"No one can solve this problem alone, but together we can change things for the better." 

– Setsuko Thurlow
Hiroshima Survivor
June 6, 2016

China’s Nuclear Expansion: The Challenges, Implications, and Risk Reduction Options



Wednesday, November 17, 2021
2:00 - 3:30pm Eastern time
via Zoom webinar

As the Biden administration continues to conduct a review of U.S. nuclear weapons policy scheduled to be completed in early 2022, China appears to be in pursuit of a significant and concerning expansion in the diversity and size of its nuclear forces.


  • Gerald Brown, defense analyst at Valiant Integrated Services
  • Rose Gottemoeller, former undersecretary of state for arms control and international security and deputy secretary general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
  • Lynn Rusten, vice president of the Global Nuclear Policy Program at the Nuclear Threat Initiative
  • Daryl Kimball (moderator), executive director of the Arms Control Association

Our speakers addressed the factors that appear to be driving China to augment its nuclear capabilities and what those advancements mean for strategic and regional stability, the importance of dialogue and engagement with Beijing on nuclear risk reduction and options for doing so, and the implications of China’s nuclear advances for U.S. nuclear force posture and modernization.

The Defense Department now projects that China is expected to exceed the department’s earlier estimate that Beijing is poised to at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile over the next decade. Recent analysis of satellite imagery by respected nongovernmental organizations has revealed the construction of at least 250 new missile silos at as many as three locations across China. Beijing also conducted over the summer two tests associated with the development of hypersonic weapons, one of which potentially involved a long-range nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicle that flew through low-orbit space and circled the globe.

The Pentagon’s latest annual report on China Military Power slated to be released this month highlights several of these and other Chinese nuclear advances.

The Biden administration has expressed grave concerns about China’s nuclear advances and argued that “Beijing has sharply deviated from its decades-old nuclear strategy based on minimum deterrence.” The administration seeks to commence a dialogue on nuclear risk reduction with Beijing, but thus far, China has rebuffed the prospect.

Whether China implements the projected nuclear buildup over the next several years remains to be seen and is likely to be determined by several variables. These variables include the trajectory of the overall U.S.-China strategic relationship, U.S. and allied military deployments in the Indo-Pacific, and advances in U.S. long-range conventional strike and missile defense capabilities.


As the Biden administration continues to conduct a review of U.S. nuclear weapons policy scheduled to be completed in early 2022, China appears to be in pursuit of a significant and concerning expansion of the diversity and the size of its nuclear forces.

Country Resources:

Toward a Balanced Outcome at the Tenth NPT Review Conference



Remarks by
Daryl G. Kimball
Nuclear Discussion Forum at the Mission of Kazakhstan to the United Nations
October 26, 2021

Executive director Daryl G. Kimball, speaking at the Permanent Mission of Kazakhstan to the United Nations, October 26, 2021 Thank you, Ambassador Ilyassov, for the invitation to speak, and thanks to the Mission of Kazakhstan for bringing us all together to refocus our attention on the pivotal, but delayed, Tenth Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference January 2-28, 2022.

As we assess what will take to achieve a balanced and successful outcome in 2022, it is important to recollect key experiences, lessons, and commitments from past NPT review cycles.

Twenty-six years ago, as states parties negotiated the terms for the extension of the NPT, the future of the treaty was not assured.

But in 1995, at the treaty’s Review and Extension Conference, world leaders and diplomats managed to come together to craft a balanced plan to advance key goals on disarmament and nonproliferation and extend this bedrock agreement to reduce nuclear dangers.

On May 11, 1995, NPT states parties committed to the “complete elimination of nuclear weapons” and specific disarmament actions as part of a balanced package of decisions. Additional specific commitments were made at the 2000 and 2010 review conferences to advance implementation and compliance with all three pillars of the treaty.

The 1995, 2000, and 2010 commitments with few exceptions remain relevant and important, but the disarmament-related commitments remain largely been unfulfilled.

They should now be reaffirmed, updated, and implemented in good faith. These commitments represent a collective determination of how to comply with Article VI. Abandoning or undercutting them would represent a lack of respect for the NPT process and cast doubt on the value of the NPT Review process itself.

Undoubtedly, NPT states parties will need to come together on many key issues at the NPT Review Conference in January, including action strengthening nuclear safeguards and steps toward addressing regional nonproliferation goals, among others.

But the success of this pivotal review conference will, more than anything, hinge on how and whether they can develop an updated, meaningful action plan on disarmament that helps to address the growing disarmament deficit.

The Disarmament Deficit

Since at least 2010, the nuclear disarmament process has been stalled, and the five NPT nuclear-armed states cannot credibly claim they are meeting their NPT Article VI obligations.

Today, tensions among the world’s nuclear-armed states are rising; the risk of nuclear use is growing; hundreds of billions of dollars are being spent to replace and upgrade the already bloated arsenals of the world’s nine possessors of nuclear weapons; key agreements that have kept nuclear competition in check are in serious jeopardy.

The United States, Russia, China, and the U.K., to varying degrees, are all engaged in a qualitative and quantitative arms race. At the last moment, Presidents Biden and Putin extended the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty, New START, and relaunched a strategic security dialogue that could evolve into nuclear disarmament talks. Progress is possible but is by no means assured.

Meanwhile, China, the United Kingdom, and France remain on the sidelines and are not part of any serious nuclear disarmament discussion or negotiation. The so-called P5 Process, while useful in many ways, is simply not an effective forum to exchange, let alone negotiate, serious disarmament proposals. And there is growing evidence that China is preparing to double or triple the size of its long-range, nuclear-armed ballistic missile force.

Consequently, as we approach the delayed 10th NPT Review Conference, we are once again are at a crossroads in the long-running journey to reduce the threat of nuclear war and eliminate nuclear weapons.

All states must approach the upcoming NPT Review Conference with a sense of urgency, a spirit of cooperation, a willingness to be flexible, and a determination to produce meaningful results that transcend old fault lines, particularly regarding the disarmament “pillar” of the NPT.

To achieve a successful outcome at this NPT Review Conference, states parties must not only reaffirm their past commitments and objectively review recent progress—or lack thereof—on meeting treaty goals and commitments—they must focus on developing an updated, focused action plan on disarmament.

No Excuses

U.S. and Russian leadership on nuclear risk reduction and disarmament has been a key to the success of pivotal NPT Review Conferences in the past. Unfortunately, neither can provide any evidence of progress on disarmament in recent years.

We can expect U.S. and Russian officials to remind us that since the end of the Cold War 40 years ago, their arsenals have declined significantly. While true, nearly all those reductions occurred before 2010.

We can expect the nuclear-armed states will continue to claim that many past NPT commitments on disarmament have been overtaken by events. Some will bemoan the fact that the “environment” for progress on disarmament is challenging and they will each claim they are open to talks on disarmament under the right diplomatic terms.

History shows that progress on disarmament can be achieved during times of tension, and that tensions can be eased, trust can be rebuilt through effective negotiations on nuclear arms control.

In 1979, for instance, during the height of the Cold War, then-Sen. Biden spoke at the Arms Control Association Annual Dinner about “The Necessity of Nuclear Arms Control,” noting that “pursuing arms control is not a luxury or a sign of weakness, but an international responsibility and a national necessity.”

Some of the nuclear-armed states may continue to oppose any recognition of the fact that since the 2015 NPT Review Conference many of the NPT’s non-nuclear member states successfully concluded the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons as a contribution to meeting their NPT Article VI obligations.

Some may even resist recognizing the grave health and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons production, testing, and use—otherwise known as catastrophic humanitarian impacts.

Such deflection of responsibility for inaction is unconstructive and irresponsible.

Next Steps on Disarmament

Instead, the five nuclear-armed NPT states should acknowledge the continued validity of their past disarmament commitments and work with other NPT states to develop an updated action plan that sets benchmarks for progress over the next several years.

Notwithstanding tensions between the nuclear-armed states, the conference can and should develop a forward-looking action plan that:

  • commits NPT states parties to take near-term steps that meaningfully reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons,
  • seeks to bring all nuclear-armed states into the nuclear disarmament process, and
  • creates new momentum to put us back on the path toward the common goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

Key elements should be rooted in the 2010 NPT action plan and can be derived from statements and proposals from the NAM, the NAC, the Stockholm Initiative, and the NPDI, as well as the commitments and policies of nuclear-weapon states themselves.

It might include the following measures which might be codified in a joint statement designed to become an element of the final conference document:

  • a call for the United States and Russia to conclude talks on a New START follow-on agreement or agreements that achieve further, lower limits on strategic and nonstrategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems no later than 2025
  • a pledge by all the NPT nuclear-armed states to freeze the size of their nuclear arsenals and reduce their fissile stockpiles, as the United States and Russia seek to achieve new agreements to reduce their offensive nuclear arsenals and limit their strategic missile interceptor systems
  • a call for all five nuclear-armed states to agree to begin to engage in disarmament talks, either bilaterally and/or through a new multilateral format, no later than 2025
  • reaffirmation by all nuclear-armed states of their de facto nuclear testing moratoria, the negotiation of voluntary nuclear test confidence-building measures to address concerns about compliance pending CTBT entry into force, and action by the eight remaining CTBT holdout states to ratify the treaty before 2025
  • a call for a halt to the introduction of new types of nuclear weapons and nuclear-armed cruise and hypersonic missiles
  • a commitment by the nuclear-weapon states to adopt and report on specific policies that reduce the role and salience and risk of use of nuclear weapons, including a phaseout to Cold War-era “launch under attack” postures, which increase the risk of accidental nuclear war
  • a recognition of the fact that any use of nuclear weapons would produce catastrophic humanitarian consequences and that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”

In the absence of coherent and constructive leadership from the nuclear-weapon states, other responsible and concerned NPT states parties need to fill the void and work together for a good outcome.

Sweden, Germany, Kazakhstan, and other states have made some strides toward a common framework on the next steps on nuclear disarmament. Leaders of the humanitarian initiative on nuclear weapons and key members of the Non-Aligned Movement also have a role to play.

We all need to act with the urgency that the threats posed by nuclear weapons demand.

If we are to reduce the nuclear threat and prevent the possible third use of nuclear weapons, we cannot afford to squander the opportunity to act while we still can.


Remarks by Executive Director Daryl G. Kimball for the Nuclear Discussion Forum at the Mission of Kazakhstan to the United Nations

US Chemical Weapons Stockpile Elimination: Progress Update



Thursday, September 23, 2021
10:00am - 11:30am Washington, DC time

As part of its treaty obligations to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the United States must finish destroying all of its declared chemical weapons stockpiles by September 2023. 

With two years remaining before the stockpile elimination deadline, the CWC Coalition seeks to discuss what has been accomplished, what still lie ahead, and the importance of meeting the 2023 deadline. 

Since becoming a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, the United States has worked steadily to destroy its declared chemical weapons stockpiles. As of May 2021, the United States has destroyed 96.52% of its Category 1 chemical weapons stockpile and all of its Category 2 and Category 3 chemical weapons. The United States is the last of eight declared stockpile possessor states to complete its safe and permanent demilitarization of chemical weapons. 


  • Dr. Brandi Vann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense
  • Irene Kornelly, Chair of the Colorado Citizens' Advisory Commission
  • Paul Walker, Coordinator, Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition, moderating

This discussion was on the record. This recording can also be found on the CWC Coalition website.


Subject Resources:

Kazakhstan: How Events 30 Years Ago Spurred Action to Halt Nuclear Testing Worldwide



Thursday, September 9, 2021
9:00am - 10:30am Washington / 4:00pm - 5:30pm Vienna / 7:00pm -8:30pm Nur-Sultan time

Thirty years ago on August 29, the main Soviet nuclear testing site, located in eastern Kazakhstan, was officially shut down. The closure was the result of a remarkable and often overlooked anti-nuclear movement that arose in opposition to Soviet nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk site. Kazakhstan's anti-nuclear movement Nevada-Semipalatinsk was linked closely with Western anti-nuclear testing movements, and together they leveraged the Soviet testing halt to advance a series of steps that would lead to the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996.



HE Yerzhan Ashikbayev, Ambassador of Kazakhstan to the United States

Speakers and topics:

Kazakhstan’s Closure of the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site -
Togzhan Kassenova, senior fellow with the Project on International Security, Commerce, and Economic Statecraft at the Center for Policy Research at the University at Albany, SUNY. She is the author of the forthcoming book Atomic Steppe: How Kazakhstan Gave Up the Bomb (Stanford Press, Feb. 2022)

The impact of Kazakhstan’s anti-nuclear movement on the global anti-nuclear movement -
Dr. Mary-Wynne Ashford, International Physicians Against Nuclear War Canada

The impact of the closure of the Semipalatinsk Test Site on the Soviet and U.S. moratoriums on nuclear testing, and subsequent opening for signature of the CTBT -
Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, Arms Control Association

Dr. Francesca Giovannini, Executive Director, Managing the Atom project at the Belfer Center, Harvard University and author of “The CTBT at 25 and Beyond” in the September issue of Arms Control Today

Following comments from the speakers, there will be a question-and-answer session.

Cohosted by the Arms Control Association, the Center for Policy Research at the University at Albany, SUNY and the Embassy of Kazakhstan to the United States



Thirty years ago, the main Soviet nuclear testing site in eastern Kazakhstan was officially shut down. Join us for a special virtual briefing on the events that led to the end of nuclear testing in Kazakstan and how it helped change the course of nuclear history.

Smarter Options on U.S. Nuclear Modernization



Monday, May 17, 2021
2:00 - 3:30pm Eastern time

The debate about how the United States should approach nuclear modernization is once again a hot topic in Washington ahead of the imminent release of the Biden administration’s fiscal year 2022 budget request and as the administration prepares to begin a more comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear policy.

The United States is planning to spend at least $1.5 trillion over the next several decades to maintain and upgrade its nuclear arsenal. The biggest bills for this effort are slated to hit over the next 10 to 15 years and poised to pose a growing challenge to other security and military priorities amid what most experts believe will be flat defense budgets over the next several years.

Competing demands such as combatting climate change and strengthening pandemic defense and response capabilities illustrate the importance of examining more cost-effective alternatives to sustaining the arsenal while ensuring a strong deterrent, enhancing stability, and pursuing additional arms control measures.

While the Trump administration expanded the role of and spending on the arsenal, the Biden administration in its interim national security strategic guidance released in March said: “We will take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, while ensuring our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective and that our extended deterrence commitments to our allies remain strong and credible.”

The Biden administration also quickly agreed with Russia a five-year extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) without conditions and pledged to “pursue new arms control arrangements.”

The expert speakers addressed how the Biden administration should approach the nuclear modernization effort, alternatives to building a new fleet of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) via the ground-based strategic deterrent (GBSD) and the W87-1 warhead replacement programs, the challenges facing the National Nuclear Security Administration’s warhead and infrastructure modernization plans, and the relationship between nuclear modernization and arms control diplomacy.

Speakers included:

  • Rep. John Garamendi (D-Calif.)
  • Steve Fetter, associate provost and dean, University of Maryland, and a former assistant director in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
  • Sharon Weiner, associate professor, American University, and a former program examiner with the National Security Division of the White House Office of Management and Budget
  • Amy Woolf, specialist in nuclear weapons policy, Congressional Research Service

Additional Resources:


Speakers addressed how the United States should approach nuclear modernization ahead of the Biden administration’s fiscal year 2022 budget request and its comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear policy.

Reinforcing the Norm Against Chemical Weapons: The April 20-22 Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention



May 10, 2021
10:00 AM Eastern Time

The Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition, in cooperation with the Arms Control Association, hosted this briefing to review the results and implications of the 25th Conference of States Parties for the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the CWC regime. 

Opening remarks were provided by H.E. Fernando Arias, Director-General of the OPCW. Following, we heard from 

  • Amb. Lisa Helfand, Permanent Representative of Canada to the OPCW
  • Amb. Gudrun Lingner, Permanent Representative of Germany to the OPCW
  • Dr. Jean Pascal Zanders, independent disarmament and security researcher at The Trench
  • Dr. Paul Walker, moderator, Coordinator, Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition


Director-General Fernando Arias:
“The civil society community of non-governmental organizations, researchers, scientists, and other relevant stakeholders are essential partners in achieving the OPCW’s mission and raising awareness about the risks posed by certain chemicals. The Chemical Weapons Convention Coalition has played a critical role in this regard by coordinating and supporting civil society engagement with the OPCW through the Conference of the State’s Parties.”
“The report of the Fact Finding Mission related to the incident in Douma on the 7th of April 2018 is still the object of discussion between some member states. The Fact Finding Mission released its report on the 1st of March, 2019. In its report, the Fact Finding Mission concluded reasonable grounds that the use of chlorine as a weapon likely took place. ... None of the 193 member states of the organization have challenged the findings of the Fact Finding Mission that chlorine was found on the scene of the attack in Douma.”
“As we count down to mark the 25th anniversary of the organization in 2022, we need to acknowledge that our world today is very different to the one in 1997 when it was founded. To meet the challenges, it is imperative for us to keep adapting and evolving in an ever changing global landscape. Preventing re-emergence will require the commitment and the efforts of all stakeholders - civil society, government, and chemical industry.”

The following resources provide supplemental information on the topic of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and strengthening the norm against chemical weapons use. 

If you wish to remain informed on this or other topics, including future webinars, please sign up and indicate your interests at www.armscontrol.org/get-the-latest



 this briefing on the results and implications of the 25th Conference of States Parties for the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the CWC regime.

Subject Resources:

Ending Nuclear Weapons Before They End Us: Opportunities Under the Biden Administration to Take Action



Thursday, March 4, 2021
11:00 a.m.


In January 2017, then-Vice-President Biden said: “As a nation, I believe we must keep pursuing the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons—because that is the only surety we have against the nightmare scenario becoming reality.”

Over the last month, we’ve seen some positive developments: the inauguration of President Biden, the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and the decision by the United States and Russia to extend the New START agreement by five years.

The history of the nuclear age shows that public pressure for saner nuclear weapons policies are essential for progress.

The event will begin at 11 am EST / 8 am PST.  The conference is organized by the Back from the Brink campaign and our colleagues at the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. The Arms Control Association is one of several official partner organizations.

Click here to view the full program and register.

We will kick off with an expert panel including ACA board members Thomas Countryman, Zia Mian, Michael Klare, and Beatrice Fihn of ICAN and Denise Duffiled of Physicians for Social Responsibility/Los Angeles. We will then present several interactive skills-building workshops to provide the tools and information to help empower you for making progress under this administration.

We hope you’ll join us to learn what opportunities exist to finally eliminate these weapons and what you can do to help.


The history of the nuclear age shows that public pressure for saner nuclear weapons policies are essential for progress. Join us to learn what opportunities exist to finally eliminate these weapons and what you can do to help. (Organized by the Back from the Brink campaign)

Nuclear Challenges for the Biden Administration in the First 100 Days



Tuesday, January 19, 2021
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. Eastern U.S. Time
via Zoom

Upon taking office Jan. 20, 2021, the new presidential administration is confronting a dizzying array of major challenges, not the least of which are related to the risks posed by the world’s most dangerous weapons. 

In this webinar, senior policy analysts from the Arms Control Association reviewed the most consequential nuclear weapons policy challenges and the decisions that the new Biden administration will need to address in its first 100 days—and sooner — and outline their recommendations on the steps that would make the United States and the world safer from the threats posed by nuclear weapons.


The speakers elaborated upon the recommendations in the new report, "Nuclear Challenges for the Biden Administration in the First 100 Days," including measures to adjust nuclear launch procedures, extend the New START agreement, return to the Iran nuclear deal, and more.

Speakers included:

  • Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy
  • Kingston Reif, director for disarmament and threat reduction policy
  • Daryl G. Kimball, executive director
  • Tom Countryman, fmr. acting undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, and ACA’s board chair, moderating

Analysts will review the most consequential nuclear weapons challenges that the incoming administration will need to address in its first 100 days and outline their recommendations as described in the new report, "Nuclear Challenges for the Biden Administration in the First 100 Days."

Country Resources:

2020 Arms Control Association Annual Meeting



Our virtual, interactive global gathering of members, friends, colleagues, and policymakers examined the key challenges and approaches for steering arms control and disarmament efforts back on course in the coming decade. 

The election of Joe Biden to the presidency creates the potential for significant progress in several key areas. Achieving meaningful and durable changes, however, will not be automatic and will not come easily. The next U.S. administration and other world leaders will need to move quickly to make decisions on a range of key issues.

We want to thank our many sponsors for helping us carry out this year's event and enable over 850 attendees from 60+ countries—a global gathering—to examine today’s tough global weapons-related security challenges.

Ambassador: Paul F. Walker, Ph.D
Leadership: Dr. Joe Hogler
Partner: Amb. Susan F. Burk · Prof. Michael Klare · Leland Cogliani · Dr. T. Douglas Reilly · Dr. Bruce Amundson · Angela Kane · Amb. Bonnie Jenkins · Jacques Guillet · Natalie Goldring · Joseph  Berkson · Alyn Ware · Peter Herby · Phillip Padgett · Stanley Riveles
Advocate: Lilly Adams · Barclay Ward · Alfredo Alejandro Labbe · Jeffery Richardson · John Balkcom · Katariina Simonen · Pedro A. Cruz · William Courtney · Charles J. Ball · Joseph P. Kerr · Robert E. Frye · John Woodworth · Rusten Lynn · Edward M. Ifft · Thomas Graham Jr. · Theodore Prociv · Milton Hoenig · Cherrill M. Spencer · Frank Klotz · Laura Rockwood · Alexander Liebowitz · Jane H. Kavaloski · Amb. Carlo Trezza · Waheguru Pal Sidhu · P. Terrence Hopmann · Rebecca Gibbons · Greg Thielmann · Norman Ret · Timothy Tulenko · Jeff Abramson · Mark Fitzpatrick


Our 2020 Annual Meeting brought together keynote speakers and expert panelists for virtual plenary sessions and simultaneous, interactive breakout sessions. Bios of all of our speakers and moderators are available here.

12:30 p.m.


Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director
Thomas Countryman, Chair of the Board

Video Recording  

12:40 p.m.

Opening Keynote

"Restoring U.S. Leadership on Nuclear Weapons Risk Reduction"
Senator Jeff Merkley, (D-Oregon)

Video Recording

1:00 p.m.


"Diversifying and Strengthening the Disarmament Movement,"
with Amb. Bonnie Jenkins (WCAPS), Cecili Thompson Williams, (Beyond the Bomb) Vincent Intondi (Montgomery College), and Daryl Kimball (ACA), moderated by Lilly Adams (ACA Board).

Video Recording 

1:50 p.m.

Breakout Sessions

  • "The Future of the U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control Regime," with Rose Gottemoeller moderated by Shannon Bugos
Video Recording
  • "Repairing the Broken U.S. Policy on Iran," with Kelsey Davenport
Video Recording 
  • Strengthening the NPT and the 10th Review Conference: a conversation with Amb. Gustavo Zlauvinen," moderated by Laura Kennedy
Video Recording

2:15 p.m.

Breakout Sessions

  • Re-evaluating U.S. Nuclear Weapons Modernization Plan” with Kingston Reif, moderated by Aaron Mehta with Defense News
Video Recording
  • "After New START: Engaging Other Nuclear-Armed States in the Disarmament Enterprise" with Tom Countryman, ACA Board Chair, and Prof. Heather Williams with Kings College, moderated by Julia Masterson
(Technical issues precluded a video recording of this session.)
  • The Impact of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” with Amb. Elaine Whyte Gómez, moderated by Zia Mian, Princeton University Program on Science and Global Security and Arms Control Association Board
Video Recording

2:40 p.m.


How You Can Be Part of the Solution
Kathy Crandall Robinson, Chief Operations Officer

Video Recording

2:50 p.m.

Closing Keynote

Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General, UN Office of Disarmament Affairs

Video Recording

3:10 p.m.

Closing Remarks

Senator Kirsten Gillibrand, (D-NY)

Thomas Countryman, Chair of the Board

Video Recording 

Questions? Contact Tony Fleming, director of communications ([email protected]) or Rachel Paik ([email protected]).


Our virtual, interactive global gathering brought together members, friends, colleagues, and policymakers through virtual plenary sessions and simultaneous, interactive breakout sessions to examine the key challenges and approaches for steering arms control and disarmament efforts back on course in the coming decade.

BRIEFING: "Trump’s Effort to Sabotage New START and the Risk of an All-Out Arms Race"



Friday, October 9, 2020
9:00 – 10:15am Eastern time
via Zoom webinar

In four months, the last treaty limiting the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals is due to expire. If the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) lapses with nothing to replace it, there would be no legally-binding limits on the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals for the first time since 1972.

However, the treaty permits an extension “for a period of no more than five years” so long as both the U.S. and Russian presidents agree to it.


Russia has offered to extend New START by five years without any preconditions, but the Trump administration has conditioned extension on Russian support for changes to the New START verification system and acceptance of a new framework that limits all types of nuclear warheads and that can involve China in the future.

Russia has rejected the U.S. offer, which it calls “absolutely unrealistic.” In response, Trump officials say they will “raise the price” for New START extension after November. Unless President Trump adjusts course, or Joe Biden is elected in November, there is a high risk that New START will disappear.

Our speakers, Senator Chris Van Hollen, and the panelists explained the value of New START, evaluated the Trump administration’s approach, and outlined pathways for extending the treaty, pursuing negotiations on deeper nuclear reductions, and guarding against an unconstrained arms race if New START is allowed to expire.


  • Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), co-sponsor of the "Richard G. Lugar and Ellen O. Tauscher Act to Maintain Limits on Russian Nuclear Forces" Act


  • Alexandra Bell, senior policy director, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
  • Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, Arms Control Association
  • Kingston Reif, moderator, director for disarmament and threat reduction policy, Arms Control Association

A question and answer session followed both the speaker’s remarks and the panel. This event was open to the press and is on the record.


Briefing with Sen. Chris Van Hollen, Alexandra Bell, and Daryl G. Kimball on the value of New START, the Trump administration’s approach, and guarding against an unconstrained arms race if New START is allowed to expire.

Country Resources:


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