May 2024  
By Kelsey Davenport

Iran closed its nuclear facilities to international inspectors the day after launching a barrage of drones and missiles at Israel and a senior military official said Tehran may rethink its prohibition on developing nuclear weapons if Israel retaliates by attacking the country’s nuclear infrastructure. 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi said Iran reopened the nuclear sites on April 15, but he kept inspectors away for another day until the situation was “completely calm.”

The April 13 Iranian strike, which included about 300 drones and missiles, was calibrated carefully to allow Israel and its partners to shoot down most of the Iranian systems. But it opens a new chapter in Iran-Israel relations as Tehran signaled it will respond to future Israeli attacks by directly striking Israel rather than relying on proxies and partners in the region. 

At the same time, Iran made clear that it does not wish to escalate the conflict with Israel. Iran’s UN mission said on April 13 that Tehran’s attack was a direct response to an April 1 Israeli strike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus that killed several high-level Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officers and that the matter is “now concluded.”

Although the United States assisted Israel in intercepting the Iranian drones and missiles, the White House said that U.S. President Joseph Biden made clear to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Washington would not participate in any counterstrike against Iran. 

Israel did retaliate for the attack on April 19 by striking several Iranian military sites, including targets near the city of Isfahan, which includes declared nuclear facilities. But Grossi said there was no damage to those nuclear sites. The scope of the attack was limited, suggesting Israel’s intention was to demonstrate to Iran its ability to strike targets deep within the country.

White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre responded to the Israeli strike by saying that the United States does “not want to see this conflict escalate” and that it is working to reduce that risk. 

Before Israel’s counterattack, Ahmad Haghtalab, the IRGC commander in charge of security at Iran’s nuclear facilities, said that Israeli threats to strike the nuclear infrastructure “make it possible to review our nuclear doctrine and deviate from our previous considerations.” 

Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has banned the development of nuclear weapons by religious decree. Nasser Kanaani, spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, reiterated the prohibition in an April 22 press briefing, saying that “nuclear weapons have no place in our nuclear doctrine.” He said the country’s nuclear program is entirely peaceful. 

But Haghtalab’s comments support assessments by western officials and experts that Tehran could rethink that prohibition and develop nuclear weapons if necessary for security.

Iran’s decision to bar access to its nuclear sites and the IAEA delay in resuming inspections suggest Tehran and the IAEA were concerned that Israel could respond to the April 13 attack by targeting Iranian nuclear facilities. 

Grossi told reporters at the United Nations on April 15 that the agency is “always concerned” about the possibility of an Israeli strike and urged “extreme restraint.” 

Some former U.S. and Israeli officials used the April 13 attack to urge Netanyahu to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, despite the risk that such action would drive Iran to develop nuclear weapons. In an April 14 CNN interview, for instance, former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton suggested that Israel should “destroy Iran’s nuclear weapons program” in response. 

Iran has the capability to develop nuclear weapons, but the country is not engaged currently in key weaponization activities, according to the U.S. intelligence community. 

Israel periodically has sabotaged Iranian nuclear facilities and assassinated Iranian nuclear scientists, but it is unclear if the country is willing to risk a large-scale attack on the nuclear program without the support of the United States, particularly if there is no evidence that Tehran is developing nuclear weapons. 

Logistically, it would be challenging for Israel to target some of Iran’s facilities using conventional weapons. Iran’s nuclear infrastructure includes deeply buried sites, such as the Fordow uranium-enrichment facility, that would necessitate the use of larger U.S. conventional bombs, such as the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator, to destroy. Furthermore, without U.S. refueling support, it would be more difficult for the Israeli Air Force to strike Iran because of the distances between the countries.

A large-scale attack on Iran also increases the risk that Tehran will decide that nuclear weapons are necessary to deter future attacks, as Haghtalab suggested. Given that Iran already has the capability to develop nuclear weapons, setbacks from a military strike would be temporary because Iran has the knowledge necessary to reconstitute the program.

As heightened regional tensions and the possibility of an attack on its territory increase the risk of Iran determining that nuclear weapons are necessary, the April 14 decision to close its nuclear facilities demonstrates how the country could cite security concerns to block IAEA access and use the period between inspections to accelerate production of material for a nuclear bomb. 

This risk is heightened because Iran has stockpiled enough uranium of near-weapons-grade quality for about three weapons and is operating centrifuges that enrich uranium efficiently. As a result of these advances, Iran can produce enough weapons-grade material for a nuclear weapon in less than a week. 

Although the IAEA would detect weapons-grade enrichment after resuming inspections, the delay could provide Tehran with enough time to divert the weapons-grade uranium to a covert site for weaponization, a process that could take six months to a year.

Grossi did not appear concerned about the April disruption. He said it “has not had an impact on our inspection activity.” But he continues to raise concerns about the overall ability of the IAEA to monitor Iran’s nuclear program. In a March 29 interview with CNN, he warned that if Iran does not cooperate with the agency, the IAEA is approaching a point where it will not be able to give “a credible assurance that Iran’s nuclear program is entirely peaceful.” He said inspectors must have “full visibility.”

May 2024  
By Kelsey Davenport

A drone strike on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant did not compromise safety and security at the site, but the attack represents a dangerous new stage in the Ukraine war, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) warned on April 11.

IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi reported during an emergency meeting of the agency’s Board of Governors that drones struck several buildings at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear complex on April 7, including a “direct hit on the reactor dome of Unit 6.” The attack is the first direct targeting of the Zaporizhzhia plant since November 2022, he said. 

The drone strike resulted in minimal damage and “did not compromise nuclear safety in a serious way,” according to Grossi, who warned that the attack is “an ominous indication of an apparent readiness” to continue strikes on the facility “despite the grave dangers they pose to nuclear safety and security.”

Russia and Ukraine requested that the board meet after the April 7 strike on Zaporizhzhia and traded accusations over the source of the strike. Russia has occupied the plant illegally since the early days of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The board has called on Russia to withdraw from the facility and return control to Ukraine. 

Mikhail Ulyanov, Russian ambassador to the IAEA, accused the agency of being “afraid” to say Ukraine was behind the attack. During a press briefing following the board meeting, he said that failing to accuse Kyiv is creating “an atmosphere” that “essentially encourages the Ukrainian side to commit reckless actions.” He expressed hope that there will be “no new attacks” on the complex and the opinion that “shooting at nuclear facilities is completely unacceptable.” 

During the IAEA meeting, Ukraine accused Russia of deliberately creating threats to the nuclear security and safety of Zaporizhzhia. 

Laura Holgate, U.S. ambassador to the IAEA, told the board that the United States condemns “all such actions regardless of who the culprit is,” but noted that the “root cause of all events threatening the safety and security of the Zaporizhzhia plant is Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its forcible seizure” of the nuclear facility. She called on Russia to “unconditionally withdraw its military and civilian personnel” from Zaporizhzhia and return control of the nuclear facility to Ukraine. 

The UN Security Council also met to discuss the drone strike. 

Grossi told the Security Council on April 15 that the “attack sets a very dangerous precedent of the successful targeting of the reactor containment.” Other drones struck targets in “close proximity to the main reactor buildings and resulted in at least one casualty,” Grossi said.

Sergiy Kyslytsya, Ukrainian ambassador to the United Nations, called the drone strike a “well-planned false flag operation” by Russia. He dismissed arguments that Ukraine was behind the attack, saying that Kyiv would not risk creating another Chernobyl-like nuclear accident by attacking the facility. Only returning the Zaporizhzhia complex to “the full control of Ukraine” can guarantee nuclear safety, Kyslytsya said. 

During the Security Council meeting, Robert Wood, the U.S. alternative representative to the UN for special political affairs, said that every member of the council should agree on the “fundamental point” that it is “imperative that we avoid a nuclear incident” at Zaporizhzhia. 

Wood also raised concerns about Russia’s targeting of critical Ukrainian infrastructure, which “directly threaten[s] the stability of external power to the [nuclear] site.” He said this poses an “unacceptable nuclear safety risk.” 

The IAEA team stationed at the Zaporizhzhia complex reported that the facility lost connection with its only backup power line on April 4. Reliable power is necessary to cool the reactors and for safety and security. 

All six reactor units are now in cold shutdown, reducing the risk of a nuclear accident, but Russia has suggested that it will try to restart at least some of the units. It is not clear if Russia has the technical capacity and enough personnel to bring any of the reactors online.  

 

May 2024 
By Kelsey Davenport

Russia ended the mandate for a UN experts panel that assesses implementation of UN sanctions on North Korea by vetoing a Security Council resolution extending the panel’s mandate. The United States responded to Russia’s veto by announcing that Washington will find an alternative mechanism to investigate and report on North Korea sanctions enforcement. 

The panel was established in 2009 under Security Council Resolution 1874 and comprises eight members appointed by the secretary-general. It assists the North Korea sanctions committee, known as the 1718 Committee, by analyzing information on sanctions noncompliance submitted by UN member states, making recommendations for more effective implementation of sanctions, and identifying individuals and entities for sanctions designations. The panel shares these findings in annual reports. 

The mandate for the panel formally ended April 30, although the 1718 Committee will continue to operate and states still are legally required to implement Security Council sanctions on North Korea. 

At the United Nations, Russian Ambassador Vasily Nebenzia defended the veto, accusing the West of trying to strangle North Korea using sanctions and describing the pressure-centric approach as “disconnected from reality.” He said that the panel has been “reduced to playing into the hands of Western approaches” and spreading “biased information.” 

Russia supports “updating the sanctions regime” against North Korea, Nebenzia said. 

Russia’s veto of the panel’s extension was not a surprise. Although the mandate generally has been renewed without controversy, Russia raised concerns about the panel during last year’s extension and sought to curtail its scope of work. Furthermore, Russia’s veto follows its blocking of Security Council action against North Korea for the past several years, despite Pyongyang advancing its nuclear and missile programs in violation of council provisions. (See ACT, May and July/August 2023.) 

In a March 28 joint statement, France, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States said that Russia’s veto of the resolution is “an attempt to silence independent, objective investigations” into violations of council resolutions. The statement accused Russia of ending the panel to prevent it from reporting on “Moscow’s own violations of Security Council resolutions” as it seeks North Korean military support for its “illegal war of aggression against Ukraine.” 

North Korea is transferring weapons, including ballistic missiles, that Russia is using in its illegal war against Ukraine. (See ACT, March 2024.) UN sanctions prohibit North Korea from exporting arms. 

The statement also asserted that ending the panel makes it “easier for [North Korea] to pursue nuclear weapons and their delivery systems” and emboldens Pyongyang to “continue its unlawful activity with a sense of impunity.” 

Russia proposed changes to the draft resolution extending the mandate, which included a yearly renewal for sanctions provisions, but the United States opposed the proposal, saying Moscow insisted on “completely unacceptable conditions” and would not compromise. 

China supported the Russian proposal, but abstained from voting on the resolution to extend the panel. 

Nebenzia said that Russia will put forward an alternative resolution with an “update to the sanctions parameters.” But comments from U.S. officials suggest that Washington does not expect the proposal to pass the Security Council and is looking for alternative options for monitoring sanctions implementation. 

U.S. Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield, speaking to reporters during a trip to South Korea on April 17, said Russia continues to protect North Korea “from being held accountable” and that she does not expect Moscow to “cooperate or agree with any efforts to find another path” to monitor UN sanctions. Russia’s opposition will not stop the United States from working with partners to find an alternative to the panel, she said. 

Thomas-Greenfield said the United States is looking at options “both inside and outside of the UN system” because the panel’s work cannot be allowed to “lapse.” She did not provide any details on the alternative mechanism that the United States  
is considering. 

She also pushed back against Russian accusations that sanctions are not effective. She said sanctions have “hampered” North Korea’s ability to “accomplish their goals.”

In its most recent report, the panel assessed that North Korea has “increased its self-sufficiency in the manufacture of equipment and components for the production of ballistic missiles.” But the March report concluded that Pyongyang still relies on illicit imports to obtain certain materials to advance its missile programs. 

On April 2, North Korea tested a solid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile that it claimed carried maneuverable warheads. According to the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the missile was a “new-type intermediate-range solid-fueled ballistic missile loaded with a newly-developed hypersonic glide vehicle.” KCNA reported the test as a success.

According to KCNA, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un attended the test and said it demonstrated the “absolute superiority” of North Korea’s military technology. The test proved the “three principles of building missile armed forces for rapidly, accurately and powerfully striking any enemy target” worldwide, Kim said. 

Solid-fueled systems can be fired more quickly than those using liquid fuel, and maneuverable warheads are more difficult to intercept. 

But manufacturing solid-fueled rocket motors comes with challenges. The March report from the UN experts panel noted that Pyongyang “will need solid-propellant materials in great volumes.” The panel assessed that North Korea may be able to produce some of the required materials but “likely remains dependent on foreign procurement” for others. It recommended that member states “redouble their efforts in preventing the supply” of certain prohibited items. 

Following the April missile test, the United States, South Korea, and Japan staged a joint military exercise that included nuclear-capable bombers.

May 2024            
By Chris Rostampour

Communities adversely affected by U.S. nuclear testing and weapons production activities in the early years of the nuclear age and their congressional representatives are urging the House of Representatives to reauthorize and expand an expiring federal program that compensates victims of nuclear radiation.

The Democratic-led Senate voted 69-30 on March 7 to approve a stand-alone bill to extend and expand the 30-year-old program, called the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA). 

“After decades of work and tireless advocacy, we are the closest we have ever been to providing justice and compensation for those who have suffered at the hands of our country’s national security,” Sen. Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.) said in a statement following the vote. 

Supporters are now trying to convince the Republican-led House to take action before RECA expires June 7.

“We need to make sure they understand this is a nonpartisan issue,” Tina Cordova, a cancer survivor and longtime advocate for expanding the law, said in an interview with Source New Mexico. 

“For House members from places like Utah, Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, and Montana, [it is important] that they understand voting against this is voting against people impacted in their states,” she said.

RECA was first passed by Congress in 1990 to offer one-time compensation packages to people in certain western counties and states who unknowingly were exposed to radiation fallout from past atmospheric nuclear test explosions, federal workers who participated in Manhattan Project-era nuclear weapons activities, and certain uranium miners. 

But the program had several limitations and did not consider other communities and individuals in the United States impacted by U.S. nuclear testing and development, including “downwinders” in New Mexico affected by the first nuclear test explosion, called “Trinity,” in July 1945. (See ACT, January/February 2024; September 2023.) 

Last September, senators added an amendment to the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act that would have extended RECA for two decades and significantly expanded its geographical coverage. 

But the House leadership omitted this amendment in its version of the defense bill. In response, RECA advocates in each chamber, including Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.), worked to trim the amendment so that it would cost less. This limited version was also rejected. Co-sponsors  of the bill blamed Republican leaders in the House and Senate for this failure. (See ACT, January/February 2024.) 

RECA reauthorization supporters are seeking to attach the bill approved by the Senate in March to a legislative vehicle in the House. The proposal would reauthorize the program for an additional six years. 

Additionally, it would expand coverage to include thousands of New Mexicans around the Trinity test site; people from Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Guam; and affected people in all counties in Arizona, Nevada, and Utah, not just select counties in those states, as the original legislation allowed. The new bill also would cover certain communities in Alaska, Kentucky, Missouri, and Tennessee where Cold War-era nuclear waste has contaminated the environment and uranium miners who started their jobs after 1971. 

The proposed legislation is estimated to cost about $50-60 billion. Since 1990, the program has provided approximately $2.6 billion in compensation for claims.

On March 7, Luján urged House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) to bring the legislation for a vote. On March 11, a bipartisan group of four members of Congress led by Rep. Ann Wagner (R-Mo.) wrote a letter to Johnson and other House and Senate leaders, saying that “it is imperative that [RECA] be attached to the upcoming fiscal year…2024 appropriations package.” 

“There is broad bipartisan and bicameral agreement that the United States must compensate American citizens who have gotten cancer and other diseases as a result of reckless government actions that exposed them to dangerous levels of radiation,” the lawmakers wrote.

But Johnson confirmed on March 21 that the RECA reauthorization legislation would not be included in the appropriations bill, saying, “I understand her position, and I look forward to working closely with Ann as we chart a path together for the House to move forward with evaluating and acting on a reauthorization measure.”

Hawley, who co-sponsored the Senate bill, blasted its exclusion from the House measure in a social media post the same day. “Politicians have talked like this for decades,” he wrote. “While doing nothing. The time to talk is over. The time to ACT is now. Put RECA on the floor and vote on it. Stop screwing around with Missouri.” Wagner, Hawley, Luján, and others continue to explore options for attaching the Senate version of the RECA reauthorization bill to another legislative vehicle in the House. 

Meanwhile, President Joe Biden in March reiterated his support for the bill, signaling that he would sign it into law if it reached his desk. From 1945 to 1963, the United States conducted 215 atmospheric nuclear tests.

May 2024  
By Shizuka Kuramitsu

U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced plans to strengthen and expand significantly their countries’ alliance with military, space-related, and other projects as a hedge against China and Russia.

In a joint statement and at a press conference at the White House during Kishida’s state visit April 10, Biden reiterated the U.S. “unwavering commitment…to the defense of Japan under Article V of the [Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security], using its full capabilities, including nuclear capabilities.” 

He said this commitment includes the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea that are claimed by China, Japan, and Taiwan. 

At the press conference, Kishida said that “Japan is determined to strengthen our defense force through [the] position of counterstrike capabilities, increase our defense budget and other initiatives, and was reassured by President Biden of his strong support for such efforts.”

The two leaders stressed a sense of urgency driven by concerns that China “could unilaterally change the status quo” in the East China Sea by force or coercion and that Russia continues waging a “brutal war of aggression against Ukraine.”

A day later, they met with Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. at the White House, underscoring the widening web of regional alliances intended to serve as a bulwark against Chinese activities in trade, technology, and military aggression.

At the April 10 press conference, Biden described the expanded Japanese-U.S. cooperation as “the most significant upgrade of our alliance since…it was first established.” 

It was the first official visit by a Japanese leader to the United States since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was hosted by President Barack Obama in 2015 and comes as Biden faces reelection in November and Kishida is expected to face a political test later this year.

Kishida cast the international community as standing at “a historical turning point.” 

He said that, “in order for Japan, the [United States], the Indo-Pacific region and…the whole world to enjoy peace, stability, and prosperity lasting into the future, we must resolutely defend and further solidify a free and open international order based on the rule of law.”

Among the steps being taken to strengthen defense and security cooperation, Biden said the allies are modernizing command-and-control structures, increasing interoperability, and planning for their military forces to work together “in a seamless and effective way.”

For the first time, Japan and the United States, working with Australia, will create a networked air, missile, and defense system. Japan and the United States will conduct trilateral military exercises with the United Kingdom and explore how Japan can cooperate with Australia, the UK, and the United States in their AUKUS defense partnership, Biden said.

Kishida hailed a space cooperation agreement that includes plans for two Japanese astronauts to go to the moon on future Artemis missions for NASA.

The prime minister’s weeklong visit to the United States included an address to Congress on April 11 in which he highlighted how, as a native of Hiroshima, he has devoted his political career to realizing a world free of nuclear weapons. “For years, I have worked to revitalize the [nuclear] Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] regime so that we can gain momentum in pursuit of the aspiration,” he said.

The Japanese-U.S. joint statement stressed that the two countries are resolved to achieve a world without nuclear weapons and reaffirmed the value of the NPT regime, as well as a series of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation initiatives advocated by Kishida.

Despite such efforts, “there exists an imminent danger of nuclear weapons proliferation in East Asia.… Ukraine of today may be East Asia of tomorrow,” Kishida warned.

Focusing on China, he said its “current external stance and military actions present an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge, not only to the peace and security of Japan but to the peace and stability of the international community at large.” 

Kishida also called attention to North Korea’s nuclear and missile program and Russia’s continued threat of nuclear weapons use.

In the face of such security challenges in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific region, “close coordination between Japan and the [United States] is required more than ever to ensure that the deterrence our alliance provides remains credible and resilient,” he said, adding that “the deterrence that our alliance provides is stronger than ever, bolstered by U.S. extended deterrence for Japan.”

The trilateral summit with Marcos reflected efforts to further expand partnerships in Asia. In a joint statement, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States voiced concerns over China’s “dangerous and aggressive behavior in the South China Sea” and “the militarization of reclaimed features and unlawful maritime claims” in the region. 

They also announced plans to conduct a sea-based trilateral exercise and establish “a trilateral maritime dialogue to enhance coordination and collective responses to promote maritime cooperation.” 

In response, Chinese officials summoned Japanese and Philippine diplomats to complain about what Beijing considered “negative comments” about China, Reuters reported on April 12.

At a press conference that same day, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning expressed China’s opposition to the “manipulation of group politics” by Japan, the Philippines, and the United States and “the establishment of closed and exclusive small circles in the region.”

Calling the joint statement and trilateral cooperation “the wonton smear attack” against China, Mao said that “they should not introduce confrontation between camps into the region, let alone engage in trilateral cooperation at the expense of harming the interests of other countries.”

May 2024     
By Xiaodon Liang

The Defense Department is planning programmatic and posture adjustments so that it can afford the proposed $440 billion nuclear acquisition bill and accommodate delays in two of the three legs of the triad, senior officials said. 

Speaking to reporters at an April 5 media roundtable, John Plumb, assistant secretary of defense for space policy, said the Pentagon is examining force posture changes “that don’t break the bank.” The military is not considering a life extension program for the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), but rather how to manage the transition to its successor, the Sentinel ICBM, he said. 

The Sentinel program, which has a $117 billion acquisition price tag, according to the latest Air Force budget request, triggered a critical breach of the Nunn-McCurdy Act in January when officials disclosed a 37 percent cost overrun. (See ACT, March 2024.)  To continue the program, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin must certify an updated cost estimate and attest to the Sentinel’s necessity later this summer. The act also requires Austin to confirm that the ICBM is a higher priority than other programs that will be cut to pay for the cost increases. 

In testimony April 9 to the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin said the service is “actively supporting the process triggered by the Nunn-McCurdy breach” and that he expects a decision in July. 

Speaking at an aerospace industry event the same day, Air Force Lt. Gen. Richard Moore, the deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, indicated that the service’s next-generation tanker and airlifter programs likely will be postponed until after the nuclear modernization program is fully funded. The commander of U.S. Transportation Command, Air Force Gen. Jacqueline Van Ovost, told the House Armed Services Committee on April 11 that the air refueling fleet could be the “most stressed fleet” under wartime conditions. Emphasizing the need for a next-generation recapitalization program, Van Ovost noted that the KC-135 aircraft, which make up most of the Air Force’s tankers, are on average 67 years old. 

Separately, the Navy confirmed on April 2 that construction of the first Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine was 12 to 16 months behind schedule and would likely miss its 2027 delivery target. The disclosure was included in a review of ship construction requested by Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro in January. Speaking on April 10 before the House Appropriations defense subcommittee, Del Toro blamed the delays on late delivery of the submarine’s turbine generator by contractor Northrop Grumman, as well as recruitment and retention problems at the shipyards. But USNI News reported on April 10 that slow completion of the bow dome of the submarine also has contributed to delays.

Del Toro said during testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee’s defense subcommittee on April 16 that the Navy is studying whether Ohio-class submarines can serve additional deployments past their intended retirement date. The secretary disclosed that five Ohio-class boats have already been identified as safe for at least one additional patrol at sea.

The Navy’s other submarine construction effort, the Virginia-class attack submarine program, is three years behind schedule, according to the review. Service officials attributed this extended delay to prioritization of the Columbia-class submarine. 

Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said during April 9 testimony before the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee that the unit cost of the B-21 bomber, another major component of the nuclear triad modernization effort, was lower than previously expected due to successful price negotiations with contractors. 

The Air Force, in its budget for fiscal year 2025, lowered its annual procurement request for the B-21 to $2.7 billion from a projection of $3.9 billion in fiscal 2024. 

Because the B-21 program does not disclose the number of bombers purchased in each year, it is not possible to verify if the reduction is due solely to unit cost savings or also a decrease in the number of planes on order. 

A U.S. Air Force representative told Bloomberg News that the lower request reflected “no material reductions in program quantities or scope.”     

 

May 2024  
By Xiaodon Liang

For the first time, the United States deployed to a foreign country ground-launched missiles previously barred by the now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. A U.S. Army task force equipped with the new Mid-Range Capability (MRC) missile system participated in the two-week Salaknib 2024 military exercise in the northern Philippines in mid-April. 

The MRC system, called the Typhon, launches the Tomahawk cruise missile and the Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) multipurpose interceptor. (See ACT, January/February 2021.) Each battery is equipped with mobile missile launchers, an operations center, and additional support vehicles. The Army has activated two MRC batteries and intends to field a total of five such systems. The current deployment in the Philippines is a temporary one and will last only for the duration of the exercise. 

The inclusion of an MRC battery in the annual U.S.-Philippine exercise signals U.S. intentions and ability to deploy long-range missiles to the first chain of islands off mainline China in the event of a conflict. From the northern Philippines, the MRC capability could contribute to anti-ship missions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, as well as attacks against fixed Chinese targets. 

The battery deployed for Salaknib 2024 was airlifted from Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington state, but the Army previously has said that the Typhon would be deployed outside of the continental United States, Breaking Defense reported in December. Such comments have contributed to predictions that the MRC capability will be located in Guam, a U.S. territory, during peacetime. The Army has not confirmed this basing plan. 

The U.S. military first deployed sea- and air-launched variants of the Tomahawk missile in the 1980s. With an estimated range of more than 1,600 kilometers, a ground-launched variant of the modern Tomahawk cruise missile would have been prohibited under the INF Treaty. That treaty barred the Soviet Union, the Soviet successor states, and the United States from producing, testing, and deploying ground-launched missiles with a range of 500-5,000 kilometers. It also required the United States to destroy an older ground-launched nuclear-armed variant of the Tomahawk, the BGM-109G cruise missile. 

According to the president’s fiscal year 2025 budget proposal, the Army will purchase more than 330 of the newest Block V variant of the Tomahawk cruise missile for its MRC batteries over the next five years. The Navy concurrently is implementing incremental upgrades to the Block V Tomahawk to improve its anti-ship capabilities.

In 2016, the Navy announced it would modify the SM-6 missile, originally designed as an anti-aircraft and missile interceptor with a range of up to 370 kilometers, to provide it with an anti-ship capability. The decision to modify the SM-6 came in the context of concerns that Chinese anti-ship and land-attack missiles had significantly longer ranges than U.S. options. 

The U.S. military could soon deploy in Asia other ground-launched missiles with capabilities that would have placed them under the INF Treaty. The Marines already have integrated launchers for the Tomahawk missile with two types of ground vehicles. In addition, the Army received in December the first deliveries of the Precision Strike Missile, a surface-to-surface missile that is compatible with existing mobile ground launchers. An October 2021 test of this missile established a maximum range beyond the design target of 499 kilometers, and the Army has awarded two early-stage contracts to develop an advanced variant of the missile with a 1,000-kilometer range. In January, the Army announced that it had tested an anti-ship seeker for the missile. 

The United States withdrew from the INF Treaty in August 2019 citing Russian development of the 9M729 ground-launched cruise missile, leading Moscow to suspend its treaty obligations. 

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told Kommersant on April 11 that Russia would withdraw its offer of a moratorium on the deployment of missiles with ranges falling under INF Treaty specifications, first floated by President Vladimir Putin in 2019, if the United States stationed the missiles in Europe and Asia. (See ACT, November 2020.) The moratorium would bar the deployment of these missiles outside the national territories of Russia and the United States, as well as in parts of each country where the missiles could threaten the other’s territory. 

The United States only cited Russian violations of the INF Treaty as grounds for withdrawal in September 2019, but Trump administration officials made clear that concerns about the need for longer-range missiles in maritime Asia to match Chinese capabilities also informed the decision. (See ACT, September 2019.)

The announcement of the deployment of the MRC system and its anti-ship missiles to the Philippines comes shortly after a trilateral summit in Washington with the United States, Japan, and the Philippines. In an April 13 joint statement, the leaders of the three countries expressed concern about China’s “dangerous and aggressive behavior in the South China Sea.” Japan and the Philippines have territorial and maritime disputes with China. 

China and the United States have held several bilateral meetings on arms control and defense issues in the past six months. (See ACT, March 2024.) The latest conversations include an April 2 telephone call between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping and an April 16 video conference between U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Chinese Defense Minister Adm. Dong Jun. According to the U.S. account of the Biden-Xi call, the two sides welcomed ongoing efforts “to manage the relationship through high-level diplomacy.”

May 2024
By Shizuka Kuramitsu

Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that would have affirmed a treaty banning nuclear weapons in outer space, fueling fresh concerns that its government is developing a space-based nuclear anti-satellite capability.

Russia cast its veto April 24 on a resolution proposed by Japan and the United States reiterating support for the principles of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the deployment of “nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction” in outer space, whether on celestial bodies or in orbit. 

The vote was 13-1, with China as the sole abstention. Russia is one of five permanent members of the Security Council with veto power, along with China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The resolution was proposed after the United States in February made public an intelligence finding that Russia is developing an anti-satellite weapon that would violate the Outer Space Treaty, which has been ratified by 115 states, including Russia and the United States. (See ACT, March and April 2024.)

A nuclear detonation in space would create an indiscriminate zone of destruction endangering more than 9,500 military and civilian satellites now in orbit.

Russian Ambassador Vasily Nebenzia justified Moscow’s veto by dismissing the resolution as insufficient and an attempt by Japan, the United States, and their allies to “camouflage their lack of interest in outer space in principle being free from any kinds of weapons.” 

With China, Russia proposed an amendment to the Japanese-U.S. draft that called on all countries, especially those with major space capabilities, to go even further and ban all weapons in space, not just weapons of mass destruction. The vote was 7-7 with one abstention, meaning the amendment failed because it failed to get the minimum nine votes.

Reacting to the Security Council action, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan reiterated in a statement on April 25 that “the United States assesses that Russia is developing a new satellite carrying a nuclear device.”

“We have heard [Russian] President [Vladimir] Putin say publicly that Russia has no intention of deploying nuclear weapons in space. If that were the case, Russia would not have vetoed this resolution,” he said.

U.S. Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield called Wednesday’s vote on the resolution “a real missed opportunity to rebuild much-needed trust in existing arms control obligations” and stressed that “in no way does this vote undermine the obligations Russia, or any other state-party, continues to have under the Outer Space Treaty,” AP and Axios reported.

Thomas-Greenfield accused Russia of undermining global treaties to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, irresponsibly invoking “dangerous nuclear rhetoric,” walking away from several of its arms control obligations, and refusing to engage “in substantive discussions around arms control or risk reduction,” AP reported.

Chinese Ambassador Fu Cong, explaining his country’s abstention, said that the Japanese-U.S. resolution was “incomplete and unbalanced and does not reflect to the fullest extent common interest and shared call of 193 member states on the issue of outer space security.”

May 2024
By Shizuka Kuramitsu

The State Department expressed concern about the activities of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia in its latest annual report on compliance with international arms control and nonproliferation agreements.

The report, released in April and covering activities in 2023, highlighted Iran’s continued efforts to expand its stocks of enriched uranium after the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and Iran’s failure to fulfill its reporting obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about new nuclear facilities. (See ACT, October and December 2023.) 

Recalling last year’s finding about Iran’s “continued failure to fully cooperate with the IAEA’s ongoing safeguards,” this year’s report determined that those “concerns have increased over time as Iran continued to fail to provide the cooperation” required under its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the agency.

In June 2023, for instance, Iran disclosed that it “had decided on locations for the construction of new nuclear facilities…[but] failed to provide the IAEA with preliminary design information as required” under the safeguards agreement, according to the report.

In response to the IAEA request for preliminary design information, Iran declared its unilateral suspension of a section of the safeguards agreement even though such an “implementation obligation cannot be suspended or unilaterally modified by Iran,” the report stated.

The report also said that “outstanding concerns remained” regarding Iran’s “possible undeclared nuclear material and activities…as evidenced by the IAEA’s ongoing safeguards investigations.” Nevertheless, the report concluded that “Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities…necessary to produce a testable nuclear device.”

The report reiterated its previous assessment that North Korea “remains subject to IAEA safeguards obligations irrespective of its 2003 notice of withdrawal” from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and “is in violation of its IAEA safeguards obligations in 2023.” 

Quoting IAEA assessments, the report noted North Korea’s continued effort to produce fissile material and indications of “possible testing” of the country’s experimental nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, which were observed to be “more frequent” and “for longer duration than previous years.”

Regarding Russia, the report cited Moscow’s withdrawal from the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the fact that it “has repeatedly used (riot control agents) as a method of warfare across the frontlines in Ukraine,” which violates Article 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention. (See ACT, March 2024.)

The report identified no new compliance issues pertaining to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Even so, the State Department expressed concern about the adherence by China and Russia to their respective testing moratoriums “due to lack of transparency with regard to their respective nuclear testing activities and previously identified adherence issues.” 

To address these concerns, the United States will continue to engage with China and Russia and to highlight the need for increased nuclear weapons-related transparency, as it did in a meeting with China in November, the report stated. (See ACT, December 2023.)

May 2024
By Shizuka Kuramitsu

India claimed a successful second night launch of its latest medium-range ballistic missile, the Agni-Prime (Agni-P), which it said can strengthen the country’s deterrence capabilities. 

In an April 4 press release, the Indian Defence Ministry announced that, on the night of April 3, “Strategic Forces Command (SFC), along with Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), conducted the successful flight-test of New Generation Ballistic [Missile].” 

The test missile, launched from Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam Island in Odisha, “met all the trial objectives validating its reliable performance, as confirmed from the data captured by a number of range sensors deployed at different locations,” the release said.

Indian Defense Minister Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh was quoted as saying that “the successful development and induction of the missile will be an excellent force multiplier for the Armed Forces.”

The first night launch of the Agni-P was conducted in June 2023 after three developmental trials. It is a canister-launch missile with a warhead that is mated and stored with the missile, thus giving India the operational flexibility to store the missile for a longer period and reducing the time required for preparation and launch. (See ACT, July/August 2023; September 2021.) 

The Defence Ministry has said that the Agni-P “incorporates new propulsion systems and composite rocket motor casings as well as advanced navigation and guidance systems,” The Economic Times reported on April 4. Because the missile is fueled by a solid propellant and is “the smallest and lightest among the entire Agni series of ballistic missiles,” this system “will further bolster the country’s strategic deterrence capabilities once it is inducted after a few more tests,” the news outlet said.

In June 2021, the Agni-P was tested with two decoys, indicating that India possibly would develop and deploy multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Last month, India conducted the first flight test of its indigenously developed Agni-5 missile with such MIRV capability. (See ACT, April 2024.)