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"Though we have acheived progress, our work is not over. That is why I support the mission of the Arms Control Association. It is, quite simply, the most effective and important organization working in the field today." 

– Larry Weiler
Former U.S.-Russian arms control negotiator
August 7, 2018
Kelsey Davenport

North Korea Conducts Fifth Nuclear Test

October 2016

By Kelsey Davenport

North Korea conducted its fifth and largest nuclear test explosion last month, prompting a number of world leaders to condemn the action and call for additional sanctions on Pyongyang over its illicit nuclear activities. 

Seismic stations picked up activity on Sept. 9 indicating an underground explosion emanating from North Korea’s nuclear test site, Punggye-ri, in the northeastern part of the country around 9 a.m. local time. North Korea confirmed that the seismic activity was caused by a nuclear explosion in a statement released several hours later and said that the test demonstrated the “toughest will” of the state to retaliate against enemy provocations. 

Researchers in South Korea check the seismic waves caused by a North Korean underground nuclear explosion September 9, which resulted in a magnitude 5.1 earthquake at the test site. (Photo credit: Woohae Cho/Getty Images)The test was North Korea’s second this year, having tested a slightly smaller device in January. North Korea also tested nuclear devices in 2006, 2009, and 2013. North Korea is prohibited from conducting nuclear tests under the terms of various UN Security Council resolutions dating back to Resolution 1718 in 2006. 

South Korean President Park Geun-hye said in response that North Korea will “face even stronger international sanctions and isolation” as a result, and the foreign ministry said that the government will maintain “a high readiness posture” against further provocations from North Korea.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, the international body that is preparing for the implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and monitors the environment for nuclear testing, estimated the seismic event had a magnitude of 5.1. 

Based on that, experts assess that the explosive yield was 10 to 20 kilotons. The test North Korea conducted earlier this year was recorded at magnitude 4.85 and was estimated to have a yield of six to 10 kilotons. (See ACT, January/February 2016.

 The Nuclear Weapons Institute of North Korea said in a statement in the state-run Korean Central News Agency that the successful test “examined and confirmed” the structure and features of a warhead and that the warhead “has been standardized to be able to be mounted on strategic ballistic missile rockets.”

The statement said that the “standard-ization of the nuclear warhead will enable [North Korea] to produce at will and as many as it wants [of] a variety of smaller, lighter, and diversified nuclear warheads.” 

Experts generally assess that North Korea has enough plutonium for six to eight nuclear weapons and could fit a nuclear warhead on a short- or medium-range ballistic missile, although the reliability of the delivery system and warhead detonation would be questionable. (See ACT, June 2014.) North Korea may also be producing highly-enriched uranium for weapons and could have enough weapons-grade material for eight to 10 additional warheads. 

UN Response

In a Sept. 9 press briefing, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon described North Korea’s nuclear test as a “brazen breach” of Security Council resolutions and urged the council to “unite and take urgent actions.” 

The council convened an emergency meeting the same day on the request of Japan. Samantha Power, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, called for new UN sanctions and said that all states must work to vigorously implement sanctions imposed under past resolutions. The call for additional sanctions was echoed by a number of other members of the council, including France, Japan, and the United Kingdom. 

Speaking to press, Vitaly Churkin, Russia’s UN ambassador, called first for a condemnation of the test and said that discussing additional measures to take against North Korea could come later. 

Liu Jieyi, China’s UN ambassador, joined in the condemnation of the test, but did not mention sanctions when he spoke to reporters. Liu said all sides should refrain from “mutual provocation” and actions that might “exacerbate the situation.” China opposes the agreement made between South Korea and the United States to deploy missile defenses in South Korea to protect against North Korean ballistic missiles. (See ACT, September 2016.

Gerard van Bohemen, New Zealand’s UN ambassador and president of the Security Council in September, said in a Sept. 9 press statement that the council discussed the test and “strongly condemned” North Korea’s action as a clear violation and “in flagrant disregard” of past Security Council resolutions. He said council members would “begin work immediately on appropriate measures” in a new Security Council resolution. The council’s response by the end of September was limited to its statement of condemnation.

Joel Wit, a former U.S. State Department official who has negotiated with North Koreans, said on Sept. 9 that although the United States should pursue sanctions and protect U.S. allies in the region, “the sanctions road is a dead end.” Wit, a senior fellow at the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University, said that the “current approach is guaranteed to fail and Pyongyang will keep on testing.” 

The current U.S. policy on negotiations with North Korea, commonly known as strategic patience, requires Pyongyang to take steps toward denuclearization before talks begin while increasing pressure on the regime through sanctions. (See ACT, January/February 2013.)

Increased Rocket Activity

North Korea’s nuclear test has been accompanied by a number of missile and rocket engine tests. 

On Sept. 20, North Korea conducted a rocket engine test at its Sohae Satellite Launching Station that it said will be used for a new space-launch vehicle. North Korea is prohibited from conducting space launches under UN Security Council resolutions because the technology is applicable to ballistic missile development, but Pyongyang does not abide by the prohibition and most recently launched a satellite on Feb. 7. (See ACT, March 2016.

An analysis of the test by aerospace engineer John Schilling, published on Sept. 21 by 38 North, an online publication of the U.S.-Korea Institute, described the rocket engine as “substantially larger and more powerful than anything North Korea has tested before.” 

In the past year, North Korea has upgraded the Sohae site to accommodate larger space-launched vehicles, but has yet to display any new systems. Schilling said that North Korea’s rocket engine tests demonstrate that Pyongyang can build rockets to its own requirements and are no longer “limited to what can be cobbled together from old Russian cold-war leftovers.” 

North Korea conducted missile tests on Sept. 5 that included the simultaneous launch of two Scud missiles with extended ranges, known as the Scud-ER. 

North Korea launched three Scud-ERs, two of which were fired within one second of each other and 30 seconds after the first launch. All three flew about 1,000 kilometers before splashing down 240 kilometers off the coast of Japan in waters claimed by Tokyo as its economic exclusion zone. The trajectories of the first and third missile were nearly identical.

The underground explosion, the second this year, drew condemnation from key world leaders and calls to impose more sanctions on Pyongyang.

The P5+1 and Iran Nuclear Deal Alert, September 30

Ministers Meet to Review Iran Deal Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) met at the ministerial level to review implementation of the nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The September 22 meeting in New York was the first ministerial-level meeting on the nuclear agreement since the ministers gathered to announce implementation of the deal in January. Iran requested that the meeting take place to review progress on the deal and to raise concerns over the slow pace of sanctions relief. European Union foreign...

Iran Continues to Comply with the Nuclear Deal

The latest IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear program confirms that the country is complying with the limits imposed by the 2015 nuclear deal.

Statement on North Korea's Fifth Nuclear Test by Daryl Kimball and Kelsey Davenport

Fifth North Korean nuclear test is alarming and cause for action to freeze its programs and reinforce global testing taboo—Statement by Executive Director Daryl G. Kimball and Director for Nonproliferation Policy Kelsey Davenport, 5am GMT, September 9, 2016.

North Korea Shifts on Denuclearization

September 2016

By Kelsey Davenport

North Korea has publicly redefined its denuclearization policy, a move that some experts say may have been intended as an overture to resume nuclear negotiations until the U.S. decision to sanction the North Korean leadership likely closed off any opportunity for new talks.

A July 6 statement by a spokesman for the North Korean government said that “the denuclearization being called for by [North Korea] is the denuclearization of the whole Korean peninsula and this includes the dismantlement of nukes in South Korea and its vicinity.”

A man in Seoul, South Korea, watches a news report September 15, 2015, on North Korea’s declaration that it had resumed normal operations at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and that the nation is improving the “quality and quantity” of its nuclear arsenal. [Photo credit: Jung Yeon-Je/AFP/Getty Images]North Korea is estimated to possess approximately six to eight plutonium-based warheads. South Korea does not have nuclear weapons, and the last U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea were withdrawn in 1991. 

Robert Carlin, a former U.S. State Department senior policy adviser to the special ambassador for talks with North Korea, said the statement marked a change from North Korea’s past characterizations of denuclearization, which stated that Pyongyang would give up its nuclear weapons only when countries such as the United States disarm.

Carlin, speaking at a July 13 press briefing hosted by the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University, said that the new position, which called only for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, is more practical and “clearly and very deliberately” lays out a definition of denuclearization similar to North Korea’s position in the 1990s, when the two Koreas signed a joint denuclearization agreement for the Korean peninsula. 

Yet, just hours after Pyongyang’s statement, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed financial sanctions on North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and several senior officials because of human rights violations. This was the first time that the United States directly targeted the North Korean leader. 

Adam Szubin, acting undersecretary of the treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence, said that action was taken to highlight Washington’s “condemnation of this regime’s abuses and our determination to see them stopped.” 

The sanctions imposed by the United States are a “dialogue killer,” said Joseph DeThomas, a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation, at the July 13 press briefing. Sanctioning Kim was a “major step” because states do not take lightly such a decision against a foreign leader, and it is unlikely that he would have been targeted personally if the United States was interested in negotiations at that time, DeThomas said. 

Pyongyang responded July 11 by saying in its state-run central news agency that it would cut off communication with the United States after Washington “impaired the dignity” of North Korea’s leadership by imposing sanctions. 

North Korea and the United States do not have diplomatic relations, but communicate via the so-called New York channel at the United Nations. North Korea said it cut off the channel after the United States refused to drop the sanctions. 

When asked about North Korea’s decision, State Department spokesman John Kirby said July 11 that the United States does not comment on the details of diplomatic exchanges, but he called on North Korea to “refrain from actions and rhetoric that only further raise tensions in the region.”

North Korea’s Conditions

In its July 6 statement, North Korea cited five specific demands for achieving denuclearization on the peninsula: public disclosure of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea, removal and verification that such weapons are not present on U.S. bases in South Korea, U.S. guarantees that it will not redeploy nuclear weapons in South Korea, U.S. assurances that it will not threaten or conduct a nuclear strike on North Korea, and withdrawal from South Korea of U.S. troops authorized to use nuclear weapons. 

North Korea said it would take “corresponding measures” if the United States satisfies its conditions. 

By invoking the names of past leaders Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung in the statement, Carlin said North Korea was signaling that this position comes from the highest authority and that Kim was putting himself behind denuclearization. 

Carlin said that there are clear similarities between these points and the 1992 joint denuclearization declaration between North Korea and South Korea and that the United States has met or generally agreed to meet the first four of the five North Korean demands. It is difficult to tell if North Korea’s offer will be completely abandoned or remain available for consideration after Pyongyang’s outrage about the sanctions dies down, Carlin said. 

IAEA Safeguards Report

Yukiya Amano, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), last month completed his yearly report on the application of IAEA safeguards in North Korea for the agency’s General Conference and Board of Governors meetings.

IAEA inspectors have not been in North Korea since 2009, but the agency continues to monitor Pyongyang’s nuclear activities through such means as satellite imagery and submits a report on any developments ahead of the IAEA General Conference, which is scheduled for Sept. 26-30.

According to the Aug. 19 report, there were no indications that the reactor at Yongbyon was operating from mid-October to early December 2015. The report noted that this time period “is sufficient for the reactor to have been de-fuelled and subsequently re-fuelled.” 

North Korea shut down the reactor in 2007, but restarted it in 2013. In the past, North Korea separated plutonium from the spent reactor fuel to provide fissile material for its nuclear warheads. 

The IAEA report also said that, from early 2016 to July 2016, there were “multiple indications consistent with the Radiochemical Laboratory’s operation.” 

The Radiochemical Laboratory was used in the past to reprocess spent fuel from the reactor at Yongbyon. If a full load of spent fuel from the reactor was reprocessed, it could yield enough separated plutonium for two to four nuclear warheads. 

The IAEA report called on North Korea to cooperate with the agency and resume full implementation of its safeguards agreement.

North Korea issued a statement redefining denuclearization, but new U.S. sanctions likely closed off any opportunity to test Pyongyang’s intentions, according to experts.

South Korea to Deploy U.S. Defense System

September 2016

By Kingston Reif and Kelsey Davenport

The United States and South Korea have agreed that the United States will deploy an advanced missile defense system on the Korean peninsula to counter North Korea, a plan that is drawing strong objections from China and vocal domestic opposition in South Korea. 

The two allies described the decision to deploy a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery “as a defensive measure to ensure the security” of South Korea and “to protect alliance military forces from North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile threats,” according to the July 8 joint announcement of the agreement. Seoul’s aim is to have the system operational by the end of 2017.

South Koreans at the Seoul Railway Station watch a television report July 13 on the planned deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system to protect the South from North Korean missiles. [Photo credit: Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images]Formal talks about deployment began in early February “in response to the evolving threat posed by North Korea,” according to the announcement. In January, North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test, which had a yield of about 10 kilotons. (See ACT, March 2016.) North Korea is also developing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles with longer ranges and tested K-11 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on July 9 and Aug. 23. 

Pyongyang embarked on an accelerated testing schedule for its intermediate-range ballistic missile, the Musudan, this spring as well as undertaking further rocket-engine tests for an intercontinental ballistic missile. (See ACT, July/August 2016; May 2016.) It is likely that North Korea already has the capability to fit a nuclear warhead on its short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, although the reliability would be uncertain. (See ACT, June 2014.) 

Three days after the U.S.-South Korean announcement, North Korea’s military threatened to respond to the THAAD deployment with “physical response measures,” including “a ruthless retaliatory strike” against South Korea. 

The mobile, ground-based THAAD system is designed to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in the middle and end stages of flight. A THAAD battery consists of interceptor missiles, launchers, a radar, a fire control and communications system, and other support equipment. A battery can hold between 48 and 72 interceptors. The THAAD system has completed 13 successful flight and interception tests since 2006, according to the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA). 

The THAAD system is intended to complement the Patriot system, which can intercept ballistic missiles at low altitudes and at short distances from its location, and the sea-based Aegis system, which can only intercept ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere. South Korea and the United States already deploy a mix of Patriot systems and Aegis ships in defense of the Korean peninsula. 

The battery will be operated by United States Forces Korea. The South Korean Defense Ministry said on July 13 that the battery would “better protect” one-half to two-thirds of South Korea’s citizens “from North Korean nuclear and missile threats.”

The defense ministry initially announced that the THAAD battery would be deployed at a military base in the southeastern county of Seongju, about 180 miles southeast of Seoul. But thousands of residents of Seongju county have demonstrated against the plan, citing concerns that the radar could pose health and environmental dangers and expressing frustration that the county was not consulted before the deployment decision. 

On Aug. 22, the defense ministry said it will review alternative locations to deploy the battery. 

China Opposes THAAD

Despite U.S. and South Korean claims that the THAAD battery will be focused solely on North Korea, China has sternly objected to the planned deployment. The decision “severely undermines China’s strategic security interests,” said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang in a July 11 press conference.

“China will take corresponding measures to safeguard its interests” in response to the deployment, Lu added. He did not specify what form such steps might take. 

Protesters outside the South Korean Defense Ministry in Seoul on July 13 denounce plans for the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system in Seongju county, about 180 miles southeast of the capital. [Photo credit: Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images]

Chinese officials have said that the THAAD system’s radar could be configured to detect and track missiles launched from China, thereby increasing the capability of U.S. missile defenses against China. 

In an Aug. 11 press conference in Seoul, U.S. Navy Vice Adm. James Syring, the director of the MDA, said the THAAD deployment “will not be part of the wider missile defense network that” the agency “has developed and commanders around the world utilize.”

The U.S. missile defense system “is not designed against China,” he said. “We don’t defend against China as a threat.”

North Korea Tests Missiles

North Korea tested a medium-range ballistic missile in August that landed approximately 125 miles off the coast of Japan in an area Tokyo claims as its economic exclusion zone. 

In an Aug. 4 statement, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe called the test “an intolerable act of recklessness” and said North Korea’s missile activities are a serious threat to Japan.

The Nodong missile, a system North Korea has tested successfully on past occasions, was launched on Aug. 3 from the southwestern tip of the country. It traveled approximately 1,000 kilometers  (620 miles) before landing in the Sea of Japan. A second missile was launched simultaneously, but exploded shortly after launch. These launches followed two Nodong tests in July that were successful but fell short of Japanese waters.

North Korea is prohibited from launching ballistic missiles under UN Security Council resolutions. The Security Council met on Aug. 4 to discuss the launch, but did not issue a statement condemning the missile test due to disagreements over language in the statement. 

An official familiar with the discussions told Arms Control Today on Aug. 15 that China wanted language in the Security Council statement saying that any deployment of missile defenses aimed at North Korea would “escalate tensions.” The United States and other members objected.

North Korea’s test launch of a K-11 SLBM took place a day after the THAAD deployment announcement. The missile appears to have exited the water successfully, but exploded after gaining altitude.

North Korea tested another SLBM on Aug. 23 from a submarine based out of Sinpo shipyard in the northeast of the country. The missile flew approximately 500 kilometers before splashing down into the ocean between North Korea and Japan. Although it is unclear what objectives Pyongyang was attempting to achieve with the test, the launch seems to have been successful.

The United States plans to operate a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in South Korea by the end of 2017.

Iran Requests IAEA Review Security

September 2016

By Kelsey Davenport

Iran is asking the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to review IAEA procedures for protecting sensitive information after the Associated Press wrote about a document allegedly laying out Iran’s future plans for its nuclear program. The IAEA denied leaking the document.

The document, as described in the July 18 article, included details on Iranian plans for phasing in advanced centrifuges in 2027. At that point, certain limitations on Iran’s uranium enrichment, including restrictions on the types of centrifuges used, expire under the July 2015 nuclear deal reached between Iran and six world powers. (See ACT, September 2015.

International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Yukiya Amano meets May 5 with Iranian Vice President Ali Akbar Salehi, who is head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna. [Photo credit: Veysel Kuecuektas/IAEA]In a July 29 statement, the IAEA said it sent a letter to Iran in reply “rejecting any statement implying that the agency has leaked information” related to Iranian declarations to the IAEA. 

Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), said on July 25 that Iran asked the IAEA in the letter to review its “methods of giving different experts access to the secret information” and to have mechanisms to “protect these secret documents.” 

Iran submitted information on the future of its nuclear program to the IAEA as part of the declaration required for implementing its additional protocol, which expands its nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA. 

In June, Reza Najafi, Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA, said that Iran would be submitting confidential information soon to the agency as part of its declaration. At that point, Najafi said Tehran “demanded that the country’s confidential nuclear data be protected.”

Iran began provisionally implementing its additional protocol Jan. 16 as part of the nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action reached between Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). 

By deploying enough advanced centrifuges, Iran could reduce the time it would take to produce enough fissile material to fuel a nuclear weapon. During the first 10 years of the nuclear deal, it would take Iran at least 12 months, according to U.S. officials. 

State Department spokesman Mark Toner said at a July 19 press briefing that, after the first decade of the agreement, Iran’s enrichment capacity will “undergo measured, incremental growth that is consistent with a peaceful civilian program.” If Iran tries to pursue nuclear weapons development at that time, Washington is confident that the safeguards in place would detect any such movement, he said.

Toner did not comment on the authenticity of the document, but said Iran’s research and development plan was “thoroughly vetted and reviewed” by the IAEA and the P5+1. 

Heavy-Water Sales

Iran reported in July that it delivered 32 tons of heavy water purchased by Washington to the United States. The deal to sell heavy water to the United States was finalized in April, but Iran did not ship the material until it received the $8.6 million payment. 

Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the AEOI, said on July 23 that Iran and Russia were finalizing the details on a sale of 40 tons of heavy water and that the AEOI is in discussion with several European countries on additional sales of heavy water. 

Iran is required under the nuclear deal to keep its stockpile of heavy water below 130 tons. Iran is still producing heavy water and slightly exceeded that limit in February, necessitating the sales. 

Iran is looking to capitalize on nuclear cooperation encouraged under the deal to further its research and development in nuclear physics. The agreement required Iran to convert its uranium-enrichment facility at Fordow into a research and development center. Iran is now looking for ways to expand work at Fordow. 

Hamid Baeedinejad, director-general for political affairs and international security in the Iranian Foreign Ministry, said Aug. 7 that Iran is in talks with several countries, including some in Europe, on cooperation to turn Fordow into a “modern center for development and research” in nuclear physics. 

New Nuclear Plants

Iran is also moving forward on plans to expand its nuclear power infrastructure and plans to begin construction on two new units at its Bushehr site. Iran currently has one nuclear power reactor at the site. Russia built and fuels the reactor. 

Rosatom, Russia’s state-owned nuclear power company, and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding in 2014 that included plans for Rosatom to supply Iran with additional units at Bushehr. This memorandum built on a 1992 agreement between Russia and Iran on nuclear cooperation. 

Salehi said that construction on the two units will begin this year, now that Russia and Iran have reached an agreement on several outstanding technical issues. Rosatom stated at the time that seismic parameters were one of the concerns holding up the construction. 

In the Iranian calendar, the current year ends March 20. Construction was originally slated to begin during the last Iranian calendar year. Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak said Aug. 8 he thought the construction could begin in 2016. 

Light-water reactors are exempt from the provision of the nuclear deal requiring approval from the procurement review process established to monitor and approve Iran’s purchases of dual-use materials.

Iran wants new procedures to protect against leaks of its sensitive information.

Syria Cited for Chemical Weapons

September 2016

By Kelsey Davenport

A panel set up by the UN Security Council concluded that the Syrian government was responsible for two attacks using chemical weapons and the Islamic State group for a third. 

In an Aug. 24 report, the panel said that the two attacks attributed to the Syrian government took place in Talmenes in April 2014 and Sarmin in March 2015. Both involved Syrian air force helicopters dropping barrel bombs with toxic substances consistent with chlorine gas, a choking agent. As a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Syria is prohibited from using chlorine gas as a weapon. 

Syrians in Daraya being treated after an alleged chemical weapons attack by government forces on January 13, 2014. [Photo credit: Fadi Dirani/AFP/Getty Images]The panel found that the Islamic State group used mortar shells filled with sulfur mustard, a blister agent that causes burns to the eyes, skin, and respiratory tract, in Marea in August 2015. 

The UN Security Council established the investigative panel in an August 2015 resolution, stating that it should “identify to the greatest extent feasible, individuals, entities, groups, or governments who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of chemicals as weapons.” 

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the body charged with overseeing and implementing the CWC, has investigated attacks using chemical weapons since 2013, but had not had the authority to identify the parties responsible for the attacks. The Security Council resolution directed that the investigation focus on attacks where the OPCW mission concluded that chemical weapons were “involved or likely involved.” The panel investigated an additional six cases between April 2014 and August 2015. In three cases, the report said that further investigation was necessary to determine responsibility for attacks involving chemical weapons. In the remaining three cases, the panel said there was insufficient evidence to draw conclusions. 

Syria acceded to the convention in 2013 and agreed to ship out its declared stockpile of 1,300 metric tons of chemical agents. (See ACT, November 2013.) The Executive Council of the OPCW expressed concern in March about the accuracy of Syria’s declaration of its chemical weapons stockpiles, although chlorine is not included in state declarations because of its industrial applications.

A panel set up by the UN Security Council concluded that the Syrian government was responsible for two attacks using chemical weapons and the Islamic State group for a third.

India to Deploy Missiles Near China

September 2016

By Kelsey Davenport

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has approved the deployment of supersonic cruise missiles along the country’s northeastern border with China, a move that Beijing’s army denounced as destabilizing the region and increasing the likelihood of confrontation. 

Brahmos missiles are seen during the rehearsal parade for India's Republic Day in New Delhi on January 20, 2007. [Photo credit: Raveendran/AFP/Getty Images]Modi chairs the Cabinet Committee on Security that in early August cleared the deployment, which includes about 100 Brahmos cruise missiles, five mobile launchers, and a command post. The missiles will be located in the region of Arunachal Pradesh, the border of which is disputed by China.

The Brahmos cruise missile, jointly developed by India and Russia, is estimated to carry a 300-kilogram warhead over a range of 290 kilometers. The missiles, which have a reported maximum speed approaching Mach 3, are likely to be armed with conventional warheads, although they could be paired with a miniaturized nuclear warhead. 

The official publication of China’s People’s Liberation Army, the PLA Daily, said Aug. 22 that India’s decision to deploy the Brahmos “exceeded its own need for self-defense and poses a serious threat to China’s Tibet and Yunnan provinces.”

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has approved the deployment of supersonic cruise missiles along the country’s northeastern border with China...

The Next President And The Iran Nuclear Deal

This op-ed originally appeared in The Huffington Post. Over the course of the presidential campaign, Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton have taken starkly different positions on the landmark 2015 nuclear deal between six world powers and Iran -‑ an agreement that verifiably blocked Tehran’s path to nuclear weapons for well over a decade and eliminated a major international security threat to the United States and our allies in the region ― but neither has explained how they would work with our allies to strengthen the agreement over the course of their term in office. Trump has suggested that...

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