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“Right after I graduated, I interned with the Arms Control Association. It was terrific.”

– George Stephanopolous
ABC News
January 1, 2005
PressRoom

Civil Society Leaders Call on States to Reinforce the CTBT

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For Immediate Release: Sept. 21, 2023

Media Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, 202-463-8270 ext 107

(New York)—In a statement to be delivered at a major United Nations conference this Friday, Sept. 22, a diverse array of nongovernmental leaders in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, as well as high-level former government officials, diplomats, military leaders, scientists, and downwinders are calling on governments take urgent action to counter growing threats to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the de facto global nuclear test moratorium it has established.

Emma Bjertén, Disarmament Programme Manager for Reaching Critical Will with the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom delivered a statement on the CTBT on behalf of civil society at the 13th Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT at UN headquarters in New York.

"Since the conclusion of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which has been signed by 187 countries, nuclear testing has become taboo," the joint statement, endorsed by 87 organizations and high-level individuals, says.

The treaty prohibits “any nuclear weapons test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion,” no matter what the yield. The CTBT Organization operates a fully functional International Monitoring System (IMS) to detect and deter cheating. 

"Though it has not yet formally entered into force, the CTBT is one of the most successful and valuable agreements in the long history of nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament," the civil society leaders say.

"Like other critical nuclear risk reduction, nonproliferation, and arms control agreements," the statement warns, "the CTBT is under threat due to inattention and worsening relations between nuclear-armed adversaries. We cannot take the treaty, the IMS, or the de facto global nuclear test moratorium for granted."

"In recent years," the civil society statement notes, "the possessors of the largest nuclear arsenals have launched nuclear weapons modernization programs, some are pursuing new nuclear weapons designs, and some are increasing the size and diversity of their arsenals. Military activities and subcritical experiments at former test sites continue."

The statement notes that there has been no serious consideration of ratification of the CTBT by any of the remaining states that must still ratify for the treaty to formally enter into force: China, DPRK, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and the United States.

The statement says that "[China's] explanation for delaying formal consideration of its ratification of the treaty is no longer serious or credible. We call on China to finally initiate the process for ratification of the treaty without further delay or excuses."

As for the United States, the civil society leaders note that "the Biden administration made it clear in 2021 that the United States supports the CTBT 'and is committed to work to achieve its entry into force' ... but unfortunately, the Biden administration has, so far, done nothing to pursue the kind of outreach and education campaign that will be necessary to secure the advice and consent for ratification by the U.S. Senate," which last debated the treaty 24 years ago.

The civil society leaders urge Russia, which has signed and ratified the CTBT "to formally reaffirm its full support for the CTBT ... and work in collaboration with other states parties to engage in talks to develop voluntary confidence-building measures to ensure that ongoing experiments at former nuclear test sites are consistent with the CTBT."

"With these challenges in mind, states parties cannot afford to simply express rhetorical support. They must do more through more energetic, higher-level bilateral and multilateral diplomacy through this Article XIV process, at the UN General Assembly, the Security Council, and beyond," according to the civil society leaders.

"Now is the time," the civil society leaders implore, "for this conference and each CTBT state party to focus on new and creative approaches to overcome the stubborn intransigence of the eight remaining Annex 2 'hold-out' states, which have deprived the international community, and themselves, of the full security benefits of the treaty and its extensive verification system."

The civil society statement also reminds the 186 CTBT states parties that they "have a moral, and in some cases, a legal obligation to provide health monitoring, health care, and other forms of assistance to those impacted by nuclear weapons test explosions."

"Hundreds of thousands of people have died and millions more have suffered—and continue to suffer—from illnesses directly related to the radioactive fallout from nuclear detonations in the southwestern and western United States, islands in the Pacific, in Australia, western China, Algeria, across Russia, in eastern Kazakhstan, India, Pakistan, the DPRK, and elsewhere," the civil society statement notes.

The civil society leaders "urge all CTBT states parties (particularly nuclear-armed states) to:

  • Support further scientific research on the health and environmental effects of nuclear testing, and provide financial support for health monitoring and health care programs for populations affected by nuclear testing; and 
     
  • Cooperate with states parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) as they begin to fulfill their legal responsibilities under that treaty to provide assistance and environmental remediation to those people and regions affected by nuclear weapon use and testing. We also encourage those CTBT states parties that have not already done so to sign and ratify the TPNW, which reinforces the CTBT's prohibition on nuclear testing."

The once-every-two-years CTBT Conference on Facilitating Entry Into Force is designed to promote ratification by the remaining 44 states listed in the treaty's Article XIV, in order to trigger formal entry into force and allow the option of short-notice on-site inspections.

The full text of the statement and list of signatories is below and available as a PDF at https://www.armscontrol.org/NGO-statement-CTBT-Sept2023-conference

Advancing the CTBT and Defending the De Facto Nuclear Test Moratorium
Civil Society Statement to the 13th Article XIV Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the CTBT
Sept. 22, 2023

Since the conclusion of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has been signed by 187 countries, nuclear testing has become taboo.

All CTBT states parties agree that the treaty prohibits “any nuclear weapons test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion,” no matter what the yield. The CTBT Organization operates a fully functional International Monitoring System (IMS) to detect and deter cheating.

Most nuclear-armed states that have not signed or not ratified the CTBT, including India, Israel, and Pakistan, are currently observing nuclear testing moratoria. Even though the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) announced in January 2020 it "will no longer observe its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing," it has not yet resumed nuclear testing.

Though it has not yet formally entered into force, the CTBT is one of the most successful and valuable agreements in the long history of nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament. Without the option to conduct nuclear tests, it is more difficult, although not impossible, to develop, prove, and field new warhead designs.

Civil society friends of the CTBT welcome the governmental support for the CTBT that is evident at this assembly.

But now, after 13 such meetings, it is clear to us that new and more energetic strategies must be considered not only to advance the treaty, but to strengthen the de facto norm against testing.

Like other critical nuclear risk reduction, nonproliferation, and arms control agreements, the CTBT is under threat due to inattention and worsening relations between nuclear-armed adversaries.

In recent years, the possessors of the largest nuclear arsenals have launched nuclear weapons modernization programs, some are pursuing new nuclear weapons designs, and some are increasing the size and diversity of their arsenals. Military activities and subcritical experiments at former test sites continue. There has been no serious consideration of ratification of the CTBT by any of the remaining Annex 2 states in several years.

With these challenges in mind, states parties cannot afford to simply express rhetorical support. They must do more through more energetic, higher-level bilateral and multilateral diplomacy through this Article XIV process, at the UN General Assembly, the Security Council, and beyond.

As representatives of civil society, we offer the following observations and recommendations for all states parties to consider and pursue.

  1. Energetic Diplomacy Focused on the Eight Hold-Out States

    We welcome recent efforts to secure ratifications from several additional states. But it is now time for this conference and each CTBT state party to focus on new and creative approaches to overcome the stubborn intransigence of the eight remaining Annex 2 “hold-out” states—China, DPRK, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and the United States—which have deprived the international community, and themselves, of the full security benefits of the treaty and its extensive verification system.

    While ratifications by individual hold-out states might stimulate other hold-out states to follow suit, there is no reason for any state to make its ratification dependent upon another state’s ratification, as the treaty becomes binding for all only when all hold-out states have ratified.

    If the states parties at this conference are serious about securing entry into force, they will need to devote more significant and higher-level diplomatic pressure in the capitals of all eight CTBT hold-out states to move them to sign and/or ratify the treaty.
  • The People’s Republic of China: Since halting nuclear testing and signing the CTBT in 1996, China’s leaders and officials have consistently expressed their support for the CTBT, but they have failed to follow through with ratification. Chinese leadership is important and overdue. The government’s explanation for delaying formal consideration of its ratification of the treaty is no longer serious or credible. We call on China to finally initiate the process for ratification of the treaty without further delay or excuses.
     
  • The United States: After some senior Trump administration officials callously discussed in 2020 that the United States should resume nuclear testing for the first time since 1992 to try to intimidate Russia and China, the Biden administration made it clear in 2021 that the United States supports the CTBT “and is committed to work to achieve its entry into force.”

    We welcome these statements of support, but unfortunately, the Biden administration has, so far, done nothing to pursue the kind of outreach and education campaign that will be necessary to secure the advice and consent for ratification by the U.S. Senate. Given that the United States has not conducted a nuclear test explosion in more than 30 years and has no technical, military, or political reason to resume testing, the national security case for ratification and strengthening the barriers against testing by others is even stronger than when it was last considered by the Senate in 1999.

    One salient issue that will need to be addressed to secure U.S. ratification is the recent U.S. State Department charge that “during the 1995–2018 timeframe, Russia probably conducted nuclear weapons-related tests” at its former test site at Novaya Zemlya. The assessment provides no evidence of the charge and does not claim the Russian activities were militarily significant. Russia, which has signed and ratified the CTBT, has vigorously denied the charge and repeatedly pointed to the failure of the United States to ratify the treaty.

    The United States, China, and Russia, all CTBT signatories, all continue to engage in weapons-related activities at their former nuclear testing sites. Although the IMS is operational and far more effective than originally envisioned, very low-yield nuclear test explosions can still be difficult to detect without on-site monitoring equipment or inspections, which will not be in place until after entry into force.

    To address concerns about clandestine activities at former test sites, states parties should explore the development of voluntary confidence-building measures designed to detect and deter possible low-level, clandestine nuclear testing.

    In a positive move, in June National Nuclear Security Administrator, Jill Hruby, announced that her agency is "open to working with others to develop a regime that would allow reciprocal observation with radiation detection equipment at each other’s subcritical experiments to allow confirmation that the experiment was consistent with the CTBT."

    We urge all CTBT states parties, especially those with active nuclear test sites, to engage in this important technical dialogue to improve capabilities to ensure compliance before and after the treaty's entry into force.
  • The Russian Federation: More than thirty years ago, citizen activists and independence leaders in Kazakhstan forced the Russian leadership to halt nuclear testing. In the years that followed, Russia actively supported the negotiation of the CTBT and it ratified the treaty.

    Now, unfortunately, there are credible reports that senior Russian officials have been discussing the option of "unratifying" the CTBT in order to achieve symmetry with the United States in all areas of nuclear policy, but no official decisions have been made.

    Such a move would be self-defeating and would sabotage the CTBT regime.

    Contrary to perceptions of extremists in Moscow, "un-ratification" would not in any way create leverage for Russia vis-a-vis "the collective West." Instead, it would undermine Russia's already shaky nuclear nonproliferation standing, alienate nonnuclear weapon states, and damage the broader nuclear nonproliferation system.

    Recall that in 2016, Russia joined the United States, China, and other members of the UN Security Council in support of Resolution 2310, which reaffirms support for the CTBT, and Russia joined a statement from its permanent five members pledging they would not take any action that would “defeat the object or purpose of the treaty."

    According to an August 29 report by the news outlet RBC, a Russian Foreign Ministry official said that as for the possibility of Russia withdrawing its ratification, the official said that the option "is not under consideration at the moment."

    We strongly urge Russia to formally reaffirm its full support for the CTBT and to work constructively with other friends of the CTBT to urge the remaining hold-out states to sign and/or ratify the treaty without delay and work in collaboration with other states parties to engage in talks to develop voluntary confidence-building measures to ensure that ongoing experiments at former nuclear test sites are consistent with the CTBT.
     
  • India and Pakistan: Since their destabilizing tit-for-tat nuclear detonations in 1998, India and Pakistan have refused to reconsider the CTBT even though neither country has expressed an interest in, nor technical justification for, renewing nuclear testing. UN Security Council Resolution 1172 paragraph 13 “urges India and Pakistan ... to become Parties to the ... Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions.”

    India and/or Pakistan could advance the cause of nuclear disarmament, enhance their national security and nonproliferation reputations, and ease concerns about a resumption of nuclear testing, by converting their unilateral test moratoria into legally binding commitments through the CTBT.
  • The Middle East: Ratification of the CTBT by Egypt, Iran, and nuclear-armed Israel— all of which must ratify to trigger CTBT entry into force—and Saudi Arabia would reduce nuclear weapons-related security concerns in the region. It would also help create the conditions necessary to achieve their common, stated goal of a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East. A goal of the co-chairs of the Article XIV process should be to approach each of these governments to gain a clearer understanding regarding the circumstances that would allow each to join the CTBT.
     
  • The DPRK: Pyongyang's push to build-up its nuclear weapons capabilities represents another threat to the norm against nuclear testing. Although Chairman Kim Jong Un has green-lighted further ballistic missile testing and fissile material production, he has not ordered the resumption of nuclear testing since he announced a unilateral nuclear test moratorium in the spring of 2018. However, the closure of the DPRK’s test site has still not been verified, and the DPRK has not made a legally binding commitment to halt nuclear test explosions by signing and ratifying the CTBT.

    All CTBT signatory states should underscore, in multilateral and bilateral fora and in meetings with the government in Pyongyang, that signature and ratification of the treaty would represent a significant step toward denuclearization and help create the conditions for peace and normalization of relations.

    In particular, we call upon the leadership of China and Russia, which maintain ties to the DPRK, to press Chairman Kim to reaffirm the DPRK's nuclear test moratorium and, as former CTBTO Executive Secretary Lassina Zerbo proposed in 2018, urge him to sign the CTBT like all the other major nuclear powers have done, and close the Punggye- ri Nuclear Test Site under international supervision.
  1. Addressing the Human Cost of Nuclear Testing

Since 1945, there have been 2,056 nuclear weapons test explosions. Of that total, the United States detonated some 1,030 test explosions and the Russian Federation detonated 715.

The CTBT and the de facto global nuclear testing moratoria help reduce further health and environmental injury from further nuclear weapons testing. CTBT states parties have a moral, and in some cases, a legal obligation to provide health monitoring, health care, and other forms of assistance to those impacted by nuclear weapons test explosions.

Hundreds of thousands of people have died and millions more have suffered—and continue to suffer—from illnesses directly related to the radioactive fallout from nuclear detonations in the southwestern and western United States, islands in the Pacific, in Australia, western China, Algeria, across Russia, in eastern Kazakhstan, India, Pakistan, the DPRK, and elsewhere.

For example, in Kazakhstan, where the Soviet Union conducted more than 450 nuclear test detonations, including 116 in the atmosphere, the Kazakh government estimates more than 1.5 million people were harmed and it is clear that many continue to suffer the effects of these detonations.

Fallout from U.S. atmospheric nuclear blasts at the Nevada Test Site may have caused 10,000 to 75,000 thyroid cancers in the United States, according to a 1990 National Cancer Institute study. A new study, released in July by Princeton University researchers, shows that the fallout from the 1945 Trinity test reached 46 states, Canada, and Mexico within 10 days of detonation. The study also reanalyzed fallout from all 93 aboveground U.S. atomic tests in Nevada and suggests that earlier official assessments underestimated the scope of the contamination, which reached all regions of the continental United States and points beyond.

In the Marshall Islands, where the United States detonated massive above ground nuclear tests in the 1940s and 1950s, the scale of damage from nuclear testing was immense. The 67 U.S. atmospheric nuclear weapons tests—23 at Bikini Atoll and 44 at Enewetak Atoll—spewed radioactivity over the entirety of the Marshall Islands and produced a total explosive power of 108.5 megatons (TNT equivalent). That was about 100 times the total yield of all atmospheric tests conducted at the Nevada Test Site.

Today, the United States and the Republic of the Marshall Islands are negotiating the terms of a new Compact of Free Association that obligates the United States to help address the damage caused by past nuclear testing.

We join others in urging the Biden administration to agree to provide the necessary financial and technical support for long-term environmental remediation programs, expansion access to health care especially as it relates to treatment related to illnesses associated with radiation exposure, and for building independent capacity to monitor, assess, and address environmental and health needs of the Marshallese in the years to come.

An independent 2021 scientific investigation using information from declassified French military archives re-evaluated the estimations of the doses of radioactivity received by the civilian population of so-called French Polynesia after the six most contaminating French atmospheric tests. The study found that France’s atomic energy commission calculations of the maximum dose received by the local inhabitants were between twice to ten times lower than the updated estimates. We urge all CTBT states parties (particularly nuclear-armed states) to:

  • Support further scientific research on the health and environmental effects of nuclear testing, and provide financial support for health monitoring and health care programs for populations affected by nuclear testing; and
     
  • Cooperate with states parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) as they begin to fulfill their legal responsibilities under that treaty to provide assistance and environmental remediation to those people and regions affected by nuclear weapon use and testing. We also encourage those CTBT states parties that have not already done so to sign and ratify the TPNW, which reinforces the CTBT's prohibition on nuclear testing.

Bottom Line

More than a quarter century since they were established, the CTBT and the CTBTO enjoy broad support and have been highly successful. But we cannot take the treaty, the IMS, or the de facto global nuclear test moratorium for granted.

Now is the time to act to reinforce the treaty and the global norm against nuclear testing, which is important for the achievement of nuclear disarmament.

Endorsed by:

Dr. Rebecca E. Johnson, Executive Director, Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy

Giancarlo Aragona, former Italian Ambassador Moscow and London, former Director of Political Affairs in the Foreign Ministry, and member of the European Leadership Network

Thomas Countryman, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, Chair of the Board of the Arms Control Association

Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association

Shatabhisha Shetty, Director, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

Tanya Ogilvie-White, Senior Research Advisor, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

Joel Petersson Ivre, Policy Fellow, Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non- Proliferation and Disarmament

Peter Wilk, M.D., Administrative Chair, Back from the Brink Coalition

Sebastian Brixey-Williams, British American Security Information Council (BASIC)

Lord Des Browne of Ladyton, Vice-Chair, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)* and former Minister of Defence of the United Kingdom

Susan F. Burk former Special Representative of the President on Nuclear Nonproliferation, and member of the ACA Board of Directors

Rachel Bronson, Ph.D., President & CEO, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Francesco Calogero, Emeritus Professor of Theoretical Physics, University of Rome*

Lord Walter Menzies Campbell of Pittenweem, member of the European Leadership Network*

Dr. Tobias Fella, Coordinator, Commission on Challenges to Deep Cuts*

Dr. Pierce Corden, Former Director of Administration, CTBTO Preparatory Commission John Tierney, Executive Director, Council for a Livable World

Admiral (ret.) Giampaolo Di Paola, former Minister of Defence and former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, and currently Chairman of the Board of Aerea*

Sergio Duarte, Amb. (ret.), Ministry of External Relations of Brazil* and former UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

Lucia Centallas, Founder and Executive Director, Bolivian Women's Efforts

Marc Finaud, Senior Advisor, Associate Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)*

Hubert K. Foy, Director and Senior Research Scientist, African Center for Science and International Security*

Rebecca Davis Gibbons, Professor, University of Southern Maine*

Robert Goldston, Professor, Princeton University, Department of Astrophysical Sciences, Affiliated Faculty Program on Science and Global Security*

Ambassador Thomas Greminger, Executive Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy

Lisbeth Gronlund, Visiting Scholar, Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy, Nuclear Science and Engineering Dept, Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

Amb. Thomas Hajnoczi, (ret.), formerly Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

Lord David Hannay of Chiswick, and member of the European Leadership Network*

Blaise Imbert, Finance Officer, Initiatives pour le Désarmement Nucléaire (IDN)*

Zahnd Patrick, Professeur à Sciences Po Paris, Initiatives pour le Désarmement Nucléaire (IDN)*

Annick Suzor-Weiner, Professor Emeritus, Initiatives pour le Désarmement Nucléaire (IDN)

Daniel Högsta, Interim Executive Director, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN)

Michael Christ, Executive Director, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW)

Garry Jacobd, President and CEO, World Academy of Art and Science*

Tedo Japaridze, Ambassador, former Foreign Minister of Georgia, and Chairman of the Center for Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Studies, House of Justice, Tbilisi

Angela Kane, Former UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

Dr. Togzhan Kassenova, Senior Fellow, Center for Policy Research, University at Albany*

Jan Kavan, former Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, and former President of the UN General Assembly

David A. Koplow, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center*

Dr. Ulrich Kühn, Director Arms Control and Emerging Technologies Program, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg*

Frederick K. Lamb, Research Professor of Physics and Astronomy and Core Faculty Member, Program in Arms Control & Domestic and International Security, University of Illinois*

Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, Vice President, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy

John Burroughs, Senior Analyst, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy

Benetick Kabua Maddison, Executive Director, Marshallese Educational Initiative

János Martonyi, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, and Professor Emeritus at the University of Szeged

Kazumi Matsui, Mayor of Hiroshima and President of Mayors for Peace*

Oliver Meier, Policy and Research Director, European Leadership Network* Ivana Nikolić Hughes, President, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Lord David Owen, former Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom Kevin Martin, President, Peace Action

John Hallam, Nuclear Disarmament Campaigner, People for Nuclear Disarmament

Matthias Grosse Perdekamp, Professor of Physics and Head of the Department of Physics, University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign*

Sebastien Philippe, Research Scholar, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University*

Martin Fleck, Director, Nuclear Weapons Abolition Program, Physicians for Social Responsibility (National)

Denise Duffield, Associate Director, Physicians for Social Responsibility-Los Angeles

Dr. Emma Belcher, President, Ploughshares Fund

Stewart Prager, Professor of Astrophysical Sciences Emeritus, affiliated with the Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University*

Alexander Glaser, Co-Director, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University

Frank N. von Hippel, Senior Research Scientist and Professor of Public and International Affairs emeritus, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University*

Francesca Giovannini, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School

William Potter, Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey*

Robert K. Musil, Ph.D., M.P.H., President & CEO, Rachel Carson Council

Amb. (ret.), Jaap Ramaker, Chair of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament

Tariq Rauf, former Head of Verification and Security Policy, IAEA, and former Consulting Advisor to the Executive Secretary for Policy and Outreach, CTBTO

Ray Acheson, Director, Reaching Critical Will

Lord Martin Rees, Astronomer Royal, and Emeritus Professor of Cosmology and Astrophysics, Department of Astronomy, University of Cambridge*

Christian N. Ciobanu, Project Coordinator, Reverse The Trend: Save Our People, Save Our Planet

Alan Robock, Distinguished Professor, Rutgers University

Carlo Schaerf, Professor of Physics, and co-founder of the International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts (ISODARCO)

Sahil V. Shah Senior Fellow and Program Manager, Janne E. Nolan Center on Strategic Weapons, Council on Strategic Risks*

Mark Muhich, Chairman, Sierra Club Stop Nuclear Weapons Team

Stefano Silvestri, Professor, Scientific Advisor, Istituto Affari Internazionali*

Dr. Jennifer Allen Simons, Founder and President, The Simons Foundation Canada

Ivo Slaus, Professor of Physics Emeritus, Honorary President of the Board of Trustees of the World Academy of Art and Science, and the European Leadership Network*

Goran Svilanovic, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro

Greg Thielmann, former Director of the Strategic, Proliferation and Military Affairs, at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and member of the ACA Board of Directors

Aaron Tovish, Founder and Member of the Coordinating Committee of NoFirstUse Global*

Carlo Trezza, former Ambassador of Italy to the Conference on Disarmament, former Chair of the Missile Technology Control Regime, and member of the European Leadership Network*

Lord David Triesman of Tottenham, member of the European Leadership Network*

Marylia Kelley, Senior Advisor, Tri-Valley CAREs (Communities Against a Radioactive Environment)

Dr. Tara Drozdenko, Director, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists

Dylan Spaulding, Senior Scientist, Union of Concerned Scientists

Deb Sawyer, Facilitator, Utah Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

Jacqueline Cabasso, Executive Director, Western States Legal Foundation

Elayne Whyte-Gomez, Professor of Practice, School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, former Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations Office in Geneva, and President of the Negotiating Conference for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Dr. Klaus Wittmann, Brigadier General (ret.) with the German Armed Forces, Potsdam University

Uta Zapf, former Chair of the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation of the Deutsche Bundestag

*Statement coordinated by the Arms Control Association

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Nongovernmental leaders in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, as well as high-level former government officials, scientists, and downwinders are calling on governments take urgent action to counter growing threats to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the de facto global nuclear test moratorium.

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Transfer of Banned Cluster Munitions to Ukraine Is the Wrong Move

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Cluster Munitions Are Prohibited by the Majority of the World's Nations and NATO Allies  

For Immediate Release: July 6, 2023

Media Contacts: Daryl Kimball, Arms Control Association, (202) 463-8270 ext 107; Susan Aboeid, Human Rights Watch, (212) 290-4700

(Washington D.C.)—The head of the independent, nongovernmental Arms Control Association criticized the announcement expected from the Biden administration that President Biden will shift course and will invoke a waiver under U.S. arms export laws to allow stocks of U.S. cluster munitions to be transferred to the government of Ukraine.

Cluster munitions are designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions, each of which weighs less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions. The U.S. stockpile includes dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICMs), surface-to-surface warheads, and other types of older cluster munitions. Given that cluster munitions disperse hundreds or even thousands of tiny but deadly bomblets, their use produces significant quantities of unexploded submunitions that can maim, injure, or kill civilians and friendly forces during, and long after, a conflict.

The limited military value and the indiscriminate impacts of these weapons led the majority of the world’s countries to negotiate the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. The treaty – which  123 nations have joined – prohibits states parties from developing, producing, acquiring, using, transferring, or stockpiling cluster munitions. While twenty-three NATO members are parties to the treaty, the United States, Ukraine, and Russia are not.

In response to the expected announcement, Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association, said: “Some types of lethal U.S. and European military assistance to Ukraine, including cluster munitions, would be escalatory, counterproductive, and only further increase the dangers to civilians caught in combat zones and those who will, someday, return to their cities, towns, and farms.

Some U.S. officials claim that these weapons 'would be useful' against mass formations of troops and armor or broad targets, such as airfields, and that they would allow Ukraine to concentrate their use of unitary warheads against higher-value Russian targets.

The reality is more complicated. Cluster munitions will not differentiate a Ukrainian soldier from a Russian one. The effectiveness of cluster munitions is significantly oversold and the impact on noncombatants is widely acknowledged, but too often overlooked.

The limited military utility and the substantial humanitarian dangers of cluster munitions are among the key reasons why the Defense Department halted using them in Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003, and has chosen to invest in alternative munitions.

It is why, in 2008, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates issued an order to phase out by 2018 cluster munitions with an unexploded ordnance rate of greater than one percent, and it is why, in 2011, the Obama administration affirmed this policy. It is why Congress, in 2018, enacted a series of export restrictions on cluster munitions with a failure rate in excess of one percent.

The Pentagon has, unfortunately, dragged its feet and in 2017, the Trump administration announced the 2018 deadline for phasing out non-compliant cluster munitions would not be met. No new deadline for meeting that goal was set by the Trump administration or the Biden administration. 

The impetus to help supply Ukraine with the right kind of weaponry to defend its territory against Russian attacks and occupation is understandable. But cluster munitions are not the “winning weapon” in Ukraine’s fight for its future, and the success of its ongoing counteroffensive does not hinge on the delivery of any one particular type of weapon.

Currently, Washington is providing Ukraine with other munitions that are important for its military effort to repel Russia’s forces, including regular 155-millimeter unitary munitions and a new type of 155-mm millimeter artillery shell that can hit targets with greater precision.

Instead of transferring controversial cluster munitions and straining alliance solidarity, Washington and its allies should focus more energy on creative ways to provide Ukraine with the precision-guided munitions and the artillery shells it needs to repel Russian aggression.

It is also clear that cluster munitions produce significant quantities of unexploded submunitions that can maim, injure, or kill civilians and friendly forces during, and long after, a conflict. Human Rights Watch has issued numerous reports detailing civilian harm and suffering from U.S.-made cluster munitions used in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Serbia, and Yemen.

As President Biden noted on the one-year anniversary of Russia’s brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, “The decisions we make over the next five years are going to determine and shape our lives for decades to come… a choice between chaos and stability.”

Rather than add to the chaos and side-step the rules of the global system, President Biden should make it clear that cluster munitions need not and should not be part of the conflict in Ukraine, or in any war."

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Some types of lethal U.S. and European military assistance to Ukraine, including cluster munitions, would be escalatory, counterproductive, and only further increase the dangers to civilians caught in combat zones

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On NSA Advisor Jake Sullivan’s Address at the ACA’s Annual Meeting on “Reducing Nuclear Dangers in a Time of Peril"

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"More nuclear weapons make every person in every nation less secure."

Statement by Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director

(WASHINGTON, D.C.)—At the June 2, 2023 Arms Control Association annual conference, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan delivered a timely address (online here) detailing the Biden administration’s vision to head off nuclear weapons competition and advance arms control at a time of increasing nuclear peril.

Due to a decade of inaction on nuclear disarmament, noncompliance with key arms control agreements and norms, Russia's disastrous war on Ukraine, and rising U.S.-China tensions, we are on the verge of a dangerous three-way arms race that no one can win. In the coming months, we look forward to working alongside the Biden administration as it puts its vision of pursuing effective nuclear arms control and risk reduction efforts among nuclear-weapon states into action.

We encourage President Biden and his team to reinforce Mr. Sullivan’s remarks by asserting that more nuclear weapons make every person in every nation less secure, as well as emphasizing that the United States will exercise prudent nuclear restraint, persistently pursue disarmament diplomacy, and work together with the other major nuclear-armed states to achieve their collective nuclear disarmament responsibilities.

We hope President Biden will pursue a whole of government approach to rallying global opinion around the ongoing need for all five nuclear-armed states under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to adhere to their treaty obligations to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” Failure to do so risks a global arms race and the eventual unraveling of the NPT.

Therefore, the Biden administration should make a concerted and sustained effort to urge the leaders of China, France, and the United Kingdom to agree to freeze the size of their nuclear arsenals as long as Russia and the United States meet their most basic disarmament responsibilities. While not eliminating the threat of nuclear war, such a global freeze would increase the chances of engaging China in arms control at the multilateral level and improve chances for progress on overdue, ambitious nuclear risk reduction and disarmament measures.

Unfortunately, as Russia wages a brutal war against Ukraine, the negotiation of a complex new bilateral nuclear arms control agreement to replace New START before its expiration in early 2026 is untenable. However, as Mr. Sullivan made clear, it is not in either country’s interest to engage in a costly and dangerous nuclear arms race.

To head off that possibility, we implore Russian President Vladimir Putin to shift gears and accept President Biden’s offer to engage in a dialogue on what follows New START. At the same time, the Biden administration should pursue a robust, diplomatic push for the United States and Russia to conclude a unilateral, reciprocal arrangement – verified with national technical means of intelligence – that commits the two countries to not exceeding the deployed strategic warhead limit of 1,550 set by New START until a more permanent arms control arrangement comes into effect.

Mr. Sullivan was smart to push back on the extreme proposals from the Dr. Strangelove caucus in Congress calling for the United States to withdraw from New START and to begin building up the U.S. nuclear arsenal. This would neither advance U.S. national security interests nor increase U.S. negotiating leverage vis-à-vis Russia. Rather, such actions would lend credence to Putin’s cynical disinformation campaign about who carries blame for the breakdown of nuclear arms control, further escalate already high tensions with a dangerous Russia, and undoubtedly encourage China to ramp up its efforts to expand and diversify its nuclear arsenal and undermine the security of U.S. allies in Europe and Asia.

At the same time, we urge the Biden administration to go further and make it clear that, for the foreseeable future, the United States will not and need not increase the size of its current nuclear deployed strategic nuclear arsenal – an arsenal that already far exceeds in number and destructive capability what is necessary to hold a sufficient number of adversary military assets at risk to deter an enemy nuclear attack.

At last year’s ACA Annual meeting, President Biden wrote in a message: “Today—perhaps more than any other time since the Cold War—we must work to reduce the risk of an arms race or nuclear escalation. In this time of intense geopolitical tension, arms control and nonproliferation diplomacy continues to be an essential part of safeguarding … global security.” We still wholeheartedly agree with this statement.

So long as the Russian war on Ukraine rages on, there will be a heightened risk of further nuclear threats from Russia. Going forward, we urge President Biden and his team to work with other responsible states, those with and without nuclear weapons, to push back and to reinforce the nuclear taboo against any and all nuclear threats, not just those issued by Russia in the context of its war on Ukraine.

Rather than attempt to distinguish between responsible and irresponsible nuclear threats, we encourage President Biden to reaffirm the statement he and other leaders (including Mr. Modi of India, Mr. Xi of China, and Mr. Kishida of Japan) issued at the G-20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia that: “nuclear weapons use and threats of use are inadmissable.” Because a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.

U.S. leadership on nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament has always proven essential to reducing and eliminating the nuclear danger. With the danger of nuclear arms racing and nuclear war rising, President Biden, backed by Congress, must jumpstart nuclear disarmament diplomacy and push back on threats of nuclear weapons use. There is no more important responsibility for a U.S. president in the nuclear age.

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"We encourage President Biden and his team to reinforce Mr. Sullivan’s remarks by asserting that more nuclear weapons make every person in every nation less secure, as well as emphasizing that the United States will exercise prudent nuclear restraint, persistently pursue disarmament diplomacy, and work together with the other major nuclear-armed states to achieve their collective nuclear disarmament responsibilities."

 

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National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan to Speak at Arms Control Association Annual Meeting on June 2

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For Immediate Release: May 8, 2023

Media Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, 202-463-8270 ext 107; Tony Fleming, director for communications, 202-463-8270 ext 110.

(Washington, D.C.)--White House National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan will deliver the address at the Arms Control Association's Annual Meeting, “Reducing Nuclear Threats in a Time of Peril,” on June 2, 2023 at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C.

Sullivan will detail the President’s vision  for heading off nuclear weapons competition, advancing nuclear arms control and nonproliferation measures, and reducing the risk of nuclear use. His remarks will come shortly after the Summit of G-7 Leaders on May 19-21 in Hiroshima, Japan, the target of the first atomic bombing.

The nonpartisan Arms Control Association promotes effective arms control policies and supports international efforts to reduce and eliminate the threat posed by the world’s most dangerous weapons. The organization has been at the forefront of efforts to promote nuclear arms control and disarmament for over 50 years.

"We are honored to have National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan deliver keynote remarks on the Biden administration’s vision for reducing nuclear weapons dangers at this pivotal time," said Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association. 

As President Biden wrote in his message to ACA at last year’s annual meeting,“Today—perhaps more than any other time since the Cold War—we must work to reduce the risk of an arms race or nuclear escalation. In this time of intense geopolitical tension, arms control and nonproliferation diplomacy continues to be an essential part of safeguarding … global security."

The June 2 event, which will run from 9am to 4pm, will also feature expert panel discussions on reinforcing the taboo against threats of nuclear use, preventing a three-way arms race,  the Iranian nuclear crisis, and the risks of artificial intelligence involvement in nuclear command and control. Our other keynote speaker is Ambassador Alexander Kmentt, one of the key architects of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Registration for the event is open to the public through the Arms Control Association's website. 

Members of the press may request complimentary registration. 

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Sullivan will detail the President’s vision  for heading off nuclear weapons competition, advancing nuclear arms control and nonproliferation measures, and reducing the risk of nuclear use.  His keynote remarks come shortly after the May 19-21 Summit of G-7 Leaders in Hiroshima, Japan, the site of the first atomic bombing.

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Putin’s Reckless Decision to "Suspend" New START Will Increase Chances of Global Nuclear Arms Race

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Statement from Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director

For Immediate Release: Feb. 21, 2023 (Updated)

Media Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, (202) 463-8270 ext. 107; Shannon Bugos, senior policy analyst, (202) 463-8270 ext. 113

In a rambling attempt to justify Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine one year ago, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his decision to suspend implementation of the last remaining treaty limiting the world's two largest nuclear arsenals, the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).

His comments suggest Russia will not engage in talks to resume New START’s on-site inspections, participate in meetings of the treaty's Bilateral Consultative Commission, nor share data on strategic nuclear stockpiles as required by the treaty. These actions represent a major violation of the terms of New START and are not allowed for under the terms of the treaty. Other senior Russian officials have previously said Russia will maintain under the central limits set by the treaty (1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles). In a separate statement issued today, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reaffirmed that Russia will continue to observe limits on the number of strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems it can deploy under the treaty.

While this does not mark the end of New START, which is scheduled to expire Feb. 5, 2026, Putin’s announcement makes it far more likely that, after New START expires, there will be no agreement limiting U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals for the first time since 1972.

Putin’s “suspension” of New START harms Russia’s own security interests. Absent full implementation of treaty provisions, Moscow (and Washington) gains less insight and information regarding the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal.

In addition, the suspension undermines Russia’s obligations as a party to the 1968 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which requires the nuclear-weapon states to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament…."

In contrast, U.S. President Joe Biden has made it clear that his administration stands ready to expeditiously negotiate a new nuclear arms control framework with Russia to supersede New START–but that Russia must first work in good faith to resume New START inspections. This is a more than reasonable request.

If New START expires in 2026 with no successor arrangement, Washington and Moscow could each double the number of their deployed strategic nuclear warheads in short order. Such a course of action would produce an arms race that no one can win and that increases the dangers of nuclear weapons for everyone.

We strongly support the Biden administration's announcement today that the United States "remains ready to talk about strategic arms limitations at any time with Russia irrespective of anything else going on in the world or in our relationship."

We reiterate our call upon Russia to comply with its obligations to allow for on-site inspections to verify compliance with New START and to engage in further nuclear disarmament diplomacy with the United States.

We also urge all states-parties to the NPT, no matter their position on Russia's war on Ukraine, to urge the Kremlin to meet its nuclear disarmament responsibilities by complying with New START and by agreeing to negotiate new–and ideally lower–limits on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals, as doing so would enhance global security and support the long-term viability of the NPT system.

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Putin’s announcement makes it far more likely that, after New START expires, there will be no agreement limiting U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals for the first time since 1972.

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U.S. Plan for "Responsible Military Use of AI" Constructive but Inadequate

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For Immediate Release: Feb. 16, 2023

Media Contacts: Michael Klare, senior visiting fellow, [email protected]; Shannon Bugos, senior policy analyst, [email protected]

WASHINGTON, DC— Today, the United States proposed a "Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy" during a conference on the issue in Europe.

While a positive signal, the declaration ultimately proves an inadequate response to the militarization of AI and the risks posed by lethal autonomous weapons, according to experts at the independent, nongovernmental Arms Control Association (ACA).

“The motivation for the U.S. framework stems from the deliberations at the expert group meetings convened by the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), where a significant number of states have voiced support for a binding international ban on autonomous weapons capable of killing humans," notes Shannon Bugos, a senior policy analyst at ACA.

In October 2022, the United States joined a diverse, cross-regional group of United Nations member states, led by Austria, on a joint declaration that expressed concern about “new technological applications, such as those related to autonomy in weapons systems.”

"However, the United States and other states with technologically advanced militaries have resisted negotiations on a legally binding instrument to regulate behavior at the CCW, which operates by consensus,” Bugos notes. “Many other states–including Austria, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, New Zealand, and Spain–have proposed negotiations on a legally binding, enforceable agreement to ban lethal autonomous weapons altogether.”

Michael T. Klare, a senior fellow with ACA, concluded that "The U.S. principles on responsible behavior, however comprehensive and commendable, do not make up formal rules or regulations, and are therefore not readily enforceable. This means that any state (including the United States) can endorse the declaration and claim to be abiding by its principles, but then violate them with impunity.”

Klare is the author of the new ACA report Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability that assesses the risks and dangers of new military technologies, including AI and autonomous weapons. The report also provides a framework strategy for curtailing the indiscriminate weaponization of emerging technologies. 

"Principles are nice in theory but will not adequately protect us from the deployment and use of autonomous weapons systems capable of killing humans, possibly in an abusive and indiscriminate manner," Klare argues.

"Given the risks posed by autonomous weapons systems and AI, we continue to urge the United States to act more responsibly and call upon all governments represented at the CCW to support the initiation of negotiations on autonomous weapons, and to help craft an outcome ensuring continued human control over weapons of war and decisions to employ lethal force," said Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association.

 

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While a positive signal, the U.S.-proposed "Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy" ultimately proves an inadequate response to the militarization of AI and the risks posed by lethal autonomous weapons, according to experts.

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New Report Examines Effects of Emerging Military Technologies on Strategic Stability

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For Immediate Release: Feb. 7, 2023

Media Contacts: Michael Klare, senior visiting fellow, [email protected]; Shannon Bugos, senior policy analyst, [email protected] 

(WASHINGTON, DC) — A new report from the Arms Control Association assesses the extent to which the military utilization of emerging technologies will result in or exacerbate the accidental, unintended, or premature use of nuclear weapons in a great-power crisis. The report also provides a framework strategy for curtailing the indiscriminate weaponization of emerging technologies. 

Increasingly in recent years, the major powers have sought to exploit advanced technologies— artificial intelligence, autonomy, cyber, and hypersonics, among others—to gain battlefield advantages. Some officials and analysts posit that such emerging technologies will revolutionize warfare, making obsolete the weapons and strategies of the past. 

Yet, before the major powers move quickly ahead with the weaponization of these technologies, there is a great need for policymakers, defense officials, diplomats, journalists, educators, and members of the public to better understand the unintended and hazardous outcomes of these technologies.

“As was the case during World Wars I and II, the major powers are rushing ahead with the weaponization of advanced technologies before they have fully considered—let alone attempted to mitigate—the consequences of doing so, including the risk of significant civilian casualties and the accidental or inadvertent escalation of conflict,” writes Michael Klare, a senior visiting fellow and board member at the Arms Control Association.

“While the media and the U.S. Congress have devoted much attention to the purported benefits of exploiting cutting-edge technologies for military use, far less has been said about the risks involved,” he emphasizes.

This primer, Assessing the Dangers: Emerging Military Technologies and Nuclear (In)Stability, unpacks the concept of “emerging technologies” and summarizes the debate over their utilization for military purposes and their impact on strategic stability. 

The report provides a deep analysis of four particular technologies—autonomous weapons systems, hypersonic weapons, cyber weapons, and automated battlefield decision-making systems—and details an overarching strategy for mitigating their dangerous weaponization and their associated risks. The primer provides an invaluable resource for policymakers, journalists, educators, and others seeking a concise yet comprehensive overview of recent developments in the field.

The full report is available for download at ArmsControl.org/Reports.

 

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Russia Should Agree to Resume Inspections, Discuss Follow-On To New START

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For Immediate Release: Feb. 3, 2023

Media Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, 202-463-8270 ext. 107; Shannon Bugos, senior policy analyst, 202-463-8270 ext. 114

(Washington DC) —Experts from the Arms Control Association called upon Russia to comply with its obligations to allow for on-site inspections to verify compliance with the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and to engage in further nuclear disarmament diplomacy with the United States.

“It is in Russia’s self-interest to resume on-site inspections and to engage in talks with the United States to hammer out new nuclear arms control framework agreement to supersede New START before it expires in three years, on Feb. 5, 2026,” says Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association.

“Russia’s failure to allow for the resumption of New START inspections is irresponsible and unnecessary, especially at this time of heightened tensions and uncertainties,” says Kimball. “Maintaining common sense limits on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals remains in the common security interests of Washington and Moscow, as well as the world.”

The U.S. State Department released its annual compliance assessment report on New START Jan. 31.

“Russia’s decisions to prohibit on-site inspections and to unilaterally cancel a meeting of the treaty’s Bilateral Consultative Commission meeting stand in clear violation of New START,” said Cara Abercrombie, deputy assistant to the president and coordinator for defense policy and arms control for the U.S. National Security Council, during a Feb. 1 briefing hosted by the Arms Control Association.

In August 2022, Moscow announced a prohibition of on-site inspections of its nuclear weapons-related facilities subject to the treaty citing obstacles to its ability to conduct those inspections. Russia and the United States planned to convene the Commission in Cairo, Egypt, in November 2022 to resolve the dispute issue, but Moscow called off the meeting and has since refused to reschedule as required by the treaty. The United States has made it clear that there are no obstacles that would impede Russia from conducting reciprocal inspections of U.S. strategic nuclear facilities.

New START will expire in exactly 1,098 days. Two years ago today, U.S. President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to extend the treaty by the full five years, in order to allow for more time to put into place a replacement arrangement.

“The United States and Russia have continued to emphasize their support of New START and have cited its great value in providing predictability, transparency, and stability,” says Shannon Bugos, a senior policy analyst at the Arms Control Association. “Washington and Moscow must maintain strong adherence to the agreement, so as to mitigate nuclear escalation and misunderstandings and to pave the way for further U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reductions.”

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Over 1,000 Scientists Condemn All Threats to Use Nuclear Weapons

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For Immediate Release: Jan. 17, 2023

Media Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, Member of the Steering Committee, Physicists Coalition for Nuclear Threat Reduction (202) 463-8270 ext 107; Chris Rostampour, Policy and Communications Coordinator, Physicists Coalition for Nuclear Threat Reduction  (202) 463-8270, ext 103

(Washington D.C./New York) — From the beginning of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly issued threats to use nuclear weapons. As the war continues into 2023, the risk of nuclear war remains high.

In response, a group of more than 1,000 scientists across various fields issued a joint statement, condemning all threats to use nuclear weapons.

In the statement, which was delivered to key governments and decision-makers today, the scientists “… state unequivocally that any threat to use nuclear weapons, at any time and under any circumstances, is extremely dangerous and totally unacceptable. We call on all people and governments everywhere to clearly condemn all nuclear threats, explicit or implicit, and any use of such weapons.”

The scientists' statement warns that: “Once nuclear weapons are used in a conflict, particularly between nuclear-armed adversaries, there is a risk that it could lead to an all-out nuclear conflagration.”

“If the United States or NATO were to launch a nuclear retaliatory strike against Russia in response to a Russian nuclear attack in Ukraine,” the scientists’ statement notes, “it would create significant risk of an escalatory cycle of nuclear destruction.”

U.S. President Joseph Biden said in early October, “I don’t think there’s any such thing as an ability to easily use a tactical nuclear weapon and not end up with Armageddon.”

“Today, it is widely understood that there can be no adequate humanitarian response following the use of nuclear weapons,” the statement notes. “Nuclear weapons kill and injure people immediately and indiscriminately, destroy cities, and contaminate the soil, water, and atmosphere with radioactivity. The smoke from burning cities in a nuclear war could darken and cool Earth’s surface for years, devastating global food production and ecosystems and causing worldwide starvation.”

“Despite this, all nine nuclear-armed states are investing in sustaining and modernizing their nuclear arsenals and have plans to use them to wage nuclear war if they choose. So long as countries possess these weapons of mass destruction, there is a risk they will be used. Threats to use nuclear weapons, especially in a time of war, make their use more likely,” the scientists write.

The scientists’ statement adds to the chorus of voices warning against the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any nuclear-armed states for any reason.

In June 2022 the 65 states-parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons issued a political statement noting that “…any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a violation of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations” and condemning “unequivocally any and all nuclear threats, whether they be explicit or implicit and irrespective of the circumstances.” In November 2022, the Group of 20 states agreed that threats and use of nuclear weapons are “inadmissible.”

Since the beginning of the nuclear age, scientists have warned governments and publics what these terrible weapons can do. In 1946, the Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists, chaired by Albert Einstein, warned the world about nuclear weapons, calling for their elimination and declaring that otherwise, “If war breaks out, atomic bombs will be used, and they will surely destroy our civilization.”

“With this statement, we add our voices to those already speaking out about the immense danger posed by nuclear weapons and call for immediate and concrete actions towards their elimination,” the January 2023 scientists’ statement concludes.

The scientists’ statement was delivered to the office of the UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, the office of the President-elect of the UN General Assembly, Csaba Kőrösi, as well as the permanent missions of the United Nations member states in New York.

Among the 1,000 signatories are several Nobel Prize laureates and Shaw Prize winners, members of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and hundreds of other distinguished scientists from across the United States and around the globe.

The full text of the statement and list of signatories is available online.

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In a statement, which was delivered to key governments this week, 1,000 scientists “… state unequivocally that any threat to use nuclear weapons, at any time and under any circumstances, is extremely dangerous and totally unacceptable. We call on all people and governments everywhere to clearly condemn all nuclear threats, explicit or implicit, and any use of such weapons.”

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Staff at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant Recognized as 2022 Arms Control Persons of the Year

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For Immediate Release: Jan. 13, 2023

Media Contacts: Tony Fleming, director for communications, 202-463-8270 ext. 110; Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, 202-463-8270 ext. 107

(Washington, D.C.)—The Energoatom staff at Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP) were selected as the 2022 Arms Control Persons of the Year through an online poll that drew more than 3,500 participants from nearly 80 countries.

Zaporizhzhia staff gathered Feb. 16, 2022, for a day of unity celebrated by Energoatom’s employees. (Photo: Energoatom)The annual contest is organized by the independent, nongovernmental Arms Control Association to highlight positive initiatives—some at the grassroots level, some on the international scale—designed to advance disarmament, nuclear security, nonproliferation, civilian protection, and international peace, security, and justice.

The Energoatom staff at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear complex were nominated for their heroic efforts to maintain nuclear safety and security at the plant under conditions of immense hardship resulting from the illegal Russian military occupation of the facility, which is Europe’s largest nuclear power plant, and amid continued shelling of the ZNPP facility.

"Russia’s illegal and unprecedented occupation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant created an untenable nuclear safety and security situation. In the face of harassment and threats by Russian forces, Ukrainian personnel have continued to operate the plant and avert a nuclear crisis,” noted Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy with the Arms Control Association.

"The international community owes a debt of gratitude to the heroism and bravery of the Zaporizhzhia personnel, but this dire situation cannot continue,” Davenport said. "The ongoing safety and security risks underscore the critical importance of establishing a zone of protection at the site, returning control of Zaporizhzhia to Ukraine, and strengthening the norm against targeting civilian nuclear infrastructure,” she added.

The runner-up in this year’s contest was Archbishop John Wester of Santa Fe, nominated for preaching the nuclear disarmament gospel in a religious context. His January 2022 pastoral letter reflects the Catholic Church's long history of speaking out against the threats posed by nuclear weapons and calls on U.S. citizens to take “concrete steps toward abolishing nuclear weapons and ending the nuclear threat.”

The December 2022 issue of Arms Control Today includes an interview with Wester by editor Carol Giacomo titled: "Making the Case That Nuclear Weapons Are Immoral.”

Online voting was open from Dec. 8, 2022, until Jan. 12, 2023. A list of the ten candidates, who were nominated by the Arms Control Association staff and board of directors, is available at https://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2022-12/2022-arms-control-persons-year-nominees-announced.

Previous recent winners of the "Arms Control Person of the Year" include: Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard and the Government of Mexico (2021); Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins and WCAPS (2020); the government of the Marshall Islands and its former Foreign Minister Tony de Brum (2016); and Setsuko Thurlow and the Hibakusha of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, (2015). A full list of past winners can be found on the Arms Control Association website.

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The Energoatom staff at Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP) were selected as the 2022 Arms Control Persons of the Year through an online poll that drew more than 3,500 participants from over 75 countries.

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