Volume 4, Issue 12, October 24, 2013
While much of the world's attention will remained focused on Iran's  negotiations with six world powers over its nuclear program, Iran will  meet with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna on  October 28 to continue talks over the agency's approach to investigating  Tehran's alleged weapons-related nuclear activities. 
These  talks provide Iran with an important opportunity to address concerns  about its past nuclear activities. Only with such cooperation can the  IAEA assure the international community that Iran is no longer pursing  actions related to nuclear-weapons development.
Iran-IAEA Negotiations
In  an annex to its November 2011 report on Iran's nuclear program, the  IAEA detailed concerns about several types of activities with potential  military dimensions that the agency is requesting that Iran address.  They include:
- High-explosives experiments with nuclear weapons implications;
 - Neutron initiation and detonator development;
 - Suspected work to fit a nuclear warhead on a missile, along with arming, firing and fusing mechanisms; and
 - Iranian procurement activities related to its alleged warhead work.
 
Following  up on these allegations, the IAEA submitted to Iran on February 20,  2012 a document identifying the kinds of actions that Iran needs to take  to respond to the IAEA's concerns. This document is referred to as the  "structured approach." Iran submitted a reply to the IAEA on February  26, 2012, which included an edited version of the structured approach document. The document presented Tehran's  preference on how the agency should proceed with the investigations. 
In  total, Iran and the IAEA have met 11 times to negotiate the approach to  the agency's investigations and resolvethe differences first laid out  in February 2012. But the sides have failed to make progress on an  agreement that will allow the agency to begin its work. In an address to  the agency's Board of Governors on June 4, 2013, IAEA Director-General  Yukiya Amano said that after the first ten meetings, no progress had  been made on the negotiations, and that the talks are "going around in  circles." 
Despite this lack of progress in the past, the October  28 meeting represents an important opportunity to make progress on the  structured approach. This will be the second meeting between Iran and  the IAEA since Hassan Rouhani took office as President in August.  Rouhani, widely acknowledged to be more moderate than his predecessor,  pledged to make Iran's nuclear program "more transparent." 
Rouhani  also appointed a new ambassador to the IAEA, Reza Najafi. Najafi  resumed negotiations on the structured approach with the IAEA on  September 27, an introductory meeting that both he and IAEA Deputy  Director Herman Naeckerts described as "constructive." 
Still,  significant differences remain, despite the change in leadership. In a  September 26, 2013 document submitted to the IAEA following the agency's  August 2013 report on Iran's nuclear program, Iran continued to insist  that the IAEA provide it access to the evidence upon which it based it  allegations about the possible military dimensions and raised objections  to the agency's proposed approach to the investigation.  
Disputed Process
A  comparison of the approaches favored by Iran and the IAEA indicate  several areas of dispute that are preventing agreement on a modality for  allowing the IAEA investigation to begin. As indicated by its February  2012 edits to the structured approach document, Iran objects to the  IAEA's proposal on the sequence, scope, and allowance for follow-up  activities as the investigation continues. While Tehran should have a  say about how the IAEA proceeds, placing undue or arbitrary restrictions  on the agency's investigations will continue to fuel international  speculation that Iran has nuclear weapons ambitions. 
Sequencing: In the February 2012 document, the IAEA laid out its intended sequence  for investigating the topics of concern, but noted that some of the  areas identified "may also be dealt with in parallel." Iran deleted the  clause allowing for parallel investigations in its edits to the document  and added the following language in a later paragraph "after  implementation of action on each topic, it will be considered concluded  and then the work on the next topic will start."
Iran's  earlier rejection of parallel investigations would only prolong the  process and hinder the IAEA's activities because many of the areas that  the IAEA identified are interlinked. It is logical that, if in the  course of its investigations in one area, it obtains information  relating to another question, it be allowed to direct its attention to  these multiple areas simultaneously. 
Scope: In 2012, Iran wanted to limit the scope of the IAEA's investigations to  only those issues identified in the annex to the November 2011 report. 
It  may be reasonable to begin with these issues, but the IAEA cannot agree  ahead of time not to pursue new areas of concern that might emerge  during the process and leave important questions unanswered.
Follow Up: In the 2012 structured approach document, the IAEA stated that it would  identify follow-up actions throughout the process as necessary to  facilitate its investigations. Iran's proposal on the approach removed  that clause that would allow the IAEA to identify any further actions  necessary throughout the investigations. 
Restricting  the agency's ability to follow up if new areas of concern emerge could  prevent the IAEA from asserting that all of Iran's nuclear activities  are entirely peaceful. In addition, evidence provided to the IAEA about  Iran's activities comes in part from intelligence gathered by member  states. It is unlikely that this information provides a complete picture  of Iran's alleged nuclear activities with military dimensions.
If  Iran wants to demonstrate the entirely peaceful nature of its nuclear  program, then it should prioritize reaching an agreement with the IAEA  that would allow the agency to proceed with its investigation as soon as  possible. 
The IAEA could encourage Iranian cooperation by  assuring Tehran that the agency would not punish Iran in the future if  it comes clean about its past activities and the agency is able to  conclude that these activities are no longer being pursued. 
Additional Transparency Measures
In  the September 26 submission to the IAEA, Iran also explained its  decision not to implement the Additional Protocol to its safeguards  agreement or Modified Code 3.1 of its safeguards agreement. In both  cases, Iran maintains that it has chosen not to observe the agreements  because the IAEA's investigations into Iran's nuclear program are  politicized and not based on technical or legal justifications. 
Iran  should reconsider its decision not to implement these agreements. While  Iran is not legally required to implement the Additional Protocol, the  transparency gained by such actions would go a long way to provide  further evidence that Iran's nuclear program is for entirely peaceful  purposes, as it claims. 
If Iran implements Code 3.1, the IAEA  will receive information about any plans Tehran has to expand its  nuclear program earlier than it would under the existing safeguards  agreement. Iran would also be obligated to share any design changes to  existing nuclear facilities. This would give the agency a clearer  picture of the trajectory of Iran's nuclear program and provide early  assurances about the nature and purpose of new facilities. 
The  Additional Protocol would allow the IAEA to visit all of the facilities  associated with Iran's nuclear activities, including sites that the  agency does not currently have access to, such as the uranium mines,  Iran's centrifuge production facilities, and its heavy water production  plant. The Additional Protocol also substantially expands the IAEA's  ability to check for clandestine, undeclared, nuclear facilities by  providing the agency with authority to visit any facility, declared or  not, to investigate questions about or inconsistencies in a state's  nuclear declarations. 
With the Additional Protocol in effect,  the IAEA would also be able to visit any site on very short notice.  These monitoring and verification measures would give the agency a more  complete picture of Iran's nuclear activities and allow for early  detection of deviations from peaceful activities. Early notification  would give the international community time to respond to any dash Iran  might make toward building nuclear weapons. 
Implementing the  Additional Protocol is a step Iran could take quickly because it already  negotiated the agreement with the IAEA. Iran signed the document and  voluntarily implemented it between 2003-2006. However, because Tehran  did not ratify the Additional Protocol, it is not legally bound to  follow it. 
Moving Forward
While the  scope of Iran's future nuclear activities will be determined by the  outcome of its negotiations with the P5+1 (China, France, Germany,  Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), an agreement is  unlikely to be reached if Tehran does not answer the IAEA's concerns and  assure the international community that it is not actively pursuing the  development of nuclear weapons. 
A deal that allows Iran to  enrich uranium only to normal reactor-grade levels, limits its  enrichment capacity and stockpile, and grants the IAEA more extensive  access and monitoring, in exchange for a phased lifting of international  sanctions related to its nuclear activities, is still within reach. For  it to be realized, however, Iran must cooperate with the IAEA and allow  the agency to resolve its outstanding concerns over Tehran's nuclear  activities with possible military dimensions.--KELSEY DAVENPORT
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The Arms Control Association (ACA) is an independent, membership-based organization dedicated to  providing information and practical policy solutions to address the  dangers posed by the world's most dangerous weapons. ACA publishes the  monthly journal, Arms Control Today. Daryl G. Kimball is ACA's executive director.