an op-ed outlining his foreign policy agenda. He emphasized his administration’s plan to improve cooperation with regional countries, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, as well as with Iran’s powerful partners, China and Russia. Pezeshkian also called for engaging in “constructive dialogue” with European countries based on “mutual respect and equal footing.” Nonetheless, he criticized the Europeans for failing to protect Iran’s interests in the JCPOA. “Iran’s relations with Europe have known its ups and downs,” he said. “After the United States’ withdrawal…European countries made 11 commitments to Iran to try to salvage the agreement and mitigate the impact of the United States’ unlawful and unilateral sanctions on our economy…. European countries have reneged on all these commitments yet unreasonably expect Iran to unilaterally fulfill all its obligations under the JCPOA.”19
Pezeshkian’s frustrations echo a widespread sentiment in Tehran that following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, European promises to uphold the agreement amounted to little more than empty rhetoric. Some Iranians have suggested that the United States and Europe engaged in a good cop-bad cop strategy by deceiving Iran into remaining in the deal for an additional year while U.S. sanctions crushed its economy.20 This view was reflected in Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s letter to Federica Mogherini, the EU foreign policy chief, on November 6, 2018. Zarif stated that he “still does not buy” the good cop-bad cop argument and complained about Europe’s inability to safeguard Iran’s interests.21
In his op-ed, Pezeshkian also addressed the United States. He urged Washington to “recognize the reality” that Tehran will not yield to pressure and emphasized that his country entered the JCPOA negotiations in “good faith” and fully met its obligation under the agreement. The United States “unlawfully withdrew from the agreement motivated by purely domestic quarrels and vengeance, inflicting hundreds of billions of dollars in damage to [the Iranian] economy and causing untold suffering, death, and destruction on the Iranian people,” he said.22 Although Pezeshkian did not call explicitly for negotiations with Washington, he hinted at an “open invitation” for constructive engagement on the international stage, adding that his administration “will welcome sincere efforts to alleviate tensions and will reciprocate good faith with good faith.”23
The experiences of the early 2000s and the JCPOA highlight that, without U.S. involvement and consent, European countries are unable to deliver any meaningful trade or commercial benefits to Iran. In both instances, despite Europe’s strong political will to uphold agreements and fulfill commitments, this resolve failed to translate into tangible benefits for Iran due to the absence of U.S. support. In the case of the JCPOA, for example, the European companies that invested in Iran in the aftermath of the agreement chose to kowtow to U.S. sanctions while disregarding the position of their respective governments. As a result, Pezeshkian cannot improve the Iranian economy significantly or bring about any changes without striking some sort of agreement with the United States. This will not be an easy endeavor.
An Experienced Team
Aiming to remove the sanctions, Pezeshkian has brought the right people onto his foreign policy team, but faces domestic challenges. Zarif, a main architect of the JCPOA, joined Pezeshkian from the beginning and, in an unprecedented move, went on the campaign trail to support his presidential bid. On August 1, Pezeshkian appointed the savvy Iranian diplomat as vice president for strategic affairs. Since then, Iranian hard-liners who opposed negotiations with the United States and the JCPOA from the beginning have resumed their attacks on Zarif, accusing him of having a “pro-American” agenda.24 Given Zarif’s familiarity with the intricacy of the nuclear talks, experience in international diplomacy, and unique knowledge of U.S. politics, he can facilitate Pezeshkian’s bid to conclude new talks if the president can secure Khamenei’s approval.
The appointment of Araghchi, Iran’s former chief nuclear negotiator, as the new foreign minister should be seen as another indication that Pezeshkian’s administration is serious about striking a nuclear agreement with the United States and the European signatories to the JCPOA. As Zarif’s deputy, he played a key role in the talks that led to the signing of the nuclear deal and has remained a staunch defender of that agreement. Araghchi, who has more revolutionary bona bides than Zarif, is a career diplomat with the Iranian Foreign Ministry and has held several ambassadorial postings. He has argued previously that as long as Iran adheres to its anti-imperialistic discourse, resolving fundamental issues with the United States is impossible but differences can be managed. “Either you abandon the anti-imperialistic discourse, which means you are no longer the Islamic Republic [of Iran], or you must confront the United States,” Araghchi has stated.
In the foreign policy agenda that he presented to the Iranian parliament, Araghchi called for “managing the hostilities” with the United States and for an “honorable” lifting of the U.S. unilateral sanctions through “serious and goal-oriented” negotiations.25 Nonetheless, he recently stated on Iranian state television that although the JCPOA can be a guide in future talks, it cannot be revived “in its current form” because the world has changed as the result of conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. “There will be other forms for an agreement that we will pursue,” he asserted.26 This is a realistic view because Iran’s technological advancements have rendered some of the JCPOA limitations obsolete, including testing and operating advanced centrifuges.
The primary challenge for Pezeshkian and his team will be persuading Khamenei once again that nuclear negotiations with Washington could be beneficial. In 2012, when Iran and the United States began their secret talks in Masqat, Oman, the task of convincing Khamenei to approve the talks fell on Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi. He urged Khamenei in a meeting that Iran had nothing to lose by engaging the United States.27 Khamenei had approved the talks reluctantly, under the condition that they would be limited strictly to the nuclear issue and that Iran’s uranium-enrichment rights would be protected.
Throughout the process, Khamenei continued to support the talks, but remained wary, often describing U.S. officials as “deceitful” and “prone to breaking their promises.”28 Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA only reinforced Khamenei’s deep skepticism, leading him to reverse his position quickly. In August 2018, shortly after the U.S. withdrawal, the Iranian leader expressed regret for approving the nuclear talks, adding that, “in the JCPOA nuclear negotiations, I made a mistake.”29 Khamenei also banned any further nuclear talks with the United States, reiterating in November 2020 that negotiations to end the sanctions did not work.30
Convincing the Supreme Leader
To fulfill his promises of improving the economy, Pezeshkian and his advisers face the daunting task of convincing Khamenei that Iran once again must negotiate conditions on its nuclear program and strike a deal with the “Great Satan,” as some Iranian officials refer to the United States. Although Khamenei remains deeply skeptical of the United States, Pezeshkian’s bear-hug approach to Khamenei could help him win the supreme leader’s consent. During a meeting with Pezeshkian’s newly appointed cabinet on August 27, Khamenei hinted that he would not oppose engagement with the United States. “We do not have to pin our hope to the enemy. For our plans, we should not wait for approval by the enemies, but [it] is not contradictory to engage the same enemy in some places. [T]here’s no barrier,” Khamenei said.31
In the search for a new deal with the United States, Khamenei’s approval is necessary but not sufficient. Simultaneously, Pezeshkian must contend with Iranian hard-liners who, after losing the election, are likely to work tirelessly to sabotage his efforts to resolve the nuclear issue and boost the economy. Pezeshkian faces formidable opposition, particularly in the parliament and the Supreme National Security Council. Jalili, a staunch opponent of the JCPOA and defeated presidential candidate, remains a significant obstacle within the council. To some extent, Khamenei’s support can shield Pezeshkian from domestic attacks, but the new president still has to build a domestic consensus to mitigate the influence of these spoilers.
As the U.S. presidential campaign nears a reckoning, Iranians, having witnessed the United States reneging on its commitments, are likely to wait for the outcome of the November election before considering any new agreements. Washington also appears unhurried about striking a deal with Iran over its nuclear program. On July 9, White House spokesperson John Kirby stated that the United States “was not ready” to resume nuclear talks with Iran under the new president.32 This is shortsighted. Amid unprecedented tensions in the Middle East, Washington should not overlook any opportunity that could help deescalate the situation. Raisi’s death has provided a rare opening for Iran and the United States. After decades of missed opportunities due to reluctance on one side or the other, Tehran seems ready to strike a deal that could lead to a mutually beneficial diplomatic resolution to the nuclear crisis.
Trump’s potential return to the White House could jeopardize any chance of a deal, but a Harris administration likely would be much more conducive to reaching a nuclear agreement. In the short term, a limited-scope, transactional arrangement could create the necessary political space for negotiating a more comprehensive deal. This interim arrangement should prioritize freezing and rolling back the most sensitive aspects of Iran’s nuclear program, such as halting enrichment to higher levels and reducing Iran’s growing stockpile of enriched uranium. Such measures could extend Iran’s breakout time and move it further away from a nuclear bomb.
For any agreement to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis effectively, it must involve reciprocal concessions from all parties. Although an ideal outcome for one side might seem like unconditional surrender by the other, this is simply impractical. Iran’s nuclear program, thanks to Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA, is now far more advanced, and Iran effectively is a nuclear threshold state. Its nuclear program is here to stay. Regime changes will not fundamentally change Iran’s nuclear posture. The question remains, after repeated failed attempts, how the United States will approach one of its enduring foreign policy dilemmas.
ENDNOTES
1. Javad M. Zarif, Raaz-e Sar be Mohr: The Nuclear Deal; Untold Story of JCPOA Protecting Iran’s Security, Rights and Development (Tehran: Institute for Political and International Studies [IPIS], 2021), pp. 580-581.
2. “Behzad Nabavi: Dar Dolat e Rouhani Ehyaye Barjam dar Dastras Bud vali Ejazeh Nadadand” [Behzad Nabavi: Reviving JCPOA was attainable under Rouhani but they were not allowed to], Rouhanihassan.com, August 23, 2023, https://www.rouhanihassan.com/Fa/News/103157/آگاهی-نو-بهزاد-نبوی-در-دولت-روحانی-احیای-برجام-در-دسترس-بود-اما-اجازه-ندادند. All translations by the author.
3. BBC, “Rast Azmayi e Monazere Dovom” [Fact checking the second debate], May 5, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-features-39821825.
4. “Goft-o-goo ba Ali Bagheri kani” [A conversation with Ali Bagheri Kani], Aparat, n.d., https://www.aparat.com/v/dH2jD (accessed September 15, 2024).
5. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015): Report by the Director General,” GOV/2021/39, September 7, 2021.
6. IAEA, “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015): Report by the Director General,” GOV/2023/57, November 15, 2023.
7. Jennifer Hansler and Kylie Atwood, “Blinken Says Iran’s Nuclear Weapon Breakout Time Is Probably Down to 1-2 Weeks,” CNN, July 20, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/19/politics/blinken-nuclear-weapon-breakout
-time/index.html.
8. Iranian Students News Agency, “Pezeshkian: agar barjam bad ast beguyand an raa edame nemidahand” [If JCPOA is bad they should say that they will not continue it- and what their alternative is], June 24, 2024, https://www.isna.ir/news/1403040402796/پزشکیان-اگر-برجام-بد-است-بگویند-آن-را-ادامه-نمی-دهند-و-جایگزینشان.
9. “Pezeshkian: On the Issues,” U.S. Institute of Peace, July 8, 2024, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2024/jul/08/pezeshkian-issues.
11. Mehr News Agency, “Pezeshikian: Amrika bayad tamam-e ta’ahodatash ra anjam dahad ta ma be barjam bargardim” [Pezeshkian: The U.S. must fulfill all its commitments so that we return to the JCPOA], July 2, 2024, https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6155077/پزشکیان-وارد-صدا-و-سیما-شد.
12. Keyvan Hosseini, “Khamenei aab e paaki ra rikht rooye dastan-e mozakere ba Amrika. Hala Taklif chist?” [Khamenei has definitively ruled out negotiations with the U.S.; what course of action will Pezeshkian take now?], BBC, June 25, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/cl77ydldekeo.
13. “Pezeshkian: Agar Magham-e Moazam-e Rahbari Nabud, Fekr Nemikonam Esme ma be Rahati Az in Sandough Ha dar miamad” [Pezeshkian: Without Supreme Leader Khamenei…I do not imagine my name would have easily come out of these [ballot] boxes], Hamshahri Online, July 6, 2024, https://www.hamshahrionline.ir/news/865040/پزشکیان-اگر-مقام-معظم-رهبری-نبودند-فکر-نمی-کنم-اسم-ما-به-راحتی.
14. Iranian journalist, telephone interview with author, July 5, 2024.
15. Nadeen Ebrahim and Michael Rios, “Reformist Lawmaker Masoud Pezeshkian Wins Iran’s Presidential Vote,” CNN, July 6, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/05/middleeast/pezeshkian-wins-irans-vote-intl-hnk/index.html.
16. Laurence Norman, “Biden Administration Presses Allies Not to Confront Iran on Nuclear Program,” The Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2024.
17. Radio Free Europe, “IAEA Chief Says Cooperation From Iran ‘Completely Unsatisfactory,’” May 7, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/grossi-iran-nuclear-iaea/32937031.html.
18. See International Crisis Group, “Man on a Wire: A Way Forward for Iran’s New President,” Crisis Group Middle East Report, No. 245, July 30, 2024, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/245-gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran/man-wire-way-forward-irans-new-president.
19. Masoud Pezeshkian, “My Message to the New World,” Tehran Times, July 12, 2024, https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/501077/My-message-to-the-new-world.
20. For example, see “Police-e Khub va bad Orupa Va Amrika Dar Barjam” [Europe and the U.S. Good Cop, Bad Cop], Iranian Diplomacy, February 2018, http://irdiplomacy.ir/fa/news/1981673/پلیس-خوب-و-بد-اروپا-و-امریکا-در-برجام.
21. “Letter of 6 November 2018 to JCPOA Coordinator on Iran’s Exhaustion of All DRM Procedures and Its Initiation of Remedial Action Under Paragraph 36,” in Javad Zarif, Letter to the UN Secretary-General: Documenting Six Years of Western [Non-] Implementation of the Iran Nuclear Deal (Tehran: IPIS, 2023), p. 88.
22. Pezeshkian, “My Message to the New World.”
24. See Hamid Resaeee (@hamidresaee), “Mr. Mezeshkian, the appointment of this individual with his pro-American views as your Vice President, a day after Haniyeh assassination, does not send the proper message to our people,” X, August 2, 2024, 5:35 a.m., https://x.com/hamidrasaee/status/1819305954573263013?s=46.
25. “Araghchi Barname-hayash ra Baraye Vezarat-e Khareje Tashrih Kard” [Araghchi outlined his agenda for the Foreign Ministry], Jamaran News, August 12, 2024, https://www.jamaran.news/بخش-سیاست-12/1640074-عراقچی-برنامه-هایش-برای-وزارت-خارجه-را-تشریح-کرد-هماهنگی-کامل-میدان-دیپلماسی-رفع-شرافتمندانه-تحریم-ها-با-مذاکرات-هدفمند-غیر-فرسایشی-ادامه-روابط-مستحکم-با-چین-روسیه-ایجاد-پیوندهای-نوین-با-اقتصادهای-نوظهور.
26. BBC, “Abbas e Araghchi vazir-e Khareje Jadid-e Iran Miguyad Barjam Ghabel-e Ehya Nist” [The new foreign minister of Iran, Abbas Araghchi, says that the JCPOA cannot be revived], August 24, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/persian/articles/czx6n53dy09o.
27. Ali-Akbar Salehi, Passage in History: Memoirs of Dr. Ali Akbar Salehi (Tehran: Iranian Foreign Ministry, 2018), p. 472.
28. Khamenei.ir, “11 Answers to Questions About the Nuclear File,” January 20, 2015, https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=29440#1.
29. BBC, “Ayatollah Khamenei: Dar Mozakerat e Barjam Eshtebah Kardam” [Ayatollah Khamenei: I made a mistake in the JCPOA negotiations], August 13, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-45167008.
30. Khamenei.ir, “We Tried Negotiations to End the Sanctions and It Did Not Work,” November 24, 2020, https://english.khamenei.ir/news/8141/We-tried-negotiations-to-end-the-sanctions-and-it-did-not-work.
31. “Iran’s Supreme Leader Opens Door to Talks With ‘Enemy’ US Over Tehran’s Nuclear Programme,” South China Morning Post, August 27, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/world/middle-east/article/3276141/irans-supreme-leader-opens-door-talks-enemy-us-over-tehrans-nuclear-programme.
32. Iran Front Page, “US Says Not Ready to Resume Nuclear Negotiations With Iran Under Pezeshkian,” July 9, 2024, https://ifpnews.com/us-nuclear-negotiations-iran-pezeshkian/.
Sina Azodi, an expert on Iran’s nuclear program and national security policies, is a professorial lecturer of international affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University.
Research suggests that the Kremlin could lose popular support if it used nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
October 2024
By Michal Smetana and Michal Onderco
In the years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin’s nuclear saber-rattling has become almost routine. President Vladimir Putin frequently highlights the power of Russia’s massive nuclear arsenal in his public speeches, while other Russian politicians and foreign policy experts do not shy away from discussing the possibility of nuclear strikes against Ukraine’s Western backers.1 Many NATO countries have taken the threat of nuclear escalation very seriously since the war began, and according to new reporting, the U.S. administration believed that Russia was on the brink of using a tactical nuclear weapon against Ukraine in the second half of 2022.2
Yet, in one of his recent speeches, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy downplayed the threat of Russian nuclear use, arguing that the Russian government would not break the decades-old “nuclear taboo” for fear of losing broad societal support.3 If this argument holds, it would suggest that nuclear employment represents a true redline for the Russian public beyond which the Kremlin can no longer count on popular approval for its foreign policy adventurism. Is there any ground for the claim that a majority of the Russian public would oppose nuclear use, especially if doing so would increase Russian chances for a swift victory in Ukraine or even prevent Russia from losing the war?
In June 2024, we conducted a unique survey experiment in Russia to find out.4 In contrast to vague questions in more traditional public opinion polls, participants in our experiment were provided with very specific hypothetical scenarios in which the Russian government considered nuclear strikes against NATO or Ukraine as a way of averting military defeat.5
We worked together with a local, independent nongovernmental organization in Russia, the Levada Center, to conduct our experiment on a large representative sample of the Russian population. Levada is a trusted partner for numerous Western organizations and media to conduct public opinion research in Russia. Our experiment was embedded in Levada’s monthly omnibus survey, which is a Russia-wide poll, with participants coming from large cities such as Moscow and Saint Petersburg and small rural settlements in Siberia and the Far East. In total, we conducted our study on a representative sample of 1,600 Russian citizens aged 18 years or older from 137 settlements in 50 regions of the Russian Federation.6
The results have been fascinating in many ways (fig. 1). A majority of Russians (71 percent) disagreed with a limited nuclear strike against a NATO military base in Poland, even when not doing so would result in the Russian army being defeated in a fictional conflict in the Baltics. Comparing these numbers to the results of our 2021 study, we can conclude that the percentage of Russians who would agree with their government’s decision to conduct a nuclear strike against NATO—28 percent in 2021 and 29 percent in 2024—has changed little over the past three years.7 This finding suggests that the Russian war against Ukraine and the Kremlin’s nuclear saber-rattling have not had a dramatic impact on the widely shared public aversion to the idea of a nuclear escalation.8
The results also show that roughly the same proportion of Russian citizens who disagreed with nuclear weapons use against NATO (72 percent) rejected a nuclear strike against a military target in Ukraine, despite the fact that Ukraine is not covered by NATO’s nuclear umbrella. It suggests that the Russian aversion to nuclear escalation is not merely due to a concern about nuclear retaliation by NATO allies. Not using a nuclear weapon in our scenario came with serious strategic consequences, specifically, the loss of Crimea, the Ukrainian region whose illegal annexation by Russia in 2014 is supported by a majority of the Russian public.9
Somewhat disconcerting was the slightly higher public support for a demonstrative nuclear explosion over the Black Sea (36 percent). A Russian expert recently proposed such a nuclear demonstration “to show the seriousness of Russia’s intentions and convince our opponents of Moscow’s resolve to escalate.”10 Yet, even in this less escalatory scenario, almost two-thirds of Russians (64 percent) disagreed with pressing the nuclear button.
It is fair to ask whether Russian leaders even care what the public thinks. After all, Putin’s regime is a repressive autocracy that has become even more so since the start of the full-blown invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.11 Yet, for Putin’s regime, what people think matters. The Kremlin has been highly sensitive to any signs of fluctuations in public opinion, and frequent public polling has been a standard practice of this regime.12 Overall, many experts on Russian politics agree that the Russian government does not only shape public preferences in foreign policy, but it also is partially responsive to public sentiments in this area.13 A case in point may be Putin’s hesitation to order a military mobilization in the first year of the war, likely postponed mainly due to concerns about public backlash.14
Interestingly, the Russian public generally tends to have a positive relationship with the country’s nuclear arsenal and sees it as a source of Russian power and status.15 This standing is due in no small part to consistent messaging in Russia, which has portrayed the nation’s enormous nuclear arsenal as prideworthy. Putin’s regime has invested heavily in showing off Russia’s newest nuclear missiles and using them as props during military parades.
The domestic nuclear messaging has continued after the invasion. Russia’s nuclear rhetoric during the first 16 months of the war was often directed at the Russian public, as well as at Western audiences. Although official Kremlin messaging has been somewhat careful, opinions peddled by Moscow’s pundits in popular outlets and various magazines and on TV have been anything but. This more hawkish narrative has been reinforced and strengthened by a religious undertone, which included the blessing of nuclear missiles by the Russian Orthodox Church.16
The amount of attention that the nuclear saber-rattling gets on Russian public TV, from which most Russians get their news, underscores that the Russian regime still cares about public views on the nuclear arsenal. Far from being irrelevant, public opinion matters for Putin’s Russia. The results of our survey indicate that, despite significant public propaganda by the Russian government and its surrogates, the Russian public thus far has not become more enthusiastic about the prospect of using nuclear weapons to influence the course of the war in Ukraine. This finding alone might cause some disappointment in the Kremlin.
For Western policymakers, these findings offer a rare glimpse of hope. The Kremlin’s coercive messaging in the war in Ukraine has shown the limited capacity of the Russian leadership to learn from the failures of its nuclear threats.17 The results of the study indicate that domestic audiences are not more eager to consider nuclear options, even in the face of potential Russian military failure and persistent domestic messaging. This finding underscores that ordinary Russians understand the limits of nuclear coercion well and their belief in the nuclear taboo appears rather firm. The lack of change in Russian public attitudes toward the use of nuclear weapons since the invasion of Ukraine underscores how difficult it might be to shift public views and how strong the atomic aversion among the Russian public is.
For Western governments, the most fruitful strategy appears to be to continue their persistent messaging rejecting the legitimacy of the Kremlin’s nuclear threats. It makes sense to continue underscoring that any use of nuclear weapons would lead to a forceful response by NATO and to material, political, and moral consequences for Russia. The Russian public subconsciously understands this message, which needs to be firmly reinforced.
ENDNOTES
1. “Putin Says Russia Will Develop Its Nuclear Arsenal to Preserve Global Balance of Power,” Reuters, June 21, 2024; “Nukes! Medvedev Again Threatens West With Nuclear Escalation,” Kyiv Post, June 1, 2024, https://www.kyivpost.com/post/33622; Sergei A. Karaganov, “A Difficult but Necessary Decision,” Russia in Global Affairs, June 13, 2023, https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/a-difficult-but-necessary-decision/.
2. Jim Sciutto, “Exclusive: U.S. Prepared ‘Rigorously’ for Potential Russian Nuclear Strike in Ukraine in Late 2022, Officials Say,” CNN, March 9, 2024, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/03/09/politics/us-prepared-rigorously-potential-russian-nuclear-strike-ukraine/index.html.
3. Nina Tannewald, “Is Using Nuclear Weapons Still Taboo?” Foreign Policy, July 1, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/01/nuclear-war-taboo-arms-control-russia-ukraine-deterrence/; Kateryna Shkarlat, “Zelenskyy Outlines What Is Restraining Putin From Nuclear Strike on Ukraine,” RBC-Ukraine, May 3, 2023, https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/zelenskyy-outlines-what-is-restraining-putin-1714764161.html.
4. For full results of our experiment and a detailed statistical analysis, see Michal Smetana and Michal Onderco, “I Hope the Russians Love Their Children Too”: Experimental Evidence on Russian Public Support for Nuclear Use After the Invasion of Ukraine,” September 2024, https://ssrn.com/abstract=4906365 (preprint).
5. “On the Possibility of Using Nuclear Weapons in the Ukrainian Conflict,” Levada Center, June 21, 2023, https://www.levada.ru/en/2023/06/21/on-the-possibility-of-using-nuclear-weapons-in-the-ukrainian-conflict/.
6. For more information, see “Levada Omnibus Survey,” Levada Center, n.d., https://www.levada.ru/en/methods/omnibus/ (accessed September 20, 2024).
7. See Michal Smetana and Michal Onderco, “From Moscow With a Mushroom Cloud? Russian Public Attitudes to the Use of Nuclear Weapons in a Conflict With NATO,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 67, Nos. 2-3 (2023): 183-209.
8. Heather Williams et al., “Deter and Divide: Russia’s Nuclear Rhetoric and Escalation Risks in Ukraine,” CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues, 2024, https://features.csis.org/deter-and-divide-russia-nuclear-rhetoric/.
9. “Most Russians Support Annexation of Crimea - Poll,” The Moscow Times, April 26, 2021, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/04/26/most-russians-support-annexation-of-crimea-poll-a73741/.
10. Dmitriy Suslov, “Пора подумать о демонстрационном ядерном взрыве” [It’s time to think about a demonstration nuclear explosion], Profil, May 29, 2024, https://profile.ru/abroad/pora-podumat-o-demonstracionnom-yadernom-vzryve-1520096/.
11. “Russia: New Heights on Repression,” Human Rights Watch, January 11, 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/11/russia-new-heights-repression.
12. Olga Oliker et al., “Russian Foreign Policy in Historical and Current Context: A Reassessment,” Rand Corp., September 12, 2024, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE144.html.
13. Anna Efimova and Denis Strebkov, “Linking Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in Russia,” The International Spectator, Vol. 55, No. 1 (2020): 93-111.
14. Oleg Sukhov, “Putin Lacks Troops in Ukraine but Fears Mobilization in Russia,” Kyiv Independent, July 5, 2022, https://kyivindependent.com/putin-lacks-troops-in-ukraine-but-fears-mobilization-in-russia/.
15. Larisa Deriglazova and Nina Rozhanovskaya, “Building Nuclear Consensus in Contemporary Russia: Factors and Perceptions,” in Nuclear Russia: International and Domestic Agendas, ed. Andrey Pavlov and Larisa Deriglazova (Tomsk: Tomsk University Press, 2020), 131-162.
16. Mansur Mirovalev, “‘God of War’: Russian Orthodox Church Stands by Putin, but at What Cost?” Al Jazeera, February 9, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/9/far-from-harmless-patriarch-kirill-backs-putins-war-but-at-what-cost.
17. Anna Clara Arndt, Liviu Horovitz, and Michal Onderco, “Russia’s Failed Nuclear Coercion Against Ukraine,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 3 (2023): 167-184.
Michal Smetana is an associate professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, and director of the Peace Research Center in Prague. Michal Onderco is a professor of international relations in the Department of Public Administration and Sociology at Erasmus University in Rotterdam.
October 2024
By Matthew R. Costlow
I read with some dismay Frank von Hippel’s “The 1970s ICBM ‘Window of Vulnerability’ Still Lingers” in the September 2024 issue of Arms Control Today. In making his case concerning the alleged dangers of U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), he errs on matters of policy, strategy, and operations to such a significant degree that I believe a public correction of the record is necessary.
Von Hippel states that “[t]he primary advantage of a launch-under-attack posture is its low cost. Its major disadvantage is the danger of accidental launch.” Addressing both assertions in turn, the U.S. ability to launch its ICBMs under attack is one option among many for a president facing an apparent attack. But the advantage of this posture lies in its deterrence effect, not in its cost. Even an ICBM force in a de-alerted state would constitute a “low cost” posture and thus cannot be why U.S. officials in Democratic and Republican administrations have long seen an advantage in keeping U.S. ICBMs on alert. Instead, as the historical record attests, U.S. officials see a great advantage in complicating adversary targeting plans by retaining the option of launching ICBMs while adversary missiles are still in flight. This approach leaves open the possibility that the adversary will have expended potentially thousands of warheads for no apparent military gain, not to mention the incoming U.S. response.
On the matter of accidental launch, von Hippel expands on his concern by stating without citation or evidence, “In contrast to this redundancy of positive controls to assure the ICBMs would be launched if ordered, there is not a single system to deal with the possibility of a mistaken or unauthorized launch.” He correctly notes that ICBMs can be launched, with proper authorization from the chain of command, from one of five launch control centers or an airborne asset called “airborne launch control system.” What he fails to note is that each of these systems can issue “inhibit launch” orders against the silo or silos in question. Far from “not a single system” to address the possibility of unauthorized launch, there is a host of systems and procedures built for that exact purpose, including manual locks, safing pins, and more.1
The Air Force is not a passive observer of the issue either. It conducts “Unauthorized Launch Studies” to red-team potential problems and undertakes “Threat Mitigation Plans” if any problems are found.2 Unsurprisingly, the Air Force mandates numerous redundant safeguards for the software used in nuclear systems that are biased toward making it far easier to inhibit a launch than to enable it.3 As the Defense Department states, “The U.S. alert system prioritizes surety over speed.”4
The policy debate over the value of ICBMs in U.S. nuclear strategy can continue usefully only if all sides have a clear understanding of the safeguards in place to prevent unauthorized or accidental launches.
ENDNOTES
1. See U.S. Air Force, “Safety Rules for the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile System,” AFI91-114, January 6, 2023.
2. U.S. Air Force, “Unauthorized Launch, Threat Mitigation, and Launch Action Studies,” AFI91-106, August 28, 2019.
3. U.S. Air Force Headquarters, “Department of the Air Force Guidance Memorandum (DAFGM) to Department of the Air Force Manual (DAFMAN) 91-119, Safety Design Criteria for Nuclear Weapon Systems Software,” DAFMAN91-119_DAFGM2024-01, June 11, 2024.
4. U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on the Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States - 2020,” n.d., p. 6, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/NCB/21-F-0591_2020_Report_of_the_Nuclear_Employement_Strategy_of_the_United_States.pdf.
Matthew R. Costlow is a senior analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy.
The United States accused Iran of sending ballistic missiles to Russia, but Iran denied the accusation.
October 2024
By Kelsey Davenport
The United States accused Iran of sending ballistic missiles to Russia, an accusation Iran denied.
Iran reached an agreement with Russia to transfer hundreds of missiles in 2023, according to the U.S. Treasury Department, but the Sept. 10 announcement was the first time that the United States confirmed that Iran shipped any missile systems to Russia.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in a Sept. 10 press conference in London that the United States had warned Iran publicly and privately that transferring the missiles would be a “dramatic escalation.” Blinken said that Russia is likely to use the weapons within the next several weeks.
Iran called the accusation “a vile propaganda ploy” and said that the United States is disseminating “misleading information.”
Iran was prohibited from transferring missiles and related technologies under UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the 2015 nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and modified UN sanctions on Iran. The missile restrictions expired in October 2023. Prior to the expiration, Iran transferred drones to Russia in violation of the UN restrictions. Iran admitted to exporting some drones, but denied it was a violation of Resolution 2231.
The United States and European countries responded to the missile transfer by announcing additional sanctions against Iran, including against Iran Air.
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom said in a Sept. 10 statement that the transfer of missiles is “a direct threat to European security.” The move is “further escalation of Iran’s military support to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and will see Iranian missiles reaching European soil,” the statement said.
The Russian Foreign Ministry said that Tehran and Moscow are cooperating in “sensitive” areas, but did not confirm or deny the transfer of missiles.
Blinken said the missile involved was the Fath-360, which has a range of 75 miles. He said Russian military personnel were trained in Iran to use that system and suggested that Russia will use the Iranian systems for “closer-range targets.”
U.S. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said that Iran benefits militarily from the security relationship with Russia. The two countries share technology and tactics, he said.
Masoud Pezeshkian made his overture to the United States and other key countries in his first address to the General Assembly since being elected Iran’s new leader in July.
October 2024
By Kelsey Davenport
Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has offered to open new nuclear negotiations with the United States and its partners in return for lifting sanctions that are crippling his country’s economy.
In his first appearance at the UN General Assembly since being elected in July, Pezeshkian criticized U.S. President Donald Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and “coercion-driven” sanctions strategy as “a threat-ridden approach.”
Arguing that “we have the opportunity… to enter a new era,” Pezeshkian said in his Sept. 24 speech that “[w]e are ready to engage with JCPOA participants” and “[i]f JCPOA commitments are implemented fully and in good faith, dialogue on other issues can follow.”
Pezeshkian’s focus on engagement with the United States and Europe marks a shift from his predecessor, Ebrahim Raisi, who derailed an opportunity to restore the JCPOA in 2022 and cast doubt on Iran’s commitment to nuclear negotiations. (See ACT, October 2022.)
But Iran’s recent decision to ship missiles to Russia and escalating tensions between Israel and Iranian-backed proxies in the region make it more challenging politically for the United States to accept Pezeshkian’s overture.
Meanwhile, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has made clear that Iran will not wait until after the U.S. presidential election on Nov. 5 to negotiate over its nuclear program and believes that the 2015 nuclear deal could provide a basis for a future agreement.
In an interview with state-run IRIB News on Sept. 15, Araghchi said that it is not surprising that the United States does not want to negotiate before its presidential election but that Iran is prepared to move forward now and engage with other countries. He said previously that the JCPOA cannot be restored, but his latest comments suggested that the agreement still provides a suitable framework for future talks.
Araghchi’s comments came after Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said in an Aug. 27 speech that the United States cannot be trusted but that there is “no harm” in interacting in “certain situations.”
The Biden administration continues to suggest that it is waiting for Iran to take the first step back to negotiations. The U.S. State Department said in response to Khamenei’s comments that if Iran wants to “demonstrate seriousness or a new approach,” it should stop its nuclear escalations and “start meaningfully cooperating” with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi told the agency’s Board of Governors on Sept. 9 that there has been “no progress in resolving the outstanding safeguards issues” with Iran.
The IAEA continues to seek answers from Iran about the presence of uranium detected at two locations that were never declared to the agency. (See ACT, July/August 2022.)
He said Iran’s assertions that “it has declared all nuclear material, activities, and locations” as required by its safeguards agreement is “inconsistent” with the agency’s findings. The IAEA must resolve these questions to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear program is “exclusively peaceful,” Grossi said.
Grossi also told the board that Pezeshkian agreed to meet “at an appropriate juncture.” He encouraged Iran to facilitate the meeting so that Tehran and the agency can “establish a constructive dialogue that leads swiftly to real results.”
In a joint statement to the IAEA board on Sept. 13, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States reiterated that Iran’s “continued stonewalling runs contrary to its legal obligations” under its safeguards agreement. There is “reasonable doubt about the nature of Iran’s nuclear activities” as long as the IAEA’s concerns persist, the states said.
They added that “further action by the Board will be necessary” if Iran does not cooperate with the agency, including asking the IAEA to compile a comprehensive report on Iran’s nuclear program to inform a decision about what additional steps the board should take.
Although the states may push for a report, Grossi suggested it is not necessary. He said in the Sept. 9 press conference that the IAEA already has provided an assessment of what occurred at Iran’s undeclared locations and is focused on resolving the issues.
In a separate report on Aug. 29, the IAEA noted that Iran installed and began operating additional advanced centrifuges at its uranium-enrichment facilities over the past few months.
According to the report, Iran installed an additional 10 cascades of IR-2 centrifuges at the fuel enrichment plant at Natanz, bringing the total number of cascades to 31. Of the 31, 15 are now being used to enrich uranium, six more than the IAEA reported as operational in May.
The IAEA also reported that Iran installed an additional eight cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at the Fordow enrichment plant. Tehran announced the installation in June, but is not yet operating any of those machines. (See ACT, July/August 2024.) Enrichment at Fordow is more concerning from a proliferation perspective because the facility is buried deeply in the mountains, making it more difficult to target in a military operation.
Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) grew over the past quarter. The IAEA reported that Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent uranium-235 was 165 kilograms as of Aug. 17, up nearly 29 kilograms from May, and its stockpile of uranium enriched to 20 percent U-235 grew from 751 kilograms to 814 kilograms.
Uranium enriched to 60 percent and 20 percent U-235 can be enriched more quickly to 90 percent U-235, which is considered weapons grade.
In a Sept. 10 statement to the IAEA board, U.S. Ambassador Laura Holgate said that if Iran is “interested in building confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program, it should down-blend its 60 percent [U-235] stockpile and stop such production entirely.”
Iran’s HEU has “no credible civilian purpose,” Holgate said. She urged Iran to be fully transparent regarding its uranium- enrichment activities.
In a new report, António Guterres reaffirmed the need to preserve human control over the use of force and said “[t]he autonomous targeting of humans by machines is a moral line that must not be crossed.”
October 2024
By Michael T. Klare and Xiaodon Liang
UN Secretary-General António Guterres reaffirmed the need for urgent action to preserve human control over the use of force in a new report that he said reflects “widespread recognition” by UN member-states of the potential harmful effects of lethal autonomous weapons systems.
Released on Aug. 6, the report summarizes the views of 73 states and 33 civil society organizations, including Human Rights Watch and the Arms Control Association, on the challenges posed by autonomous weapons systems. It was mandated by a UN General Assembly resolution passed in December. (See ACT, December 2023.)
“There is widespread concern that those weapons systems have the potential to change warfare significantly and may strain or even erode existing legal frameworks,” Guterres said in the conclusion section of the report.
He also found “widespread recognition” that human control is essential to ensure accountability, responsibility, and compliance with international law and a “strong sense that time is running out for the international community to take preventive action on this issue.”
Guterres stressed “the need to act urgently to preserve human control over the use of force” and called for the conclusion by 2026 of a “legally binding instrument to prohibit lethal autonomous weapons systems that function without human control or oversight and that cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law.”
“The autonomous targeting of humans by machines is a moral line that must not be crossed,” he said.
Although Guterres emphasized common ground, there are signs of continued international division over potential responses to the lethal autonomous weapons challenge. In a section of the report summarizing state submissions, Guterres highlighted differences between states that favored continuing discussion of such responses solely within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and states that preferred advancing discussions toward a legally binding treaty in other venues, such as the UN General Assembly.
In its analysis of the report, the Stop Killer Robots advocacy organization said that, of the 58 submissions from states or groups of states, 47 states expressed support for some form of prohibition or regulation of lethal autonomous weapons systems. But many prominent countries remain opposed to or are undecided on a potential treaty regulating these weapons, including China, India, Israel, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, it said.
Many of the positions identified by Guterres also were debated at two recent international gatherings on lethal autonomous weapons systems.
The first of these was a session of the CCW group of governmental experts held in Geneva on Aug. 26-30. It was convened in accordance with a 2023 decision by the CCW states-parties instructing the experts group to extend its work until 2026 “to further consider and formulate, by consensus, a set of elements of an instrument…to address emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems.”
At the Geneva meeting, delegations debated elements of a legally binding measure to ban or restrict the use of lethal autonomous weapons systems. Much of the debate concerned terminology, particularly the “characterization,” or definition, of the systems and the degree of human oversight required to prevent such devices from violating international humanitarian law.
Many delegations expressed support for legally binding restrictions on the deployment of these systems, but several states, notably India, Israel, Russia, and the United States, opposed overly restrictive language on their use. Because decisions at the experts group meetings are made by consensus, very little was agreed at the August session, prompting many delegations to express support for considering a binding instrument in the UN General Assembly.
The consensus procedure at the experts group “should not be an excuse to defeat the purpose of regulating the issue of [lethal autonomous weapons systems] through delays or procrastinations,” the Brazilian delegation said. Instead, “all avenues should be explored in order to achieve the best possible instrument, with the largest number of adherents, and that is to be able to be put into force the soonest.”
The debate continued Sept. 9-10 in Seoul at the REAIM (Responsible AI in the Military Domain) summit. Organized by South Korea, the meeting drew representatives from 90 countries and academics, scientists, and other specialists. This was the second REAIM summit, following an initial event at The Hague in February 2023.
The REAIM summit process differs from the CCW experts group meetings because it addresses the full range of artificial intelligence (AI) applications to military operations, not just its use in lethal autonomous weapons systems, and because it entertains nonbinding, voluntary measures only. (See ACT, April 2023.)
At the summit, panelists considered the risks and benefits of employing AI in the military domain, with some speakers arguing that AI could be used to reduce, as well as increase, the risks of humanitarian harm. Panel discussions also focused on possible strategies for minimizing the negative consequences of applying AI to military use, especially with respect to the proliferation or unintended use of weapons of mass destruction.
Following a ministerial roundtable on the second day of the summit, 61 countries signed a “blueprint for action” to guide future efforts in this field.
Claiming that AI can be used for benign as well as malicious purposes, the blueprint calls on states “to establish national strategies, principles, standards and norms, policies and frameworks and legislation as appropriate to ensure responsible AI applications in the military domain.”
Such measures could include, for example, “appropriate safeguards to reduce the risk of malfunctions or unintended consequences, including from data, algorithmic, and other biases.”
Despite the nonbinding nature of the blueprint and its relatively unrestrictive proposals, 30 countries, including China, did not sign the document. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning did not explain Beijing’s reasons for abstaining, but said that “China will remain open and constructive in working with other parties” on the issue of AI regulation.
The next major venue for addressing international constraints on the development and deployment of lethal autonomous weapons system will be the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in October in New York.
In addition to revealing a uranium-enrichment facility and a new, larger launch vehicle for long-range missiles, leader Kim Jong Un pledged to expand the country’s nuclear arsenal.
October 2024
By Kelsey Davenport
North Korea revealed a uranium-enrichment facility and a new, larger launch vehicle for long-range missiles as leader Kim Jong Un pledged to expand the country’s nuclear arsenal.
In a Sept. 10 speech marking the country’s founding, Kim said that North Korea will “steadily bolster its nuclear force” to effectively respond to “any acts of threat imposed by nuclear-armed rivals.” He also repeated past calls for an exponential increase in the country’s stockpile of nuclear weapons.
Several days after the speech, Kim visited the state’s Nuclear Weapons Institute. North Korean media released images of him walking through an unnamed facility filled with centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium.
North Korea frequently displays pictures of its missiles and occasionally shares photos of warheads, but it generally has guarded the secrecy of its uranium-enrichment program. The photographs, published Sept. 13, did not disclose the location of the centrifuges.
North Korea is known to have a uranium-enrichment facility at Yongbyon, the nuclear complex where the country’s plutonium-producing reactor is located, and is suspected of operating additional centrifuges at unknown sites. A team of experts, including Jeffery Lewis from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, identified Kangson as one of the uranium-enrichment facilities in 2018. In a Sept. 13 post on the social platform X, Lewis pointed out features from the photos that are consistent with satellite images of Kangson.
According to the Sept. 13 report on Kim’s visit from the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Kim “set forth important tasks concerning a long-term plan for increasing the production of weapons-grade nuclear materials.” He said it is necessary for North Korea to “further increase the number of centrifuges” and enhance the efficiency of the machines. He said North Korea is ready to move forward with a new type of centrifuge.
Siegfried Hecker, a U.S. nuclear physicist and former head of Los Alamos National Laboratory, visited North Korea’s centrifuge facility at Yongbyon in 2010. The centrifuges shown in the Sept. 13 images are a different model than the machines Hecker observed on his trip. It is not clear from the photos how many of the centrifuges depicted are operational. Some machines are not connected yet, suggesting that North Korea is expanding its capacity.
According to KCNA, Kim noted the importance of producing fissile material for “the manufacture of tactical nuclear weapons.”
North Korea does not disclose the size of its nuclear arsenal, and uncertainty over its production capabilities makes it difficult to assess the number of warheads that the country possesses. In a July report, experts at the Federation of American Scientists estimated that North Korea has produced enough weapons-grade material for about 90 weapons but may have assembled only about 50 warheads.
Kim justified the expansion by saying U.S. threats and the regional security environment make it necessary for North Korea to “bolster up its military capability for self-defense” and for “preemptive attack with the nuclear force as the backbone.”
U.S. State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said in a Sept. 13 press briefing that the images of North Korea’s centrifuges do not change U.S. policy. The United States “will defend our South Korean and Japanese allies, and we’ll continue to work for the full denuclearization of the Korean peninsula,” he said.
National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby said that the United States continues to monitor North Korea’s “progression in their nuclear ambitions as well as their ballistic missile technology and program.”
He said that monitoring North Korea’s advances is one reason why the Biden administration devoted more “intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, prioritizing those for the area on and around the Korean peninsula.”
North Korea also published a photo of Kim inspecting a transport erector launch vehicle that appears larger than vehicles the country has used in the past for its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The photo, published Sept. 8, shows a 12-axle launch vehicle, which suggests that North Korea may be working on a larger, more powerful ICBM. North Korea launches the Hwasong-17, its largest known ICBM, using an 11-axle launch vehicle.
In a Sept. 11 joint statement, the defense ministers of the participating states of the UN Command and South Korea strongly condemned North Korea’s illegal nuclear and missile programs, which “seriously undermine international non-proliferation regimes.”
The UN Command, which is comprised of the states that fought against North Korea in the Korean War, welcomed Germany as a new member, bringing the number of participating states to 18.
The defense ministers said they would “remain united upon the renewal of hostilities or armed attack on the Korean peninsula.” They pledged to “reinforce combined exercises and training” in response to security threats and explore options for strengthening the UN Command.
North Korea responded to the meeting by accusing the United States of “buckling down” to draw additional states into its aggressive military drills.
In a Sept. 13 statement published in KCNA, the Disarmament and Peace Institute within the North Korean Foreign Ministry said the UN Command meeting is aimed at revitalizing a “tool for war and confrontation.” It accused the UN Command states of “further increasing the possibility of military conflict.”
The “collective military confrontation” against North Korea will motivate Pyongyang to accelerate the formation of a “just strategic axis” to correct the imbalance of power in the region, the statement said.
The institute did not define the “strategic axis,” but it may have been referring to North Korea’s growing partnership with Russia.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kim signed a treaty during Putin’s visit to North Korea in June that included pledges to strengthen military cooperation and provide assistance in response to an armed invasion. (See ACT, July/August 2024.)
The UN Command joint statement “expressed serious concern” over the growing partnership between North Korea and Russia.
The decision by Canada and the United Kingdom to ban or otherwise restrict arms transfers to Israel over the Gaza War follows similar decisions by Belgium, Italy and Spain.
October 2024
By Michael T. Klare
In what appears to be a growing trend, Canada and the United Kingdom recently joined several other NATO members in banning or otherwise restricting arms transfers to Israel due to its military operations in Gaza.
Belgium, Italy, and Spain already had imposed such measures, claiming that Israel’s relentless air and artillery strikes on Gaza, which have killed an estimated 40,000 people and flattened most residential areas, have violated international law.
The addition of Canada and the UK to this list suggests a growing policy rift with the United States, which is Israel’s major arms provider, responsible for 69 percent of the country’s imports over the past five years, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
The UK decision to constrain arms transfers to Israel was announced Sept. 2 by Foreign Secretary David Lammy, who told Parliament that, under the UK Export Control Act of 2002, military gear cannot be exported to any country in which “there is a clear risk that the items might be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian law.”
After an examination of all outstanding arms export licenses to Israel, several dozen were found to pose a “clear risk” of violating international law and so had been suspended by the government, he said.
As described by Lammy, the UK is not halting all arms exports to Israel, only those “that we assess [are] for use in the current conflict in Gaza,” such as key components for fighter aircraft, helicopters, and drones. The government’s decision also exempts parts for the F-35 fighter aircraft, which Israel has used for air strikes in Gaza, because the planes are being manufactured as part of a multinational program. “Suspending all licenses for the F-35 program would undermine the global F-35 supply chain that is vital for the security of the UK, our allies, and NATO,” he explained.
Lammy’s announcement was welcomed by many members of Parliament who have been pushing for a tough stance on Israel, but was criticized by Israeli leaders, who viewed it as a betrayal of a close ally, and by human rights activists, who claimed it did not go far enough.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was especially disparaging, calling the UK decision “shameful” and saying that “[w]ith or without British arms, Israel will win this war and secure our common future.”
Amnesty International, in its response, said the government’s move was “too limited and riddled with loopholes.” The group was particularly critical of the decision to exempt parts for the F-35 fighters, saying it was “a catastrophically bad decision for the future of arms control and misses a clear obligation to hold Israel accountable for its extensive war crimes and other violations.”
Anger over Israel’s perceived misconduct in Gaza also has provoked strong public opposition within Canada to arming Israel. That pressure led Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government to stop approving new permits for arms exports to Israel on Jan. 8.
This decision did not cover permits that had been approved previously, provoking widespread criticism from human rights and pro-Palestinian groups. After months of protests, the government announced on Sept. 10 that it would halt all arms shipments to Israel, even those stemming from older permits.
Following the Jan. 8 decision, “I asked my department to look into any existing permits of arms or parts of arms that could have been sent to Israel,” Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly told reporters on Sept. 10, according to the Canadian Broadcasting Corp. After that, “I suspended this summer around 30 existing permits of Canadian companies,” she said. “We will not have any form of arms or parts of arms be sent to Gaza, period.”
Joly provided few details about the suspensions, provoking further criticism. Heather McPherson, a foreign affairs specialist for the New Democratic Party, said that Joly’s latest announcement “absolutely” does not meet her concerns. “For her to take months and months and months to take action [on the existing permits] is appalling,” she told reporters.
Neither Canada nor the UK are major arms exporters to Israel, providing less than 1 percent of its annual dollar value of military imports. Nevertheless, their decision to restrict sales over Israel’s actions in Gaza constitute a major political statement, demonstrating diminishing international support for Israel’s continued military operations.
The United Kingdom and the United States said their decision to extend their mutual defense agreement indefinitely is in response to rising threats.
October 2024
By Shizuka Kuramitsu
The United Kingdom and the United States, responding to perceived rising threats, are seeking to bolster nuclear cooperation by indefinitely extending their mutual defense agreement prior to its expiration at the end of the year.
On July 25, Karen Pierce, the UK ambassador to the United States, and Bonnie Jenkins, the U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, signed a pledge to amend the agreement. The UK Parliament and the U.S. Congress are now considering acting on the amendment, which includes a clause deleting references to the expiry date.
The mutual defense agreement has allowed the two allies to exchange nuclear materials, technology, and information related to nuclear weapons, naval nuclear propulsion, and nuclear threat reduction since 1958 and has been renewed several times.
The agreement underpins the special UK-U.S. defense relationship and is considered unique among nuclear-weapon states because of the level of dependency and technical integration. Areas of recent collaboration include nuclear weapons modernization projects and safeguards.
By extending the agreement indefinitely, the proposed amendment streamlines the UK-U.S. exchange of nuclear materials and components of nuclear weapons and submarine reactors. “The exception to this is information sharing, which either state can end unilaterally at certain times if they give one year’s notice,” according to a report on Sept. 11 by Nuclear Information Service, a UK think tank.
The change fosters bilateral nuclear cooperation amid rising nuclear threats from their adversaries, namely Russia and China. David Cullen, director of the Nuclear Information Service, told the Financial Times on Sept. 2 that the amendment “provides a permanent underpin to the modernization of the UK’s nuclear deterrent.”
“It also locks in cooperation over AUKUS,” he said, referring to the Australia-UK-U.S. agreement to supply Australia with nuclear-powered submarines and other defense cooperation.
Discussing the agreement at an event in Washington on July 29, Jill Hruby, administrator of the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, said that the two countries “are closely aligned, with our W93 [nuclear warhead] program and their [UK] replacement warhead program Astraea.”
The allies also “are working together to create a new development and training center for [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards, and we are discussing a mutual resilience strategy for our nuclear deterrence, and importantly…we are working to provide Australia with a nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarine capability under the AUKUS agreement,” Hruby added.
The amended agreement was submitted to the UK and U.S. legislative bodies in July.
The amendment is “consistent…with United States commitments to the United Kingdom regarding the development and deployment of the United Kingdom TRIDENT Strategic Weapon System, continued cooperation in nuclear propulsion programs, and support for the United Kingdom atomic weapon and nuclear threat reduction programs,” U.S. President Joe Biden said in a letter to Congress on July 29.
Sens. Tim Kaine (D-Va.), Deb Fischer (R-Neb.), Tom Cotton (R-Ark.), and Angus King (I-Maine) proposed an amendment extending the agreement as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2025. The amendment must be approved by both houses of Congress.
In the UK, the amended agreement was presented to Parliament on July 26. It will be enacted automatically unless the House of Commons or the House of Lords passes a resolution objecting to the amendment before Oct. 23.
On Sept. 2, seven members of Parliament requested a parliamentary debate, called an Early Day Motion, due to concerns that the extension “violates both countries’ obligations” under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
The explanatory memorandum attached to the amendment signed by John Healey, the UK defense secretary, on July 26 says that the agreement “does not provide for the transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices” and therefore “[o]ur cooperation under the [agreement] is consistent with the UK's obligations” under the NPT.
The initiative is designed to address an era of global transformation and catastrophic risk.
October 2024
By Shizuka Kuramitsu
World leaders kicked off a new UN initiative designed to address an era of global transformation and catastrophic risk by adopting a “pact for the future” that includes renewed promises to uphold long-standing disarmament obligations and commitments.
The leaders convened the first Summit for the Future on Sept. 22-23 on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York. The groundwork for the meeting was laid in 2022 when the General Assembly adopted a resolution authorizing a summit process that is intended to reaffirm the UN Charter, reinvigorate multilateralism, boost implementation of existing commitments, agree on concrete solutions to challenges, and restore trust among member states.
“Our collective security system is threatened by geopolitical divides, nuclear posturing, and the development of new weapons and threats of war,” UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned in a statement opening the summit on Sept. 22.
“Our multilateral tools and institutions are unable to respond effectively to today’s political, economic, environmental, and technological challenges, and tomorrow’s will be even more difficult and even more dangerous,” he said.
“We must take the first decisive steps towards updating and reforming international cooperation to make it more networked, fair, and inclusive now…. [T]oday, thanks to your efforts, we have,” Guterres added, referring to the summit outcome document.
The summit approved the pact by consensus after an unsuccessful effort to prevent action led by Russia and backed by Belarus, Iran, Nicaragua, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.
The document paints the present era as “a time of profound global transformation” in which the world is “confronted by rising catastrophic and existential risks, many caused by the choices we make.”
It notes that “[f]ellow human beings are enduring terrible suffering” and warns that “[i]f we do not change course, we risk tipping into a future of persistent crisis and breakdown.” The summit affirmed that its outcomes are important given the challenges posed to the multilateral systems particularly on disarmament issues.
Mexican Foreign Secretary Alicia Bárcena Ibarra called the pact more than “just another United Nations document” because it addresses three specific issues: “the imperative of a world free of nuclear weapons in a context of high military tension; second, the unequivocal need for financing for development; third, the need for reforms to multilateral governance, identifying guidelines for the reform of the [UN] Security Council and the international financial architecture.”
Guterres emphasized that the pact represents “the first agreed multilateral support for nuclear disarmament in more than a decade.”
The nuclear disarmament section was the result of intensive discussions among the five nuclear-weapon states recognized under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and members of the New Agenda Coalition, which includes Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, and South Africa, diplomatic sources said.
In it, pact supporters expressed “deep concern over the state of nuclear disarmament” and promised to advance the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons; uphold “our respective obligations and commitments” set out in treaties, protocols, and established norms; and “take all steps to prevent nuclear war.”
The pact seeks to revitalize the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, including by recommending that the General Assembly pursue work that could support preparation of a fourth special session devoted to disarmament.
Further, the document includes action plans to accelerate efforts to address the potential risks associated with new and emerging technologies involving lethal autonomous weapons systems and the space realm.