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Business Executive for National Security
June 2, 2022
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Trump's Oil Sanctions Compound Error of Violating 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal

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Statement from Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy

For Immediate Release: Nov. 2, 2018

Media Contact: Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy, 202-463-8270 ext. 102 

Iran’s commitment to continue implementing the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), faces another test Nov. 5, when the Trump administration’s biting sanctions on Iran’s oil sector come back into effect.

This move further compounds President Trump's reckless and irresponsible decision in May to violate the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, despite acknowledging Iran’s compliance with the accord, and reimpose sanctions. It is another serious blow to the Trump administration’s already low credibility on nuclear nonproliferation matters.

Although the new oil sanctions are unlikely to change Iran’s commitment to the JCPOA in the short-term, the long-term viability of the deal remains at risk.

The Trump administration has falsely claimed that the JCPOA has been a failure because it did not “fix” Iran’s activities in policy areas beyond the scope of the nuclear deal, such as Tehran’s support for non-state actors. 

In reality, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has significantly reduced Iran’s capability to produce bomb-grade nuclear material, opened it up to a more robust international inspections regime, and blocked its major pathways to nuclear weapons for years to come. The International Atomic Energy Agency has repeatedly confirmed that Tehran is complying with the restrictions set by the JCPOA.

Worse yet, the Trump administration turned down earlier proposals from our European partners on addressing Iran’s malign activities in other areas, and the Trump administration’s overreliance on sanctions and its “maximum pressure” policy is not a viable strategy for replacing the JCPOA. The Trump administration’s approach is a recipe for conflict and increased proliferation risks in the Middle East.

We encourage the other parties to the JCPOA to continue to meet their obligations and preserve legitimate trade with Iran. The international community must fulfill UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the nuclear deal and called upon all states to support it, until such time as the United States comes back into compliance with the agreement and new talks can begin on win-win approaches to extend and build upon key elements of the JCPOA.

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Although the new oil sanctions are unlikely to change Iran’s commitment to the JCPOA in the short-term, the long-term viability of the deal remains at risk.

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MEDIA ADVISORY: Head of CTBTO Describes Inspection Option for North Korea Nuclear Test Site

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New Analysis by CTBTO Executive Secretary Lassina Zerbo Published in Arms Control Today

For Immediate Release: Oct. 18, 2018

Media Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, publisher, Arms Control Today, 202-463-8270 ext. 107; Kirstie Hansen, CTBTO Public Information Officer in Vienna, [email protected]

(Washington, D.C.)—Earlier this year, North Korea committed to closing its nuclear test site and invited journalists to view the destruction of test tunnels at its main nuclear test site.

As Dr. Lassina Zerbo writes in a new article in the journal Arms Control Today, “although the declared closure is welcome, those present lacked the skills and necessary specialized equipment to assess the activities that took place.”

The U.S. State Department issued a statement Oct. 7 indicating that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un “invited inspectors to visit the Punggye-ri nuclear test site to confirm that it has been irreversibly dismantled.” To date, it is not clear who would inspect the site and under what terms.

“The CTBTO and its technological tools,” Zerbo writes, “are uniquely placed to provide adequate verification and to monitor an end to nuclear tests in North Korea.”

Zerbo, who is serving in his second term as the Executive Secretary of the CTBTO, describes in detail the technologies the CTBTO can provide to verify the closure of a nuclear test site, and, he explains the value of North Korean signature and ratification of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) for the denuclearization process.

“The path to the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula runs through the CTBT,” Zerbo writes. The CTBT has been signed by 184 states and ratified by 167. North Korea is not yet a signatory.

A large group of foreign ministers issued a joint statement Sept. 27 organized by Japan, Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands urging North Korea “to sign and ratify the CTBT as a matter of priority.”

“It is vital not to miss this opportunity to demonstrate to the world the value of the treaty and the efficacy of one of the most sophisticated and far-reaching verification regimes ever devised,” Zerbo says in the article.

“The Nuclear Test Ban and the Verifiable Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” by Lassina Zerbo will appear in the November 2018 issue of Arms Control Today. It is available in advance online here. 

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New Analysis by CTBTO Executive Secretary Lassina Zerbo Published in Arms Control Today

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Pompeo Must Seize the Diplomatic Opportunity with North Korea

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The stage is set for U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to jump-start the stalled denuclearization and peace negotiations with North Korea. As outlined in the Sept. 19 North-South Pyongyang Summit Declaration, Kim Jong-un has said he is willing to permanently dismantle the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, as the United States takes corresponding measures, such as supporting a joint political declaration on the end of the Korean War.

The Yongbyon complex is North Korea's major nuclear weapons production site. It includes a 5-megawatt research reactor that produces spent fuel; a reprocessing plant that separates weapons-usable plutonium; and a uranium enrichment facility, among other facilities.

A verifiable shutdown of Yongbyon would make it harder for North Korea to further expand its fissile stockpile which could be enough for 16 to 60 nuclear warheads, create momentum for further action-for-action steps, and help buy time for the long and difficult negotiations on further steps on the road toward denuclearization and peace on the Korean peninsula.

As the foreign ministers of Japan, Australia, the European Union, and dozens of other states suggested in a joint statement last week, North Korea should take another denuclearization step: signing and ratifying the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and allowing experts from the CTBT Organization to visit the Punggye-ri test site to confirm its closure.

A joint end of war declaration would ease tensions, build confidence and in no way adversely affect the very strong U.S.-South Korean political and defense alliance, or the ability of U.S. forces in South Korea to deter and defend from any North Korean military provocation.

Hesitation on the part of either side at this point could collapse the fragile diplomatic opportunity that currently exists.

For further information, see the Arms Control Association’s Oct. 3 edition of the “North Korea Denuclearization Digest” available online at https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2018-10-03/inaugural-issue-north-korea-denuclearization-digest-october-3-2018

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Hesitation on the part of either side at this point could collapse the fragile diplomatic opportunity that currently exists.

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The Third Inter-Korean Summit: A Catalyst for Denuclearization and Peace on the Peninsula?

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For Immediate Release: Sept. 17, 2018

Media Contacts: Daryl Kimball, executive director, 202-463-8270 ext 107

This week, South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong-un of North Korea will meet in Pyongyang for only the third Inter-Korean Summit, with a focus on steps to advance their Panmunjeon Declaration and on how to jump-start the U.S.-North Korean talks on denuclearization and peace, which has stalled since the Trump-Kim Summit in Singapore.

Today, the UN Security Council will meet in emergency session to discuss enforcement of sanctions against North Korea designed to pressure Pyongyang to negotiate.

Arms Control Association has several background resources and experts available for interview.


QUICK QUOTES:

  • "President Trump did the right thing, trading in violent rhetoric for an opportunity for dialogue. There are dozens of reasons to distrust North Korea’s approach to negotiations and to doubt the capability of the Trump administration to negotiate a meaningful, verifiable denuclearization of North Korea. But the pursuit of negotiation is far preferable to simply sleepwalking toward war, as we seemed to be doing a year ago.” —Thomas Countryman, former assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation, and chair of the ACA board of directors
     
  • “The Singapore summit communiqué underscores that progress on denuclearization depends on joint 'efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime' on the Korean peninsula. Kim is not going to give up nuclear weapons if he believes doing so will compromise North Korea’s security. Progress on denuclearization steps—such as a freeze on fissile material production and a declaration detailing North Korea’s program— depends on U.S. support for a joint political declaration on the end of the Korean War.” —Daryl Kimball, executive director


NEWS & ANALYSIS:


FACT SHEETS:


EXPERTS AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON:

Contact Tony Fleming, director for communications, 202 463 8270 ext 110 to schedule.

  • Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, [email protected], (202) 463-8270 ext. 107
  • Thomas Countryman, former Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, and chair of the board for the Arms Control Association, [email protected], (301) 312-3445

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Addressing the Risks of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Through the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

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For Immediate Release: September 7, 2018

Media Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, (202) 463-8270 ext. 107; Michael Klare, senior visiting fellow, (202) 463-8270

The widespread deployment of highly autonomous weapons—systems capable of operating with minimal human oversight—is likely to transform the future battlefield, accelerating the pace of fighting and delegating many critical battle decisions to machines. Technologies now in development could endow machines with the capacity to search for, identify, and kill humans on the battlefield or to hunt for and destroy an adversary’s nuclear deterrent systems, possibly igniting a nuclear exchange.

We agree with a growing number of governmental and nongovernmental experts that the unregulated deployment of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) could lead to violations of the Law of War and international humanitarian law and increase the risk of uncontrolled escalation in a major-power crisis.

We call upon responsible states to promptly pursue multilateral negotiations on a legally-binding instrument to ensure meaningful human control over weapons of war and decisions to employ the lethal use of force.

For four years, signatory states to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)—a treaty signed in 1980 with the aim of eliminating munitions deemed excessively cruel or injurious—have sought to assess the potential dangers posed by autonomous weapons and to consider whether new measures were needed to control them. Most recently this investigative task was entrusted to a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), which most recently met Aug. 27-31 in Geneva.

A significant number of governments have concluded that the use of fully autonomous weapons can never be reconciled with international humanitarian law and have advocated the adoption of a legally binding ban on such munitions; others have called for a nonbinding measure incorporating some basic principles on LAWS, like the necessity for ultimate human control; while a small minority, including the world’s major weapons producers, Russia and the United States, argue against any new measures regulating LAWS.

At its most recent meeting, virtually every delegation at the GGE affirmed that humans should always retain ultimate control over weapons systems, but they failed to agree on a path forward other than to continue further expert-level discussions in 2019.

Given the rapid progress in autonomous weaponry research and development and given that many autonomous weapons systems are moving rapidly toward deployment, it is past time for responsible governments to act.

Current policies and practices are clearly insufficient to address the dangers posed by LAWS. The U.S. government’s guidelines, outlined in a 2012 Department of Defense directive, says such systems should allow for “appropriate levels of human judgment” over the use of lethal force, leaving open the question of what constitutes “appropriate.”

The Group of Governmental Experts, which began their deliberations in 2016, has had ample time to investigate the dangers posed by autonomous weapons. Although important technical issues regarding definitions relating to LAWS remain, we believe that the time for discussion is over and that the dangers of deploying lethal autonomous weapons have been sufficiently demonstrated to warrant the initiation of formal negotiations on meaningful control mechanisms.

The appropriate place for these to begin is at the next meeting of the CCW’s High Contracting Parties, set for Nov. 21-23 in Geneva.

We fully recognize that there are differences among member states on what sort of limits to place on lethal autonomous weapons, if at all. But as the U.S. has argued in another negotiating forum, the Conference on Disarmament (which also operates by consensus), negotiations do not assume any particular outcome but allow for careful consideration of competing proposals.

We therefore urge United States to act more responsibly and call upon all governments represented at the CCW to support the initiation of negotiations on autonomous weapons at their meeting in November and to help craft an outcome ensuring continued human control over weapons of war and the decision to employ lethal force.

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Technologies now in development could endow machines with the capacity to search for, identify, and kill humans on the battlefield or to hunt for and destroy an adversary’s nuclear deterrent systems, possibly igniting a nuclear exchange.

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Comments from Executive Director Daryl Kimball In Response to Bolton-Patrushev Meeting in Geneva

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For Immediate Release: August 23, 2018

Media Contacts: Daryl Kimball, executive director, 202-463-8270 ext 107; Kingston Reif, director for disarmament policy, 202-463-8270 ext 104

At their summit in Helsinki, President Vladimir Putin presented the Trump administration with several proposals “to work together further to interact on the disarmament agenda, military, and technical cooperation,” incuding talks on the extension of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Following the summit, President Donald Trump stated that “[p]erhaps the most important issue we discussed at our meeting...was the reduction of nuclear weapons throughout the world.”

Unfortunately, they did not reach any agreement on how to do so in Helsinki.

Even after a follow-up meeting to between U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton and his Russian counterpart Nikolai Patrushev in Geneva, Bolton did not announce any agreement on resuming the nuclear arms control dialogue.

Now is the time to do so.

A qualitative nuclear arms race is underway—and a quantitative nuclear arms race may be just around the corner. The United States and Russia are both rushing forward with costly and ambitious plans to replace their Cold War nuclear arsenals and develop new types of destabilizing weapons.

In little more than two years, on Feb. 5, 2021, New START is scheduled to expire. Without a positive decision by the two presidents to extend the treaty by 5 years, as allowed for in Article XIV, there would be no legally binding limits on the world’s two largest arsenal for the first time since 1972. The risk of unconstrained U.S.-Russian nuclear competition, and even more fraught relations, would grow.

Russia has voiced interest in an extension of New START or even possibly further cuts in warhead numbers.

But today, Bolton said the Trump administration is still in the "early stages" of an interagency review about whether to extend, replace, or jettison New START, or pursue a different type of approach, such as the 2002 “Moscow Treaty” approach, which did not involve a adequate verification system and only applied to deployed warheads.

If Trump wants to avoid an unconstrained nuclear arms race, a prompt decision to extend New START is the logical path forward. If not, we may see the emergence of an even more dangerous phase in U.S.-Russian relations.

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At their summit in Helsinki, Putin presented the Trump administration with several proposals “to work together further to interact on the disarmament agenda, military, and technical cooperation,” incuding talks on the extension of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).Following the summit, Trump stated that “[p]erhaps the most important issue we discussed at our meeting...was the reduction of nuclear weapons throughout the world.”

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First-Ever Study Finds Congressional Attention on Nuclear Security Waning as Nuclear Terrorism Threat Persists

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For Immediate Release: July 26, 2016

Media Contacts: Nathan Sermonis, Executive Director, Partnership for a Secure America, (202) 293-8580; Jack Brosnan, Program Associate, Partnership for a Secure America, 202-293-8580; Kingston Reif, Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy. Arms Control Association, 202-463-8270 ext. 104; Tony Fleming, Director for Communications and Operations, Arms Control Association, 202-463-8270 ext. 110
 

(Washington, D.C.)—A new report from Partnership for a Secure America and the Arms Control Association reveals a concerning diminution of congressional engagement and interest in critical efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism.

The report, Empowering Congress on Nuclear Security: Blueprints for a New Generation, assesses current congressional staff attitudes about nuclear security and explores the role of Congress and case studies in congressional leadership on this issue. The report also offers action items for lawmakers in enhancing nuclear security efforts and reducing global stockpiles of nuclear materials.

“As the threat of nuclear terrorism continues to loom, America must maintain its leadership of global efforts to keep dangerous nuclear and radiological materials out of the wrong hands,” said Nathan Sermonis, Executive Director of Partnership for a Secure America. “Unfortunately, congressional interest has steeply declined with nuclear security faded from the headlines. We need, however, an all-of-government approach to advance the most effective measures against this threat.”

This joint report, made possible by funding provided by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, comes at a time when national attention on the security of nuclear and radioactive materials is decreasing even as these materials remain at risk from theft and more countries express interest in nuclear research and development.

“Despite significant progress in securing and eliminating nuclear materials around the world and the continued dedicated leadership role of several lawmakers, there is a need for Congress to play a more active role in shaping nuclear security policy,” noted Kingston Reif, Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy at the Arms Control Association. “We provide an important blueprint to build upon Congress’ historic bipartisan achievements on nuclear security and engage a new generation of policy advisers on Capitol Hill.”

To mark the publication of the report, Partnership for a Secure America and the Arms Control Association will be hosting an invitation-only event July 26 on Capitol Hill for congressional staff. The event will feature Ambassador Linton Brooks, Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, and General Frank Klotz.

For more information about the report, please contact Partnership for a Secure America at [email protected] or (202) 293-8580, or the Arms Control Association at [email protected] or (202) 463-8270 ext. 104.

The full report, Empowering Congress on Nuclear Security: Blueprints for a New Generation, is available online.

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A new report reveals a concerning loss of congressional leadership and interest in critical efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism.

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New Report Assesses the Impact of the Nuclear Security Summits, Yet Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Still Looms

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For Immediate Release: July 17, 2018

Media Contacts: Tony Fleming, Director for Communications and Operations, Arms Control Association, (202) 463-8270, ext. 110; Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy. Arms Control Association, 202-463-8270 ext. 102; Anna Schumann, Communications Director, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 202-546-0795 ext. 2115; Sara Z. Kutchesfahani, Senior Program Coordinator FMWG; Senior Policy Analyst, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 202-546-0795 ext. 2106.

(Washington, D.C.)—A new report from the Arms Control Association and the Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG) found that the innovative use of voluntary national commitment-making during four summits held between 2010 and 2016 led states to take more than 935 actions to significantly strengthen nuclear security.

The report, The Nuclear Security Summits: An Overview of State Actions to Curb Nuclear Terrorism 2010-2016, details the national commitments made by 53 states over the course of the Nuclear Security Summit process.

“The Nuclear Security Summits’ innovative use of national commitment-making significantly strengthened global nuclear security,” said Dr. Sara Z. Kutchesfahani, senior program coordinator for the FMWG and a co-author of the report. “Delivering on national commitments drove states to take critical steps that reduced the risk of nuclear terrorism.”

The summits’ chief accomplishments include the entry into force of a key treaty that sets binding requirements for the physical protection of nuclear material in civilian programs and the removal of all weapons-usable nuclear materials from eight participating states.

Nearly three dozen states passed new laws or updated existing regulations to strengthen nuclear security and states created more than 20 new nuclear security centers to enhance training and culture development. In total, the accomplishments strengthened nuclear security and reduced the risk of nuclear terrorism.

Yet, as indicated by a recent July 3 incident in which a drone was crashed into a French nuclear facility, gaps in the nuclear security architecture remain.

“Despite the accomplishments of the summit, the threat posed by nuclear terrorism continues to evolve,” noted Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association and co-author of the report. “Effective nuclear security requires continuous improvement to address gaps and new threats.”

“States must continue to build on the accomplishments of the summit process to minimize the risk of nuclear terrorism,” said Erin Connolly, program assistant at the FMWG and co-author of the report. “Despite the end of the summit process, states must continue to commit to national actions that will curb nuclear terrorism.”

The full report, The Nuclear Security Summits: An Overview of State Actions to Curb Nuclear Terrorism 2010-2016, is available online.

 

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Trump and Putin to Talk Nuclear Arms Control

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For Immediate Release: June 28, 2018

Media Contacts: Kingston Reif, director for disarmament policy, 202-463-8270 ext 104; Daryl Kimball, executive director, 202-463-8270 ext 107

President Donald Trump and President Vladimir Putin will meet in Helsinki, Finland July 16 to discuss how to reduce tensions between the nations across a range of issues, including nuclear arms control. It is widely expected that the future of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which will expire in 2021 unless extended by mutual agreement, and the compliance dispute over the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty will both be on the agenda.

In an interview in March, Putin voiced interest in an extension of New START or even possibly further cuts in warhead numbers. The Trump administration is conducting a review of its position on the matter. 

Arms Control Association has a number of resources and experts available to shed light on what the two sides can achieve to reduce nuclear risks and what’s at stake if they fail to make progress.

QUICK QUOTES:

  • "Extending New START would be an easy win for the President. It could help create a positive atmosphere for reducing tensions in the U.S.-Russia relationship without making an unwise or impractical concession to Moscow. Failing to do so, on the other hand, will limit U.S. intelligence on the scale of the Russia nuclear arsenal." —Kingston Reif, director for disarmament policy
     
  • “Without a positive decision to extend New Start, and if the INF Treaty comes to an end, there would be no legally-binding limits on the world’s two largest nuclear superpowers for the first time since 1972, and the risk of unconstrained U.S.-Russian nuclear competition would grow.” —Daryl Kimball, executive director

  • "Should the INF Treaty collapse and New START expire without replacement … the consequences for effective cooperative management of nuclear risks and for nuclear nonproliferation would be severe.” —Thomas Countryman, former assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation, and chair of the ACA board of directors

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FACT SHEETS:

EXPERTS AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON:
Contact Tony Fleming, director for communications, 202 463 8270 ext 110 to schedule media interviews with any of the experts or authors noted above.

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President Donald Trump and President Vladimir Putin will meet in Helsinki, Finland July 16 to discuss how to reduce tensions between the nations across a range of issues, including nuclear arms control. The Arms Control Association can provide resources and experts available to shed light on what the two sides can achieve to reduce nuclear risks and what’s at stake if they fail to make progress.

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Trump Team Undermines Climate for Summit and Negotiated Solution

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(Washington, D.C.)—Even before Thursday’s announcement by President Donald Trump to cancel the planned Singapore Summit with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, there was ample reason to believe that the two sides were not on the same page about the pace, scope, and sequencing of steps to denuclearize the Korean peninsula and create a peace regime in the region.

It was also clear that the Trump administration itself was not on the same page about the goals of the meeting, nevertheless, the summit would have been a critical opportunity to test the waters, de-escalate tensions, and launch a sustained, serious diplomatic process on denuclearization.

Whether by accident or by design, Trump’s top advisors contributed to creating a hostile environment around the summit. It is unsurprising that loose talk from National Security Advisor John Bolton and Vice President Mike Pence about “the Libya model” for denuclearization and recent comments from Pence threatening war if North Korea does not agree to a deal triggered a strong reaction from Pyongyang.

The tone of North Korea’s reaction was clearly unhelpful, but it is not surprising.

Unfortunately, Trump got spooked when he should have stayed calm and carried on.

His strongly worded letter to Kim canceling the summit was irresponsible and risks the opportunity for future negotiations with North Korea. His language comparing nuclear weapon sizes only increases the likelihood that the United States and North Korea will return to a tit-for-tat escalation that characterized 2017 and increase the risk of war.

North Korea has long maintained that its nuclear weapons are a deterrent against U.S. "hostile policy." Threatening “total decimation" if Pyongyang does not give up its arsenal only reinforces that belief.

Comprehensive, verifiable denuclearization of North Korea and establishment of a peace regime on the peninsula remains the proper long-term goal. But achieving genuine progress requires a negotiating framework and agreement on the details of phased, reciprocal steps rather than U.S. economic rewards only after full denuclearization is achieved. Such a process requires time and patience and persistence.

Successful diplomatic nonproliferation outcomes do not come easily or quickly.

In the coming days, Trump must resist the urge to abandon diplomacy and make irresponsible threats, which will only reinforce North Korea's incentive to further improve its nuclear and missile activities and greatly increase the likelihood of a catastrophic confrontation. There is no viable military solution to the North Korean challenge.

We urge Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, in coordination with our allies and partners in the region, to continue engaging with his North Korean counterparts to advance efforts to halt and reverse the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs and to reduce tensions with Pyongyang, including by supporting the inter-Korean dialogue.

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Successful diplomatic nonproliferation outcomes do not come easily or quickly. But Trump’s top advisors contributed to creating a hostile environment around the summit. North Korea’s reaction was not surprising. Unfortunately, the president got spooked when he should have stayed calm and carried on.

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