Editor's Note | Arms Control Association

This new year brings some change and some continuity to the world of arms control and nonproliferation.

On the Korean peninsula, U.S. and North Korean negotiators are locked in a standoff over how to resolve a crisis provoked by Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear arms. They are facing many of the same dilemmas that plagued negotiators in 1991, 1994, and 2002 and many of the years in between. Yet, South Korean analyst Bong-Geun Jun contends that the outward signs of continuity may be deceiving. Beneath the surface, he argues, political, economic, and diplomatic changes in Asia and the United States may be providing the conditions for a final settlement.

By pledging in July that he would seek to extend full civilian nuclear cooperation to India, President George W. Bush clearly intended to break from past U.S. nonproliferation policy. Previously, the United States had limited such assistance because of India’s possession of nuclear weapons and refusal to sign the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Zia Mian and M. V. Ramana argue that the July deal is a mistake for both countries and is likely to harm global nonproliferation efforts, spur an unnecessary arms race in Asia, and rescue an incompetent Indian nuclear industry. In 2006, Congress and nuclear-supplier countries will likely act on the Bush proposal.

Five decades ago, the United States and the Soviet Union sought to outdo one another in supplying client states with “peaceful” nuclear technology. But as 2006 begins, officials are concerned that dozens of research reactors scattered around the globe could be a source for terrorists seeking to build a nuclear bomb. Many of these reactors still use highly enriched uranium, which would be the fuel of choice for such efforts. Alexander Glaser and Frank N. von Hippel outline ways in which these reactors could be closed or could employ other fuels so as to minimize this danger.

In our “Looking Back” this month, William Burr points to another Cold War legacy with implications for today. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, President Richard Nixon and top aide Henry Kissinger explored the possibility of trying to develop an option to conduct “limited” nuclear strikes, rather than threatening the massive retaliation that was at the heart of much Cold War strategy. Facing opposition from the military brass, they ultimately concluded that such an approach was essentially unfeasible. It is a lesson that resounds today as policymakers look for more “usable” nuclear weapons.