In January 2017, then-Vice-President Biden said: “As a nation, I believe we must keep pursuing the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons—because that is the only surety we have against the nightmare scenario becoming reality.”
Over the last month, we’ve seen some positive developments: the inauguration of President Biden, the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and the decision by the United States and Russia to extend the New START agreement by five years.
The history of the nuclear age shows that public pressure for saner nuclear weapons policies are essential for progress.
The event will begin at 11 am EST / 8 am PST. The conference is organized by the Back from the Brink campaign and our colleagues at the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. The Arms Control Association is one of several official partner organizations.
We will kick off with an expert panel including ACA board members Thomas Countryman, Zia Mian, Michael Klare, and Beatrice Fihn of ICAN and Denise Duffiled of Physicians for Social Responsibility/Los Angeles. We will then present several interactive skills-building workshops to provide the tools and information to help empower you for making progress under this administration.
We hope you’ll join us to learn what opportunities exist to finally eliminate these weapons and what you can do to help. REGISTER HERE
The history of the nuclear age shows that public pressure for saner nuclear weapons policies are essential for progress. Join us to learn what opportunities exist to finally eliminate these weapons and what you can do to help. (Organized by the Back from the Brink campaign)
Tuesday, January 19, 2021
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. Eastern U.S. Time via Zoom
Upon taking office Jan. 20, 2021, the new presidential administration is confronting a dizzying array of major challenges, not the least of which are related to the risks posed by the world’s most dangerous weapons.
In this webinar, senior policy analysts from the Arms Control Association reviewed the most consequential nuclear weapons policy challenges and the decisions that the new Biden administration will need to address in its first 100 days—and sooner — and outline their recommendations on the steps that would make the United States and the world safer from the threats posed by nuclear weapons.
Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy
Kingston Reif, director for disarmament and threat reduction policy
Daryl G. Kimball, executive director
Tom Countryman, fmr. acting undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, and ACA’s board chair, moderating
Analysts will review the most consequential nuclear weapons challenges that the incoming administration will need to address in its first 100 days and outline their recommendations as described in the new report, "Nuclear Challenges for the Biden Administration in the First 100 Days."
Our virtual, interactive global gathering of members, friends, colleagues, and policymakers examined the key challenges and approaches for steering arms control and disarmament efforts back on course in the coming decade.
The election of Joe Biden to the presidency creates the potential for significant progress in several key areas. Achieving meaningful and durable changes, however, will not be automatic and will not come easily. The next U.S. administration and other world leaders will need to move quickly to make decisions on a range of key issues.
We want to thank our many sponsors for helping us carry out this year's event and enable over 850 attendees from 60+ countries—a global gathering—to examine today’s tough global weapons-related security challenges.
Ambassador: Paul F. Walker, Ph.D Leadership: Dr. Joe Hogler Partner: Amb. Susan F. Burk · Prof. Michael Klare · Leland Cogliani · Dr. T. Douglas Reilly · Dr. Bruce Amundson · Angela Kane · Amb. Bonnie Jenkins · Jacques Guillet · Natalie Goldring · Joseph Berkson · Alyn Ware · Peter Herby · Phillip Padgett · Stanley Riveles Advocate: Lilly Adams · Barclay Ward · Alfredo Alejandro Labbe · Jeffery Richardson · John Balkcom · Katariina Simonen · Pedro A. Cruz · William Courtney · Charles J. Ball · Joseph P. Kerr · Robert E. Frye · John Woodworth · Rusten Lynn · Edward M. Ifft · Thomas Graham Jr. · Theodore Prociv · Milton Hoenig · Cherrill M. Spencer · Frank Klotz · Laura Rockwood · Alexander Liebowitz · Jane H. Kavaloski · Amb. Carlo Trezza · Waheguru Pal Sidhu · P. Terrence Hopmann · Rebecca Gibbons · Greg Thielmann · Norman Ret · Timothy Tulenko · Jeff Abramson · Mark Fitzpatrick
"Diversifying and Strengthening the Disarmament Movement,"
with Amb. Bonnie Jenkins (WCAPS), Cecili Thompson Williams, (Beyond the Bomb) Vincent Intondi (Montgomery College), and Daryl Kimball (ACA), moderated by Lilly Adams (ACA Board).
"After New START: Engaging Other Nuclear-Armed States in the Disarmament Enterprise" with Tom Countryman, ACA Board Chair, and Prof. Heather Williams with Kings College, moderated by Julia Masterson
(Technical issues precluded a video recording of this session.)
“The Impact of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” with Amb. Elaine Whyte Gómez, moderated by Zia Mian, Princeton University Program on Science and Global Security and Arms Control Association Board
Our virtual, interactive global gathering brought together members, friends, colleagues, and policymakers through virtual plenary sessions and simultaneous, interactive breakout sessions to examine the key challenges and approaches for steering arms control and disarmament efforts back on course in the coming decade.
Friday, October 9, 2020
9:00 – 10:15am Eastern time via Zoom webinar
In four months, the last treaty limiting the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals is due to expire. If the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) lapses with nothing to replace it, there would be no legally-binding limits on the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals for the first time since 1972.
However, the treaty permits an extension “for a period of no more than five years” so long as both the U.S. and Russian presidents agree to it.
Russia has offered to extend New START by five years without any preconditions, but the Trump administration has conditioned extension on Russian support for changes to the New START verification system and acceptance of a new framework that limits all types of nuclear warheads and that can involve China in the future.
Russia has rejected the U.S. offer, which it calls “absolutely unrealistic.” In response, Trump officials say they will “raise the price” for New START extension after November. Unless President Trump adjusts course, or Joe Biden is elected in November, there is a high risk that New START will disappear.
Our speakers, Senator Chris Van Hollen, and the panelists explained the value of New START, evaluated the Trump administration’s approach, and outlined pathways for extending the treaty, pursuing negotiations on deeper nuclear reductions, and guarding against an unconstrained arms race if New START is allowed to expire.
Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), co-sponsor of the "Richard G. Lugar and Ellen O. Tauscher Act to Maintain Limits on Russian Nuclear Forces" Act
Alexandra Bell, senior policy director, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, Arms Control Association
Kingston Reif, moderator, director for disarmament and threat reduction policy, Arms Control Association
A question and answer session followed both the speaker’s remarks and the panel. This event was open to the press and is on the record.
Briefing with Sen. Chris Van Hollen, Alexandra Bell, and Daryl G. Kimball on the value of New START, the Trump administration’s approach, and guarding against an unconstrained arms race if New START is allowed to expire.
Thursday, October 1, 2020
11:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m. U.S. Eastern Time via Zoom webinar
The Trump administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has led Iran to retaliate by exceeding key nuclear limits set by the deal. The U.S. strategy has hobbled but not unraveled the agreement and increased tensions with Iran and the international community. Unless Washington and Teheran return to compliance, however, the deal could collapse entirely creating a serious new nuclear crisis in the region.
In this edition of the “Critical NPT Issues” webinar series sponsored by the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and the Arms Control Association, our panelists reviewed the benefits of the JCPOA, the current status of noncompliance, pathways to repair the situation, and the potential effects on the global nonproliferation system and the upcoming 10th Review Conference of Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, Arms Control Association;
Ellie Gerenmyah, Deputy Director of the Middle East and North Africa Program and Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations; and
Emad Kiyaei, Director, Middle East Treaty Organization (METO)
Our next webinar in the Critical NPT Issues series will address steps to fulfill Article VI of the NPT. We encourage you to sign up to receive invitations to future webinars and other updates from the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and the Arms Control Association.
For more information on the JCPOA, subscribe to the P4+1 and Iran Nuclear Deal Alert from the Arms Control Association, which provides periodic news and analysis on the negotiations and implementation of the nuclear deal.
If you want to follow discussions on nuclear weapons during the 2020 session of the UNGA First Committee, subscribe to the First Committee Monitor, a publication of WILPF’s disarmament programme Reaching Critical Will, or visit their resource page for more information.
In this edition of our “Critical NPT Issues” webinar series, we will review the benefits of the JCPOA, the current status of noncompliance, pathways to repair the situation, and the potential effects on the upcoming NPT Review Conference.
Thursday, September 3, 2020
9:30 a.m. - 11:00 a.m. Eastern
Co-sponsored by the Center for Policy Research at the University at Albany, SUNY, with the support of the Embassy of Kazakhstan to the United States
Over the 75-year history of the nuclear age, nuclear weapons have been used only twice in war, with deadly results. But the world’s nuclear armed states have also carried out more than 2,000 nuclear tests, which fueled the arms race and inflicted widespread health and environmental damage.
Since the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, nuclear testing has been considered taboo. However, the effects of past nuclear tests linger, and the door to the resumption of nuclear testing remains ajar.
Panelists discussed current threats to the global test ban, strategies to resolve accusations of cheating, how states can reinforce the test ban at the upcoming review conference on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), how nuclear testing by the Soviet Union and the United States has affected downwind populations, and what can be done to assist people adversely affected by those tests.
His Excellency Erzhan Kazykhanov, Ambassador of Kazakhstan to the United States
Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, Director of the International Organizations and Non-Proliferation Program at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
Togzhan Kassenova, senior fellow with the Project on International Security, Commerce, and Economic Statecraft at the Center for Policy Research at the University at Albany, SUNY
Following comments from the speakers, there was be a question and answer session.
This discussion with Ambassador Erzhan Kazykhanov and an expert panel, we discuss the 75-year history of nuclear tests, current threats to the global test ban, how states can address threats to the global test ban and reinforce it at the upcoming NPT review conference, and what can be done to assist populations adversely affected by nuclear tests.
Thursday, August 27, 2020
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. Eastern Time via Zoom Webinar
The pivotal 10th Review Conference for the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has been rescheduled and will likely begin in January 2021. By that time, enough states may have ratified the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) to trigger its entry into force. Currently, only six more states must ratify to do so.
In this edition of the “Critical NPT Issues” webinar series sponsored by the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and the Arms Control Association, our panelists will analyze the legal relationship between the TPNW and the NPT, including how the TPNW contributes to NPT Article VI disarmament objectives and the status of efforts to bring the TPNW into force. A question and answer session will follow the speakers' presentations.
George-Wilhelm Gallhofer, Head of Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation / Executive Secretary of the Hague Code of Conduct at the Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs
Anna Ikeda, Program Associate, Disarmament Peace and Security Program, Soka Gakkai International, Office for UN Affairs
Moderated by Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association
Future webinars in the Critical NPT Issues series will address steps to fulfill Article VI of the NPT; the NPT and the JCPOA; and the future of New START and multilateral disarmament.
Wednesday, June 3, 2020
10:00 a.m. - 11:00 a.m. U.S. Eastern Time via Zoom webinar
As states parties prepare for the delayed 10th Review Conference for the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, tensions between the world’s nuclear-armed states remain high, costly upgrades to nuclear arsenals are being pursued, and key treaties that have helped reduce the nuclear danger are under threat.
Last month alone, a senior U.S. official threatened to spend Russia and China “into oblivion” to win a nuclear arms race and U.S. officials discussed a demonstration nuclear test explosion to try to coerce Russia and China to accept U.S. terms for a new arms control deal.
The Reaching Critical Will program of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom and the Arms Control Association hosted this first in a series of monthly webinars with key experts and diplomats to explore these issues and discuss possible solutions as the disarmament community prepares for the Review Conference when it is rescheduled.
Future webinars in the Critical NPT Issues series will address steps to fulfill Article VI of the NPT; how the TPNW complements the NPT; the NPT and the JCPOA; and the future of New START and multilateral disarmament.
The COVID-19 pandemic is reshaping thinking about national security and geopolitics Understanding these changes is crucial to how we—as advocates, analysts, educators, and concerned citizens—respond.
Arms Control Association members are invited to join a video briefing and discussion with Colin Kahl, former national security advisor to Vice President Joseph Biden, who is now co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. Amb. Bonnie Jenkins, executive director of Women of Color Advancing Peace and Security (WCAPS) and Arms Control Association board member, will moderate.
All members will receive a separate email invitation to register for the Zoom meeting event. Current members who need assistance registering should contact us at [email protected].
If you are not currently a member and would like to join the video call, we invite you to become a member of the Arms Control Association.
Wednesday, April 29, 2020
10:30 a.m. - 11:30 a.m. Eastern
via Zoom Webinar
With the expiration date for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) less than a year away, the Arms Control Association hosted a discussion with former senior officials on the national security case for the extension of New START, the costs of failing to do so, and why extension is the best next step toward more ambitious arms control talks with Russia and other nuclear-armed states.
Key quotes from the speakers and useful resources are listed below. Some answers to additional questions that participants submitted but that the speakers were unable to address due to time constraints can be found here.
Admiral (ret.) Michael Mullen,former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 2007-2011
“Put me down in the column of extension, and the reason for that is the clock is running. Certainly in my experience, getting to the right specifics in a very complex treaty takes a long time. And I would opine at this point we don’t have time to renegotiate—or to negotiate—a new treaty as an option.”
“One of the things that is incredibly important about this treaty is the details of verification, an aspect of which, in addition to national technical means, is spoken to by on-the-ground inspections. I come from a place where there is nothing better than being physically in place in time.”
"Trying to get something done with China between now and February is virtually impossible.”
Rose Gottemoeller,former NATO Deputy Secretary-General, former U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, and the lead negotiator for New START
“Nowhere is military predictability more important than in the nuclear realm. Our presidents can give a potent sign that they take this matter seriously by an early extension of New START. It would be an act of global leadership, reassuring our publics as they grapple with sickness and uncertainty.”
“Rapid fire negotiation of a follow on agreement was always a difficult proposition, especially the effort to engage the Chinese. Without the potential for hands-on diplomacy, I really think it’s become mission impossible. Extending New START would not only give time for all of the issues to be brought to the table and new actors to be engaged, but also would allow us to get through this pandemic.”
“The last point I would like to emphasize is the firm support for New START extension among U.S. allies, and not only our allies in Europe and North America, but also the ones in Asia. The allies are keen to see the last legally binding nuclear arms reduction treaty remain in force in order to ensure the continuation of a predictable nuclear environment in their regions and to give sufficient time for new negotiations to take place.”
Lt. Gen. (ret.) Frank Klotz,former U.S. Undersecretary of Energy for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration from 2014-2018, and commander of Air Force Global Strike Command from 2009-2011
“Although limiting the number and types of Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons would certainly benefit the security interests of the United States, as well as those of its European and Asian allies, it does not logically follow that the existing limits on longer-range systems imposed by New START should be allowed to lapse because an agreement on shorter-range nuclear weapons has not yet been reached. If that were to happen, there would be more rather than fewer categories and numbers of Russian nuclear weapons that would be unconstrained, including systems that could directly threaten the U.S. homeland. From a military perspective, that hardly makes any sense.”
“Rather than being relevant to the immediate debate on the treaty’s extension, the issue of Russia’s novel nuclear delivery systems is more a matter of those Russian capabilities that might need to be addressed in any follow-on nuclear arms control arrangements.”
“Allowing New START to lapse without replacement would be a grave mistake in terms of our national security.”