With signals pointing to a resumption of U.S.-Iran talks, the Trump administration has another opportunity to reduce Tehran’s proliferation risk and the likelihood of the United States getting sucked into further, counterproductive military strikes against Iran’s nuclear program. The U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June—despite no evidence of a decision to weaponize—did destroy key Iranian nuclear facilities. But Iran’s capability to build a bomb, and its stockpile of uranium enriched to near weapons-grade levels, remains intact and unmonitored, increasing the risk of diversion, proliferation, or miscalculation that could reignite another unnecessary and costly war in the region.
Media reports suggest that if talks do resume, the list of U.S. demands will be extensive and broader than the nuclear program, including limits on Iran's ballistic missile capabilities. With several contentious issues on the table, it is unlikely the sides will reach a deal quickly. But if the Trump administration adjusts its maximalist rhetoric around uranium enrichment and if it prioritizes pushing for a resumption of IAEA safeguards, it may be possible for both sides to agree on immediate steps to reduce tensions over Iran's sensitive nuclear-fuel cycle activities and materials.
The Trump administration’s top nuclear priority should be securing Iran’s commitment to resume full implementation of its NPT-required safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Following the U.S. and Israeli attacks in June, Iran suspended cooperation with the agency. Although IAEA inspectors have since returned to sites that were not targeted, such as the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, the agency has not accessed any of the bombed sites or received reports about the status and location of Iran’s nuclear materials. This is a clear violation of Iran’s safeguards agreement—the illegality of the U.S. and Israeli strikes does not excuse Iran’s failure to meet its own legal obligations.
IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said Jan. 20 that the current situation is unsustainable—without access soon, the agency will need to declare Iran in noncompliance. Countries cannot pick and choose what obligations to comply with, Grossi said.
It is up to the IAEA to determine what access and information are necessary to fulfill its safeguards mandate. But as part of its negotiations with Iran, the United States should prioritize quickly securing a commitment from Tehran to work with the IAEA to allow prompt, regular access to all nuclear sites, and a timeline for the submission of information to the agency regarding Iran’s nuclear materials. This should also include a commitment by Iran to abide by the entirety of its safeguards agreement going forward, including subsidiary arrangements that Tehran has tried to argue are not legally binding.
A prompt resumption of IAEA inspections has several immediate benefits.
First, an agency presence will provide more insight into the status of Iran’s materials and program post-strikes. A resumption of inspections and beginning the process of accounting for nuclear materials will provide greater assurance that Iran has not resumed enrichment (the status of the new enrichment facility at Esfahan is unknown) or diverted stocks of enriched uranium to an undeclared site. Furthermore, with greater assurance that Iran is not engaged in proliferation-sensitive activities, there is less risk of the United States miscalculating Tehran’s nuclear intentions and engaging in counterproductive military strikes again.
Second, any future nuclear deal with Iran will need to be verifiable to be effective. The sooner the IAEA can return to Iran, the sooner it can begin to establish a clear picture of Iran’s capacities and materials. This work to establish new baselines can better inform negotiators about what issues need to be addressed, including new verification measures, as part of a future, long-term deal.
Third, the protests in Iran over the last several weeks have shown cracks in the regime; a return of the IAEA can mitigate risks arising from unrest. The Iranian people deserve to choose their government, but in the event of further unrest or a change in governance, nuclear risks will rise. Regime change is not an effective nonproliferation policy. If there is a military coup or a transition to a rights-respecting democracy, there is still a risk that a new government will choose to use the existing nuclear materials to weaponize. There is also an increased risk that nuclear materials could be diverted, stolen, or even used against domestic targets during a period of transition or unrest. Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium can technically be used to build a bomb. An IAEA presence to account for the materials could deter such action and provide greater assurance that key nuclear materials are being monitored and accounted for in that situation.
Beyond the nonproliferation implications, resuming IAEA inspections will also remove a future flash point that could disrupt talks or spur an escalatory spiral back toward conflict. In November, the IAEA’s Board of Governors passed a resolution censuring Iran for failing to meet its safeguards obligations. If there is no progress in the coming months, Board members will likely pursue additional action, including reporting Iran to the Security Council. Russia is likely to veto any action at the Security Council, but, following past patterns, Iran will feel pressured to respond by seeking additional leverage of its own, possibly by announcing new actions on its nuclear program. Resuming safeguards, however, could mitigate this possible flashpoint.
In exchange for Iran fully resuming its safeguards agreement and working with the IAEA to account for nuclear materials, the United States could commit not to strike Iranian nuclear facilities, target Iranian nuclear scientists, or support further Israeli strikes on the nuclear program. A credible U.S. nonaggression pledge would help address a key concern of Iran—the security of its nuclear sites going forward. This is particularly important given that Israeli strikes in June occurred days before U.S. and Iranian negotiators were scheduled to continue nuclear talks. Iran will want assurances that the United States is not using diplomacy to buy time to prepare for further military action.
Additionally, the United States could put limited relief, ideally targeted at sectors that would benefit the Iranian people, on the table. Again, the United States could quickly reverse this action and reimpose sanctions if Iran does not fulfill its end of the bargain.
Beyond the resumption of IAEA inspections, the Trump administration should move off its maximalist, unnecessary demand that Iran agree to zero enrichment. Iran is not going to forgo what it perceives as a right under the NPT. More importantly, demanding that Iran renounce enrichment is not necessary for an effective nuclear deal.
Although demanding Iran agree to forgo enrichment is unrealistic, there may be an opportunity to negotiate a freeze on Iranian enrichment activity. As an interim measure, Iran could agree not to resume any uranium enrichment activities or reconstruct/construct any new enrichment facilities. But to explore that possibility, the Trump administration needs to signal flexibility and not double down on demanding zero.
A freeze on enrichment should satisfy Trump’s demands and be more palatable to the Iranians, now, given that the country’s known enrichment capacity at Natanz and Fordow was likely destroyed. An enrichment freeze, combined with a resumption of IAEA inspections, would reduce Iran’s proliferation risk and the likelihood of a return to conflict.
The freeze could be a multiyear in duration, creating the time and space for negotiations on a deal that allows Iran to pursue a peaceful civil program, with limits and monitoring to address legitimate proliferation concerns. That program could include strictly limited enrichment, perhaps tied to Iran achieving specific milestones in reactor development, or, preferably, allow time to develop multilateral fuel cycle solutions. A multilateral approach would ensure Iran’s access to nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes, while reducing the risk that uranium enrichment technologies could be used for a weapons program.
The resumption of talks between the United States and Iran may not lead to a deal. There is a risk that both sides will not engage in good faith. But the resumption of talks, whether indirect or direct, is a critical opportunity to reduce the risks of Iranian proliferation and further conflict. If the United States and Iran approach the nuclear issue with pragmatism and political will, it is possible to reduce proliferation risks and create an environment more conducive to negotiating a longer-term agreement.—KELSEY DAVENPORT