Recalibrating the Path to Nuclear Security

July/August 2024
By Nickolas Roth

Multilateral conferences often feel like opaque affairs, distant and disconnected from reality, but the 2024 International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) in May could not have come at a more critical moment. Its goal, “Shaping the Future,” and its potential for good could not have been more relevant.

As wars rage in two regions that are home to nuclear weapons, dozens of countries consider acquiring or expanding nuclear power, and nuclear security conditions deteriorate in countries with weapons-usable nuclear materials, the week-long event brought together government ministers and other officials from around the world. Convened by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), participants aimed to strengthen the norms, legal mechanisms, and institutions designed to reduce the possibility that a terrorist would weaponize stolen nuclear material or commit an act of sabotage leading to widespread radiological release.

Since the last conference in 2020, world leaders have grappled with a global pandemic, wars in Europe and the Middle East, and the first military occupation of an operational civilian nuclear facility by Russia in Ukraine. The conference closed with governments announcing measures strengthening nuclear security implementation, a co-chairs statement endorsed by most participants emphasizing important new nuclear security concepts, and robust information exchange about how nuclear security is being implemented around the world.

As with many other international forums, this year’s event was shaken by shifting geopolitical currents as the tension between national interests and collective nuclear security played out in real time. For the first time since the IAEA started holding these conferences a little more than a decade ago, participating governments failed to produce a consensus statement supporting efforts to sustain and strengthen nuclear security.¹

The event, held in Vienna, still enabled experts from many different countries to discuss technical details, and governments expressed support for nuclear security. Nevertheless, the absence of a consensus statement indicates a dangerous level of complacency toward nuclear terrorism risks that urgently need to be addressed.

Conference Origins

To understand how the conference played out, it is useful to understand the history of these events. The conference is an extension of the nuclear security summit process that occurred from 2010 to 2016. Early in that process, participants concluded that the IAEA would be the focal point for strengthening nuclear security worldwide. It was a controversial idea at the time because some member states perceived of the agency as having a more limited mandate.

The IAEA convened the first security conference ministerial under the ICONS format in 2013 at a high point for international nuclear security engagement. The conference drew representatives from 125 countries, including 34 ministers, and produced a consensus declaration that reinforced international support for nuclear security, urging states to commit to effective nuclear security, support the IAEA’s role to strengthen the global nuclear safety and security framework, and join relevant treaties.² Due to political dynamics within the IAEA, however, the declaration did not include any specific commitments or mention complementary efforts by other international organizations or groups. This highlighted the limitations of the IAEA consensus approach, compared to the invitation-only nuclear security summits, which led to hundreds of specific national and joint actions on nuclear security.³

By the end of 2016, after the final nuclear security summit was held and the IAEA was preparing another conference under the ICONS format, the international environment had become significantly more challenging. With the notable exception of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which significantly limited Iran’s stocks of nuclear material and created new opportunities for cooperation, attention to nuclear security had peaked several years earlier. Nuclear security cooperation between Russia and the United States was collapsing. Countries were making fewer commitments to strengthen nuclear security.

Although the 2016 conference took place with 47 ministers in attendance and countries pledged to consolidate or eliminate their weapons-usable nuclear material and tighten security, it closed without an answer to a pressing question: Could the ICONS format adequately succeed the nuclear security summits as a forum for building confidence in nuclear security implementation, supporting international institutions and legal frameworks, encouraging action, and drawing attention to nuclear security?

That question lingered for four years until the IAEA held its third ICONS ministerial and it became increasingly clear that many commitments to encourage nuclear security leadership at a national level were not panning out. The nuclear security contact group that grew out of a nuclear security summit joint statement on sustaining action to strengthen global nuclear security was floundering as it searched for new leadership.⁴ India’s pledge to host a 2018 summit on countering weapons of mass destruction terrorism was unfulfilled.⁵ Many action plans developed by international institutions to carry on the nuclear security summit legacy were incomplete.⁶

Still, the 2020 conference, which hosted a record 53 ministers, continued to build on the previous two conferences. Although the event was considered successful, the ICONS format did not carry the political gravitas of the summits and did not draw the same level of commitment from governments. Based on the Nuclear Security Index, which has benchmarked nuclear security progress since 2012, political attention to nuclear security had waned.⁷

Within weeks of the close of the 2020 conference, the world changed drastically. The COVID-19 pandemic upended nuclear security implementation and regulation and limited travel and in-person meetings, bringing much of the international nuclear security cooperation to a halt. The IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) nuclear security peer reviews, which are crucial for enhancing nuclear security practices and providing reassurance to the international community, were suspended. By 2023, half of the countries with weapons-usable nuclear material had regressed in implementing measures to strengthen international confidence in their nuclear security arrangements. Significant gaps in nuclear security implementation went unaddressed.⁸

Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its assault and occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant heightened the specter of widespread radiological release throughout Europe, exacerbated tensions among governments, and caused many to fundamentally rethink the nature of nuclear security. Vienna was not immune to the fraught international political landscape, as diplomats prepared for ICONS 2024.

2024 Conference

At first glance, the 2024 conference looked much like the IAEA nuclear security conferences that came before it. Of the 100 governmental statements delivered on nuclear security, about two-thirds came from Asian or European countries, roughly the same as in 2020. However, for the first time in at least a decade, the United States notably did not send a cabinet-level official to the conference. Unofficially, attendance was reported to be comparable to previous conferences. Plenary and technical sessions were relevant and compelling and covered the most pressing topics of the day.

On closer inspection, however, the discourse and denouement were very different from prior conferences. The tone of delivered remarks was markedly more subdued, reflecting not only the tumultuous preceding four years but also current international tensions and the anticipation of impending challenges. As IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi remarked, “Many of us could not have imagined the momentous change we would experience between then and today, change that would affect billions of people, international peace and security, and nuclear security.”⁹

The themes emerging from the national statements emphasized these changes. Governments took note of the grave dangers posed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its occupation of the Zaporizhzhia plant, the challenges of COVID-19, and the benefits and risks to the rapid development of technologies such as artificial intelligence, small modular reactors, and uncrewed systems.¹⁰ The emphasis on emerging technologies was particularly striking because the nuclear security community sometimes can be slow to respond to new and evolving risks.

In addition to these thematic shifts, what made ICONS 2024 distinct was that participating countries failed to achieve a consensus ministerial declaration. According to diplomats involved in the negotiations, consensus became impossible when the Iranian government objected to language that included promoting gender diversity. This type of language is relatively new to consensus nuclear security statements, appearing first at ICONS 2020. Although the failure to reach consensus could be viewed as a weakening of international unity on nuclear security, the good news was that all countries but Iran were prepared to support the language.

In place of the ministerial declaration, conference co-presidents Australia and Kazakhstan issued a statement that countries could choose to support.¹¹ Several provisions in the document represented a step forward for nuclear security. Previous ministerial declarations emphasized the threat of attacks by nonstate actors. The co-presidents’ statement, however, highlights the vulnerability of nuclear facilities dedicated to peaceful purposes, stressing for the first time that any attacks or threats against them could compromise nuclear security. It refers to past IAEA resolutions endorsing prohibitions on armed attacks or threats against nuclear installations. The statement also recognizes for the first time the need to ensure resilience in nuclear security regimes and emergency preparedness in extraordinary circumstances, noting Grossi’s “seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict” developed in response to Russia’s occupation of Zaporizhzhia.

Finally, the statement promotes gender diversity, equity, and inclusion. Ministers who endorsed the co-presidents’ statement committed to encouraging equitable geographical distribution and gender equality within IAEA nuclear security activities and urged member states to establish inclusive workforces in their national nuclear security regimes, ensuring equal access to education and training.

Addressing broader diplomatic concerns, the statement answered one of the major questions in the run-up to the conference: Would participants chart a path forward for multilateral nuclear security engagement? The answer was yes. The co-presidents’ statement supports a second review conference for the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (A/CPPNM), the foundational treaty supporting nuclear security worldwide, and endorses holding another nuclear security conference in 2028, thus creating new, high-level opportunities for countries to make nuclear security commitments.

The co-presidents’ statement could have been stronger in several key areas. As with the previous ministerial, the co-presidents’ statement only focuses on reducing highly enriched uranium (HEU), reflecting long-standing political sensitivities about plutonium risks. Given the growth in plutonium stocks, however, minimizing all weapons-useable nuclear materials should be receiving greater attention.¹² At least the United States committed to “avoiding the production, use, and accumulation of weapons-usable nuclear material and the use of these materials in new nuclear fuels.” It was further disappointing that, because consensus already had been broken by Iran, the co-presidents’ language does not go further in recognizing diversity as a fundamental element in strengthening nuclear security implementation, a concept that has gained traction in recent years.¹³

Also regrettable is the fact that individual countries signed up for only a handful of multilateral initiatives and that the political commitments within new initiatives were not stronger. By comparison, in 2016, more than two dozen countries, including more than half the countries with weapons-usable nuclear material, endorsed a commitment to mitigate insider threats, now formalized as IAEA Information Circular (INFCIRC) 908.¹⁴ The two original co-authors of that commitment, Belgium and the United States, announced a revision of that circular this year. This revision, just like the original, however, does not commit countries to take any specific measures to protect against insider threats, even those recommended by the IAEA.

Still, countries did announce meaningful progress in their national statements. For instance, Poland, aiming to build new nuclear power plants, will be updating its design basis threat assessment, which serves as the foundation for designing and testing nuclear security systems. Kazakhstan reiterated its commitment to converting its HEU fuel to low-enriched uranium (LEU) and reported that it had made further progress by successfully converting one of its research reactors to use LEU, which is less susceptible to proliferation. Japan announced it had “significantly enhanced” its regulatory requirements for computer security at nuclear facilities in 2022 and would host an IPPAS mission in 2024. Unfortunately, it is the only country with weapons-useable nuclear material scheduled to do so. The United States announced that it had hosted an IPPAS mission and urged other countries to follow its lead.

In addition to the tangible outcomes, the conference aimed to foster a stronger nuclear security community by providing a platform for governments to discuss their work with the IAEA and for the IAEA to promote its assistance, follow up on existing plans, or develop new initiatives. The conference facilitated informal collaboration among many countries from different regions, especially during the technical sessions. For the first time, it featured a “nuclear security delegation for the future” in which 10 future leaders participated in programming to help them gain experience in leadership, diplomacy, and international nuclear security.

Despite such progress, these conferences are not creating the sense of urgency necessary to inspire widespread meaningful action to reduce nuclear security risks. With fewer countries making significant commitments, the gatherings do not carry the same weight as the nuclear security summits. Yet, as the only inclusive forum focused on advancing a wide range of nuclear security issues available for gathering high-level government officials, each conference creates an opportunity for progress. For that reason alone, it remains indispensable.

Pathway to Progress

The 2024 conference was a reflection of and an inflection point for nuclear security efforts worldwide. It allowed countries to discuss not only how nuclear security has evolved but also the direction it should take in the future. Unfortunately, another nuclear security conference or an A/CPPNM review conference that might create high-level, multilateral platforms for nuclear security leadership is likely years away. That means the future of nuclear security is uncertain at a dangerous moment. Given the geopolitical tensions making multilateral cooperation difficult and the rapidly evolving threats from state and nonstate actors, there is a serious risk that the norms, institutions, and legal frameworks that underpin nuclear security worldwide will continue to regress.¹⁵

Despite these challenges, the 2024 conference illuminated crucial opportunities and myriad ways that governments can help avert further decline. First on this list is promoting high-level nuclear security dialogue. 
Now that governments have embraced the idea of future high-level meetings to promote nuclear security, the next stage is to delineate the details. To allow time for preparations, the IAEA should announce a date for a review of the 
A/CPPNM during its General Conference later this year. An A/CPPNM review conference would provide an opportunity for governments to focus on strengthening the legal underpinnings of nuclear security worldwide. Realistically, given the requisite preparation period, the earliest feasible time frame for this review would be in 2027. The IAEA also should announce a date for the next nuclear security conference as soon as is practicable.

International leaders also should focus on revitalizing a culture of commitment. The nuclear security conference process offers governments an opportunity to make new commitments to strengthen domestic nuclear security and the institutions and laws that support nuclear security internationally. Although this year’s event saw some progress on this front, there is still considerable untapped potential. For instance, at the 2014 nuclear security summit, 35 countries endorsed an initiative to strengthen nuclear security implementation, now formalized as INFCIRC/869. This initiative involves pledges to adhere to IAEA security recommendations and undergo regular reviews of countries’ nuclear security practices. Unfortunately, many commitments made a decade ago, such as this one, have faded. If governments cannot reaffirm their dedication to these initiatives, they should establish new multilateral political commitments to enhance nuclear security. For example, INFCIRC/869 could be updated and promoted just like INFCIRC/908.

States need to reconsider the need for conference consensus documents as a barometer of success. Although such an outcome is commendable, this year’s conference still achieved quite a lot by producing an ambitious and forward-leaning statement that aligned with its theme of “shaping the future.” Rather than simply releasing a conference statement that failed to gain consensus, the co-presidents issued their own, more progressive statement supported by most participating countries. This allowed the co-presidents to include elements that would never have been included in a consensus document. If achieving a more ambitious document requires sacrificing total consensus, it may be a worthwhile trade-off. That was evidently the calculation made by the conference co-presidents and is an instructive lesson for future summits.

Nuclear security implementation should be strengthened. The ICONS process has been successful in highlighting the progress that countries have made in bolstering nuclear security and the remaining implementation gaps. In the future, there will be an opportunity to address these gaps as the IAEA updates its 2011 Nuclear Security Recommendations on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities.  These recommendations serve as the foundation for responsible nuclear security practices worldwide. In the 13 years since publication, there have been notable advances in nuclear security regulations, best practices, and international norms. Many countries also have made new political and legal nuclear security commitments. Yet, new global threats have emerged from uncrewed vehicles, attacks on digital systems, and domestic terrorists posing fresh challenges to physical protection systems.

New recommendations for nuclear security implementation should encompass key topics at the conference such as peer review mechanisms, confidence-building measures, continuous improvement strategies, protection against all plausible threats, mitigation of insider threats, performance evaluation, crisis management, fostering a strong security culture, and the consolidation and reduction of stockpiles of weapons-usable material. Although some of these topics already are addressed in IAEA documents, there is room for improvement.¹⁶

Much more is required to bolster nuclear security resilience, which generally refers to a system’s ability to bounce back from internal or external shocks. This topic has gained more attention in recent years because of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and because of the ongoing crisis at the Zaporizhzhia plant and threats to other Ukrainian nuclear facilities. Reference to this goal in the co-presidents’ statement signals a groundswell of interest in addressing the security risks to nuclear facilities during crises. In the future, it will be important for nuclear security systems to be resilient to rapidly evolving state and nonstate threats and to risks posed by naturally occurring events such as wildfires, storms, and droughts, especially if reliance on nuclear energy is to grow.

The IAEA can play a central role in responding to future crises by coordinating the shipment of equipment to help nuclear facilities weather prolonged disasters, sharing information, and offering technical support. It also can help develop nuclear security guidance for crises that require a whole-of-government response, not just at the facility or regulator level. Member states can further support Grossi’s “seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety” by developing a code of conduct based on them.¹⁷

In his opening remarks at the conference, Grossi emphasized that nuclear security is not just a commitment to the international community or other nations but a responsibility to all people. The national responsibility to protect nuclear facilities is a fundamental tenet of nuclear security.¹⁸ Governments should openly acknowledge their responsibility to improve nuclear security and recognize their duty to neighboring states, the international community, and their own societies.

Continuous improvement involves allocating adequate political and financial resources to nuclear security and maintaining high-level political attention. It also means adhering to international guidance and best practices and providing assurances to stakeholders.¹⁹ Strengthening accountability represents a necessary evolution from viewing nuclear security solely as a domestic issue to understanding it as a matter of international importance, where actions taken by one nation can have implications for the rest of the world.

Governments can begin to strengthen an accountability norm by acknowledging in their national statements at multilateral gatherings that nuclear security decisions made at the national level can have an international impact. These decisions could include, for example, failing to adhere to international recommendations, providing insufficient assurances about the effectiveness of implementation, or taking actions that undermine another country’s nuclear security. Some of this transition began at the conference, but governments will need to build on it moving forward.

Attended by more than 100 countries from five continents, the conference was an important platform for strengthening the international nuclear security community and broadening its scope. By incorporating diverse perspectives, nuclear security conferences are more likely to tackle a comprehensive range of nuclear security concerns, fostering new ideas to improve institutions, legal frameworks, and practices. Embracing diversity within these forums enhances the conversation and the effectiveness and resiliency of nuclear security efforts. To signal broad, high-level support for strengthening nuclear security, governments should send ministerial-level delegations to future conferences and other major multilateral meetings that are gender, socioeconomically, and culturally diverse.

Despite the conference emphasis on diversity, equity, and inclusion, more work is needed to encourage widespread participation in high-level nuclear security events. For example, only 16 of 54 African countries made statements at the conference. The next few years provide an opportunity to facilitate regional nuclear security dialogues that could lead to stronger nuclear security and greater participation in broader high-level dialogues, especially among the Global South, where states have made great strides recently in nuclear security.²⁰

The 2024 conference marked an opportunity to recalibrate the trajectory of global efforts to strengthen nuclear security. As governments and international organizations chart the course forward, it is imperative that they seize the opportunities highlighted in Vienna to collectively advance the mission of reducing nuclear terrorism risks.

ENDNOTES

1. The first International Conference on Nuclear Security took place in 2005 without a dedicated ministerial component. See International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “International Conference on Nuclear Security: Global Directions for the Future,” n.d., https://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/meetings/Announcements.asp?ConfID=136.

2. IAEA, “International Conference on Nuclear Security: Commitments and Actions,” n.d., 
https://www-pub.iaea.org/iaeameetings/50809/international-conference-on-nuclear-security-commitments-and-actionsz (taking place December 2016).

3. The Arms Control Association identified “935 distinct commitments to strengthen and improve nuclear security.” Sara Z. Kutchesfahani, Kelsey Davenport, and Erin Connolly, “The Nuclear Security Summits: An Overview of State Actions to Curb Nuclear Terrorism 2010-2016,” Arms Control Association, July 2018, exec. summ., https://armscontrolcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/NSS_Report2018_final.pdf.

4. Nuclear Security Contact Group, “Joint Statement on Sustaining Action to Strengthen Global Nuclear Security,” April 5, 2016, https://www.nscontactgroup.org/joint-statement.php.

5. U.S. Embassy and Consulates in India, “Joint Statement: The United States and India: Enduring Global Partners in the 21st Century,” June 7, 2016, https://in.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-united-states-india-enduring-global-partners-21st-century-june-7-2016/.

6. N. Roth and M. Bunn, “Assessing Progress on Nuclear Security Action Plans,” n.d., https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/IAEA-CN-278-605.pdf (paper presented at the International Atomic Energy Agency International Conference on Nuclear Security, February 2020).

7. Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), “NTI Nuclear Security Index: Losing Focus in a Disordered World,” July 2020, https://media.nti.org/documents/2020_NTI-Index_Report_Final.pdf.

8. NTI and EIU, “NTI Nuclear Security Index: Falling Short in a Dangerous World,” July 2023, https://www.ntiindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/2023_NTI-Index_Report.pdf.

9. IAEA, “Statement by IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi on the Occasion of the International Conference on Nuclear Security 2024,” May 20, 2024, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/statement-by-iaea-director-general-rafael-mariano-grossi-on-the-occasion-of-the-international-conference-on-nuclear-security-2024.

10. IAEA, “Nuclear Security Through the Eyes of the Co-Presidents of ICONS 2024,” May 15, 2024, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/nuclear-security-through-the-eyes-of-the-co-presidents-of-icons-2024; Insun Kang, Statement at the International Conference on Nuclear Security, 
May 20, 2024, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/05/cn-321_rok.pdf.

11. “Statement by the Co-Presidents of the International Conference on Nuclear Security 2024: Shaping the Future,” n.d., https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/24/05/joint_statement_of_the_co-presidents_icons_2024.pdf.

12. Frank N. von Hippel and Masafumi Takubo, “Banning Plutonium Separation,” International Panel on Fissile Materials Research Report, No. 20 (July 2022), https://fissilematerials.org/library/rr20.pdf.

13. Sneha Nair, “Converging Goals: Examining the Intersection Between Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion and Nuclear Security Implementation,” n.d., https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/GD-Paper_Converging-Goals-Examining-the-Intersection-Between-Diversity-Equity-and-Inclusion-and-Nuclear-Security-Implementation.pdf.

14. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Joint Statement on Mitigating Insider Threats,” 2017, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2017/infcirc908.pdf.

15. NTI and EIU, “NTI Nuclear Security Index: Falling Short in a Dangerous World.”

16. Matthew Bunn et al., “IAEA Nuclear Security Recommendations (INFCIRC/225): The Next Generation,” n.d., https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/IAEA-225-Recommendations.pdf.

17. For more information, see Nickolas Roth, Ross Matzkin-Bridger, and Jessica Bufford, “Nuclear Facilities in Times of Crisis,” NTI, May 2024, https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/NTI_Paper_FITOC_FINAL_060724.pdf.

18. For example, the IAEA’s nuclear security recommendations state, “The responsibility for the establishment, implementation and maintenance of a physical protection regime within a State rests entirely with that State.” See IAEA, “Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5),” Vienna, 2011, https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD
/Publications/PDF/Pub1481_web.pdf.

19. For more, see Matthew Bunn, Nickolas Roth, and William H. Tobey, “Revitalizing Nuclear Security in an Era of Uncertainty,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, January 2019, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-03/RevitalizingNuclearSecurity_Mar19.pdf.

20. NTI, “Building an Inclusive Narrative About the Importance of Nuclear Security,” n.d., https://www.ntiindex.org/recommendation/build-an-inclusive-narrative-about-the-importance-of-nuclear-security/ (accessed June 21, 2024).