LOOKING BACK: Kananaskis at Five: Assessing the Global Partnership

Paul F. Walker

The Group of Eight (G-8) industrial countries—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—convened in Kananaskis, Canada, in 2002 for an annual summer summit and created a new and expanded entity, the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, otherwise known as the Global Partnership.

Five years, five G-8 summits, and several billion dollars later, this partnership continues its efforts to secure and eliminate nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in Russia and former Soviet states. The Global Partnership has accomplished much in its first five years: eliminated nuclear warheads and delivery systems, provided secure transport and storage for fissile materials, secured and neutralized chemical weapons stockpiles, and retrained and re-employed former weapons scientists. Yet, most 10-year goals for elimination of former Soviet weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are less than half accomplished, and many Global Partnership members have not yet fulfilled their sizeable financial pledges. Regardless of growing perceptions of Russia as a newly wealthy country rich in oil and gas, the threat of theft, diversion, and proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons remains very real and a key component of international security for all nations. It is more important than ever that the Global Partnership continue its work to keep these potential tools of terrorists out of the hands of subnational, violent groups bent on obtaining weapons of mass destruction.

 Kananaskis is located in Alberta, Canada, just northwest of Calgary. When the G-8 countries met there in June 2002, under the chairmanship of Canada, they were fortunate to have nearby the beautiful vistas of Banff National Park but were also faced with the stark realities of the September 11 terrorist attacks, which had occurred just nine months prior. They were well aware of the ongoing, menacing, and public threat of al Qaeda’s desire to acquire nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons for future terrorist attacks and the fact that Russia was having difficulty securing its dangerous weapons and materials of mass destruction.

The Global Partnership set out four major priorities in helping Russia to prevent proliferation, theft, diversion, and accidents of weapons of mass destruction and related materials.

Among our priority concerns are the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapons scientists.[1]

The eight nations committed “to raise up to $20 billion to support such projects over the next ten years,” with $10 billion pledged by the United States and a matching $10 billion pledged by the other seven, including Russia. The formula was dubbed “10 plus 10 over 10.” The U.S. funding was simply a continuation of annual funding under the decade-old Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program and additional nonproliferation efforts that spun out of the CTR program in the mid-1990s in the U.S. Departments of Energy and State. A few other nations had also been helping the former Soviet Union prior to the establishment of the Global Partnership, but the 2002 G-8 statement was generally viewed as a major step forward by involving additional countries and resources in addressing WMD proliferation, the growing terrorist threat, and in helping the United States “share the burden” of threat reduction activities in Russia.

Expanding Global Partnership Participation

The G-8 countries encouraged other states to join the Global Partnership by citing the common interest of all countries in preventing the spread and use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. This effort was quite successful during the partnership’s first two years, with 13 additional countries and the European Union joining the partnership. Beginning then, Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Korea, Sweden, and Switzerland have all contributed to arms control and disarmament efforts in Russia and elsewhere. Contributions have ranged from $75,000 to several hundred million dollars annually. To date, the non-G-8 participants have contributed roughly $900 million (or $210 million without the EU) to the Global Partnership, certainly a significant amount.

Unfortunately, the Global Partnership’s expansion appears to have stalled. With 195 recognized states in the world, there would seem to be much more room for expansion, especially amongst the developed world. All 27 EU members contribute to the EU’s substantial common Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States and Joint Action programs. Although most of the 160 other states are small and developing, they still remain outside of the partnership.

Also important to note is the fact that Ukraine joined the Global Partnership in 2006 as a recipient state along with Russia. Although the great majority of aid still goes to high-priority projects in Russia, it is likely that more recipient states may join in the future. The United States, through its CTR and nonproliferation programs over the last 15 years, has partnered with Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine to help establish them as non-nuclear-weapon states after the breakup of the Soviet Union and has also been actively working with Georgia and other former Soviet states along the southern rim of Russia to secure fissile materials and biological pathogens.

Global Partnership Pledges

The initial pledges of the G-8 countries in 2002 to the Global Partnership were about $16 billion, or 80 percent, of the full $20 billion goal. With EU pledges of $1.4 billion, the additional commitments of 13 other countries, and the current weakness of the U.S. dollar, the Global Partnership would appear to be approaching its target amount.[2]

One of the major challenges in the Global Partnership has been to turn these initial national pledges into funding for actual projects and to appropriate and spend the funds in a timely way. One of Russia’s vocal complaints over the past five years is that very few pledges have been received in a timely manner, making project planning extremely difficult and at times impossible. Valery Biryukov, head of the Global Partnership for Security and Disarmament Issues in the Russian Foreign Ministry, recently stated, “The large [Global Partnership] donors have not fulfilled their duties in full. Countries offering smaller contributions do not provide them on a regular basis. As a result, foreign aid flows in unpredictable ways…. There is a significant gap between the foreign aid amounts declared by government donors and the amounts being provided in reality.”[3]

Similarly, Natalia Kalinina, deputy director of the Inspection Audit Chamber of the Russian Federation, recently spoke about partnership pledges for submarine dismantlement and chemical weapons destruction in Russia. She stated that “foreign partners” had pledged $1.415 billion for Russian submarine destruction but had only financed $313.4 million, or 22 percent, through mid-2006. In the chemical weapons demilitarization field, another major priority for the Global Partnership, Kalinina alleged that $1.65 billion had been pledged, but only $298 million, or 18 percent, was disbursed for projects.[4]

One must be careful when drawing broad conclusions from these Russian spending estimates because they usually account only for Global Partnership funds that flow through Russian ministries and agencies. Global Partnership spending is typically higher due to funds expended through non-Russian integrating contractors most often closely affiliated with the donor country. However, a review of Global Partnership spending to date indicates that approximately $7.9 billion has been expended, representing about 41 percent of total partnership pledges. Two countries, Denmark and Russia, have slightly surpassed their total pledges of $24 million and $2 billion, respectively. Another five countries—Finland, Norway, South Korea, Sweden, and Switzerland—and the EU have surpassed the 50 percent mark. The remaining 14 partnership members are below the 50 percent spending mark. Italy and France are by far the slowest in fulfilling their 2002 pledges of $1.4 billion and $1 billion, respectively, with spending to date estimated at only three percent and 14 percent of these amounts.[5] These delays have been due to several issues, including tight domestic budgets and challenges in negotiating bilateral agreements with Russia. If the Global Partnership is to be successful in meeting its 2002 goals, spending must be accelerated over the next five years.

Chemical Weapons Destruction

Russia signed the international Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993 and ratified it in 1997. It is one of six declared chemical-weapon-possessor states with 40,000 tons of chemical agents stockpiled at seven sites in Russia. The CWC mandates that all chemical weapons stockpiles must be safely eliminated within 10 years of the convention’s entry into force, that is, a decade from April 29, 1997. Russia has missed that date, even though Russia and the United States began bilateral discussions about stockpile destruction almost 20 years ago. Although the United States inspected its first Russian chemical weapons stockpile at Shchuch’ye in July 1994,[6] Russia did not make major progress in its destruction program until shortly after the Kananaskis summit in 2002.

Russia’s progress in destroying its chemical weapons stockpile stemmed from a lack of funds. Russian officials made clear to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the multilateral agency tasked with CWC implementation and verification, and its states-parties in The Hague in 1997 that, were Russia to ratify the convention, it would need foreign partners to help with the expensive and complex demilitarization program, especially during a unique period of historic socioeconomic transition and political upheaval for Russia.

The Kananaskis Global Partnership statement placed top priority on chemical weapons destruction in Russia for several interrelated reasons: the portable nature of more than four million nerve-agent artillery shells in the Russian stockpile, the lax and antiquated security at the stockpile sites, and the strong interest voiced by terrorist groups in obtaining chemical weapons, sometimes known as the “poor man’s weapon of mass destruction.”

Russia began operating its first neutralization facility for lewisite and mustard agents at Gorny in the Saratov Oblast in December 2002. Since then, Russia opened two additional facilities: one in Kambarka in the Udmurt Republic for neutralizing lewisite and another in Maradykovsky in the Kirov Oblast for neutralizing nerve agents. To date, Russia has declared about 8,800 tons, or 22 percent, of its chemical weapons stockpile destroyed. Although this advance in its destruction program is important, Russia has been several years behind in meeting interim destruction deadlines mandated by the CWC and has received an extension until April 2012 for destroying its entire stockpile.

The Global Partnership has been an important contributor to helping Russia advance this far in eliminating its enormous chemical weapons arsenal. Germany has provided crucial support, more than $200 million, to Gorny and Kambarka and is currently planning on providing another $207 million for a facility at Pochep that will destroy 7,500 tons of nerve agents. The United States has appropriated more than $1 billion for chemical weapons destruction in Russia, primarily for construction of the nerve agent destruction facility at Shchuch’ye. In addition, it has funded construction of a Central Analytical Laboratory in Moscow, several mobile chemical testing labs, and the dismantlement of former Russian chemical weapons production sites.

Other partnership contributors to chemical weapons elimination, with rough estimates of spending to date, include Canada ($93 million), the EU ($22 million), France ($20 million), Italy ($11 million), the Netherlands ($11 million), Switzerland ($11 million), and the United Kingdom ($29 million). All told, 17 partnership countries, along with the EU, have contributed some $2.1 billion to date to Russian chemical weapons destruction, although Russia estimates receiving only $300 million (in Kalinina’s estimate noted above) to $400 million (estimated by Gen. Valeri Kapashin, deputy director of Russia’s chemical weapons destruction program).[7] This large gap in funding is primarily due to the fact that most Global Partnership financial support goes to integrating contractors from the donor country, providing foreign oversight and accountability but not running directly through Russian ministries and agencies. Russia predicts that its total chemical weapons destruction program will cost $7-8 billion. Moscow is still optimistically aiming to meet the 2012 CWC deadline but will only be able to do so if donor countries fulfill existing pledges and increase their support.

Submarine Dismantlement

The Soviet Union was always known for its large and powerful undersea navy, including both strategic ballistic missile and attack submarines. In 1989 at the end of the Cold War, it listed 63 nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missiles (SSBNs) and another 280 tactical submarines, of which 141 were nuclear powered (SSNs). The U.S. CTR program identified Russian strategic submarine dismantlement as one of its major goals in the early 1990s and has helped Russia eliminate 30 SSBNs to date, with a commitment to help dismantle another nine by 2012.[8]

Russia has decommissioned 198 nuclear-powered submarines to date and as of the end of 2006 had scrapped 148, or 75 percent, with the help of several donor countries. Russia’s Northern Fleet included 120 decommissioned subs and the Pacific Fleet included 78. Of these, 97 have been dismantled in northwest Russia and 51 in the Far East. According to Russian figures, 23 subs are currently undergoing dismantlement, leaving at least another 26 waiting in line. These figures would apparently account for the whole Russian nuclear-powered underwater fleet 18 years ago, although additional submarine production has taken place in the meantime.[9] Russia’s current, active nuclear-powered submarine fleet reportedly includes 15 SSBNs and 26 SSNs, about one-fifth the size of its Cold War subsurface fleet.[10]

The Global Partnership has been anxious to secure and eliminate these submarines for two primary reasons: the nuclear threat from their long-range, nuclear-tipped strategic missiles and the environmental and proliferation risks posed by nuclear reactors and spent fuel assemblies. Many of these old Cold War boats have been floating and leaking at their moorings and dockside in the White or Barents Seas or the Sea of Japan for years.[11]

At present, Russia dismantles about 18 submarines annually at an estimated cost of $7 million each. According to Russian sources, the Global Partnership has financed the dismantlement of 39 submarines to date, a total of about $275 million. Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the EU have all been involved in submarine dismantlement, spent fuel storage and processing, and environmental cleanup projects at the Russian nuclear shipyards, some of it through the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership. Russia estimates that it has spent some $350 million through 2006 and has received an additional $313 million from the partnership through mid-2006 for submarine dismantlement and related shipyard activities.[12]

Russia also underlines the need to deal in the near future with at least three decommissioned submarines that are radioactively contaminated, two nuclear-powered surface ships, and 41 decommissioned nuclear support ships. None of these have yet been addressed by the Global Partnership, but ongoing bilateral and multilateral discussions with Russia indicate that they likely will be over the next five years.[13]

Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material

One of the major goals of the CTR program and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has been the security and elimination of nuclear weapons; related strategic launch systems (submarines, bombers, missiles, and silos); and fissile materials (highly enriched uranium [HEU] and plutonium) in the former Soviet Union. In more than 15 years of CTR efforts, much has been accomplished: 6,954 nuclear warheads deactivated; 644 ICBMs and 606 SLBMs eliminated; 155 strategic bombers destroyed; 12 security upgrades implemented at nuclear-weapon storage sites; and 328 train shipments of nuclear weapons to more secure, centralized storage sites.[14]

Because of these major U.S. program accomplishments related to implementation of the U.S.-Russian 1991 START and 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, the Global Partnership has focused its efforts on fissile material security in Russia.

The careful handling and secure storage of fissile materials, whether from submarine spent fuel, nuclear warheads, commercial power and research reactors, or even lighthouse nuclear generators in Russia and many other countries, is a key priority in keeping the potential tools of terrorists away from them.[15] Although exact figures are not known, it is estimated that some 1,250 tons of weapons-useable nuclear materials remain in Russia, including more than 600 tons of HEU and plutonium outside of nuclear warheads. The Global Partnership, including CTR and NNSA programs, has therefore been active in upgrading security at 75 percent of nuclear weapons material sites “of concern,” including all 50 Russian navy nuclear sites, 11 Russian Strategic Rocket Forces sites, and 175 individual buildings containing weapons-grade materials. These efforts were partly aided by the Bratislava Initiative, signed by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin in February 2005, to improve the security of nuclear materials and facilities in each country to stem any proliferation risks. Current plans are to complete all such security upgrades in Russia by 2008.[16] Although many of these programs began long before the 2002 Kananaskis summit, security upgrades and safe storage facilities need to be completed and programs for sustainability—ongoing training and equipment maintenance—put in place as soon as possible.

One major fissile-material program is the U.S.-Russian Megatons to Megawatts program. It involves the purchase by the United States of 500 tons of HEU from Russian warheads for down-blending into low enriched uranium for commercial reactor fuel, thereby eliminating the equivalent of 20,000 bombs’ worth of weapons-grade nuclear material. This program has already met more than 50 percent of its goal in 12 years and expects to finish by 2013.

The United States, with limited participation from other members of the Global Partnership, is continuing with a $1 billion effort to shut down Russia’s remaining plutonium-breeder reactors and replace them with fossil fuel power plants at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk. The United States has committed more than $200 million to date and the Global Partnership some $30 million. The United States has pledged another $700 million, and U.S. officials would like the partnership to contribute at least another $70 million.

Other related and important efforts include the U.S.-led Multilateral Plutonium Disposition Group, focused on disposing of 34 tons of Russian plutonium; training and physical-protection upgrade projects led by the International Atomic Energy Agency to prevent illicit cross-border trafficking in nuclear materials; Norwegian- and Canadian-led removal of highly radioactive power sources at lighthouses and replacement with solar power; a German-led effort to build a long-term nuclear reactor storage facility on land at Saida Bay in northwestern Russia; and the Chernobyl Shelter Implementation Plan in Ukraine to upgrade protection at the disaster site.

Nearly all of the members of the Global Partnership are participating in the nuclear weapons and fissile material security projects. Commitments to date total approximately $4.3 billion.

Preventing Brain Drain

A fourth major goal of the Global Partnership has been to support the retraining and re-employment of former Soviet weapons scientists and engineers, thus preventing any brain drain to wannabe nuclear countries and terrorist groups. Support has been directed to the International Science and Technology Centers in Moscow (ISTC) and Kiev (STCU), established by the CTR program before the 2002 Kananaskis summit. Canada, the EU, and South Korea have contributed to hundreds of projects managed through the Moscow and Kiev centers and report that several thousand former weapons scientists and engineers have been redirected into commercial fields.

The United States and the United Kingdom have also been the major supporters of the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI), which has engaged in important retraining and re-employment programs in five closed nuclear cities in Russia—Sarov, Seversk, Snezhinsk, Zheleznogorsk, and Ozersk.

Partnership members have also supported programs to prevent the spread of Russian biological pathogens and bioweapons knowledge. Much of this effort has taken place through the ISTC in Moscow and, most recently, outside of Russia. Projects include bilateral and multilateral efforts to improve security of pathogen collections, to improve diagnosis and treatment of diseases from dangerous pathogens, and to identify disease outbreaks more readily. Russia remains very sensitive about this field, as do other major powers as well, and has not allowed any foreign access to its military bio-related sites.

The Next Five Years and Beyond

The Global Partnership has clearly been quite successful in its first five years, 2002-2007, in helping Russia and Ukraine secure and eliminate their weapons of mass destruction. When combined with additional nonproliferation and threat reduction work taking place under the CTR program and related programs in the Energy and State Departments, one can conclude that considerable progress in nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament has indeed been accomplished. Three former Soviet states—Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—have been denuclearized; thousands of nuclear warheads have been deactivated; several hundred nuclear launch systems have been dismantled; almost 9,000 tons of chemical weapons have been destroyed; and dozens of potentially vulnerable nuclear weapons and fissile material sites have been secured.

The Global Partnership itself has expanded in membership from an initial eight countries to 21 today. If one includes all of the members of the EU, the membership would stand now at 35. Yet, no country has joined since 2004, and more than 80 percent of the world still remains outside. Financial pledges are approaching the goal of $20 billion over 10 years, although expenditures to date, an estimated $7.9 billion, fall far short of 50 percent at the halfway point of the Global Partnership.

As the Global Partnership begins its second five years of nonproliferation and disarmament work, it is important that its efforts not wane and its commitment not weaken.

Unfinished Business

The Global Partnership must still keep its eyes on the prize and work to complete its 2002 stated nonproliferation and disarmament missions. More than 30,000 tons of chemical weapons, 75 percent of the declared chemical weapons arsenal, remain to be destroyed in Russia today. At least 50 more decommissioned nuclear submarines and 50 nuclear-powered surface ships remain to be dismantled. Much work remains in short- and long-term storage and management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management, both solid and liquid. At least 25 percent of identified nuclear warhead and material storage sites of concern need additional security upgrades and worker training.

Better International Cooperation

There has been tremendous difficulty in getting major projects started in Russia, due to central questions of liability, predictable post-Cold War national politics, and preventable bureaucratic snafus regarding visas, taxation, customs, transparency, and access. Some of this has been overcome by new donors piggybacking onto existing bilateral agreements as Canada and other states have done with the United Kingdom. Russia has also helped to resolve bureaucratic roadblocks to efficient and timely work. All parties concerned, including Russia and the United States, must make concerted efforts to expand cooperative behavior and trust. Overcoming disagreements and bureaucratic obstacles and fostering true partnerships must become more the rule than the exception as the Global Partnership begins its second five years of nonproliferation work.

Now is not the time to reduce commitments or to turn over projects totally to Russia. Although some observers may perceive threat reduction efforts as foreign aid to a now wealthy Russia, the fact remains that these weapons and materials of mass destruction are still a global threat and can be best, most safely, and most quickly secured and eliminated with multinational cooperative projects. As part of the CTR program, however, the United States has just signed a bilateral agreement with Russia to have Russia take over major responsibility for the second half of construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility in Shchuch’ye. The Bush administration has also refused to ask Congress for any additional funds for the project, arguing that the U.S. commitment has now been fulfilled. The project is only half constructed, and the United States had promised Russia a turnkey facility for nerve agent destruction years ago. Fortunately, the House of Representatives sees this commitment differently and has appropriated an additional $42.7 million in fiscal year 2008 for the project. The Senate, on the other hand, has authorized only $1 million for chemical weapons destruction in its pending military spending bill, while including an additional $99 million for nuclear and biological weapons destruction. Ideally, the upcoming House-Senate conference committee should include both House and Senate funding and language, thus continuing the U.S. commitment to threat reduction of all weapons of mass destruction in Russia.

Some partnership members have not even begun to approach their financial commitments to Russia. Italy, for example, pledged some $400 million for construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Pochep and an additional $430 million for submarine dismantlement but has not yet followed through on these important commitments. The two main reasons for Italy’s tardiness are prior disagreements in the Russian-Italian bilateral agreement around liability, which has recently been resolved, and Italy’s ongoing budget deficit, which has not yet been resolved. This lack of follow-through by Italy has frustrated Russia and led to ongoing risks of proliferation in Russia of weapons of mass destruction and related materials. This cannot be allowed to continue.

Russia’s Requirements

Suspicions still abound in Russia about the motives behind the Global Partnership and its representatives in Russia. The anecdotes of visa complexities, expulsion of foreign workers, customs delays, misleading public statements, and lack of access to Russian sites have been all too common over the past five years to overlook. These challenges have introduced a certain weariness into threat reduction and nonproliferation efforts, but the goals of the Global Partnership are too important to abandon.

The many ongoing nonproliferation and demilitarization projects in Russia today will last long beyond 2012. Yet, the Kananaskis commitments will end that year. The complexity and cost of many, if not all, of these programs to secure and eliminate nuclear and chemical weapons, fissile materials, and related launch systems will clearly cause costs and schedule to surpass these targets. Projects may indeed proceed more quickly now that bilateral agreements have been negotiated and working relationships developed, but the tasks outlined above remain enormous and challenging.

The very serious threat of proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction still remains. This point alone well justifies continued Global Partnership projects with Russia, providing more finances and energy to secure and destroy these materials. Should Russia be left alone to deal with these challenges, it is likely to require much more time with greater risk of theft, accident, and pollution. Those who argue that Russia should now be left alone to bear these burdens do not adequately understand the threat nor the positive aspects of multilateral cooperation in this area.

Little has been said about these efforts in the past two G-8 summits in St. Petersburg, Russia, and Heiligendamm, Germany. One has to scroll down to the bottom of page five of the German chairman’s statement to see any mention of the Global Partnership. Nevertheless, the G-8 leaders emphasized that “[w]e acknowledge the progress made since the launch of the partnership in 2002. We will do more to increase the effectiveness of our cooperation. On the occasion of the midterm-review we reaffirm our commitments made in Kananaskis and will discuss in the years to come the geographical scope of the Global Partnership and whether it should be extended beyond 2012.”[17]

As the 2009 G-8 summit in Hokkaido Toyako, Japan, approaches, Global Partnership states should seriously evaluate progress toward the 2002 Kananaskis goals, work to fulfill their pledges in a timely way, and be prepared to extend these commitments to meet global security needs.[18]

The Cold War legacy of the former Soviet Union, especially Russia, continues to be fraught with tremendous challenges in nonproliferation, public health protection, and environmental cleanup. Until these challenges are resolved, not just in Russia but globally, no one will be safe from the accidental or intentional use of nuclear and chemical weapons, biological pathogens, and radioactive materials.


Paul F. Walker is Legacy Program director at Global Green USA, the U.S. affiliate of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Green Cross International, in Washington, D.C. Maria Amodio, a graduate student intern with Global Green USA, helped with research on this article.


1. Final statement by G-8 leaders at Kananaskis, Canada, announcing the Global Partnership, June 2002.

2. Many pledges were initially made in foreign currencies, including euros. All figures throughout this article are estimates and may vary depending on currency conversion and time frame assumptions.

3. Valery Biryukov, “The G-8 Global Partnership and Chemical Weapons Destruction in Russia,” in Green Cross Russia, National Dialogue Forum, 2007, pp. 30-33 (English edition).

4. Natalia Kalinina, “Existing Challenges for the Global Partnership on Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in Green Cross Russia, National Dialogue Forum, 2007, pp. 14-18.

5. For the underlying figures, see “GPWG Annual Report 2007 Consolidated Report Data,” Annex A, found at www.g-8.de.

6. The author participated in this 1994 on-site inspection of the 5,400 tons of nerve agents in Shchuch’ye in the Kurgan Oblast as a professional staff member of the House Armed Services Committee. He most recently visited Shchuch’ye in June 2007. See Paul Walker and Cristian Ion, “Report on June 2007 Visit to Shchuch’ye,” found at www.globalgreen.org.

7. “Russia Confirms Pledge to Destroy All Chemical Weapons by 2012,” RIA Novosti, August 9, 2007.

8. For Cold War figures, see the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 1989-1990 (London: Brassey’s, 1989), pp. 32-35. The latest CTR report indicates that the long-standing target goal of 39 SSBNs to be dismantled with U.S. assistance has been reduced to 36. “Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 2008,” p. 3 (table) (hereinafter CTR 2008 annual report).

9. For the dismantlement figures, see Andrei Gavrilenko, “Scrapping of Nuclear Submarines Is on Agenda,” Krasnaya Zvezda, February 19, 2007. Gavrilenko uses a total of 197 submarines, including 77 in the Pacific Fleet.

10. IISS, The Military Balance 2005-2006 (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 158-160.

11. The author witnessed this firsthand in a June 2007 visit to the Zvezhdochka shipyard in Severodvinsk in northwestern Russia. Several nuclear-powered submarines were rusting dockside, awaiting dismantlement, along with the Admiral Ushakov nuclear cruiser.

12. Robert Einhorn and Michele Flournoy, “Assessing the G-8 Global Partnership: From Kananaskis to St. Petersburg,” Strengthening the Global Partnership Project, July 2006.

13. See Anna Kireeva, “Nuclear Service Ships Problem Hard to Tackle, Murmansk Seminar Agrees,” Strengthening the Global Partnership Project, February 7, 2007. See also Cristina Hansell Chuen, “Russian Nuclear-Powered Submarine Dismantlement and Related Activities: A Critique,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, May 24, 2007.

14. CTR 2008 annual report, p. 3.

15. See Sonia Ben Ouaghram-Gormley, “An Unrealized Nexus: WMD-related Trafficking, Terrorism, and Organized Crime in the Former Soviet Union,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2007, pp. 6-13.

16. See National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, “NNSA: Working to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism,” March 2007 (fact sheet).

17. “Chair’s Summary, Heilingendamm,” June 8, 2007, found at www.g-8.de.

18. Reportedly, the United States sought to get commitments at the July 2007 G-8 summit for another “10 plus 10 over 10”commitment, but Germany resisted, with its focus on economic growth and the developing world. See Jon Fox, “G-8 Summit to Give Low Profile to WMD Proliferation Issues,” Global Security Newswire, June 1, 2007.