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"In my home there are few publications that we actually get hard copies of, but [Arms Control Today] is one and it's the only one my husband and I fight over who gets to read it first."

– Suzanne DiMaggio
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
April 15, 2019
Kelsey Davenport

In Twist to Press Arms Ban, US Asserts Role in Iran Deal

News Source (Do Not Use): 
Agence France-Presse
News Date: 
April 28, 2020 -04:00

Iran Delays Announcing Nuclear Achievements | The P4+1 and Iran Nuclear Deal Alert

Iran Delays Announcing Nuclear Achievements The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) announced March 27 that it developed a new advanced centrifuge and would unveil the machine in April, but it appears that event may have been postponed due to the COVID-19 outbreak. The AEOI may have intended to display the new centrifuge during a ceremony marking the country’s National Nuclear Technology Day, an annual event during which officials recap the country’s nuclear accomplishments of the past year. National Nuclear Technology Day was scheduled for April 8, but Behrouz Kamalvandi, a spokesman...

Another War With North Korea Would Make Coronavirus Look Like A Picnic

News Source (Do Not Use): 
National Interest, The
News Date: 
April 4, 2020 -04:00

IAEA Urges Iran to Cooperate


April 2020
By Kelsey Davenport

Tehran is refusing to cooperate with an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) investigation into possible undeclared nuclear materials and activities in Iran, saying that the agency’s evidence is biased.

Amb. Jackie Wolcott, U.S. representative to the IAEA, attends an agency meeting in July 2019. She raised "very serious concerns" about Iran's compliance with its IAEA nuclear safeguards agreement. (Photo: Dean Calma/IAEA)IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi laid out the agency’s attempts since January 2019 to get information from Tehran about the possible storage and use of nuclear materials at three locations in Iran in a March 3 report to the agency’s Board of Governors.

In December, Grossi said that Iran was not responding satisfactorily to IAEA questions and revealed in February that he may ask for support from the agency’s 35-member Board of Governors if Tehran continued to refuse to cooperate with IAEA requests.

Iran has “not engaged in substantive discussions” to clarify agency questions about possible use and storage of nuclear materials and has “not provide access to these locations,” Grossi said on March 9. He called on Tehran to “cooperate immediately and fully” with IAEA efforts.

As a state-party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is required to implement a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. A safeguards agreement includes a declaration detailing the country’s nuclear activities and the locations of nuclear materials. The IAEA is responsible for verifying that a country’s nuclear materials are accounted for and being used for peaceful purposes.

As part of its implementation of the 2015 nuclear deal, Iran also agreed to provisionally implement an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement. The additional protocol gives the IAEA access to additional information about a country’s nuclear program, provides expanded access for inspectors, and allows for greater use of environmental sampling to test for the presence of nuclear materials.

The March 3 report says that the IAEA requested access to two of the sites in January 2020 to take environmental samples, but Iran has not allowed inspectors to visit those locations. The agency also observed activities that appeared consistent with sanitization efforts at one of the sites, the report said.

Iran dismissed the allegations of concealment as based on false reports from countries hostile to Iran. “Any absurd claim made by any regime or individual should not be the basis of the agency’s questions,” Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Seyyed Abbas Mousavi said on March 11.

He may be referring to information that Israel stole from Iran in 2018 and later shared with the IAEA. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that the documents provide details about Iran’s past nuclear weapons work and has urged the IAEA to follow up on the information.

The March 3 report did not reference material provided by any state, but noted that all safeguards-relevant information provided to the IAEA is subject to “an extensive and rigorous corroboration process.”

Based on the IAEA report and Iran’s communications with the agency, it appears that the locations in question may be storing materials from Iran’s past nuclear weapons program and are not being used for ongoing or recent illicit nuclear activities.

In a Jan. 28 letter to the IAEA, Iran said it “does not consider itself obliged to respond to such allegations” because Tehran met its obligations under the 2015 nuclear deal to cooperate with the IAEA investigation into past nuclear activities.

The 2015 agreement, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, required Iran to comply with the IAEA investigation into what was then known as the “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program prior to receiving any sanctions relief.

The IAEA published a report in December 2015 concluding that Iran had a nuclear weapons program prior to 2003 and that some of the activities continued through 2009, but that there was no evidence of weaponization activities after 2009 or any credible indication that nuclear materials had been diverted for those programs.

Although the report closed the IAEA investigation into Iran’s past nuclear weapons activities, the agency is still required to investigate any evidence of undeclared nuclear activities.

Jackie Wolcott, U.S. representative to the IAEA, told the IAEA Board of Governors on March 11 that the IAEA report raises “very serious concerns regarding Iran’s compliance with its safeguards obligations” and noted that Iran “could be” violating its safeguards agreement.

She said that “any further delay, denial, or deception by Iran that inhibits” IAEA work “would require that the board appropriately escalate this issue.”

 

Tehran has stonewalled efforts to investigate allegations that it may be storing undeclared nuclear materials or information.

India Intercepts Suspected Missile Gear


April 2020
By Kelsey Davenport

India seized Chinese-manufactured equipment bound for Pakistan in February that officials claimed could be used for Islamabad’s ballistic missile program.

A solid-fuel Shaheen 2 missile is displayed in a Pakistani military parade in March 2018. On Feb. 3, Indian authorities confiscated equipment they said was bound for Pakistan's missile program (Photo: Aamir Qureshi/AFP/Getty Images)India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) said that an industrial autoclave was found on a ship that left Jiangyin Port, China and was headed to Karachi, Pakistan. The ship was detained in India’s Kandla Port on Feb. 3 when the autoclave was confiscated on the basis of an intelligence tip-off, according to Indian officials quoted in the press. The ship was then allowed to continue to Pakistan.

The DRDO said the autoclave seized from the ship was listed as an industrial dryer. Autoclaves are a dual-use technology that can be used in the production of rocket motors for ballistic missiles. India passed a law in 2005 that prohibits the trans-shipment of materials and technologies relevant to developing weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian disputed the Indian description of the seized machine and said on March 5 that it was a heat-treating furnace, not an autoclave. Zhao said that the furnace “is by no means a piece of military equipment or a dual-use item,” and therefore not subject to nonproliferation export controls.

He said that the machine was produced by a private company in China and was declared correctly.

“As a responsible major country, China has been strictly fulfilling the international nonproliferation obligations and international commitments,” he said.

The U.S. intelligence community has documented Chinese support for Pakistan’s ballistic missile program in the past. China has also provided essential technology to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.

Indian authorities confiscated equipment they said was intended for Pakistan’s missile program.

IAEA Raises Safeguards Questions | P4+1 and Iran Nuclear Deal Alert

IAEA Raises Safeguards Questions International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Rafael Grossi raised concerns in March about Tehran’s failure to cooperate with an agency investigation into possible storage and use of undeclared nuclear materials at three locations in Iran. In a March 3 report to the agency’s Board of Governors, Grossi outlined the agency’s efforts since January 2019 to request information from Iran about activities at the sites and documented Tehran’s refusal to cooperate with the agency’s investigation. Iran also refused the IAEA’s request in January 2020 to...

The IAEA’s March Reports on Iran’s Nuclear Activities Raise Questions

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) distributed two reports on Iran’s nuclear program March 3 that raise new questions about the country’s nuclear activities and its international legal obligations. The IAEA’s most recent regular quarterly report on Iran’s implementation of the 2015 nuclear deal (issued March 3 and made public March 11) notes a concerning increase in Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium and its number of operating centrifuge machines. However, Tehran’s continued compliance with the monitoring measures put in place by the agreement, known as the Joint...

Total War: This Is What Happens If North Korea Fired A Nuclear Weapon In Anger

News Source (Do Not Use): 
National Interest, The
News Date: 
March 10, 2020 -04:00

Risks and Realities of Extending the UN Arms Embargo on Iran

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Volume 12, Issue 2, March 5, 2020

More than a decade ago, the United States and its partners secured UN Security Council support for a series of resolutions imposing increasingly tough sanctions on Iran as part of an effort to pressure Tehran into multilateral talks to curb its nuclear program and block its pathways to nuclear weapons.

The United States along with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the European Union (P5+1), combined international pressure with multilateral negotiations, a strategy that produced the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA successfully rolled back Iran’s nuclear program, imposed a stringent new set of monitoring and verification requirements, some of which are permanent, and established an array of restrictions that limited Iran’s uranium enrichment for more than a decade, and effectively closed off its capability to produce plutonium. The deal also includes a permanent prohibition on certain nuclear weapons-related activities that also have non-nuclear applications. In exchange, Iran received relief from the United States, the United Nations, and European Union sanctions that were imposed as part of the pressure campaign.

Despite Iran’s adherence to the JCPOA, President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the agreement in May 2018 and violated U.S. JCPOA commitments by reimposing sanctions on Iran. The Trump administration also urged other countries to refrain from conducting legitimate business with Iran.

A year after Trump’s announcement, Iran stated that it would begin reducing compliance with the JCPOA, and it has taken a series of five steps designed to press the remaining parties to the deal to deliver on sanctions relief envisioned by the accord. Iranian officials continue to reiterate that its violations are reversible and that Tehran will return to compliance if its demands on sanctions relief are met.

The Arms Embargo, Nuclear Sanctions, and the JCPOA

As part of the initial, broader effort to pressure Iran into negotiating over its nuclear program, the UN Security Council passed several resolutions that imposed an arms embargo on Iran. (A full list of UN Security Council resolutions on Iran is available online.) The arms embargo provisions are, therefore, a nuclear-related sanction. U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice originally emphasized in 2010, when the arms embargo was expanded as part of Resolution 1929, that the sanctions would be suspended if a nuclear deal was reached.

In a statement issued on behalf of the P5+1, the United Kingdom’s ambassador to the UN, Sir Mark Lyall Grant, made a similar point about the intent of the sanctions in Resolution 1929. He said the aim of the sanctions was “to achieve a comprehensive and long-term settlement which would restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.”

During negotiations on the JCPOA, Iran argued that the arms embargo should be lifted immediately upon implementation of the nuclear deal and Russia and China supported that effort, according to former Secretary of State John Kerry. Kerry said that the United States pressed for retaining it and negotiated the five-year extension, which is reflected in Annex B, Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2231.

Resolution 2231, which was adopted unanimously by the Security Council in 2015, endorsed the JCPOA, lifted the majority of the UN sanctions and modified other nuclear-related measures, such as the arms embargo and prohibition on ballistic missile transfers. Under the terms of Resolution 2231, this five-year period ends in October 2020, unless UN sanctions on Iran are snapped back into place. Kerry described the five-year extension as a victory for the United States because, as he noted in 2015, Resolution 1929 “says specifically that if Iran comes to negotiate – not even get a deal, but comes to negotiate – sanctions would be lifted.”

Now, press reports indicate that some opponents of the JCPOA are pressing Congressional members to support a renewal or extension of the arms embargo at the UN Security Council. Although these Congressional efforts do not explicitly reference support for the snapback mechanism set up in Resolution 2231, urging the Trump administration to ensure the continuation of the UN arms embargo could be interpreted by Trump as a green light from Congress to pursue that strategy. (And because a wholly new resolution seeking to extend the arms embargo on Iran would assuredly be vetoed by Russia or China.)

On a superficial level, calls for extending the arms embargo on Iran may seem like a useful and politically expedient response to Iran’s aggressive activities in the Middle East region. But in reality, such exhortations could undermine regional security by facilitating the Trump administration’s efforts to dismantle the JCPOA completely.

Reimposing UN Sanctions Would Collapse the Iran Nuclear Deal

Although the Trump administration announced its withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018 and is no longer party to the agreement, some members of the  Trump administration believe the United States can still use the mechanism set out in Resolution 2231 to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran, including the arms embargo. "We're aiming to get that [arms embargo] extended," Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said March 5.

The Trump administration appears to believe that it can still trigger sanctions snapback at the Security Council because the United States was never formally removed from the original list of JCPOA participating states in Resolution 2231.

Other UN Security Council members, who strongly support the JCPOA, will argue that this legal argument is baseless since Trump declared that the United States is no longer a party to the JCPOA. They will surely seek to block any effort to put the issue of snapping back sanctions on Iran on the Security Council’s agenda. Once and if the issue is put on the Security Council agenda, however, the process for reimposing sanctions under Resolution 2231 cannot be vetoed.

If the Trump administration is successful in snapping back UN sanctions, the JCPOA will very likely collapse, which could trigger a new nuclear crisis.

Iran has made clear that it will withdraw from the nuclear if any state attempts to pursue a snapback at the Security Council. In that event, Iran’s nuclear program would be unconstrained and could be subject to far less intrusive monitoring.

Additionally, pushing to renew the arms embargo now based on Iran’s destabilizing regional activity further damages U.S. credibility. Arguing that the arms embargo should be extended on that basis changes the original intent and motivation behind the sanctions, which was to pressure Iran to negotiate on its nuclear program. Altering the requirements for lifting those sanctions reinforces the message to Iran that the United States cannot be trusted to waive sanctions if Tehran meets the originally described pathway to lifting the restrictions. This would make any future negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program even more difficult, as Iran will have little reason to trust the United States would follow through on its commitments.

The expiration of the arms embargo could have troublesome consequences, but the United States has other tools to address Iran’s conventional arms trade that do not risk a collapse of the 2015 nuclear deal and inflict damage to the reputation and influence of the United States.

Calls to extend the arms embargo risk conveying Congressional support for triggering the UNSC Resolution 2231 snapback mechanism, which would only escalate the Trump administration’s self-created crisis over Iran’s nuclear program and further undermine U.S. and international security.

The smarter approach for U.S. policymakers is to support more realistic and effective diplomatic efforts, beginning with a return to U.S. and Iranian compliance to the JCPOA, and a broader negotiation on a follow-on nuclear agreement that builds on the 2015 deal and that takes on other issues of mutual concern, including destabilizing arms transfers to states in the Middle East region.—KELSEY DAVENPORT, director for nonproliferation policy, and DARYL G. KIMBALL, executive director.

Description: 
On a superficial level, calls for extending the arms embargo on Iran may seem like a useful and politically expedient response to Iran’s aggressive activities in the Middle East region. But in reality, such exhortations could undermine regional security.

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