Remarks by Thomas Countryman, Chair of the Arms Control Association board of director, at the 2024 Annual Meeting.                         

June 7, 2024

For a number of reasons, many of which have been discussed today, this is a very difficult, dangerous, pivotal moment in the long journey to address the dangers posed by nuclear weapons.  So, what kind of a talk can I give you today?

Well, this is not a graveside eulogy.  Reports of the death of arms control are greatly—and deliberately—exaggerated.

This is not a religious service, where the pastor tells the faithful—in gory detail—what awaits the sinners who are not in church.

It’s also not a cable news show, where pundits bemoan the perilous state of the world (or of an election) and ask plaintively “Won’t somebody do something?”

I think it is a little more like a football coach’s locker room pep talk, fine-tuning the game plan for the second half.

So today, I will offer some thoughts not just on what we want from the possessors of nuclear weapons—what they must do—but also what this community and others need to do to effect a change in direction.

This moment is dangerous NOT because world governments have forgotten the risk of nuclear war, but because too many world leaders no longer see it as the overriding existential risk.  After the Cuban crisis of 1962, two superpowers recognized that if nuclear destruction were not averted, no other national goals mattered.

Today is different.  At least Moscow views the risk of nuclear war as secondary to the risk of failing in its goal of territorial expansion.  And this drives reactive decisions in other capitals.

As Secretary-General Guterres noted in his remarks, the primary responsibility for addressing nuclear risk continues to lie with the owners of the two supersized arsenals, the United States and the Russian Federation.  The refusal of Russia to engage in any kind of bilateral discussion is not just irresponsible, it is inconsistent with a history in which arms control dialogue continued, even at a time when one side’s weapons were killing the other side’s soldiers, in Vietnam or Afghanistan.

Just as unfortunately, in response to Moscow’s refusal, many officials in this city shrug their shoulders and say, “We tried arms control; now let’s rebuild our arsenal.”  That ignores a central lesson of the fifty years in which arms control negotiations improved America’s national security. That lesson is that the indispensable ingredient is American creativity, American persistence, American leadership.  Note that leadership does not mean American dominance or American control of a process—it simply means tireless determination.  At this moment, it means refusing to take "no" as the final answer.

As Pavel Podvig writes in the May issue of Arms Control Today, there exists still both a conceptual basis and a historical basis for Washington and Moscow to reach a successor agreement to New START those addresses both states’ national security interests.  As he notes, the political change that would make negotiation possible “may seem distant today, but it may be closer than it appears.”

There still exists a place where Russian and American officials speak to each other on nuclear issues: the P5 process.  At a moment when bilateral dialogue is impossible, the P5 dialogue should assume greater importance.  In a private dialogue, new steps—small or large—can be explored without the posturing and the point-scoring that marks the public debate in Geneva, or New York, or Vienna.

China will soon assume, for one year, the chairmanship of this process. Recall that last year Presidents Biden and Xi agreed that proliferation concerns was one topic on which the two sides need to cooperate. It is my deep hope that China will show some ambition, equal to the importance that it claims in world affairs, that it will increase the frequency of P5 meetings, elevate their level, and expand their agenda. They don't need to focus on reaching consensus among the five on every issue; they do need to focus on listening and on mutual understanding.

As I noted, the primary responsibility for progress lies with Washington and Moscow.  France, and China, and the United Kingdom are not off the hook, however. They do not have the option of sitting on the sideline, waiting for the U.S. and Russia.  They must recognize—and respond to—the overwhelming view of non-weapon states that the P5 are failing to meet—and even consciously ignoring—their obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Let me say a little bit about what we should expect and demand from the non-nuclear weapon states.

I am impressed by the way the non-weapon states parties to the NPT have stepped up in recent years. They correctly concluded that arms control initiatives are urgently needed—so urgently that the initiative should not rest only with the P5.  One result was the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, an admirable if imperfect document.

Non-weapon states now need to step up higher if we are to preserve the essential norms of global security. As the late Michael Krepon described them, these are the norms against use or threats of use, against nuclear testing, and against the transfer and proliferation of nuclear weapons.                         

So, let's be specific: when President Putin and his acolytes make nuclear threats, there is no audible pushback from the non-nuclear world, only a deafening silence. Saying out loud that such threats—whether subtle or explicit—are unacceptable to the international community is NOT taking sides on the war in Ukraine; it is simply living up to the principles that non-nuclear states proclaim in the sound-proof chambers in Geneva and New York.  Mr. Putin does not expect anyone to endorse his methods, but because he does not hear anyone outside of NATO criticizing his threatening words, he will continue to use them.

Let's be more specific: the level of the speaker matters. When I was an assistant secretary of state, I took the statements of my counterparts to represent accurately the positions of their governments.  but presidents and prime ministers do not listen to their own assistant secretaries and assistant ministers as closely as they listen to other presidents and prime ministers.  If arms control concerns are not conveyed at a higher level directly to the leaders of the P5 states, those leaders will conclude—correctly, perhaps—that nuclear issues are of lower importance to the rest of the world. Putin is not the only leader who needs to hear directly from other world leaders, but his is the right address to begin.

Non-weapon states also have a duty to preserve the nonproliferation pillar of the NPT. At a moment when several states speak openly about leaving the Treaty or developing their own nuclear arsenal, non-weapon states need to speak with one voice; they should declare, jointly and publicly, that any such move would make it impossible to continue normal political and economic relations with a new weapons-possessing state.

All of these are ideas that we have to convey loudly to the world’s governments, and since we are here in Washington, we need to start with the United States government.  Our public statements need to support the White House when it says or does the right thing.  The best example was the statement Jake Sullivan made here one year ago when he said the nuclear arsenal was sufficient for deterrence for the foreseeable future and declared that the U.S. wanted bilateral dialogue with Russia without preconditions.  (Sadly, at least a few people in the U.S. government seemed to believe that Mr. Sullivan’s offer has been overtaken by events and is now no longer relevant.)

At the same time, we have to be vocal about backward steps and persistent in convincing this government and others that there are alternatives to a new nuclear arms race.  Our work to reduce and eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons must be informed by the catastrophic humanitarian impacts of nuclear war, but our dialogue with policymakers must also recognize the validity of genuine national security concerns, made more and more obvious by threatening rhetoric from nuclear-possessing states.  We can critique the flaws in deterrence theory and postures, but we can’t simply dismiss deterrence as a concept without offering realistic alternatives sufficient to provide security.

The Arms Control Association, this tiny but mighty team, with great analytic contributions from so many of you in this room, has worked to analyze and address the questions that should be discussed among governments.  Can our national security be better protected by concepts of sufficiency rather than symmetry?  Are we tied to ratified treaties as the best form of agreements, or can we find new forms (which sometimes means old forms) of bilateral and multilateral agreements, focusing as much on behavior and transparency as on numbers? How do we achieve the goal that Presidents Xi and Biden agreed to pursue, maintaining human control of nuclear decisions?

It is also important as we push back against those who argue that arms control is dead or dying that we do one thing better than government spokesmen or diplomats: we have to speak with an air of civility, even when those who disagree with us are condescending or insulting.  As in diplomacy, anyone in or out of government who is trying to solve the same vexing issues should be seen as a potential partner, not an eternal adversary.

Our target audience is broad, perhaps impossibly broad for the size of our community.  In Washington, as in other countries, it comprises political and military leadership and workers—thousands of dedicated specialists—as well as the Congress.  We need new ways to appeal to public opinion and to mobilize public engagement, and that door is more open at this moment when more citizens are aware of nuclear risk than at any time in the last forty, or perhaps sixty years.

We cannot avoid the awareness that elections matter.  Since the 1950s, every U.S. president—except one—has acknowledged that arms control IS national security; that it can be win-win, not zero-sum; that speaking to an adversary is a sign of confidence, not of weakness; that insisting on absolute American sovereignty or American dominance in arsenals is a recipe for tragic conflict.  The results here on November 5 will affect the strategy of our efforts, but not their urgency.

In particular, we have to look to younger people, the generation from which I draw my daily dose of optimism.  Are we doing enough to raise their consciousness, to equip them with the concepts and analytic tools to address the dilemmas that my generation is leaving to them? I was pulled kicking and screaming into the 21st Century, and I don’t know how to get meaningful news and analysis from TikTok or other social media.  But millions of young people do, and we have to meet them where they are, where they read, where they watch, where they think.

In one way, I am nostalgic for the 1980s, when millions of people in the U.S. and abroad mobilized in support of saner responsible nuclear policies and arms control diplomacy to halt and reverse the arms race; their activism convinced national leaders that sensible national security pays political dividends.  We live in a different time that requires new alliances and strategies. I am heartened—but confess also envious—when I see millions of people, primarily young people, demanding responsible action on climate change, the other existential threat we face.  I recommend an article in Arms Control Today last November by Ambassador Kenneth Brill.  He notes there should be, there must be a common cause between climate change activists demanding a secure and prosperous future and nuclear activists who are simply demanding a future.

It’s a long list of tasks and it can be discouraging.  Setbacks have been frequent, and advances have only been at the margins.  The issues are many and our numbers are not. As fishermen traditionally pray: “The sea is so wide, Lord, and my boat is so small.”  The total annual budget for all of the organizations working in this field—in the U.S. and elsewhere—is less than governments spend on nuclear weapons in half a day.

As John Kennedy said about going to the moon: “We choose to do this not because it is easy, but because it is hard, because the goal will organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because the challenge is one we are unwilling to postpone”.

I still believe—despite all evidence to the contrary—that humans are better at solving problems than at creating problems. In September 1962, nobody would have predicted that within a few months, Moscow and Washington would initiate decades of world-changing negotiations, making both nations safer.

Today, we both need to work to prevent the breakdown moment when guardrails against nuclear catastrophe evaporate, and be prepared to seize the breakthrough moment, when we can advance again in the direction of the security of a world free of nuclear weapons.  Your contributions now—whether in time, or money, or analysis, or activism—will be crucial as we head toward that moment.

Now I realize that this was more like a church sermon than a locker room pep talk. I can tell because I can see a couple of people nodding off. I want to simply thank you for your attention and above all thank you—tomorrow—for your commitment.

God bless.

Opening remarks from Executive Director Daryl G. Kimball to the 2024 ACA Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C.  

June 7, 2024  

Good day everyone and welcome to the National Press Club and the 2024 to Arms Control Association Annual Meeting!

I am Daryl Kimball, executive director, and we are delighted to have so many of you here in the room and online for today's event which is titled: "Moving Back from the Nuclear Brink."

We are indeed, on the brink, or at least closer to it that we have been in decades.

The three states with the largest nuclear arsenals—Russia, the United States, and China—are on the precipice of an unconstrained era of dangerous nuclear competition. Billions of dollars are being spent by the world’s nine nuclear weapons possessor states to maintain and upgrade their deadly arsenals.

Key nuclear arms control and nonproliferation agreements that have helped to ease tensions and reduce the nuclear danger are either gone, are being ignored, or are in jeopardy.

The last remaining treaty constraining U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons will expire in about 600 days ...

... and so far, the Kremlin also rejected the U.S. offer—announced at by Jake Sullivan at ACA 2023 Annual Meeting—to engage in talks on a new U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control framework before New START expires.

Russia has also de-ratified the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, deployed sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Belarus, and is alleged to be developing a nuclear-armed space weapon. Meanwhile, as Putin's deadly and illegal assault on Ukraine continues, he continues to threaten possible nuclear weapons in response to Western efforts to help Ukraine defend itself.

Citing a China's nuclear modernization efforts, some members of the U.S. nuclear weapons establishment are proposing to spend even more U.S. tax dollars to expand the U.S. nuclear arsenal for the first time in decades.

There are other stresses the broader arms control and nonproliferation system.

Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza following the Oct. 7 terror attack has produced a monumental humanitarian catastrophe that U.S. arms transfer policies and laws were supposed to help prevent but haven't.

And, in the absence of the agreed limits on its nuclear program and tougher international monitoring through the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, Iranian leaders have expanded their capacity to produce weapons-grade nuclear material and restricted IAEA access to key sites.

As the risk of an Iranian nuclear bomb has grown, Saudi Arabia has redoubled its campaign to acquire sensitive nuclear technologies from Washington.

Our meeting today will explore these issues in depth with the help of some of the most experienced, best-informed experts from outside of government and some from inside the government, including our first keynote speaker.

We hope today's discussions will provide some new insights and ideas about how to best address these massive challenges.

Let me close this brief introduction to the day by underscoring the fact that if we are going to be successful in moving back from the nuclear brink, it will take all of us and much more to make it happen.

ACA is a medium-sized organization, with just a dozen full time staffers, a volunteer Board, working with a very modest budget that is supported by a very small number of generous foundations and our loyal members.

As the MacArthur Foundation once said about us, ACA is an "exceptional organization that effectively addresses pressing national and international challenges with an impact disproportionate to its small size.'

But we cannot succeed by ourselves. In my 35 years as a professional in the arms control and disarmament field, its clear that progress depends on:

• Smart, collaborative, sustained civil society campaigns, involving multiple organizations, large and small, local, and national, to engage and inform and mobilize the public to put pressure on key policy makers to take responsible action.
• It takes bold presidential leadership and constructive Congressional action.
• It requires responsible behavior and initiative from other governments.
• We also need the active and principled leadership of the UN and the UN Secretary-General, who we will hear from later this morning.
• and it takes some good luck and more.

Together, over the years, we've all helped to establish and defend the norms against nuclear weapons use, threats of use, nuclear testing, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear weapons buildups, and to advance progress on nuclear disarmament.

But as the civil rights and nuclear disarmament champion Coretta Scott King once said (in 1993):

“The struggle is a never-ending process. Freedom is never really won. You earn it and win it in every generation.”

At this time, the collective efforts of our generation are more important than ever.

Closing Remarks from Executive Director Daryl G. Kimball to the 2024 ACA Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C.  

What a great discussion on a difficult topic that bears our urgent attention. Thank you, Rachel, and to each of the other panelists we just heard from.

I just want to close today's event with a few words of thanks to those who helped make this all possible.

First, thanks to our ACA team who have been working for several weeks and through the day today to make this event run smoothly. ACA is fortunate to have not only a very professional and capable staff team, but they are passionate about their work, and they are a joy to work with. Let's give them all a generous round of applause.

I want to give a particular shout out to our dedicated COO Kathy Crandall Robinson, our Director of Communications and Operations Tony Fleming, our program and operations assistant Libby Flatoff, and to Allen Harris, our stellar production and design editor, who along with our chief editor Carol Giacomo, is responsible for making Arms Control Today look so sharp.

For those of you watching online, you have our videographer Brendan Kowanoski to thank for his work today.

ACA's appreciation to all of our speakers and expert panelists. We heard from some of the very best in our field today. Thanks for all you do.

Finally, I want to recognize all of this year's generous annual meeting sponsors and everyone who joined us here today in person, and online. Your financial support, your interest, and your engagement is essential to our ability to pull this off and to pursue ACA programs and initiatives throughout the year.

You'll see the list of more than 40 meeting sponsors in the back of your program book and on our online 2024 Annual Meeting page, which will soon host an archived recording of today's proceedings.

I want to give a shout out to the essential grant-making foundations in the peace and security field who generously and loyally provide much of the financial support we need to sustain our work. These include our friends at:

• the Prospect Hill Foundation
• the Ploughshares Fund
• the Carnegie Corporation of New York
• the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and
• the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, which has for many years been a major supporter of our work and that of many others in the nuclear risk reduction and nuclear policy field, but will, beginning next year, shift their attention to other urgent issues.

Yet, our work to address the threats posed by the world's most dangerous weapons must go on.

As Secretary General Guterres said, "the world is on a knife's edge," and as Tom Countryman reminded us, its our time to act to try to tackle the big challenges ahead and to make a difference.

That makes your engagement, your own efforts, and your financial support for ACA's work more important than ever.

[It will take persistence, it will take passion, it will require considered risks, it will require a more engaged and informed public, it will take new ideas and new voices, it will take all of us all working together.]

Thanks for joining us today.

We are adjourned.