Amb. Do Hung Viet, President of the 11th NPT Review Conference, circulated an updated Draft Outcome Document to states parties on the evening of May 13. The revised draft text, dubbed Rev. 1, was generally similar in style and structure, was slightly longer at 14 pages due to a few more additions than subtractions as the President, with the help of the secretariat, it sought to incorporate suggestions and criticisms of the zero draft from states parties.
Upon circulating the latest draft text, Viet told the assembled delegates that "it represents our best chance for consensus," and he urged states to demonstrate flexibility, calling upon all delegations "to bring forward concrete proposals on how to bridge remaining differences."
Beginning on Thursday and through Friday, delegations delivered comments on each of the three main sections of the document, which related to disarmament and negative security assurances, nonproliferation and safeguards, and the pursuit of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Some of the interventions were profound. Some were pedantic.
Some states heeded President Viet's admonition about providing constructive, bridge building suggestions. Many did not, and a few others decided to double-down on previous hardline positions and sometimes invoked the word "unacceptable."
Given the format of the conference -- open sessions open to all to weigh-in on the text -- many delegations have chosen to use their statements to stake out negotiating positions by restating their preferences for language that they know is problematic for other states. As a result, it will be up to the conference president and his team to try to find a middle ground or, if necessary, drop entire paragraphs from the document that cannot achieve consensus through careful wordsmithing in the dwindling time for negotiations that remains.
By Friday night, became clearer that there are still several seemingly difficult issues that might yet be resolved with re-drafting, but there are still a few very difficult and significant issues of contention that might lead one state or another to block consensus on the final text.
Iran's Nuclear Activities: The extent to which concerns about Iran's sensitive nuclear activities and its unresolved safeguards issues were dealt with in the zero draft were the subject of substantial back-and-forth in the first half of the conference. The Rev. 1 document attempts to reflect those concerns in a more understated but still factual way. The question now is whether key parties, namely the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, can show greater flexibility and agree to preserve the NPT rather than scoring rhetorical points at this conference.
Paragraph 7 of the Rev. 1 draft says:
7. The Conference expresses its concern regarding unresolved outstanding safeguards issues and non-compliance with obligations under safeguards agreements. In this context, the Conference stresses its support for a diplomatic solution to resolve concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear programme and encourages all parties to engage constructively for this purpose. The Conference emphasizes that the full and effective implementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, including full and timely cooperation with the IAEA regarding undeclared nuclear material and activities at multiple undeclared locations, is indispensable to restoring confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.
Despite the undeniable fact that there are concerns about what remains of Iran's nuclear program and its enriched uranium stockpiles, Iran's delegation still argued that they could not accept a document that mentioned by name “concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear programme,” as they continued to insist that their nuclear program is for peaceful uses only.
Attacks on Nuclear Facilities: As the 11th NPT Review Conference rolls on, two wars, one in Ukraine and another in Iran, have led to attacks on safeguarded nuclear facilities that create serious risks of nuclear accidents. The Rev. 1 document includes a clear statement of principle on the matter without invoking country names in order to side-step the kind of dispute that led Russia to block consensus in 2022 over language relating to its takeover of Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
Paragraph 41. The Conference expresses grave concerns over any attack or threat of attack against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes, which could pose a great danger to human lives and the environment and raises serious concerns regarding the application of international law. The Conference notes the relevant IAEA General Conference resolutions and decision on this matter and strongly urges all States parties to refrain from attacks or threats of attack on such facilities.
Viet's approach in this issue in the Rev. 1 document is the obvious way and perhaps only way forward if states parties want to reach consensus on a meaningful outcome document.
Nevertheless, Iran expressed displeasure with the removal of a specific reference to attacks on its nuclear facilities that were in paragraph 8 of the zero draft from Rev. 1: “The Conference notes the grave concerns expressed at the attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities and calls upon States parties to exercise maximum restraint to avoid such attack.,”
The direct reference to the attacks on Iran's nuclear sites was, unsurprisingly, opposed by the U.S. delegation, but other states made it clear that the 2025 and 2026 bombing campaigns by non-NPT, nuclear-armed Israeli and by the United States on safeguarded Iranian nuclear sites are clearly contrary to the principles of the NPT and international law.
Some states stated that the language on the protection on nuclear facilities did not go far enough, flagging that in 2022 outcome document, not adopted, the language was more specific and covered threats, “including the physical protection of all nuclear material, cybersecurity and the protection of nuclear facilities against unauthorized access, theft and sabotage” that are not present in this draft.
North Korea: The DPRK is one consequential NPT state party that isn't here because it claims to have exited the treaty more than two decades ago, a move that other states parties do not recognize as legally valid under the NPT's Article X withdrawal provisions.
North Korea has been the subject of a joint statement of concern from dozens of states at the past several review conferences, including this one.
Not surprisingly, the paragraphs in the document relating to the DPRK have elicited numerous comments and suggestions for revision. One concern that was echoed by many was the removal of the clause was included in the zero draft: The Conference “reiterates its concern over the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nuclear weapons and delivery systems programmes, which undermine the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.”
It is possible the clause was removed in an attempt to curb conflict and find consensus, but instead, several states parties felt it weakened the document and found it remained necessary to call out the DPRK's violations of its commitment not to acquire as a major threat to the non-proliferation regime.
Nuclear Sharing Is Not Faring Well: Paragraph 2 of Rev. 1, which addresses the issue of the forward-deployment of nuclear-weapon state nuclear weapons, remains highly contentious. It states that:
“The Conference notes ongoing discussion regarding longstanding and evolving nuclear weapons sharing and extended deterrence arrangements, including in relation to non-proliferation and the Treaty’s long-term effectiveness. The Conference emphasizes that sustained dialogue on issues relevant to the implementation of Articles I and II can contribute to strengthening the Treaty and its credibility, enhancing confidence, and advancing its objectives.”
This text is, no doubt, factual as it reflects the concerns expressed in the room by many non-nuclear weapon states and by China, which does not have such a relationship with nonnuclear weapon states, about the continuation of the policy of "extended nuclear deterrence" and the risks of nuclear conflict and nuclear competition that such practices and policies create.
Nevertheless, several NATO states continued to push back on such a reference arguing that such "nuclear sharing" arrangements predate the NPT and are consistent with the letter of the treaty, with some going so far as to argue that the NPT outcome document should mention what they see as the positive aspects of forward-basing of nuclear weapons in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to those states involving in such arrangements.
The topic is obviously important for many states but mild, factual references to real concerns about certain nuclear weapons policies and practices should not become grounds for opposition to an NPT outcome document as a whole.
Nuclear Testing and the CTBT: The Rev. 1 document strengthens and is more detailed in its expressions of support for the CTBT, its entry into force, the CTBTO and effective monitoring and verification, and for maintaining the de facto moratorium on nuclear explosive testing established by the 1996 treaty.
At the urging of dozens of states, including the 38 that endorsed a joint statement on the CTBT , Rev. 1 includes a new paragraph (52) that: “... commends the early deployment and operation of the International Monitoring System and of the International Data Centre that are at the core of the robust verification regime of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.”
Many states parties also commended the new preambular language in paragraph vii in Rev. 1 “Underscoring the need to uphold and strengthen the norm against nuclear testing,” though the Russian delegation on May 14 called the use of the term "norm" to be too "abstract."
Of note, Rev. 1 also includes a new line in paragraph 54 that: "urges [the nuclear-armed NPT states] to develop and implement new measures to restore confidence in explosive nuclear testing moratoriums."
For some time, civil society experts, including the Arms Control Association, have promoted this concept as a way to address verification and monitoring challenges to detect and deter potential low-yield nuclear test explosions prohibited by the treaty prior to its formal entry into force. The concept was also included in a joint statement by France, the UK and the United States issued on May 1.
Though the CTBTO's International Monitoring System is fully operational and more effective than originally envisioned, the failure of nine key states including the United States, China, and Russia, to ratify the treaty has delayed the option of short-notice, on-site inspections which are crucial to detect and deter such tests. Technical talks to develop voluntary confidence building measures could help ensure full compliance with the CTBT.
Nuclear Disarmament: Discussion and debate on key paragraphs relating to the impasse on nuclear disarmament talks and how to move forward (particularly paragraphs 55-60 of Rev. 1) continued.
Paragraph 55 now calls for the "multilateralization of arms control frameworks,” most likely in an attempt to reflect the relatively new and vague U.S. call for a multilateral nuclear-five "strategic stability" dialogue.
On May 14, China took issue with that language in paragraphs 55 of Rev. 1, which says: "The Conference calls on the nuclear-weapon States to pursue ways to multilateralize future arms control frameworks at an early date, in accordance with Article VI," because China has not embraced the vague U.S. proposal for multilateral "strategic stability" talks, in part because it does not take into account China's preferred approaches to risk reduction and arms control, including its own proposal for a multilateral treaty on no-first use.
Importantly, paragraph 55 goes on to say: "Such frameworks should include all types of nuclear weapons, including nonstrategic weapons, deployed and nondeployed. Pending the negotiation of such frameworks, the Conference calls upon the United States and the Russian Federation to voluntarily maintain the limitations of the New START Treaty," which is key language that none of the nuclear-armed states have, so far, quibbled with.
Despite China's comments, some western delegations nevertheless encouraged the inclusion of an even more specific reference to still U.S. proposal for multilateral strategic stability talks, with Canada even calling it "historic."
Such hyperbole doesn't match what appears to be on offer and it ignores the fact that what is being proposed are not actual arms control or disarmament talks but discussions on measures to reduce the risk that deterrence strategies will fail. Furthermore, it remains unclear how the U.S. proposal differs at all from the ongoing but underperforming "P5 Process," the dialogue between the NPT's nuclear five that has been underway since 2007.
Within the Article VI section, paragraphs 45-73, Amb. Viet's team tried to reflect the view of many states that there is an urgent need for the nuclear five to meet their Article VI commitments. Language calling for action “at an early date” or “urgently” were added within several sections to encourage nuclear weapon states to meet their disarmament obligations. Language was also added to note “the lack of progress on good faith negotiations,” by the nuclear five.
Not surprisingly some nuclear weapon states, including France and Russia, objected to these additions in emphasis because they “disconnect disarmament efforts from the strategic context.”
There are tensions between nuclear-armed states for sure. But a plain and literal reading of the NPT does not allow for such excuses. In other words, the nuclear weapons states cannot condition the fulfillment of their Article VI responsibilities on the emergence of a more friendly strategic environment.
Paragraph 59 of Rev. 1, which calls on states to adopt no first use postures, “pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons,” drew opposition from those states that do not have such a policy including the United States and Russia. China suggested it was open to modifications of the language in paragraph 59, but this is not an issue that is reconcilable in the days that remain and will likely be removed.
Several states pressed for more specific and stronger language to address the threats posed by the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into nuclear command and control and communications systems. As a result, the updated draft includes new language in paragraph 60 that calls out “the risks related to nuclear weapons and emerging technologies, in particular artificial intelligence…”
Subtle but important differences were expressed about paragraph 68, which says: "The Conference calls on the Conference on Disarmament to immediately commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and bring to an early conclusion, negotiations in accordance with CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein."
Talks on an FMCT have been stalled in the CD since the mid-1990s due to a handful of states blocking consensus on the start of negotiations on proposals they do not support. China, not surprisingly, suggested this paragraph should be adjusted to say such negotiations require achieving a "balanced approach" regarding other negotiating priorities at the CD.
Humanitarian Impacts: Nuclear weapons pose obvious dangers and have caused irreparable harms. Over the past 80 years, nuclear weapons production, testing, and certainly their use, have caused, and continue to cause, adverse health and environmental harms. The catastrophic impacts of nuclear war, which could easily be triggered by the use of just one nuclear device in conflict between nuclear-armed adversaries is undeniable. The preamble of the NPT itself invokes the specter of catastrophic nuclear war.
Appropriately, preambular paragraph iv of the Rev. 1 states: "Recognizing the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons ..."
Paragraph 73 Rev. 1 also notes, but importantly does not endorse, the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which its signatory states have said is fully compatible with the NPT and it reinforces their commitments to the principle of the NPT, and it represents one of their contributions to the goals of the treaty, including on nuclear disarmament.
Nevertheless, some nuclear weapon states, including France and the United States, said in their interventions on May 15 that they cannot fathom inclusion even these modest lines.
For example, the French delegation said: "We cannot accept the reference to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The same goes for the references to the humanitarian or environmental consequences of the use of nuclear weapons or nuclear tests, which" France claimed, "are not in line with the text of the NPT preamble.”
Such an approach is unnecessarily confrontational, overly defensive, and does not contribute to building solidarity among NPT state parties for the realization of the ambitious goals and objectives of the treaty.
Like it or not, the TPNW and the grave consequences of nuclear weapons use are inescapable realities that all NPT states parties must acknowledge.
What About That Trump-Xi Meeting? On May 14, Presidents Trump and Xi met in Beijing and could have, in theory, made some progress to resolve outstanding nuclear policy issues that have been under discussion and debate at the 11th NPT Review Conference. Unfortunately, they did not.
On his way back to Washington on May 15, Trump was asked by a reporter about whether he discussed nuclear matters with Xi. According to a transcript of the exchange, Trump said: "... we brought it up. The denuclearization. I talk about it all the time with Russia and with China and it did come up. We did discuss."
"And what did you conclude?" the reporter asked.
Trump's reply was, as is typical, vague, unspecific, and contradictory: "I don't know. I got a very positive response. It's the beginning," he said. Referring to upcoming multilateral summits, he added, "You know, we're going to be together four times potentially this year."
The reporter persisted: "I'm trying to understand what it is that he committed to, if he committed anything."
Trump responded by saying: "Well, I don't want to say anybody committed, but we have a very good understanding, you know, the concept of denuclearization ... and you bring Russia into it also. But the concept of that is something would be very good."
That exchange only underscores the need for a clear action on disarmament coming out of the 11th NPT Review Conference, not empty words or vague commitments to meet core Article VI goals and objectives on disarmament.
A Long Way to Go In a Short Amount of Time
At the end of week three of the 11th NPT RevCon, it is not clear if the conference can find its way through to a consensus text on an array of issues in the days and hours that remain.
Our sources suggest we might expect Rev. 2 to emerge as early as Monday, with possibly another, final version out by Wednesday, which would give delegations sufficient time to consult with their capitals one final time before the conference ends on May 22.
For a conference working papers, national statements, and other resources, visit the invaluable Reaching Critical Will web site https://reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/npt/2026
More information can be accessed via the official NPT 2026 Review Conference web site: https://meetings.unoda.org/npt-revcon/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-eleventh-review-conference-2026
-- Libby Flatoff, Program and Policy Associate, and Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director
NOTE: this is the third of three summaries of key developments at the 11th NPT Review Conference. For the first update, see:
"The 11th NPT RevCon: Choppy Waters Through Week 1; Rough Seas Ahead," May 2, 2026
"Crosswinds Swirl Around 11th NPT RevCon in Week Two," May 10, 2026