Login/Logout

*
*  
“It will take all of us working together – government officials, and diplomats, academic experts, and scientists, activists, and organizers – to come up with new and innovative approaches to strengthen transparency and predictability, reduce risk, and forge the next generation of arms control agreements.”
– Wendy Sherman
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State
June 2, 2022
April 2007
Edition Date: 
Sunday, April 1, 2007
Cover Image: 

The Chemical Weapons Convention at 10: An Interview With OPCW Director-General Rogelio Pfirter

Interviewed by Oliver Meier

On April 29, 1997, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) entered into force. Ten years on, the CWC has won support from nearly all UN member states: 182 states-parties have agreed to be bound by the convention, while an additional six states have signed but not ratified it.

On March 16, Arms Control Today International Correspondent Oliver Meier spoke with Rogelio Pfirter, director-general of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), about the CWC's achievements and challenges that lie ahead. The OPCW is the international organization charged with implementing the CWC.

ACT: On April 29, we mark the 10th anniversary of the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention. What, from your perspective, are the biggest achievements of the convention and the biggest problems lying ahead with regard to banning chemical weapons?

Pfirter: We have been successful in implementing the very concretely focused mandate of this convention. We have made progress in the actual destruction of chemical arsenals. Soon, 25 percent of the declared stockpile will have been destroyed under verification.[1] We have also achieved enormous progress in terms of national implementation. Although much, of course, remains to be achieved, we have already in place a good part of the required legislative and administrative measures. We have also been able to work in the area of assistance and protection and in developing the type of arrangements the convention foresees.[2]

Secondly, we have been able to prove that, through multilateral action, it is possible to address effectively the issues related to peace and security and, more concretely, issues that involve disarmament and nonproliferation. This is particularly important at a time when the multilateral system has been questioned in several areas, especially in the area of peace and security.

ACT: Not all states have joined the convention yet. On universality, what in particular do you think can be done to improve the number of states-parties in the Middle East?[3] There have been expectations that Iraq and Lebanon might soon accede to the CWC.

Pfirter: I think that universality is one of the biggest challenges facing the CWC because the convention is only as strong as its weakest link. The ban is weakened, of course, if any countries remain outside of it, particularly countries seen as potential possessors of chemical weapons. The Middle East is one such region where there have been allegations that a few of the countries might have chemical programs, so we definitely need to move forward with universality there. The problem is unique because, of course, the issue of chemical weapons in the region is part of the much larger problem of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, I do believe there are states where the chemical issue can be addressed on its own merit and at a speed distinct from other issues, particularly those of weapons of mass destruction. It is quite clear that, today, the ban on chemical weapons is universal and it is mandatory for all states.

How to address it? I think that we have to look at the peculiarities of the area while not forgetting the overall context. We should work with each country there to try to renovate the dynamics by ensuring that the issue is reviewed, is revised, and remains topical, that [it] is not static or stagnant or condemned to follow the fate, for instance, of the nuclear issue or tied to the overall problem. This is what we are doing, and I myself am engaging with countries in the region. Of course, it will also require the collective effort of all members of the OPCW to ensure that this issue remains on the top of the agenda and that the countries realize that they need to join.

ACT: Can you say something specific about Iraq and Lebanon , which are on the list of countries expected to join soon?

Pfirter: In the case of Lebanon , it is our understanding that the parliament has recommended accession to the convention. In fact, only positive action by the executive power is pending, which we hope will take place fairly soon. If Lebanon joins, of course, that would be an important step forward, not just for member states or for Lebanon itself but for the whole Middle East issue. So we look forward to that. We remain in contact with Lebanon in that respect. In the case of Iraq , the government has expressed its willingness to accede to the convention. We understand that steps are being taken and decisions are being made at the highest political level. Indeed, we have been engaged in helping to train Iraqi officials and to work with Iraq on the required documentation. We hope that this will take place before too long.

ACT: You mentioned destruction efforts and achievements. In an interview with ACT in 2005, you said that it would have a “devastating effect” if Russia and the United States missed their 2012 destruction deadlines. Now, at least with regard to the United States , it seems all but certain that it will not make the 2012 deadline.[4] What would be the consequences for the convention if the United States would indeed take much longer to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile? And do you still expect Russia to fulfill its obligation to destroy its chemical weapons stocks by 2012?

Pfirter: Officially, the position of the United States, repeated here [in The Hague] only 48 hours ago, is that it remains faithful to the convention and committed to its implementation and to the destruction [of its chemical weapons stockpile] at the earliest possible date. I will stick to that in the sense that I believe that there is a very strong political commitment on the part of the United States to support the convention and to comply with it. So, I am aware of the projections, I am aware of the current debate. Officially we have been told that the commitment remains, and I am convinced that the United States could comply with its obligation by 2012. So that's what I hope, and I think that's the hope of every member state in this organization.

In the case of Russia , destruction has taken on a new dynamic. Russia now has two destruction facilities in full operation, and one has already completed its task. Others are being built. I would hope that Russia picks up and maintains the momentum and will eventually in 2012 have a much better possibility of complying.

I think the issue of noncompliance is something that we should not prematurely address at this stage. It is an issue to be looked at later, as we come closer to the deadlines. For the time being, I think what remains is the commitment of the countries. None of them has in any way expressed any doubts about their obligations. The policy-making organs of the organization have granted both Russia and the United States an extension of the destruction deadlines to 2012. The OPCW has also created an additional reassurance mechanism in the sense that the policy-making organs maintain frequent contacts with the possessor states to ascertain their political will and the degree of progress. Again, I think that the general perception is that there is a strong commitment and determination from these states. That is where we stand at the moment, and I will not speculate beyond that.

ACT: If I can turn toward verification more generally, you told ACT in 2005 that “of particular concern are Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPF) where I believe our effort is still very low in proportional terms when one looks at the universe of the number of plants we have identified as potentially relevant to the convention.” What has happened since then to address this issue, and generally what do you think can be done to improve the balance between inspections for OCPFs and other facilities that handle chemicals listed on the schedules?[5]

Pfirter: First of all, let me reaffirm that I maintain the concern that I expressed in 2005. And secondly, yes, there is an issue related to the balance of inspections in terms of how intensely they are applied to each and every country. Due to the present site selection methodology, the inspection effort is being applied unevenly. I would say it is applied with a degree of inequality. A country that has, for instance, seven facilities relevant to us is treated exactly like a country that has 1,000 facilities on its territory. This has meant that we end up inspecting 100 percent of the facilities in a country with seven or 10 facilities and less than one percent of the facilities in a country with a large number of facilities.

That needs to be addressed. Less than a week ago, I announced to member states that something needs to be done. I myself intend to have the secretariat look again into this formula and introduce those modifications that would allow for a greater sense of equality among member states. We will work on the factor of the algorithm that equalizes countries irrespective of the actual number of facilities they have and try to ensure that countries with a higher number of facilities stand a greater chance of being inspected than the countries with a lower number of facilities. This is very technical. It has no political connotation in itself. When I made my announcement, there was an enormous sense of relief and support from the majority of countries. We will take it from there. There are other issues that are more political in nature that remain to be discussed. We will leave those issues to the member states to continue their discussions, and whenever they agree, we will add those modifications to the algorithm.

ACT: When do you expect to table your proposal on this issue?

Pfirter: We are working on it. It is a technical matter. [The OPCW] Verification Division is looking actively into the matter, and I hope that before too long I can offer a definite proposal.

ACT: Ten years after entry into force, it still seems unlikely that a challenge inspection will be requested despite various allegations of noncompliance, for example, by the United States against Iran . How is the secretariat preparing for challenge inspections?[6]

Pfirter: The secretariat continues to retain a high degree of readiness. Hopefully, if we are requested to conduct a challenge inspection, we will be able to do it as the convention foresees. As you very well said, triggering a challenge inspection remains in the hands of member states. So, we will be available, should they take those steps. I myself believe that the challenge inspection is a very important and fundamental instrument within the toolbox of verification for the Chemical Weapons Convention to expose violations and to deter potential violations. So, we need to make sure that this very important tool remains actual and available. And in that context, I am of course very aware of the fact that while we in the secretariat retain that readiness, there is still a need for countries at the political level to discuss these issues because there is no agreement on the matter. I hope, however, that challenge inspections are not in question at all, as countries have already agreed in the convention that the mechanism should exist.

In order to help countries understand challenge inspections, I also have thought that it would be good to offer member states and delegations, particularly here in The Hague , a better opportunity to see what challenge inspections are all about, in practical terms. So I am trying to organize with the generous contribution of the Netherlands , a mock challenge inspection exercise near The Hague , which would be available to member states for them to observe and participate. Challenge inspections are not a punishment mechanism. It is entirely a mechanism for reassurance, and we need to un-demonize it.

ACT: Is there a date set already for this mock exercise?

Pfirter: It is going to be later in the year or early next year.

ACT: The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission headed by Hans Blix warned in its report of “a dangerous erosion of the fundamental ban on chemical weapons” because they perceived “an increasing interest among some governments to adopt a more flexible interpretation of the CWC rules on the use of incapacitating chemical weapons, even as a method of warfare, in order to be able to use them in diverse situations.” How do you expect states-parties to address this challenge to the convention?[7]

Pfirter: First of all, I think that we do not know enough on this matter to say whether this is a challenge. We have a scientific advisory board, and we have policymaking organs that in due course may look into this matter. But more information is needed. Let me just start by saying that we expect all countries to be fulfilling their obligations in full and in good faith. There is no reason to suspect that this is not the case. Secondly, it is quite clear that the convention establishes unequivocally through the general purpose criterion what can and what cannot be done with these specific chemicals.[8] I am sure that countries understand that each and every development needs to be tested against that principle, and we take it from there. So I think that's the stage we are in.

ACT: States-parties have still not banned transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals to non-states-parties.[9] Do you expect this issue to be addressed any time soon? Generally, what do you think can be done to improve national implementation and monitoring on restrictions of trade with relevant chemicals? In the long term, do you see the OPCW playing a stronger role in this regard, for example, by monitoring imports and exports?

Pfirter: This is an area where action is required. It is an important component of the whole equation on what should be available to member states and what should not be available to nonmember states. I think this is a big inducement for formal involvement with the CWC. So I hope that this issue is not entirely finalized, although I do not expect that it will be reopened right away. Countries are required to make certain declarations, and sometimes we do find a lack of correlation between what a country declares and our own [data]. We are already aware of the need, and we have highlighted this many times, for better refinement in the way some things are declared. It's obviously part and parcel of a chemical ban, and we should make sure all of us, collectively, have in place mechanisms that account for any transfers [of scheduled chemicals] and that there is a way of following the chemicals as they move around the world.

ACT: Now, on national implementation, in April 2006 the 1540 Committee reporting to the UN Security Council found that a total of only 69 states had enacted some prohibitions related to chemical weapons in their national legal framework.[10] What do you think can be done to improve this situation, and should the action plan on implementation agreed to by the CWC states-parties in 2003 be expanded?

Pfirter: The action plan was quite successful, although not totally successful. Today 96 or 97 percent of states-parties already have a national authority in place.[11] Almost 50 percent of member states have comprehensive [implementing] legislation in place. This is very important because without adequate implementation the member states can not fully uphold the ban. We have to encourage and help some countries to not just implement, but implement in full. We will continue to work with any country. I hope we see the second review conference in 2008 approve a renewal of the action plan, which will still be necessary. I think that, again, we have not reached the finish line. The trend shows that countries are now much more aware and willing to enact the legislation that is required and set up the administrative measures.

ACT: You already mentioned the review conference coming up next year. From your perspective, which issues should member states address most urgently in 2008, and what is the status of preparations in the open-ended working group? Is there already agreement on whether the conference should review the convention on an article-by-article basis or on a thematic basis?

Pfirter: The open-ended working group is still undergoing a more generic type of debate. I do not think that there is yet a decision whether it will go article by article or subject by subject. There is a possibility that in fact there will be a comprehensive approach to this issue from both angles. In the next session member states will begin to focus on more concrete issues. I think the open-ended working group is a good demonstration of how countries are determined to face these issues in a spirit of consensus, working together in a collegial fashion. I believe that it will be extremely successful in producing the basis for the sort of document and declaration that will be adopted on the occasion of the second review conference.

The issues of the second review conference are being defined at the moment in the three areas that I mentioned. First of all, in the area of disarmament. I am sure that the conference would reaffirm the commitments that are there as well as the obligations in the field of nonproliferation. I do hope that the second review conference will be able to reaffirm the need for these particular parts of the agenda, which are so important, to be addressed effectively. I also hope that the issue of Other Chemical Production Facilities will receive an adequate echo in the documents. I hope also that, although this is not an anti-terrorist organization, the contributions that this organization can make under UN Security Council Resolution 1540 will also be reaffirmed through full implementation and through universality. In the field of assistance and protection, where we receive considerable demand from member states requesting support in capacity building, which also have a lot to do with their concerns in the face of the terrorist threat, I hope that we will get a reaffirmation of the need for the OPCW to fully attend to this important dimension. [The issue of assistance] also includes international cooperation aimed at helping developing countries receive training for their experts in the industrialized world, and in general, the promotion of the peaceful uses of chemistry.

ACT: You mentioned terrorism. On Feb. 23, you briefed the Security Council on the role of the OPCW in implementing UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1673.[12] You stated there as well that the OPCW is not an anti-terrorist organization. Can you explain how the work you are doing in The Hague helps to prevent terrorist attacks with chemical weapons?

Pfirter: The OPCW is not an anti-terrorist organization. It is not defined as such in the treaty, and therefore, it's a political organization. At the same time, after the events of September 11 in the United States , the member states did meet. They reached the conclusion that no organization of this nature can remain indifferent in the face of this new threat or increased threat. Secondly, the best way to make a contribution against terrorism is through the universality of the convention and full implementation of its program. And I think that this is where we made a commitment. As part of our program, countries are obligated to enact legislation and administrative measures so that they will be in a position to make the chemical weapons ban effective and to punish violations of the chemical ban on their own territories.

ACT: Finally, since this is the 10th anniversary, if you were able to look ahead another 10 years, where would you like to see both the convention and the OPCW in 2017?

Pfirter: Well, I would like to see that, of course, the destruction of chemical weapons arsenals in each and every country on this earth will have been completed and that we will have in place an effective means for monitoring and addressing their potential production in the future. In the long run, the nonproliferation regime will remain vital. In the field of cooperation and assistance, the organization will have ensured that countries develop the ability to face threats. I don't know whether the threat of terrorism will be as pertinent in 10 years time as it is today, but certainly security will remain a concern. We need also to make sure that the OPCW is capable of helping countries to acquire the means to face such a threat.

If you read Resolution 1540 and what it asks in order to prevent the access by terrorists to weapons of mass destruction, in particular chemical weapons, it calls upon countries to enact legislation and administrative measures in exactly the same manner as the CWC. There is a synergy there that demonstrates that the Chemical Weapons Convention, when effectively implemented, is an effective contributor to the prevention of use of chemical weapons by terrorists.

So, in that conviction we continue to work toward full implementation by all countries. We have also cooperated with the 1540 committee by remaining available to them to exchange information that could be of use to the committee, of course within the very strict mandates and strict confidentiality regulations we have. I look forward to the chairman of the committee's visit here in the near future and addressing their goals and sharing their experience in implementing [the resolution].

ENDNOTES

1. Six states-parties (Albania, India, Libya, Russia, South Korea, and the United States) have declared that they possess a total of more than 71,000 metric tons of chemical agents and are in the process of destroying them.

2. Under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), states-parties have pledged to provide assistance and protection to fellow member states when they are threatened with the use of chemical weapons or have suffered a chemical attack. If a state-party requests assistance, the Technical Secretariat is responsible for the effective coordination of assistance and protection measures provided by member states. These capabilities can include expertise in predicting hazards, in detecting and decontaminating chemical agents, in medical relief, and in on-site coordination with humanitarian and disaster response agencies. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) also relies on cooperation with other international organizations to assist it with dispatching and delivering assistance, managing on-site activities, and training.

3. Of the seven states remaining outside the CWC, four are in Middle East ( Egypt , Iraq , Lebanon , and Syria ). Israel has signed but not ratified the convention.

4. The convention requires states-parties to destroy their chemical weapons by 2007, 10 years after the CWC's entry into force. It is possible to request an extension of this destruction deadline by up to five years, until 2012. The conference of states-parties on December 8, 2006, approved requests for extensions of the final date for the destruction of the declared chemical weapons stockpiles. The following deadlines for complete destruction are now binding: India —April 28, 2009; Libya —December 31, 2010; Russia —April 29, 2012; South Korea —December, 31, 2008; the United States —April 29, 2012. Washington has recently admitted that complete destruction is unlikely to be completed before 2023, and it appears unlikely that Moscow can keep its promise to destroy its stocks by 2012. (See ACT, January/February 2007.)

5. The CWC verification system is based on three “schedules,” or lists of toxic chemicals and their precursors that have been developed and manufactured in the past for military purposes. Schedule 1 consists of chemical warfare agents and precursors that have no significant commercial applications, although they may be synthesized in small quantities for scientific research, pharmaceutical development, or chemical defense. Schedule 2 lists toxic chemicals and precursors that have commercial applications in small quantities. Schedule 3 contains toxic chemicals and precursors that have commercial applications in large quantities. The primary focus of routine inspections of the chemical industry under the CWC is on declared production facilities that manufacture the dual-use chemicals listed on Schedules 2 or 3. In recent years, however, the advent of small, multipurpose chemical-production facilities has made the batch synthesis of organic (carbon-based) compounds more automated and flexible. Such multipurpose plants, which constitute a fraction of the category of Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPFs), are potentially easier to divert to chemical weapons production than large, inflexible facilities that produce specific scheduled chemicals. As of November 2006, 77 member states had declared a total of 5,225 OCPFs, or more than five times the number of declared facilities that produce Schedule 1, 2, and 3 chemicals. (See ACT, January/February 2007.)

6. Article IX of the convention grants CWC states-parties the right to request a challenge inspection of any site, declared or undeclared, on the territory of another member state “for the sole purpose of clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible non-compliance.”

7. See: The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, “Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms,” June 1, 2006. Article VI of the CWC gives states-parties the right to maintain toxic chemicals for purposes not prohibited under the convention, including “law enforcement, including domestic riot control.” Whether the CWC permits the development and use for domestic law enforcement purposes of incapacitating agents with long-lasting effects, in addition to riot-control agents with transient effects, such as CS tear gas, is a matter of intense debate.

8. The “general purpose criterion” refers to the fact that the basic prohibitions of the CWC apply to all toxic chemicals and precursors that are acquired or used for hostile purposes, including those developed at any time in the future, and are not limited to the toxic chemicals and precursors listed in the three schedules of chemicals.

9. Article VI of the CWC specifies a number of restrictions on trade, keyed to the treaty's three schedules of chemicals. With the entry into force of the convention in April 1997, transfers to non-states-parties of the chemical warfare agents and precursors listed on Schedule 1 were banned immediately, and trade with non-states-parties in chemicals listed on Schedule 2 have been prohibited since April 2000. In 2003 the OPCW Conference of the States-Parties to the CWC considered a possible ban on exports to non-states-parties of Schedule 3 chemicals but could not agree by consensus. At present, the CWC allows exports of Schedule 3 chemicals to non-states-parties only if the recipient provides an end-use certificate clarifying the intended use and pledging not to make any further transfers.

10. On April 28, 2004, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1540 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The resolution mandates that all states establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials, and adopt legislative measures in that respect. In that context, the council also established a committee comprising all council members (the 1540 Committee) that would report on the implementation of the resolution.

11. To make sure that the convention is implemented effectively, states-parties are obliged to designate or establish a “national authority.” This body participates in and coordinates OPCW inspections of relevant industrial or military sites, makes initial and annual declarations, participates in assisting and protecting those states-parties that are threatened by or have indeed suffered a chemical attack, and fosters the peaceful uses of chemistry. In addition, the national authority acts as the focal point in the state-party's interaction with other member states and the OPCW's Technical Secretariat.

12. On April 27, 2006, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1673, which extends the mandate of the 1540 Committee for another two years, until April 27, 2008.

Global Strike Still on Pentagon Wish List

Wade Boese

Picture a grim scenario: U.S. intelligence learns that terrorists in a remote location are preparing an attack against the United States . The window of opportunity to react is a few hours at most, and no U.S. air, ground, or sea forces are close enough to act. The only current options, according to Pentagon officials, are to do nothing or fire a nuclear-armed, long-range ballistic missile.

The commander in charge of deployed U.S. nuclear weapons, Strategic Command chief General James Cartwright, says neither option is attractive. He wants another alternative: long-range ballistic missiles carrying conventional warheads.

Lawmakers last year were largely unconvinced of the wisdom of such a step, however, fearing particularly that Russia might mistake the launch of a conventional ballistic missile for a surprise nuclear attack requiring instant retaliation. They trimmed funding for the project from $127 million to $25 million and called for further study of the concept. (See ACT, November 2006. )

The studies are unfinished, but Cartwright and the Pentagon are back this year, asking Congress for $175 million to proceed with the project as part of the fiscal year 2008 budget request. The initial phase calls for substituting conventional warheads for nuclear warheads on two submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) for each of the dozen deployed U.S. ballistic missile submarines. The boats would continue to carry 22 nuclear-armed SLBMs apiece.

Testifying March 8 before the House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Cartwright said the Pentagon still needed a way to hit targets worldwide with a conventional warhead in under an hour. Surveying both offensive and defensive military assets, Cartwright asserted that “where we have a hole…is in the prompt global strike side of the equation.” This void could be filled in two years with the SLBM conversion, according to Strategic Command.

In his prepared remarks, Cartwright noted that “use of a nuclear weapon system in prompt response may be no choice at all.” Cartwright later testified that something “below the nuclear threshold” was required for “fleeting, high-value, high-regret factor-type threats.”

Legislators remain wary. Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.), the subcommittee chair, told Cartwright that prompt global strike is a “powerful concept, but there are a number of important questions that need to be answered before moving forward with any particular program.”

Aside from the worry that Russia and, perhaps someday, China might misinterpret a U.S. conventional missile launch as nuclear, some analysts and congressional aides have expressed other concerns. For example, they note that a launch order would be heavily reliant on intelligence, which can be limited or faulty, as demonstrated by the incorrect allegations about Iraqi unconventional weapons. In particular, the skeptics dread that the possibility of error could be magnified by the abbreviated timeline in which military and political leaders might need to make a decision. They also fear that providing a new use for ballistic missiles might enhance their perceived utility at a time that the United States has been seeking to stop their spread.

Congress has tasked the National Academy of Sciences to evaluate the need for a prompt global strike capability and how best to achieve it in varying time frames: one to two years, three to five years, and more than five years. The academy's Naval Studies Board initiated the 15-month, $5 million study earlier this year. Lawmakers had requested a preliminary report by March 15, but one has yet to be submitted.

The Pentagon is exploring other prompt strike capabilities aside from converting SLBMs, but they are longer-term possibilities. Cartwright noted that Air Force Space Command is developing a long-range ballistic missile option for launch from the United States .

Lt. Col. Randi Steffy, chief of operations for U.S. Strategic Command public affairs, told Arms Control Today in a Feb. 21 e-mail that the SLBM conversion is “only the first step in a larger plan for prompt global strike.” Steffy added that the command supports the development of such capabilities “in whatever form is deemed appropriate by Congress.”

Cluster Munitions Treaty Effort Moving Ahead

Wade Boese

Recalling the international campaign against anti-personnel landmines (APLs) a decade ago, nearly 50 governments have joined with nongovernmental organizations to negotiate a treaty to prevent civilians from being victimized by another type of weapon. This time, the focus is on cluster munitions, and the goal is to complete an agreement by 2008.

Meeting Feb. 22-23 in Oslo , Norway , 46 governments committed to pursue a legally binding instrument on cluster munitions, which are weapons that can spread up to some 600 small bomblets or grenades over areas as large as 200,000 square meters. These weapons can be dropped by aircraft, fired by artillery, or launched by rockets.

Failure rates for various submunitions can range from less than one percent to reportedly extreme cases of 100 percent under certain circumstances. Submunitions that fail to detonate properly can remain dormant, sometimes for decades, and then explode, possibly injuring or killing whoever might disturb them or happen to be close by.

Delivering the opening Oslo conference address, Norwegian Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre noted that children are “particularly vulnerable and constitute a disproportionately large group of [cluster munitions] victims.” He argued that the “humanitarian and political consequences” of cluster munitions “far outweigh their usefulness.”

Some governments at the conference, however, contended that cluster munitions have some utility. Sweden , for example, said that a successful agreement would balance “legitimate humanitarian and military interests,” while the United Kingdom drew a distinction between acceptable cluster munitions and “dumb” ones. The British government defined dumb munitions as those without self-destruct or self-deactivation capabilities or the ability to discriminate between targets and noncombatants.

Other governments, such as Ireland and Mexico , contended that all cluster munitions should be outlawed. Støre seemed to lean toward the more absolute perspective, arguing that “technical improvements in weapons technology will not be enough to address the complex humanitarian problems caused by cluster munitions.” He added that “it is impossible to create a 100 percent-reliable weapon.”

In the conference declaration, the participants set a goal of banning cluster munitions that inflict “unacceptable harm to civilians.” What cluster munitions fall inside or outside that definition will be determined through future negotiations.

The declaration also stated that the proposed accord will create “a framework for cooperation and assistance” to help aid victims, clear contaminated areas, conduct risk education, and destroy stockpiled weapons. Similar to the 1997 Ottawa Convention banning APLs, such assistance and cooperation will most likely be voluntary, not mandatory. Many countries already have donated millions of dollars to help clean up and dispose of dangerous cluster munitions remnants worldwide, including most recently those Israel employed in Lebanon last summer. (See ACT, October 2006. )

Egypt , Finland , France , Italy , Germany , and the United Kingdom reportedly surprised many in Oslo when they endorsed the declaration after earlier expressing some reservations about the process or objective. China, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States were some of the notable but expected no-shows.

Japan , Poland , and Romania were the only conference attendees that declined to sign the final declaration. In a March 20 statement to Arms Control Today, the Polish Foreign Ministry stated that Poland is very interested in reducing the “negative effects” of cluster munitions but that its policy is to seek a solution through the framework of the 1981 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). Japan and Romania offered similar explanations.

The CCW currently has five protocols regulating arms, such as incendiary weapons and booby traps, judged to be indiscriminate or inhumane. Many countries, including Austria , Ireland , Mexico , New Zealand , and Norway , have been pushing for a cluster munitions protocol for several years without success.

The CCW operates by consensus, and some countries, such as the United States and Russia , repeatedly have blocked such negotiations. This continued opposition is what compelled Norway to convene the Oslo gathering outside the CCW. (See ACT, December 2006. )

Still, several countries that signed the Oslo declaration are not giving up on the CCW. Germany, for instance, is drafting a draft cluster munitions instrument for CCW consideration.

Seeking to avoid making countries feel they must choose the Oslo process or the CCW, the Norwegian government added a line to the declaration that states should continue to try and address cluster munitions dangers “within the framework of international humanitarian law and in all relevant fora.” In its final conference statement, the United Kingdom thanked Norway for the amendment.

Through his press spokesperson, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also commended Norway 's handling of the matter. The CCW and Oslo processes “should not be seen as in competition with one another but as complementary and mutually reinforcing,” the Feb. 23 statement read.

Some of the more than 100 nongovernmental participants in Oslo were less diplomatic toward the CCW. Steve Goose, co-chair of the 177-member Cluster Munition Coalition and director of the arms division at Human Rights Watch, told government representatives Feb. 22 that the CCW was a potential “pitfall” and warned them that “there should not be any pretense that the CCW will be able to deal with this issue urgently or effectively.”

Nongovernmental participants and some states also were disappointed that the declaration did not call for countries to enact moratoriums on cluster munitions use. Instead, the declaration simply stated governments should “consider taking steps at the national level.” Austria and Bosnia and Herzegovina both announced moratoria at the conference.

Norway , in consultation with other governments, is drafting a “discussion paper” for circulation before the next meeting of participating countries. That meeting will occur May 23-25 in Lima , Peru . Subsequent meetings are tentatively scheduled for Vienna in late 2007 and Dublin, Ireland, in early 2008.

Although the declaration says negotiations should be finished by 2008, not all governments consider it a firm deadline. Sweden described 2008 as an “ambition,” and Canada , Denmark , Germany , and the Netherlands were among several countries that made similar statements.

Norway is encouraging other countries to join the process. Cambodia has been the only new volunteer as of mid-March.

Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), who has introduced legislation to stiffen U.S. cluster munitions use and export policies (see ACT , March 2007 ), criticized the Bush administration Feb. 23 for shunning the Oslo meeting. “I call on the United States to join in this effort and protect civilians from these lethal relics of war,” she declared.

A U.S. government official told Arms Control Today March 21 that the United States, which has not joined the Ottawa Convention, did not plan on enlisting in the Oslo process but would “fully participate in [CCW] discussions.” The official also stated it was “premature” to predict what position the United States might take on any agreement produced outside the CCW.

LOOKING BACK: The Missile Technology Control Regime

Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu

On April 16, 1987, the world's seven most industrialized nations (Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany) established the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Constructed in the waning days of the Cold War, the export control regime was aimed primarily at curtailing the spread of missiles cabable of delivering nuclear weapons.

The MTCR soon transformed into a more general attempt to limit ballistic missile technology to nonmember states that could use the capability to deliver biological and chemical weapons as well. Only much later did it evolve to restrict the spread of rockets, missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including some cruise missiles and drones.[1]

The MTCR's overriding objective was to limit the perceived value and attributes of missiles so as to diminish their spread. The regime began with two clear strategies for accomplishing this goal. First, it sought to coordinate policies and practices in supplying missiles and missile components to nonmembers. Second, it attempted to limit the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons by curtailing the spread of ballistic missiles that could deliver such weapons. Have these strategies helped the regime meet its ambitious objective over the past 20 years? The answer would have to be a qualified maybe.

The regime has been reasonably successful in streamlining and coordinating the relevant policies of the Group of Seven (G-7) and other Western countries. In particular, it has helped establish common ground for preventing the export of complete missiles or missile components that could provide the recipient country with ballistic missiles capable of delivering a first-generation nuclear weapon. Before the MTCR began, several countries, including Argentina , Iraq , Israel , Libya , and South Korea , had acquired either missiles or missile technology, mostly from the G-7 and other Western nations, which gave them the capability to deliver nuclear weapons.

One of the earliest contributions of the MTCR was to set the parameter of a nuclear-capable ballistic missile as one that could carry a 500-kilogram payload to a range of 300 kilometers. Of course, here the regime erred on the side of caution as a first-generation nuclear weapon was likely to weigh closer to 1,000 kilograms. These parameters and guidelines were readily accepted by the first generation of MTCR members for two reasons. First, these restrictions did not apply to transfers within the MTCR membership, evident in the U.S. supply of Polaris and Trident ballistic missiles to the United Kingdom . Second, in the early 1980s, there was concern that nuclear-capable ballistic missiles or technology supplied by one G-7 country might be used by the recipient against another G-7 country. This worry was highlighted indirectly by Argentina 's use of French Exocet missiles to sink the British destroyer HMS Sheffield and support ship Atlantic Conveyor during the 1982 Falkland Islands War.

Following concerns that several non-MTCR countries were working on chemical and biological weapons as an alternative or in addition to nuclear weapons, the regime was extended in 1993 to cover not only ballistic missiles and technology capable of delivering nuclear weapons but also chemical and biological weapons. The new MTCR guidelines did not alter the established payload or range limits, even though it was evident that a chemical or biological warhead could weigh considerably less than the prescribed 500-kilogram payload. Instead, members were urged to restrict the sale of any missile or unmanned aircraft to countries thought to be developing these so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Although the regime has been fairly successful in establishing policies, it has been less so in putting these policies into practice among its members. Indeed, some of the notable violators of the MTCR guidelines have been entities from within the original MTCR member states. For instance, the weapons-program dossier submitted by Iraq to the UN Security Council in December 2002 reads like a who's who of the MTCR. Among those listed as supplying missile technology to Baghdad are nine U.S. companies, apart from U.S. government agencies and laboratories; seven British companies; and one French company. In addition, U.S. entities have also cooperated with Israel to develop the Arrow Interceptor, whose 500-kilogram payload with a 300-kilometer range exceeds the MTCR's technical threshold. Israel is not a member of the MTCR but claims to adhere to its guidelines and control list.

Indeed, as the MTCR is a voluntary arrangement, it does not have the ability to sanction member states that violate its guidelines. The regime, considered as a cartel by many observers, has fared even worse in its unenviable task of convincing nonmembers to adhere to its guidelines and has struggled to gain legitimacy outside of its membership.[2]

One way it sought to better its standing was by expanding its membership to include key missile suppliers. Ironically, this enlargement from the original seven to the present 34 also created challenges for the regime.[3] The first round of enlargement between 1989 and 1993, coinciding with the end of the Cold War, was relatively smooth and uncontroversial, but the inclusion of Russia in 1995 and Ukraine in 1998 was problematic. Russia agreed to comply with the guidelines subject to three caveats: that all export-related disputes would be resolved multilaterally, that there should be increasing opportunity for supplying MTCR-controlled items to MTCR members, and that Moscow would have a say in regulating MTCR provisions. Predictably, several disputes arose over Russia 's missile exports, some of which were seen as contravening the guidelines. Similarly, when Ukraine joined the MTCR, it reserved the right to produce missiles, which went against the spirit of the MTCR and also flouted the U.S. rule that prospective members had to give up missles exceeding the original range/payload threshold.

Possibly in light of this experience, the MTCR membership has not invited China to join the regime. Although China gave a commitment in 1992 that it would abide by the MTCR guidelines, Beijing has subsequently refused to adhere to the updated 1993 guidelines, making the MTCR reluctant to admit a member likely to be even more recalcitrant than Russia . Thus, MTCR enlargement appears to have not only eroded the entry standards but also made consensus on sensitive issues increasingly difficult.

Limited WMD Success

On the objective of limiting the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons by curtailing the spread of ballistic missiles that could deliver such weapons, the achievements of the MTCR have been minimal at best and dubious at worst. Proponents of the MTCR often cite the abandonment of the joint Condor II program by Argentina , Egypt , and Iraq as well as the decisions of Brazil , Libya , South Africa , South Korea , and Taiwan to give up either their nuclear-capable ballistic missile or space launch vehicle programs as proof of the effectiveness of the regime. More recently, the decisions of Hungary , Poland , and the Czech Republic to destroy their old ballistic missiles, including some Soviet-era Scuds, partly to join the MTCR in 1993, are touted as evidence of the success and attractiveness of the MTCR.

In the strongest examples, the technology embargo was a contributing factor. The cases of Argentina , Brazil , Libya , and South Africa owed at least as much to domestic political changes and an improved regional security scenario. Similarly, Egypt 's decision was partly prompted by the generous annual aid package of around $2 billion from Washington and partly on account of the “cold peace” it established with Israel . These developments led Cairo to opt for a diplomatic approach, rather than a military one, to challenge Israel 's nuclear and missile capability.

Iraq 's decision to pull out of the Condor II project, on the other hand, was on account of Baghdad embarking on an ambitious indigenous missile program, which took one major war and several years of UN inspections to dismantle. Although Taiwan and South Korea ditched their ballistic missile programs, each has embarked on a sophisticated, potent, indigenous cruise missile program.

Some also argue that countries such as Brazil have joined the treaty to procure space launch technology. Finally, the Polish and Czech decisions did succeed in removing some aging missiles. Indirectly and inadvertently, however, it also paved the way for both countries to possibly acquire new and more sophisticated missiles from the United States as part of Washington 's global anti-missile system. If Russia were to carry through on its threat to respond by withdrawing unilaterally from the epoch-making 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which eliminated an entire class of ballistic missiles, the MTCR would suffer a double blow.

It appears that the MTCR did play a role in reducing ballistic missile programs capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in some non-MTCR countries. Yet, it is doubtful that the absence of ballistic missiles alone has limited the proliferation of these so-called weapons of mass destruction even in these few countries. For instance, many of the countries that have ostensibly given up ballistic missile programs capable of delivering chemical and biological weapons, such as Egypt , Iraq , and Syria , have still not joined either the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) or Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and, therefore, might still seek to acquire these weapons.

On the other hand, some countries such as Iran that have signed both the CWC and the BWC as well as the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) are still pursuing active missile programs. Despite its public vows, Iran may or may not be seeking to use its missiles as platforms for the delivery of nuclear or other unconventional weapons. Yet, because Tehran lacks access to reliable supplies of combat aircraft, it considers missiles a viable substitute. Indeed, given Iran 's experience in the eight-year-long war with Iraq , when its cities were attacked by conventionally armed Iraqi Scuds, conventionally armed missiles offer a serious military option.

The MTCR also did not gain universal appeal on account of two key omissions. First, by initially restricting itself to WMD-capable ballistic and then cruise missiles while ignoring conventionally armed cruise missiles, although it was evident as early as the Falkland Islands War that such missile proliferation and use was likely to be of greater concern in the coming years. This preference for ballistic missiles over cruise missiles and other UAVs was based on the erroneous assumption that such sophisticated missiles were more difficult for aspirant countries to acquire. The urge not to control the spread of conventionally armed cruise missile also may have been prompted by the lucrative export potential of such missiles. Second, the MTCR deliberately focused on horizontal proliferation (spread of missiles among newer states) rather than vertical proliferation (qualitative and quantitative improvement of missiles by existing missile-possessing states) and, consequently, was accused of dividing the world into missile haves and have-nots. This similarity with the NPT made the MTCR unpalatable for many countries even when they agreed with its principles.

Inadvertently in some cases, the MTCR also became a rationale for some nascent missile programs that otherwise might have been shelved. The best example is India , where one of the official justifications for its missile program is “to develop critical components [and] technologies…and to reduce the vulnerability of major programs [such as missiles]…from various embargoes/denial regimes [such as the MTCR], instituted by advanced countries.”

Indeed, partly to make this point, the creation of the MTCR in 1987 was greeted by a series of dramatic missile tests by Israel (the Jericho II in 1987, 1988, and 1989), India (the Prithvi in 1988 and the Agni in 1989), Pakistan (the Hatf II in 1989), and North Korea (the Nodong in 1993), and China's shipment of CSS-2 missiles to Saudi Arabia (1988) and M-11 and M-9 missiles to Pakistan (early 1990s). Even the most ardent MTCR supporters acknowledge that not only did the MTCR fail to significantly slow down the missile programs of India , Iran , Israel , North Korea , and Pakistan but may have actually provided a fillip for waning domestic support to their indigenous programs. In the process, they also produced a second tier of missile suppliers.

By the late 1990s, it was evident that the MTCR was in serious danger of becoming ineffective and irrelevant. One indication of this was the decision by Washington to embark on an ambitious, multilayered anti-ballistic missile defense program, seeking a techno-military fix to the perceived threat of missile proliferation from countries such as North Korea and Iran .

While Washington seeks to make a fine distinction between offensive and defensive missiles and argues that the former is benign and therefore legitimate, there are concerns that missile defense could inadvertently undermine the MTCR. First, emphasizing the techno-military fix over the politico-diplomatic approach of the MTCR might further weaken adherence to the flagging regime. Second, technically offensive and defensive missiles are more or less the same; they just have different roles. Thus, providing defensive missiles or missile technology to MTCR members might inadvertently give the recipient offensive missile capability, which contradicts the spirit of the MTCR. Finally, on what grounds could the MTCR persuade non-MTCR members not to transfer or receive similar defensive missile technology from others?

Partly to counter this prospect and partly to buttress the decline of the MTCR, several European members of the MTCR, notably the Netherlands , proposed a code of conduct against ballistic missile proliferation in 1999. This code, which was discussed over the next few years, including (at the initiative of the European Union) with several prominent non-MTCR members such as Pakistan, sought to address both missile possession and behavior and was formally adopted in November 2002 as the Hague code of conduct against ballistic missile proliferation. Although as many as 93 countries signed up to the code immediately, China , India , Iran , North Korea , Pakistan , and Syria did not. Even MTCR member Brazil has still not signed the code. The United States has signed the code, but Washington 's endorsement was tempered by its withdrawal in June 2002 from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, paving the way for an unfettered missile defense program and dashing the hopes of the European MTCR members that at least the pace of the destabilizing missile defense program could be slowed down.

In addition, by calling on members to “exercise maximum possible restraint in the development, testing, and deployment of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, including, where possible, to reduce national holdings of such missiles,” the code also appeared inadvertently to acquiesce to the possession of such missiles by all countries, much to the discomfiture of many of its original MTCR membership. Apart from a lukewarm reception among its core constituents, the code also failed to entice new constituents by focusing only on ballistic missiles and excluding cruise missiles, both conventional and nonconventional, even though the proliferation and use of cruise missiles had risen sharply since the early 1990s.

Despite these drawbacks, the Hague code is essential, given the ongoing frenetic pace of missile activity—more than 100 ballistic and cruise missiles have been tested and used just in the last couple of years. At the very least, the initial process was a useful first step by the MTCR in multilateralizing the issue of missiles. Although its proposed transparency and confidence-building measures, such as an annual declaration of ballistic missile policies and holdings and pre-flight notification of tests, are limited in scope, they are worthwhile if they are effectively and universally implemented. In this context, the efforts of code members to universalize it by having it “welcomed” by the UN General Assembly has to be commended. Much more needs to be done, however, both within and outside the United Nations, before the code is likely to be accepted and implemented universally.

If member states want the MTCR and the Hague code to remain relevant and effective, then they will have to do more to address the concerns of nonmembers in a genuinely democratic and universal setting. Among these concerns are legitimate security issues. Some of these issues can be addressed at the bilateral level or even at the regional level, but other issues can only be addressed with the inclusion of MTCR members with the biggest nuclear and missile arsenals, as with the six-party talks in Northeast Asia. Indeed, in some instances, it is the qualitative and quantitative improvement in the missile arsenals of MTCR members such as the United States that is of direct concern to non-MTCR members such as Iran and North Korea . Therefore, unless vertical missile proliferation by MTCR members is curbed, the regime is unlikely to stem the tide of horizontal missile proliferation by non-MTCR members.

Another concern for non-MTCR members is the increasing proliferation and use of conventionally armed cruise missiles by MTCR members against non-MTCR members. Hence, unless the MTCR and the code of conduct addresses the increasing use of cruise missiles, non-MTCR members are unlikely to consider the regime to be in their interest.

Finally, many non-MTCR members are concerned that the regime aims to prevent their legitimate access to civilian space launch technology under the guise of preventing missile proliferation. Unless the MTCR and the code incorporate some of the proposals related to civilian space launch made in the now-shelved Global Control System, it is unlikely to attract many new members.

Both the MTCR and the Hague code would do well to address concerns related to all missiles, not just some, if their purpose is truly to curb missile proliferation in the coming years. Otherwise, there is a danger that the MTCR will fade into history as a valiant but vain effort by the armed Western world to disarm the rest of the world of ballistic missiles.


Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu is director of the New Issues in Security course at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and was a consultant for the two UN panels of governmental experts on missiles. He is also co-editor of Arms Control After Iraq: Normative and Operational Challenges (UN University Press 2006).


ENDNOTE

1. For the official Missile Technology Control Regime website, see www.mtcr.info.

2. Mark Smith, “On Thin Ice: First Steps for the Ballistic Missile Code of Conduct,” Arms Control Today , July/August 2002, pp. 12-16.

3. The present members and their year of joining are Argentina (1993), Australia (1990), Austria (1991), Belgium (1990), Brazil (1995), Bulgaria (2004), Canada (1987), Czech Republic (1998), Denmark (1990), Finland (1991), France (1987), Germany (1987), Greece (1992), Hungary (1993), Iceland (1993), Ireland (1992), Italy (1987), Japan (1987), Luxembourg (1990), Netherlands (1990), New Zealand (1991), Norway (1990), Poland (1998), Portugal (1992), Republic of Korea (2001), Russian Federation (1995), South Africa (1995), Spain (1990), Sweden (1991), Switzerland (1992), Turkey (1997), Ukraine (1998), United Kingdom (1987), and the United States (1987). In addition, a few countries, such as China and Israel , declared that they would “adhere” to the MTCR guidelines.

On April 16, 1987, the world's seven most industrialized nations (Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany) established the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Constructed in the waning days of the Cold War, the export control regime was aimed primarily at curtailing the spread of missiles cabable of delivering nuclear weapons. (Continue)

Disarmament Forum Stalemate May End

Scarlet Kim

On March 15, the UN General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution approving Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's proposed reform of the UN disarmament bureaucracy.

Ban's original plan for restructuring the bodies, which proposed incorporating the Department of Disarmament Affairs (DDA) into the Department of Political Affairs, had been harshly criticized by a significant number of member states and civil society organizations. Many governments were upset with Ban's decision to unveil a reform plan without prior consultation. (See ACT, March 2007. )

Ban's original DDA proposal amounted to a bureaucratic demotion, stripping the department of its political and budgetary autonomy. Critics, particularly representatives of developing and European states, argued the move would lower the profile of disarmament and nonproliferation.

Responding to this criticism, Ban formulated a new plan to replace the DDA with a new office headed by a high representative whose rank would equal that of the current undersecretary-general for disarmament affairs. Though tasked with many of the same responsibilities of the existing undersecretary, Ban said he hoped by granting the high representative direct access to him the move would “revitalize the disarmament and nonproliferation agenda.”

The high representative, according to the new proposal, would focus on four core areas: policy development and coordination functions in support of the secretary-general, advocacy of disarmament and nonproliferation issues with member states and civil society groups, promotion and support of multilateral efforts in disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and promotion and support of conventional arms disarmament efforts.

The new resolution expresses General Assembly support for the establishment of an office for disarmament affairs and grants permission to the secretary-general to select a high representative. It also requests that the secretary-general submit a report, following his appointment of a high representative, outlining financial, administrative, and budgetary implications, as well as implementation of mandates assigned to the new office.

In recent years, the United States has often clashed with other General Assembly members on international disarmament initiatives. However, in a press release following the adoption of the resolutions, the U.S. mission welcomed the vote.

April 2007 Bibliography

Of Special Interest

Drell, Sidney D., Nuclear Weapons, Scientists, and the Post-Cold War Challenge: Selected Papers on Arms Control, World Scientific, 2007, 323 pp.

Goldschmidt, Pierre and Perkovich, George, Correcting Iran’s Nuclear Disinformation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 26, 2007, 5 pp.

Gorbachev, Mikhail, “ Gorbachev Attacks Labour’s ‘Rush to Deploy Nuclear Missiles’ Until 2050,” The Times, March 8, 2007.

Joseph, Jofi, “Strategic Mistake: The Neoconservative Approach to Nonproliferation has been a Disaster. Why Bush Can’t Disarm Iran,” Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, Spring 2007, p. 21.

Kimball, Daryl, “Replacement Warheads and the Nuclear Test Ban,” Defense News, March 5, 2007, p. 77.

I. Strategic Arms

Adams, Christopher, “Revolt Looms Over Trident Replacement,” Financial Times, March 1, 2007.

Associated Press, “Lawmakers: Blair Nuke Plan Has Risks,” March 7, 2007.

Broad, William, “New Design for Warhead Is Awarded to Livermore,” The New York Times, March 3, 2007, p. A10.

Brown, Colin and Russell, Ben, “Government Left Divided as Trident Rebels Defeated,” The Independent, March 15, 2007.

Costa, Keith J., “ Livermore Lab Wins Reliable Replacement Warhead Design Competition,” Inside Missile Defense, March 14, 2007, p. 2.

Cowell, Alan, “Blair Wins Vote to Renew Atom Arsenal,” The New York Times, March 15, 2007, p. A8.

Croft, Adrian, “ Britain Votes to Stay Nuclear Despite Revolt,” Reuters, March 14, 2007.

Deen, Mark and Donaldson, Kitty, “Blair Wins Nuclear Subs Renewal on Opposition Votes,” Bloomberg News, March 14, 2007.

The Economist, “Newer and Fewer: Reliably Replacing Warheads,” March 10, 2007, p. 31.

Fox, Jon, “Nuclear Attack Now Only Option in Some Cases, U.S. General Says,” Global Security Newswire, March 12, 2007.

Fox, Jon, “New Warhead Faces Uncertain Path Forward in Congress,” Global Security Newswire, March 5, 2007.

Gottemoeller, Rose, “The INF Conundrum,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 5, 2007.

Heintz, Jim, “Envoy: Moscow, U.S. Discuss START Treaty,” Associated Press, March 2, 2007.

Hoffman, Ian, “New H-Bomb Design Prompts Debate,” Inside Bay Area, March 26, 2007.

Hoffman, Ian, “Arms Race Ends in Bitter Lab Fallout,” Inside Bay Area, March 9, 2007.

Hoffman, Ian, “ Livermore Lab Will Build New H-Bomb,” Inside Bay Area, March 3, 2007.

Johnson, Rebecca, “The Trident Dispatches No. 6: Reaction to the Vote,” The Bulletin Online, March 15, 2007.

Johnson, Rebecca, “The Trident Dispatches No. 5: Voting Day,” The Bulletin Online, March 13, 2007.

Johnson, Rebecca, “The Trident Dispatches No. 4: The Run-Up to the Vote,” The Bulletin Online, March 6, 2007.

Kralev, Nicholas, “ Russia, U.S. Will Discuss START,” The Washington Times, March 6, 2007, p. A1.

Kristensen, Hans, “ U.S. Air Force Decides to Retire Advanced Cruise Missile,” Strategic Security Blog, March 7, 2007.

Pincus, Walter, “Nuclear Weapons Rarely Needed, General Says,” The Washington Post, May 10, 2007, p. A8.

Pincus, Walter, “ U.S. to Step Up Disassembly of Older Nuclear Warheads,” The Washington Post, May 4, 2007, p. A11.

Pincus, Walter, “Nuclear Warhead Plan Draws Opposition,” The Washington Post, March 4, 2007, p. A5.

Pincus, Walter, “ U.S. Selects Design for New Nuclear Warhead,” The Washington Post, March 3, 2007, p. A8.

Putrich, Gayle, “USAF to Retire Newest Nuke Missile,” Defense News, March 12, 2007, p. 6.

Quinn, Jennifer, “British Lawmakers Approve New Nuke Subs,” Associated Press, March 14, 2007.

Stephens, Bret, “Who Needs Nukes: Why the U.S. and other Western Powers Need to Modernize Their Arsenals,” The Wall Street Journal, March 20, 2007.

Sterngold, James, “Bomb Gurus Ponder Non-Nuclear Future; New U.S. Weapons Could Make Arsenal a Relic of the Cold War,” San Francisco Chronicle, March 4, 2007.

Weitz, Richard, “Has Moscow Given Up on European Arms Control?” World Politics Watch, March 5, 2007.

II. Nuclear Proliferation

Krepon, Michael, “The Nuclear Flock,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2007, p. 15.

Leopold, Evelyn, “UN Intends to Close Arms Inspection Unit for Iraq,” Reuters, March 7, 2007.

Reuters, “Arab Leaders Warn of Nuclear Arms Race,” March 29, 2007.

India

Brunnstrom, David, “EU’s India Trade Pact Draft Omits WMD, Rights,” Reuters, March 5, 2007.

Giacomo, Carol, “ U.S. Says India Must Honor Nuclear Deal Commitments,” Reuters, March 30, 2007.

Krishnaswami, Sridhar, “ US Says Nuclear Deal with India Not to Fuel Arms Race,” Hindustan Times, March 8, 2007.

Parameswaran, P., “US-India Nuclear Deal Not Moving Rapidly as Expected,” Agence France-Presse, March 8, 2007.

Sokolski, Henry, ed., Gauging U.S.-Indian Strategic Cooperation, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, March 8, 2007, 429 pp.

Walker, Martin, “ India’s Nuke Deal Falters,” United Press International, March 6, 2007.

Iran

Adler, Michael, “UN Atomic Agency Opens Meeting on Iran, North Korea,” Agence France-Presse, March 5, 2007.

Agence France-Presse, “ Iran Limits Cooperation with UN Atomic Watchdog,” March 28, 2007.

Albright, David and Brannan, Paul, ISIS Imagery Brief: Further Construction at Arak 40 MW Heavy Water Reactor, Institute for Science and International Security, March 20, 2007, 2 pp.

Associated Press, “ Iran Says it Rebuffed U.N. Because it Feared U.S. Attack,” March 31, 2007.

Associated Press, “ China Urges Iran to Return to Disarmament Negotiations,” International Herald Tribune, March 1, 2007.

Beck, Lindsay, “ Iran Sees Talks Ending Russian Atomic Plant Row,” Reuters, March 13, 2007.

Buckley, Neil, “ Russia Hardens Line with Iran,” Financial Times, March 20, 2007.

Cirincione, Joseph and Grotto, Andrew, Contain and Engage: A New Strategy for Resolving the Nuclear Crisis with Iran, Center for American Progress, March 2, 2007, 52 pp.

Cordesman, Anthony, UN Sanctions and Iranian Arms Imports, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 26, 2007.

Dareini, Ali Akbar, “ Iran Denies Halt to Uranium Enrichment,” Associated Press, March 6, 2007.

Dombey, Daniel, “Still Time for Diplomacy with Tehran, says US,” Financial Times, March 27, 2007.

Feinstein, Lee and Levi, Michael A., “Got the Sticks. Now the Talks,” International Herald Tribune, March 30, 2007.

Fox, Jon, “Lawmakers See Lax Enforcement of Iran Sanctions Act,” Global Security Newswire, March 22, 2007.

Fox, Jon, “ Lawmakers Call for More Financial Pressure on Iran,” Global Security Newswire, March 7, 2007.

Giacomo, Carol, “Progress Made on New Iran Sanctions: U.S. Official,” Reuters, March 2, 2007.

Heinrich, Mark and Strohecker, Karin, “IAEA Governors Approve Nuclear Aid Cut to Iran,” Reuters, March 8, 2007.

Heinrich, Mark and Strohecker, Karen, “ Iran’s Atomic Defiance Sets It Apart: IAEA Chief,” Reuters, March 5, 2007.

Holley, David, “ Russia Losing Patience with Iran over its Nuclear Stance,” Los Angeles Times, March 13, 2007.

Isachenkov, Vladimir, “ Russia Warns U.S. Against Striking Iran,” Associated Press, March 1, 2007.

Karimi, Nasser, “ Iran Says it Still Wants to Negotiate with West amid Nuclear Standoff,” Associated Press, March 26, 2007.

Kelland, Kate, “Air Strikes on Iran Could Backfire-Report,” Reuters, March 5, 2007.

Leopold, Evelyn, “U.N Ambassadors Consider New Sanctions on Iran,” Reuters, March 6, 2007.

Pleming, Sue, “ U.S. Opens Door to Bilateral Talks with Iran,” Reuters, March 7, 2007.

Podvig, Pavel, “Behind Russia and Iran’s Nuclear Reactor Dispute,” The Bulletin Online, March 26, 2007.

Reuters, “ Iran Implements Decision to Limit IAEA Cooperation,” March 28, 2007.

RIA Novosti, “Atomstroyexport to Continue Construction of Bushehr NPP,” March 13, 2007.

RTT News, “ Russia Receives First Payment Toward Delayed Bushehr Atomic Power Plant,” March 27, 2007.

Sciolino, Elaine, “ Russia Tells Iran It Must Suspend Uranium Project,” The New York Times, March 20, 2007, p. A1.

Shanker, Thom and Broad, William, “ Iran to Limit Cooperation with Nuclear Inspectors,” The New York Times, March 26, 2007, p. A6.

Shire, Jacqueline and Albright, David, Iran’s Centrifuges: How Well Are They Working? The Institute for Science and International Security, March 15, 2007, 2 pp.

Webb, Greg, “I AEA Governing Board Debates Iranian Nuclear Aid Cuts,” Global Security Newswire, March 7, 2007.

Weisman, Steven R., “ U.S. Cautions Foreign Companies on Iran Deals,” The New York Times, March 21, 2007, p. C1.

Williams, Dan, “Would Israel Attack Iran? Depends Who You Ask,” Reuters, March 4, 2007.

Wright, Robin, “ Iran Feels Pinch as Major Banks Curtail Business,” The Washington Post, March 26, 2007, p. A10.

Israel

Conger, George, “ Israel Urged to End Nuclear Ambiguity,” Jerusalem Post, March 12, 2007.

Libya

Agence France-Presse, “ Libya May Ask for U.S. Help on Nuclear Power,” March 12, 2007.

Reuters, “ Libya Unrewarded for Ending Nuclear Program: Gaddifi,” March 3, 2007.

North Korea

Albright, David, Phased International Cooperation with North Korea’s Civil Nuclear Programs, Institute for Science and International Security, March 19, 2007, 12 pp.

Beck, Lindsay, “IAEA Head in N. Korea as Nuclear Diplomacy Heats Up,” Reuters, March 13, 2007.

Beck, Lindsay, “ North Korea Nuclear Disarmament Complex: IAEA,” Reuters, March 12, 2007.

Bernstein, Jeremy, “Where Those Reactors and Centrifuges Came From,” The New York Times, March 10, 2007, p. A13.

Bolton, John, “ North Korea Climbdown,” The Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2007, p. A17.

Chang, Jae-Soon, “S. Korea Delays Aid to N. Korea,” Associated Press, March 2, 2007.

The Wall Street Journal, “Uranium Do-Over,” March 2, 2007, p. A10.

Fox, Jon, “House Panel Expresses Concern Over N.K. Nuclear Deal,” Global Security Newswire, March 1, 2007.

Greenlees, Donald, “Bank Blocks Plan to Release Frozen Funds to North Korea,” The New York Times, March 27, 2007, p. A6.

Hall, Kevin and Landay, Jonathan, “ U.S. Claims on North Korea Come Under Scrutiny,” The Mercury News, March 1, 2007.

Harrison, Selig, “How to Preserve the North Korean Nuclear Deal,” Financial Times, March 26, 2007.

Herskovitz, Jon, “ U.S. Calls on North Korea to Account for Uranium,” Reuters, March 6, 2007.

Hoge, Warren, “ U.S. Presses North Korea Over Uranium,” The New York Times, March 7, 2007, p. A9.

Kahn, Joseph and Weisman, Steven R., “ North Korea is Said to Tie Nuclear Accord to Freeing of Funds,” The New York Times, March 15, 2007, p. A8.

Kessler, Glenn, “New Doubts on Nuclear Efforts by North Korea,” The Washington Post, March 1, 2007, p. A1.

Kim, Jack, “ North Korea Fully Ready to End Nuclear Work: Envoy,” Reuters, March 4, 2007.

King Jr., Neil and Ramstad, Evan, “ U.S., North Korea Soften Their Stances,” The Wall Street Journal, March 2, 2007, p. A3.

Klug, Foster, “Bush Advisor Sets Aside Tough Nuke Talk,” Associated Press, March 17, 2007.

Kralev, Nicholas, “N. Korea U.S. Talks ‘Just a First Step,’” The Washington Times, March 1, 2007, p. A1.

Le Mon, Christopher, Six-Party Talks Produce Action Plan on North Korea Nuclear Disarmament, The American Society of Law, March 6, 2007.

Lynch, Colum, “U.N. Closes N. Korea Development Office,” The Washington Post, March 6, 2007, p. A13.

Reuters, “Lifting N. Korea Sanctions to Take Time: U.S. Official,” March 2, 2007.

Sands, David, “Nuclear Dialogue Opens on U.S. Soil,” The Washington Times, March 6, 2007, p. A11.

Sanger, David, “ U.S. to Offer North Korea Face-Saving Nuclear Plan,” The New York Times, March 5, 2007, p. A7.

Sanger, David and Broad, William, “ U.S. Concedes Uncertainty on North Korea Uranium Effort,” The New York Times, March 1, 2007, p. A1.

Sevastopulo, Demetri and Yeh, Andrew, “Rice Helped Unfreeze N. Korean Funds,” Financial Times, March 21, 2007.

Sokolski, Henry and Grotto, Andrew, Is the North Korea Deal Worth Celebrating? Council on Foreign Relations, March 12, 2007.

Ueno, Teruaki, “ Japan, N. Korea Talks Stall Again on Historic Issues,” Reuters, March 8, 2007.

Weisman, Steven R., “ U.S. Treasury Official to Help Free Up North Korean Funds,” The New York Times, March 24, 2007, p. A5.

Weisman, Steven R. and Greenlees, Donald, “ U.S. Discusses Releasing North Korean Funds,” The New York Times, March 1, 2007, p. A13.

III. Nonproliferation

Albright, David, “Looking for Nukes: An Ex-Inspector Explains the Art and Science of Nuclear Detective Work, and How it Applies to Iran,” Newsweek International, March 26, 2007.

Associated Press, “Nuke Transport Safeguards Bill Approved,” The Sydney Morning Herald, March 1, 2007.

Coll, Steve, “The Unthinkable: Can the United States be Made Safer from Nuclear Terrorism?” The New Yorker, March 12, 2007, p.48.

Davis, Ann, “New Exotic Focus for Hedge Funds: Uranium Market,” The Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2007, p. A1.

Digges, Charles, Putin Moves a Step Closer to Ratifying CTR Umbrella Agreement, Bellona, March 2, 2007, 2 pp.

The Economist, “Just Talk to Yourself: America and the Test-Ban Treaty,” March 10, 2007, p. 12.

Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Focusing on the Highest Priority Radiological Sources Could Improve DOE’s Efforts to Secure Sources in Foreign Countries, March 13, 2007, 17 pp.

Isango, Eddy, “ Congo Official Arrested in Uranium Sale,” Associated Press, March 7, 2007.

Khlebnikov, N., Parlse, D., and Whichello, Julian, Novel Technologies for the Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Activities, International Atomic Energy Agency, March 1, 2007, 7 pp.

Panofsky, Wolfgang K. H., “A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: Prohibition versus Elimination,” The Bulletin Online, March 5, 2007.

Quinn, Andrew, “S. African Seeks Secrecy Order in Atomic Trade Case,” Reuters, March 1, 2007.

Slaughter, Anne-Marie and Wright, Thomas, “Punishment to Fit the Nuclear Crime,” The Washington Post, March 2, 2007, p. A13.

Sprenger, Sebastian, “DHS Office May Chair ‘Global Initiative’ Meeting on Nuclear Smuggling,” Inside Missile Defense, March 14, 2007, p. 13.

Waddington, Richard, “World Disarmament Body Faces Moment of Truth,” Reuters, March 28, 2007.

Webb, Greg, “ Vietnam Nears Agreement to Remove Uranium,” Global Security Newswire, March 8, 2007.

White, Hugh, “Don’t Forget the Bomb,” The Age, January 3, 2007.

Williams, Isabelle, Analysis of U.S. Department of Defense’s Fiscal Year 2008 Cooperative Threat Reduction Budget Request, March 19, 2007, 6 pp.

IV. Missiles and Missile Defense

Abbot, Sebastian and Dareini, Ali Akbar, “Some Fear Iran Space Program is Hostile,” Associated Press, March 5, 2007.

Agence France-Presse, “ Poland Awaiting U.S. ‘Signal’ to Start Missile Defense Shield Talks: Defense Minister,” March 8, 2007.

Associated Press, “Czechs Formally Agee to Open Talks on Hosting U.S. Missile Defense Site,” March 28, 2007.

Associated Press, “German EU Presidency Calls for Calm Debate on U.S. Anti-Missile Program,” March 5, 2007.

BBC News, “ Taiwan ‘Tests New Cruise Missile,’” March 6, 2007.

Beres, Louis Rene and Ben-Israel, Isaac, “Ballistic-Missile Defense and WMD,” The Washington Times, March 19, 2007.

Beunderman, Mark, “EU Rifts Deepen over U.S. Missile Shield Plan,” EUOBSERVER, March 3, 2007.

Billingslea, Marshall, “ Moscow’s Missile Defense Bluster,” The Wall Street Journal, March 7, 2007, p. A17.

Cienski, Jan and Sevastopulo, Demetri, “ Russia is ‘Right to Fear Missile Shield’ Set in UK,” Financial Times, March 7, 2007.

Covault, Craig, “Concerns Grow About Iranian, North Korean Missiles and Chinese ASATs,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 5, 2007.

Dombey, Daniel, “NATO Chief Warns of Split Over US Missiles,” Financial Times, March 11, 2007.

Golts, Alexander, “Anti-Missile Defense Envy,” Moscow Times, March 21, 2007.

Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense Acquisition Strategy Generates Results But Delivers Less at a Higher Cost, March 2007, 71 pp.

Grossman, Elaine M., “DOD Renews Conventional Trident Request Before a Wary Congress,” Inside Missile Defense, March 14, 2007, p. 14.

John, Mark, “ U.S. Missile Shield Touches Raw Nerve in Europe,” Reuters, March 21, 2007.

Lekic, Slobodan, “ U.S. Wants Missile Radar in Caucasus,” Associated Press, March 1, 2007.

Pemberton, Mary, “Greely Can Expect $38M Bill over Flood,” Associated Press, March 30, 2007.

Project on Government Oversight, The U.S. Missile Defense System-It Can’t Stand the Rain, March 26, 2007, 2 pp.

Reuters, “ Germany’s Schroeder Slams U.S. Missile Shield Plans,” March 11, 2007.

Reuters, “ Pakistan Test Fires Short-range Missile,” March 3, 2007.

RIA Novosti, “ Russia Wants Answers on Expansion of U.S. Missile Shield: FM,” March 6, 2007.

Shalal-Esa, Andrea, “Boeing-Missile Defense Works Better Than Expected,” Reuters, March 12, 2007.

Sikorski, Radek, “Don’t Take Poland for Granted,” The Washington Post, March 21, 2007, p. A15.

Steinmeier, Frank-Walter, “We Don’t Want a New Arms Race,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, March 18, 2007.

Stott, Michael, “ U.S. in Cold War Tactics to Sell Missile Shield: Russia,” Reuters, March 21, 2007.

V. Chemical and Biological Arms

Associated Press, “Britain Announces It has Finished Destroying its Old Chemical Weapons,” March 27, 2007.

Government Accountability Office, Anthrax Detection: DHS Cannot Ensure that Sampling Activities Will be Validated, March 29, 2007, 18 pp.

Kahn, Laura H., “A Dangerous Biodefense Path,” The Bulletin Online, March 5, 2007.

Schniedmiller , Christopher, “ U.S. Eliminates New Funding for Russian CW Disposal,” Global Security Newswire, March 1, 2007.

Walters, Patrick, “Reticent Chemical Weapons Crusader Who Changed the World,” The Australian, March 13, 2007.

VI. Conventional Arms

Baston, Andrew, Fairclough, Gordon and Leow, Jason, “ China’s Military Buildup Spurs Concern,” The Wall Street Journal, March 5, 2007, p. A3.

UK Ban on Cluster Munitions Falls Short of Target, March 21, 2007.

Department of State, Direct Commercial Sales Authorizations for Fiscal Year 2006, March 2007, 180 pp.

Francis, David, “It’s Back: The Global Arms Race,” Christian Science Monitor, March 26, 2007.

Fox, Jon, “ U.S. Tests 15-Ton Bunker Buster,” Global Security Newswire, March 27, 2007.

Gibson, Erika, “South Africa to Take Delivery of New Aircraft, Ships,” Defense News, March 12, 2007, p. 20.

Hartung, William D. and Berrigan, Frida, Top Pentagon Contractors, FY 2006: Major Beneficiaries of the Bush Administration’s Military Buildup, World Policy Institute, March 2007, 8 pp.

Lague, David and Yardley, Jim, “ Beijing Accelerates Its Military Spending,” The New York Times, March 5, 2007, p. A8.

McCool, Grant, “Hidden Bombs Stalk Vietnamese as States Seek Treaty,” Reuters, March 7, 2006.

Opall-Rome, Barbara, “ U.S., Israel Negotiate New Aid Package,” Defense News, March 5, 2007, p. 16.

Raghuvanshi, Vivek, “Leased Akulas Advance India’s Blue-Water Plans,” Defense News, March 5, 2007, p. 1.

Reuters, “ U.S. Urges Transparency in China’s Military Rise,” March 4, 2007.

Vicini, James, “ITT Hit Over Export of Night-Vision Goggle Parts,” Reuters, March 27, 2007.

Williams, Frances, “ UK Spearheads Drive for Global Pact to Stem Sale of Arms to Conflict Zones,” Financial Times, March 20, 2007.

VII. U.S. Policy

Cooper, Helene, “ U.S. and Iran May Steal the Show at Iraq’s Security Meeting,” The New York Times, March 9, 2007, p. A8.

King Jr., Neil and White, Gregory, “ Russia Deals in Middle East Snarl U.S. Strategy on Iran,” The Wall Street Journal, February 28, 2007.

Mazzetti, Mark, “Latest Reports on Iran and North Korea Show a Newfound Caution Among Analysts,” The New York Times, March 2, 2007, p. A8.

Pincus, Walter, “Bush Urged to Develop Overall Nuclear Arms Policy,” The Washington Post, March 18, 2007, p. A5.

Sanger, David, “Sensing Shift in Bush Policy, Another Hawk Leaves,” The New York Times, March 21, 2007.

VIII. Space

Berkowitz, Marc J., “Protecting America’s Freedom of Action in Space,” High Frontier, March 2007, p. 13.

Black, Sam, Evolution of the Space Test Bed, Center for Defense Information, March 21, 2007, 2 pp.

Bloomberg News, “Debris Seen as Threat to Military Satellites,” March 9, 2007.

Elfrink, Tim, “StratCom Chief: ‘No Need’ for a Space Arms Race,” Omaha World Herald, March 3, 2007.

Fox, Jon, “NASA Says Nuclear Weapons Best Bet Against Asteroid,” Global Security Newswire, March 14, 2007.

Fox, Jon, “ Reaction to Chinese Antisatellite Technology Test Continues to Swirl on Capitol Hill,” Global Security Newswire, March 9, 2007.

George C. Marshall Institute Policy Outlook, FY 2008 Presidential Budget Request for National Security Space Activities, March 2007, 5 pp.

Gertz, Bill, “ China has Gained and Tested Array of Space Weapons,” The Washington Times, March 30, 2007, p. A8.

Grossman, Elaine M., “Cartwright: U.S. Needs Multifold Response to China’s ASAT Test,” Inside Missile Defense, March 14, 2007, p. 5.

Hitchens, Theresa, “The Perfect Storm: International Reaction to the Bush National Space Policy,” High Frontier, March 2007, p. 19.

Johnson, Tim, “ China Heightens Space Junk Fears,” Houston Chronicle, March 31, 2007.

Krepon, Michael, “Will the Bush Administration Endorse a Space Code of Conduct?” Space News, March 5, 2007.

Lambakis, Steven, “Leveraging Space to Improve Missile Defense,” High Frontier, March 2007, p. 25.

Mannion, Jim, “US Working on Satellite Defenses in the Shadow of a Chinese Test,” Agence France-Presse, March 10, 2007.

NASA, “Near-Earth Object Survey and Deflection Analysis of Alternatives: Report to Congress,” March 2007, 28 pp.

Reuters, “ China Urges Ban on Space Weapons,” March 29, 2007.

Samson, Victoria, Downplaying Debris Doesn’t Make it Go Away: The Ballistic Missile Defense System’s Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, Center for Defense Information, March 28, 2007, 2 pp.

Sirak, Michael, “Air Force Moves Toward Fielding Two Full Squadrons of Ground-Based Satellite Jammers,” Defense Daily, March 9, 2007.

Sprenger, Sebastian, “ Shelton: Space Warfare is Certain; DOD Must Get Ready,” Inside Missile Defense, March 14, 2007, p. 7.

IX. Other

Giacomo, Carol, “ U.S., Libya Negotiating Nuclear Medicine Project,” Reuters, March 12, 2007.

Gauther-Villiars, David, “Trials of Nuclear Rebuilding: Problems at Finland Reactor Highlight Global Expertise Shortage,” The Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2007, p. A6.

RIA Novosti, “ Russia, Kazakhstan to Sign Deal on Uranium Enrichment Center,” March 21, 2007.

United Press International, “ Iran Goes Nuclear With Currency,” March 12, 2007.

Editor's Note

Miles A. Pomper

It's never easy to negotiate an arms control agreement. But it's often just as difficult, if not more so, to carry one out. In this month's issue, several experts look at the successes and pitfalls of some recent agreements, as well as the prospects for a new one.

In our cover story, Matthew Bunn analyzes how Washington and Moscow can finally move forward and eventually move beyond a 2000 agreement to dispose of excess weapons plutonium. The agreement has been held up for years by bureaucratic delays, diplomatic wrangling, and shifting disposal strategies in Russia and the United States . Bunn suggests ways both countries could more effectively dispose of the dangerous material and urges that far more of it be made unusable for weapons than originally envisioned.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), outlawing chemical arms, entered into force 10 years ago this month. Rogelio Pfirter, director-general of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which implements the CWC, talks to Arms Control Today about the successes and challenges the international community faces in implementing the treaty.

China 's January test of an anti-satellite weapon raised concerns about an arms race in space and the threat that crucial civilian satellites could be damaged by debris from such actions. In a feature article, Geoffrey Forden proposes a treaty that would seek to prohibit future tests of this sort by banning spacecraft from maneuvering at excessive speeds near other orbiting spacecraft.

Our news section this month contains an in-depth look at European reaction to the tug of war between the United States and Russia over basing U.S. missile defense interceptors and a related radar in Poland and the Czech Republic . It also includes the latest news about negotiations to roll back North Korea 's nuclear weapons program and efforts to pressure Iran to restrain its nuclear program.

In our “Looking Back” this month, Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu examines the record of the 20-year-old Missile Technology Control Regime, which aims to impede the spread of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. As with many such agreements, Sidhu finds that the implementation scorecard is a mixed one.

April 2007 ACT Print Advertisers

Budget Woes Haunt Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone

Justin Reed

On Feb. 14, Latin American and Caribbean countries marked the 40th anniversary of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, the first of its kind in the world. Yet, at this historic milestone, the organization charged with keeping the region free of such arms is threatened by persistent budget shortfalls.

“We are surviving month to month,” Ambassador Edmundo Vargas Carreño, secretary-general of The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), told Arms Control Today March 15. “Some countries are not paying.”

OPANAL oversees the Treaty of Tlatelolco, ratified by all 33 states-parties in the region, and supports other nonproliferation and disarmament measures. It includes a council of five states that meets every two months (current members are Argentina, Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru ) and holds a general conference of all states-parties every two years. OPANAL's draft budget for 2007 totals $324,000, of which Argentina , Brazil , Mexico , and Venezuela are expected to pay the largest percentages. OPANAL employs five people.

Senior diplomatic sources said that Brazil and Argentina , two of the organization's primary sponsors, have continually neglected their dues to the organization over a period of “many years.”

Mexico meanwhile has been vital in keeping OPANAL afloat. Its recent contributions, along with those from Chile, Cuba, and Ecuador, averted the organization's shuttering in March, according to Vargas, and should keep it open through spring. It was the “first time in history” that the organization faced closure, said Vargas.

Luciano Tanto, second secretary of Argentina's embassy in Washington , confirmed that Argentina has been late with payments but attributed this to the country's 2001-2002 financial crisis that he said has affected Argentina's contributions to many similar organizations. Nevertheless, Tanto stressed Argentina considers the Treaty of Tlatelolco to be “important” and has a “strong commitment to OPANAL.”

Likewise, a Brazilian embassy official attributed the country's lack of payment to “financial constraints” but emphasized that Brazil is working “to make sure the debt is dealt with as soon as possible.”

Vargas remained optimistic. “The important countries that are not paying will have a responsibility to pay if the alternative is that we close. They will finally pay,” he said.

Tanto stated that there is a pledge for OPANAL in Argentina 's present quarterly budget and that “OPANAL will soon receive the money.”

In its efforts to keep the region free of nuclear weapons, OPANAL has been pressing countries to sign and ratify agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) based on the 1997 Model Additional Protocol. The protocol is designed to enhance traditional IAEA safeguards by providing the agency with greater authority to verify that states are not carrying out undeclared nuclear activities. Fifteen Tlatelolco states-parties have signed or ratified additional protocols.

Brazil has not signed an additional protocol, which is of particular concern to outsiders. Brazil had a nuclear weapons program in the 1970s and 1980s and has a new uranium-enrichment facility at Resende. (See ACT, October 2005. ) Such facilities can produce low-enriched uranium for use in nuclear power reactors or highly enriched uranium, which can be used as fissile material in nuclear weapons.

Nonetheless, Vargas expressed confidence that Brazil 's program is only for peaceful purposes and will not take on a military dimension.

In late 2005, Venezuela 's president, Hugo Chavez, announced his intention to have his country develop nuclear energy capabilities with the assistance of Brazil and Argentina . On the possibility that Venezuela might at some point divert nuclear energy research into a weapons program, Vargas said that “it would be ridiculous for Venezuela because it would have nothing to win and a lot to lose.” He added that there are not the political conditions for “any country in Latin America to become a new Iran or North Korea .” Venezuela has yet to sign an additional protocol.

Vargas also said that OPANAL is committed to the extension of nuclear-weapon-free zones to other parts of the world. OPANAL organized a conference of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Mexico City in 2005 and is planning another conference for New Zealand in 2010.

Vargas said that his “dream” is that more nuclear-weapon-free zones are established, “especially in the Korean peninsula.” For this to happen, he cautioned, the participation of the nuclear powers is required. The five designated nuclear-weapon states signed a protocol to the Treaty of Tlatelolco pledging not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against treaty states-parties. The largest challenge, he concedes, is the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

Proposal Aims to End CD Gridlock

Wade Boese

At the close of March, the 65-member Conference on Disarmament (CD) was weighing a proposal to end a negotiating dry spell that has stretched for more than eight years. The plan would launch treaty negotiations on halting the production of key nuclear weapons materials and initiate less-formal discussions on averting a space arms race, pursuing nuclear disarmament, and guaranteeing states without nuclear weapons that they will not be attacked by such arms.

Sri Lankan Ambassador Sarala Fernando presented the work package March 23 to the CD, which operates by consensus. The package had won the support of most CD members when the first of three work periods that make up the conference's annual session ended March 30. But China , India , and Pakistan had still not endorsed the package. Members agreed to try and hold a special plenary meeting sometime in April to take a decision on the plan before they officially reconvene May 14 for the second work period, which concludes June 29.

The proposed negotiations would be devoted to a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT), which would forbid production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium for weapons purposes. A rudimentary nuclear bomb requires at least one of these two fissile materials, while more modern weapon designs employ both.

France , Russia , the United Kingdom , and the United States already have voluntarily suspended such production, albeit after accumulating significant stockpiles of weapons and weapons-usable material. Still, the four countries want to codify their separate moratoria into a legal instrument and extend its obligations to all other nuclear weapons possessors: China, India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. Beijing is generally recognized as having ceased fissile material production for arms, although it has made no formal statement to this effect.

Washington and its allies have been pressing the conference to make an FMCT its top priority since the 1996 completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty outlawing nuclear explosions. Many countries, however, protested that an FMCT should not be the CD's exclusive focus. China and Russia called for equal treatment of preventing an arms race in outer space, and nonaligned countries pushed nuclear disarmament as their favored negotiating topic.

Until late March, the United States resisted taking up these other issues in any manner. A Department of State official told Arms Control Today March 28 that the United States “was willing to set aside [its] misgivings [on other issues] in order to breathe new life into the CD.” The official pointed out that the mandates for the trio of other subjects are not to “negotiate or search for ways to negotiate.” The mandates merely call for “substantive discussions.”

Washington submitted a draft FMCT to the conference last May. (See ACT, June 2006. ) The U.S. proposal did not contain verification measures. The Bush administration contends negotiating such measures would be difficult, time consuming, and ultimately futile because determined violators will find a way to cheat. The draft also exempted existing HEU and plutonium stockpiles from control.

Most CD members support verification measures of some kind. For instance, Canada submitted a March 20 paper on a future FMCT, noting that “an effective verification mechanism is an important element of any non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament agreement.” Other countries, such as Brazil , Egypt , Pakistan , and South Africa , have argued that an agreement also should address existing material.

The March 23 work proposal states that FMCT negotiations will be conducted “without any preconditions,” suggesting all issues are open for debate. Italian Ambassador Carlo Trezza would serve as the negotiations coordinator.

If agreed to in April, there is no guarantee that the negotiations will result in a treaty or even continue past the third and final work period of the 2007 session, which will run from July 30 to Sept. 14. The last time CD members initiated FMCT negotiations in 1998 (see ACT, August/September 1998), they failed to restart the talks the next year.

Pages

Subscribe to RSS - April 2007