November 6, 2026
The United Nations General Assembly’s First Committee concluded its 2026 session on Nov. 3 after passing 70 resolutions covering nuclear weapons, outer space, emerging technologies, conventional weapons, and other topics. Although many resolutions enjoyed overwhelming support, the United States consistently departed from international consensus in its votes.
The First Committee focuses on disarmament and international security, considering proposals on a wide range of weapons-related issues before forwarding them on to the General Assembly. Its annual meeting provides a forum for states to emphasize priorities, reaffirm existing commitments, and advance proposals for international cooperation.
This year, the United States opposed or abstained from otherwise popular nuclear disarmament resolutions. Notably, the United States continued its campaign against the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and was the only state opposing a resolution calling for its entry into force. The Trump administration has argued that the CTBT cannot be relied on to establish a norm against nuclear testing because its verification measures are insufficient to detect cheating – such as the purported covert nuclear test that the United States has accused China and Russia of conducting.
The U.S. delegation emphasized that “[t]he United States is not currently pursuing CTBT ratification and therefore cannot support calls for ratification and early entry into force.” The United States has “adhered to a zero-yield nuclear testing moratorium, while others have not,” the delegation continued.
The committee also considered its annual resolution on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, with 12 votes of disapproval, including from nuclear weapons states. The United States maintained its opposition to the resolution and was joined by allies—including the nuclear-armed states United Kingdom, France, and Israel.
In line with its recent acknowledgement of the existence of a U.S. space weapon, the United States also opposed a resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Israel was the only other country to vote against the resolution. The U.S. representative noted that, “[s]pace has long been weaponized,” and that “focusing our efforts on creating a treaty that would purport to ban weapons in space would not change this reality.”
The U.S. has also accused Russia and China of deploying space-based weapons.
Emerging technologies also featured prominently as the target of resolutions. A resolution on artificial intelligence in the military domain passed with sweeping approval but received notable opposition from North Korea, Israel, Russia, and the United States. The text affirms that international law and the UN Charter apply throughout the life cycle of military artificial intelligence systems and encourages international knowledge-sharing on the issue.
At the 81st UN General Assembly’s high-level week meetings held in September, U.S. President Donald Trump claimed that the United States “rejects any attempt to construct a globalist scheme to control artificial intelligence.” The U.S. delegation to the First Committee upheld this sentiment in its decision to oppose resolutions concerning AI, claiming “that the UN is not the appropriate forum for discussions on [AI] in the military domain.”
For more information on the First Committee and the resolutions that were approved visit the coverage and press releases published by the UN. —Xiaodon Liang, Libby Flatoff, and Jocelyn Bridges
China Confirms Talks on Possible Trilateral Meeting
A spokesperson for the Chinese foreign ministry confirmed Nov. 4 that officials are “in communication” with Russian and U.S. counterparts regarding a potential meeting between Presidents Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Donald Trump in November. China will host heads of government in Shenzhen Nov. 18-19 for an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit.
The idea of a trilateral meeting was floated by Russian officials in early September. The agenda for a potential meeting remains unclear; Putin has suggested that the three leaders could discuss an end to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, while Trump has proposed discussing “denuclearization” instead. A brief meeting on the sidelines of the Shenzhen summit would, however, provide scant time to initiate a full discussion on proposals for addressing the nuclear balance between the three states.
Speaking at the Valdai Discussion Club, Putin said Oct. 1 that Russia remains open to resuming dialogue on strategic nuclear forces with the United States. Washington has, instead, prioritized risk reduction conversations with Beijing.
P5 Officials Met on Sidelines of UNGA in October
Officials representing the five nuclear-armed members of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) met in New York the week of Oct. 5 for the latest “P5 process” consultation aimed at increasing mutual understanding of one another’s nuclear doctrines and postures and discussing confidence building measures relating to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, multiple diplomats told Arms Control Today on condition of anonymity.
To date, none of the five governments has publicly described the content or outcomes from the latest P5 process dialogue, which took place on the fringes of the 81st session of the UN General Assembly’s First Committee on Disarmament and International Security.
Ahead of the P5 process meetings, U.S. officials told the Wall Street Journal Sept. 24 that the Trump administration has been quietly holding talks with China about its rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal and U.S. allegations that Beijing conducted a 10-ton nuclear explosion in June 2020. That event, if confirmed as a nuclear explosion, would be a violation of the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
In a joint statement issued May 1 at the NPT Review Conference, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States suggested that the P5 process states engage in multilateral strategic stability talks on “confidence-building measures regarding nuclear explosive test monitoring, including increasing the ability to detect tests of any yield toward ensuring nuclear weapons states adhere to [the] zero-yield standard” established by the CTBT.
Top NATO Commander Signals Escalation Restraint
The NATO alliance will respond to a potential Russian armed attack with a defense by denial, Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, said Oct. 12 in a policy address at the Warsaw Security Forum. The approach will focus on blocking, blunting, and preventing an enemy advance, and, “should the adversary choose to press the attack or commit his reserves, [breaking] the warfighting system engaged against us,” Grynkewich said.
NATO would not, however, seek to impose “a strategic defeat,” the general said in his remarks. Instead, the alliance’s defense “requires the tactical and operational defeat of the forces being employed against us, but no more,” he said. The attempt at drawing a distinction is particularly critical given NATO plans for integration of missile and drone-based deep-strike capabilities into operational plans.
Grynkewich’s choice of words also contrasts sharply with the statement made in March 2022, shortly after the beginning of Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine, by Victoria Nuland, the undersecretary of state for political affairs, that the goal of U.S. policy was to seek the “strategic defeat” of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Putin referenced that turn of phrase in a Feb. 2023 speech announcing Russia’s suspension of its participation in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.
An implication of NATO’s approach to defense is that “the burden of escalation would rest squarely upon the aggressor,” Grynkewich said, in a veiled reference to potential use of nuclear weapons. “They, and they alone, would bear the full moral, political, and strategic weight of deciding whether to [escalate],” he said. Although the U.S. declaratory policy articulated by the first Trump administration permits the use of nuclear weapons to “defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners,” Grynkewich’s statement comes close to hinting that NATO would not use nuclear weapons to stop a Russian attack on the alliance – at least not immediately.
Similarly, earlier this fall, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Adm. Richard Correll, said the acquisition of new theater nuclear weapons platforms would “raise the threshold for consideration of theater nuclear employment by any potential adversary” and is “about deterrence first and foremost.” Speaking Oct. 20 at the Reagan Library, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Christopher Yeaw said new theater nuclear weapons do “not mean we’re lowering the threshold for nuclear use,” but rather would “raise the bar for any adversary’s considered first employment of nuclear weapons.”
Source: National Opinion Research Center survey, September 2026.
CTBTO, NNSA Advance Test Ban Verification Tools
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization launched Oct. 10 a major field exercise in Namibia to simulate the on-site inspections permitted by the treaty’s verification provisions. The Integrated Field Exercise, which will last through Nov. 20, is the third of its kind following prior exercises in Kazakhstan in 2008 and Jordan in 2014. Roughly 250 participants, including both CTBTO staff and experts from states-parties to the treaty, are simulating the use of “inspection techniques, equipment and procedures” to evaluate readiness for an actual inspection.
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty includes on-site inspections of suspected nuclear test sites in its set of mechanisms for verifying compliance. The CTBTO’s field exercises are a mechanism for readying capacity to perform on-site inspections pending the treaty’s entry into force.
Meanwhile, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration continued its series of underground conventional high-explosive experiments designed to provide data for improving detection of covert nuclear testing. On Sept. 30, the agency detonated a device in the P Tunnel of Area 12 at the Nevada National Security Site, and collected data using “advanced sensors, including accelerometers, seismometers, infrasound sensors, electromagnetic sensors, chemical and radiotracer samplers, and meteorological sensors,” according to a press release.
The last such experiment was conducted in October 2023, also in P Tunnel. The agency’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation plans to drill a new hole for conventional high explosive tests in a different section of the Nevada site — Rock Valley in Area 27.
France Exercises Nuclear Forces with Allies
In a move to deepen the UK-France defence relationship established in the July 2025 Northwood Declaration, the United Kingdom and France conducted their first joint nuclear exercise, codenamed “Rummy,” according to a UK Oct. 23 press release.
The release notes the goal of this exercise was to “demonstrat[e] the readiness and capability that help deter threats and keep the UK safe.” The exercise, the first of its kind, simulated a nuclear-strike mission conducted by French Rafale jets, accompanied by Royal Air Force Eurofighter Typhoon escorts.
This is the second time that French forces have invited other nations to participate in nuclear exercises. Earlier this summer, Germany participated in the French nuclear exercise “Poker,” providing conventional support to French nuclear forces.
On Oct. 6, France also conducted its first submarine launch of the new M51.3 variant of the M51 ballistic missile. The test evaluated the submarine Le Vigilant and its crew’s ability to launch the weapon under operational conditions.
Cost Uncertainties Linger as U.S. ICBM Moves Forward
The U.S. Air Force’s Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program marked key developmental milestones this fall while costs for the overall program remain murky. The Air Force announced Sept. 14 that the service and lead contractor Northrop Grumman had completed a stacking test of the Sentinel missile at Vandenberg Space Force Base, California, marking the first time the missile’s key sections and components have been vertically integrated into a single missile. The Air Force concurrently announced that the missile had passed a key review before a planned first flight test in 2027.
The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center also flight-tested on Oct. 9 the Mk21A reentry vehicle for the Sentinel missile, ahead of a critical design review scheduled for March 2027. This marks the second public test of the Mk21A; the Air Force conducted a prior test in June 2024.
Despite programmatic steps forward, the overall costs of the Sentinel program remain unknown, three years after the Air Force first reported a significant cost estimate overrun, triggering a mandatory redesign of the key modernization program. Since the Pentagon re-approved the Sentinel program in July 2024, the Air Force has worked to overhaul its basing plan. That plan now includes land purchases for at least 120 new missile silos.
According to Gen. Dale White, the Air Force’s director for critical major weapons systems, a new baseline cost estimate for the overhauled plan had not been completed as of his Sept. 14 comments to reporters.
Meanwhile, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) announced Oct. 9 that it had approved a performance baseline and greenlit full construction of the main process building of the future Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility, where plutonium pits for nuclear warheads will be assembled. The agency now says the building will have a cost of $23.5 billion – a sum identical to the placeholder figure included in the NNSA’s fiscal year 2027 budget request – and a completion date of December 2038.
The Savannah River facility will likely first produce pits for the W93 warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The development program for that warhead cleared a key design milestone in September, entering its engineering and manufacturing development phase. A planning estimate released by the NNSA in 2024 put the cost of the warhead at between $25 and $31 billion then-year dollars.
Calendar:
- November 16-20: Seventh Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Geneva
- Nov. 30: Day of Remembrance for All Victims of Chemical Warfare
- November 30-Dec. 4: First Review Conference of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), New York
- Jan. 22: 6th Anniversary of TPNW entry into force
- Jan 29-March 27: Conference on Disarmament, Geneva
- Feb. 5: First Anniversary of New START expiration
In Case You Missed It
“Face Off: Nuclear Anarchy?,” podcast series, Belfer Center for Science and International Security, October-November 2026.
“Nuclear-Weapon States Consult as Trump Talks Denuclearization,” Daryl G. Kimball, Arms Control Today, November 2026.
“The Golden Dome Proposal is Destabilizing and Dangerous,” Frederick Lamb and Laura Grego, War on the Rocks, November 5, 2026.
“Charting the New Nuclear Age: Scenarios for the Two-Nuclear-Peer Challenge,” Stacie Pettyjohn, Carlton Haelig and Natasha Lander Finch, Center for New American Security, Oct. 22, 2026.
“The US government’s dangerous rush to produce new plutonium pit,” Dylan Spaulding, Curtis T. Asplund, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Oct. 22, 2026.
“China reveals advanced nuclear sub was used to test-fire missile,” Josh Xiao, The Japan Times, Oct. 19, 2026.
“Golden Dome Is Technologically and Financially Infeasible,” Frederick Lamb and Laura Grego, War on the Rocks, Oct. 15, 2026.
“The Changing Role of Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” International Crisis Group, Oct. 13, 2026.
“The CTBT at 30: Reinforcing the Norm Against Testing,” remarks by Daryl Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association, for a briefing organized by the Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs of the Republic of Austria, Oct. 9, 2026.
“What can we learn from visual comparison of the Sentinel and Minuteman III ICBM?” Mackenzie Knight-Boyle & Hans Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, Oct. 8, 2026.
“The Nuclear Paradox: Why the World Wants both Deterrence and Disarmament,” Lauren Sukin, Luis Rodriguez, Stephen Herzog, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Oct. 6, 2026.
“China’s Uranium Enrichment Expansion: Worrisomely Large,” Hui Zhang, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Oct. 1, 2026.
“85% of Registered Voters Support the United States Working with China to Mitigate AI Risks, according to New Poll,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, Sept. 17, 2026.
“Mitigating the Risks of AI Integration Into Nuclear Weapons Operations,” excerpts of Sept. 11 remarks by U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. (Ret.) John “Jack” Shanahan, Arms Control Today, November 2026.
“The U.S.-Saudi Agreement for Civil Nuclear Cooperation: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions,” Kelsey Davenport, Arms Control Association, Sept. 1, 2026.
“U.S. Future options for nuclear deterrence and arms control: Report on the Pilot Workshop and Introduction to the Project,” Geneva Graduate Institute, September 2026.