Inside ACA
February 2026
For the first time in many decades, there are no legally-binding limits on U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals and there are no active negotiations to establish new nuclear arms control constraints.
On Feb. 5, the day the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty expired, President Trump posted on social media that: “Rather than extend New START … we should have our nuclear experts work on a new, improved, and modernized Treaty that can last long into the future.”
Unfortunately, we’ve heard all this before. Beginning in 2019 and since taking office again in January 2025, Trump has talked about “denuclearization” talks with Russia and China, but so far he has failed to follow through and has not advanced a coherent plan for doing so.
In the absence of New START, Trump will now be under growing pressure from some members of Congress, defense contractors, and the nuclear weapons “deep state” to begin increasing the size and diversity of the U.S. arsenal in the name of countering China’s smaller but growing strategic nuclear arsenal.
On Feb. 6 in Geneva, the U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Tom DiNanno, gave a lengthy speech blaming Russia and China for the current state of affairs.
He warned that “if directed by the President,” the United States is prepared for actions such as “expanding current forces, diversifying our capabilities, developing and fielding new theater range nuclear forces ….”
This approach would, of course, be dangerous and counterproductive. Deploying more nuclear weapons will not make anyone safer. With more than 1,550 warheads that can be delivered on nearly 700 missiles and bombers, the United States already has a massive, devastating, and largely invulnerable nuclear force that is more than sufficient to deter nuclear attack by any and all adversaries. More U.S. weapons will prompt Russia and China to take countermeasures.
A post-New START nuclear weapons buildup is now possible but is by no means inevitable.
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on Feb. 12 that Russia will continue to respect the limits of New START so long as the U.S. does, and Trump still claims that he wants some form of arms control.
If, however, Trump continues to dither on disarmament diplomacy, orders a buildup of U.S. forces, and/or follows through on threats to resume U.S. nuclear explosive testing, we are headed for a much more dangerous future.
As I outlined in a recent essay in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists titled “Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament After New START,” civil society, along with concerned U.S. lawmakers and “middle power” states, should work to steer nuclear-weapon state policies and actions in a more responsible and practical direction. This is how we can reduce nuclear dangers in the years to come.
In particular, as ACA Board member and former UN Undersecretary for Disarmament Affairs, Angela Kane, points out in a recent essay, European governments “should move to shape U.S. policies that have vital consequences for the continent” by demanding “concrete arms control measures, replacing not only New START but also previous nuclear treaties which had been abrogated in earlier years.”
You can count on the Arms Control Association to be at the forefront, working with other experts and allies, to adapt nuclear arms control and disarmament for a new era.
As ACA’s program and policy associate Libby Flatoff outlines in a new Issue Brief, bipartisan majorities of Americans want to see their leaders cap and reduce nuclear arsenals. We are bringing together a growing alliance of civil society organizations and members of Congress who are committed to halting and reversing the global nuclear arms race.
Please Make a Special Gift, Now
Thanks for your engagement and support.
Onward,
Daryl G. Kimball
Take Action: Tell Congress to Prevent a New Nuclear Arms Race After New START
Now is the time to send a message to your members of Congress urging them to speak up and oppose any attempt to build up the size of the U.S. arsenal, demand U.S.-Russia negotiations on a new agreement to cut their arsenals, urge the U.S. to pursue bilateral talks with China, and to block any attempt by the Trump administration to resume nuclear test explosions.
You can use our action alert tools to call on your elected representatives to increase their engagement and be part of the solution.
Thomas Countryman on New START Expiry and the Value of Arms Control
On the eve of New START’s expiration, ACA Board Chair Tom Countryman joined Massachusetts Senator Ed Markey, Oregon Senator Jeff Merkley, California Representative John Garamendi, ACA Executive Director Daryl G. Kimball, FAS Director of Global Risk Jon Wolfsthal, and Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis Lynn Rusten to urge the replacement of New START and a return to negotiations to prevent a new three-way arms race.
A transcript of his remarks are online here.
Informing the Debate
For the majority of the public and for many policymakers, the mainstream media is their primary source of information on weapons-related security issues. While many find their information through new and social media, mainstream press reporting shapes the conversation.
ACA continues to be a major source of news and analysis on nuclear matters, including the implications of the expiration of New START, the possibility of renewed nuclear testing, and proliferation dangers posed by states including Iran and North Korea.
In the week ending February 6, ACA experts spoke with several dozen reporters and editors from news organizations around the globe and were cited by more than 130 outlets, including: Associated Press, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Bloomberg, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, CBS Evening News, CNN, C-SPAN, The Guardian, The New York Times, NHK (Japan), Politico, Reuters, RIA Novisti, TASS, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, and others.
ACA’s Daryl Kimball discussed the expiration of New START and addressed viewer questions on C-SPAN’s Washington Journal program on Feb. 7
Tensions and Talks on Iran’s Nuclear Program, Again
This week, as the Trump administration assembles a military strike force in the Persian Gulf, senior U.S. and Iranian officials will meet indirectly for a second time in two weeks to discuss possible agreements to reduce tensions and address lingering concerns about Iran’s nuclear potential.
Agreement will be difficult, if not impossible, if the two sides insist on maximalist demands, especially when it comes to some of the core issues surrounding Iran’s sensitive nuclear activities for years.
As ACA’s director for nonproliferation policy, Kelsey Davenport, said to The New York Times in their report on Feb. 6, “If Trump does insist on zero enrichment, there’s not going to be a deal, Iran is not going to forgo what it views as a national right.”
Kelsey outlines a path forward in her analysis, “Pragmatic Nuclear Priorities for Renewed U.S.-Iran Talks,” posted on our ArmsControlNow blog. A major focus, she writes, should be for Iran to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to return their inspection teams to the most significant nuclear sites, including those damaged by the U.S. and Israeli airstrikes in June 2025 that interrupted earlier U.S.-Iran negotiations.
For more on the latest developments, see the forthcoming March issue of Arms Control Today.
Assessing New U.S. Nuclear Testing Allegations Against China
ACA has been closely tracking new U.S. government allegations that China conducted a nuclear test explosion on June 22, 2020. In a speech to the Conference on Disarmament on Feb. 6 and in another on Feb. 17, senior State Department officials said that China conducted a nuclear test of an unspecified explosive yield and sought to hide it using a technique called de-coupling.
The U.S. officials claim that the seismic signal was detected by a primary monitoring station that is part of the International Monitoring System (IMS) established by the 1996 CTBT, a treaty that the United States and China have signed, but which the Trump administration has opposed.
Trump has threatened to resume U.S. nuclear testing “on an equal basis.”
The head of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, Robert Floyd, issued a statement on Feb. 6 and another on Feb. 17 stating that: “On 22 June 2020, the CTBTO's IMS detected two very small seismic events, 12 seconds apart” at locations more than 100km from the former Chinese nuclear test site at Lop Nur.
The CTBTO noted that: “The IMS is currently capable of identifying events consistent with nuclear test explosions with a yield equivalent to or greater than approximately 500 tonnes of TNT. These two events were far below that level.”
“As a result, with this data alone, it is not possible to assess the cause of these events with confidence. Verification mechanisms [namely on-site inspections] which could address disputed claims or smaller explosions are provided by the Treaty but can only be used once the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty enters into force,” Floyd said.
ACA’s Daryl Kimball told The Wall Street Journal that the U.S. should seek to resolve concerns over possible Chinese and Russian violations by starting technical talks with those countries on voluntary confidence building measures to detect and deter very low-yield nuclear tests.
“Any U.S. resumption of testing in response to such allegations would be technically unnecessary and would set off a chain reaction of nuclear testing by other nuclear-armed states,” he added.
Opposing Irresponsible Conventional Arms Transfer Policies
This week, the Arms Control Association joined more than 30 other national organizations in expressing our opposition to the United States’ reported $210 million purchase of cluster munitions from Tomer, a company owned by the Israeli government.
When used in populated areas, cluster munitions violate international humanitarian law because they cannot distinguish between civilians and combatants, and they are banned by the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which more than 100 states have ratified.