Login/Logout

*
*  

"Though we have acheived progress, our work is not over. That is why I support the mission of the Arms Control Association. It is, quite simply, the most effective and important organization working in the field today." 

– Larry Weiler
Former U.S.-Russian arms control negotiator
August 7, 2018
Kelsey Davenport

Nuclear Nonproliferation Map Project - Report Overview

Body: 

May 12th, 2016

Since the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force in 1970, states have formed voluntary initiatives to compliment the treaty’s goals and objectives. In particular, these coalitions play a critical role in reinforcing the NPT’s efforts to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism and prevent the rise of new nuclear-armed actors.

This mapping project is designed to illustrate and explore the role that several key multilateral initiatives play in bolstering the NPT by securing existing materials and blocking proliferation. The flexibility of these voluntary initiatives and regimes to respond to emerging nonproliferation and nuclear security risks allows groups of like-minded states to address key areas of concern.

The five initiatives examined in this project include the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and the G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (G7). Clicking on the icon for each initiative will show its geographic spread on the map and bring up background material and recommendations. Clicking on an individual country will show its membership across all five regimes.

These are not the only voluntary groups working to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and strengthen nuclear security. These five regimes, however, target crucial areas of concern and offer opportunities for collaboration, which will be critical given the rise of networks of non-state actors with expressed interest in weapons of mass destruction. With the end of the nuclear security summits in 2016, these initiatives will also play an important role in continuing to advance the work of the summits and strengthen the global nuclear security architecture. This is particularly true for the GICNT and the Global Partnership, both of which were charged with carrying out part of the nuclear security summits’ agenda.

In addition to displaying the geographic scope and providing a brief background of each initiative, this resource provides general recommendations that could improve the effectiveness of each in the years ahead. These recommendations are based on open source information about the work of each initiative. In some cases, iterations of these recommendations may be under discussion, or have already been dismissed. Where appropriate, this project also puts forward options for collaboration amongst these voluntary groups to amplify impacts and results. These recommendations are meant to spur creative thinking on the role of voluntary initiatives, as such they do not provide specific pathways for adopting or implementing the ideas put forward.

By consolidating references and recommendations, this website is intended to serve as a resource to better understand the role that voluntary initiatives play in bolstering nonproliferation and nuclear security efforts. It will be updated periodically to reflect the changing membership and priorities of each initiative, as well as additional recommendations for strengthening multilateral efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and acts of nuclear terrorism.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Map Project - Report Overview

Body: 
Executive Summary · Report Overview · Resources · Country List
GICNT
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
MTCR
Missile Technology Control Regime
PSI
Proliferation Security Initiative
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers Group
G7
Global Partnership

Since the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force in 1970, states have formed voluntary initiatives to compliment the treaty’s goals and objectives. In particular, these coalitions play a critical role in reinforcing the NPT’s efforts to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism and prevent the rise of new nuclear-armed actors.

This mapping project is designed to illustrate and explore the role that several key multilateral initiatives play in bolstering the NPT by securing existing materials and blocking proliferation. The flexibility of these voluntary initiatives and regimes to respond to emerging nonproliferation and nuclear security risks allows groups of like-minded states to address key areas of concern.

The five initiatives examined in this project include the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and the G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (G7). Clicking on the icon for each initiative will show its geographic spread on the map and bring up background material and recommendations. Clicking on an individual country will show its membership across all five regimes.

These are not the only voluntary groups working to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and strengthen nuclear security. These five regimes, however, target crucial areas of concern and offer opportunities for collaboration, which will be critical given the rise of networks of non-state actors with expressed interest in weapons of mass destruction. With the end of the nuclear security summits in 2016, these initiatives will also play an important role in continuing to advance the work of the summits and strengthen the global nuclear security architecture. This is particularly true for the GICNT and the Global Partnership, both of which were charged with carrying out part of the nuclear security summits’ agenda.

In addition to displaying the geographic scope and providing a brief background of each initiative, this resource provides general recommendations that could improve the effectiveness of each in the years ahead. These recommendations are based on open source information about the work of each initiative. In some cases, iterations of these recommendations may be under discussion, or have already been dismissed. Where appropriate, this project also puts forward options for collaboration amongst these voluntary groups to amplify impacts and results. These recommendations are meant to spur creative thinking on the role of voluntary initiatives, as such they do not provide specific pathways for adopting or implementing the ideas put forward.

By consolidating references and recommendations, this website is intended to serve as a resource to better understand the role that voluntary initiatives play in bolstering nonproliferation and nuclear security efforts. It will be updated periodically to reflect the changing membership and priorities of each initiative, as well as additional recommendations for strengthening multilateral efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and acts of nuclear terrorism.

Executive Summary - Nuclear Nonproliferation Map Project

Body: 
Executive Summary · Report Overview · Resources · Country List
GICNT
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
MTCR
Missile Technology Control Regime
PSI
Proliferation Security Initiative
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers Group
G7
Global Partnership

Since the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force in 1970, states have formed voluntary initiatives to compliment the treaty’s goals and objectives. By allowing self-selecting states to move beyond the status quo to strengthen norms and target areas of concern, these initiatives play a critical role in addressing gaps in the existing nonproliferation and nuclear security architecture.

Five of the key regimes that support the NPT include the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and the G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (G7). This resource tracks the geographic scope of each initiative, provides a state-by-state listing of participation across all five groups, and makes recommendations for growth and collaboration among initiatives.

Strengthening these voluntary initiatives that target gaps in the nonproliferation and nuclear security architecture is critical given the expressed interest of terrorist groups like the Islamic State in developing or obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the spread of non-state actor networks across the globe, and the expanding interest by states in civil nuclear programs. The flexibility of these initiatives allow states to respond more quickly to emerging threats or evolving proliferation patterns and develop practices that extend beyond international obligations defined by treaty law. They also provide a forum for groups of states to tailor specific activities to address regionally-specific proliferation and security concerns.

Additionally, several of these initiatives include participation from states, namely India, Israel, and Pakistan, that remain outside of the NPT. As such, these voluntary groups can contribute to influencing the nonproliferation and nuclear security actions of states not bound by international treaty commitments.

While the voluntary nature of these regimes is a strength, the non-binding, flexible nature of these initiatives also has drawbacks. Poor transparency, ineffective coordination, weak enforcement mechanisms, and uneven membership distribution are just a few of the challenges that these initiatives face. Additionally, once an initiative establishes a pattern of activity and decision making, it can be difficult to change course to adopt new priorities or recognize that it has outlived its usefulness and close out its work.

This resources makes initiative-specific recommendations on the world map pages, but across the board, there are lessons that can be derived from analyzing the impact of these five initiatives. In general, initiatives should consider the alignment of their priorities to current threats, the geographic representation of their members, and options for strengthening coordination and compliance.

Scope

While the flexible nature of voluntary initiatives allows for adaptability as new nonproliferation or security threats emerge, there are still gaps in the global architecture. Emerging technologies and cyber threats pose new risks to the existing regime. Strengthening controls and safeguards as technologies change will be critical, and an area where voluntary initiatives could play an important role in developing best practices and norms. Radioactive source security is another possible area of work. These materials are found in almost every country around the world and security varies widely. Given the spread of non-state actors and their willingness to use chemical weapons, a move to explosives that spread radioactive material is an increasingly likely possibility. Expanded attention to source security and preventing the theft of such materials in a dirty bomb attack could be given greater priority by voluntary initiatives.

Geographic Spread

Across theses five initiatives there is clear underrepresentation of certain geographic areas, such as Central America, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific. Given the spread of non-state actor networks and the expanding problem of secondary proliferation, expanding the geographic scope of initiatives like the GICNT, PSI, and Global Partnership could prevent the emergence of, or block existing, proliferation networks. Additionally, expanded interest in civil nuclear power programs across regions like the Middle East and South Asia will necessitate enhanced nuclear security and counter proliferation efforts to prevent misuse or diversion from civil programs. Greater geographic representation can also facilitate regional approaches to emerging threats and illicit trafficking trends than might be unique to particular areas.

This is not to argue that universality should be a goal for every voluntary initiative. Membership without buy-in and capacity to support the group’s work will prevent any initiative from realizing its full potential and could undercut efforts of other member states. Additionally, given the decision making structure of some initiatives, universality or expanded membership could prove unwieldy. For regimes that rely on consensus based decision making, increasing membership can inhibit the adaptability and responsiveness of a regime. Rather these initiatives should consider enlisting key states for membership as part of a strategic plan and consider the impact of expanded participation on decision making and adaptability.

Coordination

Currently, there is little evidence of active efforts by voluntary initiatives to coordinate activities and amplify results. There are a number of areas were complimentary exercises or workshops could prove beneficial by providing a more holistic approach to address weaknesses in nonproliferation and nuclear security architecture. For instance, if exercises expose gaps in nuclear detection architecture or interdiction capabilities, initiatives like the Global Partnership that provide funding could provide funding to plug those gaps. Additionally, sharing information between states and relevant international organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency about sensitive exports could indicate a pattern of proliferation behavior that could better inform efforts to disrupt supply chains, strengthen detection networks, or deny additional exports.

Compliance

Given the voluntary nature of these regimes, there is no clear enforcement mechanism for violating the guidelines or norms established by the regime. Nor are there mechanisms to compel states to act in accordance with suggested activities. Given the voluntary nature of these regimes, punitive measures for failing to comply with initiative obligations are extremely unlikely. However, building in benefits for cooperation or provide a greater record of transparency regarding participation and implementation might entice states to take more meaningful action in support of an initiative’s goals.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Map Country List

Body: 

Below is a full list of countries and the respective regimes of which they are a member. Use these links to jump to countries starting with these letters.
A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V |Y | Z

Executive Summary · Report Overview · Resources · Country List
GICNT
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
MTCR
Missile Technology Control Regime
PSI
Proliferation Security Initiative
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers Group
G7
Global Partnership

AFGHANISTAN

ALBANIA

ALGERIA

ANDORRA

ANGOLA

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

ARGENTINA

ARMENIA

AUSTRALIA

AUSTRIA

AZERBAIJAN

BAHAMAS

BAHRAIN

BANGLADESH

(none)

BARBADOS

(none)

BELARUS

BELGIUM

BELIZE

BENIN

(none)

BHUTAN

(none)

BOLIVIA

(none)

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

BOTSWANA

(none)

BRAZIL

BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

BULGARIA

BURKINA FASO

(none)

BURUNDI

CABO VERDE

CAMBODIA

CAMEROON

(none)

CANADA

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

(none)

CHAD

(none)

CHILE

CHINA

COLOMBIA

COMOROS

(none)

CONGO

(none)

COSTA RICA

(none)

CÔTE D’IVOIRE

CROATIA

CUBA

(none)

CYPRUS

CZECH REPUBLIC

DPRK (NORTH KOREA)

(none)

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

(none)

DENMARK

DJIBOUTI

DOMINICA

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

ECUADOR

(none)

EGYPT

(none)

EL SALVADOR

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

(none)

ERITREA

(none)

ESTONIA

ETHIOPIA

FIJI

FINLAND

FRANCE

GABON

(none)

GAMBIA

(none)

GEORGIA

GERMANY

GHANA

(none)

GREECE

GRENADA

(none)

GUATEMALA

(none)

GUINEA

(none)

GUINEA-BISSAU

(none)

GUYANA

HAITI

(none)

HONDURAS

HUNGARY

ICELAND

INDIA

INDONESIA

(none)

IRAN

(none)

IRAQ

IRELAND

ISRAEL

ITALY

JAMAICA

(none)

JAPAN

JORDAN

KAZAKHSTAN

KENYA

(none)

KIRIBATI

(none)

KUWAIT

KYRGYZSTAN

LAOS

(none)

LATVIA

LEBANON

(none)

LESOTHO

(none)

LIBERIA

LIBYA

LIECHTENSTEIN

LITHUANIA

LUXEMBOURG

MACEDONIA

MADAGASCAR

MALAWI

(none)

MALAYSIA

MALDIVES

(none)

MALI

(none)

MALTA

MARSHALL ISLANDS

MAURITANIA

(none)

MAURITIUS

MEXICO

MICRONESIA (FEDERATED STATES OF)

(none)

MONACO

(none)

MONGOLIA

MONTENEGRO

MOROCCO

MOZAMBIQUE

(none)

MYANMAR

NAMIBIA

(none)

NAURU

(none)

NEPAL

NETHERLANDS

NEW ZEALAND

NICARAGUA

(none)

NIGER

(none)

NIGERIA

(none)

NORWAY

OMAN

PAKISTAN

PALAU

PANAMA

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

PARAGUAY

PERU

(none)

PHILIPPINES

POLAND

PORTUGAL

QATAR

REPUBLIC OF KOREA (SOUTH KOREA)

REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

ROMANIA

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

RWANDA

SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS

(none)

SAINT LUCIA

SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

SAMOA

SAN MARINO

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

(none)

SAUDI ARABIA

SENEGAL

(none)

SERBIA

SEYCHELLES

SIERRA LEONE

(none)

SINGAPORE

SLOVAKIA

SLOVENIA

SOLOMON ISLANDS

(none)

SOMALIA

(none)

SOUTH AFRICA

SOUTH SUDAN

(none)

SPAIN

SRI LANKA

SUDAN

(none)

SURINAME

(none)

SWAZILAND

(none)

SWEDEN

SWITZERLAND

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

TAJIKISTAN

THAILAND

TIMOR-LESTE

(none)

TOGO

(none)

TONGA

(none)

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

TUNISIA

TURKEY

TURKMENISTAN

TUVALU

UGANDA

(none)

UKRAINE

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

UNITED KINGDOM

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

(none)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

URUGUAY

(none)

UZBEKISTAN

VANUATU

VENEZUELA

(none)

VIETNAM

YEMEN

ZAMBIA

ZIMBABWE

 

    The Missile Technology Control Regime

    Body: 
    Executive Summary · Report Overview · Resources · Country List
    GICNT
    Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
    MTCR
    Missile Technology Control Regime
    PSI
    Proliferation Security Initiative
    NSG
    Nuclear Suppliers Group
    G7
    Global Partnership

    The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a voluntary export control regime that was established in 1987 after emerging concerns about the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads. The United States spearheaded the effort after imposing domestic controls over some materials and technologies relevant to missile development in 1982. The initial membership included the G-7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States), but has since grown to 35 member states.

    In 1993 the regime was expanded to include missile systems capable of delivering chemical and biological weapons. The regime generally defines WMD-capable missiles as capable for carrying a 500-kilogram payload over 300 kilometers.

    The MTCR member states commit to establishing national export control policies for certain materials and technologies relevant to the development of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, drones, remotely piloted vehicles, and sounding rockets. The materials and technologies are listed in the MTCR annexes and items can be added to or subtracted from the lists based on consensus decisions. The annex is divided into two groups, Category I and Category II. Category I includes complete missiles and rockets, major sub-systems, and production facilities. Specialized materials, technologies, propellants, and sub-components for missiles and rockets comprise Category II.

    Potential exports of Category I and II items are to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Under the regime guidelines, “there will be a strong presumption to deny” Category I transfers. MTCR restrictions for Category II exports are less severe, largely because many items in the category have dual uses, and the MTCR is not intended to hamper efforts like space exploration programs that share similar technologies to ballistic missiles.

    The MTCR identifies five factors that members should take into account when evaluating a possible export of controlled items: whether the intended recipient is pursuing or has ambitions for acquiring weapons of mass destruction; the purposes and capabilities of the intended recipient’s missile and space programs; the potential contribution the proposed transfer could make to the intended recipient’s development of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction; the credibility of the intended recipient’s stated purpose for the purchase; and whether the potential transfer conflicts with any multilateral treaty. Catch-all provisions were added in 2003.v Member states are expected to provide notifications to other MTCR members when an export is denied. There is also a no undercut provision is designed to prevent member states from fulfilling an export if that request has been denied by another member state.

    States can apply to join the MTCR, and membership is granted on the basis of consensus. Membership expanded dramatically through 1998. Since at time, only three states have been admitted for membership. Several additional states, including China, have committed to adhere to MTCR guidelines, although they are not full members.

    The MTCR is credited with hindering the ballistic missile programs in a number of states, including Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, South Africa, South Korea, and Syria.

    RECOMMENDATIONS

    • Update Technological Parameters: The MTCR has proven successful at stemming the spread of ballistic missiles in several states, but less successful against the development of cruise missiles and unarmed-aerial vehicles. Continuing to adapt the Annex I and Annex II lists on a regular basis to take into account technologies relevant to these systems, despite the crossover with manned delivery systems, and new technologies could help control the continued spread of such systems.
    • Consider Dropping Consensus Requirements for Procedural Votes: The consensus requirement for decision making, even on procedural votes, can allow one state to hold up decisions such as expanding membership in the MTCR or updating control lists for political reasons. A majority, or vote by two thirds of the members, could be adopted to make decisions in certain areas.
    • Expanded Membership: Key states remain outside of the MTCR regime for a variety of reasons. Possible countries to target could include Pakistan and China (a voluntary adherent to MTCR guidelines since 2004), given that both possess active ballistic missile and cruise missile development programs. A criteria-based approach for membership could make for a more equitable membership process and prevent blocking applications for unrelated political reasons. While increasing membership could make consensus more difficult to achieve, a simultaneous move away from consensus-based decision making on some areas, could neutralize that potential negative implication. Additionally, expanded membership can help universalize the norm against transfers of ballistic missile technologies.
    • Encourage Timely Reporting on Export Denials: According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, 65 percent of MTCR members were not fulfilling their obligations for timely reporting export control denials. While this GAO study was conducted in 2002, slow or nonexistent reporting continues. Failure to provide timely information to MTCR partners could hinder attempts to identify patterns of attempts to circumvent export controls. Notifications could be expanded to approvals as well. Sharing information about approvals would allow states to better identify patterns of proliferation concern.
    • Coordination with NSG and PSI: Coordination and information sharing on approvals and denials between the MTCR and NSG could provide more information about illicit trafficking networks and coordinated efforts to circumvent export controls. If illicit trafficking networks and patterns can be sketched out, utilizing information sharing through PSI to provide trainings for targeting and identifying particular types of transactions or geographic areas of trafficking concern could provide a more efficient allocation of resources.
    • Review of National Policies and Authorities: Given the voluntary nature of the MTCR guidelines, states implement obligations to varying degrees. Encouraging all participating states to review of national controls and notification policies could help target areas of poor implementation or noncompliance, or indicate where member states need to update their export control lists.

    The Missile Technology Control Regime

    Body: 

    The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a voluntary export control regime that was established in 1987 after emerging concerns about the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads. The United States spearheaded the effort after imposing domestic controls over some materials and technologies relevant to missile development in 1982. The initial membership included the G-7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States), but has since grown to 35 member states.

    In 1993 the regime was expanded to include missile systems capable of delivering chemical and biological weapons. The regime generally defines WMD-capable missiles as capable for carrying a 500-kilogram payload over 300 kilometers.

    The MTCR member states commit to establishing national export control policies for certain materials and technologies relevant to the development of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, drones, remotely piloted vehicles, and sounding rockets. The materials and technologies are listed in the MTCR annexes and items can be added to or subtracted from the lists based on consensus decisions. The annex is divided into two groups, Category I and Category II. Category I includes complete missiles and rockets, major sub-systems, and production facilities. Specialized materials, technologies, propellants, and sub-components for missiles and rockets comprise Category II.

    Potential exports of Category I and II items are to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Under the regime guidelines, “there will be a strong presumption to deny” Category I transfers. MTCR restrictions for Category II exports are less severe, largely because many items in the category have dual uses, and the MTCR is not intended to hamper efforts like space exploration programs that share similar technologies to ballistic missiles.

    The MTCR identifies five factors that members should take into account when evaluating a possible export of controlled items: whether the intended recipient is pursuing or has ambitions for acquiring weapons of mass destruction; the purposes and capabilities of the intended recipient’s missile and space programs; the potential contribution the proposed transfer could make to the intended recipient’s development of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction; the credibility of the intended recipient’s stated purpose for the purchase; and whether the potential transfer conflicts with any multilateral treaty. Catch-all provisions were added in 2003.v Member states are expected to provide notifications to other MTCR members when an export is denied. There is also a no undercut provision is designed to prevent member states from fulfilling an export if that request has been denied by another member state.

    States can apply to join the MTCR, and membership is granted on the basis of consensus. Membership expanded dramatically through 1998. Since at time, only three states have been admitted for membership. Several additional states, including China, have committed to adhere to MTCR guidelines, although they are not full members.

    The MTCR is credited with hindering the ballistic missile programs in a number of states, including Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, South Africa, South Korea, and Syria.

    RECOMMENDATIONS

    • Update Technological Parameters: The MTCR has proven successful at stemming the spread of ballistic missiles in several states, but less successful against the development of cruise missiles and unarmed-aerial vehicles. Continuing to adapt the Annex I and Annex II lists on a regular basis to take into account technologies relevant to these systems, despite the crossover with manned delivery systems, and new technologies could help control the continued spread of such systems.
    • Consider Dropping Consensus Requirements for Procedural Votes: The consensus requirement for decision making, even on procedural votes, can allow one state to hold up decisions such as expanding membership in the MTCR or updating control lists for political reasons. A majority, or vote by two thirds of the members, could be adopted to make decisions in certain areas.
    • Expanded Membership: Key states remain outside of the MTCR regime for a variety of reasons. Possible countries to target could include Pakistan and China (a voluntary adherent to MTCR guidelines since 2004), given that both possess active ballistic missile and cruise missile development programs. A criteria-based approach for membership could make for a more equitable membership process and prevent blocking applications for unrelated political reasons. While increasing membership could make consensus more difficult to achieve, a simultaneous move away from consensus-based decision making on some areas, could neutralize that potential negative implication. Additionally, expanded membership can help universalize the norm against transfers of ballistic missile technologies.
    • Encourage Timely Reporting on Export Denials: According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, 65 percent of MTCR members were not fulfilling their obligations for timely reporting export control denials. While this GAO study was conducted in 2002, slow or nonexistent reporting continues. Failure to provide timely information to MTCR partners could hinder attempts to identify patterns of attempts to circumvent export controls. Notifications could be expanded to approvals as well. Sharing information about approvals would allow states to better identify patterns of proliferation concern.
    • Coordination with NSG and PSI: Coordination and information sharing on approvals and denials between the MTCR and NSG could provide more information about illicit trafficking networks and coordinated efforts to circumvent export controls. If illicit trafficking networks and patterns can be sketched out, utilizing information sharing through PSI to provide trainings for targeting and identifying particular types of transactions or geographic areas of trafficking concern could provide a more efficient allocation of resources.
    • Review of National Policies and Authorities: Given the voluntary nature of the MTCR guidelines, states implement obligations to varying degrees. Encouraging all participating states to review of national controls and notification policies could help target areas of poor implementation or noncompliance, or indicate where member states need to update their export control lists.

    The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

    Body: 
    Executive Summary · Report Overview · Resources · Country List
    GICNT
    Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
    MTCR
    Missile Technology Control Regime
    PSI
    Proliferation Security Initiative
    NSG
    Nuclear Suppliers Group
    G7
    Global Partnership


    The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) is a joint U.S.-Russian initiative launched in 2006 to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism. U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin committed to forming the initiative based on their shared concern that nuclear terrorism is one of the most dangerous security challenges facing the international community.

    The initial 13 countries that attended the first meeting to form the GICNT agreed on a Statement of Principles comprised of eight different points aimed at developing capacities to combat nuclear terrorism on a “determined and systematic basis, consistent with national legal authorities and obligations.” The eight principles include improving the accounting and control of nuclear materials, securing civilian nuclear facilities, detecting illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, strengthening legal frameworks for prosecution of acts of nuclear terrorism, and improving the capabilities of participants to mitigate, respond to, and investigate acts of nuclear terrorism. The GICNT accomplishes these through activities aimed at strengthening the “plans, policies, procedures, and interoperability of partner nations.”

    Members of the GICNT. **Several GICNT member states do not appear on this map. These countries are: Cabo Verde, Malta, Mauritius, Palau, Seychelles, and Singapore.

     

    The U.S. and Russia have remained co-chairs of the initiative since 2006. In 2010, an Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG) was formed to coordinate activities and establish working groups to focus efforts on particular areas of concern to member states. The Netherlands currently serves as the chair of the IAG.

    In 2010-2011, GICNT members formed three working groups to focus efforts on a set of priority areas. The decision to move toward a working group model was intended to solidify the GICNT’s status as a durable initiative. The working groups hold meetings, exercises, and workshops that are generally open to all member states (and on occasion non-members). The working groups have also produced documents outlining a range of best practices, guidelines, and suggested exercises for participating states to adopt and use.

    The three current working groups are:

    • Nuclear Forensics: Chaired by Australia, this working group is developing best practices in nuclear forensics, assisting states in developing core capabilities, and fostering connections between relevant actors in different governments.
    • Response and Mitigation: Chaired by Morocco, this working group is examining and sharing best practices and techniques for responding to a radiological or nuclear terrorist incident.
    • Nuclear Detection: Chaired by Finland, this working group is building national detection capabilities and providing guidance on detection.

    Additional working groups can be created by the GICNT member states.

    In total, the GICNT members have held over 80 workshops or exercises in 30 countries. Any participating state can host an activity or workshop by coordinating with the IAG. Since it was created in 2006, there has been a plenary meeting every 1-2 years. The most recent plenary was hosted by the Netherlands in June 2016. The chairman’s summary from the meeting identified radioactive source security as a priority area for future focus and highlighted the importance of regionally-based exercises and workshops.

    Since 2006, GICNT membership has grown to 86 states. Any state that endorses the statement of principles can join the initiative. Five international organizations are official observers of the initiative; the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, INTERPOL, and the European Union.

    The GICNT was also designated as one of the five successors to the Nuclear Security Summit agenda. At the final summit in April 2016, participating leaders endorsed action plans for each of the five initiatives to carry on the work of the summit process. The GICNT’s action plan included a range of activities to build capacity, host additional exercises, and promote cooperation with observer organizations.

    RECOMMENDATIONS

    • Create new working groups focused on preventative actions: The existing GICNT working groups are focused on response and detection of a nuclear terrorist or trafficking incident. While these areas certainly are critical in the overarching nuclear security and nonproliferation architecture, the GICNT could put additional focus on creating working groups designed to take preventative action. This could include a focus on radiological source security and disposal, cyber threats, or insider threat mitigation. All of these areas fit within the GICNT’s priorities and additional preventative foci could broaden the appeal of the initiative, given that a dirty bomb attack, for instance, has greater relevance for a wider number of states.
       
    • Target regional and/or bilateral areas of focus through exercises and activities: At the 2016 plenary meeting, GICNT members recognized the need for more regional action. Given that PSI also targets regions to develop specific counter-proliferation strategies, GICNT could consider aligning capacity building and workshops that support or align with priorities identified by PSI activities. Focusing on detection architecture, for instance, could compliment export control trainings or interdiction exercises.
       
    • Utilize the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Training and Support Center (NSSC) database for regional trainings: The IAEA’s NSSC network is working on a database of NSSC specialties and capabilities. The GICNT could utilize the network when planning activities to more efficiently use resources or direct trainings and workshops to fill gaps that might be identified by the NSSC’s network.

    Subject Resources:

    Talks in Brussels to Precede Vienna Negotiations

    European Union Deputy Secretary-General Enrique Mora traveled to Tehran Oct. 14 to discuss the resumption of negotiations to restore the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, but it appears that Iran is still not ready to resume indirect talks with the United States. Mora coordinated the first six rounds of discussions in Vienna aimed to revive the accord, which is also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Negotiations have remained stalled since the sixth round concluded in June 2021. Mora met with Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani to review Iran’s plans to resume...

    Pages

    Subscribe to RSS - Kelsey Davenport