July/August 2024
 

The Long, Sad History of Weapons in Space

Weapons in Space: Technology, Politics, and the Rise and Fall of the Strategic Defense Initiative
By Aaron Bateman
The MIT Press
2024

Reviewed by Joe Cirincione

This year, Congress will authorize $30 billion for missile defense programs with little or no oversight. It will be no different from last year or the year before that. Whether Democrats or Republicans are in control, neither party shows much interest in knowing what became of the more than $415 billion that Congress has authorized for these programs since President Ronald Reagan launched his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), commonly called “Star Wars,” in 1983.¹

Most of these funds have been spent on failed national missile defense, that is, weapons designed to shoot down an adversary’s long-range, nuclear-armed missiles that could cross the oceans to attack the continental United States. Other funds devoted to intercepting short-range missiles that fly a few hundred miles eventually produced fairly valuable weapons, as the recent Russian attacks on Ukraine and Iranian attacks on Israel have demonstrated.

That is chiefly because short-range missiles are slow, fat, and hot and travel primarily in the atmosphere, preventing their deployment of effective decoys. Reliably intercepting long-range missile warheads that are fast, small, and cold as they speed through outer space has proved impossible, particularly if the adversary deploys countermeasures, such as decoys, chaff, and jammers.²

U.S. policymakers have known this for decades. Scores of independent technical studies informed anyone who cared to read them that national missile defense would not work.³ Republicans largely did not care. The SDI program became the tip of their ideological spear aimed at killing arms control agreements in favor of strategically overwhelming adversaries with superior weaponry and massive budgets.

For Democrats, it was largely a game of blunting political attacks by continuing to fund the program so as not to look weak on national security. Democratic efforts in Congress helped contain the missile defense program and, for a while, prevented hard-line Republicans from killing arms control.⁴ Yet, Democratic presidents never restructured Reagan’s unrealistic missile defense vision into a reasonable research program or disbanded what became a permanent pro-missile defense lobby within the Department of Defense known today as the Missile Defense Agency.

Those who favor national missile defense programs despite the scientific evidence are part of the long history of forces within the military and defense establishments who have championed the weaponization of space. George Washington University professor Aaron Bateman details the policy disputes in his new book, Weapons in Space: The Rise and Fall of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

His history is particularly useful in understanding the debates of the 1960s that, over the objections of hard-liners in the Air Force and the Pentagon, yielded the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 banning nuclear weapons in space. That victory endured for almost 60 years, but it may now evaporate. Russia again appears to be developing precisely this capability. The treaty may soon become the most recent of the giant arms control treaties to fall to an ideological axe.

Bateman shows how the desire to deploy new or imagined technologies in space became a key motivation for those who favored using military superiority to defeat the Soviet Union, rather than negotiated agreements to contain and prevent a wider conflict. For decades, some strategists have seen space as just the newest battleground, a “high frontier” that the United States must dominate. Treaties that limited the military’s ability to deploy these weapons were, in this view, signs of weakness and retreat.

Thus, the drive to develop and deploy anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons in the 1960s and 1970s morphed into proposals to deploy ASAT and anti-missile battle stations in space in the 1980s. President Jimmy Carter’s efforts to get an ASAT weapons ban were opposed by those who claimed that the United States was losing a fierce “space race.” Batemen writes, “George Keegan, the recently retired former head of U.S. Air Force intelligence, stirred anxieties about ‘a fast-emerging beam weapon ‘gap’ with the Soviet Union [in the lead].’ He claimed that Soviet laser weapons would be able to ‘completely neutralize the American strategic deterrent.’”

Such fantasies not only derailed Carter’s efforts, but they became the main argument for those who dreamed of U.S. space weapons that could defeat Soviet missiles and satellites. These included the U.S. Committee on the Present Danger, which warned of a “window of vulnerability” wherein the Soviets could wipe out all U.S. nuclear forces in a surprise first strike, and Senator Malcom Wallop (R-Wyo.), who convened a “laser lobby” of 39 senators in favor of deploying a space-based strategic defense system.

Fueled by dreams of techno-dominance, Reagan announced that “the United States will develop and deploy an ASAT capability” and, in March 1983, launched SDI, promising to make ballistic missiles “impotent and obsolete.” Bateman’s history helps us understand the rise of SDI, but his story falters on its fall. Although the author says that the aim of the book is to move “SDI’s technological dimensions to the center stage of the narrative,” he is surprisingly short on the program’s technological failures. Bateman never comes to grips with the fact that none of SDI’s proposed weapons ever worked.

Weapons in Space came out in May, 33 years to the month after Rep. John Conyers (D-Mich.), chairman of the House Government Operations Committee, convened the first of a series of investigative hearings into the Star Wars program.⁵ Conyers opened the hearing with an overview of SDI failures. He said that billions had been poured into too many projects that were later abandoned, including $1 billion for the Free Electron Laser, $1 billion for the Boost Surveillance and Tracking satellite system, $720 million for the Space-Based Chemical Laser, $700 million for the Neutral Particle Beam, and $866 million for the Airborne Optical Aircraft.

Conyers presciently warned that these weapons had not only failed but that President George H.W. Bush’s plan to restructure the program also would fail. He was right. Bush’s plan for a limited, ground-based missile defense system was just the first of multiple efforts to reconfigure the program, reduce its goals, and lower exceptions, all while keeping the contracts going. As Conyers warned, “This year, the administration officially abandoned its quest for a system that could protect the United States from a massive Soviet nuclear attack. President Bush has tried to find a new mission for this faltering program. Although the new plan is little more than a series of [viewgraphs], SDI officials are repeating the mistakes of the past and plunging ahead with plans to spend over $120 billion over the next 15 years.”

SDI officials explained that lasers in space would be replaced by kinetic interceptors in space (“Brilliant Pebbles”) and ground-based interceptors that would be highly effective against what they claimed was a growing threat of “Third World” ballistic missiles. These claims would prove to be just as false as the previous claims. None of the systems ever worked. The failure to learn the lessons of the past condemns people to repeat them, and the U.S. government has repeated them every year.

Bateman defends the program. “The fact that Reagan’s strategic defense dream never came to fruition makes it easy to dismiss SDI as a science-fiction fantasy,” he writes. Well, yes, it does. It was a fantasy. It still is.

The author also claims that by focusing on “the rationale for particular missile defense technologies,” we can better understand why SDI “continues to shape the space security environment at the present time.” That may be partially true, but not as much as two other aspects of the policy debate that are sidelined in his book: contracts and Congress.

Unarguably, spending $415 billion on a program is a lot of money. The drive to secure and continue weapons programs, whether they are real or imagined, effective or not, is the major factor that explains why these efforts continue. The strategic rationale and policy pronouncements are just a veneer justifying a mountain of contracts. Focusing on what officials say is not nearly as important as looking at why they are saying it.

The defense industry deploys an army of 775 lobbyists in Washington. No one can understand why the military budget is more than $850 billion this year and why the country continues to fund weapons that do not work and are not needed without examining the activities of the corporations profiting from the Pentagon’s largesse.

Similarly, the role of Congress is a vital element in any defense discussion. At least, it was during the SDI program. Congress featured significantly in restraining the excesses of the program and in limiting the new offensive weapons proposed as the “swords” to accompany this SDI “shield.” Public opposition to the nuclear arms race and the members of Congress who reflected that opposition in the authorization and appropriations processes where major factors in bringing SDI to ground. They are sidelined in Bateman’s book.

For example, Bateman minimizes the seminal 1985 Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies report from the congressional Office of Technology Assessment, which exposed the infeasibility of Reagan’s space plans. Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) disbanded the office when he became speaker as revenge for this report. The author similarly airbrushes the 1987 congressional hearings centered on the American Physical Society’s devastating technical critique of SDI’s infeasibility and vulnerability.⁶ That report and hearing largely killed the fanciful notion that the United States could soon deploy giant lasers in space.

This neglect may be because Congress no longer plays a significant role in shaping Pentagon budgets or programs. It is difficult to name any major investigation into failed weapons programs in the past 15 years. The last serious oversight hearing on missile defense was conducted in 2008 by Rep. John Tierney (D-Mass.), chair of the same defense subcommittee of the Government Reform and Oversight Committee that had held the 1991 hearings.⁷

The defense industry learned from the gun, oil, and drug lobbies. They poured grants into Washington think tanks to neuter criticism and produce scores of favorable reports. They flooded Congress with campaign contributions. As Tierney said recently, “Too many members of the key committees have been captured by the industry. They buy what the companies are selling, without sufficient oversight, without serious questioning.”⁸

This is why Bateman’s prediction that there will be a new push for space-based anti-missile systems is so chilling. He asserts that technical considerations will be a minor factor in such a decision. In the coming debates, “[b]oth perceptions of threats and ideas about the proper role of space in U.S. national strategy will be overwhelmingly powerful,” he writes. He may be right. Proponents are very likely to push bothersome scientific facts aside. They would much prefer to let abstract policy assertions decide budgets and programs.

Bateman’s book is a useful but not sufficient contribution to this history. Until there is serious, hard-hitting governmental oversight for these expansive programs, Americans will continue to buy the snake oil that defense corporations and their policy advocates are selling.

 

ENDNOTES

1. Estimate provided by Stephen Schwartz, author of Atomic Audit, in conversation with Joseph Cirincione, Washington, DC, June 2024.

2. See Joseph Cirincione, “Assessing the Assessment: The 1999 National Intelligence Estimate of the Ballistic Missile Threat,” The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring 2000), https://www.nonproliferation.org
/wp-content/uploads/npr/circ71.pdf.

3. Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, “Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies,” OTA-ISC-254, September 1985, https://ota.fas.org/reports/8504.pdf.

4. Joseph Cirincione, “Why the Right Lost the Missile Defense Debate,” Foreign Policy, No. 106 (Spring 1997), pp. 38-55.

5. R. Jeffrey Smith, “GAO Calls ‘Star Wars” Planners Too Optimistic,” The Washington Post, May 15, 1991.

6. R. Jeffrey Smith, “Physicists Fault SDI Timetable,” The Washington Post, April 23, 1987.

7. Subcomm. on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, “Oversight of Missile Defense (Part 3): Questions for the Missile Defense Agency,” H.R. Rept. No. 110-150 (2008).

8. Rep. John Tierney, conversation with author, Washington, DC, May 2024.

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Joe Cirincione is a national security author and analyst with 40 years of experience, including as director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Non-Proliferation Program and president of Ploughshares Fund. He was chief investigator for the House Government Operations Committee during major battles over missile defense programs. 

July/August 2024
By Thomas Wuchte

This year marks the 20th anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, part of the global response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks that transformed the international security landscape.

The adoption of Resolution 1373 some two weeks after the September 11 attacks, followed by Resolution 1540 in April 2004, established a range of unprecedented legal and operational requirements on all UN member states. This laid the foundation for international counterterrorism and nonproliferation cooperation that has expanded manyfold over the past two decades with significant tangible results.

The expansion remains a lucrative and well-resourced global priority. As one cornerstone of the post-September 11 counterterrorism architecture, Resolution 1540 is focused on preventing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from falling into the hands of nonstate actors.¹ Just as there is no agreed definition for terrorism, the definition of nonstate actor has become blurred. With conflict raging in many regions, the line between ensuring effective strategic trade controls among state actors and preventing WMD-related materials from falling into the hands of nonstate actors is now in peril.

Strategic trade controls are designed to prevent dual use technology from being transferred to bad actors. Russia’s need to get the chips and military parts for its full-scale war in Ukraine and Iran’s need for supplies for its nuclear efforts and drones has destabilized the whole process. It is now more difficult to control dual-use items and determine where they end up.

Origins of Resolution 1540

The nonproliferation community jump-started Resolution 1540 by working together to ensure that it would apply universally to all UN member states. The most positive aspect of the subsequent implementation endeavor was the absence of challenges to the legitimacy of Resolution 1540 and to plans to set up the Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament Activities. When the mandate for renewing the resolution came up in 2011, there was no question about whether to extend it, only about its duration and the specific guidance needed to support implementation responsibilities.

Some states, particularly those not closely involved in awareness raising in the early years, remained cautious about giving the Security Council too much leeway. They wanted to be sure that Resolution 1540 would not become a tool for enforcing compliance or naming and shaming states that perhaps lacked the capacity to fully implement its requirements, but that has never been the purpose. Advocates of the resolution repeatedly have stressed that implementation is about raising standards, not pointing fingers.

Today, work on implementing the resolution remains supported by a group of nine experts administered by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and under the direction of a UN Security Council entity known as the 1540 Committee, which includes the council’s five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) plus 10 others elected every two years on a rotating basis. In 2022 its charter was extended for another 10 years by a new Security Council resolution.

This committee will be almost 30 years old in 2032 and “in perpetuity” is never a useful goalpost. Should the 1540 Committee be brought to an end then, and if so, why? Much has changed since 2011, including rising global aggression, divisive populist policies, a worldwide pandemic, a growing voice from the Global South, and an increased disregard for arrangements and treaties agreed under the strategic trade control regime.² This raises the question of how to protect the gains against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery that were achieved during an era of post-September 11 goodwill.

The Appeal of Resolution 1540

Since the cataclysmic events of September 11, the resolution has helped make the world safer by reducing the chances that nuclear and other dual-use material would fall into the hands of terrorists. Toward this goal, a cadre of true believers has built awareness of international obligations under Resolution 1540 by reaching out to states and making information widely available, including at international and regional forums, workshops, meetings, and briefings. These advocates have engaged with a broadening range of international and regional organizations, whose mandates relate to the Resolution 1540 goals.

This approach has succeeded in establishing regular points of contact and useful cooperation with these organizations, which are normally closer to their members’ regional or functional needs than the Security Council. It also has facilitated assistance to states in meeting their Resolution 1540 obligations. This can include expert advice about the obligations themselves, information sharing regarding effective practices used by other countries, and acting as a clearing house to match up requests for technical assistance with offers of assistance.

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency are key players in implementing Resolution 1540 commitments. Yet, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Implementation Support Unit, which has almost no staff and is woefully underrepresented in the Resolution 1540 process, oversees the potential use of the biological weapons that many experts view as most damaging in the hands of terrorists.

An often-overlooked point is that implementation is essential because the resolution establishes binding obligations for all states to prevent and deter illicit access to weapons of mass destruction and related materials. These standards benefit regions that seek to be key global economic centers for the supply of goods and services, including to and from the United States. Putting in place adequate measures that help to protect states from nonstate actors trafficking in WMD-related materials makes good business sense.³ U.S. and other global businesses are attracted to increasing trade with states that have the highest international standards. Businesses that unwittingly are used by proliferators risk economic blowback when investors lose confidence in them. The apparent absence of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of nonstate actors over the last 20 years is the best way to quantify success.⁴

The 1540 Committee has proven its value to the international community as a facilitator rather than an enforcer, and this approach has won the backing of many countries and international and regional organizations. For example, through Resolution 1540-related programs, states have installed radiation detection equipment at nearly all ports. It is fair to say that the resolution’s approach has achieved unparalleled recognition as an important component of the global counterterrorism and nonproliferation architecture.

The Times Are Changing

It was visionary how supporters of Resolution 1540 turned words into action and action into partnership. WMD terrorism and collective international efforts now fit into a broader UN counterterrorism framework. This partnership has grown but also changed, grown perhaps too large and not to the benefit of the Global South. When is knowledge transfer considered a success?

Those tasked with implementing Resolution 1540 are disappointed that there is resistance by Russia to any UN-drafted implementation guides.⁵ This reflects the long-standing argument by Russia and China that “implementation” is a member state responsibility and should not be encumbered by an expectation that states adopt best practices imposed by the 1540 Committee. Moreover, the resolution predates technology such as artificial intelligence, blockchains, and rapid biological advances. It would be beneficial if the 1540 Committee would consider extending strategic trade controls to these technologies, but the committee has been reluctant to discuss the issue.

As a result of tensions exacerbated by the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Resolution 1540 could face the same fate that the Security Council’s sanctions committee on North Korea, an analogous UN Security Council body, experienced this year.⁶  Russia vetoed and China abstained on a measure renewing the North Korea committee’s work. This has weakened an important sanctions-related UN responsibility.

Given the tensions, policymakers should consider promoting more attention within the Security Council about nontraditional security issues such as the climate crisis, pandemics, and poverty and their relationship to the current counterterrorism and nonproliferation framework. This would be an important step toward building a transformed international peace and security architecture. Increased attention multilaterally among UN member states would help to align national priorities of the Global South countries, for example, with these emerging challenges that are linked to terrorism but are underrepresented in international policymaking forums.

Twenty years after its adoption, the 1540 Resolution is a true “little engine that could,” a multilateral initiative that has achieved far more than its advocates ever imagined.⁷ Now there is a need to consider whether what is needed today is continued capacity building or a complete rethink of the approach. Given the daunting future challenges facing the world, the Security Council should go for option two, combining Resolution 1540-related capacity building with better-resourced efforts to address the emerging threat conditions that foster terrorism. This would involve retooling collective UN counterterrorism and nonproliferation efforts to be leaner and more geographically disbursed, while leaving the empowerment of the resolution to local governments and officials who best understand the nexus of hard and soft security.

There also is a strong argument for moving the UN’s Resolution 1540 efforts out of the Security Council to Geneva, where the Conference on Disarmament is located. This would bring the group of experts closer to the regions most at risk of proliferation by nonstate actors and to the functional work of the BWC, which is underserved despite its risk. Resolution 1540 will keep chugging along if these attempts at decentralization are encouraged by a right-sized nonproliferation and counterterrorism architecture.

ENDNOTES

1. Definitions for the purpose of this resolution only: Means of delivery: missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, that are specially designed for such use. Non-State actor: individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution. Related materials: materials, equipment and technology covered by relevant multilateral treaties and arrangements, or included on national control lists, which could be used for the design, development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. UN Security Council, S/RES/1540, April 28, 2004, p. 1 note.

2. Justyna Gudzowska, Eliza Lockhart, and Tom Keatinge, “Disabling the Enablers of Sanctions Circumvention,” Royal United Services Institute, May 7, 2024, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/policy-briefs/disabling-enablers-sanctions-circumvention/.

3. Richard Cupitt, “Developing Indices to Measure Chemical Strategic Trade Security Controls,” Strategic Trade Review, Vol. 3, No. 5 (Autumn 2017): 47-70.

4. In 2004 many experts worried about the likelihood of a “dirty” nuclear bomb in the hands of terrorists—a so-called suitcase bomb. Fortunately, this has not happened. In 2024, nuclear saber-rattling supplants dirty bombs with a state actor, Russia, threatening nuclear Armageddon as the Ukraine war drags on.

5. Scott Spence, “The 1540 Nonproliferation Regime and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2663 (2022): What’s Been Achieved and What Lies Ahead,” Strategic Trade Review, Vol. 9, No. 10 (Winter/Spring 2023): 25-36.

6. Joel S. Wit and Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, “Insights From the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea,” 38North, May 14, 2024, https://www.38north.org/2024/05/insights-from-the-un-panel-of-experts-on-north-korea/.

7. Watty Piper, The Little Engine That Could, Platt & Munk, 1930, tells a story that in the United States is used to teach the value of optimism and hard work.

July/August 2024
By Xiaodon Liang

The Biden administration reaffirmed its commitment to arms control negotiations even as major nuclear-armed states expand and modernize their nuclear arsenals.

The United States needs to “persuade our adversaries that managing rivalry through arms control is preferable to unrestrained competition across domains,” a senior U.S. official said in a June 7 restatement of Biden administration nuclear weapons policy.

Speaking to the annual meeting of the Arms Control Association, Pranay Vaddi, the National Security Council’s senior director for arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation, said that “we have adjusted our strategy to account for a more complex and worsening security environment but we are in no way abandoning our principles.” Those principles, he said, include demonstrating responsible action as a nuclear-weapon power, preventing proliferation, and pursuing arms control arrangements.

According to Vaddi, the administration is “thinking through what a future arms control agreement with Russia…might look like” after the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) expires in February 2026, but it acknowledges that Russia’s rejection of arms control talks “casts a shadow over the likelihood of a New START successor.” The administration believes that Russia “continues to see value in maintaining limits on deployed strategic nuclear weapons” and intends to make public an outline of its ideas for a potential successor treaty, he said.

Vaddi also said that the United States would not “shy away” from discussing China’s proposal for a nuclear no-first-use treaty, affirming comments by Mallory Stewart, assistant secretary of state for arms control, deterrence, and stability, in May. (See ACT, May 2024.) “It would make sense for [China] to try to initiate a more serious discussion in [the P5] format,” he suggested. In August, China will assume the rotating chair of the P5 nuclear process, involving the five states recognized under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as nuclear-weapon states.

In his speech, Vaddi provided some insight into the new nuclear weapons employment guidance that President Joe Biden approved in March. Guidance of this type, which is periodically updated across administrations, typically takes the form of a classified memorandum and may include not only detailed instructions on targets, priorities, and scenarios, but also high-level statements of U.S. policy and assumptions regarding nuclear weapons use that are intended to shape military planning.

The new guidance document, Vaddi said, reaffirms the U.S. intention to abide by the central New START numerical limits until the treaty’s expiration, as long as Russia does the same. He added that unilateral reciprocal statements of continued adherence to the New START limits after February 2026 was a possibility, although the administration does not want to “settle” for this approach.

The guidance also “emphasizes the need to account for the growth and diversity of [China’s] nuclear arsenal,” Vaddi said. The extent of the increase in China’s arsenal will influence the “type of limits we will be able to agree to with Russia,” he said.

The United States is particularly concerned about China’s thinking on the use of lower-yield nuclear weapons in a scenario involving Taiwan, as well as the potential for a future shift of its strategic nuclear posture toward “early-warning counterstrike,” Vaddi said in response to questions following his remarks. He referenced the last iteration of the Defense Department’s annual report on Chinese military forces. (See ACT, November 2023.)

Responding to a reporter’s question about Vaddi’s comments, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said on June 11 that China “always keeps its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required by national security.” Speaking at a ministry press conference, Lin said that the United States “has been calling China a ‘nuclear threat’ and using it as a convenient pretext for expanding the U.S.’s own nuclear arsenal aimed at absolute strategic predominance.”

For now, the United States does not intend to “increase our nuclear forces to match or outnumber the combined total of our competitors to successfully deter them,” Vaddi said, reaffirming comments by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan last year. (See ACT, July/August 2023.)

But “absent a change in the trajectory of adversary arsenals, we may reach a point in the coming years where an increase from current deployed numbers is required, and we need to be fully prepared to execute if the President makes that decision,” Vaddi added.

In response to questions June 8 regarding Vaddi’s speech, Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova referred journalists to Russia’s existing nuclear doctrine, RIA Novosti reported.

Vaddi also noted recent or ongoing changes to the posture of the deployed U.S. strategic nuclear force below the New START limits.

These include the life extension of certain Ohio-class submarines to provide “additional margin during the transition from legacy to modern capabilities across the triad,” retirement of the B83-1 bomb, and development of the B61-13 bomb variant. (See ACT, December 2023.)

Some members of Congress are pushing forward with additional plans to expand U.S. strategic nuclear forces. The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its version of the fiscal year 2025 defense authorization bill approved June 13, requested that the Defense Department devise a plan to increase the number of deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) from 400 Minuteman III missiles today to 450 next-generation Sentinel ICBMs.

The bill also directs the Defense Department to recertify all B-52H bombers for nuclear missions and to provide a briefing on returning five to 10 strategic bombers to “alert status.”

The corresponding bill approved by the House Armed Services Committee does not endorse these nuclear force expansions, but it does require the Pentagon to establish plans for a third ground-based missile defense interceptor site, over the Biden administration’s long-standing objections.

The Senate bill also takes the first steps toward shifting the cost of new ICBMs off the Air Force’s budget. In the draft, the committee asks for a briefing on the creation of a National Land-Based Deterrence Fund to pay for the Sentinel program, which has overrun the Defense Department’s September 2020 cost projections by 81 percent. (See ACT, March 2024.)

July/August 2024
By António Guterres

For more than 50 years, the Arms Control Association has gathered experts and leaders around an issue of monumental importance: ending the madness of nuclear weapons. Your team has it right. We need to move back from the nuclear brink.

Humanity is on a knife’s edge. The risk of a nuclear weapon being used has reached heights not seen since the Cold War. States are engaged in the qualitative arms race. Technologies like artificial intelligence are multiplying the danger. Nuclear blackmail has reemerged, with some recklessly threatening nuclear catastrophe.

Meanwhile, the regime designed to prevent the use, testing, and proliferation of nuclear weapons is weakening….  [W]e need disarmament now. This was  the central message of my disarmament agenda launched in 2018. Disarmament and conflict prevention are also at the heart of the new agenda for peace to reform the global peace and security architecture.

We need all countries to step up. But nuclear-weapon states must lead the way. They must resume dialogue, commit to preventing any use of a nuclear weapon, and agree that none will be the first to launch one. They must reaffirm moratoria on nuclear testing, and they must accelerate implementation of the disarmament commitments made under the [nuclear] Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

All parties to the treaty must start collaborating now to ensure consensus at the [NPT] review conference in 2026. I also urge the United States and [Russia] to get back [to] the negotiating table, fully implement the [New Strategic Arms Reduction] Treaty, and agree on its successor. Until these weapons are eliminated, all countries must agree that any decision on nuclear use is made by humans, not machines or algorithms. Finally, nuclear saber-rattling must stop.

The United Nations is proud to stand with groups like the Arms Control Association across this important effort. Let’s continue working to achieve the secure and peaceful world every country wants.

July/August 2024
By Xiaodon Liang

The Ukrainian armed forces launched drone attacks against Russian strategic early-warning radar sites in late May, damaging at least one radar antenna. The attacks against the sites in Armavir and Orsk raised U.S. fears that Russia could misinterpret the move as an attempt to weaken the early-warning capabilities of its strategic nuclear deterrent.

The Washington Post reported on May 29 that the United States has expressed its concerns officially to Ukraine. An unnamed U.S. official cited in the report said that damage to the early-warning radars could hurt strategic stability between Russia and the United States.

The attacks occurred during a period when the White House was deliberating whether to follow NATO allies and permit Ukrainian forces to use U.S.-provided weapons systems to strike military forces inside Russia. Since then, the Biden administration has authorized Ukraine to use U.S.-provided weapons to hit back against Russian units that are attacking from across the border.

The first drone attack, launched May 22, targeted an early-warning radar site at Armavir, a city in Russia east of Crimea. Satellite imagery taken by Planet Labs and published by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty later confirmed that at least one of the two Voronezh-DM radars at Armavir was damaged in the attack.

The second Ukrainian operation was aimed at a Voronezh-M radar at Orsk, in southern Russia near Kazakhstan and approximately 1,500 kilometers from Ukrainian-controlled territory. No evidence of damage to this radar was visible in satellite images provided by Planet Labs and published by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, although signs of fire are apparent around the facility.

Both sites host south-facing early-warning radar designed to detect ballistic missile launches against Russian territory as part of the country’s strategic early-warning system. The Armavir radar site, which began operations in February 2009, replaced older Soviet-era early-warning radar sites located in Ukraine. In January 2008, Russia terminated an agreement with Ukraine to continue receiving data from those older sites, citing unreliability. The Russian military first brought the Orsk radar online in December 2016.

An unnamed Ukrainian intelligence source told Reuters on May 27 that the two sites were targeted because “[t]hey monitor the actions of the Ukrainian security and defense forces in the south of Ukraine.” In a statement to The Washington Post, an unnamed Ukrainian official said the radars monitor aerial weaponry such as drones and missiles.

But independent analysts have argued that the role of the early-warning radar sites in Russia’s war against Ukraine likely is limited. In a series of social media posts, nuclear policy expert James Acton published graphs that show that the curvature of the earth and elevation of the Armavir antennae limit the contribution of the radar site to detecting Ukrainian ballistic missile launches against targets in a narrow sector of southern Ukraine that includes Crimea.

The Pentagon disclosed on April 24 that the United States had provided Ukraine with short-range ballistic missiles in the previous weeks. Known as the Army Tactical Missile Systems, they have a range of 300 kilometers and were first used April 17 by Ukraine to strike a Russian airfield in occupied Crimea, a Pentagon spokesperson said.

According to Acton’s calculations, the Armavir site would be able to detect drones and aircraft only under unlikely scenarios. It is even more implausible that the Orsk radar, facing Kazakhstan and covering the Middle East and western China, plays any “meaningful role in enabling Russia to detect and shoot down Ukrainian munitions,” according to Acton.

Washington also believes that these “sites have not been involved in supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine,” according to an unnamed U.S. government official cited in the May 29 Washington Post story.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov warned on June 3 of an “asymmetrical response” to the drone strikes in comments to the Russian press agency RIA. He also accused the United States of acting irresponsibly in failing to prevent these attacks by Ukraine.

Dmitry Rogozin, the former Russian deputy prime minister and currently a senator representing Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, was the first official figure to acknowledge the drone strikes in a May 25 social media post.

Rogozin speculated in his Telegram post that the United States may have known about or even directed the operations. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on May 15 at a press conference in Kyiv, “We have not encouraged or enabled strikes outside of Ukraine.”

July/August 2024
By Kelsey Davenport

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said it is unacceptable for any party to use drones in the vicinity of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant after two drones struck targets in the nearby town of Enerhodar.

Russia attacked the Ukrainian power plant in violation of international law in the early days of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and continues to occupy the facility.

Russia accused Ukraine of conducting drone strikes on June 19 and 21 that cut power to residents of Enerhodar, a town near the Zaporizhzhia plant where many workers at the facility live.

IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi said on June 23 that “drone usage against the plant and its vicinity is becoming increasingly more frequent” and “must stop.” The drone activity “runs counter to the safety pillars and concrete principles, which have been accepted unanimously,” Grossi said.

The June drone strikes targeted electrical substations, but did not disrupt the plant’s power lines, which are critical for maintaining the nuclear reactor units in a cold shutdown. The damage to the electrical substations affected systems around the power plant, such as external radiological monitoring equipment, the IAEA said in a June 23 press release.

In May the IAEA team on-site at the complex was told that there were drones present in the vicinity of the cooling pond, where spent fuel from the six reactors at Zaporizhzhia is stored, but there was no attack reported. In April, drones struck a reactor building. (See ACT, May 2024.) Russia and Ukraine accused each other of being responsible for the April attacks.

Despite the security situation, Russia initially said it would restart the Zaporizhzhia reactors, which are currently in cold shutdown. During a meeting with Grossi in May, officials from the Russian state-run energy company Rosatom said that was no longer the plan, according to Russian media reports.

July/August 2024
By Shizuka Kuramitsu

Amid persistent high tensions among major nuclear-armed nations, states-parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are bracing for a challenging second preparatory committee meeting ahead of the 2026 NPT Review Conference.

The 191 states-parties to the NPT will gather July 22-Aug. 2 in Geneva to review implementation of the landmark 1968 treaty and seek to develop a forward-looking action plan on its key components of nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The preparatory meetings focus on making recommendations and advancing substantive debate on key subjects ahead of the review conferences, which are the main vehicle for assessing treaty performance and prodding states-parties to carry out their NPT-related obligations.

After two consecutive failures to adopt substantive outcome documents by consensus at the last review conferences, in 2015 and 2022, the political pressure to ensure a successful outcome at the 2026 conference is high.

Meanwhile, divisions between some NPT states-parties have intensified and played out in many multilateral nuclear-related meetings, such as the first preparatory committee meeting in 2023 and last month’s International Conference on Nuclear Security. (See ACT, June 2024, September 2023.)

One issue that analysts and diplomats expect the preparatory committee meeting to debate concerns the absence of dialogue between Russia and the United States and China and the United States on nuclear risk reduction and arms control as they accelerate efforts to fortify their respective nuclear arsenals.

Article VI of the NPT obligates states-parties to engage in good faith negotiations to halt the arms race and achieve disarmament. Thus far, Russia has rejected a U.S. proposal to negotiate a successor to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which expires in 2026. China has declined U.S. overtures for further talks on nuclear risk reduction. (See ACT, June 2024.)

“All parties to the [NPT] must start collaborating now to ensure consensus at the review conference in 2026. All countries need to step up, but nuclear-weapon states must lead the way,” UN Secretary-General António Guterres said in a June 7 video message to the Arms Control Association annual meeting. In particular, the NPT nuclear-armed states “must accelerate the implementation of the disarmament commitments” made under the NPT, he said.

For the Biden administration, the “highest priority” at the preparatory committee meeting is to “continue... to preserve the authority and integrity of the NPT,” Adam Scheinman, special U.S. representative for nonproliferation, told Arms Control Today on June 29.

“[W]e will advocate for a constructive agenda on nuclear disarmament, to include support for bilateral dialogues with Russia and ... China, for the long-overdue fissile material cutoff treaty, and for greater transparency among parties,” he wrote.

Scheinman outlined modest goals, saying that although Washington hopes to “identify areas of convergence ... there are no plans (for the NPT nuclear-armed states) to issue a joint statement.”

Experts’ concern about the ability of states-parties to fulfill their NPT obligations is echoed in multiple forums.
If “[s]tates-parties who have been the custodians of the treaty [and] whose agreement was always key to achieving an outcome…are not in a position to conduct a dialogue directly, what is our road to a substantive outcome in 2026?” Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova of the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Nonproliferation asked on May 21. She also stressed the role to be played by bridge-building states and coalitions.

Another theme that may feature heavily at the preparatory committee meeting includes nuclear safety and the security dangers posed by Russia’s continued occupation of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine. It was Russia’s objection to language in the draft 10th NPT Review Conference document relating to Ukraine’s sovereign control of that facility that led Moscow to block consensus on a final conference document 
in 2022.

Nuclear sharing arrangements between the United States and its NATO allies, coupled with Russia’s forward deployment of some of its nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Belarus and recent exercises involving its battlefield nuclear weapons, also will be a likely source of contention.

To tackle these and other divisions, Akan Rakhmetullin, Kazakhstan’s deputy foreign minister and chair-designate of the 2024 meeting, held consultations with states-parties, experts in the field, and civil society organizations ahead of the second preparatory committee meeting.

On May 21, he said he feels that all parties understand what their differences are on key issues but they diverge on how to overcome those differences. The outcome of preparatory committee meeting will depend on the political will of participants “and their willingness to work together and readiness for compromise,” he said.

July/August 2024
By Xiaodon Liang

The Biden administration dropped its opposition to a proposed nuclear-capable, sea-launched cruise missile, also known as SLCM-N, in its response to this year’s House defense policy bill. Officials say work on the missile has begun.

In its June 11 statement of administration policy in response to the House Armed Services Committee’s version of the national defense authorization bill for fiscal year 2025, the Biden administration did not repeat its previous years’ opposition to the missile. When asked for comment, a U.S. official told Arms Control Today that last year’s defense bill “directed” the Defense Department and the National Nuclear Security Administration “to establish and commence implementation” of a nuclear-capable, sea-launched cruise missile program.

“We will comply with the [bill] requirement and will look to execute in a manner that provides the most deterrence value for the least risk to the modernization program, the production enterprise, and other defense priorities,” the official said.

In fiscal year 2024, Congress appropriated $90 million for the missile and $70 million for work on its warhead. It also instructed the Defense Department to establish a development program for the missile. The House bill for 2025 would raise the missile’s annual budget to $190 million and maintain warhead funding at $70 million.

Last year’s statement of administration policy said the president “strongly opposes” the missile and that it “has marginal utility.” The statement also said “deploying [the missile] on Navy attack submarines or surface combatants would reduce capacity for conventional strike munitions [and] create additional burdens on naval training, maintenance, and operations.”

Sen. Mark Kelly (D-Ariz.) raised these issues during a May 24 hearing of the Senate Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee. “One of my biggest concerns is that we would be giving up something we really need for something we are unlikely to use,” Kelly said, referring to the possibility that the missile would displace conventional munitions aboard Navy attack submarines.

In response, Vice Adm. Johnny R. Wolfe Jr., the Navy’s director for strategic systems programs, acknowledged that “yes, there will be some impact” to the nuclear-powered attack submarine force.

“Anytime you have a conventional mission with a nuclear mission, you have to be very careful to segregate those and make sure that our war-fighters understand how that operates,” he said. Wolfe said the Navy is analyzing how to minimize the impact of fielding the missile.

In his prepared remarks, Wolfe also hinted at the resource constraints that would affect the program. “Executing this program successfully will require careful balancing of [missile] programmatic manning with ongoing Navy programs, which draw from a limited pool of experienced government personnel and the same nuclear weapons industrial base,” he said.

Testifying at an April 30 hearing before the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee, Bill LaPlante, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, said that the Navy has set up an office to manage the missile program and that it aims to clear its first programmatic hurdle, known as Milestone A, within a year. Before passing Milestone A, program officials must produce documents justifying the need for the missile, conduct an analysis of alternatives, and provide an initial cost estimate.

The Navy said on June 14 it likely would award the first contract for the missile in July. In a presolicitation notice required under contracting rules, the Navy said it intends to negotiate a sole-source contract with Virginia-based Systems Planning Analysis Inc., covering research and development for up to four years.

July/August 2024
By Kelsey Davenport

Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un signed a mutual defense treaty and committed to strengthening military ties during a June summit in Pyongyang.

The treaty comes as Russia continues to court North Korean support for its war in Ukraine and as tensions between North Korea and South Korea escalate.

According to Article 4 of the treaty that Kim and Putin signed on June 19, North Korea and Russia “shall immediately provide military and other assistance” to the other party if it “falls into a state of war due to armed invasion from an individual or multiple states.” The treaty stipulates that the assistance must be in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, which preserves the right to “individual or collective self-defense” in response to an armed attack against a UN member.

Putin told reporters after the summit that the treaty represents a “breakthrough” in Russia’s relationship with North Korea and a “new level” of strategic partnership between the two countries. Putin last visited North Korea 24 years ago, although he did meet with Kim in September 2023 near Vladivostok. (See ACT, October 2023.)

Kim described the treaty as “a most powerful agreement” that is “peaceful and defensive in nature.” He said it will be a “driving force” toward a “new multipolar world.”

In a June 23 joint statement, Japan, South Korea, and the United States condemned the “deepening military cooperation” between North Korea and Russia, noting in particular Pyongyang’s provision of arms to Moscow that “prolong[s] the suffering of the Ukrainian people.”

The three states said the partnership between North Korea and Russia is “of grave concern to anyone with an interest in maintaining peace and stability” on the Korean peninsula. The statement said that Japan, South Korea, and the United States will “further strengthen diplomatic and security cooperation” to counter the threat from North Korea and prevent escalation.

In a June 25 televised speech marking the 74th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol said that the treaty is in direct violation of UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea. South Korea “must stand up to North Korea’s provocations and threats overwhelmingly and decisively,” he said.

In addition to the provision of military assistance in the event of attack, the treaty suggests that Russia and North Korea may engage in military cooperation. According to Article 8, the parties “shall establish mechanisms” to “strengthen defense capabilities to prevent war.”

In a June 19 video statement released by the Kremlin, Putin said Russia does not rule out the possibility of military cooperation with North Korea.

Kim said that North Korea would continue to support Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine.

Chang Ho-jin, the South Korean national security adviser, responded by saying that Seoul will reconsider selling arms to Ukraine. Currently, South Korea is providing humanitarian support, but has not offered any weaponry to Ukraine due to a policy of not exporting arms to states involved in conflict.

Putin warned South Korea to refrain from providing military assistance to Ukraine, saying Seoul would be making a “very big mistake” if it transfers arms. He said Russia’s partnership with North Korea does not pose a threat to South Korea. Because South Korea “does not plan aggression against” North Korea, there is “no need to be afraid” of defense cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang, Putin told reporters during a June 20 press conference in Vietnam.

The treaty also opens the door for Russian assistance to North Korea’s nuclear energy and space programs. Article 10 states that North Korea and Russia will “develop exchanges and cooperation” in certain scientific fields, including space and “peaceful nuclear energy.”

Russia is prohibited from providing assistance to North Korea’s nuclear and space programs under the terms of UN Security Council sanctions, but Moscow has already violated the sanctions by accepting armaments from Pyongyang.

Putin said Russia will continue its opposition to sanctions imposed on North Korea, which he described as “illegal,” and suggested the two countries will work to develop payment systems that are “not controlled by the West.”

During a June 12 event at the Stimson Center, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said that Washington will be “watching carefully” to see what assistance Russia provides to North Korea.

Kim’s visit to Russia in September 2023 suggested that North Korea is interested in assistance in developing its space program. Despite announcing ambitious plans to deploy satellites, North Korea has struggled with its launch vehicles. On May 27, North Korea attempted to put a satellite in orbit using a new space launch vehicle, but it exploded midflight.

North Korea’s National Aerospace Technology Administration said that the explosion likely was caused by a defect in the first stage of a new type of rocket motor that the country is developing.

Kim said that the failure will not stop North Korea’s space ambitions and reiterated that Pyongyang needs satellite capabilities due to South Korean and U.S. threats.

The failed launch took place shortly after leaders from China, Japan, and South Korea, met in Seoul. Yoon, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, and Chinese Premier Li Qiang released a joint statement during the May 27 summit that included a reference to “denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.”

In a rare criticism of China, the North Korean state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) denounced the trilateral statement, saying that denuclearization “means a power vacuum and hastened war.” KCNA said North Korea viewed the reference to denuclearization as “a blatant challenge” to the country’s sovereignty.

South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lim Soo-suk defended the reference to denuclearization, saying that UN Security Council resolutions call for North Korea’s “complete abandonment of nuclear weapons.”

North Korea claimed to have tested a missile armed with multiple warheads on June 26, but South Korea called the launch a failure. KCNA reported on June 27 that the test involved three mobile warheads and a decoy separating from a missile. The warheads were guided to three different targets, KCNA said, adding that North Korea will now begin full-scale testing of the capability. Japan and South Korea said the missile exploded and described the test as a failure.

The test took place after South Korea conducted a live-fire exercise near the inter-Korean maritime border on June 25. South Korea was prohibited from conducting live-fire exercises along the border under a 2018 joint military agreement with North Korea, but Seoul suspended its participation in that agreement on June 4 after Pyongyang sent more than 1,000 balloons filled with trash into South Korea. North Korea withdrew from the agreement in 2023.

July/August 2024
By Chris Rostampour

A federal program that has aided thousands of people in communities harmed by U.S. nuclear testing and weapons production activities expired June 7, and it is unclear whether it can be revived.

Since the Senate voted in March to extend and expand the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA), Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) has not scheduled a House vote on the Senate bill or any variant.

Lawmakers continue to debate how they could salvage the program, but Rep. Cori Bush (D-Mo.) told a press conference May 17 that Johnson’s office has cited high costs as the reason for not acting. Later, she told Arms Control Today that she finds the argument ironic because the government always seems to have “money for war and weapons.”

To date, the RECA program has approved claims totaling $2.7 billion for 40,000 people, according to the Justice Department. The Congressional Budget Office estimated the future cost of the Senate-approved bill at $50 billion over 10 years.

Originally passed in 1990, RECA established a program to provide health screening and one-time payments to people harmed by exposure to radiation from atmospheric nuclear testing or uranium mining. It was limited to those who lived in 22 largely rural counties of Arizona, Nevada, and Utah between 1951 and 1958 and in the summer of 1962 and had developed leukemia or one of 17 other kinds of cancer.

The program also covered uranium workers from 1942 through 1971 who could document a subsequent diagnosis of diseases that are deemed eligible for compensation. Numerous health studies since 1990 have shown that fallout from past nuclear tests did not stop at the county or state lines recognized under the original RECA program.

The Justice Department announced in June that it is no longer accepting new claims, saying that “only claims postmarked on and before June 10, 2024, will be filed and adjudicated.” But health facilities continue to offer screenings for cancer and other radiation-induced illnesses. The U.S. Health Resources and Services Administration said health facilities providing screening under RECA “would remain active” for the time being, Radio KJZZ in Arizona reported.

The Senate bill, sponsored by Sens. Ben Ray Lujan (D-N.M.), Mike Crapo (R-Idaho) and Josh Hawley (R-Mo.), would extend RECA for six years and expand the program to communities that previously were excluded. This would include people in New Mexico affected by the first nuclear test explosion and communities in Missouri and Kentucky dealing with contamination from Manhattan Project-era uranium operations. The Senate passed the bill 69-30 in March. President Joe Biden has said he would sign it if it arrived on his desk.

Since the Senate vote, lawmakers from both parties and activists have urged Johnson to hold a House vote on RECA, either as a stand-alone bill or as an amendment to another legislative vehicle. (See ACT, May 2024.) 

In mid-April, Utah Republican Sens. Mike Lee and Mitt Romney, who both voted against the Senate-approved bill, introduced legislation to extend RECA for two years without expanding coverage. In late May, Johnson announced that the extension legislation would be put to a vote, but later pulled it from the House calendar due to opposition from downwinder communities and Hawley, who called the move inadequate and vowed to block the bill if taken up by the Senate.

In a May 7 letter to House leaders, dozens of downwinder communities and organizations wrote, “Our communities 
have been suffering under this injustice for many decades, and it cannot continue. Congress must improve RECA to include many communities that have been excluded and abandoned by our government.”

Tina Cordova, a nuclear exposure survivor from New Mexico and a long-time advocate of expanding RECA, told KOBTV that “while they play politics, we’re gathering up our resources for someone to have cancer treatment.”