September 2026
By Kelsey Davenport

Syria’s new government notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of a newly discovered cache of nuclear materials and allowed agency inspectors access to a site that was likely part of the former government’s illicit nuclear weapons development program.

IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi praised Syria’s “courageous decision” to notify the IAEA about the nuclear material in an Aug. 18 joint press conference with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani in Damascus.

Grossi visited Syria Aug. 17-18 and went to the location where Syria discovered several tons of undeclared nuclear material, which Damascus described as a legacy of the former Assad government. Syria informed the agency that it discovered the material in a July 17 letter. The letter has not been made public but Shibani referenced it during the Aug. 18 press conference.

Grossi did not specify what type of material was found at the site, but Shibani, said that the nuclear “materials do not pose a risk.” Axios reported Aug. 10 that U.S. officials said that the nuclear material is uranium oxide, or yellowcake, a refined uranium ore that can be converted into gas for enrichment. The enriched uranium is then fabricated into fuel for a nuclear reactor.

Under deposed President Bashar al-Assad, Syria conducted undeclared nuclear activities, including the construction of a nuclear reactor at al-Kibar in the Deir el-Zour province. The reactor, which was never declared to the IAEA, was likely intended to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. Israel destroyed the unfinished reactor in a September 2007 air strike. The U.S. intelligence community later assessed that North Korea assisted Syria in constructing the reactor. (See ACT, April 2018.)

After the Israeli strikes, the Assad government refused to allow the IAEA to inspect the bombed site when the agency first requested access in 2008 and denied conducting undeclared nuclear activities. Syria continued to obstruct the agency’s efforts to investigate its undeclared nuclear activities and later cleared the site. In 2011, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution finding Syria in noncompliance with its legally required safeguards obligations under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. (See ACT, July/August 2011.)

Before being overthrown in 2024, Assad let an agency team visit the al-Kibar site. The IAEA took samples, which indicated that uranium had been present at the location. In June 2025, Grossi met Syria’s transitional President Ahmad al-Sharaa and announced that Syria’s new government agreed to give the agency unrestricted access. (See ACT, July/August 2025.)

During his Damascus visit, Grossi said the newly discovered nuclear materials will now be accounted for and “put within the international safeguards system.” He added: “In this way, we will be able to work towards the restoration of Syria as a country in full compliance with all its legal obligations in the area of nuclear nonproliferation.”

Shibani said the nuclear materials will “remain in Syria’s custody, while being subject to the agency’s supervision system.” He suggested during the press conference that Syria may seek to use the nuclear materials for a peaceful nuclear program.

Grossi also visited the al-Kibar site while in Syria. He confirmed that the IAEA’s inspection and excavation of the site was already underway and described the results of the cooperative effort as “really, really remarkable.” He said the agency’s work at al-Kibar “validates the long-standing evaluation” that the nuclear reactor at the site “was being built in secrecy.”

An Aug. 18 joint statement from Grossi and Shibani said that Grossi will report the agency’s conclusions to the IAEA Board of Governors “with the aim of a full resolution of the outstanding issues.”

The Syrian government is also cooperating with the Organisation on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to dispose of chemical weapons stockpiled by the Assad regime. (See ACT, July/August 2026.) 

September 2026
By Michael T. Klare

After first giving U.S. technology firms a relatively free hand to speed development of cutting-edge artificial intelligence models, the Trump administration has issued two directives signaling a more cautious, custodial stance.

This new approach was unveiled June 2, with the issuance of an executive order on AI security, and June 6, with a national security presidential memorandum. Both directives claim to seek the accelerated adoption of advanced AI models by the national security establishment, but also incorporate several restraints and guardrails including protections against the release of AI models with undetected flaws and overreliance on technology contractors with their own agendas.

“The national security enterprise shall accelerate AI adoption by identifying mission areas where AI can enhance operational effectiveness and [by] eliminating unnecessary barriers to rapid deployment,” the memorandum asserts, echoing previous administration AI statements.

But, deviating from earlier guidance, it states, “To protect American warfighters … rigorous security and functionality measures, including testing, evaluation, validation, and verification, shall be implemented to assure the appropriate confidentiality, integrity, reliability, availability, and interoperability of AI systems across the national security enterprise.”

The directives are the latest shift as the Trump administration struggles to devise a clear policy on government oversight and use of the technology as the computing power of advanced “frontier” AI models has increased.

The June 2 executive order authorizes the National Security Agency to determine when an advanced AI system reaches the threshold of a “covered frontier model” and to establish a mechanism whereby developers of those systems voluntarily submit them to the federal government for independent review prior to public release, enabling timely repair of any flaws detected in the process.

The June 6 memorandum bans the use of advanced AI to “conduct unauthorized or unlawful surveillance activities” on U.S. citizens and empowers the government to terminate contracts with technology suppliers “that have repeatedly demonstrated a pattern of conduct that is inconsistent with” administration policy.

The administration’s earlier directives eschewed such restrictions. In his first initiative, Executive Order 14179 of January 23, 2025, President Donald Trump enjoined senior administration officials to terminate all measures adopted by the Biden administration to regulate advanced AI models.

The Trump administration’s original approach to AI development was further articulated in “Winning the Race: America’s AI Action Plan,” released in July 2025. The White House then viewed AI innovation as a race—primarily with China—and believed that a hands-off policy on commercial AI advancement would best ensure a U.S. victory. “The United States is in a race to achieve global dominance in artificial intelligence,” the plan states. “The United States needs to innovate faster and more comprehensively than our competitors … and dismantle unnecessary regulatory barriers that hinder the private sector in doing so.”

But recent developments caused the administration to rethink its stance on dismantling regulatory barriers to AI development, including evidence of rogue behavior by advanced AI models—instances when they circumvented guardrails imposed by human programmers to prevent unauthorized functions—and disputes over the roles private firms play in setting AI functions.

“The political winds have shifted in our direction on this, mostly because the capabilities are increasing, and there are concerns about advanced AI without safeguards,” Brendan Steinhauser, the chief executive of the nongovernmental organization Alliance for Secure AI Action, told The New York Times in February.

Among the factors affecting the Trump administration’s thinking is its dispute with Anthropic over the AI firm’s attempt to impose limits on how the U.S. Defense Department might employ its Claude program in military operations. During contract negotiations in February, Anthropic insisted that the department eschew using Claude to govern autonomous weapons systems or to conduct mass surveillance of U.S. citizens. The move incensed Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who said that only the Pentagon could set the rules for its use of AI products and declared Anthropic a “supply chain risk,” essentially barring it from federal contracts.

Although many federal agencies continue to employ Claude in one capacity or another and the Anthropic-Pentagon dispute, now in federal court, may yet be resolved amicably, U.S. officials seem determined to prevent future instances of corporate overreach in this area, as shown by the June 6 memorandum, with its mandate for the termination of any AI programs with unauthorized corporate provisions.

In a second challenge to the administration’s earlier approach, another Anthropic tool, Claude Mythos, was revealed by the company to be highly proficient at detecting flaws in existing computer code, potentially enabling malign operators to use the system to hack into sensitive computer systems and inflict serious harm.

At first, Anthropic and the Trump administration sought to restrict access to Mythos, but it soon became obvious to AI experts that similar capabilities were, or would soon be available, from other tech companies, including some in China. Beijing “is already racing to build and acquire these AI capabilities and may be closer to developing its own Mythos than many U.S. policymakers hope,” Michael Sulmeyer, a former assistant secretary of defense for cyber policy, wrote in Foreign Affairs.

Defense against advanced AI-enabled cyberattacks thus has become a national security priority, as reflected in Trump’s June 2 executive order, which calls for an “AI cybersecurity clearinghouse” intended to facilitate government-industry collaboration in detecting and repairing key cyber vulnerabilities.

September 2026
By Libby Flatoff

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced that the German military will be participating in a French nuclear exercise for the first time as a part of France’s new deterrence strategy.

“We will have German conventional forces participate in a nuclear exercise conducted by the French armed forces before the end of this year,” Merz said at a July 17 news conference with French President Emmanuel Macron, according to the Associated Press.

The announcement came after Germany and France formed a nuclear steering group March 2, “to coordinate strategic doctrine and exercises.” (See ACT, March 2026.)

Politico reported July 16 that the drills would be part of France’s flagship nuclear exercise, “Poker,” and take place in September. The Federation of American Scientists reported in its 2025 overview of French nuclear weapons that France’s Strategic Air Forces Command conducts about 70 exercises per year, four of which are part of Poker.

The exercise involves “a majority of France’s nuclear-capable Rafale aircraft, which during flights carry unarmed air-sol moyenne portée-amélioré (ASMPA) air-launched cruise missiles,” according to the federation’s profile. The drill carries out a simulated nuclear aid raid and includes refueling operations by A330 MRTT tankers and “penetration of enemy airspace and firing of ASMPA missiles by Rafale fighters.”

On July 16, France and Germany took the first operational step and conducted a joint conventional air activity “in the context of the French concept of forward deterrence,” according to a press release from the French armed forces ministry. No nuclear forces were used, the release stated.

At the July 17 news conference, Merz emphasized that this new drill “complements our commitment to NATO’s nuclear sharing and deterrence arrangements, which we continue to uphold.” Macron noted that he viewed Germany as playing a “vanguard role” in European deterrence.

In April, Germany produced its first defense strategy that noted its goal is to become “the strongest conventional 
army in Europe.” The strategy names Russia as Europe’s biggest threat and also asserts that “Germany must … become an even stronger military Ally to the United States.”

As of January 2026, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimated that a number of NATO member states, including Germany, together host 100 to 120 U.S. B61-12 nuclear bombs as a part of the alliance’s nuclear sharing agreement.

The Franco-German exercise will occur after the United States announced a new six-month force posture review in Europe as it pushes Europe to be primarily responsible for its own defense (See ACT, July/August 2026.) France also conducted two other nuclear steering group meetings, one with Sweden April 23 and the other with Poland July 10.

September 2026
By Kelsey Davenport

Twelve years after Australia and India reached a nuclear cooperation agreement, the two countries finalized the necessary technical arrangements to allow Australia to begin exporting uranium to India.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the deal during the third annual India-Australia summit in Melbourne July 9.

The agreement, which took two years to negotiate, provides a framework for implementing the 2014 nuclear cooperation agreement. According to the Australian government, it addresses long-standing conditions that any exported uranium must be used solely for India’s civil nuclear program and not for nuclear weapons by establishing tracking and accountancy procedures. Neither Australia nor India has provided details about how the accountancy arrangement will function.

In a joint press conference July 9, Albanese emphasized that Australian uranium would be used only for “peaceful purposes” in India and “help increase the share of non-fossil fuel power capacity.” Modi said the deal “will pave the way for uranium supplies from Australia to India and give our clean energy objectives fresh momentum.”

India operates 24 nuclear reactors and is building 10 more, but it relies on imports to fuel its expanding nuclear energy program. Modi initially sought a nuclear cooperation agreement with Australia to secure necessary uranium for fuel purposes. Australia is the fourth-largest producer of uranium and it leads the world in uranium reserves, at about 28 percent.

When the two countries reached a nuclear cooperation agreement in 2014, Modi described the deal as a “historic milestone” and said it would provide his country with “long-term reliable supplies of uranium.” (See ACT, October 2014.)

But after the nuclear cooperation agreement was finalized, Australia’s Joint Standing Committee on Treaties recommended that the country delay any uranium export contracts until certain conditions were met, including on safeguards and inspections, to ensure that Australian uranium did not end up in India’s nuclear weapons program.

As a member of the Treaty of Rarotonga, which established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific, Australia cannot sell nuclear materials to any country that does not have a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The treaty specifically states that the recipient state must have a safeguards agreement as required by the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). India, which developed nuclear weapons outside of the NPT, does have an IAEA safeguards agreement, but it only applies to certain civil facilities.

When the Australian Parliament voted to lift its ban on selling uranium to India in 2011, critics of the deal argued that the facility-specific safeguards are not the same as the comprehensive safeguards agreement required by the NPT. India signed a facility-specific additional protocol with the IAEA in 2014, which helped facilitate its nuclear cooperation agreement with Australia. The additional protocol is designed to provide the IAEA with expanded access to information and sites, but India’s additional protocol omits some of the key transparency provisions included in the IAEA’s model agreement. (See ACT, March 2009.)

September 2026
By Libby Flatoff

The United States implemented additional sanctions and called for further investigation into chemical weapons use by Sudan in 2024.              

The additional economic sanctions went into effect July 20 as Sudan continued to deny the chemical weapon use allegations. New sanctions included aviation restrictions preventing airlines owned by Sudan’s government from engaging in any air transportation to or from the United States.

During the 112th session of the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) July 7-10, the United States reiterated its allegations that Sudan “used chemical weapons in 2024 and remained in non-compliance in 2025.”

In April 2025, Washington first announced that it, “determined under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 … that the Government of Sudan used chemical weapons in 2024.”

As a result, the United States implemented its first round of sanctions against Sudan for chemical weapons use June 26 and 27. The sanctions were to remain in place for at least one year and followed a France 24 investigation published in November 2025 that found strong evidence of chlorine gas used as a chemical weapon by the Sudanese Army Forces in 2024 (See ACT, January/February 2026.)

In response to these initial allegations and sanctions, Sudan formed an internal national technical committee. In May 2025, the Sudan Tribune quoted Sudan’s army chief, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, as saying that the purpose of the committee was “to investigate the American allegations, and it is to submit its report immediately.”

The Sudanese government committee’s interim report was circulated at the OPCW’s July session and concluded: “Based on the information reviewed, field inspections conducted, interviews undertaken, and observations made during the reporting period, the National Committee has not, identified any material, technical, or documentary evidence that substantiates the allegations concerning the use of chemical weapons in the locations examined.”

Delivering the U.S. statement at the OPCW session, Ambassador Nicole Shampaine emphasized that “domestic bureaucratic mechanisms are not a substitute for treaty compliance and independent verification.” She called on Sudan to grant the OPCW Technical Secretariat “unhindered, transparent access.”

After the session, Sudan’s foreign ministry issued a statement asserting that the United States had ignored proposals to verify the chemical weapons use allegations, the Sudan Tribune reported. “The government of Sudan proposed through the joint mechanism to send U.S. experts to Sudan for field investigation and direct verification of claims regarding the army’s use of chemical weapons, but the American side refrained from responding to these invitations.”

September 2026
By Shaghayegh Chris Rostampour

Attacks and disruptions on Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant are rising, heightening concerns about the facility’s ability to maintain essential safety functions.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported Aug. 14 that the plant experienced three losses of off-site power in the first eight days of August, requiring emergency diesel generators to power vital safety systems. This brings the total number of times the plant lost all off-site power since the beginning of the conflict to 25. Thirteen of those outages have occurred in the last four months.

The incidents come amid continuing uncertainty over the plant’s future, which has been illegally occupied by Russia since its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The United States and Russia have proposed different arrangements for the future control and operations of the complex, but Ukraine opposes both proposals. (See ACT, May 2026.)

Meanwhile, a more immediate concern remains the deterioration of plant infrastructure, which increases the risk of meltdown and radiation release. According to the IAEA, the nuclear power complex requires reliable external electricity for reactor and spent-fuel cooling and other essential safety systems. Before Russia invaded Ukraine, the plant had access to 10 off-site power lines. It now has only one operational connection, the 330-kilovolt Ferosplavna-1 line, after damage left the 750-kilovolt Dniprovska line unavailable. When that line is disconnected, as it was on Aug. 8, the plant experiences a complete loss of off-site power and must rely on emergency diesel generators.

A drone struck a turbine May 30, causing localized damage. The IAEA described the incident as the first military activity to directly affect the plant site since April 2024. The plant subsequently suffered repeated power disruptions.

In a June 26 statement, IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi stressed the challenging nature of making repairs during temporary ceasefires, especially as military action continued in the area.

The IAEA reported July 15 that more than two-thirds of the complex’s off-site radiation monitoring stations appeared not to be transmitting data because of power losses or damage. Attacks on local electrical infrastructure disrupted water supplies to parts of the complex and nearby Enerhodar, although groundwater wells remained available for reactor cooling.

On August 1 and 4, the plant lost off-site power, automatically activating emergency diesel generators. The IAEA has described the increasing frequency of outages as “deeply concerning” and reported that the plant raised water levels in its six spent-fuel pools as a precaution against prolonged loss of power and diesel supplies.

No radiological release or loss of reactor cooling has occurred. Although the power plant reactors are currently shut down and therefore in a cold state, continued damage to supporting infrastructure could leave the complex increasingly vulnerable to a prolonged power loss or other emergency.