May 2024            
By Daryl G. Kimball

The success of the global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament system has always relied on effective cooperation and dialogue between the two largest nuclear-weapon states.

But as their relations deteriorated over the past decade, Russia and the United States have dithered and delayed on new disarmament talks and even failed to resolve disputes on successful arms control agreements that helped ease tensions and reduce nuclear risks in the past.

Russia’s illegal and brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threat rhetoric have increased the danger of nuclear conflict. The war has become the Kremlin’s cynical excuse to short-circuit meaningful channels of diplomacy that could reduce nuclear risk. 

In early 2023, Russia suspended implementation of the last remaining Russian-U.S. nuclear arms control agreement, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), while publicly committing to adhere to the treaty’s central limits. But New START will expire in February 2026.

That is why U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan proposed in June 2023 that the two sides start talks “without precondition” to establish a new nuclear arms control framework. 

“It is in neither [Russian or U.S.] interests to embark on an open-ended competition in strategic nuclear forces,” and the United States is “prepared to stick to the central limits as long as Russia does,” he said. New START caps each side at no more than 1,550 treaty-accountable deployed nuclear warheads.

But in December, Russia rejected the U.S. proposal, saying it sees “no basis for such work” due to tensions over the war in Ukraine. 

Meanwhile, China is expanding and diversifying its relatively smaller arsenal, now estimated at 500 nuclear warheads, about 300 of which are on long-range systems. After agreeing to discuss nuclear risk reduction with U.S. officials in November, Chinese leaders have declined so far to meet again.

The White House has requested $69 billion for sustaining and upgrading the massive U.S. nuclear arsenal in fiscal year 2025, a 22 percent increase from the previous year. Nevertheless, some politicians and members of the nuclear priesthood are pushing to increase the cost and size of the nuclear arsenal even more by deploying 50 extra land-based missiles and uploading additional warheads on existing missiles.

If Russia and the United States exceed New START limits, China undoubtedly would be tempted to accelerate its own nuclear buildup. Such an action-reaction cycle would be madness. 

Once nuclear-armed adversaries achieve a mutually assured destruction capability, as China, Russia, and the United States have done, expanding their nuclear forces or acquiring new capabilities will not lead to more security but rather to an increasingly costly, unstable, and dangerous balance of terror. As U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin put it in December 2022, “Nuclear deterrence isn’t just a numbers game. In fact, that sort of thinking can spur a dangerous arms race.”

Halting the cycle of spiraling nuclear tensions is in every nation’s interest. Furthermore, under Article VI of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Russia and the United States, along with China, France, and the United Kingdom, have a legal obligation to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” Refusing to engage at the negotiating table, combined with building an even greater nuclear destructive capacity, is a violation of this core NPT tenet.

Ahead of New START’s expiration, all NPT states-parties, nuclear armed or not, allied or nonaligned, must increase the diplomatic pressure on Russia and United States, as well as China, to freeze the size of their nuclear arsenals and engage in meaningful, sustained arms reduction talks. Their message should be sent through all relevant channels, including bilateral meetings, the upcoming preparatory meeting for the next NPT review conference, the UN General Assembly, and daily at the UN Security Council.

A comprehensive, formal Russian-U.S. nuclear arms control deal would be difficult to achieve even in a more stable geostrategic environment. In these more troubled times, the pragmatic interim approach should be for Moscow and Washington to pursue a simple executive agreement or just unilaterally declare that they will continue to respect New START’s central deployed warhead limit until a more comprehensive nuclear arms control framework agreement can be concluded. 

As part of such a deal, the two sides also should seek to resume on a reciprocal basis data exchanges and inspections similar to those under New START. If they cannot do that, each side could confidently use their national technical means of intelligence to monitor compliance and ensure there is no militarily significant violation by the other party of the deployed warhead ceiling. Such an arrangement would lessen dangerous nuclear competition and create space for more intensive and wide-ranging arms control negotiations.

More nuclear weapons make us all less secure. Embarking on a safer path through disarmament diplomacy is imperative.

May 2024     
By Pavel Podvig

In 2021, it appeared that the Russian-U.S. arms control process was back on track. That February, the two states extended the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for five years and, at a high-profile summit meeting in June, agreed to launch a strategic stability dialogue to explore options for moving forward with arms control.

Although not a formal negotiation process, the dialogue was expected to prepare the ground for an agreement that would succeed New START, which expires in February 2026. Delegations representing the two states had only three meetings before February 2022, when the United States paused the process in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion in Ukraine.

It was to be expected that the war in Ukraine would deeply affect the Russian-U.S. arms control process. Both parties, however, continued to comply with their New START obligations regarding notifications and data exchange. It was also expected that on-site inspections, suspended in 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic, would eventually resume despite the tensions created by the war. The U.S. attempt to resume inspections in August 2022 proved unsuccessful, leading Russia to suspend access to its sites and then the work of the treaty-mandated Bilateral Consultative Commission. 

This put Russia in technical violation of the treaty, and eventually the government suspended participation in New START. In announcing that decision, which took effect in February 2023, Russia stated that it will continue to abide by the treaty limits until New START expires and that it would continue to provide notifications of ballistic missile launches as required by an earlier Soviet-U.S. agreement.¹ The United States also made a commitment to stay within the treaty limits as long as Russia does so and to continue providing notifications of ballistic missile launches.²

Later in 2023, the United States made an attempt to relaunch the strategic stability dialogue process with Russia by offering to discuss bilateral arms control issues “without preconditions.”³ Russia rejected the offer, arguing that any discussion of arms control should be linked to a broader set of security issues.⁴ 

Even though the Russian government has not put forward specific conditions for resuming the dialogue, its position apparently includes a comprehensive remaking of the security architecture in Europe that would limit NATO activities there, as well as implementation of all elements of a so-called security equation.⁵ The latter is a concept that is often used by officials and experts to describe Russia’s official approach to strategic stability and arms control. It usually implies that future agreements “should take into account all factors significant for strategic stability,” such as nuclear and non-nuclear strategic weapons, missile defense, and security in outer space.⁶ Because reaching a comprehensive agreement of this kind would have been difficult in the best of circumstances, it appears to be impossible today, when the resumption of the dialogue seems to be linked firmly by Russia to resolving differences over the war in Ukraine. It is almost certain that when the New START term comes to an end in February 2026, there will be no new agreement to succeed it.

Unsettling, Not Unprecedented

The prospect of having no agreement that limits the arsenals of the two largest nuclear powers is quite unsettling, especially when it comes after several decades during which arms control arguably has become a norm. This situation, however, is not unprecedented. No limits on nuclear forces were in place in the early 1980s, when the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States were rather tense and both states were actively modernizing and expanding their strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces. Of course, that was a very dangerous moment in Cold War history, and there is no comfort in knowing that the world might be going through the same cycle again. At the same time, the past experience in arms control can help illuminate today’s challenges.

Most importantly, past experience strongly suggests that the notion that arms control and disarmament dialogue can be sustained in an atmosphere of outright hostility in the relationships is not entirely correct. Compartmentalization may have worked in a very narrow sense, as a principle of leaving some disagreements, even serious ones, outside of the process that deals with strategic nuclear weapons as the most visible and most dangerous component of nuclear confrontation. Yet, every successful arms limitation or disarmament agreement was a product and an important component of a relative normalization of the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union or Russia. 

Arms control is often rationalized as a tool of managing confrontation by reducing risks, improving stability, and avoiding a costly and dangerous arms race. Indeed, it can contribute to these goals, as it has in the past, but its most significant role is in providing parties with the practical means of demonstrating that they share a common vision on certain issues and in acknowledging each other’s concerns. This aspect of arms control has been particularly important to the Soviet Union and Russia, confirming its status as an equal partner with the United States and therefore helping legitimize its role in international affairs. 

In this context, compartmentalizing arms control always has value because it encourages a focus on narrow technical issues, thereby signaling acceptance of the broader status quo without having to address all issues of disagreement. The technical nature of most arms control measures also has facilitated a demonstrated commitment to compliance and to the broader objectives of political normalization.

This understanding of arms control strongly suggests that the current attempt to separate arms control from the broader context of the Russian-U.S. relations is unlikely to succeed. The current Russian leadership apparently came to believe that the United States and its allies are not prepared to acknowledge Moscow’s interests and that their views on a range of security issues, in Europe in particular, are irreconcilable. The degree to which these beliefs are justified or to which the views of the current leadership are compatible with the national interests of the Russian society is almost immaterial here. As long as the Kremlin believes that the most important component of the process, the acknowledgment of its interests, is absent, it is unlikely to return to negotiations.

This seems to contradict the view of arms control that suggests that Russia should be interested in preserving balance with the United States by establishing quantitative or qualitative limits on U.S. strategic programs. Indeed, the Soviet Union and Russia traditionally have put a premium on numerical parity with the United States. Yet, parity rarely has been the decisive factor in its arms control decisions. 

Russia accepted significant disparity in the 1993 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) and the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty of 2002. During the New START negotiations, Russia agreed to provisions that allowed the United States to retain the capability potentially to double the number of deployed strategic warheads.⁷ Numerical balance may matter when parties assess the capabilities of their strategic forces by their counterforce potential, but for a state that relies on guaranteed retaliation, as Russia clearly does, the size of the strategic arsenal is far from the most important parameter. 

Nuclear arms control agreements help introduce a degree of transparency and predictability into military modernization programs, sometimes preventing unnecessary buildup. More often than not, however, treaties simply codified modernization decisions that were already made, often for reasons that had little to do with the issues of strategic balance or arms control. The contours of the current modernization programs in Russia and the United States largely have been determined, and neither country appears to have a strong incentive to scale them back. Equally important, neither side has the capability to significantly expand them either, especially with regard to strategic delivery systems.

Arms Control Lessons

One area where Russia traditionally sought to impose some constraints on the United States is missile defense. Indeed, the history of Russia’s unsuccessful attempts first to prevent the U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) and then to get the United States to acknowledge Russia’s concerns about its missile defense program definitely has played a role in the demise of the arms control process. It is unlikely, however, that the prospect of including missile defense in the security equation would provide a sufficient incentive for Russia to return to the dialogue today. 

From the narrow technical perspective, missile defense clearly cannot undermine Russia’s deterrence potential meaningfully, even though Russia often framed the issue this way. As for the political aspect of the problem, Moscow appears to have concluded that its own asymmetric response in the form of new systems, such as a hypersonic glide vehicle unveiled in March 2018, provides an adequate answer to U.S. missile defense efforts.⁸ The effectiveness of these Russian systems is quite questionable, but they served their political purpose. Moscow definitely would welcome a discussion of missile defense in any event, but it apparently is no longer the central issue that it used to be. 

One lesson from the 1980s is that attempts to resolve an arms control impasse by ramping up tensions and accelerating a military buildup can produce an extremely dangerous situation. Today, an attempt to force Russia back into dialogue in this manner is likely to create serious risks. Russia has a wide range of destabilizing tools at its disposal, and its recent actions suggest that its risk tolerance is much higher than that of the Soviet leadership in the 1980s. 

This does not mean that progress in arms control requires accepting the Kremlin’s vision of security. Many elements of that vision have been rejected rightfully by the international community, and indeed, most of them arguably undermine the interests of Russia as a society. It may well be impossible to achieve any progress with the current Russian leaders unless they can make a plausible case to themselves and to the political audience in Russia and elsewhere that the country’s interests are taken into account. A more realistic path to progress might involve a political leadership change in Moscow. Even in this case, a stable arrangement would require a shift of political attitudes in the West toward a vision of a nonconfrontational security and arms control framework. Elements of this framework should be designed today, if only to signal the possibility of a positive shift in case of a political change in Moscow.

Depending on political developments in Russia, a future bilateral arms control deal could be more or less ambitious in scope. At the very minimum, one could imagine basic continuity in Russia’s political stance, returning to the situation that existed before its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Even if the conflict in Ukraine were still unresolved, all parties possibly could engage in dialogue to reconcile their different visions of security arrangements in Europe and security guarantees to Ukraine in particular. A process such as that could open the possibility of restarting the strategic stability dialogue that the invasion interrupted.

Approaches to New Negotiations

The most natural starting point for the new round of discussions would be New START, which provides a robust framework for a future agreement. It could be adapted to address most of the concerns expressed by Russia and the United States in recent years. Other concerns could be addressed by a separate agreement or a political understanding once the negotiations process is underway.

Regarding the central limits on strategic forces, a new treaty could either leave them in place; lower them, perhaps dramatically; or raise the ceilings. Although the treaty is expected to facilitate nuclear disarmament and the reaction of the international community is likely to be very negative if the limits are held stable or are raised, it would be up to the parties to bear the political cost associated with reversing the disarmament trend of the last decades. The verification and transparency arrangements, arguably among the treaty’s most important elements, would remain in place even if the number of deployed warheads is allowed to increase.

Indeed, a new round of arms control discussions could begin shifting its focus away from numerical balance. One lesson that can be drawn from the tensions surrounding the war in Ukraine is that the role of nuclear weapons in this conflict would not have changed had the numbers been different. This is especially true for nonstrategic weapons. The situation would not have changed significantly had Russia had tens of these weapons in its arsenal as opposed to the more than 1,000 that it is believed to have today. The war demonstrated that nuclear weapons are poorly suited for a military role on the battlefield and that the political barriers to their use are quite significant.⁹

Another nuclear lesson from the war in Ukraine is that there is considerable value in separating nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, particularly in the case of nonstrategic systems. Amid concerns about a potential use of nuclear weapons, the absence of signs indicating preparations for such use has introduced a degree of stability in the situation.¹⁰

These considerations suggest a way of dealing with the issue of nonstrategic nuclear arsenals, which is certain to emerge in any future arms control discussion. The United States believes that any new treaty should address the disparity in the size of Russian and U.S. nonstrategic arsenals, while Russia traditionally has resisted attempts to bring nonstrategic forces into its security equation. 

The U.S.-favored approach would establish a common ceiling for all nuclear warheads and give parties the freedom to choose the composition of their force. Given that the Russian nonstrategic arsenal is estimated to include about 2,000 weapons and the New START limit is 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, one option is to have a common ceiling of about 3,500 weapons.¹¹ This approach does not take into account, however, the fact that virtually all nonstrategic weapons would be considered nondeployed in New START. Adopting the suggested common ceiling would legitimize an increase of the number of deployed nuclear warheads, in some cases increasing the risks of nuclear use. The practical implementation of this approach also would require the development of new and untested verification mechanisms to account for all nuclear weapons.¹²

A different way to deal with this issue would be to leave the ceiling for all nuclear warheads at the current New START level of 1,550 warheads or lower, but apply it only to weapons that are actually deployed, such as the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) warheads. The weapons assigned to strategic bombers and to all nonstrategic systems would be removed from the bases where their delivery systems are located to some central storage sites.¹³ These weapons would be considered nondeployed. This approach is fully consistent with the way New START treats the reserve warheads for ICBMs and SLBMs and with the practice of operating nonstrategic weapons that exists in Russia. Importantly, the absence of weapons at base-level sites can be verified without access to nuclear weapons and with the application of tested protocols and practices.¹⁴

One issue that emerged in the course of implementing New START is that of the “exotic” systems unveiled by Russia in March 2018, such as the Avangard hypersonic glider, the nuclear-powered cruise missile, and the underwater drone.¹⁵ Some of these systems, specifically the Sarmat ICBM and the Avangard glider, already are covered by the New START limits. Others can be added to the scope of a future treaty if they ever get to the deployment stage. At the very least, the new agreement should include a detailed mechanism that would allow parties to discuss whether any new kinds of strategic arms should be covered. This mechanism should go beyond the New START provision that gives parties “the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Commission” but does not provide further guidance on the matter. It also could be used to discuss “non-nuclear strategic weapons,” which Russia would like to include in its security equation.

Even if missile defense is no longer an issue of the utmost importance for Russia, any future arms control agreement would have to find a way to deal with it. In this case as well, New START provides a template for a solution. Its preamble acknowledges the interrelationship between offensive and defensive weapons, but states that “current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms” of the parties. This formula can be reproduced safely in any future disarmament agreement because it correctly reflects the capability of missile defense systems to counter strategic offensive arms.¹⁶ 

None of these measures would require significant concessions from Russia or the United States. Some of them, such as the treatment of nonstrategic weapons or missile defense, may depart from long-established positions, but none of them departs too far to make an agreement impossible.

One factor that could complicate the return to a Russian-U.S. arms control dialogue is the concern about the direction of China’s nuclear modernization program often expressed by the United States. It may be difficult to bring China into this equation, especially given its traditional reluctance to get involved in arms control. Most of the analysis regarding the Russian and U.S. views of the political role of arms control would apply to the situation with China as well. Russia’s response to any military buildup by the United States would be determined primarily by the status of their broader bilateral relationship rather than by narrow considerations of numerical balance.

Despite all the problems facing nuclear arms control and disarmament today, it is important to recognize that the system is not entirely broken. The commitments made by Russia and the United States to remain within the New START limits and to continue the exchange of some notifications signal some restraint on both sides. For example, the way Russia handled the deratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 2023 also suggests that it is not prepared yet to fully abandon the test ban regime and its institutions.¹⁷ 

It is important to preserve the experience and practices of bilateral and multilateral arms control because they could provide a foundation for future nuclear reductions once political change makes them possible. The change may seem quite distant today, but it may be closer than it appears. A vision for a cooperative arms control framework and nonconfrontational security arrangements is essential to create this change.

ENDNOTES

1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Foreign Ministry Statement in Connection With the Russian Federation Suspending the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START),” February 21, 2023, https://www.mid.ru/ru/press_service/spokesman/official_statement/1855184/?lang=en.

2. Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability, U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Countermeasures in Response to Russia’s Violations of the New START Treaty,” June 1, 2023, https://www.state.gov/u-s-countermeasures-in-response-to-russias-violations-of-the-new-start-treaty/; “Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan for the Arms Control Association (ACA) Annual Forum,” Arms Control Association,      
June 2, 2023, https://www.armscontrol.org/2023AnnualMeeting/sullivan-remarks (hereinafter Sullivan remarks).

3. Sullivan remarks.

4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Statement and Answers to Media Questions During a News Conference on Russia’s Foreign Policy Performance in 2023, Moscow, January 18, 2024,” January 18, 2024, https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1926392/?lang=en. 

5. Evgeny P. Buzhinskiy, Vladimir A. Orlov, and Sergey D. Semenov, “Against Compartmentalization,” PIR Center, December 26, 2023, https://pircenter.org/en/editions/against-compartmentalization/. 

6. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov’s Opening Remarks at a Briefing at the Rossiya Segodnya International Information Agency on Arms Control and Strategic Stability, February 11, 2021,” February 11, 2021, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1415641/. 

7. Although Russia has later obtained a similar capability, it did not have it at the time the treaty was signed. Matt Korda, “If Arms Control Collapses, U.S. and Russian Strategic Nuclear Arsenals Could Double in Size,” Federation of American Scientists, February 7, 2023, https://fas.org/publication/if-arms-control-collapses-us-and-russian-strategic-nuclear-arsenals-could-double-in-size/. 

8. President of Russia, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957. 

9. Pavel Podvig, “Why a Russian Nuclear Expert Thinks the Doomsday Clock Should Move Away From Midnight,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 8, 2023, https://thebulletin.org/2023/11/why-a-russian-nuclear-expert-thinks-the-doomsday-clock-should-move-away-from-midnight/; Daryl Kimball, “Strengthening the Nuclear Taboo in the Midst of Russia’s War on Ukraine,” Arms Control Today, February 2023, https://www.armscontrol.org/issue-briefs/2023-02/strengthening-nuclear-taboo-midst-russias-war-ukraine.

10. Pavel Podvig, “A Russian Nuclear Strike on Ukraine Is Not a Threat - At Least Not Yet,” The Moscow Times, October 18, 2022, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/10/18/a-russian-nuclear-strike-on-ukraine-is-not-a-threat-at-least-not-yet-a79114; David E. Sanger, “Biden’s Armageddon Moment: When Nuclear Detonation Seemed Possible in Ukraine,” The New York Times, March 10, 2024. 

11. Frank Miller, “As the World Changes, So Should America’s Nuclear Strategy, Says Frank Miller,” The Economist, April 4, 2024, https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2024/04/04/as-the-world-changes-so-should-americas-nuclear-strategy-says-frank-miller; Edward M. Ifft, “Beyond New START,” Hoover Institution, January 27, 2023, https://www.hoover.org/research/beyond-new-start. 

12. For one attempt to develop arrangements of this kind that illustrates the complexity of the task, see Miles A. Pomper et al., “Everything Counts: Building a Control Regime for Nonstrategic Nuclear Warheads in Europe,” CNS Occasional Paper, No. 55 (May 2022), https://nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/op55-everything-counts.pdf. 

13. Pavel Podvig and Javier Serrat, “Lock Them Up: Zero-Deployed Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2017, https://www.unidir.org/sites/default/files/publication/pdfs/lock-them-up-zero-deployed-non-strategic-nuclear-weapons-in-europe-en-675.pdf; Pavel Podvig, Ryan Snyder, and Wilfred Wan, “Evidence of Absence: Verifying the Removal of Nuclear Weapons,” UNIDIR, 2018, https://www.unidir.org/sites/default/files/publication/pdfs/evidence-of-absence-verifying-the-removal-of-nuclear-weapons-en-722.pdf.

14. Pavel Podvig, ed., “Menzingen Verification Experiment: Verifying the Absence of Nuclear Weapons in the Field,” UNIDIR, 2023, https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/UNIDIR_Menzingen_Verification_Experiment_Report.pdf.

15. Ifft, “Beyond New START.” 

16. Pavel Podvig, “The False Promise of Missile Defense,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 14, 2009, https://thebulletin.org/2009/09/the-false-promise-of-missile-defense/. 

17. Pavel Podvig, “Preserving the Nuclear Test Ban After Russia Revoked Its CTBT Ratification,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 80, No. 2 (March 3, 2024): 75-80.

Pavel Podvig is a senior researcher in the weapons of mass destruction program at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research.

May 2024        
By Ian Fleming Zhou, Valeriia Hesse, Anna-Elisabeth Schmitz, and Karina Touzinsky

Global tensions are surging with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, echoing the Cold War era’s geopolitical instability and dangerous nuclear rhetoric. 

In this environment, the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference scheduled for 2026 will be a juncture for the nuclear nonproliferation regime, demanding a reinvigoration of arms control and multilateral diplomacy amid the continuous erosion of crucial arms control instruments. Otherwise, the continued failure of the review conference process could contribute to several major negative consequences: further erosion of arms control frameworks, expansion of geopolitical tensions, diminished confidence in multilateral diplomacy, and the increased risk of nuclear conflict and nuclear proliferation. 

During the review conferences of the 1980s, the international environment was strained and marked by the invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, and setbacks in arms control negotiations. The lessons learned from these conferences can inform the approach to achieving success in 2026 in a similarly strained geopolitical environment. In particular, analysis of the 1985 review conference can help identify key success factors. This is especially true when considering adept negotiation tactics and the strategic emphasis on incremental achievements to cultivate cooperation in the realm of future nuclear nonproliferation. 

Recognizing the pivotal role of multilateral institutions is crucial, given the difficulty in achieving consensus on key issues in today’s global politics.¹ Although NPT review conference success seemingly is tied to the adoption of an outcome document achieved by consensus, the current dynamics of geopolitics make reaching such a document nearly impossible. In such circumstances, NPT states-parties become accustomed to not achieving consensus. The result is a stalemate with no further progress toward more effective arms control with clear objectives, confidence- and security-building measures, and adaptability. This raises questions about the efficacy of the existing approach to the NPT negotiations and further emphasizes the urgency of exploring alternative mechanisms to ensure the “success” of NPT review conferences and to foster progress in nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially when consensus appears elusive. 

Lessons From the Past 

The 1980 review conference was marked by unresolved issues and the absence of a final declaration. For instance, the Iran-Iraq war impacted negotiations because Iranians were unwilling ideologically to compromise out of fear of displaying the weakness of their new postrevolution regime. Additionally, the pursuit of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) faced obstacles, with delayed concessions contributing to the breakdown of consensus. Effectively, the United States shifted its stance too late in the process to make a difference.² 

During the 1985 review conference, strategic compromises among nations became instrumental to reaching consensus.³ Diplomatic mediation found solutions to stalemates such as the discord between Iran and Iraq. In the final declaration, states-parties condemned attacks on civilian nuclear infrastructure, referring to the attacks on Iraq’s Osirak reactor and Iran’s Bushehr reactor, and agreed to attach Iran’s and Iraq’s statements on the attacks to the final document package. Intentional negotiation pertaining to the CTBT impasse resulted in agreement to disagree: the language acceptable to all parties in addressing the test ban reflected the disagreement by including the statement that “the conference, except for certain states,” regretted that the treaty had not been agreed.⁴

The success of the 1985 review conference is attributed to various factors. Despite several ongoing crises, tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States were waning, and their new leaders were more inclined to cooperate at the conference.⁵ In general, the credibility of the NPT hinged on steering clear of consecutive failures and reaching consensus on a final declaration. As a result, member states arrived with a shared determination to secure an outcome document and refrained from directly attacking each other.⁶ The Soviet Union and the United States had a common interest in preserving a strong nonproliferation norm and recognized that their cooperation would shape the review conference structure and tone.⁷ Because of this common interest, they were able to compartmentalize NPT-related issues.⁸

Although at a similarly extreme height of geopolitical tensions among all the key players, the 2026 review conference will experience many differences from the 1980s. The desire to produce a consensus document prevailed in 1985, but at the moment, the two major powers do not share common views on arms control. The polarization between Russian and U.S. interests is eroding the arms control mechanisms that existed in the 1980s. It is unclear whether the NPT holds the same significance for Russia. Its recent actions, such as weaponizing the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant⁹ and threatening to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon state, run counter to the aims of the NPT. This outright defiance of the NPT’s underlying principles and norms impedes compartmentalization of certain aspects under negotiation within the NPT framework in a manner that was possible in 1985. 

In 1985, states-parties invented options for mutual gain to reach consensus and break the stalemate that had led to the failure of the 1980 review conference. The key success lessons from the 1985 conference include the ability to acknowledge dissenting voices while maintaining majority support and to emphasize listening, consulting, and backroom negotiations as a means of fostering deeper mutual understanding. This approach allowed the conference to navigate disagreements without compromising the NPT.¹⁰ Applying this approach to the upcoming 2026 review conference would provide for flexible negotiating principles and allow for a wider definition of a successful review conference.

Possible Future Outcomes 

The success of review conferences extends beyond consensus; a shared commitment to nonproliferation and negotiation strategies are pivotal. This nuanced understanding of historical challenges sets the stage for policy considerations for a successful 2026 review conference.

In reevaluating approaches to the zones of possible agreement within the context of the NPT, it becomes evident that historical emphasis on achieving a consensus document may limit the scope of the success metrics. Perhaps the most optimal outcome lies not in a document adopted by consensus but in a commitment to transform critical issues into actionable items and an opportunity to deliberate on these matters further. 

Bearing this in mind, the traditional pass/fail evaluation paradigm should be challenged. Research suggests that there is a spectrum of outcomes that should encourage flexibility in defining success in 2026. The least favorable outcome of a review conference involves a final document that is weakly phrased and fails to reach consensus. This scenario portends significant negative repercussions, including the potential erosion of the NPT, diminished confidence in multilateral diplomacy, heightened risk of nuclear conflict, and increased nuclear proliferation. Such an outcome would signify a failure of the conference to address pressing issues effectively, thereby exacerbating global nuclear insecurity and undermining efforts toward disarmament and nonproliferation.

Next in line on the favorability scale would be an agreement by consensus on a weakly phrased final document on basic issues, such as the reaffirmation of general principles that fails to address key points of contention or detailed differences among states-parties. This course of action outlines the possibility of a less favorable outcome resulting from consensus on a final document that lacks clarity and strength in addressing crucial matters. Consequently, the document may lack specificity and fail to offer a clear road map for addressing anything of true importance. This deficiency leaves major issues unattended, potentially leading to frustration among participants and undermining trust in multilateral diplomacy.

The next possibility involves a neutral favorable outcome whereby an actionable, strongly phrased draft document is formulated but not adopted by consensus. Instead, parties agree to present negotiation outcomes encapsulating varying perspectives in an information circular. This circular operates independently from the outcome document and serves as an informal mechanism to guide subsequent negotiations. It allows for the delineation of disagreements and issues earmarked for future agreement in different forums or through bilateral discussions and potentially quantifies the support and opposition for specific points if required. This approach maintains transparency, encourages continued dialogue, and provides a framework for addressing contentious issues in subsequent discussions.

A more favorable outcome would be a strongly phrased, actionable outcome document that is adopted by consensus, effectively capturing agreements and disagreements among the parties involved. This document serves as a comprehensive representation of diverse perspectives, facilitating a deeper understanding of the challenges and opportunities within the nonproliferation landscape. By acknowledging and addressing varying viewpoints, this outcome fosters a sense of collaboration and cooperation among stakeholders, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of multilateral efforts toward nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.

The best outcome would include a unanimously agreed upon outcome document, devoid of any disagreements, that is adopted by consensus. This document comprehensively addresses pertinent issues crucial for the preservation and progressive development of the nonproliferation regime. It incorporates robust language and actionable items, reflecting a commitment to tackle nuclear proliferation challenges effectively. Moreover, this outcome fosters principles of transparency, equality, and inclusivity, underlining a collective dedication to promoting peace and security in the global community.

Taking into account the current geopolitical environment, the optimal course of action, in the absence of a consensus on a substantial draft document that aims to uphold and fortify the NPT regime, would involve creating an information circular. This document, characterized by its nonbinding and informational nature, would explicitly detail points of agreement and disagreement. Its publication would not necessitate a vote due to its purely informative purpose. Simultaneously, it would provide a trajectory for subsequent negotiations, address current issues, and create avenues for bilateral or multilateral exploration of specific aspects in alternative formats.

Charting Success in 2026 

Redefining success would allow states-parties to view review conferences as dynamic, systematic endeavors that contribute to the continuous growth and development of global nonproliferation efforts. The outcome declaration, whether or not adopted by consensus, should codify systematically points of convergence and divergent views among states-parties in case the negotiation comes to a stalemate. Inclusion of differences is essential for enhancing the transparency and comprehensiveness of the review process. 

By utilizing strong rather than diluted language, the outcome document would ensure meaningful discussions fostering nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. A clear, detailed codification of differences serves as a valuable resource for policymakers, researchers, and stakeholders, enabling a more thorough examination of the complex dynamics shaping the global nuclear nonproliferation landscape without sacrificing the integrity of the discussions through watered-down language.

Approaching the 2026 review conference, the following flexible negotiation principles should be kept in mind: Separate people from the problem. Understand that individual diplomats represent state positions, which cannot be changed easily, rather than just their personal views. On the one hand, judging from the 1980s experience, personalities can deeply influence the process and outcome of the negotiation. On the other hand, although personal contacts and trust are helpful, they frequently cannot fully change policies.

Focus on interests, not positions. Each position in the negotiation carries the weight of geopolitical considerations and national interests. By directing attention toward underlying motivations, negotiations can tap into shared concerns, and conference participants can achieve better results. Sustaining ongoing dialogues across various levels with a broad spectrum of countries, especially among the states holding opposing positions, can be helpful to understand the complexities and diversities of perspectives involved, encouraging collaborative problem-solving that aligns with the broader interests of the international community. 

Invent options for mutual gain. It is most important to emphasize that preserving the NPT and the dialogue is in the common security and development interest. Therefore, NPT members must make review conferences meaningful for mutual gain, which entails avoiding diluted language, talking substance even if it means just pinpointing the divergence in positions, and maintaining principles of equality. 

Insist on using objective criteria. Such an approach is helpful in settling differences of interest that involve high costs. The objective framework to guide the review conference negotiation should include the NPT itself, relevant International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) documents, the UN Charter, International Court of Justice decisions, and other applicable international norms. At the same time, it is important to admit that there exist limitations to applying international instruments because they themselves are subject to interpretation and bear no enforcement mechanisms. 

In redefining success for the 2026 review conference, it is paramount to embrace flexible negotiating principles that embody the evolving nature of global nonproliferation efforts. A key tenet is the systematic reflection of convergent and divergent viewpoints among states-parties within the proposed outcome document in case of a stalemate. As previously mentioned, a substantive and resolute approach, rather than a diluted consensus document, is the true benchmark of success. A separately drafted information circular that captures the different views of the parties could set the direction for further negotiations. Inclusion of differences enhances transparency and comprehensiveness, providing a valuable resource for policymakers, researchers, and stakeholders. 

By clearly articulating the intended progress in these review conferences as well as disagreements without dilution, the document becomes a foundation for constructive engagement and future dialogue while maintaining confidence in multilateral diplomacy and institutions. Approaching the 2026 negotiations, it is crucial to shift the focus from consensus but to maintain strong language, engage in preparatory dialogues, understand state positions and discuss differences, agree to disagree, and ensure knowledge transfer. By inventing options for mutual gain, understanding the distinction between individuals and state positions, focusing on issues that align with shared concerns, and insisting on objective criteria rooted in international norms, the review conference process can foster substantive progress that serves the common security and development interests of the international community.

ENDNOTES

1. Jayantha Dhanapala and Randy Rydell, “Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT: An Insider’s Account,” UN Institute for Disarmament Research, 2005, https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/multilateral-diplomacy-and-the-npt-an-insider-s-account-323.pdf. 

2. Lewis A. Dunn, “Perspectives on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, October 2018, https://www.nti.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/09/Discussion_Paper-Perspectives.pdf. 

3. Kjolv Egeland, “Who Stole Disarmament? History and Nostalgia in Nuclear Abolition Discourse,” International Affairs, Vol. 96, No. 5 (July 2020): 1387-1403.

4. Harald Müller, David Fischer, and Wolfgang Kötter, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1994); Lewis Dunn, video interview with authors, November 13, 2023 (hereinafter Dunn interview); Tariq Rauf, video interview with authors, November 7, 2023 (hereinafter Rauf interview).

5. Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, video interview with authors, November 8, 2023 (hereinafter Mukhatzhanova interview); Dunn interview; Rauf interview. 

6. Jozef Goldblat, ed., Non-proliferation: The Why and the Wherefore (Philadelphia: Taylor & Francis, 1985). 

7. Ibid.

8. Bill Potter, video interview with authors, November 21, 2023; Dunn interview; Rauf interview; Robert Einhorn, video interview with authors, November 24, 2023 (hereinafter Einhorn interview); Mukhatzhanova interview.

9. Gabriela Rosa Hernandez and Daryl Kimball, “Russia Blocks NPT Conference Consensus Over Ukraine,” Arms Control Today, September 2022. 

10. Goldblat, Non-proliferation; Dunn interview; Rauf interview; Einhorn interview.

Ian Fleming Zhou is a doctoral candidate at the University of Pretoria. Valeriia Hesse is a researcher at the Odesa Center for Nonproliferation in Ukraine. Anna-Elisabeth Schmitz is a foreign and security policy adviser for a member of the German Parliament. Karina Touzinsky is a military policy analyst for the U.S. Department of Defense. This article is adapted from a policy brief based on research supported by the Arms Control Negotiation Academy (ACONA).

May 2024
By William N. Faulkner

I enjoyed David Koplow’s investigation (“Planetary Defense: The Nuclear Option Against Asteroids,” April 2024) into the odd niche where planetary defense and nuclear weapons overlap. Deflecting space objects has been proposed as a potential use for nuclear weapons since the 1980s. Although I learned much from his legal analysis, I feel compelled to add context. The main steps of planetary defense proceed in a set order: detection, characterization, deflection, and mitigation. The first step, detecting the object and determining its size and orbit, is required for all of the rest. From this perspective, planning and testing deflection strategies, whether nuclear standoff explosions or kinetic impactors such as NASA’s Double Asteroid Redirection Test (DART) mission, is putting the cart (deflection) before the horse (detection). 

Fortunately, two new U.S. observatories, the ground-based Vera Rubin in Chile and the space-based Near-Earth Object (NEO) Surveyor, should catalog nearly all the potentially hazardous objects in our solar system by the mid 2030s. The 2005 George E. Brown Jr. Near-Earth Object Survey Act legally required that NASA implement a near-earth object survey. Soon after, the quantitative completion and size thresholds of 90 percent of objects that are 140 meters or larger and are estimated to produce “regional” damage were specified in the NASA Authorization Act of 2005. Both projects enjoy bipartisan congressional support and received full funding for 2024. Vera Rubin should start operations this year; NEO Surveyor, in 2028.

I do not envision a near-term human society without nuclear weapons. But I feel that attention paid to the “nuclear option” in planetary defense can all too easily be construed as justification for maintaining the prestige, peaceful nature, and ultimate necessity of our nuclear arsenals’ mind-boggling destructive capacity. 

Those considering deflection should spend more effort promoting the economically efficient, scientifically sound, and drastically more ethically straightforward U.S. projects in detection: Vera Rubin and NEO Surveyor.

William N. Faulkner is director at Flux Research, Monitoring and Evaluation in New Orleans and co-Founder of Gulf Coast Eval Network. 

May 2024  
By Kelsey Davenport

Iran closed its nuclear facilities to international inspectors the day after launching a barrage of drones and missiles at Israel and a senior military official said Tehran may rethink its prohibition on developing nuclear weapons if Israel retaliates by attacking the country’s nuclear infrastructure. 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi said Iran reopened the nuclear sites on April 15, but he kept inspectors away for another day until the situation was “completely calm.”

The April 13 Iranian strike, which included about 300 drones and missiles, was calibrated carefully to allow Israel and its partners to shoot down most of the Iranian systems. But it opens a new chapter in Iran-Israel relations as Tehran signaled it will respond to future Israeli attacks by directly striking Israel rather than relying on proxies and partners in the region. 

At the same time, Iran made clear that it does not wish to escalate the conflict with Israel. Iran’s UN mission said on April 13 that Tehran’s attack was a direct response to an April 1 Israeli strike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus that killed several high-level Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officers and that the matter is “now concluded.”

Although the United States assisted Israel in intercepting the Iranian drones and missiles, the White House said that U.S. President Joseph Biden made clear to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Washington would not participate in any counterstrike against Iran. 

Israel did retaliate for the attack on April 19 by striking several Iranian military sites, including targets near the city of Isfahan, which includes declared nuclear facilities. But Grossi said there was no damage to those nuclear sites. The scope of the attack was limited, suggesting Israel’s intention was to demonstrate to Iran its ability to strike targets deep within the country.

White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre responded to the Israeli strike by saying that the United States does “not want to see this conflict escalate” and that it is working to reduce that risk. 

Before Israel’s counterattack, Ahmad Haghtalab, the IRGC commander in charge of security at Iran’s nuclear facilities, said that Israeli threats to strike the nuclear infrastructure “make it possible to review our nuclear doctrine and deviate from our previous considerations.” 

Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has banned the development of nuclear weapons by religious decree. Nasser Kanaani, spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, reiterated the prohibition in an April 22 press briefing, saying that “nuclear weapons have no place in our nuclear doctrine.” He said the country’s nuclear program is entirely peaceful. 

But Haghtalab’s comments support assessments by western officials and experts that Tehran could rethink that prohibition and develop nuclear weapons if necessary for security.

Iran’s decision to bar access to its nuclear sites and the IAEA delay in resuming inspections suggest Tehran and the IAEA were concerned that Israel could respond to the April 13 attack by targeting Iranian nuclear facilities. 

Grossi told reporters at the United Nations on April 15 that the agency is “always concerned” about the possibility of an Israeli strike and urged “extreme restraint.” 

Some former U.S. and Israeli officials used the April 13 attack to urge Netanyahu to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, despite the risk that such action would drive Iran to develop nuclear weapons. In an April 14 CNN interview, for instance, former U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton suggested that Israel should “destroy Iran’s nuclear weapons program” in response. 

Iran has the capability to develop nuclear weapons, but the country is not engaged currently in key weaponization activities, according to the U.S. intelligence community. 

Israel periodically has sabotaged Iranian nuclear facilities and assassinated Iranian nuclear scientists, but it is unclear if the country is willing to risk a large-scale attack on the nuclear program without the support of the United States, particularly if there is no evidence that Tehran is developing nuclear weapons. 

Logistically, it would be challenging for Israel to target some of Iran’s facilities using conventional weapons. Iran’s nuclear infrastructure includes deeply buried sites, such as the Fordow uranium-enrichment facility, that would necessitate the use of larger U.S. conventional bombs, such as the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator, to destroy. Furthermore, without U.S. refueling support, it would be more difficult for the Israeli Air Force to strike Iran because of the distances between the countries.

A large-scale attack on Iran also increases the risk that Tehran will decide that nuclear weapons are necessary to deter future attacks, as Haghtalab suggested. Given that Iran already has the capability to develop nuclear weapons, setbacks from a military strike would be temporary because Iran has the knowledge necessary to reconstitute the program.

As heightened regional tensions and the possibility of an attack on its territory increase the risk of Iran determining that nuclear weapons are necessary, the April 14 decision to close its nuclear facilities demonstrates how the country could cite security concerns to block IAEA access and use the period between inspections to accelerate production of material for a nuclear bomb. 

This risk is heightened because Iran has stockpiled enough uranium of near-weapons-grade quality for about three weapons and is operating centrifuges that enrich uranium efficiently. As a result of these advances, Iran can produce enough weapons-grade material for a nuclear weapon in less than a week. 

Although the IAEA would detect weapons-grade enrichment after resuming inspections, the delay could provide Tehran with enough time to divert the weapons-grade uranium to a covert site for weaponization, a process that could take six months to a year.

Grossi did not appear concerned about the April disruption. He said it “has not had an impact on our inspection activity.” But he continues to raise concerns about the overall ability of the IAEA to monitor Iran’s nuclear program. In a March 29 interview with CNN, he warned that if Iran does not cooperate with the agency, the IAEA is approaching a point where it will not be able to give “a credible assurance that Iran’s nuclear program is entirely peaceful.” He said inspectors must have “full visibility.”