Remarks at a Joint Briefing at the UNGA First Committee on
"Advancing Article VI Goals as New START Expires"
Daryl G. Kimball, Arms Control Association
October 9, 2025
In just 119 days, on Feb. 5, 2026, the last remaining treaty limiting the two largest nuclear arsenals—the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)—will expire.
The treaty limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads on no more than 700 operational launchers (i.e. long-range missiles and bombers) and has provided greater predictability in the dangerous Russian-U.S. deterrence relationship.
As Trump said July 25 in response to a question about expiration of the treaty, “We are starting to work on that. That is a big problem for the world, when you take off nuclear restrictions.”
Unless the two leaders reach an interim deal to maintain existing limits, each side could quickly increase the size of its deployed nuclear arsenal for the first time in more than 35 years by uploading additional warheads on their existing long-range missiles.
Unfortunately, there are many in Washington, D.C., in the Congress, in the Pentagon, and in the nuclear weapons establishment, who are advocating that the United States build-up the size of the deployed strategic nuclear force in order to counter China's growing strategic nuclear arsenal in the name of an outdated, Cold-War era "damage limitation" concept that posits that the United States must hold at risk every aversary nuclear weapons than could potentially strike the U.S. homeland or its allies.
As most of us already realize, more nuclear weapons will not make anyone safer, and limiting damage in a nuclear war is an illusion.
The United States, along with Russia and China, each already have a devastating, survivable nuclear force that is more than sufficient to deter nuclear attack. Adding more nuclear weapons to these arsenals would not change the fundamental calculations about the initiation of nuclear weapons use by any nuclear-armed adversary.
A new Russian and U.S. buildup would further destabilize the mutual balance of nuclear terror; strain the already costly, behind-schedule U.S. nuclear modernization program; and create further disincentives for China to halt or reverse its ongoing nuclear buildup.
Instead, it is vital for international peace and security, for the preservation of the NPT regime, and for U.S. and Russian national security that they resume serious talks to verifiably reduce their still massive nuclear arsenals.
U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control and reduction negotiations have never been easy, but history shows it is possible are possible if both sides are serious and ready to find win-win solutions.
Near the end of his first term, in 2020, Trump failed to make headway with Russia on a new nuclear arms control agreement, in part because his national security team convinced him to try to pressure China in a three-way negotiation. China, which has a smaller arsenal, is concerned about its vulnerability to a first strike and values opacity, rebuffed the proposal. Russia responded by insisting that France and the United Kingdom also be involved.
This time, around all sides will need to craft a more practical and effective approaches.
We have a good first step in the right direction almost in hand. President Putin proposed on Sept. 22 that the two sides should seek a simple, informal deal to maintain the existing caps after the treaty expires, as long as the other side does so. This is an idea that my organization, the Arms Control Association has been advocating for some time.
It was very encouraging that when he was asked on October 5, about Putin's proposal, President Trump, said: "It is a good idea."
Why? Because continuing to stay below the central limits of New START -- 1,550 deployed strategic warheads on no more than 700 strategic delivery vehicles -- for at least one year beyond its expiration will help reduce tensions, forestall a costly arms race that no one can win, create diplomatic leverage to curb the buildup of China’s arsenal, and buy time for talks on a broader, more durable, treaty.
It is possible, but unlikely, that the two sides could go slightly further and resume data exchanges and inspections. If that doesn't prove feasible, they could simply monitor compliance through their national technical means of intelligence.
It is now vital that in the coming days and weeks: 1) the Kremlin and the White House formalize the proposal to continue to respect the central limits of New START after its expiration, and: 2) immediately direct their teams to begin negotiations on a new more comprehensive agreement or agreements on further nuclear constraints, which will require innovative solutions to address the difficult issues with which the two sides have long struggled.
These issues include whether and how to achieve deeper verifiable strategic nuclear reductions; new types of restrictions on intermediate-range forces; measures to account for and reduce the threats posed by their sub-strategic nuclear weapons; and commonsense limits on large-scale strategic missile defense systems, including space-based weapons, as well as long-range conventional strike weapons that can pose a threat to strategic stability.
Talks on nuclear-capable intermediate-range missile restrictions are particularly urgent as Russia has threatened to deploy its Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile in central Europe, possibly in Belarus, and as NATO countries are developing and deploying their own intermediate-range systems.
It is also important that responsible UN member states take note of this development, publicly welcome the readiness of the Russian and U.S. presidents to adhere to the central limits of New START for a year after expiry, note that more nuclear weapons won’t make anyone safer and are contrary to mutual NPT obligations, and emphasize that the time should be used by the White House and the Kremlin to negotiate deeper reductions in their massive nuclear forces and engage other nuclear armed states, including China, in the disarmament enterprise.
In addition, we encourage the White House, and the Kremlin seek to broaden the disarmament effort. After all, Article VI of the NPT requires that all nuclear armed states to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament ...."
Specifically, Putin and Trump could call on China, France, and the UK to report on their total nuclear weapons holdings and freeze their nuclear forces at the current number of strategic launchers, provided Russia and the United States pursue deeper verifiable reductions in their far larger strategic nuclear warhead and launcher stockpiles.
According to the independent assessment by the Federation of American Scientists researchers and published by SIPRI, the United States and Russia have fewer than 800 total strategic nuclear launchers each; China has some 550 strategic nuclear launchers; and the U.K. and France have a combined total of 96 strategic launchers.
A mutual freeze in the number of strategic nuclear launchers at these levels would not adversely affect any one country's nuclear deterrence capabilities, it would create some much-needed predictability and provide a basis for serious talks on a bilateral basis on further nuclear restraints and reductions.
If Putin and Trump maintain current strategic nuclear limits after New START expires, separate nuclear arms control from the complex challenge of ending Putin’s war on Ukraine, and launch talks on more ambitious nuclear disarmament measures, they can help reduce the most immediate existential security threat facing the world and bolster the beleaguered international nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament system.