President Donald Trump announced July 22 that the United States and Saudi Arabia finalized a civil nuclear cooperation agreement. Although Trump has yet to submit the deal to Congress for review, as required by the Atomic Energy Act, media reports and the administration’s descriptions of the agreement suggest the deal could provide Saudi Arabia with proliferation-sensitive technologies without adequate international verification. In negotiating this deal, the Trump administration has rejected key nonproliferation standards for U.S. nuclear cooperation that have long-standing bipartisan support and are internationally recognized best practices.
The following are answers to frequently asked questions about the U.S-Saudi nuclear agreement, including what is known about the agreement, and the requirements of Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. The questions also begin to explore the possible regional and international implications of this deal for nonproliferation efforts.
This FAQ will be updated as more information about the agreement becomes public.
What is the status of Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program?
Saudi Arabia has outlined an ambitious plan for civil nuclear energy generation. Currently, Saudi Arabia has one completed, but not yet fueled, nuclear research reactor built by Argentina. Saudi Arabia’s nuclear development entity, known as the Nuclear Holding Company, has solicited bids from four companies, Rosatom (Russia), China National Nuclear Corporation, EDF (France) and KEPCO (South Korea) to build its first two power reactors (1.4GWe each) at the Duwaiheen site near the border with Qatar and the UAE.
In addition to the power reactors, Saudi Arabia’s energy minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman stated in 2023 that Riyadh plans to develop the “entire nuclear fuel cycle,” including “the production of yellowcake, low-enriched uranium and the manufacturing of nuclear fuel both for our national use and of course, for export.”
Consistent with its fuel cycle plans, Saudi Arabia has conducted some exploration of its domestic uranium resources in cooperation with China National Nuclear Corporation. Although Riyadh appears optimistic about mining the ore, Uranium 2022: Resources, Production, and Demand, a joint publication of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency, reported that uranium ore deposits in Saudi Arabia would be “severely uneconomic” to mine and that other deposits are only “inferred.”
Saudi Arabia, as a non-nuclear weapon state party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), can legally pursue a civil nuclear program, including uranium enrichment, under the treaty’s required International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Riyadh, however, has been slow to cooperate with the IAEA on safeguards issues in the past. Riyadh initially had an outdated safeguards agreement, known as the Small Quantities Protocol, designed for states with little to no nuclear materials. Despite repeated requests from the IAEA, Riyadh was slow to update its Small Quantities Protocol or sign a comprehensive safeguards agreement. In 2024, Riyadh finally negotiated a comprehensive safeguards agreement.
What has Saudi Arabia said about nuclear weapons?
Saudi Arabia is a member of the NPT and legally obligated to refrain from developing or acquiring nuclear weapons. However, in a March 2018 interview with CBS, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said that “Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb, but without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.”
Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir reiterated the comment in a June 2018 interview with CNN, saying that “if Iran acquires a nuclear capability, we will do everything we can to do the same.” In 2022 at the World Policy Conference in Abu Dhabi, al-Jubeir’s successor, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, made a similar remark, saying that “[i]f Iran gets an operational nuclear weapon, all bets are off.”
Saudi Arabia does not currently have fissile material production capabilities (the U.S.-Saudi deal may provide that technology) and there is no evidence that Saudi Arabia has violated its NPT obligations and engaged in illicit nuclear activites. Riyadh does appear to be expanding its ballistic missile capabilities, providing a possible delivery system for a nuclear warhead. Saudi Arabia possesses ballistic missiles, purchased from China, that would be technically capable of delivering a nuclear warhead. Previous U.S. intelligence assessments and open-source imagery analysis also suggest that Saudi Arabia is manufacturing ballistic missiles with Chinese support, according to media reports.
What is the status of the US-Saudi Nuclear Cooperation Agreement?
President Donald Trump announced on July 22 that the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a nuclear cooperation agreement. The deal was signed eight months after Trump and bin Salman announced a framework for nuclear cooperation, which stated that U.S. companies will be Saudi Arabia’s “civil nuclear cooperation partners of choice.” A nuclear cooperation agreement, or 123 agreement, is necessary before certain technologies or materials are transferred to a foreign country.
The United States and Saudi Arabia were engaged in talks on nuclear cooperation for more than a decade before Trump announced the deal. Previous efforts to reach an agreement stalled over Saudi Arabia’s refusal to adopt the more intrusive IAEA safeguards arrangement, known as the Additional Protocol, and forgo enrichment and reprocessing, technologies that can be used for producing nuclear fuel as well as the fissile material for a bomb.
The Trump administration dropped these conditions in the final 123 agreement, even though there was broad bipartisan support for including them in any nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia. For instance, while he was in the Senate, Secretary of State Marco Rubio authored a bill with Senator Ed Markey (D-Mass.) that would have required Riyadh to have an Additional Protocol to its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in place and agree to forgo enrichment and reprocessing as part of any nuclear deal. That legislation did not pass, but Congress did pass a section in the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act that essentially requires the Additional Protocol for new nuclear cooperation agreements. If the deal does not include the Additional Protocol, the president must issue a report to Congress justifying the decision not to require it. (Details on the report on Saudi Arabia are below)
Although Secretary of Energy Chris Wright signed the Section 123 agreement for nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia on July 23, the day after Trump announced the deal, the Atomic Energy Act requires Congress to review the deal before it enters into force. (See below for questions about the review process.) Trump has yet to submit the text and the required Nonproliferation Assessment to Congress, so it is unclear exactly what the agreement includes, but a Congressionally required report on the safeguards included in the deal submitted last year and media reports provide some key details about the agreement, which are discussed below. (This FAQs will be updated once the agreement is submitted and publicly available).
Does the nuclear cooperation agreement require Saudi Arabia to adopt the IAEA Additional Protocol?
No. The Trump administration confirmed in a November 2025 report to Congress that the proposed 123 agreement would not require Saudi Arabia to adhere to the IAEA’s Additional Protocol. The Additional Protocol is a more intrusive safeguards agreement that gives inspectors expanded access to sites and information about a country’s nuclear program and additional tools for following up on allegations of undeclared activities.
According to that report, which was required under a provision in the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act for any 123 agreement that did not include the additional protocol, the agreement will instead put in place a bilateral safeguards agreement that covers facilities where cooperative nuclear activities take place.
The decision to forgo the Additional Protocol reverses long-standing U.S. efforts to universalize the Additional Protocol and bipartisan support for requiring states to have an Additional Protocol in place as part of any 123 agreement.
What is the Additional Protocol and why is it important?
The Additional Protocol is not legally required by the NPT or a legal requirement for U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements, but it is the internationally accepted best practice for safeguards. According to the IAEA, which implements Additional Protocols, the agreement “significantly increases the IAEA’s ability to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in States with comprehensive safeguards agreements.” The United States was instrumental in pushing for the Additional Protocol’s negotiation in the 1990s and advocating for its universalization
Finalized in 1997, the Additional Protocol was designed to address gaps in the NPT-required comprehensive safeguards agreements. The NPT requires non-nuclear weapon states to implement a safeguards agreement with the IAEA to provide assurance that civilian nuclear materials and technologies are not being diverted for use in a prohibited nuclear weapons program.
However, revelations about the illicit nuclear weapons development efforts of Iraq and North Korea in the early 1990s demonstrated that standard NPT-required safeguards were insufficient, particularly for detecting undeclared nuclear activities. The Additional Protocol includes several key mechanisms for strengthening IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs), including by:
- Expanding the sites that the IAEA can inspect. Inspections under a CSA apply only to sites where nuclear material is present. The Additional Protocol allows the IAEA to inspect sites that support a nuclear facility, but where no material is present (such as research and development facilities, centrifuge production sites and uranium mines, as uranium ore is not considered nuclear material).
- Requiring a state to provide additional information about its program to the agency, including imports.
- Providing the IAEA with additional tools, such as wide-area environmental sampling, to investigate and assess if a state has conducted illicit nuclear activities.
- How does the bilateral arrangement compare to the Additional Protocol? How will the two safeguards arrangements work together?
According to the IAEA, 144 states and Euratom have ratified the Additional Protocol. The United States and the four other NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states have a version of the Additional Protocol in place for their civil nuclear programs. Iran implemented an Additional Protocol as part of the 2015 nuclear deal, but suspended it in 2021, three years after Trump withdrew from the agreement despite Iran’s compliance.
Has the United States entered into nuclear cooperation agreements without the Additional Protocol in the past?
Yes, but it is rare. There is long-standing bipartisan support in Congress for requiring the Additional Protocol as a condition of 123 agreements.
India, a nuclear-armed state that is not a member of the NPT, did not have an Additional Protocol in place when it negotiated a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States in 2006. India later negotiated and signed an Additional Protocol, but it is criticized as a weak version of 1997 Model Additional Protocol. The United States also reached 123 agreements with Argentina and Brazil that did not require the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply. These agreements were concluded shortly after the Additional Protocol was negotiated. Argentina and Brazil also already had an established bilateral accounting regime in addition to their IAEA safeguards agreements. Even so, the United States continued to encourage both countries to adopt Additional Protocols.
Furthermore, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a multilateral initiative comprised of 48 states (including the United States) that sell nuclear technology, adopted the Additional Protocol (or a regional safeguards arrangement) as a condition of supplying enrichment and reprocessing technology in 2011. Specifically, the updated guidelines say that suppliers should authorize enrichment and reprocessing exports only if the recipient has brought into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol or, “pending this, [the recipient] is implementing appropriate safeguards agreements in cooperation with the IAEA, including a regional accounting and control arrangement for nuclear materials, as approved by the IAEA Board of Governors.”
The NSG guidelines—which the United States pushed for—underscore that enrichment and reprocessing technology transfers are discouraged and that the Additional Protocol is widely supported as a condition of supplying enrichment and reprocessing technology.
What is the bilateral safeguards agreement that the United States will pursue instead of the AP?
The Trump administration has provided few details regarding the bilateral safeguards agreement that it claims is a sufficient replacement for the Additional Protocol. In its report to Congress regarding the decision not to require the Additional Protocol, the Trump administration said the agreement will employ “additional safeguards and verification measures to the most proliferation-sensitive areas of potential nuclear cooperation,” including enrichment, conversion, fuel fabrication and reprocessing. The bilateral agreement will include the “necessary tools to verify the absence of diversion of nuclear material, equipment, components, and technology from covered sites.”
The report said the bilateral safeguards agreement will involve the IAEA and must be in effect before any materials and technologies are transferred to Saudi Arabia.
The report does not describe how the bilateral safeguards agreement compares to the rigor of the Additional Protocol. Nor does it make clear the relationship between the bilateral agreement and the IAEA’s implementation of Saudi Arabia’s comprehensive safeguards agreement or what might happen in the bilateral safeguards arrangement and the IAEA reach different conclusions about the status of Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program or materials. Congress should press the administration for answers to those questions and whether the bilateral agreement could undermine the IAEA’s mandate.
The description of the bilateral safeguards agreement suggests that certain sites relevant to Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program may not be covered by either the bilateral agreement or the CSA, raising concerns about how these locations will be monitored and whether the IAEA will be able to access them if it has concerns or evidence of undeclared activities. If Saudi Arabia, for instance, mines uranium without U.S. assistance, it appears that neither the IAEA safeguards agreement nor the bilateral safeguards agreement would apply to that site.
Furthermore, there is a risk that the bilateral safeguards will not be sufficiently rigorous if both countries have an economic incentive to continue cooperation. Essentially, it is a U.S.-Saudi arrangement inspecting U.S.-Saudi sites. This differs from the Brazil-Argentina arrangement, for instance, where both sides have an interest in intrusive bilateral verification to ensure the other party was not engaged in illicit nuclear activities due to historical mistrust. The U.S.-Saudi bilateral agreement would be, essentially, a form of self-inspection.
Does the United States typically pursue bilateral safeguards agreements in its nuclear cooperation agreements?
Not anymore. The United States did negotiate bilateral safeguards agreements as part of its early nuclear cooperation agreements, reached before the negotiation of the NPT. Once the NPT entered into force in 1970, however, its requirement for all non-nuclear weapon states to negotiate safeguards agreements with the IAEA largely replaced previous safeguards agreements. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 formalized the inclusion of full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of nuclear cooperation in Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. So, the United States does not have recent experience conducting bilateral safeguards. Furthermore, even in the pre-NPT nuclear cooperation agreements, the United States has never negotiated a bilateral safeguards agreement to cover a uranium enrichment facility.
Will the 123 agreement allow Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium and/or reprocess plutonium?
Yes. The Trump administration’s report on the AP, as well as subsequent media coverage, suggests that the United States will support Saudi Arabia’s acquisition of uranium enrichment technology and possibly supply enrichment technology. According to reporting, the United States and Saudi Arabia will study the commercial viability of enrichment for two years. If that study supports enrichment, the United States will construct a black box enrichment facility in Saudi Arabia. The black box approach is designed to prevent Riyadh from having direct access to the centrifuge technology used for uranium enrichment, but it is unclear how effective this strategy will be.
If the study does not support a U.S.-constructed enrichment facility, then, after ten years, Saudi Arabia could pursue an indigenous uranium enrichment program or work with another supplier state to develop an enrichment program. Presumably, that program would not be subject to the bilateral U.S.-Saudi safeguards agreement or the Additional Protocol, unless a different foreign supplier insisted upon its inclusion.
The United States has long opposed the spread of enrichment because the same technology that refines uranium for nuclear fuel can also be used to produce fissile material for a bomb by increasing the enrichment level. Enrichment concentrates the fissionable isotope uranium-235. Uranium enriched to less than 5 percent U-235 is generally used for nuclear power reactors. Uranium enriched to 90 percent is considered weapons-grade, although nuclear warheads can be built with uranium enriched to less than that level.
How would a “black box” enrichment program work? What are the risks?
As described by media reports, the United States would construct and operate an enrichment facility in Saudi Arabia. Arguments in favor of this approach contend that the arrangement will prevent Saudi Arabia from directly accessing the enrichment technology.
Even if Saudi personnel do not have direct access to the facility, however, the so-called black box approach does not guarantee that the United States can prevent the Saudis from gaining access to or knowledge of the enrichment technology. There is a risk that information will leak during the course of cooperative activities (the Saudi nuclear regulator, for instance, may require certain information about the facility) or in the course of providing information necessary for Saudi Arabia’s declaration to the IAEA regarding the enrichment facility.
It is also unclear how the United States would ensure physical security of the facility and protection of its technology. In the event of rupture of the U.S.-Saudi relationship, Saudi Arabia could attempt to seize and/or nationalize the facility. Similarly, instability in Saudi Arabia or conflict in the region could put the facility in jeopardy. If the enrichment facility were damaged in conflict, it could also be challenging to prevent Saudi Arabia from accessing the damaged site.
Members of Congress need to press the administration for answers on how it is planning for these contingencies.
What uranium enrichment technology would the United States transfer to Saudi Arabia?
It is unclear what U.S. entity would provide the uranium enrichment technology to Saudi Arabia if the 2-year study supports the black box approach. The United States has very limited civil uranium enrichment capabilities and already faces challenges meeting its own enriched uranium supply needs. Supply challenges may increase in the coming years, as U.S. law will prevent importing Russian fuel after 2028. The U.S. government has provided grants to several companies to start or increase uranium enrichment production, but diverting some of that capacity to Saudi Arabia could compound uranium supply issues in the United States.
Will US companies benefit from nuclear commerce with Saudi Arabia if the 123 agreement is in effect?
Not necessarily. Trump has tried to sell the deal as beneficial for reinvigorating U.S. nuclear commerce. In November 2025, Saudi Arabia stated that U.S. companies would be Saudi Arabia’s nuclear suppliers of choice. However, finalizing the 123 agreement does not guarantee U.S. nuclear trade to Saudi Arabia.
During the debate over the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement, the Bush administration made similar arguments: the agreement would lead to U.S. reactor sales to India. But since that deal was finalized in 2008, no U.S. company has sold a reactor to India.
If the United States does not provide enrichment technology to Saudi Arabia will Russia or China?
A common argument in favor of the U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal suggests that if the United States does not assist Saudi Arabia in developing its nuclear program, Russia or China will, and with fewer safeguards in place. But it is unclear if this scenario would play out.
Russia and China, like the United States, should abide by the Nuclear Suppliers Group condition that a state have an Additional Protocol, or other regional mechanism in place, before the transfer of enrichment or reprocessing technology. Both states have refrained from supplying Saudi Arabia with this technology, despite preexisting nuclear cooperation arrangements.
Furthermore, both states may see value in refraining from supporting Saudi Arabia’s fuel production plans, particularly if Saudi Arabia builds Russian or Chinese-supplied reactors. Russia’s state-owned Rosatom, for example, prefers to sign reactor contracts that include lifetime fuel supply because of the economic benefits.
What is section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act?
Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act (AEA) establishes the conditions and outlines the process for major nuclear cooperation between the United States and other countries. In order for a country to enter into such an agreement with the United States, that country must commit to a set of nine nonproliferation criteria. These criteria state that:
- Nuclear material and equipment transferred to the country must remain under safeguards in perpetuity.
- Non-nuclear-weapon states partners must have full-scope IAEA safeguards.
- Transferred nuclear material, equipment, and technology will not have any role in nuclear weapons development or any other military purpose (except in the case of cooperation with nuclear-weapon states).
- In the event that a non-nuclear-weapon state partner detonates a nuclear device using nuclear material produced or violates an IAEA safeguards agreement, the United States has the right to demand the return of any transfers.
- U.S. consent is required for any re-transfer of material or classified data.
- Nuclear material transferred or produced as a result of the agreement is subject to adequate physical security.
- U.S. prior consent rights to the enrichment or reprocessing of nuclear material obtained or produced as a result of the agreement.
- Prior U.S. approval is required for highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium obtained or produced as a result of the agreement. An agreement permitting enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) using U.S. provided material requires separate negotiation.
- The above nonproliferation criteria apply to all nuclear material or nuclear facilities produced or constructed as a result of the agreement.
The President may exempt a proposed agreement from any of the above criteria upon determination that maintaining such a criteria would be “seriously prejudicial to the achievement of U.S. non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense of the United States.” Exempted 123 agreements require a congressional joint resolution approving the agreement for it to become law. The Saudi agreement will be a non-exempt agreement and will not require an affirmative vote of approval.
For the U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement with India, a non-NPT member state without full scope safeguards, Congress passed the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act in 2006. The Hyde amendment has been criticized for undermining U.S. and international counterproliferation efforts, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
What is the Congressional review process?
The Atomic Energy Act requires that nuclear cooperation agreements are submitted to Congress for a review period comprised of 90 days of continuous session. That period is broken up into a 30-day review by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee, followed by a 60-day review by the entire Congress.
If the 90 days elapse without Congressional action, a non-exempt nuclear agreement enters into effect. If Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval, the agreement cannot enter into effect (unless it is vetoed and the veto is not overridden). A resolution of approval or disapproval is privileged and thus subject to expedited consideration.
A joint resolution of approval can simply support the deal or it could also include conditions for any export of U.S. technology under the 123 agreement, such as a requirement that Saudi Arabia join the Additional Protocol.
In considering the Saudi agreement, Congress should consider pressing the administration to answer questions about the implications of abandoning the Additional Protocol and the risks of providing enrichment technology to a country that has openly threatened to build nuclear weapons. Members of Congress should also consider the broader ramifications of abandoning these key nonproliferation conditions. Questions could include:
- What are the implications for IAEA access to sites not covered by a comprehensive safeguards agreement or the bilateral agreement?
- What happens if there is a discrepancy between IAEA assessments and US-Saudi safeguards assessments?
- How will the United States continue to support universalization of the Additional Protocol?
- Is the Trump administration concerned about the precedent set by negotiating a bespoke safeguards arrangement?
- Is the Trump administration concerned that the Saudi deal could make it more challenging to negotiate an effective nuclear deal with Iran?
- What is the makeup of the group that will study the question of enrichment and how will it make its decision?
- What limits will be placed on any enrichment that takes place in Saudi Arabia?
- How does the US plan to protect the facility?
- Is the United States concerned that Saudi Arabia will leverage its threat to weaponize once there is domestic enrichment in the country for additional US security guarantees?
- Is the United States concerned that other countries will seek similar deals (with the US or others) giving additional states access to key technologies necessary to produce fissile material for a bomb?
What is the Gold Standard?
The Gold Standard refers to a nuclear cooperation agreement that requires a state to permanently forgo uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. The United Arab Emirates negotiated such an agreement with the United States in 2009.
When members of Congress refer to the Gold Standard, they often reference the prohibition on enrichment and reprocessing as well as a requirement that the state implement an Additional Protocol.
The U.S. push to include the Additional Protocol in all nuclear cooperation agreements, however, predates the Gold Standard, and continued as U.S. policy even after administrations began to move away from the Gold Standard.
After the United States and Saudi Arabia announced a framework for nuclear cooperation in November 2025, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Jim Risch (R-Idaho) and Ranking Member Jeanne Shaheen (D-HN) both stated that any 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia should adhere to the Gold Standard.
Has the United States supported the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies as part of its past nuclear cooperation agreements?
No. The United States has never directly transferred enrichment or reprocessing technology to a non-nuclear-weapon state or provided it via a ‘black box’ agreement because of the proliferation risks. Transferring uranium enrichment technology to Saudi Arabia would break the long-standing U.S. opposition to the spread of those technologies as part of its nonproliferation strategy.
The United States has, on a limited basis, provided what Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act refers to as “advanced consent.” This provides pre-approval for a state to alter nuclear materials provided by the United States or produced by technologies provided by the United States. The United States, for example, in its 123 agreement with Japan, provided advanced consent for Japanese reprocessing of spent fuel for its civilian nuclear power program.
The United States has also negotiated 123 agreements that allow states to conduct indigenously designed enrichment and reprocessing activities under certain limits. The 123 agreement with South Korea, for instance, created a pathway to South Korea’s enrichment of uranium to less than 20 percent, if agreed upon by a high level US-South Korean commission. (Trump reversed long-standing U.S. opposition to South Korean enrichment in November 2025 and the United States is now negotiating with South Korea regarding the scope of a uranium enrichment program, but it will not include the transfer of U.S. technology.)
How might the US-Saudi nuclear agreement affect negotiations with Iran?
Given Iran’s history of illicit nuclear activities and expected uncertainties in accounting for Iran’s nuclear material after U.S. and Israeli strikes, the additional protocol should be a key priority in any US-Iran nuclear deal. But Iran has long argued that it does not want to be singled out for restrictions beyond what other non-nuclear weapon states are subject to. If the United States is not requiring Saudi Arabia to implement an Additional Protocol, it will likely be harder to press Iran to accept the Additional Protocol.
Similarly, Trump has suggested he is pushing for a 15-20 year suspension on uranium enrichment in Iran as part of any deal. Iran may be less likely to accept a longer moratorium if Saudi Arabia may have uranium enrichment technology on its soil after two years.
Furthermore, the deal may disincentivize states from pursuing regional solutions to meet fuel cycle needs and reduce proliferation risks. If states pursue bespoke arrangements with different conditions with the United States, there is less incentive and basis for future collaboration.
Will other states seek similar 123 agreements with the United States or other supplier states?
There is a risk that the Saudi deal will incentivize other states to seek agreements that allow them to develop technologies relevant to weapons under the guise of cooperative civil activities and without more intrusive safeguards. This is particularly worrisome now as additional states are debating the merits of acquiring nuclear deterrents and the value of remaining in the NPT.
The UAE, for instance, could renegotiate its Gold Standard agreement with the United States under a clause that allows for revisiting the deal if another state in the region gets more favorable terms.
There is also a risk that other supplier states may provide similar proliferation-risky deals to partners or allies. If the United States makes an exception for Saudi Arabia and provides enrichment technology without an Additional Protocol, other states may similarly seek to flout the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines for their partners and allies, increasing the risk that the proliferation-sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies are more widely available.
The United States is risking a race to the bottom.—KELSEY DAVENPORT, Director for Nonproliferation Policy