December 2025
By Shaghayegh Chris Rostampour

Belgium is conducting multiple criminal investigations after 17 recent, unexplained drone sightings over its nuclear power plants, military sites, and airports.

A spokesperson for Belgium’s federal prosecutors suggested that the problem escalated to the federal level due to signs of possible foreign interference. “Initially, we contact local police and prosecutors. If there are indications of espionage or interference, it will be federalized,” Yasmina Vanoverschelde told The Brussels Times Nov. 5.

Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken confirmed Nov. 2 that a series of unidentified drone flights were observed near the Kleine-Brogel air base, which is believed to host U.S. nuclear weapons. He described the incidents as coordinated and resembling a spying operation. “By whom, I don’t know. I have a few ideas but I’m going to be careful about speculating,” he said.

But on Nov. 28, the Dutch newspaper Trouw reported that the drone alerts frequently were false alarms and revealed scant hard evidence of Russian involvement.

Additional drone sightings near the two main airports around Brussels led to temporary shutdowns Nov. 6 and Nov. 10. “At first, drones flying over our military bases were seen as our problem. Now it has become a serious threat affecting civilian infrastructure across multiple European countries,” Francken said in a Nov. 7 interview with the BBC.

NATO countries have expressed concern that such flights could be testing allied defenses. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius linked the Belgian drone incursions to tensions over Russia’s war on Ukraine, its hybrid warfare tactics, and NATO’s consideration of using Russian frozen assets to further help defend Ukraine.

Reuters reported Nov. 10 that France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have sent experts and equipment to Belgium to help combat the drones. Addressing Belgium’s parliament, Francken announced Nov. 13 that the United States has offered “technical and operational assistance.”

Russia has denied any involvement with the drone incursions; the Russian embassy in Brussels said in a Nov. 5 statement on social media that it had “neither interest nor motive” in such activities.

Russia has been blamed for several recent airspace violations, notably in Poland and Estonia, prompting alliance security consultations under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. (See ACT, October 2025 and September 2025.) In response, NATO announced a multidomain operation Sept. 12 to “bolster NATO’s posture along the eastern flank.” At a press conference that day, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said that although the operation followed Poland’s request under Article 4, “what happened on Wednesday was not an isolated incident. Russia’s recklessness in the air along our eastern flank is increasing in frequency.”

On Nov. 25, the Romanian Defense Ministry announced that NATO jets intercepted two Russian drones that had crossed into the country’s airspace from Ukraine, following missile and drone strikes between Russia and Ukraine. Moldova, a non-NATO European country, separately announced having detected six drones in its airspace, including one aerial vehicle that then traveled toward Romania.

Recent large-scale drone strikes, including Ukraine’s “Spiderweb” offensive against Russian strategic assets in June, have alarmed military planners worldwide. These events illustrate how emerging unmanned technologies are enabling new forms of asymmetric warfare, forcing a reevaluation of the security of high-value military assets, including the potential vulnerability of NATO allies’ own nuclear forces. (See ACT, July/August 2025.)

“Drones are already redefining warfare. Having drone defenses is no longer optional for anyone,” European Commission Vice President Kaja Kallas said at a press conference in Brussels Nov. 20.

She added that the European Union is developing a new anti-drone defense system “in close coordination” with NATO that is expected to be fully operational by the end of 2027.

Ukraine is also set to receive a French-made, first-of-its-kind “drone wall,” guided by artificial intelligence, that is designed to intercept incoming munitions from Russia. Speaking to Business Insider Nov. 12, the manufacturer described the new defense as a “flying drone minefield.” The system is expected to be deployed within the next few weeks.

December 2025
By Michael T. Klare

Members of the UN General Assembly’s First Committee voted overwhelmingly to approve two resolutions calling for greater international scrutiny of the risks posed by the military use of AI, with Russia and the United States in notable opposition.

The two resolutions adopted Nov. 6 constitute pioneering efforts by UN member states to better comprehend the consequences of using AI for military purposes, especially in the nuclear realm.

One resolution, on “artificial intelligence in the military domain and its implications for international peace and security,” first introduced in 2024, addresses the larger picture of AI weaponization and was approved 166-5 with five abstentions; the other, on “possible risks of integration of artificial intelligence into command, control and communication systems of nuclear weapons,” focuses on that particular aspect of the problem. It was approved 115-8 with 44 abstentions.

The measures have been submitted to the full General Assembly, which is almost certain to approve them by the end of the year.

The adoption of these proposals by the First Committee, which is responsible for security and disarmament affairs in the General Assembly, reflects growing international concern over the exploitation of AI for military purposes. (See ACT, November 2025.) Many experts have warned that without effective safeguards, AI-enabled systems could bypass or eliminate human control over the use of force, causing substantial death and destruction and possibly triggering the use of nuclear weapons. (See ACT, June 2024.) This, in turn, has sparked calls for the imposition of international controls on the use of AI in combat systems.

“Humanity’s fate cannot be left to an algorithm,” UN Secretary-General António Guterres told a Sept. 24 session of the UN Security Council devoted to AI and international security. “Humans must always retain authority over life-and-death decisions,” Guterres added.

The two resolutions incorporate these concerns and call on member states to work together in identifying the dangers posed by the military use of AI and in devising safeguards to avert those perils.

Resolution A/80/46 urges states to “pursue national, regional, subregional and global efforts to address the opportunities and challenges, including from humanitarian, legal, security, technological and ethical perspectives, related to the application of artificial intelligence in the military domain.” It also authorizes the secretary-general to organize a three-day gathering of member states in 2026 to exchange views on this topic and to consider next steps to address the dangers involved. The UN Office for Disarmament Affairs is charged with preparing a summary of these deliberations for consideration at the next General Assembly meeting, in fall 2026.

The United States voted in favor of a similar resolution in 2024, but this time voted “no,” along with Burundi, Israel, North Korea, and Russia. Explaining its vote, the U.S. delegation claimed that the resolution “risks starting down the unwelcome and unhelpful path of creating a global governance regime designed to institute centralized control over a critical technology.”

This outlook is consistent with President Donald Trump’s call for U.S. victory in what he has termed a “race” to achieve “global dominance in artificial intelligence.” It also reflects claims by leaders of the commercial tech industry that international controls on AI, however mild, pose a threat to their unbridled development of advanced AI models.

Consistent with this outlook, the United States also voted “no” on the second resolution, A/80/56, concerning the potential dangers arising from the integration of AI into nuclear command-control-and-communications (NC3) systems.

This measure represents the General Assembly’s first attempt to address these risks. Many experts, including former military officials, have warned that the unrestrained integration of AI into NC3 could result in the “poisoning” of nuclear decision-making systems by false or corrupted data, leading to hasty or misguided nuclear launch decisions. (See ACT, September 2025.)

The resolution seeks to diminish this risk by encouraging member states to jointly explore the unique dangers created by the integration of AI into NC3 systems. It also calls on the nuclear-armed states to take immediate steps to ensure that humans, not machines, exercise ultimate control over the use of nuclear weapons.

December 2025
By Lipi Shetty

The U.S. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) will continue its work at limited capacity despite the loss of a quorum earlier this year after a board member stepped down. The essential ongoing evaluations on the board’s agenda include safety considerations at Los Alamos National Laboratory’s PF-4 Plutonium Facility, which was the focus of an Oct. 10 board report to the Department of Energy (DOE).

Since January, the five-person board had been reduced to two members: acting Chairman Thomas Summers and Patricia Lee. Summers’ second term as vice chairman and as acting chairman concluded Oct. 18, leaving Lee as acting chairman and the only remaining member of the board.

In an Oct. 17 letter to Energy Secretary Chris Wright, the board stated that it “assure[s] you that the Board’s dedicated staff will continue to execute the safety oversight mission as required by the Atomic Energy Act” despite loss of the quorum.

The letter also notes that Summers has delegated certain authorities to board staff, including the authority to issue reporting requirements.

“Past board recommendations have resulted in saving millions of dollars by preventing accidents and providing a basis to modify or not build facilities,” said the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability in a Sept. 11 letter. “Maintaining a Board quorum preserves the DNFSB’s ability to issue formal recommendations, impose reporting requirements, and conduct hearings, thus ensuring that DOE avoids accidents and remains accountable,” the coalition of nonprofit advocates said in the letter.

Nominees to the board must be appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. The board has sent a list of potential nominees to the White House.

In one of its last acts before losing a quorum, the board published Oct. 10 its review of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s safety analysis of the Los Alamos Plutonium Facility. The report concluded that the energy department is prioritizing capability upgrades to its plutonium facility over infrastructure safety concerns.

“DOE and [Los Alamos National Laboratories] should consider prioritizing safety-related infrastructure projects to ensure that the Plutonium Facility safety strategy adequately protects the public, as the facility takes on new and expansive national security missions,” the report said.

The report determined that several safety considerations at the facility “depend on assumptions that cannot be technically verified and are sometimes non-conservative.” Among infrastructure projects that have been delayed are glovebox system improvements and fire prevention systems for mitigating risks associated with seismic activities.

The board has “long advocated for the use of safety-related active confinement systems in nuclear facilities for the purposes of confining radioactive materials.” The Energy Department favors passive confinement systems, which may allow unfiltered air with radioactive material to be released following an accident.

The PF-4 plutonium facility is currently undergoing upgrades to meet the congressionally mandated production target of 30 plutonium pits per year by 2030. A first production unit of a plutonium pit for the W87-1 warhead was completed in October 2024.

December 2025

International diplomats began another effort to advance a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East when they met Nov. 17 in New York. The sixth session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, presided over by Morocco, is due to last through Nov. 21.

“The people of the Middle East deserve stability and peace, but the threat of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is pushing this promise out of reach,” UN Secretary-General António Guterres said in an opening statement. “A zone free of these scourges would ease tensions and prevent the worst-case scenario from ever coming to pass.”

The goal of the annual conference is to negotiate a legally binding treaty to establish a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East, as mandated by 2018 General Assembly. The Arab League; Iran; Israel; four of the five nuclear-weapon states recognized under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; and the members of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons attended.

During the conference, member states called for greater engagement from nuclear weapons states. Previous sessions have laid the groundwork of substantive and procedural matters, with the fifth session focusing on development of an index of topics for future sessions.—LIPI SHETTY

December 2025
By Daryl G. Kimball

Nuclear testing is a dangerous vestige of the past that fueled the arms race and the development and deployment of new and more deadly types of nuclear weapons. From 1945 to 2017, the world’s nine nuclear-armed states conducted more than 2,000 nuclear detonations, including more than 500 in the atmosphere, which spread deadly radioactive fallout downwind and across the globe.

The United States has not conducted a nuclear explosive test since 1992, and today, along with 186 other countries, it is a signatory to the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which bans all nuclear test explosions. U.S. support for the CTBT was crucial to securing the indefinite extension of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1995.

Nevertheless, on October 30, President Donald Trump suddenly announced on social media that “because of other countries nuclear testing programs,” he wants the “Department of War to start testing our nuclear weapons on an equal basis.”

Trump’s nuclear testing rhetoric is confusing, counterproductive, and dangerous. The United States has no technical, military, or political reason to resume nuclear explosive testing for the first time in 33 years. No other country is conducting nuclear explosive tests, which the nuclear-weapon states define as “nuclear explosions that produce a self-sustaining, supercritical chain reaction of any kind.”

U.S. nuclear explosive testing would violate the country’s legal obligation as a CTBT signatory and undermine the technical and political basis for the U.S. stockpile stewardship program. More significantly, a resumption of explosive nuclear testing would trigger a global chain reaction of nuclear testing that would raise tensions and blow apart the nuclear nonproliferation system at a time of growing nuclear danger.

Adding to concerns about Trump’s intentions, on October 31, the United States, for the first time ever, was the only “no” vote on an annual UN First Committee resolution in support of the global moratorium on nuclear testing and the CTBT.

In the United States, opposition to nuclear testing is strong and growing. In May 2025, the Nevada State Legislature unanimously approved a bipartisan resolution in support of maintaining the moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing. A 2024 national opinion survey by the University of Maryland found that 75 percent of Americans support the global nuclear test moratorium. Days after Trump’s threats, bills were introduced in Congress to block a resumption of U.S. nuclear testing.

The Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration have publicly stated, and privately briefed the White House, that nuclear explosive tests are not necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear arsenal and would be counterproductive. Energy Secretary Christopher Wright tried to walk back Trump’s comments, telling Fox News Nov. 2 that Trump was referring to “non-critical tests” of nuclear weapons systems, a reference to subcritical nuclear experiments conducted underground at the Nevada National Security Site that do not produce a nuclear explosion. That interpretation, however, has not yet been confirmed by the White House.

China, Russia, and the United States continue to actively engage in weapons-related experiments at their former nuclear testing sites. They also maintain respective “test readiness” programs to enable them to resume full-scale nuclear explosive testing.

As a result, there remains a risk that some experimental activities at these former test sites might be misconstrued as nuclear test explosions or might be cited as a cynical excuse for another state to openly resume explosive testing. For example, in 2019, the United States alleged that Russia might be conducting extremely low-yield, supercritical nuclear tests, also known as “hydronuclear” tests, which are banned by the CTBT. Russia has denied the charge and raised its own concerns about U.S. activities.

When pressed at a May 29, 2019, event by Wall Street Journal reporter Michael Gordon whether he believes Russia is actually conducting hydronuclear tests, Gen. Robert Ashley, the Defense Intelligence Agency director at the time, replied: “I’d say we believe they have the capability to do it the way they are set up.”

Any CTBT violation by Russia or other treaty signatories would be a very serious matter. Yet very low-yield explosive tests by Russia or the United States would not provide significant technical or military value for advanced nuclear-armed states such as China, Russia, or the United States. Any perceived benefits of hydronuclear tests are far outweighed by the risks of giving other states the green light to resume full-scale multi-kiloton nuclear tests, which would help them improve warhead design capabilities.

If such accusations are the basis of a U.S. move to resume nuclear explosive tests, it would be far more effective to pursue, as Washington did in 2023, technical talks to develop specialized equipment and mutual confidence-building measures prior to CTBT entry into force in order to ensure that subcritical nuclear experiments comply with the treaty.

Nuclear weapons policy decisions should not be driven by one man’s emotional reactions or misinformation. The stakes are far too high. If Trump is allowed to follow through on his nuclear testing threat, it would severely damage global security and turn the United States into a nuclear rogue state.