Nonproliferation Risks of the U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

Volume 18, Issue 6, September 16, 2026

After more than a decade of intermittent negotiations, the U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement is now finalized and in the hands of Congress. During the mandated 90-day review, members of Congress have a critical opportunity to assess the proliferation risks posed by the Saudi agreement and act to approve, modify, or disapprove it.

Although the Trump administration claims the agreement advances U.S. national security interests and will reinvigorate the U.S. nuclear industry, the U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement, as written, abandons key nonproliferation conditions that have longstanding bipartisan support. Most concerningly, the deal does not require Saudi Arabia to adopt the Additional Protocol, a more intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement. It also provides Saudi Arabia—a country that has threatened to develop nuclear weapons—with an unprecedented pathway to obtain U.S. technologies that can be used to enrich uranium. 

In the documents transmitted to Congress, the Trump administration has failed to explain how the nuclear cooperation agreement mitigates the proliferation risks created by the decision to support Saudi enrichment under an inspections regime that is far weaker than the global standard. 

In addition to increasing Saudi Arabia’s proliferation threat, the 123 agreement risks eroding long-standing international norms championed by the United States to prevent the spread of key technologies necessary to build nuclear weapons. The proposed U.S.-Saudi agreement sets a dangerous precedent that may prompt other states to seek the capabilities to produce weapons-grade nuclear materials under the justification of civil nuclear development and reject the Additional Protocol in nuclear cooperation agreements with the United States or with other suppliers.

Congress must use the 90-day review period mandated by the Atomic Energy Act to carefully examine the risks —both to Saudi Arabia and the broader nonproliferation regime—and press the administration for additional clarity on key provisions of the deal. Currently, the publicly available documents suggest that the risks posed by the deal far outweigh any perceived benefits. To protect against Saudi proliferation and erosion of key nonproliferation norms, Congress should take the necessary steps to disapprove of the deal or condition the agreement on additional measures to reduce risk.

In assessing how the agreement impacts Saudi Arabia’s future proliferation risk, Congress should focus particularly on gaps in the verification regime and the risks posed by transferring uranium enrichment technologies.

Inadequate Monitoring and Verification: The nuclear cooperation agreement (known as a Section 123 agreement) does not commit Saudi Arabia to ratify an Additional Protocol to its nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)-required safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Instead, the 123 agreement includes a Bilateral Safeguards Agreement (BSA) that the Trump administration claims will provide adequate verification.

The BSA, which would be implemented by the IAEA, would require Saudi Arabia to provide some additional information and access to the agency beyond what its safeguards agreement requires. But the BSA applies only to sites where Saudi-U.S. cooperative nuclear activities would take place. It would not give the agency information and access to the full range of fuel cycle activities inside Saudi Arabia, such as uranium mining and milling and certain research activities. Those sites are covered by the Additional Protocol. Furthermore, the BSA would not grant the IAEA complementary access to undeclared sites to follow up on evidence of illicit nuclear activities. The Additional Protocol, by contrast, requires states to grant complementary access.

The broader scope of the Additional Protocol and its complementary access provisions gives the IAEA a more complete picture of a state’s nuclear program. According to the agency, the Additional Protocol allows the IAEA to provide greater assurances that states are not engaged in undeclared nuclear activities. Discovery of the Iraqi and North Korean illicit nuclear weapons programs in the 1990s made clear that NPT-required comprehensive safeguards agreements are insufficient. Those agreements focus on ensuring that nuclear materials in declared programs are accounted for and remain in peaceful purposes. Comprehensive safeguards do not provide the necessary information and authority for the IAEA to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. The Additional Protocol was negotiated to address those gaps.

The BSA, by contrast, is focused on deterring diversion from Saudi Arabia’s declared bilateral nuclear activities with the United States. As the unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement (NPAS) that was submitted with the 123 agreement states, the BSA is intended to provide “added confidence against the possible diversion of material for a nuclear explosive device.” Measures in the BPAS do go beyond NPT-required safeguards at certain bilateral sites, but they do not address the issue of complementary access. The NPAS even acknowledges that an Additional Protocol would provide further assurance that Saudi Arabia is not engaged in undeclared nuclear activities. 

In comparing the Additional Protocol to the BSA, some key differences include:

• The Additional Protocol provides expansive IAEA access to a state’s entire fuel cycle and relevant research activities; the scope of the BSA is much narrower. The BSA requires Saudi Arabia to provide short-notice access and information beyond what is required by the NPT-required safeguards agreement, but the requirement applies only to “covered sites.” Covered sites are defined as facilities where cooperative US-Saudi nuclear activities occur. The 123 agreement specifically references bilateral facilities for conversion of uranium to a form suitable for enrichment (similar to the NPT-required CSA), enrichment, fuel fabrication, and some research facilities that do not include nuclear materials (which are not included in an NPT-required CSA). The BSA does not appear to include any uranium mining, milling, or unilateral Saudi research-related activities that do not involve nuclear activities, which would be covered under an Additional Protocol. This limitation in IAEA access is a critical gap: the agency should be able to regulaly access all fuel cycle activities—from mining uranium to waste—and all research and production activities that support the nuclear program. 
• The BSA does not ensure IAEA access to sites that are not part of Saudi Arabia’s declared nuclear program. The Additional Protocol gives the IAEA complementary access to undeclared sites to follow up on evidence of illicit nuclear activities. The BSA does not include complementary access to undeclared sites or require Saudi Arabia to facilitate IAEA requests for access to sites outside of its declared nuclear program. It states only that if the IAEA has outstanding questions, Saudi Arabia and the United States agree to consult with the agency “on appropriate procedures and means to resolve the question.”
• The BSA requires Saudi Arabia to provide less information to the IAEA. The Additional Protocol requires a state to provide additional information about its research activities that do not involve nuclear materials and relevant imports. The BSA only requires additional information about cooperative nuclear activities, a ten-year research plan, and imports/exports for covered nuclear activities.
• The BSA limits IAEA environmental sampling. The Additional Protocol requires a state to accept wide-area environmental sampling at any location. This is a particularly powerful tool for determining if a state conducted illicit activities with nuclear materials at undeclared sites. The BSA only requires Saudi Arabia to accept limited sampling at covered sites. 

These key differences make clear that the BSA is not an adequate substitute for an Additional Protocol. Requiring Saudi Arabia to adopt an Additional Protocol is the most straightforward path to addressing these safeguards gaps.

Although U.S. law does not require an Additional Protocol for nuclear cooperation agreements, there is long-standing bipartisan support for conditioning U.S. nuclear cooperation on a state’s ratification of the Additional Protocol. Since the Model 1997 Additional Protocol was finalized, the United States has negotiated only two nuclear cooperation agreements with non-nuclear weapon states that did not require the more intrusive safeguards agreement. Those states, Brazil and Argentina, already had in place a bilateral accounting mechanism to enhance nuclear transparency, and their nuclear cooperation agreements were finalized shortly after the Additional Protocol was negotiated. Even then, the United States continued to press both states (and all other states) to adopt an Additional Protocol.

A Pathway to Uranium Enrichment in Saudi Arabia: If the 123 agreement enters into effect, a two-year study of the feasibility, commercial viability, and proliferation risks of uranium enrichment in Saudi Arabia commences immediately. If the study determines that enrichment is viable and the BSA is in effect, the nuclear cooperation agreement allows the United States to transfer enrichment technology and nuclear materials to Saudi Arabia. This would not include certain restricted data, such as centrifuge designs. 

The U.S. transfer of enrichment technology would be an unprecedented concession: the United States has never shared fissile material production capabilities with a non-nuclear weapon state. The transfer would also be a violation of the voluntary guidelines adopted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (a multilateral initiative of states, including the United States, that sell nuclear technologies) in 2011, which require an Additional Protocol or regional safeguards arrangement before any such transfer.

If the study supports enrichment in Saudi Arabia, the initial enrichment level will be capped at 5 percent uranium-235, a level suitable for power reactors, but, after a vaguely described subsequent study, that level could be increased to 20 percent, with the written consent of both parties.

Enrichment to 20 percent U-235, a level suitable for research reactors and some proposed small modular reactors, poses a more significant risk because enriching to that level constitutes the majority of work necessary to enrich to weapons-grade levels, or 90 percent. The United States has repeatedly, and rightly, raised concerns about Iran previously enriching to the 20 percent level.

The nuclear cooperation agreement itself contains few details about how a U.S. supplied enrichment facility in Saudi Arabia would operate. According to the 123 agreement, the two states will “develop arrangements and procedures under which any such enrichment may take place.” Reportedly, one of the confidential side letters suggests that the United States would build and operate the enrichment plant according to an unspecified "black box" arrangement designed to try to prevent Saudi Arabia from gaining direct access to the technology.

Although a black box, combined with the prohibition on sharing restricted data, would create barriers to access, once the United States has transferred sensitive technology to Saudi Arabia, it risks losing physical and/or institutional control of the equipment and certain data associated with the facility. Critical information about enrichment technology may leak to the Saudis during the course of cooperative activities or as part of Saudi Arabia’s mandatory declarations to the IAEA. The facility’s security could also be compromised. It is unclear, for instance, how the United States will provide physical protection for the facility and the sensitive technology in the event of a conflict or fissure in the U.S.-Saudi relationship or an attempt to nationalize the facility. 

The lack of an IAEA Additional Protocol further compounds the proliferation risks. If the IAEA suspects that Saudi Arabia is using information gleaned from U.S. enrichment technologies for research that does not include nuclear materials (such as centrifuge development), neither the NPT-required safeguards nor the BSA would ensure the IAEA has access to those sites. Without an additional protocol, the IAEA will not have the authority to access undeclared sites to investigate any concerns that Saudi Arabia is pursuing unilateral activities relevant to weaponization.

A future administration could choose not to follow through on the provision of U.S. enrichment technology and materials, but that may only reduce proliferation risk for a limited period.

According to reporting in The Wall Street Journal, if the enrichment study does not support a program in Saudi Arabia, Riyadh will be able to pursue a domestic program, or with another partner, after 10 years. If this were to occur, Saudi Arabia could develop enrichment without the BSA in effect or an Additional Protocol, further increasing proliferation risks.

A common argument in favor of a nuclear cooperation agreement is that if the United States had not worked with Saudi Arabia on developing a domestic enrichment program, China or Russia would have provided the technology with fewer safeguards. There are reasons, however, to doubt that Beijing or Moscow would support domestic enrichment in Saudi Arabia.

First, both countries have been engaged in nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia for several years and refrained from providing such technology. Russia in particular sees economic benefit in nuclear cooperation agreements that have permanent fuel supply provisions attached to nuclear reactor contracts. This suggests that Russia might similarly refrain from supporting any Saudi push for the fuel cycle. Second, the United States would likely respond to Saudi Arabia developing enrichment technology with Chinese or Russian assistance with some type of economic penalty. Riyadh may not want to risk having to reorient toward Beijing and Moscow as a possible consequence of any U.S. sanctions.

This suggests that the United States had more leverage, and more time, to reach a nuclear cooperation agreement with stronger nonproliferation standards.

Furthermore, if the United States had legitimate concerns that Russia, China, or other states were intending to transfer enrichment or reprocessing technology without requiring adequate safeguards, the better alternative would be to strengthen consensus around the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply. It is not clear that the Trump administration made any effort to do so. Now, with the United States deciding to disregard the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines on requiring an Additional Protocol (or regional safeguards regime) before transferring enrichment technology, there is an increased risk that other states will follow suit. 

Compounding the Iranian and Regional Proliferation Risks

In addition to weakening broader nonproliferation norms, the Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement will also have adverse regional effects, most immediately on Iran.

Iran has long objected to being singled out for more stringent limitations and verification beyond what is required for other states. Given the uncertainties about the location and status of key nuclear technologies in Iran as a result of U.S. and Israeli strikes and Iran's pre-2003 illicit nuclear weapons program, any effective new arrangement with Iran must include the implementation of the Additional Protocol at a minimum.

The steadfast U.S. support for universalization of the Additional Protocol and more than 140 states having Additional Protocols in effect allowed Washington to argue that requiring Tehran to adhere to those more intrusive safeguards is not an exceptional ask that singles out Iran for special treatment. Tehran is likely to be even more resistant to implementing an Additional Protocol if other states in the region are not required to do so.

Furthermore, Iran is less likely to agree to a long-term enrichment suspension—which the Trump administration is pushing for—and/or cap at less than 5 percent if it feels pressured to match future Saudi nuclear capabilities. 

Similarly, the United Arab Emirates, which agreed to forgo enrichment in its nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States, has the option to renegotiate those terms if another state in the region receives more favorable conditions in a 123 deal. Renegotiation may be more attractive now if the UAE is concerned about future Iranian and Saudi proliferation. 

Congressional Options Moving Forward

As negotiated, the U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement abandons long-standing nonproliferation conditions that Republicans and Democrats have supported for decades. The United States has never before contemplated, let alone negotiated and concluded a nuclear cooperation agreement with a state that has threatened to build nuclear weapons, as Saudi Arabia’s leaders have done.

Congress has a critical opportunity, however, to prevent this agreement from entering into force. Careful consideration of the proliferation risks justifies voting to disapprove this deal. Without a veto-proof majority, however, a joint resolution of disapproval will send an important political message, but not meaningfully reduce the risk posed by the agreement. 

Another option could be to modify the terms of the deal by passing stand-alone legislation that requires Saudi Arabia to take additional steps before any U.S. nuclear technologies or materials are transferred. Congress took a similar approach toward the controversial U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement with China in 1985. In the Saudi case, this could include conditioning any exports of nuclear technology on Saudi Arabia’s adoption of the Additional Protocol. If carefully calibrated, such an approach could lead to nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia that strengthens nonproliferation, builds ties between the nuclear communities in the two states, and encourages regional collaboration on peaceful nuclear development.—KELSEY DAVENPORT, director for nonproliferation policy 

Key Questions Congress Should Be Asking:

Monitoring and Verification

• Will the BSA require Saudi Arabia to provide the IAEA with information about its uranium exploration activities conducted in cooperation with China?
• Under the BSA, will Saudi Arabia be required to accommodate IAEA requests for access to undeclared nuclear sites if the agency has concerns about illicit activities?
• Will the United States continue to support universalization of the Additional Protocol? Will the United States continue to push for other states to adopt and maintain an Additional Protocol as a condition of nuclear cooperation agreements?
• Would the Trump administration be comfortable if other nuclear-supplier states, such as China or Russia, eschewed the additional protocol as a condition of supply and they begin negotiating bilateral safeguards agreements of unknown quality and effectiveness?

Likely Transfer of Enrichment Capabilities

• What are the conclusions of classified technical assessments of whether the so-called “black box” arrangement is sufficient to guard against leakage of the technology over time?
• Saudia Arabia is currently engaged in wars on two fronts. How does the U.S. plan to ensure the physical protection and security of the facility, and at what cost?
• Is the United States concerned that Saudi Arabia might try to leverage its threat to pursue the development of nuclear weapons once there is a domestic enrichment facility operating in the country for additional U.S. security guarantees or other concessions?
• How will the United States ensure that the IAEA has access to any undeclared site if there is evidence that Saudi Arabia is using U.S. technology for covert purposes?
• Is the United States concerned that other countries would seek similar deals (with the U.S. or others) giving additional states access to key technologies necessary to produce fissile material for a bomb, and how might states that have agreed to nuclear cooperation arrangements with far tougher nonproliferation safeguards react to being "undercut" by the proposed U.S.-Saudi arrangement?

Eroding Nonproliferation Norms

• Did the United States have concrete intelligence suggesting that Russia or China would supply Saudi Arabia with enrichment technology in an agreement that does not meet the safeguards required by the NSG’s guidelines?
• Would it be more profitable for the United States to sell nuclear fuel to Saudi Arabia as part of long-term contracts for any U.S. reactor than to support a Saudi enrichment program?
• What steps did the Trump administration take to work with Russia, China, and other suppliers to strengthen the conditions of supply for sensitive nuclear technologies, like enrichment, before agreeing to a nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia that does not adhere to NSG guidelines?
• What steps is the Trump administration planning to take to prevent the further spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies after abandoning the NSG guidelines?

Implications for Iran

• Is Iran less likely to accept an Additional Protocol and enrichment suspension if the U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation agreement enters into effect?
• Does the lack of an effective nuclear agreement with Iran increase the risk that Saudi Arabia will follow through on its threats to pursue nuclear weapons to match an Iranian capability? Does the United States have a comprehensive plan for mitigating that risk?