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"[Arms Control Today] has become indispensable! I think it is the combination of the critical period we are in and the quality of the product. I found myself reading the May issue from cover to cover."

– Frank von Hippel
Co-Director of Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University
Daryl G. Kimball

Pandemic Reveals Misplaced Priorities


April 2020
By Daryl G. Kimball

For decades, national security and health experts have warned of the risks of global threats that are simply too big for one country to handle, such as disease pandemics, climate change, and nuclear war. For many years, the response of our national and global leaders has fallen short.

Twenty years ago, John Steinbruner, then the chair of the Arms Control Association Board of Directors, warned in his book Principles of Global Security that globalization is generating “a new class of security problems in which dispersed processes pose dangers of large magnitude and incalculable probability.” He argued that policymakers “will have to shift from contingency reaction to anticipatory prevention” and “this will have to be done in global coalition.”

Unfortunately, U.S. spending priorities and modes of thinking about security have been become increasingly defined in military terms. Congress provided a record $746 billion for national defense in fiscal year 2020. U.S. arms manufacturers dominate the global arms trade and help fuel regional conflicts that undermine human development. In recent years, the Trump administration’s nationalist “America First” foreign policy has made it even more difficult for the world’s leading nations to work together on the toughest global challenges.

Today, the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, which threatens the lives and livelihoods of millions worldwide, has laid bare the terrible human cost of these misplaced policy choices.

As the scope and scale of the coronavirus threat began to reveal itself in January and February, the Trump administration focused on other matters. For example, the administration in February asked Congress for $44.5 billion in fiscal year 2021 for programs to maintain and upgrade the U.S. nuclear arsenal, a 19 percent increase above the previous year.

The U.S. government spends tens of billions of taxpayer dollars to maintain a massive nuclear arsenal capable of destroying the planet many times over. Meanwhile, it does not have a stockpile of masks large enough to protect front-line health care workers who are battling COVID-19 and is proposing to cut programs that help provide for early disease detection.

The U.S. stockpile of medical supplies includes 12 million medical-grade N95 masks and 30 million surgical masks, which is only about 1 percent of the 3.5 billion needed in a year to deal with a disease pandemic. At the price of $0.50 a mask, it would cost approximately $1.75 billion to build up the N95 stockpile and about $350 million a year to replace expired masks, according to a report published by The War Zone. That is less than the $3.2 billion increase above fiscal year 2020 levels that the Pentagon is seeking for its multiyear programs to sustain and rebuild the U.S. triad of nuclear-armed missiles, submarines, and bombers.

Meanwhile, the administration is proposing to slash by 37 percent the budget request for the Defense Department’s Biological Threat Reduction Program, which “seeks to facilitate detection and reporting of diseases caused by especially dangerous pathogens.” As a result of that program’s previously provided threat reduction training efforts, local officials in Thailand detected the first case of the novel coronavirus there, only days after its initial discovery in Wuhan, China.

Now is the time for Congress to radically scale back the existing plan to replace and upgrade the already excessive U.S. nuclear arsenal, particularly plans for new missiles and bombers, new nuclear warheads, and production infrastructure. This would save billions of taxpayer dollars that should be spent on addressing higher priority human and health security needs.

Making matters worse, the United States has become part of the problem rather than helping to find viable solutions to counter the most serious global threats.

While the Trump administration is seeking to expand U.S. nuclear capabilities at the expense of programs that address human security needs, it is turning its back on hard-won agreements that have effectively reduced the nuclear threat.

President Donald Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal with no viable plan to replace it creates the potential for a new nuclear crisis. Iran’s leaders have retaliated to the reimposition of U.S. sanctions by breaching key limits on their nuclear activities.

In addition, the post-Cold War progress toward reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons has stalled. To date, Trump has failed to take up Russia’s offer to extend the only remaining treaty that limits the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals, the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The global nonproliferation and disarmament regime, the best prophylactic against a nuclear pandemic, is under serious threat.

The unfolding COVID-19 outbreak will not only take away the lives of people, but it will change our personal lives, and it will very likely force changes in the international system. If we are to survive well into this century, there must be a profound shift in the way we deal with global security challenges and how we align our scientific, economic, diplomatic, and political resources to address the health, climate, and nuclear dangers that threaten us all.

 

For decades, national security and health experts have warned of the risks of global threats that are simply too big for one country to handle, such as disease pandemics, climate change, and nuclear war. For many years, the response of our national and global leaders has fallen short.

NPT Review Conference To Be Postponed


April 2020
By Daryl G. Kimball

The global coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has forced a postponement of the 10th review conference of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), possibly until early 2021. Originally scheduled to be held at UN headquarters in New York from April 27 until May 22, the conference typically involves hundreds of representatives from most of the 191 states-parties to the treaty, as well as nongovernmental organizations and meeting support personnel. The conference caps off a five-year cycle of meetings through which states-parties review implementation and compliance with the treaty and seek agreement on action steps to overcome new challenges and to fulfill core goals and objectives.

Gustavo Zlauvinen of Argentina, president-designate of the 2020 NPT Review Conference, addresses the UN Security Council in February. (Photo: Evan Schneider/UN)In a March 26 interview with Arms Control Today, conference president-designate Gustavo Zlauvinen of Argentina said that after extensive consultations, he circulated a proposal on March 25 to NPT regional groups to postpone the review conference “until such time as conditions permit, but not later than April 2021.”

Zlauvinen said his communication explained that because the pandemic makes it impractical to hold meetings at the present time, the only way for states-parties to express their agreement on a decision to postpone the review conference is to do so in writing, and he requested responses by March 27.

All other related preparatory meetings and consultations, including plans for NPT workshops in Jordan, Mexico, and Thailand, have been postponed. A U.S.-hosted third working group meeting for the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament initiative, planned for April 8–9 in Washington, has also been postponed.

In March, as the scale and scope of the pandemic grew, Zlauvinen said he began discussing conference options with senior UN officials and NPT states parties, including the UN secretary-general on March 4. On March 13, he circulated a proposal to delegations calling for the conference to be “suspended” until a later date after a short procedural meeting on April 27 to elect a conference officers and possibly to agree on a program of work, if conditions allowed.

Given the importance of the NPT, Zlauvinen said he initially wanted to hold the meeting on April 27 to provide a strong “symbolic” start to the review conference and to “maintain the integrity” of the review process. The conference had originally been scheduled to begin the same day.

As the COVID-19 outbreak worsened in New York, however, the prospects of an in-person procedural meeting on April 27 became untenable, Zlauvinen said.

Another option explored was to use video conferencing to hold the April 27 meeting, he said, but that arrangement could have led to technical difficulties for some states, including potential problems regarding procedures and voting. He also said that there were differing views among states-parties about selecting a date for resuming the conference, with some seeking rescheduling in early 2021, others in the late-fall of 2020, while others proposed an earlier date.

According to a Xinhua news report in March, the Non-Aligned Movement of 120 member states decided on March 12 to recommend postponing the review conference to April and May of next year, saying it is too important to hold on a smaller scale at an earlier date.

Taking these factors into account, Zlauvinen came to the conclusion that he should recommend to states-parties that the meeting should be postponed until such time as it is possible for “the review conference to undertake its important work.”

When the review conference will be held remains unclear. In addition to the uncertainties about the duration of the pandemic, Zlauvinen said that another complicating factor is that the UN conference facilities in New York are almost completely booked with other official events, including rescheduled events, for the next several months.

Preparations for the review conference have been underway for some time and have experienced other unexpected turns. Last year, the preparatory meeting for the 2020 review conference tapped veteran Argentine diplomat Rafael Grossi as president-designate for the meeting. In late 2019, however, he was selected to become the new director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

In his place, Argentina put forward Zlauvinen, who is a deputy foreign minister and has a long track record on nonproliferation matters. He served as the IAEA representative to the United Nations in New York for nearly eight years and was an alternate head of the IAEA’s NPT delegation from 2002 to 2009.

The NPT, which marked it 50th anniversary of entry into force on March 5, obligates the five nuclear-weapon states recognized by the treaty not to help non-nuclear-weapon states develop or acquire nuclear weapons, it obligates the non-nuclear-weapon states to forswear the pursuit of such weapons, it acknowledges the “inalienable right” of states-parties the peaceful use of nuclear energy under safeguards, and the treaty commits states-parties to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”

The challenges facing the treaty have grown in recent years, especially since 2015 when NPT states-parties failed to reach agreement on a final document at that year’s review conference. Many non-nuclear-weapon states have also argued that key benchmarks agreed to at the historic 1995 review and extension conference and the successful 2010 review have not been met by the nuclear-weapon states.

At a UN Security Council session on nuclear nonproliferation issues convened by Germany in February, the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu warned that “relationships between states, especially nuclear-weapon states, are fractured.”

“The specter of unconstrained nuclear competition looms over us for the first time since the 1970s. We are witnessing what has been termed a qualitative nuclear arms race, one not based on numbers but on faster, stealthier and more accurate weapons. Regional conflicts with a nuclear dimension are worsening, and proliferation challenges are not receding,” she said.

“I hope the review conference can serve as a springboard for thinking on how to address the nuclear weapons challenges of our time,” Nakamitsu told the council.

“Obviously the NPT is not on the top of the priority list for our governments right now. The pandemic is, and rightly so. Once we resolve the issue of the postponement and once travel restrictions are lifted, I plan to continue the series of regional seminars on the three pillars of the NPT that my predecessor, Ambassador Grossi, started, as well as my personal consultations with states-parties in Geneva, Vienna, in New York, and in other capitals,” Zlauvinen said.

“Once we can move back into the important discussions on all of the issues relating to the NPT, I hope the states-parties can think like a community and find common solutions to common challenges,” Zlauvinen added. “The coronavirus is an invisible enemy—you don’t see the virus. It requires a concerted global effort. Nuclear weapons are also a kind of invisible threat that most nonexperts don’t think about in their everyday lives. These are both global challenges that require global solutions.”—DARYL G. KIMBALL

 

COVID-19 Delays Security Meetings

A lone worker walks through the rotunda of the Vienna International Centre on March 19. The center normally houses more than 2,200 IAEA employees who have been directed to work at home during the public health crisis caused by the novel coronavirus. (Photo: Dean Calma/IAEA)Efforts to slow the spread of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19), have led to a suspension of arms control and international security meetings at the UN and other institutions in Geneva, New York, Vienna, and beyond.

Most prominently, this year’s review conference for the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) at UN headquarters in New York has been postponed.

In Vienna, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has delayed or deferred most events through the end of May, including the eighth review conference of the Nuclear Safety Convention. The IAEA is maintaining its nuclear safeguards operations, including in Iran. The IAEA and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization are operating remotely, following instructions of Austrian authorities.

Mandatory restrictions in Switzerland have locked down the nation, including a ban on gatherings of more than five people until mid-April. As a result, the Palais des Nations has minimized its on-site staff and cancelled upcoming events. Among them are two plenary sessions of the Conference on Disarmament, as well as a working group and second informal meeting in preparation for the sixth conference of parties to the Arms Trade Treaty.

Also delayed is the third round of consultations on a political declaration to address the humanitarian harm arising from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.

Other meetings affected by COVID-19 include the Group of Seven summit, once scheduled to
be hosted by the United States, which will now be held via video conference June 10–12.
—LEA SCHAAD and DARYL G. KIMBALL

Reflecting public health concerns, the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference, scheduled to begin Apr. 27, will be postponed.

ACA and the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic

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March 24, 2020

Dear friends and colleagues around the globe,

We hope you and your family are taking good care in these anxious times.

Whether it is an unprecedented public health crisis, a climate emergency, or the threat of nuclear war, we are all in this together and our collective actions can make a difference.

The coronavirus pandemic underscores the importance of effective global governance and international cooperation.

Our staff and Board of Directors remain committed to advancing the core mission of the Arms Control Association: eliminating the threats posed by the world's most dangerous weapons.

Thanks to our loyal members and supporters, we are fortunate to have the resources and flexibility necessary to continue our work in the difficult months ahead. Here is what we are doing:

  • Our 12-person staff team is now set up for teleworking. We will continue our work, including producing and publishing the news and analysis you have come to rely upon, such as our flagship journal, Arms Control Today.
  • In the coming weeks, we will offer new virtual engagement opportunities for members and other supporters. Our 2020 Annual Meeting has been postponed and will shift to an interactive streaming format. We’ll continue our series of occasional member telebriefings. We’ll also be active through our social media platforms, including Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, and Instagram.
  • We will continue our public policy and media outreach campaigns to shore-up the guardrails against nuclear catastrophe: the nonproliferation and arms control agreements and diplomacy that are increasingly under threat.
  • As a leader in the field, we will continue to communicate with other organizations, experts, and networks in the United States and around the world about how we can adapt to the changes that the coronavirus crisis will impose on the international system. We will continue to encourage more effective international cooperation and governance.

We all may be more physically distant these days, but we ask that you stay in touch, and we welcome your suggestions and ideas. After all, we need one another more than ever.

You can contact us at 202-463-8270 or email us at [email protected].

Thank you and please be safe,

Daryl G. Kimball,
Executive Director

Risks and Realities of Extending the UN Arms Embargo on Iran

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Volume 12, Issue 2, March 5, 2020

More than a decade ago, the United States and its partners secured UN Security Council support for a series of resolutions imposing increasingly tough sanctions on Iran as part of an effort to pressure Tehran into multilateral talks to curb its nuclear program and block its pathways to nuclear weapons.

The United States along with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the European Union (P5+1), combined international pressure with multilateral negotiations, a strategy that produced the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA successfully rolled back Iran’s nuclear program, imposed a stringent new set of monitoring and verification requirements, some of which are permanent, and established an array of restrictions that limited Iran’s uranium enrichment for more than a decade, and effectively closed off its capability to produce plutonium. The deal also includes a permanent prohibition on certain nuclear weapons-related activities that also have non-nuclear applications. In exchange, Iran received relief from the United States, the United Nations, and European Union sanctions that were imposed as part of the pressure campaign.

Despite Iran’s adherence to the JCPOA, President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the agreement in May 2018 and violated U.S. JCPOA commitments by reimposing sanctions on Iran. The Trump administration also urged other countries to refrain from conducting legitimate business with Iran.

A year after Trump’s announcement, Iran stated that it would begin reducing compliance with the JCPOA, and it has taken a series of five steps designed to press the remaining parties to the deal to deliver on sanctions relief envisioned by the accord. Iranian officials continue to reiterate that its violations are reversible and that Tehran will return to compliance if its demands on sanctions relief are met.

The Arms Embargo, Nuclear Sanctions, and the JCPOA

As part of the initial, broader effort to pressure Iran into negotiating over its nuclear program, the UN Security Council passed several resolutions that imposed an arms embargo on Iran. (A full list of UN Security Council resolutions on Iran is available online.) The arms embargo provisions are, therefore, a nuclear-related sanction. U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice originally emphasized in 2010, when the arms embargo was expanded as part of Resolution 1929, that the sanctions would be suspended if a nuclear deal was reached.

In a statement issued on behalf of the P5+1, the United Kingdom’s ambassador to the UN, Sir Mark Lyall Grant, made a similar point about the intent of the sanctions in Resolution 1929. He said the aim of the sanctions was “to achieve a comprehensive and long-term settlement which would restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.”

During negotiations on the JCPOA, Iran argued that the arms embargo should be lifted immediately upon implementation of the nuclear deal and Russia and China supported that effort, according to former Secretary of State John Kerry. Kerry said that the United States pressed for retaining it and negotiated the five-year extension, which is reflected in Annex B, Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2231.

Resolution 2231, which was adopted unanimously by the Security Council in 2015, endorsed the JCPOA, lifted the majority of the UN sanctions and modified other nuclear-related measures, such as the arms embargo and prohibition on ballistic missile transfers. Under the terms of Resolution 2231, this five-year period ends in October 2020, unless UN sanctions on Iran are snapped back into place. Kerry described the five-year extension as a victory for the United States because, as he noted in 2015, Resolution 1929 “says specifically that if Iran comes to negotiate – not even get a deal, but comes to negotiate – sanctions would be lifted.”

Now, press reports indicate that some opponents of the JCPOA are pressing Congressional members to support a renewal or extension of the arms embargo at the UN Security Council. Although these Congressional efforts do not explicitly reference support for the snapback mechanism set up in Resolution 2231, urging the Trump administration to ensure the continuation of the UN arms embargo could be interpreted by Trump as a green light from Congress to pursue that strategy. (And because a wholly new resolution seeking to extend the arms embargo on Iran would assuredly be vetoed by Russia or China.)

On a superficial level, calls for extending the arms embargo on Iran may seem like a useful and politically expedient response to Iran’s aggressive activities in the Middle East region. But in reality, such exhortations could undermine regional security by facilitating the Trump administration’s efforts to dismantle the JCPOA completely.

Reimposing UN Sanctions Would Collapse the Iran Nuclear Deal

Although the Trump administration announced its withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018 and is no longer party to the agreement, some members of the  Trump administration believe the United States can still use the mechanism set out in Resolution 2231 to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran, including the arms embargo. "We're aiming to get that [arms embargo] extended," Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said March 5.

The Trump administration appears to believe that it can still trigger sanctions snapback at the Security Council because the United States was never formally removed from the original list of JCPOA participating states in Resolution 2231.

Other UN Security Council members, who strongly support the JCPOA, will argue that this legal argument is baseless since Trump declared that the United States is no longer a party to the JCPOA. They will surely seek to block any effort to put the issue of snapping back sanctions on Iran on the Security Council’s agenda. Once and if the issue is put on the Security Council agenda, however, the process for reimposing sanctions under Resolution 2231 cannot be vetoed.

If the Trump administration is successful in snapping back UN sanctions, the JCPOA will very likely collapse, which could trigger a new nuclear crisis.

Iran has made clear that it will withdraw from the nuclear if any state attempts to pursue a snapback at the Security Council. In that event, Iran’s nuclear program would be unconstrained and could be subject to far less intrusive monitoring.

Additionally, pushing to renew the arms embargo now based on Iran’s destabilizing regional activity further damages U.S. credibility. Arguing that the arms embargo should be extended on that basis changes the original intent and motivation behind the sanctions, which was to pressure Iran to negotiate on its nuclear program. Altering the requirements for lifting those sanctions reinforces the message to Iran that the United States cannot be trusted to waive sanctions if Tehran meets the originally described pathway to lifting the restrictions. This would make any future negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program even more difficult, as Iran will have little reason to trust the United States would follow through on its commitments.

The expiration of the arms embargo could have troublesome consequences, but the United States has other tools to address Iran’s conventional arms trade that do not risk a collapse of the 2015 nuclear deal and inflict damage to the reputation and influence of the United States.

Calls to extend the arms embargo risk conveying Congressional support for triggering the UNSC Resolution 2231 snapback mechanism, which would only escalate the Trump administration’s self-created crisis over Iran’s nuclear program and further undermine U.S. and international security.

The smarter approach for U.S. policymakers is to support more realistic and effective diplomatic efforts, beginning with a return to U.S. and Iranian compliance to the JCPOA, and a broader negotiation on a follow-on nuclear agreement that builds on the 2015 deal and that takes on other issues of mutual concern, including destabilizing arms transfers to states in the Middle East region.—KELSEY DAVENPORT, director for nonproliferation policy, and DARYL G. KIMBALL, executive director.

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On a superficial level, calls for extending the arms embargo on Iran may seem like a useful and politically expedient response to Iran’s aggressive activities in the Middle East region. But in reality, such exhortations could undermine regional security.

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No One Wins an Arms Race or a Nuclear War


March 2020
By Daryl G. Kimball

Fulfilling a goal outlined in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review report, the Trump administration acknowledged last month that the United States has deployed for the first time a low-yield nuclear warhead on some U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

The move comes as the administration is proposing to increase spending to more than $44 billion next year to continue and, in some cases, accelerate programs to replace and upgrade all the major elements of the bloated U.S. arsenal. Unless curtailed, the plan, which departs in important ways from long-standing U.S. policies, will accelerate global nuclear competition and increase the risk of nuclear war.

As if to underscore the dangers of the administration’s strategy, the Defense Department led an exercise last month simulating a limited nuclear war. “The scenario included a European contingency…. Russia decides to use a low-yield, limited nuclear weapon against a site on NATO territory,” and the United States fires back with a “limited” nuclear response, according to the Pentagon. The U.S. response presumably involved the low-yield sub-launched warhead, known as the W76-2.

The exercise perpetuates the dangerous illusion that a nuclear war can be fought and won. The new warhead, which packs a five-kiloton explosive yield, is large enough destroy a large city. It would be delivered on the same type of long-range ballistic missile launched from the same strategic submarine that carries missiles loaded with 100-kiloton strategic warheads. Russian military leaders would be hard pressed to know, in the heat of a crisis, whether the missile was part of a “limited” strike or the first wave of an all-out nuclear attack.

Nevertheless, Trump officials insist that the president needs “more credible” nuclear use options to deter the possible first use of nuclear weapons by Russia. In reality, once nuclear weapons of any kind are detonated in a conflict between nuclear-armed adversaries, there is no guarantee against a cycle of escalation leading to all-out global nuclear war. Lowering the threshold for nuclear use by making nuclear weapons “more usable” takes the United States and Russia and the world in the wrong direction.

The administration plans do not stop there. Its fiscal year 2021 budget proposal calls for other new kinds of destabilizing nuclear weapons systems, including a new nuclear warhead for SLBMs, dubbed the W93, and a new nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile for deployment on surface ships and submarines. If developed, the W93 would be the first new warhead design added to the U.S. arsenal in more than three decades.

The Defense Department is also seeking $28.9 billion next year, a 30 percent increase, for programs to sustain and recapitalize the existing nuclear arsenal.

The Pentagon’s nuclear modernization spending binge includes $4.4 billion to begin construction of a fleet of 12 Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines; $2.8 billion for the new B-21 stealth bomber program; $1.5 billion to start work on a new ground-based intercontinental ballistic missile system; and $500 million to continue development work on a new nuclear-armed, air-launched cruise missile.

The administration is also demanding a 25 percent boost for the National Nuclear Security Administration’s weapons budget, to $15.6 billion, to cover the growing cost of nuclear warhead refurbishment, design, and production work. This includes expanding the capacity to build plutonium warhead cores to at least 80 per year—an unrealistic and unnecessary goal.

The administration’s grandiose proposals not only would contribute to a dangerous global qualitative nuclear arms race, but they are excessive and unaffordable. Over the next 30 years, these and other nuclear weapons programs are estimated to cost taxpayers at least $1.5 trillion.

Worse yet, the Trump administration’s program of record would sustain deployed strategic warhead numbers at levels 30 percent higher than the Pentagon itself determined in 2013 is necessary to deter nuclear attack. Taken together, Trump’s policies to “greatly strengthen and expand” the U.S. nuclear capability and his failure to engage in good faith negotiations to end the arms race and pursue disarmament are a violation of U.S. obligations under Article VI of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

It does not have to be this way. First, the Trump administration needs to heed calls from military officials, U.S. allies, and bipartisan national security leaders to take up Russia’s offer to extend the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty by five years before it is due to expire early next year. Without the treaty, the doors to an open-ended global nuclear arms competition will swing open. History shows that there are no winners in a nuclear arms race.

Second, the Congress, and perhaps a new president in 2021, must rein in the exploding cost and scope of the U.S. nuclear modernization program, particularly the efforts to develop “more usable” nuclear weapons. Hundreds of billions of dollars can be saved by delaying, trimming, or eliminating major elements of the current plan while maintaining a devastating nuclear deterrent. This would allow for those monies to be redirected to other, more urgent national security projects and domestic programs that address real human needs.

Fulfilling a goal outlined in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review report, the Trump administration acknowledged last month that the United States has deployed for the first time a low-yield nuclear warhead on some U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

Donald Trump Is Destroying Nuclear Arms Control

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