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"No one can solve this problem alone, but together we can change things for the better." 

– Setsuko Thurlow
Hiroshima Survivor
June 6, 2016
March 2008
Edition Date: 
Saturday, March 1, 2008
Cover Image: 

Pakistan Defends Nuke Security Amid Instability

Peter Crail

In recent months, Pakistani officials have sought to allay concerns that the deteriorating security situation in their country would allow extremist elements to acquire nuclear weapons or materials. Political instability in Pakistan has persisted over the past year, raising questions about Islamabad’s ability to protect its nuclear assets.

In early January 2008, Islamabad criticized Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for comments made in a Jan. 8 interview with the pan-Arab al-Hayat newspaper in which he expressed concern that “nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of an extremist group in Pakistan or in Afghanistan.” Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad Sadiq characterized such comments Jan. 9 as “unwarranted and irresponsible,” stressing that Pakistan’s weapons are as secure as those in any other nuclear-weapon state.

Responding to Pakistan’s criticism, the agency issued a statement clarifying that ElBaradei was attempting to “call attention to the need to bolster nuclear safety and security measures” worldwide, not just in Pakistan. Although Islamabad has not signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, it is a member of the IAEA and has placed a number of civilian nuclear facilities under the agency’s safeguards.

During a Jan. 27 briefing, retired Lt. General Khalid Kidwai, director-general of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, which oversees the security of the country’s nuclear arsenal, sought to reassure foreign journalists. He argued that scenarios involving the theft or takeover of Pakistani nuclear assets were unrealistic. In addition to describing steps that Islamabad has taken to enhance its nuclear security, Kidwai asserted that “[t]here’s no conceivable scenario, political or violent, in which Pakistan will fall to extremists of the al Qaeda or Taliban type.” He also noted that “the state of alertness has gone up” in recent months since domestic tensions within Pakistan have increased.

Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division serves as the secretariat of the National Command Authority, which is headed by the president and is responsible for command and control over Pakistan’s strategic weapons and infrastructure. (See ACT, December 2007. ) Both organizations were created in 1999, a year after Pakistan tested nuclear weapons.

Pakistan is believed to have produced enough nuclear material for about 60 weapons. As a security precaution, these weapons are stored unassembled, with the fissile material core kept separately from the explosive triggers.

Following Kidwai’s briefing, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf also sought to underscore the apparent confidence that the U.S. intelligence community places in the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. In a Feb. 14 lecture at a Paris think tank, Musharraf argued that “[i]f you ask the head of [the] CIA or top officials of Western intelligence agencies, they will talk contrary to the point of view being projected by the Western media against Pakistan and its leadership.”

Musharraf’s reference to such an assessment by Western intelligence agencies followed the Feb. 5 testimony of top U.S. intelligence officials to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Although admitting to “vulnerabilities” in the Pakistani military’s control over its weapons complex, John Michael McConnell, director of national intelligence, told the committee that “the ongoing political uncertainty in Pakistan has not seriously threatened the military’s control of the nuclear arsenal.”

Officials from neighboring nuclear rival India, however, continue to cite the risk to Pakistan’s nuclear arms. During a Feb. 18 lecture in New Delhi, Indian Special Envoy Shyam Saran cited the possibility that, “[in] a situation of chaos, Pakistan’s nuclear assets may fall into the hands of jihadi elements.”

In recent months, Pakistani officials have sought to allay concerns that the deteriorating security situation in their country would allow extremist elements to acquire nuclear weapons or materials. Political instability in Pakistan has persisted over the past year, raising questions about Islamabad’s ability to protect its nuclear assets. (Continue)

Letters to the Editor: “Trust Us” Is Not Enough in Pakistan

Pervez Hoodbhoy

It is good to see Kenneth N. Luongo and Brigadier General (Ret.) Naeem Salik’s unbridled optimism about Pakistan’s ability to safeguard its nuclear arsenal (“Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security,” December 2007). But a more tempered approach would perhaps have been better. In thinking about how well Pakistan may be able to secure its nuclear weapons, materials, and experts, it is worth remembering that Pakistan has been unable to protect its constitution from military coups, has lost half its territory (East Pakistan, now Bangladesh) in 1971, and has failed to safeguard the lives of its most prominent political leaders in recent months.

The goals of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD), with which one of the authors was associated, are indeed laudable. With U.S. tutoring and funds, the SPD says it has implemented various technical precautions such as improved perimeter security, installation of electronic locks and permissive action links that require the entry of a code before nuclear weapons can explode, and implementation of a personnel reliability program. Although these increase safety against theft or unauthorized access to weapons and material, it is better to be cautious about such security given the increasingly sophisticated and violent Islamist insurgency in Pakistan and the longer-term direction and intensity of social change.

Some claims made by those in charge of Pakistan’s nukes are brash. Feroz Hassan Khan, a former SPD director, for instance told The Wall Street Journal in late November that “[t]he system knows how to distinguish who is a ‘fundo’ [fundamentalist] and who is simply pious.” If it were truly so, Pakistan need not have suffered the tidal wave of suicide bombings that has crashed through its towns and cities in recent years.

The feeling of being in total control starts at the top of the army. President Pervez Musharraf, who recently resigned from the military, was asked by Newsweek’s Fareed Zakaria in January 2008 if he thought Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were safe from Islamic militants. He confidently replied, “Absolutely. [The SPD] is like an army unit. Can one rifle be taken away from an army unit? Can the bullet of a rifle be taken away from an army unit? I challenge anyone to take a bullet, a weapon, away from an army unit.”

But just two weeks later, the Pakistani newspaper Dawn reported that Taliban militants had captured four military trucks in Darra Adamkhel on the Indus Highway. Some reportedly carried ammunition, while others were transporting 4x4 military vehicles fitted with sophisticated communications and listening technology. Another week later, the trucks were recovered, minus cargo.

There are other examples. In August 2007, the BBC reported that about 250 Frontier Constabulary soldiers surrendered to the Taliban, together with their equipment and weapons, all without firing a shot. Initially an attempt was made to deny that any soldiers had been kidnapped or had surrendered. But some weeks later, after the BBC interviewed the military officers in the Taliban’s captivity, President and then-General Musharraf criticized them for cowardice and unprofessional behavior.

Here lies the crux of the problem. In spite of the SPD’s professionalism, the fact is that procedures and technical fixes are only as good as the men who operate them. This is not just an academic question. For more than 25 years, the army nurtured Islamist radicals as proxy warriors for covert operations on Pakistan’s borders in Kashmir and Afghanistan. This produced extremism inside parts of the military and intelligence. Today, some parts are at war with other parts.

This chilling truth is now emerging. A score of suicide attacks in the last few weeks, some bearing a clear insider signature, have rocked an increasingly demoralized military and intelligence establishment. Fearful of more deadly attacks, military officers in Pakistan have abandoned use of uniforms except when on duty. They move in civilian cars accompanied by gunmen in plain clothes and no longer flout their rank in public.

The authors state that “there have not been any examples to date of systemic failure” in Pakistan’s nuclear security. But, given that there is no oversight body, how are we to know? Even the nuclear-weapon states, the United States included, have had serious problems at some point. Pakistan has the additional problem that it cannot be guaranteed that the custodians of nuclear weapons will always be responsible to the government.

One also does not know if radical Islamists can eventually hijack a weapon or acquire the technical expertise and the highly enriched uranium needed for a crude, in situ nuclear device. But it is quite certain that, having gone to the trouble of getting it, they will use it if they can. One should not assume that London or New York will be the preferred targets because Islamabad and Delhi may be just as good—and certainly much easier. In the twisted logic of the fanatics, there is little or no difference between apostates and those who are the tools of apostates. The suicide bombings inside mosques, and in Pakistan’s public places, send exactly this message.

I would like to believe Luongo and Salik that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and materials are safe. The problem is that, like me, they really do not know. In a matter involving enormous consequences, for them to say “trust us” is not good enough.

 


Pervez Hoodbhoy is chairman of the Department of Physics, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, and author of Islam and Science: Religious Orthodoxy and the Battle for Rationality (1991).


Kenneth N. Luongo and Naeem Salik Respond

Kenneth N. Luongo and Brigadier General (Ret.) Naeem Salik

Pervez Hoodbhoy is a longtime observer of political and nuclear developments in Pakistan, and his views are important in the debate over Pakistan’s nuclear security. Our article was a factual assessment of how Pakistan’s nuclear security has evolved over the past nine years, where it stands today, and how it might continue to evolve in the future. In fact, Time magazine characterized this piece as “the most detailed account yet of how Islamabad protects its atomic arsenal.” The article speaks clearly on the threat scenarios that exist in Pakistan and acknowledges the issue of growing religious fundamentalism in both the civilian and military sectors. It emphasizes the importance of assuring and improving personnel reliability. Further, the article makes clear that Pakistan, like all nuclear nations, has ongoing and evolving security challenges and therefore must remain adaptive and open to further improvement. That is why it continues working with the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Surprisingly, however, Hoodbhoy’s letter also introduces examples of challenges faced by Pakistan that are really tangential to the performance of nuclear security. His arguments about Pakistan’s social fragility, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, attacks against military units, and the 1971 secession of its eastern wing are in a category of political and social challenges faced by many nuclear nations. In the nuclear era, the United States has survived the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and the attempts on the lives of Presidents Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan. The United States was unable to prevent the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the British government failed to prevent the London Underground bombings—all acts carried out by religious extremists. These tragic events did not translate into the inability of these nations to keep their nuclear assets safe in crisis situations just as Pakistan has been able to maintain control of its nuclear assets during the recent political crisis.

Political challenges and crises will arise. The important point is to have in place the best systems possible to ensure that nuclear assets are not at risk as a result. We, like Pervez Hoodbhoy, remain concerned with the state of nuclear safety and security in Pakistan because it is important for global security. That is why Pakistan has taken significant steps since the 1998 nuclear tests to strengthen the custodial controls of its strategic assets. This progress is important, and it needs to continue.

 


Kenneth N. Luongo is president of the Partnership for Global Security and a former senior adviser on nonproliferation policy to the secretary of energy. Brigadier General (Ret.) Naeem Salik is currently the South Asia Studies Visiting Scholar at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.


Arms Control Today welcomes letters from our readers. Letters should be under 600 words and should include the writer's full name, address and daytime phone number. Please put "LETTER TO THE EDITOR" in the subject line of the E-mail. Letters may be edited for space. E-mail to the Editor.

It is good to see Kenneth N. Luongo and Brigadier General (Ret.) Naeem Salik’s unbridled optimism about Pakistan’s ability to safeguard its nuclear arsenal (“Building Confidence in Pakistan’s Nuclear Security,” December 2007). But a more tempered approach would perhaps have been better. In thinking about how well Pakistan may be able to secure its nuclear weapons, materials, and experts, it is worth remembering that Pakistan has been unable to protect its constitution from military coups, has lost half its territory (East Pakistan, now Bangladesh) in 1971, and has failed to safeguard the lives of its most prominent political leaders in recent months. (Continue)

 

Contradictions Still Plague U.S.-Indian Nuclear Deal

Daryl G. Kimball

Two and a half years after President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced their proposed U.S.-Indian civil nuclear cooperation deal, the ill-conceived arrangement faces a highly uncertain future. In the next few weeks, decisions will likely be made at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) that will determine whether the deal occurs at all and, if so, at what cost to the global nuclear nonproliferation system.

As soon as this month, the IAEA Board of Governors may be convened to consider a new India-specific safeguards agreement. If approved, the 44 other members of the NSG might then act on a U.S. proposal to exempt India from long-standing guidelines that require comprehensive IAEA safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply. If these bodies agree, the United States and other suppliers could finalize bilateral nuclear trade deals with India.

Although many states are willing to bend some rules to help India buy new reactors and the additional fuel needed to run them, there is growing resistance to forms of nuclear trade that could indirectly enable India’s nuclear weapons program or that would allow continued nuclear trade if India breaks its pledge not to resume nuclear test explosions. There is good reason for such concern because India violated past agreements on peaceful nuclear cooperation when it tested its first nuclear device in 1974 and has refused to allow comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

Contrary to claims of its proponents, the deal does not bring India into the nonproliferation mainstream. In fact, given India’s refusal to join the five original nuclear-weapon states in halting the production of fissile material for weapons, foreign supplies of nuclear fuel could free up New Delhi’s existing (and limited) uranium stockpile and increase its capacity to produce more nuclear bomb material. Unlike 177 other states, India has not yet signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Meanwhile, Indian officials are highly sensitive to concerns that the deal could affect its nuclear weapons program. To preserve India’s military options, the Singh government has bargained hard for unprecedented fuel supply assurances and unspecified “corrective measures” in the new safeguards agreement to offset disruptions that might occur if India resumes testing.

Indian leaders are also demanding terms of trade with other nuclear suppliers that sidestep the minimal but vital nonproliferation conditions and restrictions established by Congress in 2006 implementing legislation. The law, known as the Hyde Act, would require the termination of U.S. nuclear trade if New Delhi resumes nuclear testing or violates its safeguards commitments.

To improve its fuel production and spent fuel reprocessing capabilities, the Singh government has fought tooth and nail to secure access to uranium-enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies. The Hyde Act effectively bars the transfer of these sensitive nuclear technologies, which India could potentially use to enhance its military nuclear program.

Yet, India is demanding an NSG exemption without any of these and other conditions or restrictions. To date, the Bush administration has carried India’s water. The current U.S. draft proposal calls for a “clean” exemption, and the bilateral U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation agreement contradicts the Hyde Act in several areas.

But at a hearing Feb. 13, the new chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Rep. Howard Berman (D-Calif.), challenged Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on this approach, noting that would give other nuclear suppliers, such as France and Russia, a commercial advantage and undermine U.S. nonproliferation objectives. Rice told Berman that the United States would pursue India-specific nuclear trade guidelines that are “completely consistent” with the Hyde Act.

Days later, India’s special envoy, Shyam Saran, contradicted Rice, saying that “it is our expectation that there would be a fairly simple and clean exemption from these guidelines, without any conditions or even expectations regarding India’s conduct in the future.” He asserted that India has “no problem with permanent safeguards provided there are permanent supplies of fuel.”

Saran noted that, in the U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation agreement, the Bush administration pledged to help India amass a strategic fuel reserve and provide fuel supplies for the lifetime of its safeguarded reactors. Yet, at the urging of Sen. Barack Obama (D-Ill.), the Hyde Act stipulates that fuel supplies should only be “commensurate with reasonable reactor requirements.”

Now is the time for Congress and responsible members of the NSG to hold the Bush administration to Rice’s pledge to support international guidelines for trade with India that, at the very least, incorporate the minimal requirements mandated by U.S. law. If India’s leaders cannot even abide by these minimal standards and decide to reject the deal, that is their choice. Additional concessions to India will only further compromise the already beleaguered global nonproliferation system.

Two and a half years after President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced their proposed U.S.-Indian civil nuclear cooperation deal, the ill-conceived arrangement faces a highly uncertain future. In the next few weeks, decisions will likely be made at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) that will determine whether the deal occurs at all and, if so, at what cost to the global nuclear nonproliferation system.

As soon as this month, the IAEA Board of Governors may be convened to consider a new India-specific safeguards agreement. If approved, the 44 other members of the NSG might then act on a U.S. proposal to exempt India from long-standing guidelines that require comprehensive IAEA safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply. If these bodies agree, the United States and other suppliers could finalize bilateral nuclear trade deals with India. (Continue)

U.S.-Indian Deal in Limbo as Clock Ticks

Wade Boese

Bush administration officials and some U.S. lawmakers are prodding India to accelerate its efforts to advance a civil nuclear trade initiative or risk losing it. At the same time, domestic political opponents in India are pressing the Indian government not to move ahead on the initiative or chance losing power.

President George W. Bush agreed with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh nearly three years ago to disassemble the legal and regulatory barriers to India’s participation in the civilian nuclear trade market. (See ACT, September 2005. ) The United States had taken the lead in erecting those barriers following India’s 1974 explosion of a nuclear device derived in part from U.S. and Canadian nuclear supplies designated for peaceful purposes.

Congress gave its preliminary and conditional approval to the initiative in December 2006 through legislation known as the Hyde Act after Rep. Henry Hyde (R-Ill.), who at that time chaired the House International Relations Committee. (See ACT, January/February 2007. ) Before Congress can take a final vote on an agreement granting India access to U.S. nuclear fuel and technologies, the voluntary 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) must first exempt India from a restriction against nuclear trade with non-nuclear-weapon states, like India, that do not subject their entire nuclear complex to international oversight. Although India possesses nuclear arms, it is classified as a non-nuclear-weapon state by the 1968 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which India has never signed.

NSG members, which seek to coordinate their export controls, are waiting on India to complete a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) before considering exempting India from the group’s trade rule. Safeguards are mechanisms, such as inspections and remote monitoring, placed on a country’s civilian nuclear facilities and materials to verify that they are not being used for nuclear weapons purposes. In addition to six thermal nuclear reactors already under IAEA safeguards, Singh in March 2006 committed to place an additional eight of 16 such reactors under safeguards. (See ACT, April 2006. )

Confidential talks on a new, India-specific safeguards arrangement for those eight reactors began last November between India and the agency, but no final agreement has emerged. General speculation is that the delay stems from India linking its willingness to abide by safeguards, which are supposed to be in perpetuity, to guaranteed nuclear fuel supplies. In a Feb. 18 speech to the India International Centre in New Delhi, Shyam Saran, special envoy on the nuclear initiative for Singh, stated, “Our position right from the outset had been that we have no problem with permanent safeguards provided there are permanent supplies of fuel.”

Whatever the reason for the prolonged negotiations, U.S. supporters of the initiative are anxious. They had hoped that the safeguards agreement would be completed in time for the IAEA Board of Governors to take the necessary step of approving it at the board’s March 3-7 meeting. The next regular board meeting is not scheduled until June 2-6, which is after the planned May plenary of the NSG and presents a sequencing problem for the initiative. Both the IAEA Board of Governors and the NSG can convene extraordinary meetings to take decisions.

Some U.S. lawmakers say that the IAEA and NSG steps must be done before June in order for Congress to take up the initiative for a final vote because of the abbreviated congressional calendar caused by the upcoming November presidential and congressional elections. Visiting New Delhi Feb. 20 with Sens. John Kerry (D-Mass.) and Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.), Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del.), chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, told reporters, “It is important for India to move the agreement as rapidly as possible, preferably within weeks.”

Similarly, Nicholas Burns, undersecretary of state for political affairs, said Feb. 11, “[W]e don’t have all the time in the world.” David Mulford, U.S. ambassador to India, delivered the same message in a Feb. 10 interview with India’s CNN-IBN, and he added, “My opinion is that if this is not processed in the present Congress, it is unlikely this deal will be offered again to India.” The trio of senators similarly said that if the deal did not go through this year, it would likely be renegotiated by a future administration.

But Singh’s government is receiving pressure from the opposite direction from its domestic critics who assert the initiative will make India subservient to the United States or impinge on India’s nuclear weapons program. Leftist parties that align themselves with Singh’s governing coalition have threatened to withdraw their support from the government if they are unsatisfied with the final IAEA safeguards agreement. Such a move could trigger new elections that could oust Singh’s government.

The main opposition party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), also has stepped up its attacks on the initiative after Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in Feb. 13 testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the United States will seek an exemption for India at the NSG “consistent” with the Hyde Act. Indian politicians of all stripes dislike the Hyde Act because it conditions future trade on India’s behavior, including continuation of a nuclear test moratorium. The act also effectively bars, except in special circumstances, transfers to India of uranium-enrichment, plutonium reprocessing, and heavy-water production technologies, which can be used to produce essential nuclear bomb materials.

India prefers what it calls a “clean” NSG exception. As Saran explained in his Feb. 18 speech, “It is our expectation that there would be a fairly simple and clean exemption from these guidelines without any conditionalities or even expectations regarding India’s conduct in [the] future.”

The BJP responded to Rice’s statement by demanding that Singh’s government apologize for misleading and betraying India. BJP spokesperson Prakash Javadekar asserted Feb. 15, “[T]he primary objective of the Hyde Act is to cap, then roll back, and ultimately eliminate India’s nuclear weapons capability.”

Rep. Howard Berman (D-Calif.), who took over as acting chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee after Rep. Tom Lantos (D-Calif.) passed away Feb. 11, signaled that he would prefer an NSG exemption that reflected the Hyde Act and not a clean one. He told Rice that if the United States pursued a clean exemption for India, “we would essentially be creating two standards for nuclear trade for India, one for the United States and one for the rest of the world.”

North Korea Slows Nuclear Disablement

Peter Crail

Two months after a Dec. 31, 2007, deadline to disable its nuclear reactor complex and provide a declaration of all nuclear activities, North Korea has slowed disablement work and has yet to offer a complete declaration. Pyongyang says that faster progress on its obligations is contingent on first receiving concessions from the United States and other parties participating in the six-party talks, which also include China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea. Meanwhile, South Korea’s new and more conservative administration has similarly declared that economic assistance it provides to North Korea must be linked to progress on denuclearization, representing a shift in the reconciliation-oriented policy of Seoul’s two previous administrations.

Disablement Slows

North Korea was supposed to complete disablement of the three primary facilities involved in its plutonium-based nuclear weapons program by Dec. 31, but work is currently poised to continue for several months. The deadline was established as part of an Oct. 3, 2007, joint statement in which North Korea pledged to disable its facilities and provide a declaration of all of its nuclear activities in exchange for additional energy assistance and the rescinding of certain U.S. sanctions against Pyongyang. (See ACT, November 2007. ) The delay in meeting the initial deadline was due originally to technical and safety considerations, but political motives have now slowed progress even further. (See ACT, January/February 2008. )

In Feb. 6 testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Christopher Hill, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, indicated that North Korea was slowing down the disablement process by reducing the number of work shifts from three per day to one. Siegfried Hecker, former head of Los Alamos National Laboratory, provided further details following his mid-February visit to Pyongyang and Yongbyon. He explained during a Feb. 16 press briefing that the fuel rods from the reactor were being unloaded at a rate of about 30 each day. More than 6,000 fuel rods remain in the reactor.

North Korea has declared that it would slow down disablement work due to delays in receiving concessions from the other parties engaged in the talks. The North Korean state-run media quoted a North Korean Foreign Ministry official Jan. 4 as stating, “Now that other participating nations delay the fulfillment of their commitments, the DPRK is compelled to adjust the tempo of the disablement of some nuclear facilities.”

Hill admitted Feb. 6 that the pace of providing the energy assistance pledged to North Korea has not matched the pace of disablement. He explained that, while eight of the 11 disablement steps have been completed at Yongbyon, North Korea has only received 20 percent of the 1 million tons of heavy-fuel oil other parties agreed to deliver in return for the disablement of its Yongbyon facilities and its declaration. However, a deadline was not expressly established for the provision of energy assistance in the October 2007 agreement, unlike the deadlines set for disablement and the declaration.

China, Russia, South Korea, and the United States have each delivered a shipment of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea.

NK Seeks Concessions First on Declaration

In addition to using the heavy-fuel oil delays as an excuse to slow the disablement work, Pyongyang has made receiving this fuel a condition for providing a declaration on its nuclear programs. Hecker said Feb. 16 that North Korean officials told him that until they receive the energy aid and are removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism and the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act, “they will not be able to produce what Ambassador Hill calls a ‘complete and correct’ declaration.”

The notion that North Korea is now withholding a complete and correct declaration appears to step back from Pyongyang’s claim in January that it had already “notified the U.S. side” of the contents of its declaration. (See ACT, January/February 2008. )

Regarding two of the most contentious issues related to the declaration, Pyongyang’s suspected uranium-enrichment program and its nuclear cooperation with other states, North Korea has attempted to provide some assurances it is not currently engaged in these activities. Yet, it has not offered such assurances about similar past activities.

On the uranium-enrichment issue, Hill described Feb. 6 North Korea’s explanations regarding thousands of aluminum tubes it imported several years ago that raised suspicions of a North Korean uranium-enrichment program. (See ACT, December 2007. ) North Korea showed U.S. officials two conventional weapons systems that utilized these tubes, one of which was incompatible with this material. Hill told the committee that “it is our judgment that the tubes were not brought into [North Korea] for the weapon system that did not work” and that the tubes were then transferred to another weapons system that did work.

Although it appears that North Korea is currently using these materials for a conventional weapons system, the original intention behind the acquisition of the tubes is unclear. U.S. technicians discovered traces of enriched uranium on the tubes provided by North Korea for examination, further calling into question the original purpose of the material.

Two Asian diplomats told Arms Control Today that the process of uncovering information about a North Korean uranium-enrichment program might move faster if Washington would share its evidence regarding such a program with North Korea and its allies in the region. Hill admitted Feb. 6 that there are different assessments among the other parties engaged in the talks about the existence and nature of a North Korean uranium-enrichment program.

The matter of North Korea’s nuclear cooperation with other states largely hinges on Pyongyang’s possible nuclear assistance to Syria. On Sept. 6, 2007, Israel carried out an airstrike against a suspected Syrian nuclear facility, which may have been constructed with North Korean assistance. (See ACT, November 2007. ) Hill told reporters Feb. 19 that he has continued to discuss “the Syria matter” with North Korea. According to Hill, Pyongyang has stated that it is not currently engaged in nuclear cooperation with other countries and says that it will not do so in the future. North Korea also maintains that it did not carry out any such cooperation with Syria.

Shift Expected in Seoul

The Feb. 25 inauguration of South Korean President Lee Myung-bak brought the first conservative government into power in Seoul in a decade. Lee’s Grand National Party (GNP) has traditionally opposed the “Sunshine Policy” of short-term reconciliation with North Korea adopted by his two predecessors, instead favoring the application of greater pressure on Pyongyang to denuclearize. Although Lee has not suggested an end to Seoul’s engagement with Pyongyang, he has indicated that his country’s assistance to North Korea will be linked closely to progress on the nuclear issue.

The shift in Seoul’s North Korea policy appears to be part of a broader expected realignment in South Korea’s foreign policy focus, with greater attention to be given to the country’s relations with Washington. Moreover, the new president has asserted that such a shift may benefit inter-Korean relations. The International Herald Tribune quoted Lee Jan. 14 as stating, “[I]f South Korean-U.S. relations get stronger, it will actually help improve inter-Korean relations. And it can actually help improve North Korean-U.S. relations.”

A diplomatic source close to the six-party talks told Arms Control Today Feb. 15 that, unlike previous South Korean administrations, the Lee government is not seeking any major accomplishments in regard to North Korea. Moreover, the new administration will review the pledges made by former president Roh Moo-hyun in October 2007 to provide North Korea with a range of economic development assistance and carry them out only if they are supported by a “national consensus.” (See ACT, November 2007. )

Bush Administration Seeks Congressional Authorization

In his Feb. 6 testimony, Hill indicated that the administration requires a congressional waiver of U.S. legislation in order to carry out additional work in North Korea beyond the current disablement process. Due to North Korea’s October 2006 detonation of a nuclear device, U.S. law currently prohibits nearly all agencies from using funds for nonhumanitarian assistance in North Korea. (See ACT, January/February 2008. )

Hill stated that the current funding is enough to cover disablement “but not much more” and that “more substantial” funding would be required with respect to additional activities, which include verification, facility dismantlement, and the removal of spent fuel and other materials. According to Hill, the administration is seeking language in the fiscal year 2008 supplemental appropriations bill funding U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan “or any other appropriate legislative vehicle” that would remove restrictions on the use of funds to carry out further denuclearization work in North Korea.

In his opening statement during the hearing, Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del.), the committee chairman, stated that he and the ranking member, Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), “have drafted legislation that would provide the Department of Energy and the Department of State with the necessary authority to implement a robust denuclearization plan.” Congressional sources told Arms Control Today that, at the end of last year, the administration attempted to seek this authorization as part of the fiscal year 2008 omnibus appropriations bill but did not do so in time to incorporate the appropriate language.

Russia Halts Missile Launch Notices

Wade Boese

Russia recently stopped providing advance notice of its ballistic missile launches to fellow members of a voluntary missile transparency and restraint regime. Other participants, including the United States, also are not fully implementing their commitments.

Established in November 2002, the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) calls on its 128 participating states to “exercise maximum possible restraint” with respect to missiles capable of delivering biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons. In addition to cutting their missile forces if possible, participants are supposed to provide annual reports on their missile inventories and activities and give advance notice of ballistic missile and space-launch vehicle firings. Ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicles are technically very similar.

Russia’s suspension took effect Jan. 1 and reportedly will last at least one year. HCOC activities are supposed to be confidential, and Russia did not publicly declare the halt, but several foreign government officials confirmed Russia’s action to Arms Control Today.

The suspension only applies to pre-launch notices, which the Kremlin began providing in 2004. Russia is expected to continue submitting an annual report, which many HCOC members fail to do. Most of those members, however, do not possess ballistic missiles or space-launch vehicles.

The foreign sources said Russia identified two main reasons for the suspension. One was the refusal of other HCOC members to adopt a Russian proposal to make the annual reports and pre-launch notification requirements more optional rather than politically binding. Moscow contends that such a move might make code membership more attractive to nonmembers, which include growing missile and space technology powers Brazil, China, India, Iran, and Pakistan. North Korea, a leading missile proliferator, also is not a participant.

Russia’s other rationale for its suspension was that some current members have not been issuing pre-launch notifications. Presumably, the key culprit in Russia’s eyes is the United States, which has never supplied pre-launch notifications through the code. The United States has regularly provided HCOC annual reports.

Washington and Moscow also bilaterally exchange advance notice on their ICBM and submarine-launched ballistic missile flights as required by a 1988 missile launch notification agreement and the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty limiting their strategic forces. Those notices are conducted through the two countries’ Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers.

When it signed the code in 2002, the United States said it would start providing advance notice under the HCOC when a U.S.-Russian Pre- and Post-Launch Notification System became operational as part of the planned Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC). The intended purpose of that center is to enable the United States and Russia to share in real time their early-warning data on ballistic missile launches worldwide.

The JDEC, however, has yet to begin operation. The Russian government recently released the property on which the center was to be built for another purpose. Moscow has identified two alternative sites for the center, according to a U.S. government official, who in a Jan. 15 interview with Arms Control Today declined to confirm or comment on Russia’s HCOC suspension.

Progress on the JDEC, initially agreed to in 1998, has been delayed for several years due to various disputes on tax and liability issues. The United States and Russia reached an agreement in 2005 that U.S. officials saw as a basis for resolving the JDEC holdup, but the two governments are still working out legal details. (See ACT, June 2006. )

Moreover, Russian officials told Arms Control Today last April that their country would not move ahead on the JDEC while the United States continues efforts to base strategic anti-missile systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. U.S. government officials say that Russia has not informed them of that linkage.

Two foreign officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the HCOC confidentiality rule, speculated that other code members providing advance launch notices would continue to do so despite the Russian suspension. They named France, Japan, Norway, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom as some states that have made notifications. But the officials worried that U.S. and Russian nonparticipation would make it less likely that nonmembers might join.

Meanwhile, Russia Feb. 12 proposed the negotiation of a treaty proscribing weapons in space and a universal pact proscribing ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (see page 50 ). Washington and Moscow renounced and eliminated that category of missiles in the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

Marius Grinius, Canadian ambassador and permanent representative to the 65-member Conference on Disarmament, questioned Moscow’s proposals in light of the current HCOC status. “It may well be unrealistic to call for new [transparency and confidence-building measures] when existing ones that we have worked so hard to create, like the HCOC, are regrettably falling into disuse, whatever the rationalization may be,” he said.

The Austrian government, which serves as the HCOC’s voluntary executive secretariat, notes on its foreign ministry website that members at their annual meeting last year discussed “strengthening” the code’s various confidence-building measures, including pre-launch notifications. Members are scheduled to gather this year May 29-30 in Vienna.

The HCOC is the second agreement in as many months that Moscow has suspended. Last December, Russia indefinitely halted its participation in inspections, data exchanges, and notifications mandated by the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. (See ACT, January/February 2008 .) Russia accused the United States and its Western allies of ignoring Russian concerns and not abiding by the treaty, which limits the deployment of tanks and other heavy weaponry in Europe.

Russia recently stopped providing advance notice of its ballistic missile launches to fellow members of a voluntary missile transparency and restraint regime. Other participants, including the United States, also are not fully implementing their commitments. (Continue)

Russia Pushes Pacts as U.S. Kills Satellite

Wade Boese

At the stalemated Conference on Disarmament (CD), Russia recently urged states to pursue separate pacts to outlaw all arms in space and ban certain types of missiles already forsworn by Russia and the United States. Chances for work on those two proposals or other long-standing subjects appear slim, however, as no issue commands the prerequisite consensus at the 65-member conference. The negotiating climate was further clouded in late February by the U.S. destruction of a faulty U.S. satellite.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov Feb. 12 submitted draft frameworks of the two agreements to the conference. The Geneva-based body convenes annually for three multiweek working periods but last negotiated a treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, in 1996. Members have been arguing since that time about what they should negotiate next.

Lavrov said his country’s initiatives were not intended to further complicate the ongoing struggle to adopt a CD work agenda. Beginning last year, members have focused debate on a compromise plan to launch negotiations to halt the production of key fissile materials, plutonium and highly enriched uranium, for weapons purposes. The draft agenda also calls for establishing less formal talks on outer space, nuclear disarmament, and assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states that they will not suffer nuclear attack.

Last year, all but three countries, China, Iran, and Pakistan, were prepared to accept that agenda. The trio argued, in part, that all the issues should be treated equally rather than giving priority to a U.S.- and Western-favored fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT). European diplomatic sources in Geneva say that Algeria, Egypt, India, Israel, and Sri Lanka also harbor reservations about the proposed agenda.

Lavrov indicated that Russia’s outer space proposal, co-sponsored by China, was not in opposition to the draft agenda or an attempt to change it. Instead, he described the Russian proposal as having a “research mandate.” But Lavrov added, “We hope that subsequently, when appropriate conditions are there, our work can be channeled into a negotiating format.”

Similarly, Lavrov suggested that Russia was not seeking to graft its missile proposal on to the agenda. He said Russia was circulating the concept for “study” in hope of sparking a “constructive dialogue.”

Neither Russian proposal garnered a warm U.S. reception. Washington has long maintained that the existing 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which bans placing unconventional weapons in orbit, is sufficient. In its 2006 space security strategy, the Bush administration stated it would “oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space.” (See ACT, November 2006. )

The administration further contends that it would be difficult to ensure compliance with a space weapons ban because of the inherent ambiguity and dual-use capability of many space technologies and systems. For instance, a vessel used to conduct repairs on an orbiting satellite could alternatively damage or disable it.

In addition to proscribing the placement of any type of weapon in orbit or on celestial bodies, the draft Russian-Chinese treaty would obligate future states-parties “not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects.” But Washington argues the measure would fail to prevent the research and development of air-, sea-, and land-based anti-satellite weapons, such as the system China used last year to destroy one of its aging satellites. (See ACT, March 2007. )

Seemingly underscoring its own point, the United States Feb. 20 smashed into small pieces a defunct U.S. satellite using a modified Standard Missile-3 interceptor, which is designed to counter short- to intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Many independent experts sharply questioned the stated U.S. justification for the action: protecting people against the slight possibility of injury or death from exposure to the satellite’s highly toxic hydrazine fuel.

Several days before the satellite intercept, Ambassador Christina Rocca, the U.S. permanent representative to the CD, said the proposed “engagement is not part of an anti-satellite development and testing program.” Moscow saw it differently. Reuters Feb. 16 quoted a Russian Defense Ministry statement accusing the United States of “going ahead for tests of an anti-satellite weapon. Such tests mean in essence the creation of a new strategic weapon.”

Two days later, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Jianchao described China as “highly concerned.” After the incident, Liu asked the United States to share data on the resulting debris, which unlike that created by the Chinese satellite destruction is not expected to pose threats to other satellites or spacecraft because the U.S. strike took place at a much lower altitude, around 250 kilometers instead of approximately 850 kilometers. Consequently, the U.S.-created debris is lower than where most satellites operate and will more quickly be pulled into the Earth’s atmosphere and burned up on re-entry.

U.S. officials denied that they would alter additional anti-missile interceptors to transform them into satellite killers. General James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters Feb. 21 that the modifications are “not something that we would be entering into the service in some standard way.”

Increased U.S. interest in developing anti-ballistic missile defenses in the late 1990s helped fuel Chinese and Russian demands for a new space agreement to limit U.S. systems. The Bush administration has subsequently sought seed money for a so-called space-based missile defense test bed, but lawmakers have consistently denied it funding, including for the current fiscal year. Still, the administration Feb. 4 resurrected the $10 million request as part of its fiscal year 2009 budget proposal (see page 30).

Like the United States, Russia expresses concern about other states’ growing missile capabilities; unlike the United States, Russia has not turned to missile defenses. One of the Kremlin’s initial reactions was to contemplate withdrawing from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty so Russia could legally field missiles comparable to those being developed by other countries. The INF Treaty bars the United States and Russia from possessing ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

Moscow’s Feb. 12 missile proposal indicates it has shelved, at least momentarily, the withdrawal option in favor of exploring extending the INF Treaty prohibitions to other countries. The Russian proposal urges other states to complete an agreement to stop flight testing and producing ground-launched missiles with INF Treaty-banned ranges and destroy their stockpiles.

A Department of State official e-mailed Arms Control Today Feb. 14 that the Russian proposal was “well-intentioned” but “not…the best way to address” the spread of missiles. The spokesperson contended a “one-size-fits-all treaty” would be impractical because of “complex regional situations,” such as those in South Asia and the Middle East.

Notwithstanding its skepticism, the United States joined with Russia last October to encourage other states to renounce INF Treaty-class missiles. The spokesperson noted that no government has responded publicly to that petition.

Meanwhile, many appeals to China, Iran, and Pakistan to support the draft CD agenda have failed. Pakistan in particular remains adamant that the plan is unacceptable.

While calling for a balanced work program, Pakistan maintains the current FMCT negotiating mandate is flawed for not specifying that a final agreement must be effectively verifiable. That goal used to be a common conference aim, but the United States declared in 2004 that such an objective was unattainable and should not be a precondition to negotiations. (See ACT, September 2004.) Although disagreeing, most countries have relented to the U.S. position on the understanding that verification measures can be broached in actual negotiations.

Islamabad further insists that FMCT negotiations not begin unless countries can raise the possibility that a potential agreement might go beyond stopping fissile material production to dealing with existing stockpiles. Pakistan is worried about freezing the status quo in which India has a lot more fissile material and weapons potential than Pakistan. Pakistani concerns have been compounded by the U.S. campaign to roll back rules limiting India’s access to foreign nuclear technologies and fuel.

In a rare speech by a defense minister to the CD, Des Browne of the United Kingdom Feb. 5 urged all countries to drop preconditions for negotiations on an FMCT, which he described as a “key milestone” on the road to nuclear disarmament. Despite a preliminary decision last year to extend its nuclear weapons capability at least another two decades, Browne insisted the British government supports “a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.” He said the United Kingdom would help advance that goal by hosting before 2010 a conference on verifying nuclear disarmament for personnel from British, Chinese, French, Russian, and U.S. nuclear laboratories.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also took the atypical step Jan. 23 to travel to the conference and personally admonish it. Telling the CD that its successes were “distant memories,” Ban implored members to stop holding negotiations on one subject “hostage” to work on another. He warned the conference that it risked “losing its way.”

Conference members have until March 28 to set a course before the first working period expires. The conference will then reconvene May 12 to June 27 and July 28 to September 12.

At the stalemated Conference on Disarmament (CD), Russia recently urged states to pursue separate pacts to outlaw all arms in space and ban certain types of missiles already forsworn by Russia and the United States. Chances for work on those two proposals or other long-standing subjects appear slim, however, as no issue commands the prerequisite consensus at the 65-member conference. The negotiating climate was further clouded in late February by the U.S. destruction of a faulty U.S. satellite. (Continue)

IAEA: Iran Work Plan Progress Incomplete

Peter Crail

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei issued a report Feb. 22 on Iran’s nuclear program indicating that the agency has made considerable progress in clarifying some of Iran’s past nuclear activities, but has not been able to resolve all allegations of a previous nuclear-weapons program. These allegations primarily surround a claim by Western intelligence agencies that they possess a laptop and other documentation that once belonged to an Iranian nuclear technician and that contained studies relevant to a nuclear weapons program.

Iran claims that these allegations are fabrications and argues that it is not obligated to address them any further. Meanwhile, the United States and others have recently authorized the IAEA to confront Iran with additional documentation regarding the studies.

The report also notes that Iran has increased its transparency with the agency in the last few months, although the IAEA qualifies this cooperation, stating that it was not provided “in a consistent and complete manner.” Moreover, Iran has not complied with UN Security Council demands to suspend sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities and some council members have stated that failure to meet that requirement will lead to additional sanctions.

Questions Still Outstanding

The agency’s report focuses largely on the progress made under an August 2007 work plan intended to resolve a number of “outstanding questions” surrounding Iran’s past nuclear activities. (See ACT, September 2007. ) Iran resolved some of these questions with the agency prior to the November 2007 report, and IAEA spokesperson Melissa Fleming stated Jan. 13 that Iran agreed in January to complete the work plan within four weeks.

Prior to the February report, the remaining issues were related to Iranian experiments with polonium-210, activities at a uranium mine, uranium contamination at a technical university, procurement efforts for centrifuge components, a document detailing the fashioning of uranium metal, and “alleged studies” on a nuclear-weapons program. Of these issues, the report indicated that only the alleged studies issue remains outstanding. However, the IAEA states that its “overall assessment” still requires an understanding regarding the role of the uranium metal document and the procurement activities of military-related organizations.

The alleged weaponization studies entail a number of efforts that the IAEA characterized as “a possible military dimension to Iran’s nuclear program.” These activities included work on the conversion of uranium dioxide into uranium tetrafluoride, high-explosives testing similar to that of a nuclear-weapon trigger, and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle that might be capable of accommodating a nuclear warhead. Uranium tetraflouride is the precursor to uranium hexafluoride, the feedstock used in centrifuges to enrich uranium to low levels for nuclear power reactors or high levels for nuclear weapons. The IAEA also sought information regarding procurement efforts and individuals related to these studies.

A senior IAEA official indicated Feb. 22 that, although the agency received the documentation regarding the studies in August 2005, it was unable to substantially address the alleged studies with Iran until recently. Moreover, the United States and other countries that provided the IAEA with documentation on the alleged studies did not authorize the agency to confront Iran directly with the original documentation until Feb. 15.

According to the report, Iran has provided written responses to some of the agency’s questions on these alleged studies but has not provided access to individuals associated with them. In its responses, Tehran declared that the allegations related to uranium tetraflouride conversion, high-explosives testing, and a nuclear-weapon-related re-entry vehicle were “baseless and fabricated.” The agency is still in the process of clarifying a number of procurement activities related to the studies, as well as a suspected project on laser uranium enrichment.

In responding to a question from Arms Control Today, a senior agency official admitted Feb. 22 that the time needed to resolve the remaining work plan issues “depends on the Iranians” and the types of responses they provide. The official noted that the agency is trying to understand what Tehran means when it says the allegations are baseless but that it has not made any conclusions as to whether the allegations are fabrications or if Iran’s explanations are plausible.

Iranian officials have argued that Iran has no further obligations to answer questions related to the studies. During a Feb. 22 interview, Ali Asghar Soltaniyeh, Iranian envoy to the IAEA, stated that Iran agreed in the negotiation of the work plan to “touch upon” the alleged studies issue “not as an outstanding issue, but as a good gesture.” Now that Tehran has provided its response to the allegations in writing, he added that “officially therefore that issue of alleged studies is over.”

A senior IAEA official stressed Feb. 22 that the agency has a mandate to clarify the alleged studies from the UN Security Council resolutions.

Iran Develops Faster Centrifuge

Meanwhile, Iran has been able to accomplish some technical advances with its uranium-enrichment program, which it claims is solely for peaceful purposes. Iran has developed a more advanced centrifuge adapted from the P-2 centrifuge design received from the nuclear smuggling network led by Pakistani nuclear official Abdul Qadeer Khan. This improved design, called the IR-2, is capable of enriching uranium about twice as fast as the P-1 centrifuge, which Iran currently has installed at its commercial facility at Natanz. Due to difficulties with the maraging steel bellows of the P-2 centrifuge, Iran adjusted the design to avoid the need to construct the bellows while maintaining the faster enrichment rate. (See ACT, November 2007. )

Iran has installed a single IR-2 centrifuge as well as a cascade of 10 IR-2 machines at its pilot enrichment plant at Natanz. In January, Iran began feeding uranium hexafluoride into the single IR-2 machine under IAEA monitoring.

Iran has worked on developing and testing this more advanced centrifuge, but it has not increased its current enrichment capacity since the last IAEA report in November 2007. It maintains a single module of about 3,000 centrifuges at its Natanz commercial enrichment facility. According to the report, Iran is preparing other areas of the facility for the installation of additional centrifuges.

Iran also continues to operate its centrifuges at far below their stated capacity. (See ACT, December 2007. ) According to the report, since February 2007, Iran has fed 1,670 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride into the centrifuges at its commercial facility and has produced a total of 75 kilograms of uranium enriched to 3.8 percent of the uranium 235-isotope. That output is less than half the amount that would be produced by efficient operation of P-1 centrifuges.

 

Iran-IAEA Work Plan Issues and Conclusions

The IAEA has held discussions with Iran to resolve a number of outstanding questions regarding the country’s past nuclear activities as part of a work plan agreed to in August 2007.  The agency detailed its progress in a Feb. 22 report.

 


Issue

Iran’s Explanation

IAEA Conclusion

Gchine Mine

 

The IAEA sought to clarify the circumstances surrounding the uranium mining and milling operations at Gchine, including the lack of declared operations between 1993 and 2000, to determine whether Iran used the mine as an independent source of uranium.

Iran explains that the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran always oversaw operations at Gchine and, between 1993 and 1998, preparations for ore processing took place at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center.

The IAEA concluded that this newly provided information is consistent with its findings and the documentation and no longer considers the issue outstanding.

Polonium-210 Experiments

During the 1980s, Iran conducted experiments with polonium-210, which has application in nuclear weapons designs as well as civilian purposes.

Iran maintains that the experiments were conducted by university scientists for civil applications and were not part of broader research and development.

The IAEA declared that the explanations Iran provided were consistent with its findings and no longer considers the issue outstanding.

 

Uranium Contamination

The IAEA detected the presence of highly enriched uranium contamination on equipment at a technical university in Tehran, suggesting that this equipment may have been used in an undeclared enrichment facility.

Iran explained that the equipment was contaminated when used in proximity to centrifuge equipment that was contaminated in Pakistan prior to transfer.

The IAEA concluded that Iran’s explanations and documentation “were not inconsistent with the data currently available to the agency” and no longer considers the issue outstanding.

Procurement Efforts

A former head of the Physics Research Center (PHRC) at Lavisan-Shian procured or sought a range of dual-use equipment that was consistent with a uranium-conversion and -enrichment program. The Lavisan-Shian site is associated with the Iranian Ministry of Defense, and beginning in late 2003, Iran razed the site, raising suspicions that it was covering up undeclared nuclear activities.

Iran asserts that none of the equipment that the former PHRC head obtained or sought was intended for use in a conversion or enrichment program. Tehran provided documentation regarding the non-nuclear use of some of the equipment and indicated that other equipment was not delivered.

 

The IAEA determined that the explanations provided by Iran and the responses of the former head of the PHRC “were not inconsistent with the stated use of the equipment.” It no longer considers the issue outstanding.

 

Uranium Metal Document

Iran obtained a document that describes the procedures for reducing uranium hexafluoride into uranium metal and machining enriched-uranium metal into hemispheres. This process may be used to make the fissile core for nuclear weapons.

Iran maintains that it received the document at the initiative of the A.Q. Khan network.

 

The IAEA is seeking to clarify with Pakistan the circumstances surrounding the provision of the document.

 

Alleged Studies

Western intelligence agencies accuse Iran of engaging in studies regarding the conversion of uranium dioxide into uranium tetrafluoride, high-explosives testing similar to that of a nuclear-weapon trigger, and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle that might be capable of accommodating a nuclear warhead. Iranian officials also carried out procurement activities and projects that could be related to these studies.

Iran claims that the allegations regarding these studies are “baseless and fabricated” and denies the existence or role of some of the personnel named in the documentation. Iran also provided a response indicating that some of the procurement efforts were not related to the studies.

 

The IAEA awaits further responses regarding the procurement activities and projects that could be associated with the studies and intends to share additional documentation regarding the studies with Iran.

 


New UN Sanctions on Iran Proposed

Peter Crail

France and the United Kingdom Feb. 21 formally introduced a new draft sanctions resolution on Iran’s nuclear program to the UN Security Council. The draft lays the basis for a third UN sanctions measure against Iran. Tehran has refused to comply with Security Council demands to suspend its enrichment-related work and the construction of its heavy water reactor.

The draft resolution is based largely on a set of sanctions that Germany and the five permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) agreed to on Jan. 22. In February, the six countries shared a draft sanctions package with the nonpermanent members of the Security Council for commentary.

John Sawers, the United Kingdom’s permanent representative to the United Nations, told reporters Feb. 21, “The text that we’ve circulated today reflects some of the comments we’ve had back from delegations.”

Vitaly Churkin, Russia’s permanent representative to the UN, indicated that Moscow would be willing to back the measure. He told reporters Feb. 27, “If Iran in the next few days does not stop the enrichment activities…then yes, Russia…has taken upon itself certain commitments…to support the resolution that has been drafted in the past month.”

Several nonpermanent members of the Security Council had pushed for delaying consideration of an additional sanctions resolution until after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released its February report on Iran. Ricardo Alberto Arias, Panama’s permanent representative to the UN, told reporters Feb. 14, “We have to wait for the report of the IAEA because it’s a factor to have to consider in this.” The agency issued the report Feb. 22 (see page 25).

Since the release of the IAEA report, however, Libya has indicated that it would not likely agree to the currently proposed sanctions. Giadalla Ettalhi, Libya’s permanent representative to the UN, told reporters Feb. 25 that “there should be some changes” in the draft resolution and that his country “cannot be supportive of further sanctions.”

Responding to questions regarding the concerns expressed by other council members about the sanctions measures, Department of State deputy spokesperson Tom Casey told reporters Feb. 26, “Nobody seems to think that we can’t address their concerns and overcome the differences.”

The sanctions included in the current draft are already weaker than what the United States originally sought. China and Russia voiced opposition to more stringent measures prior to the initial agreement on a sanctions package in January. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Feb. 13 that the sanctions are “not as strong as the United States would have liked, but they have the effect of reminding Iran that it is isolated from the international community.”

The draft resolution reinforces the current set of sanctions targeted against personnel and entities involved in Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs and applies additional efforts aimed at curtailing Iran’s access to nuclear equipment and technology. It also expands the list of 50 individuals and entities subject to travel restrictions and assets freezes under the two previous resolutions, as well as the list of dual-use items prohibited for transfer to Iran. (See ACT, April 2007. )

One of the key additional efforts in the draft resolution is a call for states to inspect cargoes carried by the firms Iran Air Cargo and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line if there are reasonable grounds to believe that they may contain prohibited items. South Africa has reportedly expressed opposition to this provision of the draft resolution.

GAO Report Questions U.S. Sanctions Impact

As the United States and its allies continue to seek multilateral sanctions on Iran through the UN, a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report released in January calls into the question the effectiveness of a variety of U.S. sanctions measures.

At the request of Rep. Christopher Shays (R-Conn.), the GAO examined the full range of U.S. sanctions on Iran, including the comprehensive trade and investment restrictions imposed in the 1980s, sanctions on foreign entities engaging in proliferation or terrorism-related activities with Iran, and more recent targeted financial restrictions against Iranian entities involved in proliferation or terrorism-related activities.

The report concludes that the extent of the impact of sanctions on Iran “is difficult to determine” and recommends that the National Security Council and other key agencies carry out periodic assessments of these sanctions. It notes, however, that “Iran’s global trade ties and leading role in energy production make it difficult for the United States to isolate Iran.”

The report recommends periodic assessments of U.S. sanctions. It noted that although U.S. officials have stated that U.S. sanctions have specific impacts on Iran, “agencies have not assessed the overall impact of sanctions.” Administration officials told the GAO that sanctions are just one factor influencing Iran’s behavior and it is not possible to determine the impact various sanctions have on policymaking in Tehran.

A staffer for Shays told Arms Control Today Feb. 13 that the report was requested in order to get an idea of “what was working and what was not.” In response to the report, Shays introduced legislation Jan. 18 that requires relevant U.S. agencies to carry out an annual assessment of sanctions on Iran.

The Department of the Treasury informed the GAO that it does carry out assessments of financial sanctions. In a Dec. 6, 2007, response to the draft report, Stuart Levey, undersecretary of the treasury for terrorism and financial intelligence, claimed that, as a result of eliciting the support of private financial institutions, “foreign-based branches and subsidiaries of Iran’s state-owned banks are increasingly isolated, threatening their viability.”

For the last several years, the Treasury Department has engaged in a concerted effort to convince other states and foreign financial institutions to apply financial pressure on countries such as Iran. Levey told a Senate Appropriations subcommittee in April 2006 that senior Treasury Department officials have met with their counterparts “in a number of countries in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East to urge them to ensure that U.S.-designated proliferators are not able to do business in their countries.”

Treasury officials admit, however, that Iran has employed ways to circumvent U.S. financial restrictions on its financial institutions. In a Feb. 8 speech, Deputy Treasury Secretary Robert Kimmitt stated that such circumvention has “allowed actions by Iranian banks to remain undetected as they move funds through the international financial system to pay for the regime’s illicit activities.”

Iranian officials have boasted of their own efforts to evade sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies. Tahmasb Mazaheri, governor of Iran’s central bank, told a London audience Feb. 7, “The central bank assists Iranian private and state-owned banks to do their commitments regardless of the pressure on them.”

Senate Still Examining Pre-War Iraq Intel

Peter Crail

Five years after the March 2003 invasion of Iraq by U.S.-led coalition forces, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has yet to conclude its investigations into the pre-war intelligence that was cited by the Bush administration as the basis for the decision to take military action against Iraq.

The committee has conducted the investigation in two phases. The first phase, concluded in 2004, centered on a faulty October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) regarding Iraq’s nonconventional weapons programs. (See ACT, September 2004. )

The second phase of the examination has faced repeated delays since it was announced in February 2004. Nonetheless, this phase has examined a variety of issues, including the intelligence community’s use of information provided by the Iraqi National Congress. (See ACT, December 2006. ) Two issues remain outstanding, and congressional sources told Arms Control Today Jan. 30 that the committee hopes to vote on reports regarding them before the summer recess. It is unclear if this can be accomplished.

One of the remaining issues relates to whether pre-war public statements on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and links to terrorism by administration officials were substantiated by intelligence information. As part of this investigation, the committee has asked the administration to share all Presidential Daily Briefs on Iraq during the investigation’s time frame. The administration has refused to honor this request.

The second remaining issue involves the intelligence-related activities conducted by two Pentagon offices: the Office of Special Plans and the Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group. Then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld established the Office of Special Plans, which was tasked with examining raw intelligence related to Iraq’s WMD programs, within the office of Douglas Feith, the under secretary of defense for policy. Feith created the Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group after the September 2001 attacks to examine links between terrorist organizations and host countries.

In February 2007, the Pentagon inspector general issued a report stating that Feith’s office produced “alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al Qaeda relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community.” The report further stated that, although these activities were not illegal or unauthorized, they were “inappropriate.” Congressional sources told Arms Control Today Feb. 15 that former committee chairman Pat Roberts (R-Kan.) used the Pentagon investigation as an excuse to delay the committee’s investigation into Feith’s offices.

Five years after the March 2003 invasion of Iraq by U.S.-led coalition forces, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has yet to conclude its investigations into the pre-war intelligence that was cited by the Bush administration as the basis for the decision to take military action against Iraq. (Continue)

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