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former IAEA Director-General

Nuclear Testing

New Leadership, Opportunities on the Korean Peninsula

The election of Mr. Moon Jae-in as South Korea’s next president could lead to an important and helpful shift in the international community’s approach to halting and reversing North Korea’s increasingly dangerous nuclear and missile programs. If Moon stays true to the policies outlined in his campaign , South Korea’s approach to North Korea will likely shift from “pressure only” to “pressure with pragmatic engagement.” This could improve the chances for lowering of tensions with North Korea and the resumption of talks designed to verifiably halt and then, later, reverse North Korea’s nuclear...

U.S. Support for the CTBTO Enhances U.S. and Global Security



According to the FY2018 budget outline, the Trump administration will seek funding cuts in the U.S. contribution for the CTBTO, the intergovernmental organization responsible for the global nuclear test monitoring system designed to detect and deter clandestine nuclear explosions.


Volume 9, Issue 2, May 2017

At a time when it is more important than ever to reinforce the global norm against nuclear test explosions and to maintain global capabilities to detect nuclear weapons testing by other countries, the Donald Trump administration is proposing severe budget cutbacks at the State Department, including U.S. contributions to key international organizations.
According to the Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 budget outline released by the Trump administration in February, his administration “seeks to reduce or end direct funding for international organizations whose missions do not substantially advance U.S. foreign policy interests, are duplicative, or are not well-managed.” No further detail or explanation was provided.
The Trump administration is expected to release its full budget request the week of May 22.
These funding cuts could include a reduction in the U.S. contribution for the intergovernmental organization responsible for the global nuclear test monitoring system designed to detect and deter clandestine nuclear explosions, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).
Such funding cuts would run counter to the value placed on this contribution by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who joined with his G7 foreign ministerial counterparts to extoll the value of the CTBTO in their April 11 Joint Communique on nonproliferation and disarmament. They said in part:

We believe that all States should maintain all existing voluntary moratoria on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and those States that have not instituted such moratoria should do so.
The verification regime being established by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, in particular the International Monitoring System and International Data Centre, has proven its effectiveness by providing substantive and reliable data on the nuclear tests conducted by North Korea. We strongly encourage all interested States to complete the IMS as a matter of priority.

The statement also recalls UN Security Council Resolution 2310 (passed September 23, 2016) —which calls on all states to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), refrain from nuclear testing, and provide support for the CTBTO. The resolution also notes the contribution of the CTBT to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.

Past U.S. Support and Results

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and other diplomats vote to adopt the resolution in support of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty during a UN Security Council meeting September 23. (Photo credit: Astrid Riecken/CTBTO) The final omnibus appropriations bill for FY 2017 fully funds the Obama administration’s final budget request of $32 million for the U.S. contribution to the CTBT International Monitoring System (IMS) and CTBTO. This is in line with the United States’ longstanding support for the CTBT, which was formally established in 1997.
The CTBTO was established with the support of the United States and the other 182 signatories of the CTBT to build, operate, and maintain a robust IMS and International Data Center to detect and deter nuclear weapon test explosions, which are banned by the treaty.
Today the IMS is more than 90% complete and is collecting and analyzing information on a continuous 24/7 basis for the purpose of detecting and deterring clandestine nuclear test explosions and to provide the technical basis for international responses to noncompliance.
The CTBTO provides additional nuclear test detection capabilities beyond U.S. national means of intelligence and is a neutral source of information that can mobilize international action against any state that violates the global norm against nuclear testing.
The total annual budget of the CTBTO was about  $128 million for 2016. The United States provides 22.47% of the CTBTO’s funding. Over the years, the United States has also made voluntary, in-kind contributions including for the operation and maintenance costs of all IMS facilities in the United States and support to the software development for the International Data Center, which analyzes the global monitoring data for nuclear testing activity. These in-kind contributions are valued at more than $5 million USD in 2015 and $9 million in 2016.
Although United States signed the CTBT in 1996 and has not conducted a nuclear test explosion in 25 years, the United States is one of eight remaining states that must ratify the treaty in order to allow for its formal entry into force.

The Illogic of the Treaty’s Critics

Unfortunately, a small but influential group of Republican lawmakers are seeking to cut U.S. funding for the CTBTO and undermine international support for the CTBT and the global nuclear test moratorium.
Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) and Rep. Joe Wilson (R-S.C.) introduced legislation on Feb.7 to “restrict” funding for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).
The Cotton and Wilson bill  purports not to restrict U.S. funding specifically for the IMS, but in practice any significant reduction in U.S. technical and financial support for the CTBTO would:

  • adversely impact the organization’s ability to operate and maintain existing nuclear test monitoring stations. This is due to the fact that a wide range of organization’s personnel and assets directly or indirectly support the IMS. This includes staff time and technical support for the International Data Centre in Vienna, which processes information provided by IMS operations; and
  • prompt other states to restrict their funding for the CTBTO or possibly withhold data from CTBTO monitoring stations that are based in their territory, thus undermining the capabilities of the system to detect and deter clandestine nuclear testing.

The bill also seeks to undermine the U.S. obligation—as a signatory to the CTBT—not to conduct nuclear test explosions. It calls on Congress to declare that the September 15, 2016 UN Security Council resolution does not “obligate…nor does it impose an obligation on the United States to refrain from actions that would run counter to the object and purpose” of the CTBT, which President Bill Clinton signed in 1996.
Contrary to what the Cotton/Wilson bill implies, Resolution 2310 (which was endorsed by 42 states including Israel) does not impose any new obligations on the United States. Rather, UNSC 2310:

  • encourages states to “provide the support required” to the CTBTO and the IMS, and urges states to refrain from nuclear testing and urges those states that have not ratified to do so; and
  • also takes note of the September 15 joint statement by the five permanent Security Council members that formally “recognized” that a nuclear explosion would “defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT.” 

So long as the United States remains a signatory of the CTBT, it is legally obliged not to take actions that would defeat its object and purpose. In other words, like all other 183 signatories, it shall not conduct a nuclear test explosion.
However, if Congress were to adopt the Cotton-Wilson bill asserting that the United States is not required to respect our obligations as a CTBT signatory not to test, it would signal to other states that that the United States is seeking to back out of its commitment to a global and verifiable nuclear test ban and is considering the resumption of nuclear weapons testing.
That’s not a smart move. With North Korea threatening to conduct a sixth nuclear test explosion, it is essential that the United States reinforce, not undermine, the global nuclear testing taboo
Backing off our historically strong commitment to ending nuclear testing at this time could trigger a dangerous chain reaction by other nuclear-armed states and would run afoul of key U.S. allies who strongly oppose nuclear testing and who support the CTBT. Continuing to fund the U.S. contribution to detect and deter nuclear weapons testing enhances national and international security.

—DARYL G. KIMBALL, executive director

Posted: May 8, 2017

Recalibrating U.S. Policy Toward North Korea



The new administration has a narrow window to shift U.S. policy toward North Korea in ways that halt its nuclear activities.


Volume 9, Issue 1, February 2017

North Korea’s advancing nuclear and ballistic missile program is one of the most serious national security challenges that Donald Trump faces as president. The new administration has a narrow window of opportunity to recalibrate U.S. policy toward North Korea and seek a lasting arrangement that halts and then ultimately rolls back Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visits a coastal defense unit on Mahap Islet in this undated photo released by the official Korean Central News Agency on November 11, 2016. (Photo credit: KNS/AFP/Getty Images)Currently, North Korea is assessed to have the capability to deliver a warhead on a short- or medium-range ballistic missile, threatening allies and U.S. troops in the region. But if North Korea remains on its current trajectory, it could soon begin testing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and deploy the system within the next decade, which would pose a direct threat to the continental United States and upset the security situation in East Asia.

A concerted diplomatic effort aimed first at freezing North Korea’s nuclear and missile testing, followed by negotiations designed to roll back Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program, will be difficult and may not succeed. However, when compared to other policy options, it stands the best chance of halting North Korea’s program.

The Obama administration’s policy toward North Korea, known as ‘strategic patience,’ failed to halt Pyongyang’s illicit nuclear and missile activities. The strategic patience approach involved increasing sanctions pressure on North Korea and returning to negotiations only after Pyongyang took steps toward denuclearization, which it committed to in the Six Party Talks with the United States, China, South Korea, Russia and Japan in 2005.

The onerous preconditions in the Obama administration’s policy approach, coupled with the failure to provide sufficient incentives, prevented the resumption of negotiations with North Korea. Instead, over the past eight years, North Korea expanded its stockpile of weapons-usable nuclear material, conducted four nuclear tests, and accelerated its missile activities.

North Korea’s leadership is likely waiting for Washington to signal what its approach will be. They will not likely wait long. The Financial Times reported February 1 that the White House launched a review of its North Korea policy.

A new U.S. policy that first seeks to resume negotiations, followed by pressure if North Korea scuttles diplomatic efforts, is still no guarantee of success. But is the most promising approach.

North Korea’s Advancing Programs
North Korea is currently estimated to possess about 50 kilograms of separated plutonium, enough material for more than 10 warheads, and activities suggest that its stockpile will continue to expand.

Kim Jong-Un stated his intention to continue expanding the country’s nuclear arsenal. Most recently in his annual New Years address on Jan. 1, 2017, he said that North Korea "will continue to build up” its nuclear forces… as long as the United States and its vassal forces keep on nuclear threat and blackmail and as long as they do not stop their war games they stage at our doorstep disguising them as annual events.”

To that end, Pyongyang restarted its 5mw nuclear reactor at Yongbyong in August 2013, which has since operated intermittently. The reactor produced the plutonium that North Korea used for its nuclear program, but was shut down in 2007 as part of the Six Party Talks. Satellite imagery from 38 North, a site run by the U.S. Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) suggests that North Korea’s reprocessing facility, which separates plutonium for weapons from the reactor’s spent fuel, is also operating.

North Korea is also known to possess centrifuges, and may enrich uranium for weapons purposes. Based on estimates from North Korea’s known centrifuge facility, Pyongyang could have produced enough highly-enriched uranium for an estimated 6-8 warheads, bringing the total count to 16-18 as of late 2016. Independent experts assess that North Korea could have as many as 20-100 warheads by 2020.

It is highly likely that North Korea is also taking steps to refine its warhead design, both to increase the explosive yield and develop a miniaturized weapon that can be mounted on a ballistic missile.

After the February 2013 test, North Korea claimed it had tested a miniaturized device. Pyongyang announced after the January 2016 test that it exploded a hydrogen bomb. While it is extremely unlikely that Pyongyang did test a hydrogen bomb, North Korea may have tested a boosted fission device. Boosted fission increases the explosive yield of a warhead by using isotopes of hydrogen to increase the efficiency of the reaction. While the assertions that North Korea tested a miniaturized or boosted fission device cannot be ascertained with certainty, continued testing gives Pyongyang more information about the performance of its warheads.

North Korea’s missile testing activity also indicates that Pyongyang is taking steps to extend the range of its ballistic missiles and develop delivery options, including a submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

In 2016, North Korea tested its Musudan missile eight times, the first tests of the missile since it was unveiled in 2010. The Musudan is a medium-range ballistic missile that experts assess could deliver a 650-kilogram payload over 1,200 kilometers. There is uncertainty about the range of the system, given there was only one successful test. However, a 1,200-kilometer range puts South Korea, Japan, and parts of China and Russia within range, but falls short of Guam. Although only one of the tests was a success, North Korea gained data relevant to the performance of the Mususdan and its longer-range systems.

North Korea is also taking steps to field SLBMs. John Schilling, an aerospace engineer, suggests that North Korea could initially field this capability in the second half of 2018. If North Korea can successfully field nuclear-tipped SLBMs, it would pose a regional threat, and could allow Pyongyang to evade the regional missile defense system set for deployment in South Korea. Given the nature of North Korea’s submarines and the estimated range of the SLBM, it is unlikely to pose an intercontinental threat.

Given North Korea’s continued production of fissile material and its ballistic missile activities, the threat posed by its nuclear program will continue to grow, unless checked.

“A New Approach” Toward North Korea
The new U.S. Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, recognized the need for a new approach to North Korea during his confirmation process. In a response to written questions from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Tillerson said that “North Korea is one of the leading threats to regional and global security. If confirmed, I will work closely with my interagency colleagues to develop a new approach to proactively address the multitude of threats that North Korea poses to its neighbors and the international community.”

Tillerson, however, provided little insight into what his approach will be. He mentioned working with regional partners to increase pressure on North Korea and further isolate the country. He also talked about the need for China to enforce UN sanctions and mentioned the possibility of secondary sanctions if Beijing does not enhance its compliance.

Steps such as increasing sanctions on North Korea or putting in place secondary sanctions for failure to implement UN measures, do not alone constitute a strategy that will halt North Korea’s advancing nuclear weapons program and ultimately roll it back. Indeed, pursing certain types of sanctions could have the opposite effect ­‑ secondary sanctions on China could alienate Beijing.

First and foremost, the Trump administration’s new policy should focus on signaling to Pyongyang that Washington is ready and willing to engage in serious negotiations without preconditions.

To start, the new administration should deliver a message directly and carefully to North Korea’s leadership that recalls positive statements that Pyongyang has made about negotiations over its nuclear program, such as to Pyongyang’s statement from July 2016 calling for denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula: “The denuclearization being called for by the DPRK is the denuclearization of the whole Korean peninsula and this includes the dismantlement of nukes in South Korea and its vicinity.” This will also make clear that the United States remains committed to denuclearization as the end state in negotiations with Pyongyang.

The United States should also simultaneously reach out to states in the region to discuss the administration’s negotiating position and provide assurances that Washington remains committed to the security of its allies. Clear communication with China, given its close relationship with North Korea, will be particularly necessary. In the communication with President Xi, the United States should emphasize importance of China strictly enforcing existing sanctions, and the U.S. intent not to seek new sanctions as long as the North acts with restraint, including no nuclear and missile flight tests.

If North Korea is willing to negotiate, initial talks should focus on obtaining a moratorium to prevent additional nuclear and ballistic missile tests. The advantage of pursuing a testing freeze is that it would prevent North Korea from continuing to advance its capabilities, halting progress toward an ICBM and an SLBM capability.

The United States will need to be prepared to put something on the table in return for North Korea’s commitment to freeze nuclear and missile tests. After consultations with Seoul, Washington might consider scaling-back or delaying its annual joint military exercises with South Korea. The United States could also commit not to take actions viewed by North Korea as deliberately threatening, such as flying nuclear-capable bombers over the Korean peninsula.

The advantage of putting military exercises on the table is that they can easily be scaled back up if North Korea breaks the agreement and conducts a test. Monitoring for nuclear and missile tests also does not require inspectors on the ground.

Another option could be a U.S. commitment to delay the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system, so long as Pyongyang observes a strict test moratorium. Beijing has voiced a strong opposition to the system over concerns that the THAAD radar coverage will include parts of China. In addition to alienating China, deploying THAAD could provoke Pyongyang to continue developing missiles capabilities that would allow it to evade and/or over whelm U.S. missile defenses in the region.

If the initial moratorium holds, North Korea and the United States could discuss steps that would roll back Pyongyang’s nuclear activities, including a verifiable halt to fissile material production (including plutonium production and uranium enrichment) that would be monitored by international inspectors into North Korea’s nuclear sites. In return, the United States might extend to North Korea limited sanctions relief and negative security assurances against military attack under certain conditions.

To maintain leverage, the United States and its partners should strengthen implementation of UN Security Council-mandated sanctions that have not been fully enforced thus far. This would also preserve the option to try to increase economic and financial sanctions pressure if North Korea refuses to negotiate.


Flawed Alternatives
Other policy approaches pose very high risks and have a low chance of success. A campaign to impose crippling sanctions on the North is likely to fail, since it will be opposed by China. Any attempt to coerce Beijing will likely be met with a strong response, creating a rift that North Korea will exploit to continue to move forward with its weapons of mass destruction programs. Preemptive military strikes will face severe operational difficulties and almost certainly a strong, likely military, response from Pyongyang that could trigger a second Korean War. It would also be opposed by South Korea and Japan and draw China into what may be an escalating regional conflict.

The dangers posed by North Korea—ranging from the direct threat to the United States and a growing threat to South Korea and Japan, to the possibility that Pyongyang will transfer nuclear technology abroad to earn hard currency—cannot be ignored. Simply maintaining the current policy will not slow North Korea’s advances; and more robust missile defenses provide only a partial defense for the United States and its allies, at best.

In formulating a more effective approach, the new administration must jettison flawed assumptions that have underpinned a failed U.S. policy for the past eight years. A new policy that tries negotiations first, and then puts pressure on the North if its intransigence scuttles diplomacy, is still no guarantee of success, but is the most promising approach.

DARYL G. KIMBALL, executive director and KELSEY DAVENPORT, director of nonproliferation policy

Country Resources:

Posted: February 2, 2017

Copenhagen: a Play about the Science, Politics, and Morality of Atomic Weapons

On a calm and cool January evening, we found ourselves attending a stimulating showing of Michael Frayn’s 1998 Tony award-winning play, Copenhagen , at Theater J in Washington D.C. Before going any further, perhaps we should start with some personal background (and humility). We are not nuclear weapons experts. Or physicists. Or historians, really. Rather, our recollection and understanding of World War II and the race to the atomic bomb is, shall we say, rusty. We’re both young professionals working more on conventional weapons issues–from examining the global arms trade to analyzing defense...

The P5+1 And Iran Nuclear Deal Alert, December 22

The Iran Deal Under Trump President-elect Donald Trump has yet to clarify his administration’s policy toward Iran and the July 2015 multilateral nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). But he will need to move quickly as Iranian news outlets are reporting that the spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran said a meeting of the nuclear deal's Joint Commission will take place in early January and include members of the Trump team. Trump’s advisors, however, have voiced conflicting views about the agreement. The presumptive National Security Advisor,...

IAEA Condemns North Korea’s Actions

Pyongyang’s defiance tops the issues International Atomic Energy Agency’s annual meeting.

November 2016

By Kelsey Davenport

Member states of the Inter-national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) passed several resolutions at the organization’s yearly meeting, including one that condemns North Korea’s nuclear activities, but did not vote on a controversial resolution singling out Israel’s nuclear program. 

The IAEA’s 60th General Conference was held Sept. 26-30 in Vienna. 

Yukiya Amano, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, addresses delegates September 26 at the 60th IAEA General Conference in Vienna. (Photo credit: Dean Calma/IAEA)The agency’s resolution on North Korea was adopted unanimously Sept. 30. It reaffirmed that North Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon state under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and called on Pyongyang to implement comprehensive safeguards and resolve all outstanding issues that have emerged since agency inspectors were last granted access to North Korea’s nuclear facilities in 2009. 

North Korea joined the IAEA in 1974, but withdrew in 1994. The agency has not been able to conduct safeguards activities since then, although inspectors had limited periodic access through 2009.

Laura Holgate, U.S. representative to the IAEA, said in a statement on Sept. 30 that the resolution is “strong, resolute, and unequivocal” and underscores that North Korea could “not harbor any illusions that its illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons will achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.” 

Holgate said that enhanced pressure on North Korea will remain essential to compel Pyongyang to “correct its course.” 

In June, the Arab member states of the IAEA made a request to put Israel’s nuclear capabilities on the agenda, but unlike past years did not introduce a resolution on the subject during the conference. 

Zeev Snir, head of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, said in his opening statement at the meeting that Israel welcomed the decision to refrain from putting forward a draft resolution but regretted the Arab Group’s decision to include the topic on the agenda for discussions, saying it leads to “politicized, irrelevant discussions.” 

Holgate said the United States welcomed the decision by the Arab states and that the resolution singling out Israel was “not an appropriate item” for the conference.

In the last decade, the resolution has passed once, in 2009, and was not put forward in 2011 and 2012. It failed to pass in 2010, 2013, and 2014.

The member states did approve a resolution on Sept. 29 on the application of safeguards in the Middle East. The measure was approved 122-0, with six abstentions, including the United States. Explaining the U.S. position, Holgate said that efforts to advance toward the creation of a Middle Eastern zone free of weapons of mass destruction have been pursued at IAEA general conferences “without seeking consensus among states in the region” and that this approach undermines trust. 

The resolution calls on all states in the Middle East to accede to the NPT and accept full-scope IAEA safeguards on their nuclear activities. It also calls on states in the region to take measures toward supporting a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. 

The resolution does not specifically single out Israel, but Israel is the only Middle Eastern country not party to the NPT. Israel is suspected of having a nuclear arsenal of about 80 warheads, with enough material for up to 200 weapons, although it has never officially acknowledged possessing such arms or demonstrated its capability through a declared nuclear test.

The conference also passed resolutions relating to the agency’s budget, nuclear security work, and technical cooperation. It approved three new applications for IAEA membership for Gambia, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

Posted: October 31, 2016

Second Debate Provides Opportunity to Discuss North Korea

Oct. 9 marks both Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump’s second presidential debate and the 10th anniversary of North Korea’s first nuclear test. This serendipitous timing should push each candidate to present a clear plan of action to confront North Korea’s rapid nuclear development. To date, Clinton has avoided making policy recommendations about North Korea and Trump has provided a handful of troubling remarks. North Korea’s most recent nuclear test Sept. 9 , its fifth thus far, took place only eight months after its last Jan. 6. The explosive yield from the September test was greater than 10...

The Future of the CTBT: Collective Goals and Strategies for Building Momentum

The Arms Control Association brought together representatives from several like-minded organizations and visiting members of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization's Youth Group for a September 23 discussion on the future of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. The session, hosted by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies , addressed collective efforts to promote the CTBT and the challenges for mobilizing awareness and support for the Treaty in the near future. The CTBTO Youth Group, a separate entity from the CTBTO, is an expanding group of next generation students, young...

Iran Continues to Comply with the Nuclear Deal

The latest IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear program confirms that the country is complying with the limits imposed by the 2015 nuclear deal.

Stimson-ACA Event—20 Years Later: The United States and the Future of the CTBT



Please join the Stimson Center and Arms Control Association for a briefing on the security value of the CTBT and the purpose of President Obama's UN Security Council initiative.


20 Years Later: The United States and the Future of the CTBT

Tuesday, September 13, 2016, 9:00 a.m. - 10:30 a.m.
The Stimson Center, Washington, DC

Audio and Slideshow Available

Twenty years ago, the United States took a leading role in negotiations for a verifiable ban on the explosive testing of nuclear weapons. The result was the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which opened for signature September 24, 1996. Although the treaty has widespread domestic and global support, the CTBT has not yet entered into force because the United States and seven other key states have failed to ratify the treaty. This month, the Obama administration, along with other UN Security Council member states, are considering a resolution that reaffirms support for the global norm against nuclear testing and the eventual ratification of the CTBT.

Rose Gottemoeller, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, U.S. Department of State
Ambassador Adam M. Scheinman, Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State
Ambassador Mitsuru Kitano, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna
Ambassador Kairat Umarov, Ambassador of Kazakhstan to the United States
Michael Krepon, Co-Founder of the Stimson Center
Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association


   FINLAY: Ladies and gentlemen, welcome. My name is Brian Finlay, I'm the president and CEO here at Stimson. And on behalf of our partners and co-conveners for this event, Daryl Kimball and his colleagues at the Arms Control Association, I would very much like to welcome you here to the Stimson Center for what is, as you can see from the panel, going to be an action-packed and international discussion on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

   It's a little bit deja vu all over again when I think my being in this room with many of you previously talking about this very issue. But it's exciting to open The New York Times and The Washington Post and actually see potential progress on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

   But we, as I say, do have a very action-packed agenda. And so without further ado, I would like to welcome my colleague and the co-founder of Stimson, Michael Krepon.


   KREPON: Thanks for coming.

   For the panel today and for me and the Stimson Center's partner, Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty isn't just professional, it's personal. And everybody on this dais has been working on this treaty for 20 years or more. And we are grateful for your commitment to this treaty.

   And that's what this event is about. That's what the U.N. Security Council resolution is about. That's what the P5 statement is about next week.

   We're here to remember the value of the treaty, to recommit to its entry into force, to add propulsion to this very long and difficult process. It's not going to happen tomorrow, but tomorrow will come sooner because of the steps that will be taken in New York next week.

   We are pressed for time. Rose needs to leave us at 9:30. She has an agenda that would buckle the knees of a teenager. So I'm not going to introduce our distinguished panel. You can read their bios.

   We've asked Rose, Ambassador Kitano and Ambassador Umarov to limit their opening remarks to 10 minutes. Then Daryl will handle the Q&A. And after Rose leaves, Adam, whose commitment to this issue is as immense as anybody else, is going to fill in on the Q&A side, after you perhaps direct just a couple of questions at Rose before she leaves.

   So with that, Rose, the floor is yours.

   GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you very much, Michael.

   It's a real pleasure to be back here at the Stimson Center and also to be participating in this important event in partnership also with the Arms Control Association. So thank you for this opportunity.

   I love coming to the Stimson Center. Last time I was here it was for an important event to launch our annual publication, "To Walk the Earth in Safety." Many of you also work on the landmine clearance and unexploded ordnance of war, clearance of those kinds of tragic remnants of wars around the world. And I really always take my hat off to the commitment of the Stimson Center to so many important issues in the realm of not only weapons of mass destruction, but also disposition of conventional armaments as well.

   And I'm delighted to be here with my esteemed counterparts, Ambassador Kitano and Ambassador Umarov. This year has been such an important year for Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It is the 20th anniversary of the opening of the treaty for signature, and these two countries, Japan and Kazakhstan, have been right at the heart of our commemoration, pushing every day to not only commemorate the event of the opening of the treaty for signature, but to push forward from this moment toward its entry into force.

   So I very much appreciate the work of the two ambassadors, Ambassador Kitano and Ambassador Umarov, but their countries as well. They have been great colleagues throughout this year.

   And indeed, as Michael said, next week will be an important week at the U.N. General Assembly and there will be a lot more action there with, again, Japan and Kazakhstan taking a leading role.

   Ambassador Adam Scheinman is also here. He'll be happy to take a lot of questions from you, or maybe not happy, but he's ready to take a lot of questions from you.


   SCHEINMAN: Happy, ecstatic.

   GOTTEMOELLER: I am going to have to depart right around 9:30, but I'll plan on taking one or two questions before I have to run out the door. So I apologize for that in advance.

   As we come here together to note the 20th anniversary of the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the establishment of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, I'd like to begin, as I often do, by making note of the long road to complete a global ban on nuclear explosive testing.

   The CTBT is in fact the longest-sought, hardest-fought prize in the history of arms control. And we are still fighting. We must remember how far we have come. The creation and implementation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963 is a testament to what we are capable of achieving when we set our sights on a goal. That treaty provided the foundation for a total ban on nuclear explosive testing, and another step along the road, let us not forget is the entry into force in 1990 of the TTBT, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, as well as the PNET, the ban on peaceful nuclear explosions.

   The United States is very proud of its role in the negotiation of a comprehensive ban on nuclear explosive testing, and we were proud to be the first nation to sign the CTBT after it opened for signature in 1996.

   The United States signed the CTBT because we recognized the potential of this treaty to significantly strengthen nuclear nonproliferation, thereby enhancing the security of our nation and every nation around the world.

   As the president noted in his statement for the CTBTO's June ministerial meeting, after 20 years the full potential of the CTBT remains unfulfilled, but the United States is steadfast in our support for the treaty and for the critical work of the Preparatory Commission.

   Our dedication to the treaty is demonstrated through unmatched monetary and technical support and our clear commitment to ensuring that the verification regime is completed and able to function as intended.

   It is critical that every signatory to the treaty support the work of the Preparatory Commission to complete the treaty's verification regime and help enhance the effectiveness of the provisional technical secretariat.

   We should all work to upgrade the International Data Center, the IDC, and ensure the completion of an effective, on-site inspection capability.

   Despite our clear support for the CTBT, the United States acknowledges that we have not completed our work on the ratification process and that our delay gives cover to other Annex 2 states who have not yet ratified the treaty. That is why we are building support for this treaty here at home, state by state and sometimes person by person, because we know that a global ban on nuclear explosive testing is good for our country.

   We are making it clear to the American public that our scientists and military experts agree that the CTBT is verifiable and we do not need to conduct nuclear explosive testing in order to maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear stockpile.

   I won't deny that this work is difficult and that we face domestic political obstacles. That does not change the fact that this treaty is in our national security interests, and so it is incumbent upon us to convince those who doubt this fact. We are certain that we have a good case to make; we will continue to make it.

   In the meantime, it is in the U.S. national security interests to reaffirm the moratoria against nuclear explosive testing and continually increase our ability to monitor and detect nuclear explosive tests. That is why the Obama administration decided to engage with the members of the U.N. Security Council, including the five Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty nuclear weapon states, on potential steps to further reduce nuclear dangers by strengthening the international nuclear explosive detection architecture and supporting existing national moratoria on nuclear explosive tests.

   To be clear, we are not proposing and will not support the adoption of a U.N. Security Council resolution imposing legally binding prohibitions on nuclear explosive testing. Further, the resolution we have in mind would in no way be a substitute for entry into force of the CTBT, which would require, among other things, ratification by the United States with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate. The administration is committed to working with the Senate to build support for ratification.

   In the meantime, it is in the U.S. national security interests to reaffirm the moratoria against explosive nuclear testing.

   In closing, I would like to say that I have always emphasized the clear national security benefits of the CTBT, and over the last few years I've personally seen the effects nuclear explosive testing has had on people and the environment. I was in the Marshall Islands on the 60th anniversary of Castle Bravo. In Alaska, I spoke with residents who said that they are worried that radiation from explosive tests there had found its way into the food chain. I spent time in southern Utah talking to ranchers who had lost their entire flocks to radiation from nuclear testing in Nevada.

   And in New Mexico, I walked the cold, hard ground at Trinity, still littered with black, glass-like particles from the test. I thought how far we have come, but how far we still have to go. In each place, people of different backgrounds support the treaty 100 percent, no matter what their background, no matter what their experience.

   The administration will continue to make the case to students, civic groups, faith-based groups, political leaders across this country. But I will say that there are those among us who already recognize the value of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We need to expand that circle every day.

   Thank you very much for your attention, and I look forward to hearing from my esteemed colleagues. Thank you.

   KREPON: Thanks, Rose.

   Ambassador Kitano.

   KITANO: Thank you very much, Michael.

   And it is a great pleasure and honor for me to be here, together with the distinguished panelists and Undersecretary Rose Gottemoeller and Ambassador Kairat Umarov of Kazakhstan, and Kazakhstan is a country with which Japan is working very, very closely all these years in this area, and Ambassador Scheinman, it is a great pleasure.

   And many of you have a longer engagement with the CTBT. For me, at least, I can date back 20 years. I was one of the team who was involved for the Japanese signing and ratification in 1996 and 1997. So for me, it is an unfinished business.

   And as I am a participant from Vienna and a participant from Japan and I suppose my role here is to provide some of Japan's perspective and also a perspective from Vienna. Vienna is a place where CTBT organization is located. We have daily discussions on all aspects of CTBT.

   So let me start my presentation in touching upon our response to the most recent debate which happened last Friday, DPRK's fifth test. It was around 2:30 midnight or early in the morning the event happened. And immediately, an international warning system of CTBT detected this event.

   And of course, the Preparatory Commission was called to convene and a technical briefing provided. And the countries expressed their perspective on this event. And we have come up with a report and saying that many condemning the announced nuclear test and expressing grave concern over the serious, negative effect about any such test on international peace and security.

   It is needless to say that this test constituted a serious, grave threat to Japan's security. And it also undermines the peace and security of Northeast Asia and also the international community as a whole.

   And also in the context of CTBT, I would say that it is a stark reminder of the necessity of the legal, binding instrument, legally binding commitment for not to conduct nuclear tests.

   Now, having said that, I would like to touch upon the significance of CTBT in today's context. For me, the question which is in front of us is appropriate, is it in our interests to try to strengthen, enhance a set of ideas not to conduct nuclear weapon tests? You know, we can hold an international standard for not to conduct nuclear weapon.

   For me, in view of the most recent event last week, the answer is very much evident and clear. Yes, it is, it is in our interests to do so; we should aim for a set of ideas for not to conduct nuclear testing. And it is very much widely shared.

   And CTBT was established for that purpose. CTBT was very much widely shared, agreed international agreement. And it has a signing states of 183 signing states. And it has been ratified by 164 states. And this number will soon increase to 166, adding such countries as Swaziland and Myanmar.

   And as is well-known, all P5 states and nuclear weapon states under NPT, and together with India and Pakistan, declared and maintain moratoria for not to conduct nuclear tests. And it is quite widely shared ideas.

   Think about the situation if another test, a new test would be conducted anywhere in the world, whether it would be in Northeast Asia, whether it would be in South Asia, whether it would be in Middle East or anywhere else, it should most certainly exacerbate the international security situation very seriously.

   So thinking about that, I suppose it is very much important we should make efforts to enhance this set of ideas, international standards for not making, conducting nuclear test.

   But here, I have to make one very much important caveat. That is to say, what we should aim at is a legally binding commitment not to conduct nuclear testing. This should be effectuated by way of entering into force for CTBT.

   But my point is, while we strive for that, it would be in our interests to strengthen this set of ideas, an international standard not to conduct nuclear testing.

   Now, I would like to touch upon another important aspect of CTBT, and that is to say a ratification mechanism of CTBT. The idea, underlying idea of a CTBT is that we should come up with a verifiable nuclear test ban treaty, as Rose has mentioned. And for that purpose CTBT is treated in ways very much and robust, solid mechanism of verification centered on international monitoring system.

   Now, around the world there are around 300 monitoring stations. And they send data to International Data Center of CTBTO. And they gather information and analyze. It is with this system which detected all five nuclear tests of DPRK, including their most recent. So my point here is it is very much in our interests to strengthen, improve this set.

   And before I make my concluding remarks, let me and touch upon our role as what we call Article 14 co-coordinator. Article 14 is one that was a mechanism of the treaty by which co-coordinator tried to push for the process of entering into force.

   And the general image of CTBT is that the CTBT might be in limbo, nothing and not many things are happening in the ratification for the remaining eight countries, and putting aside all the effort which is conducted in the United States.

   From my standpoint (inaudible). For example, China, China had started sending data from their monitoring stations to the International Data Center of CTBT for certification.

   Thinking about Israel, and Israel's (inaudible) is that the ratification of the CTBT is not a question of why, but it is a question of when. And they could pull out specific issues that have to be addressed.

   Think about Pakistan, for example. Pakistan is one of three countries among the remaining eight and (inaudible) countries who have not signed the treaty. But Pakistan gained the status of observer and status of CTBT, they are part of the discussion of CTBTO in that capacity. And it was quite recent that they made a proposal and was calling to India why not making one step forward for the nuclear test moratorium.

   So things are happening. So in our role, Kazakhstan and Japan, what we are trying to do is trying to gather this momentum and trying to channel that in the right direction.

   And concluding remarks, maybe I would like to mention two things. The role of the U.S. is very much important. Japan, and I personally, appreciated, welcomed all the effort it has made and U.S. is making and U.S. is going to make and, of course, the advancement of CTBT.

   And why I say this, it is not only from disarmament nonproliferation standpoint we are saying, it is based on security considerations we are saying that, too. And as you can see, in my presentation I made reference to DPRK issues, which is national security issues. As you would understand.

   The last one pitch I would like to make is the significance of this year, and this year is the 20th year anniversary of this opening for signature for CTBT. As I said, in Vienna there is a strong sense that it is unfinished business, let us finish what we have started 20 years.

   And what happened this year, two rounds of nuclear tests. This is very much in a way we would like to condemn it, but it is also a wake-up call, and it gives at least us a very important message. So what our role is now, to take that message and try to transfer it, bring it to action.

   Thank you very much for your attention.

   KREPON: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

   Ambassador Umarov.

   UMAROV: It's a pleasure to be here at the Stimson Center.

   And thank you, Michael and Daryl, for inviting me to speak today as part of this distinguished panel.

   It's quite symbolic that this event to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the CTBT coincides with the 25th anniversary of the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing site in Kazakhstan.

   These two important events are very much linked. By closing one of the world's largest test sites, Kazakhstan's president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, made history as the first to legally ban nuclear tests.

   It wasn't long before other nuclear states or nuclear test sites followed Semipalatinsk, creating a unique condition needed to ensure the ban for nuclear tests becoming a global phenomenon.

   The day the test site was closed, August 29th, 1991, paved the way for adoption of the CTBT. It is very symbolic that August 29th is recognized by the U.N. as the international day against nuclear tests and is commemorated across the world annually.

   Another well-known initiative of Kazakhstan, it is the ATOM Project, which stands for Abolish Testing Our Mission. The project is aimed at creating global awareness and support for a final and irrevocable nuclear test ban. It engages hundreds of thousands of general public across the world by explaining the consequences of nuclear tests. It encourages anyone who opposes the nuclear weapons to sign an online petition urging their governments to abandon nuclear testing permanently and help to ensure the CTBT is achieved.

   At the beginning of this year, my president actually introduced a new and very interesting, I think, initiative, the Manifesto: The World. The 21st Century.

   In this vision and document, my president suggests that the international community should stop being complacent about the nuclear threat and develop a holistic action plan to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, nuclear wars. It actually declares war on wars.

   Ladies and gentlemen, 20 years ago, U.N. General Assembly resolution adopted the CTBT. Twenty years is a long period of time. But the treaty which was designed to be a key element in the international security system has not yet entered into force.

   We believe that the reason the CTBT hasn't entered into force is a lack of political will in the Annex 2 states. Political will is essential to build a sense for global solidarity for our shared future.

   North Korean nuclear and missile testing of recent weeks and months gives added urgency and shows that the global risks of nuclear testing and proliferation are not eliminated completely. With each and every test, we see that North Korea is trying, is attempting to modernize its nuclear capability, which is a very dangerous thing for the global security.

   Kazakhstan strongly condemns the actions of DPRK leadership. It's not only causing serious damage to the efforts of the international community on nuclear disarmament, but also undermines nuclear balance and security.

   We need CTBT in place to further pressure Pyongyang to abandon its unacceptable practice and renounce nuclear ambitions. We need CTBT to outlaw DPRK's activities in this dangerous sphere.

   The treaty and related efforts have so far proved effective. We are confident that the impact will increase significantly after the CTBT enters into force. Considerable progress has been made in creating and deploying the international monitoring system. This system, even in its uncompleted state, has helped to identify nuclear tests conducted by DPRK, including the most recent ones. All on-the-ground nuclear explosions, however small or clandestine, were successfully registered, including by five Kazakh stations connections to IMS.

   Measures taken by CTBTO on strengthening the verification regime as well as conducting on-site inspections and field experiments should be commended and further supported.

   Probably we should follow the famous Ronald Reagan's principle, "trust, but verify," but in a little bit reverse order. Probably today we have this verification system in place, in function; now we should probably work on building the trust, which really could help change hearts and minds. And we think that CTBT could exactly play that role.

   As co-coordinators of Article 14, Kazakhstan and Japan conduct consistent work to help facilitate the entry into force of the CTBT. We made clear our intentions in the high-level joint statement in October, last October, by President Nazarbayev and Prime Minister Abe, as well as this year in two other statements issued at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington and the open-ended working group in Geneva.

   We are committed to continue our efforts on the Annex 2 and Annex 1 states to make the CTBT universal.

   As a nation, we are also taking important steps domestically to ensure the treaty's entry into force. This August, Almaty hosted the IX International Conference summit titled Monitoring of Nuclear Tests and Their Consequences, aimed at improving the verification methods further and facilitating the entry into force of the CTBT.

   We also intend to build a radio nuclear control and normal gas station in Kazakhstan. It will help considerably intensify capabilities of the CTBT monitoring system and will be our significant contribution to the nuclear test ban process.

   Later today, together with Senator Markey, we will host an event at the Capitol Visitors Center in commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, where we will further discuss the human and environmental costs of nuclear weapons as well as importance of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

   Let me close by stressing the following. The people of Kazakhstan have suffered from the effects of nuclear testing, as well as Japan actually, nuclear testing, and we understand the risks and consequences of nuclear test exposures.

   This makes us principal believers in Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty effectiveness and necessity to bring it into force.

   Pending the entry into the force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, we support the adoption of the U.N. Security Council resolution that would emphasize the importance of maintaining moratoria on nuclear testing and would build support for the completion of the treaty's verification regime.

   As an incoming, non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, Kazakhstan is looking forward to working with all our partners to achieve progress in this direction.

   Thank you for your attention.

   KREPON: Thank you, Ambassador.


   We might just have one or two minutes for one or two quick questions for Undersecretary Gottemoeller. So let's take those, then we'll go to the rest of the panel. And why don't we start here in the middle? Thank you. Just identify yourself.

   QUESTION: Hi, Rachel Oswald, a reporter with Congressional Quarterly.

   Undersecretary, based on your remarks, it seemed that I was hearing from you that the U.N. Security Council resolution will not invoke Chapter 7 authority and that it sounds like it's unlikely words like "determine" and "decide" will be used in the resolution. Correct me if I'm wrong.

   But will there be any kind of determination that signatories to the treaty should abstain from nuclear testing? And wouldn't the effect of passage of such a resolution be for it to become customary international law?



   First of all, I will just reiterate the points that I made during my remarks, that the U.N. Security Council resolution that we are still working on in New York, and as it is a diplomatic effort, diplomatic negotiation with exchanges back and forth still going on, I'm not going to speculate about final word formulations or anything like that.

   But I can, once again, confirm and underscore for this audience that it will not impose new, legally binding constraints on nuclear testing. That is not the kind of UNSCR that we are after. We are after, and we have been from the outset, a U.N. Security Council resolution that would really give new momentum to entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in this, the 20th year since its opening for signature.

   And entry into force at its very heart means that states fulfill their internal procedures for entry into force, whether it is pursuing in our own system the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate.

   And people kind of confuse this oftentimes. It is the Senate that gives advice and consent, but it is the president of the United States who actually completes the ratification process. So that is our own national procedure.

   Whatever the national procedure is, this UNSCR will push forward the momentum toward entry into force and each state, in turn, that is among the Annex 2 states will have to complete its own national procedures for ratification.

   So I do want to underscore that for this audience today.

   KREPON: Undersecretary Gottemoeller, I just want to respect your time. Are we...

   GOTTEMOELLER: One more question is OK, if you have one.

   KREPON: One more question, all right. Julian Borger from The Guardian.

   QUESTION: Julian Borger from The Guardian. So the other side of that question is, if it doesn't add any binding force, what is the point of it, you know, other than the formal words encouraging countries to adhere to it? In what way does it add momentum?

   GOTTEMOELLER: Julian, the U.N. Security Council frequently lends its political weight, its international authority to any number of international goals and international policy campaigns. In this case, I stress the entry into force goal, lending momentum into entry into force, but we actually have three goals for this U.N. Security Council resolution.

   Yes, lend momentum to entry into force is number one. Number two Ambassador Kitano talked about in quite an articulate way, that is strengthening and lending additional moral authority to the moratoria. And the moratoria have had real effect. They are not legally binding, but they have had real effect.

   We have not tested since 1992. We have not conducted a nuclear explosive test. So these moratoria are important to the cessation of nuclear testing worldwide, even though they are not, quote, "legally binding" and this U.N. Security Council resolution will lend new authority and momentum to the moratoria.

   And the third very important reason is to bolster the work of the PrepCom for the comprehensive test ban, the CTBTO and its very important verification system, the international monitoring system, which over time has gained great effectiveness.

   Again, I'm grateful to my colleagues for underscoring the role it played in the DPRK test last Friday. Within a very short time, the CTBTO had, from the IMS, results out to the international community in a very public way.

   And I want to underscore, that is a great, valuable aspect of the IMS, that it does make available to the entire international community serious information about nuclear testing events when they sadly occur, as has been the case with the DPRK tests just this year. It was the IMS that was first off the block with important public information about the nuclear test.

   We have our own national technical means. They are very important to our own national confidence about what is going on in the nuclear testing realm, but a lot of that information is classified, it cannot be made available to the international community. So the IMS is a very valuable tool for the public role it plays in constraining nuclear testing.

   So I must excuse myself. My colleague, Ambassador Scheinman, is really good on all these legal issues.


   So he'll be glad to...

   KREPON: I'll put some more.

   GOTTEMOELLER: He'll be glad to answer some more questions. And I apologize to my colleagues, but I will see you later today on Capitol Hill. So thank you very much.

   KREPON: Thank you very much.

   We'll just take a moment as we transition here.

   KIMBALL: I want to join Michael Krepon and the Stimson Center, on behalf of the Arms Control Association, in appreciating the work of the people on the panel over the years on the Test Ban Treaty.

   I want to recognize the immense value of Kazakhstan's decision to close Semipalatinsk's test site, as Ambassador Umarov said, and Ambassador Kitano's work over the decades has been immense and I want to thank him for coming all the way from Vienna just for this event and some other meetings today, and Ambassador Scheinman also.

   And we have some people in the audience who have a deep familiarity and experience with the Test Ban Treaty, and there are others representing some of the governments and Security Council who are part of this effort also.

   So we have more time for your questions. And so I just wanted to, once again, open up the floor to questions to the entire panel or to a particular panelist.

   I see Mr. David Culp from the Friends Committee on National Legislation, in the middle, and there's a microphone for you.

   QUESTION: Thank you. So a question for the two of you. So as you probably know, 35 Republican senators sent a letter responding to the president saying if the administration goes forward we win, we're going to try to cut off all the money toward the CTBT.

   So, Adam, do you take this threat seriously?

   And, Ambassador, you're in Vienna, what would be the impact of U.S. nonpayment to the CTBTO for next year?

   KIMBALL: And just to clarify, it was written by 33 senators, not 35.

   QUESTION: Thirty-three, sorry.


   KIMBALL: All right. Ambassador Scheinman, you want to start, please?

   SCHEINMAN: Yeah. Well, I can answer that very quickly. I think, David, we certainly take seriously letters from, you know, close to three dozen senators on this question. So our best answer to the group is to answer the questions that they raise, as honestly and as factually as we can.

   We don't believe that the threats that this group of senators believe exists, is really there, and we'll continue to have conversations with the Senate on what this resolution is and what it isn't. And we think we can address the criticisms very effectively.

   So I think that's my answer. I pass to Mr. Kitano.

   KIMBALL: Ambassador Kitano?

   KITANO: Thank you very much for your question. And the United States is a very important contributor to the CTBTO. And it provides a very much important contribution to our extra budgetary resources also. And it is a very much an important basis for various activities in the CTBT. And verification regime is one of them.

   And as has been mentioned by Rose and others, this verification mechanism has been in operation. And CTBT has not come into effect. So legally speaking, it is not a legally binding instrument.

   But at the same time, what is very much noticeable is that CTBT is operational and (inaudible) for its verification mechanism. And it is functioning and it functions well and detected all kinds of nuclear tests of DPRK.

   So I suppose the question I would like to put forward is, will it be in our interests to strengthen that mechanism or not? And U.S. contribution plays a very important role, I would say. Thank you very much.

   SCHEINMAN: Let me just add one comment. You know, the fact of U.S. funding for the international monitoring system has been with us under both Republican and Democratic administrations. And that's been because, we think, that the IMS actually adds to our own verification capability by providing a global system. That's why it has had the support of Republicans historically. And I suspect, you know, that will remain.

   KIMBALL: Yeah. Before we go to other questions, let me just see if I could ask Adam a question to clarify Rose Gottemoeller's earlier answer about the concerns of some of these senators.

   She said that the resolution that the United States is seeking at the Security Council and the P5 statement would not impose any new, legally binding prohibition on nuclear testing. And specifically, as I read a couple of the letters, the concern was about, from Senator Corker, a specific proposal in the P5 statement and the Security Council resolution that might clarify that a nuclear test explosion would violate or defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which, of course, is to ban, prohibit all nuclear test explosions.

   Would it be fair to say that if that were part of the P5 statement or referenced in the Security Council resolution would be a public articulation of an existing obligation as a signatory not to violate the purpose or intent? How is the administration interpreting that particular aspect of this issue?

   SCHEINMAN: Yeah. So we had developed the idea in concert with our P5 partners of issuing a statement that would express a national view that each of us share, which is that a nuclear test would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. And as a signatory obligation we all share under CTBT since we've all signed or ratified the treaty, this would then be sort of a national interpretation of our obligations under international law not to defeat the object or purpose of the treaty.

   The resolution itself would not try to impose that. Our idea is that the resolution would not try to impose that particular interpretation on U.N. member states. It would simply take note of the statement made by the P5 states.

   KIMBALL: OK, thank you for that clarification.

   Do we have other questions from the audience, or have we answered every question that you have about the longest-sought, hardest-fought treaty in arms control history?

   Oh, we have a question here. Mr. Horner, I think I know who you are.


   QUESTION: Hi, Dan Horner from Nuclear Intelligence Weekly.

   Panelists here and elsewhere have talked about the North Korean test in the context of the CTBT and the need for having the CTBT.

   Can you say what you think would have been different about North Korea's behavior if a CTBT had been enforced, given that North Korea has flouted international norms repeatedly? Would that have changed the decision-making and the dynamics? Or what do you think would have been different with a CTBT in force?

   I'll address it initially to Ambassador Kitano, but I'd like to hear all the panelists on that. Thanks.

   KIMBALL: Thank you.


   KITANO: Yes. When CTBT is entered into effect, it means that all the remaining annexed states should ratify that. That means in the DPRK should have ratified that.

   Yes, if that is the case, in that situation, and the DPRK is legally bound by all the provisions of CTBT, including its Article One obligation, very basic obligation not to conduct explosive nuclear testing, so that would be very much in a strong engagement, legal engagement on the part of DPRK. So that is the situation which we would very much aim at.

   And the other thing which I mention is that I would not say that that would happen overnight. I mentioned in my earlier presentation now there is a very much widely shared international standard not to test. It is only one country in this century who conducted nuclear testing, that is DPRK.

   So it would be what we should aim at is try to enhance and strengthen that international standard with a view to not coming up with an alternative. This is also the point which was also mentioned by Mr. Umarov of Kazakhstan. Thank you very much.

   UMAROV: I think that it will create a momentum again to pressurize North Korea to stop testing on the side of other P5 countries and other countries in the world, just to make sure that North Korea is behaving itself outside as an outcast, as an outsider of the international law and boundaries.

   So I think that this will also create some momentum when we have CTBT in force, enforced, and that will help other countries to make good, resolute actions just to condemn DPRK.

   KIMBALL: Ambassador Scheinman?

   SCHEINMAN: Yeah, just I'd add very quickly. I tell you, Dan, you're very optimistic anticipating a CTBT in force because, of course, that means North Korea has signed and ratified the treaty. And obviously, that's the hardest nut to crack among the list of Annex 2 states.

   In the absence of a CTBT in force, our job should be to create the highest-possible barriers to additional North Korean nuclear testing. If we can't do it today with a CTBT in force, then it seems incumbent upon us to find other ways to do it.

   And that's one of the reasons why we've looked at the idea of a U.N. Security Council resolution as increasing the political barriers to nuclear testing by North Korea.

   KIMBALL: All right. Other questions?

   Jolene, why don't we start over here again, and then we'll come over here.

   QUESTION: I have a question for Ambassador Scheinman. Is this resolution the last hurrah for the Prague agenda of this administration that, you know, started so optimistically and has, for many different reasons, fallen short of the aspirations? Or is there more to come, are there more options for the administration under that agenda in its last months?

   SCHEINMAN: Well, I'd say that there are a number of elements of the Prague agenda that are still very much in play, irrespective of our ability to compel states to do exactly what we'd like them to do.

   You know, the offer is still on the table for Russia to join us in pursuing nuclear reductions. Russia doesn't seem to want to take us up on the offer.

   We'd be very happy to be engaged in multilateral negotiations on a fissile material cutoff treaty, but Pakistan has not allowed that negotiation to go forward in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament for reasons I think everyone here knows.

   And we, of course, are pursuing this idea on a CTBT. But, you know, I wouldn't say that the initiative rose from a sort of last-ditch effort to, you know, maybe bookend the Prague agenda. The idea actually originated among some here in this room, that, you know, coming on 20 years since the treaty was open for signature. And, you know, with our interest in guarding against some level of fatigue where political and maybe financial support starts to lag, this was a good time to reaffirm international support for the CTBT and perhaps to reopen the dialogue in the United States on CTBT, even in ways that we didn't necessarily anticipate.

   So I think one of the benefits that I've seen through this process, notwithstanding the, you know, fairly tough criticism we've heard from some quarters in the Senate, is by making the issue more visible, we've brought ourselves into a debate on the merits of CTBT, and it's one we welcome.

   KIMBALL: All right, Edward?

   QUESTION: Yes, Edward Ifft, Georgetown University.

   Let me just go back for a moment to the Republican senators' letter and try to maybe clarify.

   I think the concern that was shown in that letter was that the U.S. was going to go to the Security Council and get a resolution under Chapter 7, which would declare that additional testing would be a threat to international peace and security. That would have led to a binding obligation on all U.N. members, and that could certainly have been viewed as an end run around the Senate's prerogatives regarding advice and consent.

   As Rose explained, the U.S. is not doing that, we're not going to invoke Chapter 7.

   The language on...

   KIMBALL: To your question, please.

   QUESTION: Sorry?

   KIMBALL: Your question is?

   QUESTION: I'm just clarifying.



   QUESTION: See if the panel agrees. The language on object and purpose comes from the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which says that once you've signed a treaty you may not do anything which would defeat the object and purpose.

   The U.S. position, as I understand it, is that an additional test would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. You could probably find a lawyer somewhere who would say that an additional test or two would not. See what...

   SCHEINMAN: Yes, if I could just pick up on that because I think -- I thank Ed for his clarification. It's correct, but it missed one element. Under the Vienna Convention, state signatories are obligated not to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty unless they no longer intend to become a party to that treaty.

   This administration clearly has made its support for CTBT very well known, and so we believe it's our interpretation that that obligation under the Vienna Convention exists. We're not creating it through a U.N. Security Council resolution. It's been with us for decades.

   A future administration, should it believe that a nuclear test was required, could make clear to the international community that it no longer intended to become party to the treaty; and therefore, the obligation under the Vienna Convention no longer applies.

   So, you know, it's sort of legal arcana, but the important element here is that the obligations of a signatory apply so long as you intend to become a party to that treaty.

   KIMBALL: Correct. Rachel?

   QUESTION: Well, thank you, Ed and Adam, you kind of answered some of my questions about customary international law under the Vienna Convention, recognizing the U.S. hasn't ratified the Vienna Convention, but still considers it customary international law.

   Is there a timeline for when this resolution will come before the Security Council? And how, recognizing that there are discussions ongoing, how are the talks with the P5 countries going, particularly Russia and China?

   SCHEINMAN: One clarification, the United States does not consider the entire Vienna Convention to represent customary international law, only Article 18 which deals with signatory obligations. And that's been a position of the United States going back, you know, before I got involved in this.

   The resolution is sort of in an advanced state of negotiation. We hope to have it completed and issued before the end of the month.

   The discussions with other P5 states has gone very well. They're all supportive of the concept and the construct that we have proposed, a P5 statement that would run in parallel to a resolution. And we're talking with our other colleagues on the council, including Japan and others, in an effort to tie it up in a bow in the next week-and-a-half or two.

   KIMBALL: Great. Ambassador Kitano, do you have anything else to add.

   KITANO: No, I don't think so.

   KIMBALL: OK. And could I ask you, Ambassador Kitano, we were discussing this earlier, you mentioned the severe concern about North Korea's fifth nuclear test. The Security Council is also looking at that issue at the same time that it is dealing with this U.N. Security Council resolution on the test ban ahead of the anniversary of opening for signature, which is the 24th of September.

   Do you expect that these processes will intermingle or will they be separate? I mean, what can we possibly expect? And I recognize that this is in process and you can't say for sure. But, I mean, what is your hope and expectation as a member of the council?

   KITANO: Thank you very much for your question. Last week on Friday, the Security Council got together and discussed about the DPRK fifth nuclear test. And the chair's statement has been issued, and it clearly states that the Security Council will lead a follow-on discussion because there has been a previous Security Council resolution, which was after the fifth and fourth nuclear test, and a subsequent missile launch was conducted.

   And it is Security Council Resolution 2270, and it really spells out if another test would be conducted, the Security Council will be in a position to examine the follow-up actions. So last week, Friday, the Security Council got together and confirmed this line of action.

   And certainly, Daryl, thank you very much for putting that on the table, there will be this discussion going on.

   And at the same time, and as has been mentioned by Rose and Adam, there has been a discussion about what to do in a CTBT resolution. And (inaudible) something (inaudible) content and how to strengthen CTBT and how to give political support to that. And that is on the one hand.

   The other is on how to give consequences to what DPRK did last Friday. And this is two topics. So what to do with that would be very much a matter of the Security Council.

   But what I would like to share with you is that this is this in two lines of discussions and how to do that would be the role of the Security Council.

   KIMBALL: All right, good.

   Ambassador Graham, and then we'll go back to (inaudible).

   QUESTION: I'd just like to ask...

   KIMBALL: Ambassador Tom Graham, who has had a few things to do with nonproliferation and the test ban treaty.        Go ahead.

   QUESTION: I would just like to ask Ambassador Scheinman a small question. Isn't it the case that part of the argument with the Senate was that the actions of President Bush amounted to the U.S. indicating it did not intend to ratify the CTBT; therefore, the U.S. was no longer bound under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, and this statement would correct that or make the U.S. government position clear.

   SCHEINMAN: No, the intent here was not to find a mechanism to reverse the policy pronouncement of the prior administration. You know, it is true that the last administration made clear to the Senate when questions came up on these issues that it no longer intended to become a party to the CTBT; and therefore, the obligations not to defeat the object and purpose no longer would apply. That's what the last administration had done.

   In our estimation, that policy was effectively reversed with the Prague speech in 2009 where the president said I will aggressively seek U.S. ratification of the CTBT. Now, it hasn't worked out and that's a different conversation.

   But clearly, this administration has intended to become a party to the CTBT. So that issue was dealt with at the beginning of the administration, and we have not sought to use this resolution to address or even respond to the actions of the previous administration. This has entirely been about, how do we strengthen support for CTBT, how do we reaffirm the moratoria, and how do we acknowledge the good work that has been done in Vienna?

   KIMBALL: All right. And I would just hasten to add my colleague Michael Krepon testified last week at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and also pointed out that the CTBT remains on the executive calendar of the Senate. There has not been a sufficient number of votes to discharge it and to send it back to the White House. So it's still there, it's still technically the business of the Senate. And several senators in 1999 who voted no expected to have another chance to look at the treaty at some point in the future.

   So that's an important point to keep in mind with respect to Senate prerogatives, which I think some senators were not actually aware of last week.

   I think we had another question in the back. Yes, sir?

   QUESTION: Ray Willeman, University of Maryland.

   The IDC in Vienna has made significant changes to take advantage of new science, but the overall architecture of their data processing is based on a system developed at a DARPA-funded facility during the 1990s. And some of the new science doesn't fit very well into that architecture. Radionuclide science and seismology and other areas.

   Do any of you see the possibility of a U.S. or international-led effort to develop a completely new architecture which has the possibility of vastly improving the detection thresholds for nuclear tests?

   KIMBALL: All right. Ambassador Kitano, do you want to address whether that's been something that's been discussed?

   And maybe, Adam, you can also address, in your estimation, how the IMS capabilities have advanced over the years, in addition to Ray's particular question.

   KITANO: Yes. Thank you very much for your question. I have here the text of the CTBT. And it is a thick document. And because I was one of those who was for Japanese ratification, I read and scrutinized all the document, including the annex, and trying to find out an appropriate Japanese translation and to identify a proper understanding and interpretation of all the things.

   And the reason why I mention this is, in the creation of CTBT and what should be done most appropriate mechanism of verification is one of the things which we debated a lot. And that is not the only issue which we debated, but that was a very important part of the discussion.

   And CTBT is one instrument, but a technical means for verification is very much important for that. So what we are looking at is to have this system as a whole to be operational and ratification of in the eight remaining states.

   And what I'm going to share is that the current technical secretariat, headed by my dear friend, Dr. Lassina Zerbo, and he would like to be open to that new science and technology. And one of the works which Lassina is putting a lot of an emphasis is on a science technology forum in order to catch and to be open as much as possible to that, grasp and capture that. So he and the secretary is doing great effort in doing that.

   And it would be nice if we can make use of various techniques, and it would be good.

   But the point which I would like to make is that this treaty is based on what is written here. And the important thing is that we have unfinished business. Thank you.

   KIMBALL: Adam, anything to add?

   SCHEINMAN: No, nothing further.

   KIMBALL: OK. I wanted to ask Ambassador Umarov and Ambassador Kitano a question about your view of the challenges ahead, beyond the U.N. Security Council resolution. Your governments are the co-chairs of the Article 14 process. This is a provision in the treaty that allows for a conference every two years of states' parties to encourage and facilitate progress towards entry into force. And you all are the co-chairs, as I understand, for another 12 months.

   Ambassador Kitano, you mentioned some of the other states on the Annex 2 list, the list of states that must sign and ratify to facilitate entry into force.

   So, Ambassador Umarov and Ambassador Kitano, what, in your view, are the things that particular states might be able to do to move closer to ratification and entry into force, especially among those key Annex 2 states?

   And I would just note, I think a very important trigger for this year's action catalyst has been Foreign Minister Idrissov of Kazakhstan who spoke out a year ago when Kazakhstan took the co-chair of the Article 14 process, and he said that as we look forward in this 20th anniversary year, business as usual will not do. And so this resolution represents a departure from business as usual.

   So tell me what types of steps do you think would be helpful in addition to perhaps action by the United States, of course. What can be done to move us closer to entry into force amongst the other countries?

   So, Ambassador Umarov, maybe if you could offer your thoughts, please.

   UMAROV: I think we have a challenging road ahead. We have to convince other countries, especially those who have not yet ratified, to (inaudible) here and just to support the system.

   I think that if we come to the kind of the very essence, the very essence of why it was not ratified in 1999, was that there was, first, the Senate was kind of doubting that without nuclear tests any organization or any checking of the efficiency of the nuclear weapons could be done, and the second is that there is not any verification system in place.

   I think after these 20 years, we can say that both of the issues are addressed. And now we have to think about the next step. And what is the next step? The next step is really to have a system and have a tool, an international tool which could prevent the Pandora's box to be open, because CTBT, at this point in time, is not ratified, not being in force, still plays an important role that other countries keep the moratoria on nuclear testing.

   If that is not the case, we have a lot of cases today that threshold countries would like to acquire the nuclear weapons, they would like to acquire these sensitive technologies, because there is an illusion, a false illusion that having a nuclear weapon or having a nuclear capability will address the issue of nuclear security of the country.

   So we think it's important today just to continue this work of explaining and telling people that our safety and our security, not in the modernization or enhancing the nuclear capabilities of the countries, but to eliminate the possibility to avoid temptation to use it in the future.

   That's why think that it shouldn't be a business as usual. We should really step up the activities. And with the DPRK's dangerous activities, we can see that this is not finished business. We have to really work on those matters. And our role here is to continue with the same activities, explaining, convincing.

   Of course, we think that if the United States will show a lead in CTBTO ratification process, other countries will follow suit. I think that the U.S. is a great country and that it showed the capability of leading the world. This is one of the cases where the United States could really show its leadership role. Thank you.

   KIMBALL: Thank you.

   Ambassador Kitano, your thoughts?

   KITANO: Yes, thank you very much. It is a great, great question. And we should seriously think about it.

   And let me answer in mentioning three key words. And the first key word I would like to mention is in raising political awareness, and that is very much important and discussed in the Security Council resolution. And it would be very much (inaudible) in doing that.

   And also, in thinking about what will happen from now in the coming weeks, we are approaching to the United Nations in a high-level week. And there will be, this year, there will be another (inaudible) of CTBT friends ministerial meeting, which is organized by a group of other countries, CTBT friends, and Japan is one of them. And that would be another occasion in which countries who very much have a strong interest for pushing forward on CTBT.

   The 40 ministers, they will all get together and try to send out a strong message, so raising political awareness. And this is something which continue to make. And as this is the 20th year anniversary after the opening for signature, we very much would like to make the best use of this anniversary year. And that is the first key word I would like to mention.

   Second key word I would like to mention is "push for the bottom." And we suppose the U.S. plays a crucial, important role. But there are seven other countries and remaining Annex 2 countries, we very much hope and positive steps on the part of the United States.

   But at the same time, we would like to push forward other countries, and as I mentioned, Israel, China, Pakistan and so on, and together with Kazakhstan we have been closely in touch, getting in touch with these countries, trying to identify what is the difficulties, what is the issues on the part of these countries, and think about how best we can address that.

   And we do that not -- and the two of us are not doing that alone, we liaise with technical secretariat and executive secretary Dr. Lassina Zerbo, and he is very much bringing about very powerful activities to liaise with that. And there are various countries and various bodies who are working in that.

   So we are thinking that in our role as co-coordinating and ask literally, and we try to gather such momentum, and pushing for the bottom is something which I would like to mention as a second key word.

   Third key word I would like to put forward is DPRK. And there has been and the possibility has advanced that they might make another test in the future, it would be a sixth test. And it is a situation which we are facing. And we have to think about how best we address these DPRK issues.

   We should think about what consequences we can bring about in terms of sanctions for the Security Council. And we can also think about, in each country's security standpoint, and making use of their security asset and what to do with that. And it is also an important thing and we should do it, but as nuclear testing is a serious threat and how to do that. And we should bring this discussion, not only for Northeast Asia, but it is an international question.

   And then we should in thinking about DPRK, we have all the reasons to activate CTBT. And that would be another channel which we can activate the discussion about CTBT.

   And what I would like to do is to make use of this kind of discussions and try to assemble and put together all the effort going toward entry into force. Thank you.

   KIMBALL: Thank you.

   I think we're closing in on our closing time. I just want to see if there was any final question that we need to have asked.

   Mr. Koplow, and then we will close.

   QUESTION: Thank you. In view of the quite robust criticism of the DPRK nuclear test that your countries and the Security Council have made, would you agree one step further that a nuclear weapons test by any country today would constitute a threat to international peace and security? And would it be useful for the Security Council to determine that fact in a resolution, even if, at the moment, the council would not be preparing to make a decision in a legally binding fashion what to do about that? Would the determination be a valuable contribution by itself?

   KIMBALL: Any thoughts?

   SCHEINMAN: Well, that's not part of this exercise, David. And our interest is primarily finding ways to strengthen support for the CTBT and not provoke an even harsher, negative reaction from some domestic elements in this country.

   So that kind of idea has never been part of our calculation as we thought about what to do about CTBT at the 20-year anniversary and how do we, you know, pursue greater engagement that makes CTBT more visible and hopefully opens up a debate that can get us to a point where the U.S. might be able to ratify the treaty.

   I think the idea that you laid out would raise real questions and perhaps legitimate what some have suggested we're pursuing through this Security Council idea, which is, in essence, to walk down a pathway short of CTBT that would make any nuclear test, in effect, legally prohibited.

   Even though I know that's not exactly what you're recommending, the perception will be that we are engaged in some sort of, you know, Trojan horse exercise to get to that point short of a CTBT. And that's not the conversation we think would be beneficial because we'd like to have an open and fair debate on the merits of the CTBT without the disturbance of these other issues.

   KIMBALL: But there may be other views in the world.


   Ambassador Kitano, Ambassador Umarov, is a nuclear test explosion a threat to international peace and security? Your thoughts, quickly.

   KITANO: Yeah, and just quickly, my understanding of the Security Council, is it important in a function of the Security Council for it to constitute a threat to international peace and security. And it is a very important judgment on its part. And my understanding is that they would like it in a detailed situation and what constitutes peace (inaudible) and peace and security of the international situation.

   So my sense is that the Security Council would take it a cautious analysis to it. Thank you.

   KIMBALL: OK. Any thoughts, Ambassador Umarov?

   UMAROV: I think, yes, we don't want to see that happen. So we need to make everything possible that it won't happen. But at the same time, it should be in the interests of each and every country which is a part of it.

   So let's work kind of gradually to achieve our goals, and maybe there will be a time when we can say this in a very determined fashion. But we don't want to jeopardize the whole process. It is important to have the CTBT in place. And we would like to take a very gradual approach.

   The other thing is that we would like, as co-chairs, to create conditions where we can talk more about it and to raise the global awareness. And with our coming U.N. Security Council non-permanent membership, this is one of our tasks, to work more actively to discuss these issues and come to understanding what is in the overall interests, the security interests, to have the world free of nuclear weapons and stop nuclear tests, making it a normal way of life, you know, in the global affairs.

   Today's technology does not need the nuclear testing as an important kind of start to modernize the weapons. But we need to have an assurance that none of the countries will go for this. So we think that it's important. We can bear it in mind, but we can work with all the countries to achieve the primary goal of CTBT to be entering into force without major hiccups and problems.

   KIMBALL: All right. Well, to close I just want to join my colleague Michael in thanking all of you for being here. I want to thank our panelists.

   And I want to just note that we are determined to create the conditions for an adult, serious conversation on the CTBT so that we can realize its true potential.

   So thanks a lot, Michael, for your teamwork and for helping to host this event.

   KREPON: Daryl, it's just been a real pleasure to partner with you and ACA.

   There is a strong phalanx of support for this treaty domestically and internationally. Our stockpile stewardship program, which is the best in the world, is not an end in itself. Driving down detection thresholds, which we are now doing through national technical means and through the international monitoring system based in Vienna, it's not an end in itself.

   We aim to achieve a permanent end to nuclear explosive testing. And we are going to succeed, but it's going to take a heck of a long time still, or too long a time.

   I think the next step after this very, very welcome U.N. Security Council resolution and the accompanying very meaningful P5 statement, for me, the next step is to have careful, deliberative hearings on this treaty, which we have not had for almost two decades, where expertise in constitutional law, in international law, in monitoring technologies, in national security can be given microphones. It's time for this to happen. Perhaps it will happen in the next Congress.

   It is puzzling to me that some would argue that having voted on this treaty once it's a closed issue. And the same people who make that argument have voted over 40 times on national health care, for example. So we're not ready for a vote. It's time to get informed again about this treaty and what's happened since the last time it was voted on.

   So this event is part of the process. This panel is part of the process. We thank you again for your commitment. We're going to thank Rose in absentia.

   Thank you for coming. Have a great day.



Posted: September 13, 2016


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