June 2026
By Kelsey Davenport & Shaghayegh Chris Rostampour

U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the United States and Iran are close to reaching a peace agreement, but Iranian officials cautioned that a deal is not imminent. Even if an agreement is reached, Washington and Tehran said it will not address nuclear issues in detail and that more negotiations will be necessary.

In a May 23 post on Truth Social, Trump wrote that “An Agreement has been largely negotiated,” and that “Final aspects and details of the Deal are currently being discussed, and will be announced shortly.”

The previous week, Trump threatened to resume strikes but said he would hold off at the behest of states in the region. The leaders of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates asked the United States “to hold off on our planned Military attack” against Iran set for the next day because “serious negotiations are now taking place,” Trump wrote May 18 on Truth Social.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei concurred that progress was made, but disputed Trump’s assertion that a deal would be announced soon. “We have reached conclusions on a large portion of the issues, but no one can claim that the signing of an agreement is imminent,” he told Iranian state media May 25.

Both Baghaei and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio suggested that the agreement will not address key nuclear concerns in detail and that subsequent negotiations will focus on those issues. Baghaei said in a May 25 press conference that the “focus of the negotiations is on ending the war” and “at this stage, we are not discussing the details of the nuclear issue.”

Rubio told The New York Times during a trip to New Delhi May 24 that “the straits [sic] have to be immediately reopened, and then we will enter, under agreed-to parameters, into very serious talks about enrichment, about the highly enriched uranium, and about [Iran’s] pledge to never have nuclear weapons.”

The future of the Strait of Hormuz emerged as a key issue after the United States and Israel attacked Iran Feb. 28. The subsequent war and Iran’s focus on asserting military control over the strait largely halted maritime traffic through the waterway, a critical route for commodities such as oil and fertilizer. Iran now wants to charge ships for transit, while the United States maintains that the waterway should be open.

Iran is also seeking sanctions relief as part of the initial agreement. Iranian media reported that the head of Iran’s central bank, Abdolnasser Hemmati, accompanied Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to Qatar May 25 for talks on sanctions relief.

Even if an agreement to formalize the April 7 ceasefire and reopen the Strait of Hormuz were reached, Iranian and U.S. statements suggest that the two sides remain far apart on the future of Iran’s nuclear program and the disposition of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium-235 (HEU), particularly the 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to near-weapons-grade levels. Baghaei suggested a 30-to-60-day window to negotiate a nuclear agreement after Washington and Tehran reached a deal to end the war.

Before announcing that a deal was imminent, Trump maintained that Iran must hand over the HEU to the United States and threatened to send U.S. troops into Iran to retrieve the material.

In a May 25 Truth Social post, however, Trump suggested that he might be relaxing his demand that the United States take possession of the material. He said, “The Enriched Uranium (Nuclear Dust!) will either be immediately turned over to the United States to be brought home and destroyed or, preferably, in conjunction and coordination with the Islamic Republic of Iran, destroyed in place or, at another acceptable location.”

Iranian officials have emphasized that the HEU must remain in Iran. Iran’s supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, reportedly supports that position, saying that transferring the material abroad could increase Iran’s vulnerability to future military pressure or attacks, according to senior Iranian sources quoted May 21 by Reuters.

Araghchi has suggested that Iran offered to blend down the HEU to lower levels, which poses less of a proliferation risk, during negotiations with the Trump administration before the U.S. and Israeli decision to bomb Iran Feb. 28. (See ACT, April 2026.) Down-blending could be what Trump referred to when he said the HEU must be destroyed.

Speaking May 15 at the BRICS foreign ministers’ meeting in New Delhi, Araghchi said that the two sides were deadlocked over the future of the HEU, “but we will come to that subject in later stages.”

Trump also may be demonstrating more flexibility on the future of Iran’s nuclear program. He recently suggested that the United States may be willing to relax its demand that Iran forgo uranium enrichment in perpetuity and accept instead a 20-year suspension of enrichment. “Twenty years is enough, but the level of guarantee from them is not enough. In other words, it’s got to be a real 20 years,” he told reporters May 15 on Air Force One.

Iran has repeatedly rejected a permanent ban on uranium enrichment, which it views as a sovereign right under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Senior Iranian officials have said Tehran is willing to suspend enrichment but rejected doing so for 20 years.

It is unclear if Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would accept a deal allowing Iran to enrich uranium in the future or retain any enriched uranium.

In a May 24 statement, Netanyahu said he discussed the negotiations with Trump the previous day and that the two leaders “agreed that any final agreement with Iran must eliminate the nuclear danger. This means dismantling Iran’s uranium enrichment sites and removing enriched nuclear material from its territory.”

A re-eruption of hostilities also threatens progress. Two days after Trump announced an agreement was imminent, the United States bombed Iran, in what U.S. Central Command described as “self-defense strikes.”

In a May 25 statement, Central Command spokesman Capt. Tim Hawkins said the United States acted with “restraint” and targeted “missile launch sites and Iranian boats attempting to emplace mines” that threatened U.S. forces.

In a May 26 statement, Iran’s Foreign Ministry said that the United States “committed a grave violation of the ceasefire.” These “acts of aggression, coinciding with the ongoing diplomatic process mediated by Pakistan, once again exposes the ill intent and bad faith of the U.S. ruling establishment,” the statement said. “Iran will not leave any act of hostility unanswered.”

If Iran does retaliate, The New York Times reported May 12 that it may be better positioned militarily than previously assessed. Unnamed U.S. officials quoted in the article said that U.S. intelligence assessed that Iran retained about 70 percent of the stockpile of missiles it possessed before the war and roughly the same amount of missile launchers.

June 2026
By Libby Flatoff and Daryl G. Kimball reporting from New York

 After four weeks of intense debate and discussion, diplomats from 130 states at the 2026 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference failed to agree on ways to address rising nuclear weapons dangers.

With delegates unable to overcome an array of disputes among a handful of states, including Iran and the United States, conference President Do Hung Viet announced May 22 that consensus on the eight-page draft outcome document was not possible.

“No one [state] blocked consensus because I realized there was not consensus, and so I did not put the document forward,” Viet, Vietnam’s UN ambassador, told a news conference. “I had options. I decided I had to make the difficult decision to pursue this path [because] I wanted to maintain my neutrality and maintain my commitment to a balanced approach.”

Viet said there were “difficulties” reaching consensus on more than one section of the final draft text, but “a very important reason” for the impasse was the country-specific language in paragraph 15 of the final draft, which said “Iran can never seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.”

According to diplomats who spoke with Arms Control Today on condition of anonymity, the U.S. delegation insisted that language faulting Iran must remain in the document; Iran refused to accept the reference and objected to the omission of language in an earlier version of the document condemning U.S.-Israeli military attacks on its safeguarded nuclear facilities.

This marks the third-straight NPT review conference at which states-parties failed to agree on a final conference outcome document. At the 2022 conference, held shortly after Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, Russia objected to references to its occupation of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. At the 2015 conference, the United States blocked consensus over a proposal for a conference to discuss the Middle Eastern weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) free zone. (See ACT, September 2022; ACT, June 2015.)

The April 28-May 22 review conference at UN headquarters in New York was the 11th such meeting to review implementation and compliance with 1968 treaty obligations, to reaffirm support for the treaty and decisions taken by consensus at previous review conferences, and to identify further steps to advance NPT goals and objectives.

In an interview with Arms Control Today before the 2026 review conference, Viet warned that if there was another failure, “We may lose the credibility of the NPT itself.” (See ACT, April 2026.) In his post-conference remarks May 22, he said, “A third failure to reach a consensus outcome is disastrous for this regime.”

Throughout the conference, states-parties underscored their general support for the treaty and its three main pillars on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, preventing a nuclear arms race, and advancing the peaceful use of nuclear technology under safeguards. But members sparred on several key issues in the final conference document, including the conflict in the Middle East and Iran’s nuclear program. On day one, the United States led a lengthy objection to Iran’s nomination by the Non-Aligned Movement to serve as one of 35 largely ceremonial conference vice presidents, making it clear that the U.S. priority was to insist that Iran “can never be allowed to have a nuclear weapon.”

Many other states, including in the Western Group, also wanted the conference to “express concerns over the finding of the [International Atomic Energy Agency] Board of Governors of Iran’s non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with IAEA.”

Iran and some other states emphasized that two nuclear-armed states, the United States and Israel, had attacked the safeguarded nuclear facilities of a non-nuclear-weapon state—Iran—in violation of key nuclear safety principles and international law. This prompted a number of sharply worded “right of reply” statements among the United States, Gulf Arab states, and Iran. Other states noted that the regional conflict underscored the urgent need for further progress on the negotiation of a WMD-free zone.

As was the case at the 2022 conference, Russia’s war on Ukraine and the risks to the safety and security of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants were the target of sharp criticism, mainly from European states. This prompted right-of-reply statements from the Russian delegation, which opposed any language referring to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear facility.

In response to criticism from several states about the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in certain allied states and potential new nuclear sharing arrangements, several Western European states worked hard to defend their nuclear sharing and deterrence policies as being compatible with the letter of the NPT.

Significant Interventions

Among the most significant interventions were those of the United States, China, and Russia on their concerns about one another’s nuclear arsenals and their stance on nuclear testing and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Many non-nuclear-weapon states pressed for stronger commitments on disarmament and nuclear risk reduction from the five nuclear-weapon states recognized under the NPT.

The opening U.S. statement by Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Yeaw focused on U.S. criticisms of Chinese nuclear policies, including its buildup of nuclear forces and U.S. allegations that China conducted a prohibited nuclear test in 2020. He noted that all five NPT nuclear-armed states have Article VI responsibilities and said that is why “we have proposed multilateral strategic stability and arms control” talks.

Russia and China expressed regret that the United States had failed to take up opportunities to negotiate a follow-on to the now expired New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). They urged Washington to actively consider Moscow’s proposal to respect the New START limits for one more year and explore a follow-on agreement “in a responsible manner.”

On April 29, China’s director-general for disarmament, Sun Xiaobo, clearly referenced the United States in his statement, arguing that “One certain country exaggerates so-called nuclear threats from others as a pretext for investing trillions of dollars in nuclear modernization. The so-called ‘multilateral nuclear arms control and strategic stability dialogue’ proposed by certain country is in essence an attempt to shift its special and primary responsibilities as the country with the largest nuclear arsenal onto others. Attempts to shift the responsibility for nuclear disarmament to other countries will lead nowhere. China has no interest in them,” he said.

Sun’s statement continued: “China supports the purposes and objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and honors its commitment on moratorium on nuclear testing, and urges those concerned to recognize the grave consequences of resuming nuclear testing against the trend of history.”

The U.S., French and UK delegations issued a joint statement May 21 to “strongly encourage all nuclear weapon States under the NPT to engage in multilateral strategic stability talks to promote mutual transparency and adopt concrete risk reduction measures.”

Notably, their statement also endorsed the pursuit of “confidence-building measures regarding nuclear explosive test monitoring, including increasing the ability to detect tests of any yield towards ensuring nuclear weapons states adhere to a zero-yield standard,” which was established by the CTBT.

Despite differences on whether and how to advance their joint Article VI obligations, the nuclear five worked together to methodically eliminate more specific elements from the draft outcome document that would have committed them to more specific actions designed to reduce the salience and number of their nuclear weapons.

CTBT Language Saved

However, due to the efforts of the vast majority of states that support the CTBT, U.S. attempts to eliminate language in support of the treaty were rebuffed. The final draft outcome document “underscore[d] the need for nuclear-weapon States to ratify the CTBT, and to uphold and adhere to national moratoriums against all nuclear test explosions and commend[ed] the provisional operationalization of the International Monitoring System and of the International Data Centre” (emphasis as received).

To try to find solutions to these and other differences, Viet presented the first version of the draft outcome document earlier in the conference to allow for more time to negotiate. Each successive draft document was written in an economical style that sought to focus on key principles and objectives without extraneous language that might prompt time consuming negotiation. The first version was 13 pages; the fifth and final draft was only eight pages.

In the final round, two paragraphs were dropped from the document, apparently due to Russian objections, in an attempt to find consensus. One paragraph mentioned North Korea’s illicit nuclear weapons program; the other mentioned the IAEA’s five nuclear safety principles relating to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. These omissions made certain European states, as well as Japan and South Korea, very unhappy.

Many non-nuclear-weapon states were also displeased that the document failed to commit the nuclear-weapon states to urgently resume bilateral or multilateral arms control and disarmament negotiations. The final draft of the outcome document only called for “constructive dialogue on the basis of mutual respect and acknowledgement of each other’s security interests and concerns, to ease international tension, promote international peace and stability, enhance confidence and reduce strategic risks, and note that such engagement could facilitate future arms control discussions, and help progress towards nuclear disarmament.”

After the conference failure, Ireland published a statement on behalf of its fellow New Agenda Coalition members, Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, New Zealand, and South Africa: “Against a backdrop of elevated nuclear risks, we would have expected to see more flexibility from the nuclear-weapon States over the course of this Conference, particularly given that many non-nuclear weapon States demonstrated considerable flexibility throughout these negotiations. Collective, constructive and bold leadership is required, especially from all nuclear-weapon States.”

If the draft outcome document had been approved, it would have decided that at the next NPT review conference, there would be “structured, in-person discussions and exchanges of views on the national reports by the nuclear-weapon States,” something many states have argued would improve accountability in the NPT review process.

Viet noted at his May 22 press conference that he tried to “appeal to states to come to an agreement that would have contributed to reducing tension and risk and nuclear dangers.” In the end, however, it was not enough, as there was no middle ground between the United States and Iran.

States-parties agreed that the next NPT review conference will be held in 2031 with the next preparatory meeting in 2028.

June 2026
By Xiaodon Liang

U.S. President Donald Trump presented a “denuclearization” proposal to his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, during a May 14-15 state visit, Trump told journalists on his way back from Beijing.

“I talk about it all the time with Russia and with China, and it did come up. We did discuss” denuclearization, Trump said May 15 on Air Force One in response to a question from the press pool about his previous statement in January that he would seek arms control negotiations with Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin. (See ACT, March 2026.)

“I got a very positive response,” the president said.

“I don’t want to say anybody committed, but we have a very good understanding, you know, the concept of denuclearization,” he said.

In a May 15 press statement on the state visit, however, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi did not mention nuclear arms control but said that the two presidents had reached an understanding on “a constructive China-U.S. relationship of strategic stability.”

That new descriptor, repeated prominently in Chinese press releases regarding the state visit and in state-controlled media reports, marks a fresh attempt by China to frame the complex, multi-dimensional bilateral relationship, and speaks as much to politics and economics as it does to the military balance of power.

In a May 17 fact sheet, the White House echoed the Chinese formulation, confirming that the two presidents had agreed to “build a constructive relationship of strategic stability.”

The U.S. fact sheet claimed that Trump and Xi had agreed that “Iran cannot have a nuclear weapon,” and that they had “confirmed their shared goal to denuclearize North Korea,” but Chinese statements did not affirm either of these. (See ACT, June 2026.)

While the White House account of the meeting focused primarily on economic ties between the two countries, the Chinese counterpart, as attributed to Wang, chose to foreground the broader strategic understanding purportedly reached between the two presidents.

Trump indicated in his comments on Air Force One that he sees the conversation on nuclear arms control between the United States and China as just the beginning.

“We’re going to be together four times, potentially, this year,” he pointed out.

At a May 14 state banquet in Beijing, Trump invited Xi to visit the White House Sept. 24. Wang’s statement confirmed that “Xi will pay a state visit to the United States this fall.”

The two leaders might also meet again at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Shenzhen, China, in November, as well as the Group of 20 summit in Miami in December.

Although details of the U.S. denuclearization concept remain scant, Trump rejected, in his Air Force One comments, a reporter’s suggestion that the proposal was an extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, with China somehow involved. That treaty, which expired Feb. 5, bound only U.S. and Russian nuclear forces.

Earlier this year, the United States “provided detailed proposals to Russia and China, and among the P5, on possible initial steps, including on transparency, risk reduction, and nuclear testing,” according to an April 29 statement by Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Christopher Yeaw, referring to the five nuclear-weapon states recognized under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

Yeaw delivered the statement April 29 at the NPT Review Conference in New York, where states-parties gathered from April 27 to May 22 to discuss implementation of the foundational treaty. (See ACT, June 2026.)

Diplomatic sources told Arms Control Today that they could not confirm that a written proposal had been delivered.

Trump also discussed arms sales to Taiwan with Xi, the U.S. president said in his Air Force One interview, despite a long-standing assurance made by President Ronald Reagan to Taiwan’s leaders that Washington would not discuss arms sales to Taipei with Beijing.

Xi “brought that up. He talked about that obviously. So, what am I going to do, say I don’t want to talk to you about it because I have an agreement that was signed in 1982?” Trump said.

Speaking to NBC News May 14, Secretary of State Marco Rubio insisted that “U.S. policy on the issue of Taiwan is unchanged as of today.”

An arms deal worth $14 billion—primarily consisting of air- and missile-defense interceptors—is awaiting Trump’s signature, Reuters reported May 13.

“I’m holding that in abeyance, and it depends on China. It’s a very good negotiating chip for us, frankly,” Trump said in a May 15 interview with Fox News. Trump said the value of the deal was smaller, at around $12 billion.

In July 2024, China cited U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as justification for discontinuing bilateral nuclear risk reduction talks. (See ACT, September 2024.)

Taiwan’s opposition-controlled parliament approved a special additional defense budget May 8, allocating $25 billion to pay for U.S. weapons.

The move was a partial setback to the government of President Lai Ching-te, which had sought a larger special budget of nearly $40 billion that would cover additional domestic procurement.

June 2026
By Kelsey Davenport

U.S. President Donald Trump said he has been in communication with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un but declined to provide any details about the exchange of messages.

Trump’s comments came as he was leaving Beijing May 15 following a two-day summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping, which included discussions about North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

When asked by reporters on Air Force One about the nature of his communications with Kim, Trump said it “doesn’t matter.” Trump said that the two leaders have a good relationship and that Kim has “been respectful of our country.”

In a May 17 fact sheet released after the summit, the White House said Trump and Xi “confirmed their shared goal to denuclearize North Korea.”

Although UN Security Council resolutions require North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons program, China has moved away from emphasizing denuclearization in recent statements.

When Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun was asked to confirm the accuracy of White House statement on denuclearization during a May 18 press conference, he said “China’s position and policy on the Korean Peninsula issue maintain continuity and consistency.” China is “committed to encouraging relevant parties to face up to the root cause and crux of the Korean Peninsula issue … and make constructive efforts towards easing tensions and maintaining peace and stability in the region,” he said.

Kim has said he will not negotiate with the United States, as long as the Trump administration insists on denuclearization. (See ACT, October 2025.) Since U.S.-North Korean diplomacy broke down during Trump’s first term, Kim has continued to expand the country’s nuclear weapons program and emphasized that its status as a nuclear-armed state is irreversible. (See ACT, October 2022.)

Before the Trump-Xi summit, Kim inspected a new warship that Pyongyang says will carry nuclear-armed missiles when it is deployed in June. Deployment of the ship comes several months after North Korea’s Ninth Party Congress announced plans to focus naval upgrades on nuclear weaponization. (See ACT, April 2026.)

The state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported May 8 that Kim visited the destroyer, named the Choe Hyon, the previous day and took part in a “navigation test to assess various maneuvering elements of the destroyer.” The test took place in the Yellow Sea, 120 nautical miles offshore.

According to KCNA, Kim reaffirmed “the steadfast will of our Party to build a powerful navy at any cost” and received a report on the progress of two additional Choe Hyon-class destroyers under construction. Another Choe Hyon-class destroyer, named the Kang Kon, is already complete.

When the Choe Hyon was completed in April 2025, Kim attended the launch ceremony and noted in a speech that the ship would carry hypersonic strategic cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles.

North Korea is increasingly focused on sea-based nuclear weapons systems. A report on the Ninth Party Congress in February noted that “nuclear weaponization of naval surface and underwater forces” will be a main component of North Korea’s plans to upgrade its navy.

In addition to expanding the role of sea-based nuclear weapons, North Korea’s parliament reportedly agreed to constitutional changes, including the command and control of the nuclear arsenal.

Kim has sole control over the country’s nuclear forces, but NK News, citing an unverified document describing the changes, reported May 6 that a “new provision also allows Kim to delegate authority over the use of nuclear forces to the state nuclear forces command organization.

The constitutional changes also removed references to reunification with South Korea. This removal is consistent with Kim’s previous statements. In December 2023, he said that “reunification can never be achieved.” (See ACT, January/February 2024.)

In addition to expanding the nuclear weapons program, Kim is focused on strengthening military defenses on the border with South Korea.

During a May 17 meeting with commanding military officers, KCNA reported that Kim called for “strengthening the first-line units and other major units in military and technical aspects as an important decision to more thoroughly deter war.” The border between North Korea and South Korea, already heavily militarized, must be turned into “an impregnable fortress,” he said.

June 2026
By Xiaodon Liang

The U.S. Army will not deploy an intermediate-range ground-launched missile unit to Germany, reversing a commitment made in July 2024 to reassure European allies following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The decision came after a public display of acrimony between U.S. President Donald Trump and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, sparked by Merz’s criticism of the Israeli-U.S. war against Iran.

“The United States is studying and reviewing the possible reduction of Troops in Germany,” Trump announced in an April 29 social media post.

Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell confirmed May 1 that 5,000 U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Germany over the next six to 12 months. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth subsequently decided that the missile unit would not deploy and that a rotation of a 4,700-strong armored brigade combat team to Poland, the Baltic states, and Romania would be canceled as well, CNN reported May 14.

The long-range missile unit would have accounted for the deployment of roughly 500 soldiers to Germany, according to CNN. The Department of Defense has not yet announced the withdrawal of any other troops in Germany.

Under the 2024 plan announced by the United States and Germany at that year’s NATO summit, the missile unit would have begun a rotational presence this year. (See ACT, September 2024).

The army stood up the relevant unit last October as the 3rd Battalion, 12th Field Artillery Regiment. A Dec. 15 announcement regarding the unit noted that it would contribute to the “expansion of long-range fires capability in the European Theater.”

The battalion, based out of Fort Drum, New York, will be equipped with the intermediate-range Tomahawk land-attack and anti-ship cruise missile, the SM-6 multi-purpose strike and air defense missile, and, once production ramps up, the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon.

The army had said earlier this spring that it expected a first complete set of the new hypersonic missile to be delivered imminently to a sister battalion assigned to Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. A Pentagon official said the weapon has now reached initial operational capacity, Fox News Digital reported April 30.

The Tomahawk-equipped battery, known as the mid-range capability, of a third long-range battalion test-fired a Tomahawk May 5 at a target 600 kilometers away as part of an exercise in the Philippines. The battery was first deployed to the Philippines in April 2024. (See ACT, May 2024).

Germany’s defense minister, Boris Pistorius, said in a May 12 interview with broadcaster ZDF that his government had inquired about purchasing Tomahawk missiles from the United States a year and a half ago,but was still awaiting approval from Washington. (See ACT, September 2025).

The decision to cancel the armored brigade combat team deployment, the latest in a series of rotations by U.S. troops on NATO’s eastern flank that the Biden administration began in 2022, was criticized by both Republicans and Democrats during a May 15 hearing before the House Armed Services Committee.

Gen. Christopher LaNeve, acting chief of staff of the Army, confirmed during the hearing that the brigade combat team would not deploy.

The move by Hegseth is a “slap in the face to Poland. It’s a slap in the face to our Baltic friends,” said Rep. Don Bacon (R-Neb.). Bacon said Polish officials called his office May 14 seeking to confirm the CNN story, suggesting that the NATO ally had been caught off guard by the report.

According to the Army Times, which first reported the cancellation of the rotation May 13, portions of the unit are already in Poland and equipment was enroute.

LaNeve was not asked to comment on and did not confirm the cancellation of the missile unit deployment.

June 2026
By Xiaodon Liang

Russia aims to deploy on combat duty the first regiment of the RS-28 Sarmat heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by the end of this year, following a second successful test of the missile.

The test took place May 12, according to a statement published the same day by the office of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The liquid-fueled missile was likely fired from the Yasny missile base in Dombarovsky, Orenburg region, and landed at the Kura missile test site, open-source analysts concluded based on safety announcements issued by Russian authorities.

The successful Sarmat test was followed by large-scale strategic forces exercises May 21—unusual, but not unprecedented, timing for drills that are typically conducted in the fall.

Belarusian and Russian forces also conducted tactical nuclear weapons exercises. Gen. Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the Russian General Staff, said troops carried out “the delivery and transfer of nuclear munitions to Russian and Belarusian units that can use nuclear weapons,” according to a translation of a May 21 Kremlin press release by Pavel Podvig, a senior researcher at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research.

The exercises occurred after Putin’s return from a state visit to Beijing, where he and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, issued a joint statement on strategic cooperation. The document, which mirrors other lower-level bilateral statements on strategic stability, reiterates shared concerns about U.S. missile defense, space interceptors, nuclear sharing with allies, and long-range conventional strike capabilities. (See ACT, June 2025.)

In the new statement, the two countries recognize each other’s positions on the expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and express concern about the possibility of nuclear proliferation by Japan and non-nuclear European states.

As Russia continues the modernization of its strategic forces, the U.S. Department of State assesses that total deployed warhead numbers at the end of 2025 “likely exceeded” the New START central limits, which Russia has said it will continue abiding by despite the expiration of the treaty in February 2026.

This assessment, in the department’s annual New START implementation report, also finds with “high confidence that Russia did not engage in any large-scale activity above the Treaty limits in 2025.”

The RS-28 Sarmat ICBM, which also has the NATO designation SS-29, is believed to be capable of delivering up to 10 nuclear warheads. The missile it will replace, the aging RS-20V Voevoda ICBM (SS-18 Mod 6), was likewise declared under arms control treaties as having a payload of 10 warheads.

In the May 12 statement, Putin said the Sarmat has a combined payload yield “more than four times greater than that of any existing Western counterpart.” The missile’s ability to travel on a suborbital trajectory “extends its operational range to over 35,000 kilometres while simultaneously doubling the accuracy,” he said.

The flight test in May is only the second confirmed successful full test of the Sarmat. Since April 2022, when the missile first completed a flight test, there have been at least three failed attempts in February 2023, November 2024, and last November. (See ACT, November 2024.)

The failed test last November also took place at the Yasny base, according to an open-source analysis published Jan. 29 by the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, a French think tank.

Sergei Karakayev, the commander of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, said the first Sarmat unit would be stationed at the Uzhur missile field in Krasnoyarsk territory, according to the Russian statement.

The Federation of American Scientists assesses that the Strategic Missile Forces will deploy 46 siloed Sarmat missiles to fully replace the RS-20V Voevoda. 

The Sarmat may also replace the UR-100NUTTH (SS-19 Mod 4), another Soviet-era ICBM, of which 12 are presently active.

June 2026
By Xiaodon Liang

Budget documents indicate the U.S. Air Force plans to assess options for a new heavy bomber that could replace the B-52H.

The service is requesting $1 million from Congress to begin a heavy bomber analysis of alternatives in fiscal year 2027, according to Air Force research and development funding documents.

The study would “determine future B-52 requirements and costs and/or a new heavy bomber aircraft configuration and costs.” The analysis of alternatives was first reported May 6 by Aviation Week.

In fiscal 2027, the study would begin by conducting “initial planning activities to develop key performance parameters, key system attributes, and additional performance attributes for a follow-on heavy bomber.”

The Air Force is already procuring a new stealth bomber, the B-21 Raider. In 2021, Bloomberg News reported that the originally planned fleet of 100 B-21s would cost $89 billion in constant 2019 dollars to acquire. The Pentagon is separately weighing whether to buy more B-21s. (See ACT, May 2026.)

The B-52H first entered service in 1961. The Air Force is currently executing several sustainment and capability improvement programs to extend the lifespan of the venerable fleet.

Notably, these programs include a $3 billion radar modernization and a $19 billion engine replacement. The Air Force announced May 4 that the new engine had recently passed a critical design review and that the first bombers would be upgraded this year.

The fiscal 2027 budget documents also indicate that the Air Force is requesting $30 million from Congress this year to begin development of a new weapon pylon for the B-52H that would be capable of carrying heavier and a larger number of missiles or bombs.

The request specifically mentions the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, a tactical cruise missile, as an example.

Seventy-six B-52Hs remain operational, according to the Air Force. Approximately 42 of these bombers are certified for nuclear roles, according to the Federation of American Scientists, and roughly three-quarters of those planes were typically reported by the United States as deployed strategic bombers under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

In the fiscal year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress permitted the secretary of defense to recertify all B-52Hs in the fleet for nuclear missions.

June 2026
By Xiaodon Liang

In a series of public hearings, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) defended its plans for plutonium pit production at two sites at Los Alamos, New Mexico, and Savannah River, South Carolina, as Congress raised questions at budget hearings about cost overruns and delays to the pit program.

The hearings were held on five dates in May 2026 at cities near the two proposed production plants, as well as at sites near Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, the Kansas City weapons components plant in Missouri, and in Washington, D.C.

In each case, NNSA officials presented an overview of a programmatic environmental impact statement released April 10 for the two-site production plan. The agency was ordered to produce the environmental study and to hold public hearings after a judge ruled in September 2024 that the NNSA had breached the National Environmental Policy Act by failing to adequately study the environmental consequences. (See ACT, November 2024.)

The draft impact statement describes the NNSA’s assessment of three alternatives: a no-action option that would produce 30 pits per year at Los Alamos National Laboratory while continuing construction of the Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility, a single-site option that would focus production of 80 pits per year at one or the other site, and a multi-site option that corresponds with the agency’s preferred plan to produce 30 pits annually at Los Alamos and 50 pits annually at Savannah River.

In the study, the NNSA argues that its options are constrained by demands of the U.S. Congress, including an instruction in last year’s national defense authorization act that the agency pursue pit production at both sites. (See ACT, January/February 2026.)

The draft statement is “a retroactive rubber stamp,” said Dylan Spaulding, a senior scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists, at the May 14 hearing in Santa Fe, New Mexico.

Tom Clements of Savannah River Site Watch, a plaintiff in the lawsuit that forced the new hearings, said at the May 5 hearing in North Augusta, S. C., that the draft statement still lacks a realistic plan for management of transuranic and low-level waste.

Not all comments at the hearings were critical of the NNSA’s study. Some local interest groups and chambers of commerce spoke in favor of the economic benefits pit production would bring to Los Alamos and Savannah River.

The hearings come at a critical time for the Savannah River facility, which is under increasing scrutiny as the NNSA reports a “budgetary placeholder” estimate of $25 billion as the cost of the construction project in the agency’s fiscal year 2027 budget request.

“I want to ask the hard questions. Do we need two plutonium pit production facilities?” asked Sen. John Kennedy (R-La.), chair of the energy and water development subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, at an April 29 hearing. “I’m not saying we don’t, but we’re going to have to talk about it,” Kennedy said, in a rare admission of Republican doubts.

On Feb. 27, the NNSA re-tendered the managing and operating contract for the Savannah River Site, after a Dec. 9 performance evaluation found that the current contracting consortium “underperformed” in executing work on the new plutonium facility.

“The timeline and the budget is not acceptable,” said Brandon Williams, the NNSA administrator, at a May 13 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee. “We are reevaluating the requirements from a bottom-up, top-down approach,” he said.

Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), a longtime supporter of projects at the Savannah River Site, quizzed Secretary of Energy Chris Wright April 22 over the reprogramming of $149 million of appropriated funds from Savannah River to Los Alamos. “I don’t feel good about it,” Graham said at a hearing of the Senate Appropriations energy and water subcommittee. “That wasn’t the intent” of Congress.

David Beck, the NNSA deputy administrator for defense programs, told the Senate Armed Services Committee April 20 that projections for pit production at Los Alamos in 2026 have risen after he “brainstormed ideas with experts across the complex” and made changes to the “regulatory environment” at the facility.

June 2026
By Libby Flatoff

The United Kingdom has halted a deal to cede the disputed Chagos Islands archipelago to Mauritius after U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew his support.

The largest island in the archipelago, Diego Garcia, contains a shared U.S.-UK military base. Under the deal, signed May 22, 2025, the UK would have paid Mauritius an average of $136 million per year to lease back this island for the UK and the United States to operate the naval and bomber base for at least 99 years. (See ACT, Jan/Feb 2025.)

The deal required U.S. support because the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, signed between Westminster and Washington in 1996, needed to be amended to allow the transfer of the islands. Many U.S. Republicans were against the treaty change and the deal due to Mauritius’s proximity and friendliness toward China.

Sen. John Kennedy (R-La.) stated in a March 13 press release, “When two countries shake hands on a treaty, one of them can’t start changing the terms without the other country agreeing to it. That’s just common sense. That’s why I take issue with the United Kingdom trying to give our joint military base on Diego Garcia to a pal of [Chinese President] Xi Jinping’s—all without getting the U.S. Senate’s consent.”

He said he introduced a bill that “would make sure that our friends in the U.K. don’t modify our treaty and hand this gift to China without giving the Senate a say.”

Although Trump and his administration initially favored the deal, he wrote in a Jan. 20 social media post that the UK decision to give away Diego Garcia was “an act of GREAT STUPIDITY, and is another [reason] in very long line of National Security reasons why Greenland has to be acquired.”

At the time, he was pushing hard to acquire Greenland, an autonomous territory within Denmark that has refused Trump’s demands.

Trump even went so far as to call on Denmark and other European Allies to “DO THE RIGHT THING,” and stop the UK from following through on the Chagos deal.

By Feb. 5, he seemed to walk back the criticism and once again showed reluctant support for the deal in a social media post, writing that “I understand that the deal [UK] Prime Minister [Keir] Starmer has made, according to many, the best he could make.”

But later that month Trump changed his reason for disliking the deal, and in a Feb. 18 social media post, wrote, “that Leases are no good when it comes to Countries, and that [Starmer] is making a big mistake by entering a 100 Year Lease.… they have to remain strong in the face of Wokeism, and other problems put before them. DO NOT GIVE AWAY DIEGO GARCIA!”

Ten days before the United States and Israel began bombing Iran, Trump made another social media post Feb. 18, stating that “it may be necessary for the United States to use Diego Garcia, and the Airfield located in Fairford [England], in order to eradicate a potential attack by a highly unstable and dangerous Regime.”

The Guardian reported that without U.S. support, the UK Parliament was forced to shelve the bill as time ran out in the parliamentary session.

Upon hearing that the deal had been indefinitely paused, Mauritian Foreign Minister Dhananjay Ramful said, “We will spare no effort to seize any diplomatic or legal avenue to complete the decolonization process,” according to The Guardian. “This is a matter of justice.” The fate of the deal is unclear.

June 2026
By Kelsey Davenport

The United States announced it would contribute funds to repair damage done to the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and urged other states to also commit resources to securing the site.

In an April 29 press release, the State Department announced that the United States would provide up to $100 million “to ensure the continued containment of fissile nuclear material at the Chornobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine.”

The repairs are necessary after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) assessed that the New Safe Confinement structure, built over the reactor at the Chernobyl site after it melted down in 1986, sustained damage during a February 2025 drone strike. The IAEA concluded in a November 2025 report that the containment structure “lost its primary safety functions” due to damage caused by the strike during the full-scale Russian war against Ukraine. (See ACT, January/February 2026.) “Without repairs, the [existing structure] can no longer provide adequate protection, creating the specter of a dangerous leak of highly radioactive material in Europe,” the State Department spokesperson’s office wrote.

The Group of 7 world economic powers estimated that the total cost of the repairs will be $500 million. In the April 29 press statement, the State Department called “upon [its] G7 and European partners to follow suit and make substantial financial commitments to share the burden of these essential repairs.”

In an April 25 statement marking the 40-year anniversary of the Chernobyl accident, the European Union’s Directorate-General for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood said that the “EU will continue supporting Ukraine and assisting in ensuring nuclear safety, security and radiation protection.” The statement noted that the EU’s Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation provided $43 million for nuclear safety in Ukraine last year, some of which would go toward repairing the New Safe Confinement structure.

The statement used the Chernobyl anniversary to call attention to the ongoing nuclear security and safety risks in Ukraine. Russia’s illegal seizure and continued occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine “significantly increase the risk to human life and environmental protection,” the statement said. It added that “Moscow’s systematic attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure threaten the stable power supply required for the safe operation of nuclear facilities.”

According to a May 7 statement from IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi, a drone struck the External Radiation Control Laboratory at the Zaporizhzhia plant May 3. The IAEA team at Zaporizhzhia visited the laboratory the following day, and “observed damage to meteorological equipment used to collect real-time environmental parameters in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency,” according to Grossi’s statement. The equipment is currently not operable, the statement said.

Grossi said that “we cannot afford for the next damage to occur on essential nuclear safety equipment” and called upon “both sides to make all efforts to avoid military activities in the vicinity of nuclear facilities—wherever they are located.”

The previous week, a worker at the Zaporizhzhia complex was killed by a drone strike, according to an April 30 statement from the IAEA. In that statement, Grossi urged all parties to abide by Pillar 3 of the “seven indispensable pillars” of nuclear security and safety during conflict.

Pillar 3 states that “the operating staff must be able to fulfil their safety and security duties and have the capacity to make decisions free of undue pressure.” Grossi announced the seven pillars in May 2022, shortly after Russia attacked Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhia in the opening days of its illegal invasion of Ukraine.