September 2024
By Steven Andreasen 

At a time of heightened global tensions, when a handful of leaders with only a few minutes of decision time could determine the world’s fate, the next U.S. president must prioritize nuclear risk reduction. Faster, more powerful delivery systems and new technologies, including cyber and artificial intelligence, are increasing the risk of nuclear blunders.¹ The best way to reduce these risks is global nuclear failsafe.²

“Failsafe” refers to safeguards that prevent the unauthorized, accidental, or mistaken use of a nuclear weapon. In the United States, these safeguards could involve nuclear policy or force posture, such as adopting a no-first-use policy or modifying the nuclear triad. They also could include procedures that would strengthen the decision-making process for nuclear use, such as placing guardrails around the president’s sole authority to authorize the use of nuclear weapons. Further, they could involve the design of nuclear weapons or delivery systems, for example, by ensuring that they are built to prevent a terrorist from using a stolen bomb or by installing a system that would allow for the postlaunch destruction of nuclear weapons or their associated delivery systems if launched by mistake.

Hollywood has highlighted these risks through iconic performances by its biggest stars. In the 1964 movie “Failsafe,” Moscow is destroyed by a U.S. nuclear bomber due to computer error. The box-office hit “Dr. Strangelove” involves an unauthorized U.S. nuclear attack on Russia instigated by the mad commander of U.S. nuclear forces. In the 1990s, “Crimson Tide” depicted a tense standoff between a U.S. nuclear submarine captain and his executive officer over whether a U.S. nuclear strike on Russia has been properly authorized.

The epilogue to “Crimson Tide” notes that Washington was taking steps to ensure that the scenario in the movie could not happen. Those steps were mandated in an independent review by the Kirkpatrick Commission, which the George H.W. Bush administration initiated at the urging of Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.).³ In 1992 the commission authorized more than 50 steps to prevent unauthorized, accidental, or mistaken nuclear use, but that was more than 30 years ago during the digital Stone Age. Since then, the world has entered a new era, with new threats and new technologies.

The good news: In the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress mandated a new independent failsafe review.⁴ The Biden administration included a commitment to conduct this review in its Nuclear Posture Review with the results due this fall.⁵

The responsibility will fall to the next U.S. president to ensure that the review’s recommendations are implemented, to think creatively about enacting additional steps that might be needed and to institutionalize a process of future failsafe reviews to keep pace with evolving threats. Finally, the next president should make a major push to internationalize failsafe reviews in every nuclear-armed state. These reviews can be done without any agreements, treaties, or verification.

Each nation with nuclear arms has a responsibility to reduce the risk of nuclear blunders and can benefit from unilateral actions and similar actions taken by other nuclear powers. Leaders must give themselves every available tool to prevent a mistake from turning into a catastrophe.

ENDNOTES

1. Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn, “The Return of Doomsday,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 98, No. 5, (September/October 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2019-08-06/return-doomsday.

2. Euro-Atlantic Security Leadership Group, “Advancing Global Nuclear ‘Fail-Safe,’” 
February 2023, https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/EASLG-Statement_GNFS_FINAL-022723.pdf.

3. U.S. Department of Defense, “Final Report of the Federal Advisory Committee on Nuclear Risk Reduction (FARR),” n.d., https://archive.org/details/FinalReportoftheFederalAdvisory
CommitteeonNuclearFailsafeandRiskReductionFARR/mode/2up.

4. The 2022 National Defense Authorization Act states, “The Secretary of Defense shall provide for the conduct of an independent review of the safety, security, and reliability of covered nuclear systems. The Secretary shall ensure that such review is conducted in a manner similar to the review conducted by the Federal Advisory Committee on Nuclear Failsafe and Risk Reduction.” National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-81, 135 Stat. 1541 (2021).

5. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review states, “[A]s directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, [the Department of Defense] will commission an independent review of the safety, security, and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons, [nuclear command, control, and communications], and integrated tactical warning/attack assessment systems.” U.S. Department of Defense, “2022 Nuclear Posture Review,” October 27, 2022, p. 13, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF#page=49.

Steven Andreasen, the National Security Council’s staff director for defense policy and arms control from 1993 to 2001, teaches national security policy and crisis management at the Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota.

September 2024
By Jessica Sleight 

The next U.S. president will inherit a program to modernize each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad (intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarines, and bombers) to the tune of $1.7 trillion. The program is already marred by delays and overruns, including an 81 percent increase in the cost of the Sentinel ICBM and doubts over the ability of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to meet plutonium pit production goals. Additionally, China’s nuclear expansion and Russia’s growing reliance on nuclear coercion have fueled calls for an expanded U.S. nuclear force in the name of deterring two nuclear peer adversaries.

The next president will need to prioritize a rethinking of nuclear strategy that avoids fear-based, short-term thinking; guards against gatekeeping and steamrolling by the military-industrial complex; and takes a holistic approach to strategic deterrence. The decisions made over the next four years will shape the U.S. nuclear arsenal for decades to come.

For former President Donald Trump, the influence of the Heritage Foundation, crafters of Project 2025, cannot be overlooked. A new report by a Heritage expert calls for the nuclear modernization program to be “accelerated and expanded,” including a new road-mobile ICBM, additional nuclear-armed submarines, and new nuclear variants of hypersonic, anti-ship, and intermediate-range missiles.¹ It also calls for a small, accelerated nuclear strategy development process; the NNSA to be put on “wartime footing”; and forgoing some safety and environmental regulations in order to move quickly.

There is little justification for such steps, aside from an ambiguous “deterrence gap,” and no real consideration of budgetary impacts. Nevertheless, a second Trump administration likely would have little hesitancy with implementation, having previously introduced new capabilities, including a low-yield warhead for sea-based nuclear missiles. Following up with recommendations from the Heritage report would increase the bloated nuclear budget, threaten to replicate past harms to communities and the environment, further isolate nuclear decision-making, and place the United States squarely in a new nuclear arms race.

As a U.S. senator, Vice President Kamala Harris opposed the development of new low-yield nuclear warheads and encouraged broad interagency input into nuclear strategy development.² As vice president, Harris has not had much presence on these issues, indicating that her potential administration may follow the Biden administration’s lead.

Recently, Biden officials announced a new strategic review and consideration of options to increase deployed nuclear weapons and other adjustments to U.S. posture to address the new threat environment.³ This comes on the heels of the 2023 report produced by the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, which deemed the current modernization program “necessary but not sufficient.”⁴ Although the new strategic review is necessary, such efforts traditionally fall victim to momentum, tinkering at the margins of strategy development, undervaluing discussion of risks associated with U.S. action, and shutting down perspectives that may threaten current or future programs. It will be important for a potential Harris administration to stand against such practices.

The difference between a modernization program that ensures a credible nuclear deterrent and one that needlessly throws resources at new and additional weapons starts with nuclear strategy. There are additional options for a future administration to consider. For example, taking adversarial forces off the nuclear targeting list could alleviate a so-called need for new nuclear capabilities and decrease incentives for preemptive nuclear use.

It is imperative that the next president demand in-depth analysis of all options and refrain from deferring to those that conflate supremacy with security. Sober analysis of the assumptions, risks, budget implications, impacts on local communities and the environment, and non-nuclear strategic deterrence tools can save the United States from entering an unwinnable arms race.

ENDNOTES

1. Robert Peters, “A Nuclear Posture Review for the Next Administration,” Heritage Foundation Special Report, No. 287 (July 30, 2024), https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2024-07/SR287.pdf.

2. See Edward J. Markey et al., Letter to Rex W. Tillerson, James N. Mattis, and Rick Perry, July 19, 2017, https://www.markey.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017-07-19-Markey-letter-State-Energy-DoD-NuclearPostureReview.pdf; “Harris Statement on Vote Against NDAA,” VoteSmart, June 18, 2018, https://justfacts.votesmart.org/public-statement/1257967/harris-statement-on-vote-against-ndaa/.

3. “Nuclear Threats and the Role of Allies: A Conversation With Acting Assistant Secretary Vipin Narang,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, n.d., https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2024-08/240801_Narang_Conversation_Secretary.pdf?VersionId=ITu9zdugiGiBfBig7gUEICXnw9nYn9yR (transcript of August 1, 2024, event).

4. Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, “America’s Strategic Posture,” October 2023, https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/a/am/americas-strategic-posture/strategic-posture-commission-report.ashx.

Jessica Sleight is the Janne E. Nolan Nuclear Security Fellow at the Truman Center for National Policy. 

September 2024
By Lynn Rusten

For 32 years, under Republican and Democratic administrations, the United States has observed a moratorium on explosive nuclear weapons testing. U.S. leadership prompted other countries to cease 
testing and to complete negotiation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996.

Today, the national security, environmental, and humanitarian benefits of what has become a global moratorium are indisputable. The five states recognized as nuclear-weapon states under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) have been observing a moratorium on nuclear testing since 1996 (1990 for the Soviet Union/Russia, 1991 for the United Kingdom, 1992 for the United States, and 1996 for China and France).

Of the world’s nine nuclear-armed states, only North Korea has tested since 1998. Between 1945 and the mid-1990s, there were approximately 2,000 explosive nuclear tests worldwide, with more than 500 tests conducted aboveground or underwater. The devasting environmental and health consequences of these tests for private citizens and veterans persist to this day, including in the United States.¹

For these and other reasons, a resumption of nuclear testing would face widespread opposition in the United States and globally. Yet, some, including the former national security adviser to President Donald Trump, are suggesting that the United States do just that.²

Fortunately, there is an alternative. The United States relies on the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), which uses science-based assessments of nuclear weapons to ensure confidence in the safety, reliability, and effectiveness of its nuclear stockpile without the need for explosive nuclear testing. This program has proven remarkably successful.³ Every U.S. president since Bill Clinton has determined through the SSP that resuming explosive nuclear testing is scientifically and technically unnecessary, based on the assessment and certification by the directors of the national weapons laboratories.

A return to testing for any other reason, such as to develop new nuclear weapons or create negotiating leverage with Russia or China, would be extremely shortsighted. If the United States were to resume testing, a cascade of other states—Russia, perhaps China, and more—likely would follow suit, and proliferation pressures could grow on states that currently do not have nuclear weapons but might seek them.

The United States has the most to lose from a multilateral resumption of nuclear testing because of the high confidence in its stockpile provided by the SSP without testing. Other states may think they have more to gain by developing and testing new weapon types, but this too would be shortsighted.

A return to testing, particularly by any of the five NPT nuclear-weapon states, also risks unraveling the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. The commitment to conclude a test ban treaty was central to achieving the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. A return to nuclear testing would seriously erode the credibility of the nuclear-weapon states’ commitment to the NPT and their obligation to work toward nuclear disarmament. It also would exacerbate mounting frustrations among the non-nuclear-weapon states.

The next president should recognize the national security benefits of upholding the U.S. moratorium on explosive nuclear testing and encouraging all nuclear-armed states to maintain their moratoriums on nuclear testing. Beyond that, the president should advance the longer-term goal of U.S. ratification of the CTBT and work with other states to bring the treaty into force. The alternative, a resumption of nuclear testing in their backyards and beyond, will never be welcomed by the American people or the international community.

ENDNOTES

1. “Downwinders and the Radioactive West,” PBS, October 3, 2022, https://www.pbs.org/video/downwinders-and-the-radioactive-west-usugap/; Morgan Knibbe, “The Atomic Soldiers,” The New York Times, February 12, 2019.

2. Robert C. O’Brien, “The Return of Peace Through Strength: Making the Case for Trump’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 103, No. 4 (July/August 2024), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/return-peace-strength-trump-obrien.

3. “Managing an Arsenal Without Nuclear Testing: An Interview With Jill Hruby of the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 53, No. 10 (December 2023): 14-18.

Lynn Rusten is vice president for the Global Nuclear Policy Program at the Nuclear Threat Initiative. 

September 2024
By Amy J. Nelson

How the candidates should handle Russia and its nuclear modernization program centers on two important questions: What should U.S. nuclear policy be in light of sovereign states that break from the status quo, particularly with respect to the nuclear order? How can the United States best prepare for nuclear eventualities resulting from Russia’s modernization plan, given that Russia no longer is constrained by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and perhaps even the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)?

Russia’s aggressive actions over the past decade signal a departure from the major powers’ norms of behavior, which historically have included good-faith participation in international institutions and promotion of a rules-based order. Russia’s revisionist and risk-seeking tendencies include incursions into sovereign states, exerting undue influence over its neighbors, and claiming territory in states that flank NATO. Its behavior tracks an equally troubling course for nuclear norms. In the mid-2010s, Russia violated the INF Treaty, which banned all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, with its 9M729 missile. Russia denied the violation and refused to provide transparency into the nuclear weapons system or to modify it in any way. The United States eventually withdrew from the treaty because of Russian noncompliance.¹

In 2022, Russia suspended U.S. inspections under New START after the West imposed sanctions in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.² In February 2023, Russia escalated its noncompliance by suspending participation in New START more broadly, halting inspections and data sharing. It stated, however, that it would still respect the treaty’s limits. The United States responded by halting its own obligations under the treaty, including ceasing to share certain data on missile launches and to participate in inspections.³

Additionally, Russia has been accused of providing nuclear assistance and technologies to Iran and North Korea and blocking or weakening nuclear nonproliferation language in UN Security Council resolutions. Russia also has occupied the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine, using the facility as a nuclear shield, violating norms concerning the protection of civilian infrastructure in wartime and increasing the risk of a nuclear accident.⁴

Russia’s most risky violation of nuclear norms may be its threatened nuclear use. This has included statements that Russia might use nuclear weapons if its own security is threatened and signals that it might be willing to escalate its war in Ukraine from a conventional conflict to a nuclear one.⁵ The United States has condemned such rhetoric.⁶

Meanwhile, Russia continues its military modernization plans, including for its nuclear forces. Although aimed at optimizing conventional forces for quick campaigns and decisive outcomes, these plans also involve the development of novel strategic weapons, including nuclear-powered cruise missiles, nuclear-powered “torpedoes,” and a hypersonic boost-glide system. These destabilizing systems are designed to evade U.S. missile defenses and complicate traditional deterrence calculations.⁷

Such developments highlight shortcomings with and challenges for U.S. nuclear policy. Russia’s saber-rattling underscores the paradox of possessing nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes, which requires signaling to an adversary a willingness to use them, but then balking at threats associated with their use. Because disarmament is not feasible in the near term, the United States must work with the four other main nuclear-weapon states to redefine the obligation of responsible nuclear powers to uphold deterrence norms.

Further, Russia is pursuing its exotic nuclear systems with no formal Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in place, only an informal moratorium that is weakening. Russia signed the treaty in 1996, ratified it in 2000, then withdrew ratification in 2023. The United States signed the treaty in 1996 but never ratified. Ratifying the CTBT could prove an important tool in constraining Russia’s development of novel nuclear weapons.

ENDNOTES

1.  Shannon Bugos, “U.S. Completes INF Treaty Withdrawal,” Arms Control Today, September 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-09/news/us-completes-inf-treaty-withdrawal.

2.  Shannon Bugos, “Russia Further Pauses New START Inspections,” Arms Control Today, September 2022, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2022-09/news/russia-further-pauses-new-start-inspections.

3.  Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability, U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Countermeasures in Response to Russia’s Violations of the New START Treaty,” June 1, 2023, https://www.state.gov/u-s
-countermeasures-in-response-to-russias-violations-of-the-new-start-treaty/.

4.  Amy J. Nelson and Chinon Norteman, “What to Do About the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant,” Brookings: Order From Chaos blog, March 23, 2023, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-to-do-about-the-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant/.

5.  Jim Sciutto, “Exclusive: U.S. Prepared ‘Rigorously’ for Potential Russian Nuclear Strike in Ukraine in Late 2022, Officials Say,” CNN, March 9, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/09/politics/us-prepared-rigorously-potential-russian-nuclear-strike-ukraine/index.html.

6.  “Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan for the Arms Control Association (ACA) Annual Forum,” The White House, June 2, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/06/02/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-for-the-arms-control-association-aca-annual-forum/.

7.  Matthew Kroenig, Mark Massa, and Christian Trotti, “Russia’s Exotic Nuclear Weapons and Implications for the United States and NATO,” Atlantic Council Issue Brief, March 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Russias-Exotic-Nuclear-Weapons.pdf.

Amy J. Nelson is a visiting fellow in the International Security Program at New America and an adjunct faculty at Georgetown University.

September 2024
By James M. Acton

If states behaved like rational adults, China and the United States would sit down and try to negotiate an agreement to head off their emerging nuclear arms race. Unfortunately, that is not going to happen.

Beijing has made it very clear that it has “no interest” in discussing arms limitations.¹ If it changed its mind, it would become immediately apparent how little thought the United States has put into the question of what it would be prepared to give China in return for such limits. Although the next U.S. administration should think through this issue and articulate a vision for a mutually beneficial Chinese-U.S. arms control regime, even talks appear unlikely for the foreseeable future.

Fueled by a growing bipartisan consensus that the United States must augment its nuclear force in response to China’s nuclear buildup and the possibility that Beijing may forge some kind of alliance with Moscow, a Chinese-U.S. arms race now seems virtually certain.² Indeed, the last legal barrier to this outcome, the limits on long-range nuclear forces imposed by the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), will expire just more than one year into the next president’s term.

Yet, even if averting a new arms race will be extremely difficult, the next president still should try to do that by forcing the bureaucracy to consider its costs seriously. Specifically, the next president should require, as part of the next nuclear posture review, a realistic assessment of the feasibility of effective nuclear “counterforce” operations, the U.S. practice of targeting an opponent’s nuclear forces and command-and-control systems, compared to the alternatives.³

As far as is publicly known, although the Pentagon draws up plans to limit damage to the extent possible, it does not assess whether those plans would meet a presidentially determined threshold for effectiveness. Furthermore, the president should make clear that the alternatives to counterforce targeting should not involve aiming nuclear weapons at civilians. Instead, the United States could exclusively target conventional military forces and war-supporting industry, which have been on the U.S. target list for decades.⁴

Counterforce targeting is justified primarily as a way to enable the United States to limit the damage it would suffer in a nuclear war. It provides the intellectual ballast for why the United States should build up its nuclear arsenal in response to China; the more nuclear weapons Beijing has, the more Washington needs to destroy them preemptively. Thus, the congressionally mandated 2024 strategic posture commission calls on the Pentagon to modify its nuclear posture to “address the larger number of targets.”⁵

As part of the next nuclear posture review, the president should require the intelligence community and the Department of State to analyze how China and, for that matter, Russia would respond to a U.S. buildup. Would Beijing simply pursue its existing plans. or would it further augment its force requirements? After all, an arms race, which would be expensive and raise tensions, would be worth running only if it actually ended up increasing the security of the United States.

If China can ensure that U.S. counterforce attacks would not limit meaningfully the damage that the United States would suffer in a nuclear war, arms racing would be an exercise in pure futility. The next president should want to know what kind of arms race the country will be running before the spending bill that begins it is placed on the Resolute Desk.

ENDNOTES

1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Department of Arms Control and Disarmament Holds Briefing for International Arms Control and Disarmament Issues,” July 8, 2020, https://web.archive.org/web/20211014015131/https:/www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1795979.shtml.

2. Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, “America’s Strategic Posture,” October 2023, https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/a/am/americas-strategic-posture/strategic-posture-commission-report.ashx.

3. Charles L. Glaser, James M. Acton, and Steve Fetter, “The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Can Deter Both China and Russia: Why America Doesn’t Need More Missiles,” Foreign Affairs, October 5, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/us-nuclear-arsenal-can-deter-both-china-and-russia.

4. James Acton, “Two Myths About Counterforce,” War on the Rocks, November 6, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/11/two-myths-about-counterforce/.

5. Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, “America’s Strategic Posture,” p. viii.

James M. Acton is the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

September 2024
By Barbara Slavin

The next president’s ability to handle the simmering issue of Iran’s advancing nuclear program will be complicated by Tehran’s growing regional influence and the spiraling Gaza war, which was triggered by Hamas’ heinous October 7 attack on Israel and since has embroiled Iran and other Iran-backed militant groups in various ways.

Former President Donald Trump, who withdrew the United States in 2018 from the nuclear deal with Iran known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), has long insisted that he could negotiate a better deal. Like presidents before and after him, he also has said that he would never allow Iran to develop nuclear weapons and has advocated a policy of “maximum pressure.”¹ Informed of an alleged Iranian plot to kill him in retaliation for his order to assassinate Iran’s most important general, Qassem Soleimani, in 2020, Trump threatened “to wipe [Iran] off the face of the earth” if Tehran succeeded.²

Vice President Kamala Harris has not laid out views on Iran that differ significantly from the Biden administration approach. She has demonstrated more empathy than President Joe Biden for the Palestinians, however, and spoken of the intensifying Israeli-Hamas conflict as not a “binary” matter, suggesting a nuanced understanding of the region and support for diplomacy.³ In this, she has been helped by her national security adviser, Philip Gordon, who nearly two decades ago criticized the George W. Bush administration for “benign neglect” toward European-led nuclear talks with Iran and wrote a book opposing the Bush policy of forceful regime change in the Middle East.⁴

Despite the plethora of other crises likely to face the next president, deescalating tensions with Iran should remain a priority. The best approach would be ending the Gaza war in a durable manner. As long as that war continues, the danger of a wider conflagration remains, eroding any hope of reaching new understandings with Iran on any topic.

If relative peace could be established, the next administration should embrace a step-by-step approach that diminishes Iran’s incentive to move from threshold nuclear status to nuclear- weapon-possessor  state. As others have suggested, there should be a series of reciprocal concessions by the United States on sanctions and by Iran on transparency and monitoring.⁵

Iran just inaugurated a new president, who has stressed the need for sanctions relief to boost the country’s battered economy. He has assembled a team of advisers that includes key figures who negotiated the JCPOA. To stabilize the Iran file before leaving office, the lame-duck Biden administration should resume contacts with Iran via Oman and Iran’s UN mission in New York.

If Harris wins, the United States will be well positioned to continue such work. If Trump is elected, the prospects for diplomacy with Tehran are less certain but not impossible. As one former Trump adviser said recently, “As long as you call it the ‘Trump Plan of Action and not JCPOA 2.0,’ and tell Trump he could win a Nobel prize, diplomacy with Iran can proceed.”⁶

ENDNOTES

1. “Remarks by President Donald Trump on Iran,” January 8, 2020, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-iran/.

2. “Trump: ‘If Iran Assassinates Me, U.S. Must Wipe It Off the Face of the Earth,’” Agence France-Presse, July 26, 2024.

3. “Remarks by Vice President Harris Following Meeting With Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel,” The White House, July 25, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2024/07/25/remarks-by-vice-president-harris-following-meeting-with-prime-minister-benjamin-netanyahu-of-israel/.

4. Barbara Slavin, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S. and the Twisted Path to Confrontation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2007), p. 212; Philip H. Gordon, Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2020).

5. Kelsey Davenport, “Constraining Iran’s Nuclear Potential in the Absence of the JCPOA,” Arms Control Association Policy White Paper, July 2024, https://www.armscontrol.org/sites/default/files/files/PolicyPapers/ACA_PolicyPaper_Iran_2024.pdf.

6. Confidential comment to the author at a recent Track 1.5 meeting with Iranians.

Barbara Slavin is a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center and editor of Middle East Perspectives.

September 2024
By Jean H. Lee

Former President Donald Trump has claimed that he and Kim Jong Un “fell in love” and speculated that the North Korean leader misses him.¹  Vice President Kamala Harris has said she can promise one thing: she will not be exchanging love letters with Kim.²

Whoever occupies the White House in 2025, North Korea’s nuclear program will be exponentially more challenging. Over the past decade, Kim has been amassing the arsenal of his dreams, one that is bigger and more dangerous than ever, including solid-fueled ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.³

The problem extends beyond the Korean peninsula. North Korea allegedly is providing Russia with ammunition and ballistic missiles for the war in Ukraine,⁴ as well as Hamas with rockets for the conflict in Gaza,⁵ thus underlining the urgency of addressing a threat with global implications.

Now is the time for the U.S. presidential nominees to develop careful strategies on how to do that. These policies must anticipate Kim’s actions. They need to be tough yet creative, and the candidates need to be pragmatic.

Going into the presidency with no plan would cede the advantage to North Korea, which already is working to intensify tensions by provoking South Korea and the United States.⁶ The tensions are part of a bid to draw attention to North Korea in the leadup to the U.S. election, influencing its outcome and flagging North Korea as a foreign policy priority for the next administration.

Yet, Kim will not make it easy even if Trump becomes president. Any sustainable nuclear deal with North Korea will be more difficult than ever to negotiate. Not only is Pyongyang’s arsenal bigger, but the sanctions regime is weakened, and the stakes are even higher, for Kim and for the world.

The burgeoning relationship between Russia and North Korea also makes diplomacy more difficult. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Pyongyang in June yielded a military pact that gives North Korea the potential to acquire specialized technology that could enable further nuclear advancement under the guise of space exploration. A Russian veto at the UN Security Council has deprived the international community of a way to track North Korean sanctions violations.⁷

Meanwhile, Kim has worked to blunt the impact of sanctions and isolation by investing in cybertheft. North Korean hackers are accused of stealing more than $3 billion through cyberattacks in recent years.⁸ The North Koreans know they need a contingency plan to accommodate geopolitical shifts, including the possibility that Trump may lose. They are watching closely for opportunities, especially as they make tentative steps out of isolation. But that window might be brief.

Harris, if elected, should be swifter in introducing a revamped North Korea policy than President Joe Biden was in 2020. She should explore creative ways to provide North Korea with a face-saving way to return to nuclear negotiations. That means remaining aggressive against cybertheft while stepping up collaboration with allies, as well as China and maybe Russia, on shared proliferation concerns.⁹

The candidates need to show strength in the face of the North Korean threat, but they also need to display diplomatic dexterity in seizing the opportunity that a change of administration can offer. The alternative of four more years of unfettered North Korean nuclear development must be considered untenable.

ENDNOTES

1. Former President Donald Trump, speech at Republican National Convention, July 2024.

2. Council on Foreign Relations, “Candidates Answer CFR’s Questions,” n.d., https://www.cfr.org/election2020/candidates-answer-cfrs-questions.

3. See Arms Control Association, “Arms Control and Proliferation Profile,” June 2024, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms-control-and-proliferation-profile-north-korea.

4. U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “North Korea: Enabling Russian Missile Strikes Against Ukraine,” May 2024, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publications/DPRK_Russia_NK_Enabling_Russian_Missile_Strikes_Against_Ukraine.pdf.

5. Kim Soo-yeon, “S. Korea’s Spy Agency Confirms Hamas’ Suspected Use of N. Korean Weapons,” Yonhap News Agency, January 8, 2024.

6. Mike Valerio, Yoonjung Seo, and Brad Lendon, “North Korea Claims It’s Sending 250 New Missile Launchers Toward the South Korean Border,” CNN, August 5, 2024, https://www.cnn.com/2024/08/04/asia/north-korea-new-missile-launchers-border-intl-hnk.

7. George Lopez, “With Russia’s U.N. Veto, Where Do North Korea Sanctions Go From Here?” U.S. Institute of Peace, June 30, 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/07/russias-un-veto-where-do-north-korea-sanctions-go-here.

8. Edith M. Lederer, “UN Experts Investigating 58 Suspected North Korean Cyberattacks Valued at About $3 Billion,” February 9, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/un-experts-north-korea-cyberattacks-nuclear-sanctions-8e84703049dfb4fda011829115777c9e.

9. U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, “North Korea Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories,” n.d., https://www.cisa.gov/topics/cyber-threats-and-advisories/advanced-persistent-threats/north-korea (accessed August 11, 2024).

Jean H. Lee, a journalist who opened the AP news bureau in Pyongyang and reported from North Korea for nine years, co-hosts the Lazarus Heist podcast about North Korea for the BBC World Service.

September 2024
By James Goldgeier

Since the fall of 2021, when the Biden administration recognized that Russia was preparing to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, U.S. policy has been to help Ukraine and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government survive while avoiding a direct NATO-Russian war. U.S. President Joe Biden led the alliance and its global partners to provide robust military assistance, but he has been careful, as he has often said, not to “start World War III.”¹

Biden’s approach has been more cautious than many in the West would have preferred. This caution is particularly manifest in the U.S. constraints imposed on Ukraine with respect to attacking targets within Russian territory. To date, Biden’s policy has helped Ukraine stave off defeat. He also strengthened NATO by facilitating the accession of Finland and Sweden as alliance members.

Containment of Russian aggression will remain NATO’s core role in European security as long as the Kremlin pursues imperialist policies and refuses to live within its 1991 internationally recognized territorial boundaries. Whether the United States continues to lead that effort depends on who wins the presidency in November.

Unlike Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris, former President Donald Trump has been hostile to Ukraine and sympathetic to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Yet, even a U.S. president who wants to continue to assist Ukraine has to decide on two central questions: Is there a theory of victory, and in the absence of total victory, is there a strategy for how to produce an end to the war that preserves a sovereign, independent Ukraine?²

The 75th anniversary NATO summit declaration emphasized an allied commitment “to provide sustainable levels of security assistance for Ukraine to prevail.”³ It did not define “prevail,” which could mean anything from surviving as a sovereign state controlling the territory currently not occupied by Russia all the way up to recovering the occupied territory, including Crimea, in a victory over Russian armed forces. The latter would require much greater assistance than NATO is willing to provide and, given Ukrainian manpower constraints, might be too much to achieve even if greater assistance were forthcoming.

If the goal is to support Ukraine’s ability to achieve sovereignty and security over its territory that is not occupied by Russia, without giving up hope of eventually liberating those occupied lands, then some strategy for how to end the fighting is needed. There could be negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, but the gulf between the sides is large. Putin does not seem interested in offering any concessions and appears to believe he can grind down Ukrainian opposition through a war of attrition.⁴ Zelenskyy would have to gain political support for accepting Russian occupation of nearly 20 percent of Ukrainian territory.⁵

Whether the current fighting stops through mutual exhaustion, a ceasefire, or a peace deal, NATO should invite Ukraine to join the alliance. Without the backing of NATO treaty Article 5, Ukraine will not deter future Russian attacks credibly, and thus endless instability will persist along whatever border emerges between Russia and Ukraine.

ENDNOTES

1.  Aaron Blake, “Why Biden and the White House Keep Talking About World War III,” 
The Washington Post, March 17, 2022.

2.  Eugene Rumer, “NATO’s Biggest Test Since the Cold War Is Still Ahead,” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, July 9, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2024/07/nato-summit-ukraine-russia-war?lang=en.

3.  NATO, “Washington Summit Declaration,” July 10, 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm.

4.  Veronika Melkozerova, “Ukraine Wants Peace but Can’t Trust Russia,” Politico, June 13, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/volodymyr-zelenskyy-war-in-ukraine-summit-on-peace-negotiations-russia-vladimir-putin/. For a different view that opportunities for a deal existed previously and could again, see Samuel Charap and Sergey Radchenko, “The Talks That Could Have Ended the War in Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, April 16, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/talks-could-have-ended-war-ukraine.

5.  Nicole Gonik and Eric Ciaramella, “War and Peace: Ukraine’s Impossible Choices,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 11, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/06/ukraine-public-opinion-russia-war?lang=en.

James Goldgeier is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution and a professor of international relations at American University. 

September 2024

Weeks before the United States elects a new president, the global nuclear security environment could hardly be more precarious. Russia continues to raise the specter of escalating its war on Ukraine to nuclear use; Iran and North Korea persist in advancing their nuclear programs; China is moving to steadily expand its nuclear arsenal; the United States and Russia have costly modernization programs underway; and the war in Gaza threatens to explode into a region-wide catastrophe entangling Iran and nuclear-armed Israel, among other countries. Meanwhile, Russia and China are refusing to enter arms control talks with the United States, new countries are raising the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons and decades of arms control treaties are unraveling. The situation has driven Rafael Mariano Grossi, director-general of the International Atomic Agency, to warn in an interview with The Financial Times on August 26 that the global nonproliferation regime is under greater pressure than at any time since the end of the Cold War. The U.S. presidential election campaign has not engaged publicly on most of these issues in any serious way despite the fact that whichever candidate wins will, once inaugurated, immediately inherit the sole authority to launch U.S. nuclear weapons. In an effort to foster debate and prudent decision-making, Arms Control Today asked a group of respected nuclear experts to consider the challenges facing the president ahead.—CAROL GIACOMO

• Avoiding Nuclear War Through Nuclear Failsafe 
  By Steven Andreasen
• How to Spend $1 Trillion for the Military?
  By Jessica Sleight
• Preventing a Resumption of Nuclear Testing
  By Lynn Rusten  
• Russia and Its Nuclear Modernization Plans
  By Amy J. Nelson
• Dealing With a China That Will Not Talk
  By James M. Acton
• Gaza Tensions Complicate Iranian Nuclear Threat
  By Barbara Slavin
• Grappling With North Korea’s Expanding Arsenal
  By Jean H. Lee
• How Will the Russian War in Ukraine End?
  By James Goldgeier

September 2024
By Oliver Meier

Getting a grip on the problem of shorter- and medium-range missiles in Europe is an urgent problem. Russia is using ground-, sea-, and air-launched shorter- and medium-range missiles in its war against Ukraine and wreaking havoc on the civilian infrastructure. For example, on July 8, Russia hit a children’s hospital in Kyiv with an air-launched Kh-101 medium-range missile.

Russian shorter- and medium-range missiles also directly threaten NATO members. It is particularly worrisome that all Russian medium-range missile systems are dual capable, meaning that the missiles can be fitted with conventional or nuclear warheads.

The militaries of some NATO members have air- and sea-based medium-range missiles, but they do not have any ground-based systems that can hold at risk targets deep inside Russia. This is about to change. On the sidelines of the NATO summit in Washington on July 9-11, Germany and the United States announced that the United States will “begin episodic deployments of the long-range fires capabilities of its Multi-Domain Task Force in Germany in 2026, as part of planning for enduring stationing of these capabilities in the future.”¹ These deployments would include the shorter-range Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), as well as medium-range Tomahawk cruise missiles and Dark Eagle hypersonic missiles, the latter of which are still under development. The stationing would mark the first time since 1991 that Germany will host ground-based missiles that can target Russia directly.

In response to the announcement, Moscow hinted at the possible deployment of additional medium-range missiles, which could be nuclear tipped. Thus, Europe is standing at the brink of an arms race with ground-based medium-range missiles. These missiles, because of the short flight time and the difficulties of detecting attacks with the hypersonic variant, are particularly destabilizing. All of this makes it important to pursue arms control now and to tackle the threat posed by medium-range missiles before Russia and NATO deploy such systems in larger numbers.

Patchy Explanations

In Germany, the agreement to deploy medium-range missiles came under fire from different directions. Some observers were surprised that Berlin and Washington had announced the decision bilaterally and not through NATO, especially while leaders of the 32 alliance members were gathering nearby for the organization’s 75th anniversary summit.

The backstory around the deployment remains hazy. Germany initially said that Washington “offered” the new systems to Berlin, which accepted that proposal. By contrast, the Süddeutsche Zeitung later reported that Berlin quietly had pressed the Biden administration for more than a year to deploy the new missiles in Germany. According to the newspaper, the U.S. Department of Defense initially hesitated because it preferred to deploy such assets in the Asia-Pacific region, but eventually relented.2

The bilateral nature of the agreement also is surprising because Germany historically has avoided being singled out in NATO and has been critical of other allies for making bilateral agreements with the United States outside of the alliance. The stationing of the missiles is a NATO affair because it affects the security of other allies. In a July 27 interview, Jasper Wieck, political director at the German Ministry of Defense, emphasized that these weapons would “protect not only Germany.” All missiles would be mobile and although they would be stationed in Germany during peacetime, could be deployed “outside of Germany’s borders,” Wieck explained.³ This possibility of moving the missiles to other NATO countries alone should necessitate a joint alliance approach.

Such allied coordination also would be important because of the risks associated with the deployment. Tomahawk cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles are counterforce weapons. In war, they likely would be used to destroy high-value targets, including Russian missile launchers deep in the Russian hinterland. Even though the U.S. weapons would carry only conventional warheads, they could fuel a crisis dynamic that could lead to nuclear weapons use. The chair of the Social Democrat Party in the German Parliament, Rolf Mützenich, has warned that the “danger of an unintentional military escalation is considerable” if the U.S. weapons were deployed.⁴

The Arms Control Void

Lawmakers in Berlin criticized the agreement because it lacked any reference to arms control. Ever since suspicions arose that Russia was violating the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty by developing and deploying the ground-based, mobile SSC-8/9M729 cruise missile, NATO has urged Russia to come clean on the violation and eliminate the system in question. The alliance had hoped to save the accord, which prohibited both sides from deploying ground-based missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Concerns about Russian ground-based missiles persisted after the Trump administration withdrew from the treaty in 2019. They intensified against the background of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and subsequent use of medium-range missiles.

In the NATO summit communiqué, allies stated that “arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation have made and should continue to make an essential contribution to achieving the alliance’s security objectives and to ensuring strategic stability and our collective security.”⁵ As critics in Berlin pointed out, however, the German-U.S. agreement did not even attempt to use the forthcoming missile deployment as a lever to bring Russia back to the negotiating table.

A week after the summit, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz acknowledged that arms control gap, saying that “even if it is not on the agenda, we should not lose sight of the arms control issue.”⁶ Arms control options to avert a missile arms race likely will be among the issues discussed in the German Bundestag and possibly other European parliaments. Nils Schmid, foreign policy spokesperson for the Social Democrats, argued in an August 11 interview that ”it is crucial that we combine the announcement of the deployment decision with offers to Russia on arms control.” Schmid said this moment is an “opportunity to test, whether the Kremlin is willing to talk about medium-range weapons.” He cautioned that “over the last years, that willingness did not exist,” but announced that Germany “will try it now anyway.”⁷

It is not too late to combine the deployment decision with an arms control proposition that, if Russia seriously engages, could delay permanent deployment of medium-range missiles, limit their numbers, and, should political conditions allow, open a path to reductions of the most destabilizing systems. Even an unsuccessful arms control initiative could have benefits by making the NATO-Russian deterrence relationship less risky if it increases NATO cohesion, improves empathy between Russia and NATO, and delineates those issues where both sides see arms control as feasible and desirable. To prepare for such an opening, it is necessary to think through the rationale behind such an approach, the obstacles that would have to be overcome, and the shape of the arms control proposal.

Arms Control Hurdles

Any thinking about an arms control proposal on shorter-range (500-1,000 kilometers) and medium-range (1,000-3,000 kilometers) missiles has to account for Russia’s refusal to engage on this issue. As long as Russia continues to wage war against Ukraine, nuclear arms control seems impossible. Since early 2023, Russia has rejected any nuclear arms control talks with the United States, including a new framework to succeed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which expires in 2026, arguing that the West would first have to change its “anti-Russian attitudes.” This policy of leveraging arms control in an attempt to weaken Western support for Ukraine has been unsuccessful, but Russia is sticking to its position.

Meanwhile, NATO is divided over arms control with Russia. In June 2023, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated the U.S. “willingness to engage in bilateral arms control discussions with Russia and with China without preconditions.”⁸ One year later, Pranay Vaddi, another senior National Security Council official, did not repeat the “without preconditions” formula, but still affirmed that the Biden administration remains “ready to pursue critical arms control measures” in order “to reduce nuclear threats to the United States and our allies and partners by limiting and shaping adversary nuclear forces.”⁹

Some central European countries, including the Baltic states, take a different stance and argue that Russia cannot be a trusted now or in the future. For example, former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, who recently became the European Union’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, has made it clear that she thinks that a dialogue with Russia is futile.¹⁰

There is also the problem of path dependency. Any route to arms control likely would have to overcome pushback from those in the political, military, and private sectors who have vested interests in new deployments. The new missiles are going to be part of the U.S. Army’s Multi-Domain Task Forces, which combine several military assets to improve the U.S. ability to respond quickly to conflicts in key regions overseas and to neutralize an adversary’s anti-access and area-denial capabilities. The task force headquarters in Germany was activated in 2021, but the initial planning was for long-range missile components to remain in the United States.¹¹ The lack of an arms control dimension to the announcement regarding Germany may reflect U.S. reluctance to include the missile components of their brand-new task force in any future arms control talks.

Separate from the German-U.S. bilateral agreement, France, Germany, Italy, and Poland on July 11 signed a letter of intent committing them to joint production of their own medium-range missiles under the European Long-Range Strike Approach. This program is likely aiming at production of a European ground-launched cruise missile with a range of 1,000-2,000 kilometers.¹² The number of missiles to be produced, the specific configuration of partners and projects, and the main goals have not been announced, but Wieck argued that NATO should seek “parity” with Russia. This would imply that several hundred medium-range missiles could be built, given that Russia probably now has around 500 ground-based medium-range missiles. Wieck argued that production of large numbers would be desirable to bring down unit costs. This logic of defense economies at scale would further complicate any arms control initiative.

Beyond these political and military problems, regulating medium-range missiles is an inherently difficult problem. Any future talks would need to tackle several difficult and controversial questions. How would an agreement account for the different conventional and nuclear payloads? Should an agreement cover only ground-based missiles or also air- and sea-based shorter- and medium-range missiles? What missile ranges should be covered? What geographic area of deployment would be relevant?

Commonsense Arms Control

NATO does not need to resolve these and other difficult challenges before formally proposing that Russia engage on arms control on the subject of shorter- and medium-range missiles. Premature discussions on a NATO arms control proposal would expose competing priorities among the allies and could be seen as putting NATO unity at risk. Attempting to achieve allied consensus on the scope and shape of a future agreement even before arms control talks have been proposed to the Kremlin would be akin to throwing out the baby with the bath water. That is because arms control opponents easily could misuse such allied discussions to derail any attempt to engage Russia. In 2010-2012, when political conditions were more favorable and NATO tried to agree internally on a list of reciprocal confidence-building measures on nonstrategic nuclear weapons to discuss with Russia, opponents of such dialogue prevented any meaningful outcome by invoking NATO’s consensus principle and thus shorter-circuiting any chance for engagement.¹³

Some fuzziness on NATO’s terms of engagement could be positive if both sides want to maintain flexibility in future talks. In addition, allied discussions concerning a prospective arms control proposal could improve NATO cohesion if it helps member governments such as Germany, where arms control is seen as an integral part of a sound and sustainable security policy, to make the case for the U.S. missile deployments.

Europeans generally support arms control. A recent study found that popular support for arms control in Germany and the Netherlands had dropped substantially after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but also underscored “the continuous popularity of arms control among the European publics.”¹⁴

Arms control engagement offers an important mechanism for understanding an adversary’s motivations and redlines better, particularly at a time when direct channels of communication are scarce. Russia’s recent threats of possible nuclear use make it more important than ever that the West understand Russian signals and that the Kremlin correctly interpret NATO intentions and moves.

Deterrence will be the name of the game between NATO and Russia for the foreseeable future, but alliance members can influence the level of nuclear risks in that deterrence relationship. Discussions involving arms control could help the allies build a new consensus on what kind of deterrence relationship NATO wants to have with Russia and how best to use arms control to ensure that deterrence is more stable. For the alliance, an arms control proposal is a way to prepare the ground for when political conditions improve for nuclear risk reduction and a cooperative regulation of weapons.

For some time, the Kremlin has pursued a policy based on increasing nuclear risks, but its security calculus could change. Economic considerations, a preference to avoid risky arms races, and various international pressures could come into play once the war against Ukraine is over or possibly earlier if there is a change in the Russian political leadership.

A NATO decision to agree now on a blueprint for preventing a new, dangerous arms race would be consistent with the alliance’s 60-plus-year-old proven policy of combining defense and deterrence with pragmatic arms control proposals. The alternative of deploying new missiles without any arms control framework is simply too dangerous to contemplate.

A Phased Approach

Given Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, its dismal arms control record, and nationalist-populist leadership, any NATO arms control proposal would have to be based on at least four principles, which should be stated up front.

First, any agreement would have to be verifiable. Given the high level of distrust between NATO and Russia, allies are not going to take any Russian statements on current or future actions at face value. This hurdle is not insurmountable, even if Moscow now rejects the notion that arms control can build trust.¹⁵ Trust facilitates arms control, but it is not a necessary precondition for agreements, particularly if they do not require substantial and irreversible changes to one side’s defense posture.

Second, any agreement would need to be reciprocal. There is no political space between NATO and Russia for unilateral goodwill gestures now or in the foreseeable future. In principle, however, both sides accept reciprocity. NATO already included this principle in its 2010 strategic concept, and Moscow has a long tradition of demanding reciprocity as a necessary element of any arms control agreement.

Third, an arms control proposal needs to be sincere. Any suggestion for a dialogue would have to provide incentives for Russia to engage and must meet NATO interests. Such a proposal should address NATO concerns about Russia’s dual-capable missiles and offer a way to prevent permanent new deployments of U.S. and future European medium-range missiles that Russia sees as destabilizing.

Fourth, NATO consensus must be sought. This is important because the Kremlin is very likely to exploit and amplify different interests among the allies. At the same time, those fundamentally opposed to any talks with Russia must not be allowed to prevent progress, given that NATO continues to see arms control as a useful instrument. Allies such as Hungary that are close to Russia should not be able to unduly influence NATO policy on this issue. A practical way to meet that requirement and still make progress would be an arrangement similar to how the INF Treaty was negotiated in the 1980s: Washington would talk directly with Moscow, but would consult closely with allies in the relevant NATO bodies. The phased deployment of new medium-range missiles in Germany offers an opportunity to test the arms control waters with Russia. NATO could propose a step-by-step approach, starting with small, tangible measures to stabilize the situation followed by more ambitious steps if both sides deem implementation of previous steps successful. Such an approach would guard against Russia playing NATO along. It would provide an opportunity for the alliance to finesse its position on arms control as talks develop.

NATO could outline a three-stage arms control proposal to Russia. The first phase could last through the “episodic deployments” of U.S. missiles beginning in 2026 and would be open-ended as long as no date for the permanent deployment of the new missiles has been announced.

During this initial period, both sides would agree to a freeze on permanent deployments. This could build on Russia’s October 2020 proposal, which suggested verification measures to go with a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles. There is some confusion regarding whether the Kremlin still considers this proposal valid, but NATO could seek clarification, including on any transparency or monitoring provisions.¹⁶

In return, NATO would offer to postpone the permanent deployment of ground-based medium-range missiles in Europe as long as Russia does not increase the number of its ground-based missiles deployed east of the Urals. Russia would need to be sufficiently transparent on its shorter- and medium-range missile holdings to facilitate monitoring of the freeze. In return, the alliance could propose some transparency around temporary deployments in Germany.

Even without on-site verification measures, NATO and Russia should be able to detect significant violations and movement of missiles, particularly if nuclear armed, through remote monitoring and national technical means. There is precedent for this in that the United States so far has been able to certify Russian compliance with core limits of New START even though Russia has stopped implementing the treaty’s verification provisions.

NATO also could outline a second phase involving reciprocal, limited withdrawal or disarmament of ground-based missiles. This would have to be based on faithful implementation of the first phase of an agreement over several years. A gradual reduction of the most destabilizing systems could then be combined with upper limits for sea- and air-based medium-range systems. The focus in this stage could be on those Russian 9M729 nuclear-capable medium-range systems about which NATO has been worried and tried to get eliminated for a long time.

The general goal of this phase would be to reduce or eliminate Russia’s numerical superiority of land-based missiles in Europe.¹⁷ In return, the alliance could offer temporal or quantitative limitations on the episodic deployments of SM-6s, Tomahawk cruise missiles, and Dark Eagle hypersonic weapons, which Moscow likely sees as destabilizing. In this case, some level of on-site verification probably would be required, although novel verification and remote monitoring technologies might make it possible to reduce their intrusiveness.

Putting the European Long-Range Strike Approach on hold during this second stage likely would be difficult but not without precedent. After all, Moscow and Washington agreed in 1987 to cover modern shorter- and intermediate-range systems under the INF Treaty and subsequently eliminated 1,846 Soviet and 846 U.S. missiles in these categories.

Finally, in a third phase, NATO could outline to Russia an even more ambitious agenda to be pursued if both sides have implemented previous steps successfully. Such a menu of possible steps could include options that are out of reach today, but might provide both sides with further incentives for engagement.

Thus, an agreement on the nondeployment of nuclear-armed missiles could put “the N back into INF,” as NATO’s former Deputy Secretary-General Rose Gottemoeller has argued.¹⁸ One option, to be pursued alone or in combination with other steps, could be talks on banning all intermediate-range missiles of a certain range, whether land or air based. Such a ban would be immensely stabilizing and of interest to Russia, which has been concerned about Western weapons that threaten its nuclear second-strike capabilities.

An alternative approach would be to declare certain regions “missile free,” especially in Europe. Recent research has demonstrated that it is easier to verify the absence of certain types of nuclear weapons in geographically well-defined areas than to monitor upper limits.¹⁹

Any of these proposals could be called into question because they initially would sidestep important details, but that cannot be an excuse to do nothing. For now, NATO’s main task is to demonstrate its willingness to avert a new missile arms race, provided Russia engages in serious arms control discussions. Implementation would have to wait until Russia has stopped its aggression against Ukraine and both sides are willing to consider ways to make the postwar security situation less risky. Until then, NATO should demonstrate that it can unite around using arms control to improve strategic stability. The alternative of relying only on deterrence is simply too perilous.

ENDNOTES

1. The White House, “Joint Statement From United States and Germany on Long-Range Fires Deployment in Germany,” July 10, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/07/10/joint-statement-from-united-states-and-germany-on-long-range-fires-deployment-in-germany/.

2. Daniel Brössler et al., “Raketen für den Frieden,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, July 26, 2024, https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/scholz-biden-raketen-russland-deutschland-lux.KnYokHExRoyS398cG3zYBQ.

3. Bundeswehr, “Nachgefragt - U.S.-Mittelstreckenraketen in Deutschland I Bundeswehr,” YouTube, July 26, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DKdJncyyxYY.

4. Victor Goury-Laffont, “U.S. Missiles Are Welcome in Germany, Foreign Minister Says,” Politico, July 21, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/us-missiles-welcome-germany-foreign-minister-annalena-baerbock/.

5. NATO, “Washington Summit Declaration,” July 10, 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227678.htm.

6. “Olaf Scholz im Interview mit t-online,” Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, July 18, 2024, https://olaf-scholz.spd.de/aktuelles/detail/news/olaf-scholz-im-interview-mit-t-online/18/07/2024.

7. Simon Kaminski, “U.S.-Mittelstreckenwaffen für Deutschland: Nötiger Schutz oder gefährliche Aufrüstung?” Augsburger Allgemeine, August 11, 2024, https://www.augsburger-allgemeine.de/politik/mittelstreckenraketen-in-deutschland-schutz-oder-aufruestung-102958227.

8. “Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan for the Arms Control Association (ACA) Annual Forum,” The White House, June 2, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/06/02/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-for-the-arms-control-association-aca-annual-forum/.

9. Pranay Vaddi, “Adapting the U.S. Approach to Arms Control and Nonproliferation to a 
New Era,” Arms Control Association, June 7,2024, https://www.armscontrol.org/2024AnnualMeeting/Pranay-Vaddi-remarks.

10. Mared Gwyn Jones, “Kaja Kallas: The Russia Hawk Poised to Become the EU’s Top Diplomat,” Euronews, June 26, 2024, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/06/26/kaja-kallas-the-russia-hawk-poised-to-become-the-eus-top-diplomat.

11. Andrew Feickert, “The Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF),” CRS in Focus, IF11797, July 10, 2024, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11797.

12. Timothy Wright and Douglas Barrie, “The Return of Long-Range U.S. Missiles to Europe,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, August 7, 2024, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2024/08/the-return-of-long-range-us-missiles-to-europe/.

13. Oliver Meier and Simon Lunn, “Trapped: NATO, Russia, and the Problem of Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 44, No. 1 (January/February 2014): 18-24.

14. Michal Onderco, Michal Smetana, and Tom W. Etienne, “Hawks in the Making? European Public Views on Nuclear Weapons Post-Ukraine,” Global Policy, Vol. 14, No. 2 (May 2023): 305-317.

15. “Russian Ambassador Doesn’t See Chance for Moscow-Washington Ties to Improve Just Yet,” Tass, August 5, 2024, https://tass.com/politics/1825583.

16. “Russia’s Putin Vows ‘Mirror Measures’ in Response to U.S. Missiles in Germany,” Associated Press, July 28, 2024.

17. Simon Lunn and Nicholas Williams, “The Challenge of Russian Dual-Capable Missiles,” European Leadership Network, July 2024, https://europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/The-challenge-of-Russian-dual-capable-missiles-2.pdf.

18. Rose Gottemoeller, “Rethinking Nuclear Arms Control,” The Washington Quarterly 43, no. 3 (January 1, 2020):139–59, 148.

19. Pavel Podvig and Javier Serrat, “Lock Them Up: Zero-Deployed Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” UN Institute for Disarmament Research, 2017, http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/lock-them-up-zero-deployed-non-strategic-nuclear-weapons-in-europe-en-675.pdf.

Oliver Meier is policy and research director at the European Leadership Network.