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“What's really strikes me about ACA is the potential to shape the next generation of leaders on arms control and nuclear policy. This is something I witnessed firsthand as someone who was introduced to the field through ACA.”
– Alicia Sanders-Zakre
ICAN
June 2, 2022
Daryl Kimball

Russian De-Ratification of Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Would Be Self-Defeating “Own Goal,” Say Experts

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More Than 80 Civil Society Leaders Call on Russia to “Reaffirm Its Full Support for the CTBT”

For Immediate Release: Oct. 6, 2023

Media Contact: Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, (202) 463-8270 ext. 107

(Washington, D.C.)—Following remarks by Russian President Putin yesterday indicating he is “not ready to say now whether we really need or don’t need to conduct tests” and suggesting that Russia could revoke its ratification of the 1996 treaty to ban nuclear tests to “mirror” the United States, the Russian Duma will consider “de-ratification” of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The United States has signed the treaty, but unlike Russia, it has not yet ratified the pact.

“Russian ‘de-ratification’ of the CTBT would be a clumsy, self-defeating gimmick that would have no effect on the United States nuclear test ban policy,” said Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, which has campaigned for decades for a global ban on all nuclear weapons tests.

“Instead, it would undermine efforts to bring into full legal force the CTBT, which has the support of the other 186 states that have signed the treaty since 1996, including China and virtually all of the world’s non-nuclear weapon states,” he said.

Other nonproliferation experts and members of civil society agree. In a statement delivered Sept. 22 at a conference on the CTBT at the United Nations, 87 nuclear experts and organizations said:

“De-ratification would further undermine Russia's already shaky nuclear nonproliferation reputation, alienate non-nuclear weapon states, and damage the broader nuclear nonproliferation system.”

“Contrary to perceptions among some in Moscow,” Kimball added, “Russian ‘de-ratification’ of the CTBT would not in any way create leverage for Russia vis-a-vis ‘the collective West,’ nor will it change the United States government’s strong support for the CTBT and the de facto global nuclear test moratorium.”

“Ironically,” Kimball noted, “Russian ‘de-ratification’ of the CTBT would not bring the United States any closer to ratification of the treaty, which requires a supermajority of 67 out of 100 Senators. That legislative body is currently divided on highly partisan lines. Generally speaking, politicians do not change their votes under pressure from foreign governments.”

“To the contrary, it is more likely that de-ratification of the CTBT by the Duma would raise questions about whether Russia plans to resume nuclear explosive testing, which would make some U.S. Senators more hesitant about approving U.S. ratification,” said Kimball, who has lobbied for a ban on testing and the CTBT since 1990.

“De-ratification by the Duma would also contradict recent and past Russian statements and pledges on the CTBT and its nuclear test moratorium,” Kimball said.

In 2016, Russia joined the United States, China, and other members of the UN Security Council in support of Resolution 2310, which reaffirms support for the CTBT, and Russia joined a statement from its permanent five members pledging they would not take any action that would “defeat the object or purpose of the treaty.”

Resolution 2310 also took note of a Sept. 15, 2016, joint statement by the five permanent Security Council members recognizing that “a nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT.” By endorsing this language, the resolution affirmed the view of these five states that even before the treaty enters into force, all CTBT signatories have an existing obligation not to conduct nuclear test explosions.

“We strongly urge states parties to the CTBT and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which also bans nuclear tests, to call upon President Putin to reaffirm full support for the CTBT and the moratorium on nuclear testing, and not to take Russia and the world backward to a dangerous era of tit-for-tat nuclear threats and nuclear arms racing,” Kimball said.

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Consideration by the Russian Duma to “de-ratify” the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would be a "clumsy, self-defeating gimmick," say nuclear nonproliferation experts with no effect on United States nuclear test ban policy.

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Just Say ‘No’ to Uranium-Enrichment Cooperation With Saudi Arabia


October 2023
By Daryl G. Kimball

Curbing the spread of nuclear weapons and the uranium-enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technologies needed to make them has long been in U.S. security interests. Today, this is especially true in the troubled Middle East, where one state, Israel, already is nuclear-armed, and another state, Iran, has amassed a substantial uranium-enrichment capacity. The challenge of containing Iran's capabilities has grown significantly since U.S. President Donald Trump pulled out of the successful Iran nuclear deal in 2018.

Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman (L), India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi (C), and U.S. President Joe Biden attend a session as part of the G20 Leaders' Summit at the Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi on September 9, 2023. (Photo by Evelyn Hockstein/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)Further troubles loom ahead. In a Sept. 20 interview on Fox News, Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, reiterated his threat that “[i]f Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, we must obtain one as well.”

In January 2023, Saudi Arabia's energy minister, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, told a mining and industry conference in Riyadh that the oil-laden kingdom plans to enrich uranium stocks to ensure its ability to complete “the entire nuclear fuel cycle.” The Saudis have also purchased nuclear-capable Dongfeng-3 ballistic missiles from China and are manufacturing ballistic missiles that could provide the means to deliver nuclear weapons against an adversary, according to a 2022 U.S. intelligence assessment.

Disturbingly, no Biden administration official has publicly condemned the latest Saudi threat to acquire nuclear weapons if Iran does. Worse yet, The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal report that a small circle of senior Biden administration officials is engaged in active, high-level talks to supply the kingdom with a U.S.-run uranium-enrichment operation, among other nuclear supply alternatives, as part of a complex three-way deal to establish official diplomatic relations between the Saudis and the Israelis.

Whatever value a Saudi-Israeli rapprochement may serve, it must be measured against the potential damage to other long-standing U.S. and international security interests. Saudi Arabia’s brazen nuclear weapons hedging is a profound threat to the global nonproliferation regime that the United States has led for decades.

The United States has never before contemplated, let alone negotiated and concluded a nuclear cooperation agreement with a state that is threatening to leave the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and for good reason.

Unnamed Biden officials have issued vague pledges that “whatever is done regarding civil nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia or anybody else will meet stringent U.S. nonproliferation standards.” Such statements are hardly reassuring given Saudi Arabia’s stated intentions and given that the modest standards for nuclear cooperation, contained in section 123 of the 1954 U.S. Atomic Energy Act, are insufficient and out of date.

The Biden administration must commit to, and Congress must insist on, more stringent nonproliferation standards. To start, the United States must maintain its position that Saudi Arabia sign and ratify an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which allows expanded agency access to information, sites, and materials to guard against military diversion. Saudi Arabia is one of the few countries that has refused to adopt such a protocol.

But tougher IAEA safeguards are not enough. The United States must seek a legally binding Saudi commitment not to pursue or acquire enrichment and reprocessing technology. Such technology is unnecessary for the kingdom’s future nuclear energy or commercial pursuits.

The absence of such a provision would depart from the policy pursued by the three prior U.S. presidents and open the door for the kingdom to pursue fuel cycle capabilities without U.S. approval, possibly igniting a regional nuclear arms race. A typical 123 agreement merely requires that the United States consent to any request to enrich or reprocess uranium if the material is of U.S. origin.

Washington also should press the Saudis to sign the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and stipulate that U.S. nuclear cooperation will be terminated if Saudi Arabia conducts a nuclear test explosion, violates IAEA safeguards, or seeks to acquire enrichment or reprocessing technology.

If the Biden administration or a future administration concludes a 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia that does not contain adequate nonproliferation guardrails, Congress, which has the right to block the agreement, should condition its approval on the adoption of these or other higher nonproliferation standards.

U.S. and global efforts to prevent proliferation have been more successful when U.S. presidents and Congress insist on high barriers to the transfer of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology. We have seen setbacks and failures when they make exceptions for “friends“ and “partners.”

In his speech to the UN General Assembly on Sept. 19, President Joe Biden vowed that the United States would “lead by example on curbing weapons of mass destruction.” To succeed, he will need to walk the talk and avoid making compromises and exceptions for Saudi Arabia.

Curbing the spread of nuclear weapons and the uranium-enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technologies needed to make them has long been in U.S. security interests.

Civil Society Leaders Call on States to Reinforce the CTBT

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For Immediate Release: Sept. 21, 2023

Media Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, 202-463-8270 ext 107

(New York)—In a statement to be delivered at a major United Nations conference this Friday, Sept. 22, a diverse array of nongovernmental leaders in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, as well as high-level former government officials, diplomats, military leaders, scientists, and downwinders are calling on governments take urgent action to counter growing threats to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the de facto global nuclear test moratorium it has established.

Emma Bjertén, Disarmament Programme Manager for Reaching Critical Will with the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom delivered a statement on the CTBT on behalf of civil society at the 13th Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT at UN headquarters in New York.

"Since the conclusion of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which has been signed by 187 countries, nuclear testing has become taboo," the joint statement, endorsed by 87 organizations and high-level individuals, says.

The treaty prohibits “any nuclear weapons test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion,” no matter what the yield. The CTBT Organization operates a fully functional International Monitoring System (IMS) to detect and deter cheating. 

"Though it has not yet formally entered into force, the CTBT is one of the most successful and valuable agreements in the long history of nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament," the civil society leaders say.

"Like other critical nuclear risk reduction, nonproliferation, and arms control agreements," the statement warns, "the CTBT is under threat due to inattention and worsening relations between nuclear-armed adversaries. We cannot take the treaty, the IMS, or the de facto global nuclear test moratorium for granted."

"In recent years," the civil society statement notes, "the possessors of the largest nuclear arsenals have launched nuclear weapons modernization programs, some are pursuing new nuclear weapons designs, and some are increasing the size and diversity of their arsenals. Military activities and subcritical experiments at former test sites continue."

The statement notes that there has been no serious consideration of ratification of the CTBT by any of the remaining states that must still ratify for the treaty to formally enter into force: China, DPRK, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and the United States.

The statement says that "[China's] explanation for delaying formal consideration of its ratification of the treaty is no longer serious or credible. We call on China to finally initiate the process for ratification of the treaty without further delay or excuses."

As for the United States, the civil society leaders note that "the Biden administration made it clear in 2021 that the United States supports the CTBT 'and is committed to work to achieve its entry into force' ... but unfortunately, the Biden administration has, so far, done nothing to pursue the kind of outreach and education campaign that will be necessary to secure the advice and consent for ratification by the U.S. Senate," which last debated the treaty 24 years ago.

The civil society leaders urge Russia, which has signed and ratified the CTBT "to formally reaffirm its full support for the CTBT ... and work in collaboration with other states parties to engage in talks to develop voluntary confidence-building measures to ensure that ongoing experiments at former nuclear test sites are consistent with the CTBT."

"With these challenges in mind, states parties cannot afford to simply express rhetorical support. They must do more through more energetic, higher-level bilateral and multilateral diplomacy through this Article XIV process, at the UN General Assembly, the Security Council, and beyond," according to the civil society leaders.

"Now is the time," the civil society leaders implore, "for this conference and each CTBT state party to focus on new and creative approaches to overcome the stubborn intransigence of the eight remaining Annex 2 'hold-out' states, which have deprived the international community, and themselves, of the full security benefits of the treaty and its extensive verification system."

The civil society statement also reminds the 186 CTBT states parties that they "have a moral, and in some cases, a legal obligation to provide health monitoring, health care, and other forms of assistance to those impacted by nuclear weapons test explosions."

"Hundreds of thousands of people have died and millions more have suffered—and continue to suffer—from illnesses directly related to the radioactive fallout from nuclear detonations in the southwestern and western United States, islands in the Pacific, in Australia, western China, Algeria, across Russia, in eastern Kazakhstan, India, Pakistan, the DPRK, and elsewhere," the civil society statement notes.

The civil society leaders "urge all CTBT states parties (particularly nuclear-armed states) to:

  • Support further scientific research on the health and environmental effects of nuclear testing, and provide financial support for health monitoring and health care programs for populations affected by nuclear testing; and 
     
  • Cooperate with states parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) as they begin to fulfill their legal responsibilities under that treaty to provide assistance and environmental remediation to those people and regions affected by nuclear weapon use and testing. We also encourage those CTBT states parties that have not already done so to sign and ratify the TPNW, which reinforces the CTBT's prohibition on nuclear testing."

The once-every-two-years CTBT Conference on Facilitating Entry Into Force is designed to promote ratification by the remaining 44 states listed in the treaty's Article XIV, in order to trigger formal entry into force and allow the option of short-notice on-site inspections.

The full text of the statement and list of signatories is below and available as a PDF at https://www.armscontrol.org/NGO-statement-CTBT-Sept2023-conference


Advancing the CTBT and Defending the De Facto Nuclear Test Moratorium
Civil Society Statement to the 13th Article XIV Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the CTBT
Sept. 22, 2023

Since the conclusion of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has been signed by 187 countries, nuclear testing has become taboo.

All CTBT states parties agree that the treaty prohibits “any nuclear weapons test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion,” no matter what the yield. The CTBT Organization operates a fully functional International Monitoring System (IMS) to detect and deter cheating.

Most nuclear-armed states that have not signed or not ratified the CTBT, including India, Israel, and Pakistan, are currently observing nuclear testing moratoria. Even though the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) announced in January 2020 it "will no longer observe its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing," it has not yet resumed nuclear testing.

Though it has not yet formally entered into force, the CTBT is one of the most successful and valuable agreements in the long history of nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament. Without the option to conduct nuclear tests, it is more difficult, although not impossible, to develop, prove, and field new warhead designs.

Civil society friends of the CTBT welcome the governmental support for the CTBT that is evident at this assembly.

But now, after 13 such meetings, it is clear to us that new and more energetic strategies must be considered not only to advance the treaty, but to strengthen the de facto norm against testing.

Like other critical nuclear risk reduction, nonproliferation, and arms control agreements, the CTBT is under threat due to inattention and worsening relations between nuclear-armed adversaries.

In recent years, the possessors of the largest nuclear arsenals have launched nuclear weapons modernization programs, some are pursuing new nuclear weapons designs, and some are increasing the size and diversity of their arsenals. Military activities and subcritical experiments at former test sites continue. There has been no serious consideration of ratification of the CTBT by any of the remaining Annex 2 states in several years.

With these challenges in mind, states parties cannot afford to simply express rhetorical support. They must do more through more energetic, higher-level bilateral and multilateral diplomacy through this Article XIV process, at the UN General Assembly, the Security Council, and beyond.

As representatives of civil society, we offer the following observations and recommendations for all states parties to consider and pursue.

  1. Energetic Diplomacy Focused on the Eight Hold-Out States

    We welcome recent efforts to secure ratifications from several additional states. But it is now time for this conference and each CTBT state party to focus on new and creative approaches to overcome the stubborn intransigence of the eight remaining Annex 2 “hold-out” states—China, DPRK, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and the United States—which have deprived the international community, and themselves, of the full security benefits of the treaty and its extensive verification system.

    While ratifications by individual hold-out states might stimulate other hold-out states to follow suit, there is no reason for any state to make its ratification dependent upon another state’s ratification, as the treaty becomes binding for all only when all hold-out states have ratified.

    If the states parties at this conference are serious about securing entry into force, they will need to devote more significant and higher-level diplomatic pressure in the capitals of all eight CTBT hold-out states to move them to sign and/or ratify the treaty.
  • The People’s Republic of China: Since halting nuclear testing and signing the CTBT in 1996, China’s leaders and officials have consistently expressed their support for the CTBT, but they have failed to follow through with ratification. Chinese leadership is important and overdue. The government’s explanation for delaying formal consideration of its ratification of the treaty is no longer serious or credible. We call on China to finally initiate the process for ratification of the treaty without further delay or excuses.
     
  • The United States: After some senior Trump administration officials callously discussed in 2020 that the United States should resume nuclear testing for the first time since 1992 to try to intimidate Russia and China, the Biden administration made it clear in 2021 that the United States supports the CTBT “and is committed to work to achieve its entry into force.”

    We welcome these statements of support, but unfortunately, the Biden administration has, so far, done nothing to pursue the kind of outreach and education campaign that will be necessary to secure the advice and consent for ratification by the U.S. Senate. Given that the United States has not conducted a nuclear test explosion in more than 30 years and has no technical, military, or political reason to resume testing, the national security case for ratification and strengthening the barriers against testing by others is even stronger than when it was last considered by the Senate in 1999.

    One salient issue that will need to be addressed to secure U.S. ratification is the recent U.S. State Department charge that “during the 1995–2018 timeframe, Russia probably conducted nuclear weapons-related tests” at its former test site at Novaya Zemlya. The assessment provides no evidence of the charge and does not claim the Russian activities were militarily significant. Russia, which has signed and ratified the CTBT, has vigorously denied the charge and repeatedly pointed to the failure of the United States to ratify the treaty.

    The United States, China, and Russia, all CTBT signatories, all continue to engage in weapons-related activities at their former nuclear testing sites. Although the IMS is operational and far more effective than originally envisioned, very low-yield nuclear test explosions can still be difficult to detect without on-site monitoring equipment or inspections, which will not be in place until after entry into force.

    To address concerns about clandestine activities at former test sites, states parties should explore the development of voluntary confidence-building measures designed to detect and deter possible low-level, clandestine nuclear testing.

    In a positive move, in June National Nuclear Security Administrator, Jill Hruby, announced that her agency is "open to working with others to develop a regime that would allow reciprocal observation with radiation detection equipment at each other’s subcritical experiments to allow confirmation that the experiment was consistent with the CTBT."

    We urge all CTBT states parties, especially those with active nuclear test sites, to engage in this important technical dialogue to improve capabilities to ensure compliance before and after the treaty's entry into force.
  • The Russian Federation: More than thirty years ago, citizen activists and independence leaders in Kazakhstan forced the Russian leadership to halt nuclear testing. In the years that followed, Russia actively supported the negotiation of the CTBT and it ratified the treaty.

    Now, unfortunately, there are credible reports that senior Russian officials have been discussing the option of "unratifying" the CTBT in order to achieve symmetry with the United States in all areas of nuclear policy, but no official decisions have been made.

    Such a move would be self-defeating and would sabotage the CTBT regime.

    Contrary to perceptions of extremists in Moscow, "un-ratification" would not in any way create leverage for Russia vis-a-vis "the collective West." Instead, it would undermine Russia's already shaky nuclear nonproliferation standing, alienate nonnuclear weapon states, and damage the broader nuclear nonproliferation system.

    Recall that in 2016, Russia joined the United States, China, and other members of the UN Security Council in support of Resolution 2310, which reaffirms support for the CTBT, and Russia joined a statement from its permanent five members pledging they would not take any action that would “defeat the object or purpose of the treaty."

    According to an August 29 report by the news outlet RBC, a Russian Foreign Ministry official said that as for the possibility of Russia withdrawing its ratification, the official said that the option "is not under consideration at the moment."

    We strongly urge Russia to formally reaffirm its full support for the CTBT and to work constructively with other friends of the CTBT to urge the remaining hold-out states to sign and/or ratify the treaty without delay and work in collaboration with other states parties to engage in talks to develop voluntary confidence-building measures to ensure that ongoing experiments at former nuclear test sites are consistent with the CTBT.
     
  • India and Pakistan: Since their destabilizing tit-for-tat nuclear detonations in 1998, India and Pakistan have refused to reconsider the CTBT even though neither country has expressed an interest in, nor technical justification for, renewing nuclear testing. UN Security Council Resolution 1172 paragraph 13 “urges India and Pakistan ... to become Parties to the ... Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions.”

    India and/or Pakistan could advance the cause of nuclear disarmament, enhance their national security and nonproliferation reputations, and ease concerns about a resumption of nuclear testing, by converting their unilateral test moratoria into legally binding commitments through the CTBT.
  • The Middle East: Ratification of the CTBT by Egypt, Iran, and nuclear-armed Israel— all of which must ratify to trigger CTBT entry into force—and Saudi Arabia would reduce nuclear weapons-related security concerns in the region. It would also help create the conditions necessary to achieve their common, stated goal of a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East. A goal of the co-chairs of the Article XIV process should be to approach each of these governments to gain a clearer understanding regarding the circumstances that would allow each to join the CTBT.
     
  • The DPRK: Pyongyang's push to build-up its nuclear weapons capabilities represents another threat to the norm against nuclear testing. Although Chairman Kim Jong Un has green-lighted further ballistic missile testing and fissile material production, he has not ordered the resumption of nuclear testing since he announced a unilateral nuclear test moratorium in the spring of 2018. However, the closure of the DPRK’s test site has still not been verified, and the DPRK has not made a legally binding commitment to halt nuclear test explosions by signing and ratifying the CTBT.

    All CTBT signatory states should underscore, in multilateral and bilateral fora and in meetings with the government in Pyongyang, that signature and ratification of the treaty would represent a significant step toward denuclearization and help create the conditions for peace and normalization of relations.

    In particular, we call upon the leadership of China and Russia, which maintain ties to the DPRK, to press Chairman Kim to reaffirm the DPRK's nuclear test moratorium and, as former CTBTO Executive Secretary Lassina Zerbo proposed in 2018, urge him to sign the CTBT like all the other major nuclear powers have done, and close the Punggye- ri Nuclear Test Site under international supervision.
  1. Addressing the Human Cost of Nuclear Testing

Since 1945, there have been 2,056 nuclear weapons test explosions. Of that total, the United States detonated some 1,030 test explosions and the Russian Federation detonated 715.

The CTBT and the de facto global nuclear testing moratoria help reduce further health and environmental injury from further nuclear weapons testing. CTBT states parties have a moral, and in some cases, a legal obligation to provide health monitoring, health care, and other forms of assistance to those impacted by nuclear weapons test explosions.

Hundreds of thousands of people have died and millions more have suffered—and continue to suffer—from illnesses directly related to the radioactive fallout from nuclear detonations in the southwestern and western United States, islands in the Pacific, in Australia, western China, Algeria, across Russia, in eastern Kazakhstan, India, Pakistan, the DPRK, and elsewhere.

For example, in Kazakhstan, where the Soviet Union conducted more than 450 nuclear test detonations, including 116 in the atmosphere, the Kazakh government estimates more than 1.5 million people were harmed and it is clear that many continue to suffer the effects of these detonations.

Fallout from U.S. atmospheric nuclear blasts at the Nevada Test Site may have caused 10,000 to 75,000 thyroid cancers in the United States, according to a 1990 National Cancer Institute study. A new study, released in July by Princeton University researchers, shows that the fallout from the 1945 Trinity test reached 46 states, Canada, and Mexico within 10 days of detonation. The study also reanalyzed fallout from all 93 aboveground U.S. atomic tests in Nevada and suggests that earlier official assessments underestimated the scope of the contamination, which reached all regions of the continental United States and points beyond.

In the Marshall Islands, where the United States detonated massive above ground nuclear tests in the 1940s and 1950s, the scale of damage from nuclear testing was immense. The 67 U.S. atmospheric nuclear weapons tests—23 at Bikini Atoll and 44 at Enewetak Atoll—spewed radioactivity over the entirety of the Marshall Islands and produced a total explosive power of 108.5 megatons (TNT equivalent). That was about 100 times the total yield of all atmospheric tests conducted at the Nevada Test Site.

Today, the United States and the Republic of the Marshall Islands are negotiating the terms of a new Compact of Free Association that obligates the United States to help address the damage caused by past nuclear testing.

We join others in urging the Biden administration to agree to provide the necessary financial and technical support for long-term environmental remediation programs, expansion access to health care especially as it relates to treatment related to illnesses associated with radiation exposure, and for building independent capacity to monitor, assess, and address environmental and health needs of the Marshallese in the years to come.

An independent 2021 scientific investigation using information from declassified French military archives re-evaluated the estimations of the doses of radioactivity received by the civilian population of so-called French Polynesia after the six most contaminating French atmospheric tests. The study found that France’s atomic energy commission calculations of the maximum dose received by the local inhabitants were between twice to ten times lower than the updated estimates. We urge all CTBT states parties (particularly nuclear-armed states) to:

  • Support further scientific research on the health and environmental effects of nuclear testing, and provide financial support for health monitoring and health care programs for populations affected by nuclear testing; and
     
  • Cooperate with states parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) as they begin to fulfill their legal responsibilities under that treaty to provide assistance and environmental remediation to those people and regions affected by nuclear weapon use and testing. We also encourage those CTBT states parties that have not already done so to sign and ratify the TPNW, which reinforces the CTBT's prohibition on nuclear testing.

Bottom Line

More than a quarter century since they were established, the CTBT and the CTBTO enjoy broad support and have been highly successful. But we cannot take the treaty, the IMS, or the de facto global nuclear test moratorium for granted.

Now is the time to act to reinforce the treaty and the global norm against nuclear testing, which is important for the achievement of nuclear disarmament.

Endorsed by:

Dr. Rebecca E. Johnson, Executive Director, Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy

Giancarlo Aragona, former Italian Ambassador Moscow and London, former Director of Political Affairs in the Foreign Ministry, and member of the European Leadership Network

Thomas Countryman, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, Chair of the Board of the Arms Control Association

Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association

Shatabhisha Shetty, Director, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

Tanya Ogilvie-White, Senior Research Advisor, Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

Joel Petersson Ivre, Policy Fellow, Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non- Proliferation and Disarmament

Peter Wilk, M.D., Administrative Chair, Back from the Brink Coalition

Sebastian Brixey-Williams, British American Security Information Council (BASIC)

Lord Des Browne of Ladyton, Vice-Chair, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)* and former Minister of Defence of the United Kingdom

Susan F. Burk former Special Representative of the President on Nuclear Nonproliferation, and member of the ACA Board of Directors

Rachel Bronson, Ph.D., President & CEO, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Francesco Calogero, Emeritus Professor of Theoretical Physics, University of Rome*

Lord Walter Menzies Campbell of Pittenweem, member of the European Leadership Network*

Dr. Tobias Fella, Coordinator, Commission on Challenges to Deep Cuts*

Dr. Pierce Corden, Former Director of Administration, CTBTO Preparatory Commission John Tierney, Executive Director, Council for a Livable World

Admiral (ret.) Giampaolo Di Paola, former Minister of Defence and former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, and currently Chairman of the Board of Aerea*

Sergio Duarte, Amb. (ret.), Ministry of External Relations of Brazil* and former UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

Lucia Centallas, Founder and Executive Director, Bolivian Women's Efforts

Marc Finaud, Senior Advisor, Associate Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)*

Hubert K. Foy, Director and Senior Research Scientist, African Center for Science and International Security*

Rebecca Davis Gibbons, Professor, University of Southern Maine*

Robert Goldston, Professor, Princeton University, Department of Astrophysical Sciences, Affiliated Faculty Program on Science and Global Security*

Ambassador Thomas Greminger, Executive Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy

Lisbeth Gronlund, Visiting Scholar, Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy, Nuclear Science and Engineering Dept, Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

Amb. Thomas Hajnoczi, (ret.), formerly Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

Lord David Hannay of Chiswick, and member of the European Leadership Network*

Blaise Imbert, Finance Officer, Initiatives pour le Désarmement Nucléaire (IDN)*

Zahnd Patrick, Professeur à Sciences Po Paris, Initiatives pour le Désarmement Nucléaire (IDN)*

Annick Suzor-Weiner, Professor Emeritus, Initiatives pour le Désarmement Nucléaire (IDN)

Daniel Högsta, Interim Executive Director, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN)

Michael Christ, Executive Director, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW)

Garry Jacobd, President and CEO, World Academy of Art and Science*

Tedo Japaridze, Ambassador, former Foreign Minister of Georgia, and Chairman of the Center for Foreign Policy and Diplomatic Studies, House of Justice, Tbilisi

Angela Kane, Former UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

Dr. Togzhan Kassenova, Senior Fellow, Center for Policy Research, University at Albany*

Jan Kavan, former Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, and former President of the UN General Assembly

David A. Koplow, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center*

Dr. Ulrich Kühn, Director Arms Control and Emerging Technologies Program, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg*

Frederick K. Lamb, Research Professor of Physics and Astronomy and Core Faculty Member, Program in Arms Control & Domestic and International Security, University of Illinois*

Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, Vice President, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy

John Burroughs, Senior Analyst, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy

Benetick Kabua Maddison, Executive Director, Marshallese Educational Initiative

János Martonyi, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, and Professor Emeritus at the University of Szeged

Kazumi Matsui, Mayor of Hiroshima and President of Mayors for Peace*

Oliver Meier, Policy and Research Director, European Leadership Network* Ivana Nikolić Hughes, President, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Lord David Owen, former Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom Kevin Martin, President, Peace Action

John Hallam, Nuclear Disarmament Campaigner, People for Nuclear Disarmament

Matthias Grosse Perdekamp, Professor of Physics and Head of the Department of Physics, University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign*

Sebastien Philippe, Research Scholar, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University*

Martin Fleck, Director, Nuclear Weapons Abolition Program, Physicians for Social Responsibility (National)

Denise Duffield, Associate Director, Physicians for Social Responsibility-Los Angeles

Dr. Emma Belcher, President, Ploughshares Fund

Stewart Prager, Professor of Astrophysical Sciences Emeritus, affiliated with the Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University*

Alexander Glaser, Co-Director, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University

Frank N. von Hippel, Senior Research Scientist and Professor of Public and International Affairs emeritus, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University*

Francesca Giovannini, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School

William Potter, Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey*

Robert K. Musil, Ph.D., M.P.H., President & CEO, Rachel Carson Council

Amb. (ret.), Jaap Ramaker, Chair of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament

Tariq Rauf, former Head of Verification and Security Policy, IAEA, and former Consulting Advisor to the Executive Secretary for Policy and Outreach, CTBTO

Ray Acheson, Director, Reaching Critical Will

Lord Martin Rees, Astronomer Royal, and Emeritus Professor of Cosmology and Astrophysics, Department of Astronomy, University of Cambridge*

Christian N. Ciobanu, Project Coordinator, Reverse The Trend: Save Our People, Save Our Planet

Alan Robock, Distinguished Professor, Rutgers University

Carlo Schaerf, Professor of Physics, and co-founder of the International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts (ISODARCO)

Sahil V. Shah Senior Fellow and Program Manager, Janne E. Nolan Center on Strategic Weapons, Council on Strategic Risks*

Mark Muhich, Chairman, Sierra Club Stop Nuclear Weapons Team

Stefano Silvestri, Professor, Scientific Advisor, Istituto Affari Internazionali*

Dr. Jennifer Allen Simons, Founder and President, The Simons Foundation Canada

Ivo Slaus, Professor of Physics Emeritus, Honorary President of the Board of Trustees of the World Academy of Art and Science, and the European Leadership Network*

Goran Svilanovic, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro

Greg Thielmann, former Director of the Strategic, Proliferation and Military Affairs, at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and member of the ACA Board of Directors

Aaron Tovish, Founder and Member of the Coordinating Committee of NoFirstUse Global*

Carlo Trezza, former Ambassador of Italy to the Conference on Disarmament, former Chair of the Missile Technology Control Regime, and member of the European Leadership Network*

Lord David Triesman of Tottenham, member of the European Leadership Network*

Marylia Kelley, Senior Advisor, Tri-Valley CAREs (Communities Against a Radioactive Environment)

Dr. Tara Drozdenko, Director, Global Security Program, Union of Concerned Scientists

Dylan Spaulding, Senior Scientist, Union of Concerned Scientists

Deb Sawyer, Facilitator, Utah Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

Jacqueline Cabasso, Executive Director, Western States Legal Foundation

Elayne Whyte-Gomez, Professor of Practice, School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, former Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations Office in Geneva, and President of the Negotiating Conference for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Dr. Klaus Wittmann, Brigadier General (ret.) with the German Armed Forces, Potsdam University

Uta Zapf, former Chair of the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation of the Deutsche Bundestag

*Statement coordinated by the Arms Control Association

Description: 

Nongovernmental leaders in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, as well as high-level former government officials, scientists, and downwinders are calling on governments take urgent action to counter growing threats to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the de facto global nuclear test moratorium.

“Somebody Has to Make the First Move”

Inside the Arms Control Association September 2023 On June 2, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan spoke at ACA’s Annual Meeting and announced that “rather than waiting to resolve all of our bilateral differences, the United States is ready to engage Russia now to manage nuclear risks and develop a post-2026 arms control framework” and “without preconditions.” The Kremlin responded cautiously saying Russia would study with care any formal proposal for discussions from Washington. It was an encouraging sign and since then, we have been closely monitoring and persistently encouraging the two...

Defending the De Facto Nuclear Test Ban


September 2023
By Daryl G. Kimball

More than 30 years ago, citizen activists and independence leaders in Kazakhstan forced Russia to halt nuclear testing, prompting the United States, under pressure from U.S. activists and members of Congress, to adopt a nine-month testing halt in 1992. On July 3, 1993, U.S. President Bill Clinton extended that moratorium and announced plans to pursue negotiations on a global, comprehensive test ban treaty. After more than 2,000 deadly nuclear test explosions worldwide since 1945, including 715 Soviet tests and more than 1,030 U.S. tests, these developments marked the beginning of the end of the nuclear testing era.

The former Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site in eastern Kazakhstan, looking toward the ground zero for the first Soviet nuclear weapon test explosion, which was conducted on Aug. 29, 1949. (Photo by Daryl G. Kimball)Since the conclusion of the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has been signed by 186 countries, nuclear testing has become taboo. All CTBT states agree that the treaty prohibits “any nuclear weapons test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion” no matter what the yield. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization operates the fully functional International Monitoring System (IMS) to detect and deter cheating. Most nuclear-armed states that have not signed or not ratified the CTBT, including China, India, Israel, and Pakistan, are observing nuclear testing moratoria.

Although it has not yet formally entered into force, the CTBT is one of the most successful agreements in the long history of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. Without the option to conduct nuclear tests, it is more difficult, although not impossible, for states to develop, prove, and field new warhead designs.

But as with other critical nuclear risk reduction, nonproliferation, and arms control agreements, the CTBT is under threat due to inattention, diplomatic sclerosis, and worsening relations between nuclear-armed adversaries.

After senior U.S. officials in the Trump administration in 2020 callously discussed having the United States resume nuclear testing to try to intimidate China and Russia, the Biden administration made it clear in 2021 that “the United States supports [the CTBT] and is committed to work to achieve its entry into force.”

But the Biden administration has done none of the outreach and education that will be necessary to secure treaty ratification by the Senate. Given that the United States has not conducted a nuclear test in more than 30 years and has no technical, military, or political reason to resume testing, the national security case for ratification and for strengthening the barriers against testing by others is even stronger than when the treaty was last considered by the Senate in 1999.

One salient issue that needs addressing is the recent U.S. charge that “during the 1995-2018 timeframe, Russia probably conducted nuclear weapons-related tests” at its former test site at Novaya Zemlya. The assessment provides no evidence and does not claim that the Russian activities were militarily significant. Russia, which ratified the CTBT, has denied the charge and repeatedly pointed to the U.S. failure to ratify the treaty.

China, Russia, and the United States continue to engage in weapons-related activities at their former nuclear testing sites. Although the IMS is operational and far more effective than originally envisioned, very low-yield nuclear test explosions still can be difficult to detect without on-site inspections, which will not be in place until after the treaty’s entry into force.

To address concerns about clandestine activities at former test sites, CTBT states-parties should adopt voluntary confidence-building measures designed to detect and deter possible low-level, clandestine nuclear testing by the major nuclear powers. In a positive move, Jill Hruby, administrator at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, announced in June that her agency is “open to working with others to develop a regime that would allow reciprocal observation with radiation detection equipment at each other’s subcritical experiments to allow confirmation that the experiment was consistent with the CTBT.”

Meanwhile, Russia may be on the verge of further nuclear nonproliferation sabotage. Russian officials acknowledge reports that they are considering the self-defeating option of “unratifying” the CTBT to achieve symmetry with Washington in all areas of nuclear policy, but say no official decisions have been made.

Contrary to the perceptions of extremists in Moscow, “unratification” would not create leverage for Russia vis-à-vis the collective West. Rather, it would undermine Russia’s already shaky nuclear nonproliferation standing, alienate non-nuclear-weapon states, and set back the very popular and heretofore very successful CTBT regime. In 2016, Russia joined the United States and other members of the UN Security Council in supporting Resolution 2310, which strongly reaffirms support for the CTBT, and a statement from its five permanent members pledging that they would not take any action that would “defeat the object or purpose of the treaty.”

As diplomats from CTBT signatory states gather this month for the next conference on facilitating the CTBT’s entry into force, more energetic strategies must be considered not only to advance the treaty, but to strengthen the de facto norm against testing.

 

Although it has not yet formally entered into force, the CTBT is one of the most successful agreements in the long history of nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. But as with other critical nuclear risk reduction, nonproliferation, and arms control agreements, the CTBT is under threat due to inattention, diplomatic sclerosis, and worsening relations between nuclear-armed adversaries.

NPT Meeting Underscores Chronic Divisions


September 2023
By Gabriela Iveliz Rosa Hernández, Jupiter Kaishu Huang, and Daryl Kimball

Despite growing threats to the nonproliferation and disarmament regime, states-parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) failed to bridge fundamental policy differences during a July 31-Aug. 11 meeting in Vienna.

Safeguards agreements and additional protocols were the focus of one side event at the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) meeting at The Hague on July 31-Aug. 11. Panelists included, from left, Takeshi Hikihara, the Japanese ambassador to the UN International Organizations in Vienna; Massimo Aparo, deputy director-general at the International Atomic Energy Agency; Levent Eler, Turkish ambassador to the UN International Organizations in Vienna; and Susan Pickett, head of the IAEA Safeguards Training Section. (Photo by Dean Calma/IAEA)The results of the first preparatory committee meeting for the 11th NPT Review Conference underscored deep fissures over the implementation of key treaty obligations, differences between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states over disarmament and deterrence, and simmering disputes about nuclear weapons sharing arrangements.

Ideally, NPT preparatory committee meetings should end with a formal agreement on the draft rules of procedure and provisional agenda that is reflected in a formal summary and the chair’s recommendations for the review conference. But increasing geopolitical tensions are making it difficult to reach an agreement on even some of the most fundamental matters.

Due to the objections of various delegations, the Vienna meeting collapsed without the chair issuing a formal summary. That document is meant to put on record what states discussed during the meeting and serve as a blueprint for further discussion. (See ACT, September 2022.)

Instead, the chair’s recommendations to strengthen the preparatory process for the next review conference were issued as a working paper, which has become a common outcome.

Under the NPT, the 191 states-parties are obligated “to pursue good faith measures to the cessation of an arms race at an early date and to disarmament,” while non-nuclear-weapon states are committed to forgo acquiring or developing nuclear weapons and to pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy under safeguards.

Preparatory committee meetings are intended to review and promote the full implementation of the NPT and forward findings to the review conferences, which are scheduled to take place every five years. (See ACT, July/August 2023.) As with the NPT review conferences, preparatory meetings operate on the basis of consensus.

Disarmament

At the Vienna meeting, numerous states-parties expressed support for implementation of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which restricts the size of the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals and is the last remaining arms control agreement between them. (See ACT, April 2023.)

“Countries with the largest nuclear arsenals must continue to fulfill their special and primary responsibilities for nuclear disarmament, effectively implement…New START…and further significantly and substantially reduce their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable, irreversible, and legally binding manner,” the Chinese delegation said in a statement.

Beijing and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) stressed the importance of Russia and the United States furthering the disarmament process by committing to deeper reductions in their arsenals.

Many states, including Australia, France, Japan, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden, and the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), comprising Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, New Zealand, and South Africa, expressed concern about Russia’s suspension of its implementation of New START. Some countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary Norway, Poland, Slovenia, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, called on Russia to return to full compliance with New START.

In a statement on Aug. 3, the Russian delegation insisted that Russia “continue[s] to adhere to the central quantitative limits stipulated in…New START…, inform the United States of launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles through an exchange of relevant notifications, and observe a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of ground launched intermediate- and shorter-range missiles until similar U.S.-made weapons emerge in relevant regions.” (See ACT, March 2023.)

In addition to urging Russia and the United States to resume a bilateral arms control dialogue, China, the NAC, and the NAM called for sustained engagement in multilateral formats on NPT Article VI by the five states authorized to possess nuclear weapons under the NPT (China, France, Russia, the UK, and the United States).

The U.S. delegation reported that it had organized a working-level expert meeting with the four other nuclear-weapon states on Aug. 2 in Vienna to discuss strategic risk reduction measures.

Nuclear Sharing

States-parties clashed over nuclear sharing agreements. This discussion was spurred by Russia’s announcement in March that it planned to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and prompted states belonging to the NAC and the NAM to broaden criticism of nuclear sharing practices.

“[A]ny horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon-sharing by states-parties constitutes a clear violation of non-proliferation obligations undertaken” under the NPT, the NAM said in a statement Aug. 4. “The [NAM], therefore, urges these states-parties to put an end to nuclear weapon-sharing with other states under any circumstances and any kind of security arrangements in times of peace or in times of war, including in the framework of military alliances.”

The NAC previously criticized nuclear sharing practices in a working paper issued on June 31. On July 2, China called for a “withdrawal of nuclear weapons deployed overseas.” This marked a shift from the 10th NPT Review Conference in 2022, when Beijing criticized nuclear- sharing arrangements more generally and noted that they “run counter to the provisions of the NPT and increase the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear conflicts.”

Nuclear Deterrence

The Vienna meeting also highlighted deep divisions over disarmament and the role of nuclear deterrence. “We cannot rely with any degree of certainty that nuclear deterrence is or will be effective, but we know for sure that nuclear deterrence can fail,” the Austrian delegation said in an Aug. 10 statement.

The Polish delegation responded by asserting that nuclear deterrence is essential for the security of some states under prevailing security circumstances and that the security of states cannot be diminished in the pursuit of the goals of the NPT.

Brazil on Aug. 3 criticized attempts by various delegations to distinguish between “responsible” and “irresponsible” nuclear-armed states, arguing that the concept of “responsible” possession of weapons of mass destruction is an oxymoron. “Responsibility is not binary,” said Flávio Soares Damico, Brazil’s representative to the meeting. “Neither are behaviors. Nuclear deterrence doctrines, even the most defensive in nature, always rest upon a credible threat of use of nuclear weapons.”

Nuclear Propulsion

Some states-parties raised nonproliferation concerns about the AUKUS agreement by which the UK and the United States will supply Australia with nuclear-powered submarines fueled by highly enriched uranium. (See ACT, July/August 2022.) Delegates from China, Iran, and Russia described the agreement as a challenge to the nonproliferation regime while other states took a less confrontational approach. “Discussions regarding nuclear naval propulsion should be aimed at strengthening safeguards verification mechanism under the [International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)] framework in a transparent, inclusive, and accountable manner,” the Indonesian delegation said.

The UK and the United States stressed that their arrangement would be done in cooperation with the IAEA and conform with safeguards arrangements. The Australian, UK, and U.S. leaders “have made clear that the provision of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines to Australia will be carried out in a manner that sets the highest nonproliferation standard and strengthens the global nonproliferation regime,” according to a U.S. statement on Aug. 3.

Summary Report Debate

According to a brief by Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, an expert on the NPT review cycle process, NPT states-parties “have never agreed on substantive recommendations, and no factual summary has been adopted by a [preparatory committee] session since 2002. Instead, [the preparatory committee] chairs usually issue draft summaries and recommendations as working papers in their own capacity.” At the Vienna meeting, some states-parties took issue with the chair's summary and argued against including it in the procedural report, while others argued that it should not be included in the documentation of the review cycle altogether.

“A summary should contain facts.… [I]t should not look like the perceptions of the chair,” the Iranian delegation argued on Aug. 11. Indonesia and South Africa, among others, also complained that the factual summary was problematic. “We agree that the text cannot be considered factual,” the South African delegation said on Aug. 11, highlighting how the summary elevated nonproliferation over disarmament issues in the first paragraph.

The chair’s summary said that states-parties reaffirmed the central role of the NPT “as the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the foundation of the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.” But New Zealand, South Africa, and other countries took issue with the chair's language, which they argued implies a hierarchy of objectives by making disarmament aspirational rather than legally binding.

Iran, backed by Russia and Syria, objected to the summary being listed even as a working paper. The Iranian delegation alleged that the summary negatively singled out Iran and presented a one-sided view of the situation relating to the 2015 nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and that the chair had given preference to the Western group of delegations.

As a result, the meeting chair, Jarmo Viinanen, Finnish ambassador for arms control, removed the factual summary altogether from the review cycle documents, a sign of trouble ahead at the next NPT review conference in 2026. The second preparatory committee meeting is set for July 22-Aug. 2, 2024, in Geneva and will be chaired by Akan Rakhmetullin, Kazakhstan’s ambassador to the United Nations.

Fissures over the implementation of key treaty obligations, nuclear deterrence, and nuclear-weapon sharing arrangements dominated the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty gathering.  

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