April 2025

Ending the Nuclear Arms Race: A Physicist’s Quest
By Frank N. von Hippel
Lynne Rienner Publishers
2024

This book is a personal account of physicist Frank von Hippel’s decades-long efforts to reduce the risks of nuclear weapons. It starts with his early passion for physics, inspired by his grandfather’s role in the Manhattan Project. It then traces how the Vietnam War protests shaped his anti-nuclear beliefs, leading to his involvement in the Nuclear Freeze movement of the 1980s.

Von Hippel, a professor emeritus at Princeton University, is influential far beyond academia. He has advised multiple U.S. administrations in crises, spanning the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 to resolving the stalemate in negotiations with Iran on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015. The book also highlights his collaboration with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s scientific advisers, which helped end nuclear testing and reduce U.S. and Soviet arsenals. What distinguishes this memoir is the delicate balance of technical specificity and accessibility. Von Hippel explains complex issues with precision and immersion that will likely engage both experts and regular citizens. The book is a timely reflection on the power of science and one man’s quest to affect nuclear policy outcomes, making it a must-read for anyone interested in nuclear matters.—DONIYOR MUTALOV

Hiroshima: The Last Witnesses
By M.G. Sheftall
Penguin Publishing Group
2024

This first installment of a two-volume series examines the events and aftermath of the U.S. atomic bombing of Hiroshima Aug. 6, 1945. Drawing from the author’s personal interviews and encounters, the book offers a deeply human perspective on the catastrophic consequences of nuclear warfare. It explores the limited understanding that U.S. military personnel had of the bomb and its devastating effects. The book also delves into Japan’s wartime kamikaze philosophy, tracing its roots in the samurai moral code of self-sacrifice to the suicide attacks by Japanese fighter pilots in World War II. The author explains how the United States underestimated this factor. By juxtaposing the present-day image of Hiroshima with its wartime legacy, he also critiques the longstanding “peace discourses” promoted by the Japanese and U.S. governments and explores the complexities of memory and reconciliation. Later chapters focus on poignant personal stories of the hibakusha—civilian survivors of the atomic bombing—and make their lesser-heard narratives accessible to English speakers. The harrowing tales of the hibakusha, as well as stories of those lost and injured in the bombings, speak for themselves. The book details the far-reaching consequences of nuclear weapons, from environmental destruction to humanitarian crises, and examines postwar Japan’s profound sociocultural and religious transformation. The second book, Nagasaki: The Last Witnesses, expected in 2025, will document the stories of hibakusha from Nagasaki. —SHAGHAYEGH CHRIS ROSTAMPOUR

April 2025
Reviewed by Kelsey Davenport

Sanctions for Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Moving Forward
By Armend Bekaj and Peter Wallensteen, eds.
Routledge Global Security Studies
2025

Making Sanctions More Effective

In the last several decades, sanctions have played a central role in international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Despite the increasing reliance on such unilateral and multilateral measures, their utility as a tool of statecraft in pressing nations to abandon nuclear weapons programs is largely unquestioned in policymaking circles. With a looming proliferation crisis on the horizon, fueled by territorial aggression and diminishing trust in alliances, sanctions will probably remain a key fixture in responding to the threat of new nuclear-armed states. But how effective are sanctions as a tool for preventing proliferation and promoting disarmament? How are they best integrated into broader strategies to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons?

Sanctions for Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation provides a critical and timely contribution to understanding the role of sanctions in disarmament and nonproliferation policy and to challenging established narratives about the utility of coercive measures in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The contributors deconstruct sanctions as a tool of statecraft and propose a working theoretical framework for employing and lifting sanctions. They also seek to discern how sanctions, and more specifically, certain types of sanctions, impact the target state’s decision to proliferate or disarm using case studies.

In deconstructing sanctions and providing a more nuanced approach to applying them, the book provides a much-needed evidence-based critique of the generalizations that frequently drive sanctions policy. The critique is more compelling in that it does not dismiss sanctions outright as a tool; it acknowledges the role that these coercive measures can play if properly calibrated and integrated into a broader strategy. The book does not consider sanctions in a vacuum but rather examines the necessity of rethinking the diplomatic frameworks and approaches in which sanctions operate, further contributing to the overarching policy relevance. Although this book is relevant to academics and policymakers, its arguments and conclusions are especially applicable for using sanctions more effectively for addressing contemporary proliferation challenges.

Positive and Negative Sanctions

One key contribution to policymaking is the discussion of the role that positive sanctions or inducements should play in nonproliferation and disarmament strategies. In contrast to negative sanctions, which are intended to punish or penalize, positive sanctions are additive, providing a benefit to the targeted state. Policymakers frequently dismiss positive sanctions as a sign of weakness or a reward for the targeted state, particularly if that state has not taken steps to reverse the activities that prompted sanctions.

David Cortright and Thomas Biersteker directly challenge that narrative in the chapter “Incentivizing Nonproliferation” and argue compellingly that positive sanctions pay dividends by creating opportunities for engagement and willingness to cooperate. Overreliance on negative sanctions, in contrast, isolates a state and can close off opportunities for interaction. The authors discredit the notion that negative sanctions alone will push the targeted state to change course. They suggest an integrative approach, which combines coercive sanctions targeted at decision-makers representing the offending state with focused engagement and incentives.

Cortright and Biersteker pay equal attention to the policy implications of relief from negative sanctions. In addition to providing a flexible framework for releasing pressure from negative sanctions in response to concessions from the targeted state, Cortright and Biersteker contend that inducements, such as investment guarantees, can supplement sanctions relief. The 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and six world powers highlights the importance of this point, where lifting sanctions alone did not provide the tangible economic benefits that Iran expected under the deal.

Although positive sanctions are rarely used today, the case study of West Germany by Dogukan Cansin Karakus illustrates the role that they can play. The author contends that the “multifaceted approach combining punitive actions with incentive-driven strategies” used by the United States influenced West Germany’s decision to join the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1969. He further identifies that distinct characteristics shape a state’s decision-making and argues for a tailored strategy that considers a state’s ideology, security concerns, and economic imperatives in crafting an approach that balances positive and negative sanctions.

One theme that resonates through several chapters is the disconnect between perceptions of sanctions’ effectiveness and the impact of these measures on a targeted state’s behavior. George Lopez, for instance, calls attention to the outdated or erroneous generalizations about sanctions policy that still inform decision-makers, including the concept that noncompliance with sanctions should drive further sanctions imposition and that partial compliance by the targeted state suggests that holding firm on implementing sanctions will lead to 
full compliance.

Lopez presents a more accurate list of data-driven maxims for guiding sanctions policy, including the assessment that excessively punitive sanctions on broad sectors such as banking and trade are rarely successful and more often lead to the targeted state doubling down on its position rather than shifting its behavior. He argues that when a state employs sanctions without a strategy for engaging the targeted state it creates an environment in which sanctions become the strategy rather than a tool. He also posits that if sanctions are going to change a state’s behavior, it is most likely to happen in the first two and a half years of imposition.

Another policy-relevant contribution focuses on the importance of aligning sanctions action with a specific objective and clearly articulating that objective to the targeted state. The chapter on efforts to prevent proliferation in China and India by Rishika Chauhun offers a particularly useful breakdown for thinking about the relationship between sanctions and policy goals. Her approach to aligning sanctions to one of four key objectives offers a useful heuristic to policymakers who will pursue and assess sanctions effectiveness.

Chauhun’s framework states that sanctions can be used to demonstrate a response, deter future action, constrain a state from continuing a behavior, and coerce a state to improve its behavior. This approach of articulating specific nonproliferation objectives for sanctions is particularly relevant for U.S. policy. Increasingly, the United States has relied on overly broad sanctions measures and attempted to tie relief from those sanctions to the targeting state changing its behavior in multiple areas. Crafting targeted sanctions with more specific objectives could help policymakers better assess their effectiveness and better communicate their goals to the international community. It also would signal to the targeted state the concessions necessary to achieve sanctions relief.

Nuclear-weapon State Division

That observation is particularly relevant today, when unity among the five nuclear-weapon states recognized and bound by the NPT on prioritizing nonproliferation efforts is fracturing. As Lopez notes, shifts in the global economic system and the demise of the UN Security Council as “the major law-based structure with the authority and global support for imposing sanctions” negatively impact consistent sanctions use for nonproliferation policy. In recent years, for example, China and Russia have shielded North Korea from additional Security Council sanctions, despite blatant North Korean violations of UN restrictions on its nuclear program. Furthermore, the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw the United States from the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran in 2018, despite Tehran’s compliance, eroded the credibility of sanctions lifting. Policymakers will need to grapple with the implications of great- power disunity diminishing sanctions effectiveness as the world responds to proliferation threats.

The shifting proliferation environment and the emergence of nuclear weapons discourse in states that are U.S. allies or partners suggests that Washington will need to grapple with contradictions between pursuing national security and prioritizing nonproliferation. In a chapter focused on Pakistan, Bekaj and Chihaun review how U.S. security interests in Pakistan clashed at times with sanctions targeted at Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. The authors describe the U.S. approach to stymieing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons ambitions as “erratic and dysfunctional” and the implementation of sanctions relegated to a less important role compared with the country’s geostrategic value. Pakistan’s relationship with China, and Beijing’s willingness to assist at certain periods, led the authors to conclude that the threat of sanctions and the ability of the international community to lift sanctions were credible only when there was international consensus.

The lessons drawn from the Pakistan case are particularly relevant when considering the U.S. response to possible future proliferators. Apart from Iran, current proliferation threats include Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Turkey. In these cases, geostrategic interests could be competing with nonproliferation norms, possibly impacting the extent to which the sanctioning state would enforce negative sanctions targeting nonproliferation. This dynamic underscores the necessity of rethinking positive sanctions and of integrating inducements into nonproliferation strategies.

In addition to its utility in challenging predominant narratives that portray sanctions as a panacea, the book raises important questions for further research that could positively influence how sanctions are used in statecraft. While arguing that positive sanctions should be a more integrated part of nonproliferation policy, the authors acknowledge that more research on such inducements and the sequencing of positive and negative sanctions is necessary. They point out that security guarantees and alliances historically have served as important inducements, but the shifting geopolitical landscape has diminished the credibility of security commitments. Without addressing the security drivers of proliferation, states will be less likely to reverse nuclear weapons programs. The United States, in particular, will need to examine the consequences for proliferation that could emerge from rolling back extended deterrence commitments and questioning the value of alliances.

Another area that could be ripe for further study is the potential role of nuclear cooperation—in areas such as energy generation, medicine, and agriculture—as a positive sanction. In addition to providing direct benefits to the state, positive sanctions in the peaceful nuclear cooperative space would build additional transparency around nuclear programs and foster ties between expert communities that could be used to clarify intentions.

As well as highlighting the gaps between the perceived and actual effectiveness of sanctions, the book provides new, compelling guidelines for the use of sanctions in a more integrative strategy. Dispelling deeply held beliefs by policymakers, particularly in the United States, however, will be challenging.

With multiple proliferation threats looming, nonproliferation policy will remain a critical issue for years to come. This book is an indispensable contribution to rethinking how sanctions are applied and framed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

April 2025
By Alexey Gromyko

Sergey Rogov was born in Moscow in 1948. His father was a Soviet Air Forces officer. His mother taught history at school. As a result, military history became the passion of his life. It helped him grow into one of the leading Russian and international specialists on arms control.

Rogov spent his childhood in military towns and from his earliest days was obsessed with military maps, from the campaigns of Alexander the Great to World War II. When he was six years old, his family moved to Siberia where they lived near the Belaya Long-Range Aviation Base. There, Rogov endured daily five-kilometer walks to school, including in winter when temperatures of minus 40 degrees Celsius were not unique. Such hardship only contributed to the strength of his character. Later, when his family returned to Moscow, Rogov finished school with a gold medal and went to a famous state institute of international relations in Moscow.

His life took a definite turn in 1971 when he joined the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies (ISKRAN) at the Russian Academy of Sciences. The head of ISKRAN was Georgy Arbatov, who was for many years a key figure in relations between the Soviet Union and the West. Arbatov was on a good footing with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko and the institute enjoyed special treatment: the right to send one of its researchers to the Soviet Embassy in Washington with the rank of first secretary, and to send two interns to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations.

In 1973, Rogov became one of the interns. He lived in a small, rented flat on 96th Street in Manhattan. It did not escape his attention that time and again, judging by the burned butts of expensive cigarettes, the FBI visited the flat in his absence. Even more curious, a bottle of Stolichnaya in the refrigerator also was taken into consideration by the FBI visitors, who would add water to it. One time, Rogov put a sticker on the front door: “Drink vodka but after, don’t add water.”

Professionally, it was a happy time; he stayed in New York for a year and a half, establishing many contacts, some of whom lasted for the rest of his life. In 1984, as more mature specialist, Rogov was appointed an ISKRAN representative at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. He replaced Valentin Berezhkov, who had translated for Joseph Stalin. Earlier that year, Rogov defended his doctoral thesis on the political-military alliance between the United States and Israel.

It was not a coincidence that later, in the twilight of the Soviet Union, Rogov went to Israel for meetings. One morning at 8 a.m., he knocked at the door of the Israeli Labor party headquarters. Gen. Yitzhak Rabin, with whom he had an appointment, let him in. Rogov, who wore a suit, was taken off guard by Rabin’s appearance: barefooted and in a shirt. They started a conversation that led to the issue of an Israeli-Palestinian peace treaty. The general’s face, according to Rogov’s reminiscences, turned querulous. But the Russian was well-armed and put a bottle of Moskovskaya vodka on the table. Rabin’s eyes became animated. Rogov argued that it was possible to strike a peace deal with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Rabin insisted that “with that terrorist,” he would never have anything in common. Before 9 a.m., the bottle was empty. Two years later, Rabin signed the Oslo accords.

In 1995, Rogov was elected director of ISKRAN, replacing Arbatov and remaining until 2015. From the 1970s through the 1990s, Arbatov and Rogov created a dense fabric of professional and personal contacts with U.S. experts, diplomats, and politicians. Rogov was unmatched in arranging confidential discussions, dialogues, and Track II meetings. In the course of this tireless activity, he built a reputation as a tough negotiator and a trusted friend. His counterparts included secretaries of defense Robert McNamara, Les Aspin, and William Perry; secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and Condoleezza Rice; national security advisors Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski; and senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar.

One recent Rogov success was staging the Russian-American Conference on Arms Control in Moscow in April 2019. He co-organized previous events in this series with the Arms Control Association, the Deep Cuts Commission, and the Nuclear Crisis Group. At the 2019 conference, Rogov was behind a public statement by U.S. and Russian experts urging the United States and Russia to resume arms control negotiations, especially on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Among his other achievements were the dialogue on military risk reduction in Europe, launched with the Institute of Europe in 2020, and co-moderating seminars with the Committee on International Security and Arms Control.

Once, I was standing with Sergey at the viewing point on the notorious, yet heroic Seelow Heights over the Oder River. In April 1945, a bloody battle played out there as Soviet troops approached Berlin and many thousands of them sacrificed their lives in the muddy terrain. As we looked down the plain before us, I noticed tears in Sergey’s eyes. I never asked him if it was wind. He dedicated his life to arms control and his credo was straightforward: Arms are inevitable; control is existential.

April 2025
By Xiaodon Liang

Leaders in France, Germany, and Poland have signaled plans to fundamentally reconsider their countries’ nuclear policies as Europe adjusts to the possibility of weaker U.S. commitments to the continent under a second Donald Trump presidency.

In a March 5 televised address, French President Emmanuel Macron said he would open a strategic debate with European allies on the role of French nuclear forces in their protection. Macron made a similar offer to discuss France’s notably opaque nuclear policies to allies in February

 2020, when he declared that “France’s vital interests now have a European dimension.” (See ACT, March 2020.)

The suggestion of a greater role for French nuclear forces in defending against a perceived Russian threat comes at the invitation of German Chancellor-elect Friedrich Merz, who, speaking Feb. 21 to German television station ZDF, said Germany should discuss how French and UK nuclear forces could help guarantee European security.

Merz also called for a new European nuclear sharing arrangement, but clarified in a March 9 radio interview that he would prefer to see existing NATO nuclear sharing plans, which call for NATO aircraft to deliver U.S. gravity bombs stationed in Germany and four other NATO countries, maintained as well.

Nuclear sharing was not mentioned in Macron’s March 5 speech. The president made clear instead that nuclear decisions would remain in his hands.

In a March 6 radio interview, French Defense Minister Sébastien Lecornu affirmed that sharing French nuclear forces was not part of Macron’s offer.

Merz also emphasized that Germany would not seek nuclear weapons itself due to its treaty obligations.

The incoming chancellor has made German rearmament a priority. On March 18, the Bundestag, in a lame-duck session, approved a package of amendments to Germany’s Basic Law that would permit a significant increase in military spending.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk also signaled his intention to engage Macron on the offer of a French nuclear umbrella in a March 7 speech to the Polish parliament. Tusk suggested that Poland should “reach for opportunities related to nuclear weapons,” according to The New York Times, although he paused short of calling for a national nuclear weapons program.

Polish President Andrzej Duda, a political rival of Tusk, renewed March 13 his call for the United States to deploy nuclear weapons in Poland as part of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements. Duda, who faces reelection in May, made a similar pitch to the Biden administration in 2022. (See ACT, November 2022.)

U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance was quick to dismiss the prospect, saying in a Fox News interview on the same day that he would be “shocked” if President Donald Trump would support the idea.

Macron’s extended deterrence proposal has been met with a mixture of concern and scorn in Russia. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov accused the French president of “thinking more about war, about continuing the [Ukraine] war,” in March 6 comments to reporters.

But Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov made light of the French offer in a March 12 interview, describing it as a pledge to “protect all of you with my three or four nuclear bombs.”

The United Kingdom did not respond in public to Merz’s call for new dialogue on European extended deterrence. Unlike France, the UK already maintains that its nuclear forces are assigned to defend the NATO alliance.

The UK government believes that U.S. technical support for UK nuclear forces continues to be reliable, according to a comment by the prime minister’s office to The Guardian. The statement came after a former UK ambassador to the United States, David Manning, questioned the longstanding nuclear relationship in March 5 testimony before a House of Lords committee.

The renewed push across Europe for increased military spending comes after signals that U.S. commitments to NATO’s defense might be weakening. A confrontational Feb. 13 speech by Vance at the Munich Security Conference inflamed concerns initially prompted by the U.S. administration’s direct outreach to Russia on the war in Ukraine.

“Listening to that speech, they try to pick a fight with us and we don’t want to pick a fight with our friends,” said Kaja Kallas, the European Union’s high representative for foreign affairs, on Feb. 14, Reuters reported.

Trump further exacerbated European worries March 6 when he said that the United States might adopt a policy of not defending NATO allies that fail to meet military spending targets. “If they don’t pay, I’m not going to defend them,” he said, according to the Associated Press. The comment came after NBC News first reported on the potential policy shift, citing multiple administration sources.

Leaders of the 27 EU member states endorsed on the same day a proposal by the European Commission to ease the bloc’s budgetary spending rules to permit additional military spending. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen claimed that this would allow for about $700 billion in additional military investment, which could be supplemented by another $160 billion in EU-backed loans.

April 2025
By Kelsey Davenport

U.S. President Donald Trump sent a letter to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, expressing interest in a nuclear deal, but the overture comes amid Iranian steps to expand its nuclear program and U.S. threats to strike Iran.

The contents of the letter—which was delivered to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi by an Emirati official on March 12—have not been made public. Trump, however, told Fox News in an interview March 7 that the letter says, “I hope you’re going to negotiate because if we have to go in militarily it’s going to be a terrible thing.”

The day the letter was delivered, Khamenei said Iran is not interested in talks with a “bullying government” and described the missive as an attempt to “deceive global public opinion.” He said the U.S. threat of military action is “irrational” and warned that Iran is capable of “delivering a reciprocal blow.”

Despite Khamenei’s skepticism that the Trump administration is serious about an agreement, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian responded to the letter. In a March 30 speech, he said that Iran “rejected” the possibility of direct talks in its response but emphasized that the “path for indirect negotiations remains open.”

Trump has not articulated his aim for an agreement, but National Security Advisor Michael Waltz suggested that the United States will press for Iran to dismantle its entire nuclear program.

In a March 16 interview with ABC News, Waltz said Iran can either “give up” its nuclear program, including its uranium enrichment activities, “in a way that is verifiable” or “face a whole series of other consequences.” He made a similar comment in February, saying that the United States will talk to Iran only if they want to “give up their entire program.”

Iran’s mission to the UN tweeted on X that Iran would consider negotiations if the objective would be to “address concerns vis-à-vis potential militarization” of the country’s nuclear program but that talks “will never take place” if the goal is to discuss dismantlement.

Iranian officials met their Chinese and Russian counterparts in Beijing March 14 to discuss the nuclear issue. In a joint statement released after the meeting, the three countries called for the termination of “all unlawful unilateral sanctions” and called for dialogue based on “mutual respect.” The statement said all parties should refrain from “any action” that escalates the situation. The trilateral meeting came after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s offer to mediate between Iran and the United States, but it is not clear if the two sides will accept Moscow as an intermediary.

Heightened regional tensions could affect Iran’s willingness to engage the Trump administration. Trump said he will hold Iran “fully accountable” for any further action by Houthi militants that threatens shipping lanes and U.S. interests. Trump made the statement on Truth Social after large-scale U.S. airstrikes began targeting Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen March 15. The Houthis increased military activities in the region after Israel announced it would block aid to Gaza.

Although Iran has provided military support and backing for the Houthi forces, it is not clear how much influence Tehran has on their actions. Trump, however, said the Houthi attacks “all emanate from, and are created by, IRAN.”

Trump’s direct outreach to Iran followed a quarterly report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that noted a significant increase in Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent uranium-235, a level close to the 90 percent U-235 that is considered weapons grade.

The Feb. 26 report said Iran produced 91 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent U-235 over the quarter, bringing the total stockpile of 60 percent U-235 material to 275 kilograms. Over the previous quarter, Iran had only produced about 18 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent U-235. The significant increase in the stockpile was expected after Iran notified the agency of its intention to increase production of 60 percent U-235 material at its Fordow enrichment facility in December.

In a March 4 joint statement to the IAEA Board of Governors, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom called the increase in 60 percent U-235 material “alarming.” They said that “Iran has chosen to escalate its nuclear program … beyond any credible civilian use, thereby causing a proliferation crisis” and reiterated their commitment to a diplomatic solution.

IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi called for diplomacy with Iran in a March 3 press conference. He said that “high-level engagement is indispensable.” He also called for concrete results on the IAEA’s yearslong investigation into undeclared Iranian nuclear activities from the pre-2003 period, saying it is time to “stop talking about process and start getting some answers.”

France, Germany, the UK, and the United States expressed similar concerns about the outstanding safeguards investigation in a March 5 statement to the board. The four countries said that “Iran must fully cooperate” with the IAEA or “the board must be prepared to find Iran in noncompliance” with its safeguards agreement.

April 2025
By Mina Rozei

Syria’s interim foreign minister called the Assad regime’s chemical weapons program “one of the darkest chapters” in world history and promised that the new government in Damascus will work to dismantle what is left, adhere to international norms, and ensure accountability for past wrongs.

Interim Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani made the commitments during a March 5 address to the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague.

It was the latest step in an international effort to reset relations with Syria after the ouster of President Bashar al-Assad in December and a civil war in which his regime used chemical weapons against domestic opponents and thwarted OPCW attempts to hold Syria to account.

“The new Syrian government … is determined to rebuild Syria’s future on a foundation of transparency, justice and cooperation with the international community,” Shibani said.

He said that although the Assad era chemical weapons program “is not our program .… our commitment is to dismantle whatever may be left from it, to put an end to this painful legacy, and ensure Syria becomes a nation aligned with international norms.”

However, Shibani said achieving that goal will be challenging because the program was top secret and many involved officials have fled, likely taking key documents with them. He also cited complications from Israel’s decision to conduct airstrikes in Syria after the regime fell.

“We lack the information, expertise, technical capacity, and human resources to fully assess and address any chemical weapons that may still exist,” he said.

Shibani addressed the executive council meeting after OPCW Director-General Fernando Arias held talks with interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa in Damascus in February. The OPCW presented a nine-point plan of action to assist with locating and destroying the remaining chemical weapons stockpile.

Shibani said the Syrian government began acting on the plan after the visit and identified a Foreign Ministry official to liaise with the OPCW on chemical weapons issues. The liaison already has met with the OPCW and Syria is working with the OPCW Technical Secretariat to plan further operational trips to Damascus in the near future, Shibani said. He credited the OPCW and its member states for documenting the chemical attacks perpetrated in Syria.

The foreign minister asked OPCW member states and the broader international community to provide information, coordination, technical assistance, capacity building, and other resources on the ground in Damascus and in The Hague. He also called for lifting economic sanctions on Syria to allow the OPCW to operate on the ground, stem the spread of criminal networks, and allow the war-torn country to recover economically.

Several OPCW member states supported Shibani’s appeal, stressing the “historic” opportunity to strengthen the norm against chemical weapons that the organization is now facing.

April 2025
By Kelsey Davenport

North Korea threatened to escalate its nuclear weapons program after the United States announced it was sending an aircraft carrier to South Korea for combined, joint military exercises.

The USS Carl Vinson docked in Busan, South Korea, ahead of the annual combined, joint Freedom Shield military exercise, held March 10-20. The South Korean navy described the carrier’s participation as a demonstration of the “permanent and ironclad” U.S. extended deterrence commitment to South Korea.

Kim Yo Jong, sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, called the U.S. decision to send the USS Carl Vinson to South Korea a “provocative” act that shows the “most hostile and confrontational will” toward North Korea.

Kim Yo Jong, who serves as the vice department director of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, said in a March 4 statement to the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), that U.S. actions offer “sufficient justification [for Pyongyang] to indefinitely bolster up its nuclear war deterrent.” North Korea also will examine its options to threaten “the enemy at the strategic level” and set new records to demonstrate North Korea’s strategic deterrence capabilities, she said.

Kim did not specify what capabilities North Korea may seek to demonstrate or what steps the country may take to enhance its nuclear weapons program. North Korea launched several ballistic missiles before and during the South Korea-U.S. exercise, but the systems did not appear to demonstrate any new capabilities.

South Korea said the March 10 launch likely involved combat-range ballistic missiles that fly very short distances. Before the exercise, North Korea launched a strategic cruise missile. A Feb. 28 KCNA report on the launch said the activities were carried out to inform adversaries about North Korea’s retaliatory capabilities and its nuclear readiness.

After the Freedom Shield exercise commenced, North Korea accused South Korea and the United States of warmongering in a March 11 KCNA statement. The day before, North Korea said the yearly exercise was aimed at practicing a preemptive attack on North Korea’s nuclear facilities. The statement reiterated that North Korea views U.S. hostile actions as a justification for the “radical” growth of its nuclear arsenal.

The combined, joint exercise included more drills than last year but did not include live-fire drills. South Korea and the United States described Freedom Shield as defensive drills aimed at countering a range of North Korean threats emanating from land, sea, space, and cyber domains.

Russia also criticized the combined, joint exercise and said North Korea’s decision to expand its own deterrence capabilities in response is justified. Maria Zakharova, the spokeswoman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, said that Freedom Shield “could trigger a new round of escalation.” She condemned the United States for “saber-rattling” and said there are avenues for peacefully resolving tensions on the Korean peninsula. She encouraged U.S. President Donald Trump to reach out to Kim and suggest “practical steps” to stabilize the situation.

The Trump administration has called for the denuclearization of North Korea and reiterated its support for South Korea, but it is not clear if Trump will try to use his personal relationship with Kim to engage North Korea diplomatically—or if Kim wants to negotiate with the United States.

North Korea appears to be investing in the fissile material production capabilities necessary to expand its nuclear deterrent. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi raised concerns about North Korea’s fissile material activities March 3. He said there are “strong indicators” that North Korea is preparing for a reprocessing campaign, which removes weapons-grade plutonium from the spent nuclear fuel. Grossi said it appeared that the 5-megawatt reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear complex resumed operations in October 2024, likely after being refueled.

Grossi also described Kim Jong Un’s recent call for expanding weapons-grade nuclear material production a “serious concern.”

In addition to plans to expand its nuclear arsenal, North Korea announced March 8 that it is building its first “nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine” and showed pictures of Kim Jong Un inspecting what appeared to be a submarine under construction. It was not clear from the photos how close the submarine is to completion.

North Korea has conventionally powered submarines, but the diesel engines powering those systems are noisy, making the submarines easier to track. North Korea also has tested submarine-launched ballistic missiles capable of delivering a nuclear warhead, but its existing fleet of submarines probably could not carry those missiles.

On his shipyard visit, Kim said North Korea is modernizing its underwater forces to counter the “gunboat diplomacy of the hostile forces,” according to KCNA.

April 2025
By Shizuka Kuramitsu

States-parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) concluded their third meeting by renewing a commitment to effectively implement and universalize the pact amid escalating nuclear tensions.

Voicing growing concerns over global instability, the states-parties adopted a political outcome document that reaffirms the roles played by “the majority of non-nuclear-armed States … in bridging divides, promoting diplomacy, and reinforcing multilateralism.” They also recommitted “to unite and mobilize the international community around the imperative and urgency of progress toward eliminating the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons.”

The meeting was held March 3-7 in New York.

The treaty, which goes beyond other arms control agreements by banning nuclear weapons, entered into force Jan. 22, 2021, and has been ratified by 73 states. But its effectiveness is hampered by the fact that none of the states possessing nuclear weapons—China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—have signed on.

The states-parties agreed that alarming international developments highlight the imperative of disarmament and nonproliferation initiatives. “Heightened geopolitical tensions, further expansion and modernization of nuclear arsenals, the increasing salience of nuclear weapons in military and security doctrines, including through security guarantees, and the growing dangers of nuclear proliferation and potentially devastating nuclear arms races demand immediate and decisive action from the international community,” the political outcome document stated.

At the opening session March 3, Izumi Nakamitsu, the UN high representative for disarmament affairs, said that “sadly, these trends have continued and only intensified. Geopolitical tensions remain unresolved, and are also dramatically evolving…. Yet, even in this challenging moment, there are reasons for hope, especially in relation to the full implementation of the TPNW.”

Ahead of the meeting, the officials who had been working on the intersessional initiative facilitated by Austria at the direction of the previous meeting of states-parties produced their report. (See ACT, January/February 2024.) It outlines a comprehensive assessment of how nuclear weapons pose security threats to the TPNW states and recommendations on how they can challenge the nuclear deterrence doctrines of nuclear-armed states.

In citing the report, the outcome document said that “nuclear deterrence is posited on the very existence of nuclear risk, which threatens the survival of all.” It added that the states-parties showed their commitment to expand efforts to continue challenging nuclear deterrence and aiming for a paradigm shift in nuclear doctrines.

On the TPNW mandate of establishing an international trust fund for victim assistance and environmental remediation from the consequences of nuclear use and testing, the meeting decided to produce a report no later than the end of July 2026.

The meeting occurred as states that are not TPNW members are intensifying reliance on nuclear deterrence in their security doctrines. On March 5, French President Emmanuel Macron said his government would be open to discussing nuclear extended deterrence with its European partners against the backdrop of possible shifts in U.S. security guarantees to NATO allies, as mooted by the Trump administration.

NATO members Belgium, Germany, and Norway observed the past two TPNW meetings but skipped this one. Albania was the only NATO member to attend, but left after the first day. According to a March 14 report in the Chugoku Shimbun, Hiroshima’s local newspaper, a NATO diplomat explained that NATO members, after consultations, decided to skip the meeting.

Japan also was absent, despite strong domestic pressure to attend the meeting for the first time as an observer after the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Nihon Hidankyo, the lobby group for World War II atomic bomb survivors known hibakusha. (See ACT, December 2024.)

Concluding the meeting, Akan Rakhmetullin of Kazakhstan, the meeting president, called the event a success. “The risks associated with [nuclear weapons] continued existence are greater than ever,” he said. “Our discussion this week reinforced the urgency of concrete steps towards a global disarmament.”

Fifty-five states-parties, 31 observer states, and 163 nongovernmental organizations participated in the weeklong TPNW meeting. South Africa was elected chair of the first TPNW review conference, set for November 2026.

April 2025

Since coming into force a half-century ago, the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has been the central pillar of the international arms control regime and specifically, efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Its 191 member states are divided into two groups—the five nuclear-weapons states known as the P5 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and all the rest, who pledged never to acquire such weapons. The latter group has been promised access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy (such as power and medical uses) in return for forsaking nuclear weapons; the nuclear-weapon states have committed to pursue complete disarmament. The non-nuclear weapon states have not gotten the peaceful energy benefits they expected, and disarmament has halted. Meanwhile, the NPT has become increasingly embattled as the full-scale Russian war on Ukraine has exacerbated geopolitical tensions, other treaties collapsed, Iran and North Korea keep advancing their nuclear programs, and several other states threaten to start their own programs. It is a difficult environment ahead of the 2026 NPT Review Conference when member states will take stock of the treaty and attempt to shore it up and nudge it forward. Recent conferences have failed to agree on consensus outcome documents. The last of three meetings to prepare for the 2026 event will be April 25-May 9. To explore what the 2026 Review Conference could achieve and how this year’s preparatory committee (PrepCom) meeting could be useful, Carol Giacomo, chief editor of Arms Control Today, and Shizuka Kuramitsu, a researcher with the Arms Control Association, interviewed Ambassador Harold Agyeman of Ghana, the chair of this year’s PrepCom meeting; Deputy Foreign Minister Akan Rakhmetullin of Kazakhstan, the 2024 chair; and Ambassador Jarmo Viinanen of Finland, the 2023 chair. This transcript has been edited for space and clarity.

Arms Control Today: The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is more than 50 years old. Is it still fit for the purpose for which it was created, or is it too battered?

Ambassador Harold Agyeman: There’s no doubt that the world is in a very difficult place. There are a lot of uncertainties across different parts of the world, and it portends very severe risks for all of us, especially when you take into account that the driving force relates to some of the P5 states. Nonetheless, I think that the NPT has stood its ground as a stabilizer in avoiding proliferation for all these decades. It has held back the proliferation rates that, at the time it was negotiated, the threat was very real. I think the fact that it’s held as a stabilizing force in avoiding proliferation is a major achievement.

Certainly, the NPT is under pressure because the aspirations that many of our states-parties held—especially at the time of the review and extension conference in 1995, that there would be a stronger commitment to disarmament—has not necessarily panned out. That is something that we need to look at and find a resolution for. Also, the issues relating to the inalienable rights of non-nuclear-weapon states, especially for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and other applications, needs to be stepped up because this is the other end of the bargain that many have committed to.

The NPT is indeed fit for purpose, and if we were to negotiate it today, it would be very difficult to have such an agreement. We need to make very good use of the NPT to ensure that the arrangement that it was intended to provide in terms of disarmament of our nuclear weapons, the nonproliferation regime, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, are reinforced and implemented accordingly.

Ambassador Jarmo Viinanen: The treaty is still fit for purpose. There are a lot of pressures on the treaty, from outside the treaty’s realm, but also from the inside. Yet, we have to remember that the treaty is functioning well every day. We have for example the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards in place, which actually curb proliferation risks all the time, every day, everywhere. We have a very elaborate system for promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for development to combat climate change, and so on. We certainly need to do better in that respect.

Another issue concerning nuclear disarmament: This is the only treaty where the recognized nuclear-weapon states have agreed to a legal obligation to engage in good faith in nuclear disarmament. Without that, there wouldn’t be a legal commitment or obligation from their side. At the same time, when we are approaching the review conference next year, we can see that the turmoil that we are facing in today’s world actually makes all the purposes of the treaty even more urgent and important. It is clear that in this very difficult situation, we need more nuclear disarmament than ever before. It has become obvious with the Russian war in Ukraine and with the nuclear threats that have followed throughout the war.

It means that something concrete has to happen in this respect. It’s not going to be enough that the nuclear-weapon states say that the international environment is not conducive to nuclear disarmament. They are the states-parties that have the most leverage, they are permanent members in the UN Security Council. They can do better and they must do better. At the same time, concerning proliferation, we can see even during the last two to three weeks in multiple places where there is serious discussion about acquiring nuclear weapons, in states-parties that never had nuclear weapons before but now are contemplating seriously whether they should take that path. This should be a wake-up call for all of us to do everything to curb the tendencies that lead to nuclear proliferation because we don’t need any more states with nuclear weapons in this world.

The third issue is on the peaceful uses side. As with proliferation and nuclear disarmament, we can see that climate change is advancing at a very rapid pace. We see serious catastrophes happening in different parts of the world, and they are partly due to climate change. Nuclear energy, used in a peaceful manner, can actually be helpful in combatting climate change and advancing development, so we need to do better in that respect.

Deputy Foreign Minister Akan Rakhmetullin: The NPT is the only legal instrument where officially recognized nuclear powers have taken responsibilities to move forward the issues of disarmament and nonproliferation. Of course, the treaty is burdened by the overall political context—be it Ukraine, overall global developments, lack of mutual trust. If I may compare it with my recent presidency over the third meeting of states-parties to the TPNW [Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons] in New York, the TPNW is comprised of like-minded countries, non-nuclear-weapon states, that are united and they discuss different issues, like universalization, the impact on affected communities, on individuals, on the environment.

In the context of the NPT, it is very optimistic for us that the nuclear powers remain NPT states-parties, and not one of them has said the treaty is no longer relevant—that it is not fit for purpose and that we have to abandon it and go somewhere else. They are present in the NPT and they speak. They don’t agree with each other all the time, but they talk, and they do listen to each other. In some instances, they agree; in some they do not. But this treaty is the only treaty which remains relevant in terms of the global nonproliferation regime.

There are seminal issues within the treaty which are most controversial. The pillar on peaceful uses of nuclear energy remains least controversial and where we can think about areas that unite [and] converge the vision of the different states-parties, including nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states. We also very much rely on the authority and the talking ability of non-nuclear actors to somehow try to influence the nuclear powers. What I brought away from chairing the second NPT PrepCom last year in Geneva is that we still have some domains where it is really very difficult for countries to converge their positions. Countries all agree on the relevance and the importance of each component of the treaty, but they have their own vision of how this or that component should be implemented.

I think at the 2026 Review Conference we have to at least reconfirm our commitments, which we attained during the previous review conferences. Given the political context [and] geopolitical developments, it is really very hard to build trust.… But again, just to confirm what my colleagues said, this treaty is relevant, and it is fit for purpose.

ACT: What should NPT states-parties do to achieve success at the 2026 NPT Review Conference? What specific steps must states-parties undertake to fulfill their NPT obligations and improve the atmosphere?

Rakhmetullin: It’s really a million-dollar question, and it’s really hard to answer that because they all come to the review conference or the PrepCom with their prepared national positions and national statements. We always think we’re being strong proponents of multilateralism but all these negotiations are a two-way avenue, because if we want to take something, we have to give something. I think during the preparatory period to the review conference, it is good to know each country’s redlines. They’re actually well known, and I don’t think they will shift away from their redlines. But we hope they can demonstrate a certain degree of flexibility in order to attain some tangible progress.

We can just reconfirm the existing commitments within the review conferences of 1995, 2000, and the latest, 2010, because having no result in the conference is also a result on its own because countries at least sat together, they have discussed complex issues, they again indicated their concerns, their priorities. [Although some alternative approaches were initially considered ahead of the 2024 PrepCom] we decided just to go with the existing practice, and to understand what each country is ready to take and what it’s not. Unfortunately, countries were not flexible enough and we could not arrive at a consensus, but we managed to at least produce a factual summary which served as a more procedural outcome. We just managed—sometimes by playing with different language, like adding a footnote to the document—to bring it to a situation where the countries did not oppose having some kind of final document. My strong conviction is that states-parties have to produce some kind of reflections [from the preparatory committees], because having nothing from the deliberations is just the way to nowhere.

Viinanen: The questions are very complicated. What everybody can do is adhere to what has been agreed earlier within the NPT. If we all would live up to the standards which are laid out, for example, in the UN Charter, the world would be a much better place and it would be much easier to agree on these things. But I think it’s very important that there’s a strong commitment in every state-party that we need to get an outcome from the review conference 
next year.

We have had two review cycles without any outcome, and although that’s not the measurement of the success of the treaty or whether the treaty is fit for purpose, if we have this kind of diplomatic exercise—three PrepComs, a Review Conference of four weeks—that’s a lot of effort, it’s a lot of time, it’s a lot of money. We need to come out with an outcome because if we are not trying to succeed in that, it might be detrimental for the credibility of the treaty. So, this is the main issue. And as Akan said, when we come together, everybody has to compromise on certain things; otherwise, it’s not going to happen.

Another issue is political leadership. Some of our colleagues have been dealing for a very long time with these issues, and they know every detail in the whole process. Sometimes we need to have a little bit more political engagement in our capitals, because sometimes it would be a little bit easier for political leaders to overcome the challenges which sometimes are overwhelming for us diplomats to do. So, I would like to see the capital involvement on a political level.

As for possible outcomes, we cannot achieve miracles, but of course there has to be a recommitment, stronger language concerning the need to address nuclear disarmament. Here I would once again challenge our friends and colleagues in the nuclear-weapon states: Listen to the concerns of the other countries which are not in possession of nuclear weapons. Listen to the concerns which came from the TPNW meeting. Even though you don’t agree on the substance, you have to see that the concern of the majority of the states-parties to the TPNW is a real one, and it has to be addressed.

The same applies to nuclear proliferation. I don’t think that nuclear proliferation would be in any state-party’s interest. We have to be clear on this. We don’t need to have all countries possessing nuclear weapons. It would be detrimental for everybody.

Agyeman: I think that the expectation is that we should have an outcome [document] and the process for the NPT review cycle is such that it requires consensus. It will require all of us to give and take and to show flexibility during the negotiation of the final outcome document in 2026. This is a difficult task, but it’s important that we do so for some of the reasons that we have mentioned. Indeed, as a chair, it is not my intention that our ambition should exceed that of the states-parties. At the same time, I’m very conscious of the fact that there’s a strong expectation from many people around the world to have a pathway ultimately set out toward denuclearization and disarmament of nuclear-weapon states. We cannot afford to have a RevCon [Review Conference] that does not come out with an outcome document. I think that flexibility is therefore required.

One issue that Ambassador Viinanen spoke about relates to the engagement of the nuclear-weapon states themselves, because it’s important that they also engage strongly…. I’m encouraged by some of the remarks that I’ve heard from the new leader of the United States in the direction of engagement. I think it’s important that that engagement takes place, and that trust be rebuilt, in ways that can ensure that there is a cooling down of the nuclear rhetoric. It could also help to ensure that the concerns that are coming up in terms of countries that are now beginning to think about acquiring nuclear weapons, in terms of the proliferation race, can be addressed.

At the same time, there is a strong pressure from many parts of the world, including from non-nuclear-weapon states, that there should be a recommitment to the existing obligations that advances the disarmament regime. The clarity that is required is to say that proliferation is prohibited and that clarity is needed to be expressed at the RevCon in 2026. The issues relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy need to be practicalized so that many non-nuclear-weapon states will see a benefit from being part of this treaty.

ACT: Ambassador Agyeman, can you be more specific about the encouraging things that you heard from U.S. President Donald Trump? Are you reacting to his public remarks or has he said something specific to you?

Agyeman: I’m referring to his general remarks, which for me is encouraging. As Ambassador Viinanen indicated, there is a need for high-level political leadership to ensure that the risk is brought down. And [Trump’s] indication of a willingness to be able to engage in that direction is one that I find encouraging. I hope that we can leverage that to engage in discussions, including on the suspension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty by the Russian Federation, and look beyond 2026 in terms of what will be done by these two major nuclear-weapon states.

ACT: There have been several references today to concerns about other states possibly going nuclear. Other than Iran, what states are you talking about?

Viinanen: Iran is a very specific case. There have been long-term oversight issues with the Iranian nuclear program, dating back before 2000. It doesn’t look like Iran has made a decision to acquire a nuclear weapon. They want to keep it on a certain level. But it’s an issue which needs to be solved. And the key in solving the matter, the trust issue, is the Iranian government itself. It has to come to terms with the IAEA regulations, IAEA demands, and actually respond to them in a credible way so that we can put this issue aside.

The more current issues are related to changes in U.S. policy, which have raised the issue in some countries of whether they can rely on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. This shows that extended deterrence, whether you like it or not, has been a very effective way of exercising nonproliferation. When there is extended deterrence, there’s no need for many countries to acquire nuclear weapons themselves.

We are a long way from changes in this respect. But even serious political talk about the matter in some countries already should be a concern enough that something needs to be done. And I hope this can be solved in a way that there’s not going to be countries under the umbrella of extended deterrence who see a need to change their policy. It depends on all of the countries in that alliance or those alliances and partnerships.

ACT: Does this concern relate to NATO and France’s talks with other Europeans about possibly extending its nuclear deterrence to them?

Viinanen: I mean all of these are ripples of the same political effect, the political turmoil which we are seeing. There are a little bit different origins for each of them, but it’s part of the same issue, concern about the reliability of the extended deterrence, the security framework which had been existing in Europe for more than 75 years. But the issue when it comes to NPT is the cascading effect. If there is going to be one other country acquiring nuclear weapons, it could be easily said that there would be a second one, a third one, a fourth one. Then, the proliferation is much more difficult to contain, and therefore, there shouldn’t be any more countries acquiring nuclear weapons.

Rakhmetullin: On one hand, it’s a matter of internal policy, of the sovereign right of any country that is eligible to ensure its security by different means. At the same time, we are a bit concerned with this rhetoric in general and that this proposal is not fully understood, particularly the underlying reasons behind it, why it happened, and why France proposed that. But at the same time—I’m talking from my personal capacity as the nation of Kazakhstan—we’re a bit concerned when countries go that far.… The NPT clearly speaks about five countries which are eligible to legally have the right to possess the nuclear weapon. Going beyond that undermines the letter and spirit of the treaty.

I had numerous meetings with our French colleagues, and we know that nuclear deterrence is part of their national security doctrine. At the same time, it shouldn’t be done at the expense of the existing fragile balance. I think a similar reaction would follow any kind of rhetoric from the other side, because we have already seen that different countries were not happy with this idea, including saber-rattling rhetoric and plans to deploy more nuclear weapons or to reconsider the nuclear sharing policy.

Agyeman: The question that you pose is not an easy one, and it relates to issues largely out of the NPT but impacting the NPT strongly. From my perspective, nuclear deterrence, nuclear sharing, nuclear umbrella—all these are being redefined. We need to be very careful about the manner we go in those directions and avoid a situation where we could escalate the nuclear rhetoric and lead to a new arms race.

There needs to be a frank and robust discussion among the P5 nuclear-weapon states and for clarity to be established that it will not be in their interest—nor in any of us outside of the P5 interest—if that situation is made to unbound itself and lose control of the situation in terms of the proliferation risk that my colleagues have talked about. That for me is a major concern, especially with the unfolding situation that we are witnessing—because once one has it, another will seek it. And there will be no end to the risk. Even for the five nuclear-weapon states that are recognized under the treaty, it is difficult to ensure synchrony of actions lately.

ACT: The Russian war on Ukraine has complicated international relations for several years. You all stress the need to make progress at this next NPT Review Conference. How will you mitigate the disruption that the war is causing?

Agyeman: The situation in Ukraine today is not at the same place it was in 2022. And so, we have a bit of room to work around in a way that Ukraine does not become a negative element in the efforts to achieve consensus. Issues relating to nuclear safety and security in terms of the Ukrainian civilian nuclear infrastructure continue to be of concern but there is a bit of engagement by the IAEA director-general and his team to ensure that that risk is largely mitigated. Also, when we take the efforts that the new U.S. administration is making for peace in Ukraine, I anticipate that if the trajectory that we see is sustained, then by 2026 it will not be the big concern that should impede common agreement. But these are of course things that one cannot have full control over, because it’s not yet been resolved.

Rakhmetullin: We are trying to be optimistic about the progress we make with this because we know that today, President Trump’s talks with the [Russian] president are ongoing. That gives us a hint of feeling that the bloodshed and the conflict may deescalate from its active phase. At the same time, I’m not sure that Russia will withdraw its presence from the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant. I think the Ukrainians, after three-plus years of conflict, will also have so many wounds—moral, financial, military, emotional—that they will not let go easily. I think they will be using this opportunity during the 2025 PrepCom, being present in the same room with Russians and with other pro-Ukrainians stakeholders, to promote their own interest, which is opposing the interests of Russia. This may impede progress. In this case, we would need to appeal to the political wisdom of some other states, which have their own vision and have their good contacts with the Ukrainian colleagues and with Russians, to try to mitigate the overall conflict and the overall negative sentiment in the room.

Iran also keeps us quite optimistic that they’re not leaving the treaty. They are there, they are quite loud, they try to promote their own interests, their priorities are to protect them, try to find some kind of positive outcome. Maybe they are not as flexible as many countries want to see them be, but at the same time it gives us a feeling of optimism that they are at least engaged in the process, they are not leaving the room and they are trying to somehow contribute to the review process.

Viinanen: As Harold said, we are in a different situation with the Russian war in Ukraine than in the summer of 2022. Probably in the spring of 2026 we are going to be even in a more different situation. So, we don’t know how that is going to look like next year.