January/February 2026
By Samantha Neakrase 

The four biennial Nuclear Security Summits, convening more than 50 heads of government between 2010 and 2016, delivered high-level attention on nuclear terrorism, drove concrete actions to prevent nuclear theft and sabotage, and strengthened the global nuclear security architecture. Yet momentum has waned amid competing priorities, worsened geopolitical dynamics, and weakened multilateral mechanisms. Hopes that new and existing institutions and initiatives would sustain momentum have proven difficult to realize.

Today’s persistent and evolving nuclear security risks—combined with an increasingly complex threat environment—demand renewed attention. Reversing the imbalance between nuclear risks and declining attention will require a more inclusive and flexible strategy that reflects many different priorities, elevates underrepresented voices, and builds new partnerships and coalitions. The 2027 Review Conference of the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (A/CPPNM) and global expansion of nuclear energy offer near-term opportunities to regain focus but will require rethinking traditional approaches.

Summits Drive Progress

The summits drove major progress: Fifteen countries eliminated civilian stocks of weapons-usable nuclear materials, global inventories declined, and many countries strengthened regulations and facility security.¹ The summits also advanced best-practice sharing and peer review, and accelerated treaty ratifications, including by non-summit countries, leading to entry into force of the A/CPPNM, the only international agreement requiring physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. The summits also produced 11 joint statements (“gift baskets”) in which participants committed to action on key issues such as transport security, minimizing stocks and use of highly enriched uranium (HEU), and insider threats, several of which were later formalized as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) information circulars for wider adoption.²

After the final summit, states hoped that new mechanisms would sustain momentum and address emerging challenges. The summit action plans outlined how international organizations such as the IAEA could carry forward elements of the summits’ agenda. The Nuclear Security Contact Group was created to enable senior officials to continue driving progress without convening heads of government. The new series of IAEA international conferences on nuclear security (ICONS) in 2013, 2016, 2020, and 2024 were intended as regular venues for countries to highlight progress, make commitments, set priorities, and share expertise among practitioners. Following the final 2016 summit push to bring the A/CPPNM into force, countries envisioned periodic review conferences, triggered by the treaty’s entry into force, as a forum to monitor implementation, identify gaps, advance improvements, and address emerging threats.

Declining Attention to Nuclear Security

Although many countries continued improving nuclear security after the summits, the 2020 and 2023 editions of the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Nuclear Security Index documented a marked decline in progress.³ For example, only two countries have eliminated their weapons-usable nuclear materials since 2016.⁴ Nuclear security has been overshadowed by other global crises and shifting priorities, including climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic. Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine has further diverted global diplomatic attention and intensified divisions within the IAEA, contributing to increasingly difficult negotiations at recent agency general conferences.

New vehicles for dialogue such as the contact group and the IAEA ICONS showed early promise but have delivered mixed results. The contact group struggled to sustain consistent senior-level engagement and became dormant during the pandemic. The ICONS saw ministerial participation rise in 2020 but decline in 2024, when governments failed—for the first time—to agree on a ministerial declaration.⁵ Although a handful of countries have subscribed to nuclear security information circulars since 2016, most have stagnated.

An Evolving Threat Environment

It is imperative to maintain attention on nuclear security. Even after decades of effort to reduce risks, nuclear terrorism remains one of the greatest international security threats governments face. The risk environment is evolving, and nuclear security, the most effective tool to prevent catastrophe, requires continuous improvement through updated tools and best practices.

Nonstate threats have grown more complex: Beyond large terrorist networks, there is increased risk from self-radicalized individuals, domestic violent extremists, and insiders, who are more difficult to detect.⁶ Some extremists have targeted critical infrastructure, including nuclear facilities.⁷ Expanded access to drones, cyber tools, and advanced technologies such as AI introduce new nuclear security vulnerabilities.

Nuclear security standards and best practices now must also reflect the risks of nuclear facilities in conflict zones.⁸ Russia’s attacks on and occupation of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant violated laws and eroded norms against armed attacks on nuclear facilities.⁹ Attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities further weakened that norm and resulted in degraded nuclear security conditions.¹⁰

The expansion of nuclear energy is positive but poses new security challenges that must be addressed. As more countries pursue nuclear power to meet climate change and energy-security goals, many lack the regulatory frameworks and trained workforce needed to implement robust nuclear security, raising the risk that this expansion will outpace nuclear security preparedness. Small modular reactors and advanced reactors introduce unique security considerations tied to their designs, deployment models, and fuel types.11 Together, these trends underscore the need for renewed global attention on nuclear security at precisely the moment when political focus is waning.

Renewing Momentum

Despite declining high-level attention, there have been some bright spots. The 2022 A/CPPNM review conference adopted a substantive, forward-looking consensus outcome document outlining nuclear security priorities.12 Importantly, a majority of states-parties sent a request to the IAEA to convene a subsequent review conference, signaling support for continued dialogue on implementation of this foundational treaty.13

Although the 2024 ICONS did not produce a consensus ministerial declaration, the co-presidents’ statement gained support from more than 70 countries as reflected in information circular 1233.¹⁴ Two new nuclear security information circulars (1216 and 1217), which recognized the critical nexus between nuclear security and nuclear energy, were each endorsed by 25 or more countries.¹⁵

Three of the original nuclear security information circulars continue to drive engagement and tangible results. Belgium and the United States lead cooperation on insider threats under information circular 908, including at the Second International Symposium on Insider Threat Mitigation in March 2024 with participants from more than 50 countries.¹⁶ The United Kingdom advances transport security cooperation through information circular 909. Norway’s information circular 912 on HEU minimization has supported multiple symposiums, with a fourth planned for March 2026.¹⁷ Together, these efforts show sustained interest and demand for nuclear security cooperation.

Implementation and capacity-building efforts also continue through IAEA advisory services workshops, centers of excellence, and bilateral cooperation programs. Sustained funding for these activities will be essential as nuclear energy expands globally.

Together, these and other initiatives provide a solid foundation for future progress. They show continued willingness to engage constructively, the emergence of new tools and commitments, and sustained work by practitioners to strengthen security. The task ahead is to build on these efforts and bolster them with political and financial support.

Shaping a More Inclusive Narrative

Refocusing global attention on nuclear security requires a larger “nuclear security tent” to create space for more perspectives. Strong nuclear security depends on the engagement of all countries, not just those with weapons-usable nuclear materials or nuclear facilities. Nuclear security has long been framed mainly as a counterterrorism issue driven by those countries, a narrative that remains important but is too narrow, and one that sidelines countries whose priorities center on development, energy security, or peaceful uses.

A more inclusive narrative is needed, one that elevates a range of national and regional perspectives and connects nuclear security to broader priorities. Insights from NTI-hosted dialogues underscore the diversity of viewpoints and the need to respect regional identities. A one-size-fits-all approach is ineffective. Evidence shows that diverse decision-making improves innovation and financial performance.¹⁸ Global nuclear security is no different and will only be as strong as the diversity of countries shaping it. A narrative that reflects many perspectives will be more resilient, politically relevant, and sustainable over time.

Emphasizing Linkages Between Nuclear Security and Climate, Energy, and Development

Growing interest in nuclear power presents an opportunity for a broader nuclear security dialogue. Countries are turning to nuclear energy—including small modular reactors and advanced reactors—to meet net-zero carbon goals, strengthen energy security, and satisfy growing electricity demand. Nuclear technology also advances sustainable development through medical, agricultural, industrial, and infrastructure applications to improve lives around the world.

As more countries seek to adopt nuclear technologies for energy and development, it is critical to emphasize how nuclear security supports, rather than hinders, those goals. Strong nuclear security builds public confidence that nuclear technologies are safe, secure, and not vulnerable to misuse. That confidence is crucial for expanding and sustaining the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology. Concepts such as security by design, which integrate security into all stages of small modular reactor and advanced reactor design and development, will reduce later costs for operators and strengthen nuclear power’s growth. Newcomer countries can reinforce this by signaling to reactor vendors that nuclear security, as well as safeguards and spent fuel management, will be priorities as they review design options.

The link between nuclear power and nuclear security is reflected in recent multilateral statements. The “tripling pledge” approved at the 2023 UN Climate Change Conference (COP28) calls for nuclear expansion to meet “the highest standards of safety, sustainability, security, and non-proliferation” and commits support for countries pursuing new civil nuclear programs under those standards.¹⁹ Together with the two nuclear-energy-related information circulars at the 2024 ICONS, this explicit recognition of the nuclear power-nuclear security nexus provides a strong basis for continued dialogue on why robust security is essential to the successful and sustainable expansion of nuclear power. It reinforces a more inclusive narrative on nuclear security for all countries seeking the benefits of nuclear power.

These linkages should be explored further in international forums focused on climate change, nuclear power, development, and peaceful uses thereof—for example, COP, nuclear power ministerials, the World Economic Forum, and the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review process.

Informal and Regional Approaches

Consensus-based multilateralism has limits. In today’s polarized geopolitical environment, consensus alone is insufficient to drive progress, as we saw at recent IAEA general conferences and the 2024 ICONS. This does not mean abandoning consensus where it is achievable but supplementing it with more flexible approaches. Issue-specific coalitions, informal working groups, regional dialogues, and multi-stakeholder partnerships can advance progress when formal negotiations stall. The summit “gift basket” model demonstrated how like-minded countries can achieve outcomes outside consensus. Apart from the two new joint statements at the 2024 ICONS, this model remains underused. Similar approaches may be useful if consensus proves elusive at the 2027 A/CPPNM review conference and the 2028 ICONS.

Although the IAEA will remain central to global nuclear security, regional leadership must play a larger role in addressing the needs of an increasingly diverse nuclear landscape. Regional institutions and coalitions may offer more promising venues for open dialogue, particularly for countries feeling marginalized or disenfranchised in global settings where nuclear security can be perceived as an imposition or barrier to peaceful uses, or is overshadowed by complex political dynamics. Regional engagements can be more relevant to differing regional priorities, which are shaped by common values, history, and priorities. Regional risk assessment hubs could strengthen nuclear security cooperation and analysis. Subregional approaches can account for broader regional divisions around nonproliferation, disarmament, and other security issues.

Sustaining nuclear security over the long term will require strong regional leadership. Regional approaches offer more opportunities for regional leaders to emerge, enabling regions to shape agendas and negotiated outcomes at global meetings such as the 2027 A/CPPNM review conference and the 2028 ICONS. Encouraging greater regional ownership, empowering regional organizations, and ensuring that regional perspectives inform global processes should be core objectives in the coming decade. Platforms such as the African Commission on Nuclear Energy, the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy, and the Organization of American States Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism offer promising foundations for these efforts.²⁰

Preparing for the 2027 A/CPPNM Conference

The most significant near-term opportunity to refocus political attention on nuclear security is the 2027 A/CPPNM review conference. As the only legally binding international agreement requiring the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, the amended convention remains foundational to the global nuclear security architecture. The 2027 review conference can serve both as a venue to assess progress and as a platform to renew political momentum.²¹

The 2022 A/CPPNM review conference showed that parties can work constructively even in a difficult geopolitical environment. Despite taking place shortly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, states-parties adopted a substantive and forward-looking outcome document by consensus.²² Building on that success, the 2027 review conference should aim to: promote the foundational role of the A/CPPNM; build a strong, effective, and sustainable convention regime; strengthen implementation, including Article 14; and encourage new commitments and universalization. In addition, it should strive to be inclusive of diverse perspectives; reaffirm the adequacy of the A/CPPNM; and agree on regular future review conferences as a vehicle for sustained nuclear security dialogue.²³

These objectives should inform the design of the preparatory process. With the 2022 precedent established, there is no need to revisit the rules of procedure or make significant adjustments to the agenda. Preparations can concentrate instead on substantive dialogue and negotiating the outcome document. Regional dialogues in 2026 could help shape priorities and coordinate positions ahead of negotiations.²⁴ States-parties should identify their priorities, consider ways to strengthen the outcome document, and plan how to demonstrate commitment through national statements or new joint statements among countries with shared interests. They should also begin building support for requesting that the IAEA host the next review conference. The most ambitious option would be to institutionalize regular review conferences, with each setting the date for the next one.²⁵

The 2027 review conference will not restore momentum by itself, but it can serve as a powerful anchor, especially if its outcomes feed into the 2028 ICONS. That conference, which is open to all IAEA member states and features more in-depth, cross-sector discussions, complements the review conference. Together, the two events offer critical opportunities to renew political attention.

Sustaining nuclear security will require rethinking global nuclear security dialogues. Regaining momentum amid competing crises and geopolitical tensions demands more flexible, inclusive, and regionally grounded approaches. This means broadening the nuclear security narrative; strengthening links to nuclear power and sustainable development; empowering regional leaders; and recognizing diverse priorities and perspectives. The 2027 A/CPPNM review conference and the 2028 ICONS are key moments to reinforce commitments and reset priorities.

A strong global nuclear security architecture will depend on diverse voices, shared ownership, and sustained attention. Progress is achievable, but only by reframing and adapting nuclear security to a changing world.

ENDNOTES

1. Samantha Neakrase, “The Global Nuclear Security Architecture: Closing Gaps to Build Greater Assurance, Accountability, and Action,” Nuclear Threat Initiative paper, September 2021, p. 1; Matthew Bunn, Nickolas Roth, and William H. Tobey, “Revitalizing Nuclear Security in an Era of Uncertainty,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs report, January 2019, pp. 1-4, 15-18, 70.

2. Sara Z. Kutchesfahani, Kelsey Davenport, and Erin Connolly,“The Nuclear Security Summits: An Overview of State Actions to Curb Nuclear Terrorism 2010–2016,” an Arms Control Association and Fissile Materials Working Group report, July 2018.

3. “NTI Nuclear Security Index: Losing Focus in a Disordered World,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, July 2020, p. 8; “NTI Nuclear Security Index: Falling Short in a Dangerous World,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, July 2023, pp. 5-6.

4. Neakrase, Global Nuclear Security Architecture, p. 19; NTI, Nuclear Security Index 2020, p. 39.

5. Information on ministerial attendance at ICONS 2020 and 2024 appears in IAEA General Conference reports: IAEA, “International Conference on Nuclear Security: Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts,” August 31, 2020, p. 1; IAEA, “International Conference on Nuclear Security: Shaping the Future,” p. 1.

6. Rebecca L. Earnhardt, Brendan Hyatt, and Nickolas Roth, “A Threat to Confront: Far-Right Extremists and Nuclear Terrorism,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 14, 2021; Sneha Nair, Anna Pluff, and Christina McAllister, “The Threat from Within: An Overview of the Domestic Violent Extremist Threat Facing US Nuclear Security Practitioners,” Stimson Center, November 2, 2023.

7. Dan Sullivan, “National Guard ‘neo-Nazi’ aimed to hit Miami nuclear plant, roommate says,” Tampa Bay Times, June 13, 2017.

8. Nickolas Roth, Ross Matzkin-Bridger, and Jessica Bufford, “Nuclear Facilities in Times of Crisis,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, May 2024, p. 1.

9. Ibid., pp. 1, 5, 9.

10. Theft of nuclear materials was a major concern in the aftermath of the strikes. Reports indicated that Iran had moved its roughly 400 kilograms of HEU before the attacks, raising alarms because weapons-usable nuclear material is more vulnerable during conflict and transport, and a new location might lack the protections of the damaged facilities. Insider threats could also be a risk, as individuals with access to the material could be susceptible to bribes. See Edward Helmore, “JD Vance suggests Iran’s uranium stockpile is still intact despite US strikes,” The Guardian, June 24, 2025.

11. World Institute for Nuclear Security, “Security of Advanced Reactors,” August 2020, pp. 26-28, 32; Laura Holgate, “Sustaining Attention on the Security of Nuclear Materials and Facilities: Challenges and Strategies in a Shifting Global Landscape,” NTI Global Dialogue discussion paper, July 2025, pp. 2, 6.

12. IAEA, “2022 Conference of the Parties to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,” outcome document, April 2022.

13. IAEA, “Communication Dated 24 March 2022 received from the Permanent Mission of the United States of America concerning a Joint Proposal to the IAEA to convene further CPPNM as amended Review Conferences,” March 25, 2022.

14. IAEA, “Communication dated 23 July 2024 received from the Co-Chairs for the preparatory process of the Ministerial Declaration for the 2024 International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) concerning the Statement by the Co-Presidents of the International Conference on Nuclear Security 2024: Shaping the Future, 20-24 May 2024,” July 24, 2024.

15. IAEA, “Joint Statement on Advanced Nuclear Energy Technologies,” June 4, 2024; IAEA, “Joint Statement on the Role of Nuclear Security in Harnessing the Power of Nuclear Energy,” June 4, 2024.

16. “INFCIRC/908: Insider Threat Mitigation,” Insider Threat Mitigation Hub.

17. IAEA, “The Fourth International Symposium on HEU Minimization organized by the Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (DSA) (organized in cooperation with the IAEA).”

18. Vivian Hunt, Dennis Layton, and Sara Prince, “Why diversity matters,” McKinsey & Company, January 2015, pp. 1-2.

19. At COP28, countries launch “Declaration to Cripple Nuclear Energy,” U.S. Department of Energy, 2023.

20. For ideas on potential regional forums for dialogue, see Irma Arguello, Trevor Findlay, and Hubert Foy, papers prepared for the November 2019 NTI Global Dialogue.

21. Jonathan Herbach and Samantha Pitts-Kiefer, “More Work to Do: A Pathway for Future Progress on Strengthening Nuclear Security,” Arms Control Today, October 2015.

22. Ibid.

23. Samantha Neakrase, “A Roadmap to the 2027 A/CPPNM Review Conference,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, July 2025.

24. NTI and the IAEA hosted regional dialogues in advance of the 2022 Review Conference; similar NTI-led workshops are now underway.

25. Samantha Neakrase, “Strengthening Nuclear Security With a Sustainable CPPNM Regime,” Arms Control Today, June 2019.