May 11, 2026
On May 6, Amb. Do Hung Viet, the President of the 11th NPT Review Conference, circulated a relatively concise 13-page "zero draft" of the final conference document and invited states parties to begin offering their feedback. The document was put forward for review just 10 days into the month-long meeting and it takes a focused approach to each of the several major elements of the treaty and the dozens of issues that were raised in general debate statements in the previous days.
Viet's zero draft is written in an economical style that seeks to focus on key principles and objectives without extraneous language that might to trigger arguments about ongoing interstate disputes and wars that have befuddled attempts to reach consensus at the previous two NPT review conferences.
By most accounts, Viet's zero draft provides good basis for reaching consensus on a final conference document, but only if certain state parties are willing to act in the interest of reinforcing the treaty, respect previous commitments to key goals and objectives, and avoid overt finger-pointing and name-calling.
Nevertheless, as NPT states parties ended the second week and enter the third of the 11th treaty review conference, there were not only dozens and dozens of suggestions for rewording, but there are substantial points of disagreement in several areas that may not be able to be resolvable even with the most careful and clever wordsmithing.
In general, the vast majority of states-parties commended the text's reaffirmation of "the validity of all existing commitments undertaken, including those contained in the decisions and resolutions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, the outcome document of the 2000 Review Conference and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions agreed by the 2010 Review Conference."
In the past, some nuclear weapon states, such as the United States at the 2019 NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting, have objected to reaffirming past NPT commitments. Most states have made it clear in one way or another that they will not tolerate back-sliding on the validity of past commitments and consensus-based NPT Review Conference decisions.
For the most part, most states also lauded:
- the document's recognition of the importance of the IAEA and its system of safeguards against diversion of nuclear technology for military purposes (relating to Article III), and
- the text's paragraphs expressing support for cooperation on expanding opportunities for access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Article IV).
Many non-nuclear weapon states called for strengthening language relating to the need for the nuclear weapon states to meet their special disarmament obligations and more action-oriented and time specific commitments (Article VI).
Some nuclear weapon states, unsurprisingly, argued that the zero draft should acknowledge that geopolitical tensions make progress on disarmament challenging.
Paragraph 57 "recognizes the importance of continued engagement by all nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons."
Paragraph 51 is particularly important. It says: "the Conference urges the nuclear weapons states" ... "to [take] steps to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies. It calls on the nuclear-weapon States to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, regardless of their location, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures, consistent with action 5 of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference."
Notably, paragraph 56 also says: "The Conference deeply regrets that the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) expired without a successor arrangement or negotiations thereon. The Conference calls on the Russian Federation and the United States to commence negotiations on a successor to New START, to include all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed."
More specific responses to these and other key Article VI-related passages from the United States, Russia, and China will likely be heard in week three of the conference.
Several states-parties said the zero draft document does not sufficiently address the threats posed by the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) in nuclear command and control and communications systems, as well as the dangers of emerging technology on dangerous nuclear deterrence relationships, especially in a crisis situation.
Many states supported the language in the conference document that calls for the effective maintenance of human control over nuclear weapons at all times, but several said it should include language requiring that nuclear weapon states ensure that regarding nuclear weapons use decisions, effective human control must always be maintained.
Regional Issues
The language in the draft relating to NPT obligations affected by the ongoing wars on Ukraine and Iran, however, drew divergent responses from key states.
Iran strongly objected to being singled out by name for not meeting its safeguards commitments and for being described as a proliferation concern, while the United States objected to a paragraph noting, “The Conference notes the grave concerns expressed at the attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities and calls upon States parties to exercise maximum restraint to avoid such attacks” as it believed it was implicated by such a reference.
The text also addresses concerns about nuclear safety and security at Ukraine's nuclear power production facilities in paragraphs 43-45, reminding states parties of the importance of IAEA principles for nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict.
Paragraph 45 “expresses grave concern about the safety and security of nuclear facilities and materials in Ukraine, and its appreciation for the IAEA’s continued efforts to address this concern,” but this passage, many European states observed, fails to note which state (Russia) is responsible for creating the conditions that have put the safety and security of those facilities at risk.
Attempts to revise these sections, while they may be warranted for factual reasons and contextual reasons, could open up the possibility that competing formulations may lead one country or another to threaten to block consensus on the outcome document as a whole.
U.S. Testing the Limits Consensus on Nuclear Testing
Paragraphs 52-55 address the CTBT, the global nuclear testing moratorium, and the dangers of a resumption of nuclear testing. However, many states said they wanted to see stronger language, including mention of the fact that a large majority of NPT states parties have also signed (187) and ratified (178) the CTBT.
While many states-parties noted the importance of the CTBT-related elements of the zero draft, one delegation -- United States -- was highly critical, saying, “Several elements in P52-55 are problematic,” implying that if these paragraphs, or something like them, remain the final text, the United States might block consensus.
In a short statement late on Friday May 8, a U.S. delegate said there was “a need to strengthen language on testing in the draft by finding constructive ways to restore confidence in testing moratoria and call for improving the threshold to detect nuclear explosive tests of any yield, rather than focus on entry into force of the CTBT.”
Alluding to the recent U.S. allegations of Chinese testing six years ago, she said: “That is why the United States has proposed restoring confidence in states adherence to their testing moratoria, including through confidence building and technical measures. We recommend that the outcome document specifically call on nuclear weapon states to clarify the scope of their moratoria. We have proposed a working group to this regard within the P-5 ...”
According to several key delegations with whom we spoke, the U.S. approach appears both troubling and befuddling.
Not only is the CTBT and its entry into force (EIF) a well-established goal agreed to by consensus at past NPT Review Conferences, but its EIF will advance global capabilities to detect and deter CTBT-prohibited nuclear test explosions of any kind by making short-notice, on-site inspections possible.
In addition, the scope of the CTBT and the unilateral moratoria announced by former nuclear testing states after it was opened for signature in 1996 is well-established. Article I prohibition on any and all nuclear explosions, which according to the U.S. State Department, are nuclear tests that produce a self-sustaining, supercritical chain reaction of nuclear energy.
As China's lead CTBT negotiator, Amb. Sha Zukang at the Conference on Disarmament said on March 28, 1996:
“China is committed to concluding a CTBT which prohibits any nuclear-weapon test explosion at any place and in any environment. Proceeding from this guiding principle, the Chinese delegation proposed at the outset of the negotiations its scope text prohibiting any nuclear-weapon test explosion which releases nuclear energy. The phrase ‘release of nuclear energy’ was intended to distinguish the scope of the CTBT from that of the PTBT and TTBT and to define the scope of the CTBT with more precise and scientific language. The Chinese delegation has always held that the scope of the CTBT should exclude any threshold. After two years of negotiations, most countries have reached a common understanding on the phrase “any nuclear-weapon test explosion” in the scope article. That is to say, the future CTBT will without any threshold prohibit any nuclear-weapon test explosion.”
All of the other N5 delegations made statements that align with this explanation of the scope of the CTBT, which the basis of the nuclear testing moratoria they each now observe.
Therefore, this would not appear to be an issue that requires renegotiation, nor is it likely that any of the CTBT states parties would be comfortable seeing the N5 negotiate some interpretation of what a nuclear test ban permits and prohibits out concern that it might deviate from what they agreed to during the course of the CTBT negotiations and afterwards.
It is notable that the U.S. delegation (and the P3 in their joint statement) call for new efforts to develop confidence building measures to strengthen verification and compliance with the norm against nuclear testing established by the CTBT.
The CTBT International Monitoring System provides powerful nuclear test monitoring capabilities, but because entry into force has been delayed (along the on-site inspection option it would provide) it is possible that very low-yield nuclear explosions could potentially escape detection, especially in the absence of CTBT entry into force.
To address this challenge, it would indeed be useful for nuclear armed states to engage in technical discussions to develop voluntary confidence building measures to ensure ongoing activities at their former test sites are fully compliant with their obligations under the CTBT. The idea was floated in June of 2023 by the head of the Biden administration's National Nuclear Security Administration. (See the joint NGO statement on “Reinforcing the Prohibition on Nuclear Explosive Testing and the CTBT” delivered on May 1 to the NPT Review Conference.)
Conflicting Views on Other Issues
Many statements including many "rights-of-reply" exchanges, revolved around the subject of "nuclear sharing," the term used to describe the practice of a nuclear weapon state deploying nuclear weapons on the territory of another state while maintaining institutional and operational control over their potential use.
Paragraph 2 of the zero draft attempts to capture the reality that there are concerns and there should be dialogue to address the concerns. It says:
“The Conference notes ongoing discussion regarding nuclear weapons sharing and extended deterrence arrangements, including in relation to the Treaty’s long-term effectiveness and credibility. The Conference expresses concern about the potential establishment of any new nuclear sharing arrangement. The Conference emphasizes that sustained dialogue on issues relevant to the implementation of Articles I and II can contribute to strengthening the Treaty, enhancing confidence, and advancing its objectives."
The United States and several NATO states energetically pushed-back against some statement expressing concerns about nuclear sharing, arguing that nuclear sharing agreements were created and established before the ratification of the NPT and therefore they are consistent with their obligations under the Treaty and, they argued the conference as a whole does not share the concerns of some states about nuclear sharing.
Several delegations called for stronger language on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons use, including the delegations from the Holy See. Preambular paragraph iii of zero draft says the conference recognizes: "... the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons."
In an intervention from the floor, the U.S. delegation suggested that not every potential use of nuclear weapons would lead to catastrophic humanitarian consequences.
Looking Ahead
In the coming days, states parties will continue to weigh-in on the zero-draft into Wednesday, May 13, at which point a second, revised draft of the final conference outcome document may be in circulation. (See the revised program of work issued on May 3.)
How many serious differences will remain after that and how the President of the Conference manages those remaining differences to try to arrive at a meaningful conference outcome is yet to be seen.
For a conference working papers, national statements, side event schedules, and other resources, visit the invaluable Reaching Critical Will web site https://reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/npt/2026
More information can be accessed via the official NPT 2026 Review Conference web site: https://meetings.unoda.org/npt-revcon/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-eleventh-review-conference-2026
-- Libby Flatoff, Program and Policy Associate, and Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, reporting from the UN in New York
NOTE: this is the second of two summaries of key developments at the 11th NPT Review Conference. For the first update, see: "The 11th NPT RevCon: Choppy Waters Through Week 1; Rough Seas Ahead," May 2, 2026