March 2024

Belarus is in the process of adopting a new military doctrine that would allow for the use of nuclear weapons by Russia.

Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin announced the decision at a meeting of the country’s Security Council on Jan. 16, saying that Belarus “will put forth a new military doctrine that for the first time provides for the use of nuclear weapons,” the Associated Press reported on Jan. 17.

At the same meeting, Aleksander Volfovich, the Security Council secretary, said that “statements by our neighbors, in particular Poland…forced us to strengthen” the military doctrine and that “the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus is intended to deter aggression from Poland, a NATO member,” AP reported.

In late April, the doctrine will go to the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly for approval. The assembly works in parallel with the parliament, and its approval is needed before the doctrine becomes official, according to Russian state media RIA Novosti.

Belarus pushed forward the new doctrine as neighboring Baltic states signed an agreement to reinforce their borders with Belarus and Russia.

“The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of the Republic of Belarus is considered an important measure of the preventive deterrence for potential adversaries from unleashing armed aggression against the Republic of Belarus,” Khrenin said at a briefing on Jan. 19, according to CNN.

In March 2023, as Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine intensified, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that he could transfer tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus, a close ally. By the end of the year, news reports suggested that the shipments were completed. (See ACT, May 2023.)

Since that time, Belarusian President Aleksander Lukashenko repeatedly has said that he would not hesitate to order the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons if Belarus faced an act of aggression.—SHIZUKA KURAMITSU

March 2024
By Shizuka Kuramitsu

China has purged nine generals from its national legislative body in a sweeping move that analysts say exposes corruption in the senior army ranks and could slow President Xi Jinping’s campaign to modernize the military.

The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, China’s national legislative body, announced on Dec. 29 the dismissal of nine senior military officials of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Some of those affected were senior members of the PLA Rocket Force, which is responsible for overseeing the country’s conventional and nuclear land-based missiles.

Beijing did not explain the move, but on Jan. 6, Bloomberg attributed the purge to “widespread corruption [that] undermined [Xi’s] efforts to modernize the armed forces and raised questions about China’s ability to fight a war.”

Citing an unidentified U.S. intelligence source, Bloomberg reported that the corruption scandal involved nuclear missiles that were filled with water instead of fuel and lids for missile silos that do not function properly, thus undermining the effective launch of missiles.

“The corruption inside China’s Rocket Force and throughout the nation’s defense industrial base is so extensive that U.S. officials now believe [that] Xi is less likely to contemplate major military action in the coming years than would otherwise have been the case,” the source told Bloomberg.

On Jan. 15, in its first bulletin of 2024, the Standing Committee explained that the reason for the purge is due to “suspected serious violations of law and discipline,” a commonly used phrase to refer to corruption. Further, the bulletin reported that the ousting of four members, including the former chief of the Equipment Development Department and former commanders of the Rocket Forces, took place Sept. 26 and Dec. 5.

This purge is part of a trend under Xi’s regime. Not even two years after a big reshuffle of high-ranking officials in 2022, China has dismissed even more of them in 2023, including PLA Rocket Force head Li Yuchao in June, Foreign Minister Qin Gang in July, and Defense Minister Li Shangfu in September.

The most recent target is Li Guangchang, a former nuclear fuel director at China National Nuclear Corp., the country’s sole supplier of nuclear fuel. Li is under investigation due to “suspected serious violations of law and discipline,” The South China Morning Post reported on Feb. 4. It said that the Chinese “[C]ommunist Party’s top corruption watchdog says he is undergoing disciplinary inspection and supervision,” but no details have been provided.

In October, the U.S. Defense Department said in its annual China military power report that China had more than 500 operational nuclear warheads in May 2023, compared to 400 warheads in 2022. The department projected that China will possess in excess of 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030 and will accelerate development of its intercontinental-range ballistic missiles. (See ACT, November 2023.)

If there are flaws with Chinese nuclear missiles as described in the Bloomberg report, “these flaws would compromise missile operations, calling into question China’s nuclear force readiness and overall capabilities,” Jon Wolfsthal, director of global risk at the Federation of American Scientists, wrote in an open letter to U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin on Jan. 10. Wolfsthal asked if the department was aware of this allegation and whether it would affect the department’s projections.

The department report serves as a basis for U.S. nuclear policies. Because “[t]he growth and reported capabilities of China’s nuclear arsenal are being used increasingly to justify current and potentially additional increases in U.S. nuclear capabilities and spending…the accuracy of [department] documents with regard to China’s nuclear capabilities are central to informing these debates in Congress as well as among security experts and the broader public, and thus, ensuring they are accurate and complete is essential,” Wolfsthal wrote.

But Heather Williams, director of the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, argued that “the recent news questioning the reliability of China’s missiles should not change anything about current U.S. policy.”

In an essay on Jan. 25, she wrote that “the intent of the silos was always unclear, and if anything, Xi has indicated a clear intent to move forward with making them operational and expanding China’s arsenal.”

At the Chinese Communist Party Congress in October 2022, Xi emphasized his determination to build a world-class military with strategic deterrence capability. But “it will take some time for China to clean up the mess and restore confidence in the Rocket Force’s competence and trustworthiness,” Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Stimson Center, told Reuters on Dec. 31.

March 2024
By Shizuka Kuramitsu

China and the United States resumed military-to-military contacts with a series of recent meetings, delivering on a decision by their leaders at a November 2023 summit.

Two days of meetings, called the China-U.S. defense policy coordination talks, took place Jan. 8-9 at the Pentagon. It was the first formal in-person encounter between the two militaries since January 2020.

The meetings were co-chaired by Michael Chase, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, and Maj. Gen. Song Yanchao, Chinese deputy director of the Central Military Commission Office for International Military Cooperation.

The two sides discussed Chinese-U.S. defense relations and regional and global security issues, including Ukraine, North Korea, and the South China Sea, according to the U.S. Defense Department, which added that it “will continue to engage in active discussions with [Chinese] counterparts about future engagements between defense and military officials at multiple levels.”

In a Jan. 10 news release, the Chinese Defense Ministry said that its delegation expressed a willingness at the meeting “to develop a sound and stable military-to-military relationship with the U.S. side on the basis of equality and respect and work together.”

Meanwhile, on Dec. 21, two weeks before the Pentagon meeting, China and the United States conducted a video teleconference involving teams led by U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Air Force Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. and Chinese Gen. Liu Zhenli, the chief of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Joint Staff Department.

The two sides discussed a number of global regional security issues, the U.S. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said afterward. It also reported that the U.S. delegation reiterated “the importance of working together to responsibly manage competition, avoid miscalculations, and maintain open and direct lines of communication” and “the importance of the [PLA] engaging in substantive dialogue to reduce the likelihood of misunderstandings.”

The Chinese delegation also shared a similar viewpoint, that “the two sides exchanged candid and in-depth views on implementing the important military-related consensus reached between the two heads of state in San Francisco and on other issues of common interest,” Senior Col. Wu Qian, spokesperson for the Chinese Defense Ministry, told a press conference on Dec. 28.

“The video call yielded positive and constructive outcomes,” Wu said. “Going forward, we expect the U.S. side to work with us in the same direction and take concrete actions on the basis of equality and respect to promote the sound and steady development of [the] China-U.S. military-to-military relationship.”

Bilateral military-to-military contacts broke down after U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in 2022. Many analysts increasingly have been concerned that Beijing’s and Washington’s inability to communicate directly courts danger if a crisis erupts over Taiwan or some other major flashpoint.

But even after the recent meetings, tensions and differences between China and the United States remain evident. For example, Wu complained that the United States “has been intensifying its military deployment in the Asia-Pacific, which is full of Cold War mentality.”

“We urge the [United States] to abandon the outdated security vision and zero-sum Cold War mentality, view China and China’s military development in an objective and rational light, instead of being obsessed with the pursuit for hegemony,” Wu said.

Similarly, a Chinese Defense Ministry news release on Jan. 10 urged the U.S. side “to take seriously China’s concerns and do more things that contribute to the growth of the mil-mil relationship.”

Both sides seem determined to maintain the restored lines of communication. On Jan. 25, Wu confirmed that, “[w]ith the concerted efforts of the two sides, mil-to-mil dialogues and consultations have been steadily resumed on the basis of equality and respect. Currently, the Chinese military and the U.S. military are maintaining communication and coordination on exchange programs.”

Following the November summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden and the two sets of military-to-military meetings in December and January, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met in Bangkok on Jan. 26-27.

Given that 2024 marks the 45th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic relations, China said that the two countries “should work together toward mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation, finding the way for China and the United States to get along with each other,” according to the Chinese Embassy in Washington.

The U.S. Embassy in Beijing reported that, in his meeting with Wang, Sullivan “stressed that although the United States and China are in competition, both countries need to prevent it from veering into conflict or confrontation.”

Both sides also “recognized recent progress in resuming military-to-military communication…noted the importance of maintaining these channels...[and] discussed next steps on a range of areas of cooperation [including on] holding a U.S.-China dialogue on [artificial intelligence] in the spring,” the embassy said.

It added that the “two sides held candid, substantive and constructive discussions on global and regional issues, including those related to Russia’s war against Ukraine, the Middle East, [North Korea], the South China Sea, and Burma” and that Sullivan “underscored the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.”

Further, the U.S. embassy said that the two sides “committed to maintain this strategic channel of communication and to pursue additional high-level diplomacy and consultations in key areas.”

China and the United States also held long-awaited talks on nuclear arms control on Nov. 6 in Washington D.C., the first such meeting in nearly five years.

Speaking to the Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Working Group on Feb. 8, Mallory Stewart, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for arms control, deterrence, and stability who led the U.S. delegation to the arms control talks, admitted that “we didn’t see much substantive progress from this first engagement” with China’s representative Sun Xiaobo.

“But the idea that we would make the substantive conversation from the very first engagement that we have not had for many years on our arms control, strategic stability and risk reduction is not realistic,” she said. (See ACT, December 2023.)

“I think the key is to encourage them to appreciate why we need to share our questions and they need to share their questions, and we work together to get to a place where we address each other’s specific understandings,” added Stewart.

March 2024
By Kelsey Davenport

North and South Korea exchanged threats after the North Korean leader abandoned the goal of unifying the peninsula and labeled South Korea a hostile country. Despite the rising tensions, the Biden administration assesses that there is no immediate threat of a North Korean attack.

In December, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un forsook a long-standing policy of achieving unification with South Korea at some point in the indefinite future. (See ACT, January/February 2024.) As a result of the shift, Kim said on Feb. 8 that North Korea can legally “annihilate” South Korea now that it is defined as a “hostile country.”

He said North Korea has adopted a “national policy to occupy and pacify” South Korea “in case of emergency.” North Korea’s military advances and weapons development give the country the capability to implement that policy, he added.

South Korea still supports unification, but the administration of President Yoon Suk Yeol has threatened to respond to North Korean provocations and is taking steps to increase military readiness.

In a Jan. 13 speech, Yoon called the Kim regime “irrational” and said that a “sensible regime would give up nuclear weapons and find a way for its people to live.” He said that Kim’s comments and the country’s recent military drills “constitute a provocation and threat.”

Yoon also accused North Korea of conducting “psychological warfare and activities” against South Korea and said that South Korea expected provocations from North Korea, including at the border between the two countries, over the course of the year.

South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik said during a Jan. 24 visit to an air force facility that the military must be prepared to respond to North Korea, including quickly eliminating the “enemy leadership” if Pyongyang decides to go to war.

Despite the rhetoric coming from Pyongyang and Seoul, the Biden administration dismissed suggestions that North Korea is preparing for war.

Jung Pak, the senior U.S. official for North Korea at the State Department, said in a press briefing on Feb. 15 that the United States does not see any signals of “an imminent or direct attack at this point.”

Pak said Kim’s posture has not fundamentally changed, despite the decision to abandon unification.

But North Korea is continuing to develop weapons systems that are more difficult to defend against and conducting live-fire exercises, including near the Northern Limit Line, the maritime boundary between North and South Korea.

Yoshimasa Hayashi, Japan’s chief cabinet secretary, said on Feb. 15 that North Korea’s testing of missiles “from various platforms” strengthens the country’s “surprise attack capabilities.”

In January, North Korea tested new missiles, including a solid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile, a strategic cruise missile, and a submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM). The systems tested are more difficult to intercept using missile defenses and are nuclear capable, according to the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). The cruise missiles also give North Korea more launch options, which makes it more difficult to preemptively target the country’s systems.

The strategic cruise missile contributes to North Korea’s “rapid counterattack posture,” KCNA said in a Jan. 31 statement.

After the SLCM launch on Jan. 28, KCNA said that Kim oversaw the launch and emphasized that “nuclear weaponization of the navy is an urgent task” and a “core requirement for building the state nuclear strategic force.”

The intermediate-range ballistic missile, tested on Jan. 14, included a maneuverable reentry vehicle, which uses a technology that can be used to make the missile more challenging for missile defenses to shoot down.

KCNA said the test successfully verified “the gliding and maneuvering characteristics of intermediate-range hypersonic maneuverable controlled warhead and the reliability of newly developed multi-stage high-thrust solid-fuel engines.”

The North Korean missile test had “nothing to do with the regional situation,” KCNA reported.

Although the Biden administration assesses that North Korea’s missile advances and rhetoric are not signs of an imminent attack, Pranay Vaddi, the U.S. National Security Council senior director for arms control, warned that the “nature of North Korea as a threat in the region could drastically change over the coming decade.”

Vaddi, speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on Jan. 18, said that the “unprecedented level of cooperation in the military sphere” between Russia and North Korea could improve the North’s capabilities.

The United States and South Korea must continue to ensure that U.S. extended deterrence remains credible as the threat evolves, Vaddi said.

March 2024
By Kelsey Davenport

The United States accused Russia of launching North Korean ballistic missiles at Ukrainian targets and warned that Pyongyang will benefit from seeing how the missiles perform.

In a Jan. 4 press briefing, John Kirby, the National Security Council coordinator for strategic communications, said that Russia attacked Ukraine using North Korean ballistic missiles with a range of about 900 kilometers on Dec. 30 and Jan. 2.

The White House said in October that North Korea transferred armaments to Russia in September in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, but it appears that the Dec. 30 attack was the first time Russia used North Korean ballistic missiles against Ukraine. (See ACT, November 2023.)

The United States and its partners will impose additional sanctions on entities that facilitate the transfers of weapons and will call public attention to the arms deals, Kirby said.

He did not reference a specific North Korean ballistic missile, but experts and Ukrainian officials say missile fragments suggest Russia is using the short-range Hwasong-11A. Ukraine also accused Russia of using two Hwasong-11A missiles in a Feb. 7 attack on Kharkiv.

At a UN Security Council meeting on Jan. 10, Russian Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia disputed the allegation and accused the United States of spreading “deliberately false information.”

During the meeting, South Korea, which joined the Security Council for a two-year term beginning in 2024, raised concerns about the knowledge North Korea will gain from providing the systems to Russia. Ambassador Hwang Joon-kook said the launches “provide valuable technical and military insights” and that Moscow’s use of the missiles will encourage Pyongyang to export missiles to other states to “rake in new revenue to further finance” its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.

Although the Security Council did not take action against Russia, more than 50 states signed a Jan. 9 statement condemning North Korea’s export of missiles to Russia. The states said the “transfer of these weapons increases the suffering of the Ukrainian people, supports Russia’s war of aggression, and undermines the global non-proliferation regime.”

March 2024
By Kelsey Davenport

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has raised concerns that Russia’s decision to cut staff at the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is compromising nuclear safety and security.

IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi visited the facility on Feb. 7, a week after Russia announced that workers employed by Energoatom, the Ukrainian nuclear energy company, would no longer be allowed to work at the site.

After Russia illegally attacked and occupied the Zaporizhzhia complex in March 2022 as part of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it brought in employees from Rosatom, the Russian state-run nuclear company, to operate the nuclear power plant and pressured Ukrainian employees to sign contracts with Rosatom. Until Feb. 1, 120 Energoatom employees were still working there. Following the announcement, Russia informed the IAEA that it had sufficient personnel to run the facility without the 120 Energoatom staffers. Russia said it was necessary to bar Energoatom employees from the site to operate the plant in line with Russian regulations.

After his visit, Grossi said the number of staff is “significantly reduced” from prewar levels and warned that even though the reactor units are in shutdown mode, “the plant still requires sufficient numbers of qualified personnel to conduct both operational tasks and to ensure that equipment important for nuclear safety and security is properly maintained.”

Prior to visiting the Zaporizhzhia plant, Grossi met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and various Ukrainian officials, including Petro Kotin, the head of Energoatom. Grossi said his agency is working to “assess the operational impact of this [Russian] decision.” There is “absolutely no place for complacency” regarding the security and safety of the facility, he said.

In January, the IAEA team at the Zaporizhzhia complex notified the agency that Russia mined the area between the internal and external fences surrounding the site. Russia previously had placed landmines in that zone, but removed them in November 2023.

In a Jan. 19 statement, Grossi said the use of landmines is inconsistent with IAEA standards for nuclear safety.

Russia defended its decision in a Jan. 31 statement to the IAEA, saying that landmines “do not pose any threat to personnel” at the Zaporizhzhia plant and that their use “does not contradict any IAEA recommendations.”

Russia said that landmines are necessary “to deter potential saboteurs.” It argued that deterring sabotage “corresponds” to the five IAEA principles for ensuring the safety and security of the plant, specifically that all structures at the facility must be “protected from attacks or acts of sabotage.” Grossi introduced the five principles at a UN Security Council meeting in May 2023 and continues to reiterate their importance. (See ACT, June 2023.)

In addition to staffing and landmines, Grossi raised additional concerns about nuclear safety and security during a Jan. 25 briefing to the Security Council. He said that the IAEA expert team at the Zaporizhzhia site “has not had timely access to some areas of the plant” and stressed that access is necessary to “effectively conduct” assessments of safety and security.

After the Feb. 8 visit, Grossi emphasized that IAEA personnel must be able to ask questions about conditions at the site. He said that “there were situations where there were suggestions that [agency experts should] look but not talk.” Preventing questions “is not good,” Grossi said.

March 2024
By Libby Flatoff and Daryl G. Kimball

Russian leaders have rejected a formal U.S. proposal to resume talks “without preconditions” on a new arms control framework to succeed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) that expires in two years.

If the decision holds, it means that the only remaining bilateral nuclear arms control agreement limiting the world’s largest nuclear weapons arsenals will expire on Feb. 5, 2026, along with its strict verification provisions.

In a written response to the United States on Dec. 2 obtained by Arms Control Today, the Russian Foreign Ministry said, “The proposal of the U.S. Side to launch a bilateral dialogue ‘to manage nuclear risks and develop a post-2026 arms control framework’ is unacceptable to us. Such ideas are completely inappropriate and absolutely untimely for they cannot be considered adequate to today’s realities and to the state of Russia-U.S. relations.”

Citing NATO and the “acute conflict around Ukraine,” the Russian diplomatic note also said, “At the moment, the U.S. Side does not demonstrate any interest in a mutually acceptable settlement of the current crisis [Ukraine], does not show readiness to take into account Russia’s security concerns…. Thus, there is no visible basis for a constructive and fruitful dialogue with the United States on strategic stability and arms control.”

The U.S. proposal was first announced by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan at the annual meeting of the Arms Control Association last June. Sullivan said that the United States is ready to engage in nuclear arms control diplomacy with Russia and with other nuclear-armed members of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) “without preconditions.”

“Rather than waiting to resolve all of our bilateral differences, the United States is ready to engage Russia now to manage nuclear risks and develop a post-2026 arms control framework,” he said. Three days later, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov described Sullivan’s comments as “important and positive.” (See ACT, July/August 2023.)

But by August, Russian officials at the preparatory committee for the 11th NPT Review Conference had already started signaling that, in their view, nuclear arms control talks “cannot be isolated from the general geopolitical and military-strategic context,” which includes the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The United States followed up Sullivan’s June speech with a written proposal to Russia that was transmitted in September. (See ACT, December 2023.)

On Jan. 17, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov elaborated on Russia’s written response to the U.S. proposal, saying that “amid a ‘hybrid war’ waged by Washington against Russia, we aren’t seeing any basis, not only for any additional joint measures in the sphere of arms control and reduction of strategic risks, but for any discussion of strategic stability issues with the United States.”

Pranay Vaddi, senior director for arms control at the U.S. National Security Council, said at an event hosted by Center for Strategic and International Studies on Jan. 18 that the rejection “linked other politics to arms control in a way that has not been done in the post-Cold War era…[and] as a result, we don’t have a conversation to be had.”

Vaddi expressed disappointment that Russia had not even offered a counterproposal on nuclear arms control and disarmament. In failing to do so, “Russia is minimizing their obligations under the NPT” and not even attempting “to pursue negotiations in good faith” as required by Article VI of that treaty.

Shortly after Russia’s rejection of the U.S. proposal became public, the U.S. State Department on Jan. 31 released its annual report to Congress on the implementation of New START. It said that the United States had 1,419 warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers, below the limit of 1,550 deployed warheads permitted by the treaty.

The report said that Russia’s decision to pause New START inspections in 2022 and its failure to provide data on its strategic nuclear forces since it suspended implementation of the treaty in early 2023 “negatively affects the ability of the United States to verify Russia’s compliance” with the New START deployed-warhead limit.

Despite the verification obstacles, the report assesses that Russia “likely did not exceed” the treaty’s deployed-warhead limit in 2023 and “that there is not a strategic imbalance between the [United States] and [Russia] that endangers the national security interest of the United States.”

But the report noted that “due to the uncertainty generated by Russia’s failure to fulfill its obligations with respect to the [t]reaty’s verification regime, the United States was unable to verify that [Russia] remained in compliance throughout 2023 with its obligation to limit its [number of] deployed warheads…to 1,550” on delivery vehicles subject to the treaty.

Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said in an interview with RIA Novosti on Jan. 22 that, “for now, we are focusing on the task of maintaining the quantitative indicators of strategic offensive weapons at the levels established by the treaty on the condition that further destabilizing steps by Washington will not make such a task meaningless for us.”

March 2024
By Mina Rozei

Ukraine has accused Russian ground forces in Ukraine of multiple instances of using riot control agents against Ukrainian infantry positions this year in a manner prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

Russia used K-51 grenades filled with chloropicrin, a World War I-era chemical substance, 229 times since the beginning of January, according to a Feb. 9 statement from the Armed Forces of Ukraine published via the Ukrainian Army’s Telegram channel.

In a televised statement on Jan. 30, a Ukrainian military spokesperson said Ukraine also has documented incidents from 2023 in which Russia used grenades and drones filled with chloropicrin and more recently with 2-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile gas, commonly known as tear gas, both of which are classified by the CWC as riot control agents.

These agents, which are used widely by domestic police forces around the globe, are banned by the CWC for use by militaries on the battlefield. Article 1 of the treaty specifically obligates states-parties “not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare.”

The spokesperson for Ukraine’s Tavria military group, Col. Oleskandr Shtupun, said on Jan. 30 on Ukrainian national television that each case of alleged use of these agents is being investigated separately. “Appropriate analyses are made, and then the results are submitted to international institutions,” Shtupun said, according to The Kyiv Independent.

The Russian Embassy to the Netherlands denied the charges in a Jan. 26 statement on social media. “All allegations that Russia is using grenades with chloroacetophenone banned by the Geneva Convention are based on unconfirmed data. There are no chemical weapons in the stockpiles of the Russian army, as confirmed by international investigations,” according to the post.

But in November, Mallory Stewart, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for arms control, deterrence, and stability, said that “Russia’s problematic behavior has now expanded to Ukraine.”

Speaking to the CWC conference of states-parties, she noted that “reports shared by our Ukrainian colleagues and aired on Russia’s own state media suggest Russian armed forces are using [riot control agents] against Ukrainian forces.”

“We call on Russia…to immediately and unconditionally withdraw from Ukraine and to comply with its CWC obligations, including refraining from using [these agents] as a method of warfare,” Stewart said.

At the same conference, Ukraine’s representative, Kateryna Bila, said her government is in contact with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) “on the threat of chemical weapons use and assistance and protection support from the [secretariat] as well as from [CWC] states-parties.”

The OPCW Executive Council will meet March 5-8 in The Hague, but the alleged use of riot control agents in Ukraine is not on the provisional agenda posted by the OPCW secretariat. Russia lost its elected seat on the council in a contentious vote in November.

March 2024
By Kelsey Davenport

Italy has identified new priorities for a multilateral initiative aimed at preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including a focus on the nexus between climate change and chemical security and counterproliferation financing.

As chair of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction for 2024, Italy is responsible for setting priorities for the 31-member initiative. The Global Partnership, which was established in 2002 by the Group of Eight industrialized countries, works to prevent the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.

According to a January statement, Italy aims, during its presidency, to improve the “common understanding of well-known and emerging” WMD challenges among member states.

Specifically, Italy said it intends to “increase awareness on chemical safety and security” given the “huge impact of major adverse climate changes and natural disasters associated with the accidental release of chemical material.” Italy said the Global Partnership will focus on enhancing preparedness to respond to such events.

Italy also identified proliferation finance as a priority for 2024 and said it would look to build on domestic experience to “renew a strong commitment on counter-proliferation financing” and focus on countering states that use “a variety of illicit activity and sanction evasions schemes” to fund nuclear and missile programs.

Furthermore, the initiative will look at the impact of disinformation on policy responses in the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear domains, Italy said.

In addition to the new priorities, Italy said the Global Partnership will continue biosecurity work prioritized under Japan’s leadership in 2023, including efforts to “address emerging and ongoing biothreats by building capacities” in Africa, and will pay special attention to WMD risk reduction efforts in Ukraine. (See ACT, January/February 2024.)

One of the mechanisms that the Global Partnership uses to achieve its goals is a match-making process that pairs states with funds and expertise with recipients looking to implement projects that align with the initiative’s mission.

In 2023, Global Partnership members provided funding and expertise for 319 projects across 96 states, according to an activity report released by Japan.

In addition to promoting biosecurity projects in Africa and WMD risk reduction in Ukraine, Japan prioritized the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires states to implement measures to prevent WMD proliferation to nonstate actors.

According to the report, projects funded in Ukraine included a multiyear project to bolster public health and crisis response capabilities in the event of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incident. Other projects related to Ukraine focused on providing expertise and funding for nuclear security, including rebuilding security at the former Chernobyl nuclear plant and strengthening the security of radioactive sources.

In the biosecurity space, Japan reported “meaningful progress” in all areas of the Signature Initiative to Mitigate Biological Threats in Africa, including projects aimed at “strengthening international capacities to prevent, detect and respond to deliberate biological threats.”

Consistent with Resolution 1540, the Global Partnership’s members provided “extensive support” to states and regional organizations aimed at strengthening capacities to “prevent, detect, and respond to [WMD] terrorism.” For example, Mexico partnered with Chile and Brazil to conduct a trilateral peer review of national legal frameworks for implementing the resolution.

Global Partnership member states also supported projects to mitigate WMD threats beyond the specific priorities articulated by Japan.

The report noted several projects aimed at building capacity to implement UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea and to prevent the reemergence of chemical weapons in Syria.

March 2024

U.S. prosecutors have charged an alleged member of the Japanese mafia with trafficking nuclear materials.

The superseding indictment against Takeshi Ebisawa of Japan and co-defendant Somphop Singhasiri of Thailand on charges of “conspiring with a network of associates to traffic nuclear materials from Burma to other countries” was made public Feb. 21 by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York.

According to a news release from the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Ebisawa and his conspirators allegedly attempted to traffic nuclear materials from Myanmar between early 2020 and February 2022. In the course of the operation, they showed samples of nuclear materials to an undercover agent from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, who was posing as a narcotics and weapons trafficker. Ebisawa thought he was selling nuclear materials to an Iranian general for use in a nuclear weapons program and aimed to purchase military-grade weapons “on behalf of an ethnic insurgent group” in Myanmar, according to the indictment.

The press release reported that Thai authorities assisted U.S. law enforcement investigators in transferring the nuclear samples to the United States and “a U.S. nuclear forensic laboratory later analyzed the samples and confirmed that the samples contain uranium and weapons-grade plutonium.”

“In particular, the laboratory determined that the isotope composition of the plutonium found in the nuclear samples is weapons-grade, meaning that the plutonium, if produced in sufficient quantities, would be suitable for use in a nuclear weapon,” the release added.

In April 2022, Ebisawa, Singhasiri, and one other Thai national were arrested, indicted, and charged with trafficking in drugs and weapons including surface-to-air missiles. Ebisawa is detained in New York awaiting trial. The new charges are an addition to the existing ones.

Although the Justice Department believes Ebisawa is “a leader within Japanese Yakuza, transnational organized crime syndicate,” Japanese police told Yomiuri Shimbun on July 27, 2022, that there was no confirmed information that Ebisawa was a leader or had a connection to Japanese domestic organized crime.

“It is chilling to imagine the consequences had these efforts succeeded and the Justice Department will hold accountable those who traffic in these materials and threaten U.S. national security and international stability,” Matthew G. Olsen, U.S. assistant attorney general for national security, said in the press release.

There was no specific information given regarding how the defendants may have acquired or produced nuclear materials.—SHIZUKA KURAMITSU