"[Arms Control Today] has become indispensable! I think it is the combination of the critical period we are in and the quality of the product. I found myself reading the May issue from cover to cover."

– Frank von Hippel
Co-Director of Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University
October 2006
Edition Date: 
Sunday, October 1, 2006
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Fingers on the Nuclear Trigger

At the Borderline of Armageddon: How American Presidents Managed the Atom Bomb. By James E. Goody

Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.

At last, a well-written, objective account of the evolution of U.S. nuclear weapons policy and efforts at nuclear arms control from the beginning of the nuclear age to the dangerous situation we face today. In At the Borderline of Armageddon, James Goodby examines how each U.S. president since World War II has sought to manage the atomic bomb.

U.S. presidents have had no illusions about the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war. Despite great differences in personality and the challenges they faced, all presidents have come to understand that such a conflict, in the words of President Ronald Reagan, “cannot be won and must never be fought.” Although public formulations of nuclear policy have at times appeared to preserve nuclear options in certain circumstances, presidents have been very careful to step back from the borderline of Armageddon.

Goodby presents this historical review essentially as a series of case studies examining the role of each president in turn rather than the evolution of separate policy issues. This provides the reader with material to assess and compare the overall contribution of each president.

The book challenged me to review my own experiences, which somewhat parallel Goodby’s. Although prepared to be critical, I found myself in almost complete agreement with his treatment of the complex history of the period and his commentary on events and personalities.

Presidents and Precedents

President Franklin D. Roosevelt initiated the nuclear age when he authorized the Manhattan Project, but President Harry Truman took the decisive steps when he authorized the use of nuclear weapons against Japan and subsequently approved the then-controversial hydrogen bomb project. Goodby correctly emphasizes, however, that Truman also established numerous wise precedents for the control of nuclear weapons.

These precedents included civilian control of atomic energy, presidential control of nuclear weapons, and a rejection of preventive war, as well as attempts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and bring them under international control. He also showed a willingness to negotiate with adversaries.

At the time that the United States was the sole possessor of nuclear weapons, Truman proposed a universal ban on nuclear weapons with international controls under the United Nations. He unambiguously established the primacy of the president in controlling these arms when, during the Korean War, he cashiered General Douglas MacArthur, who wanted a free hand against China, including possibly using nuclear weapons. Truman’s legacy was a remarkable record for a simple man thrust by fate into the world’s most powerful position.

In contrast to Truman, former General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had led Allied forces in World War II, came to the presidency well qualified to tackle the nuclear threat. In the wake of the testing of multi-megaton thermonuclear weapons, he concluded that there could be no winners in a nuclear war. With the growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities, however, he was under increasing military and political pressure to react. These pressures were epitomized by the 1957 Gaither Report, whose recommendations, Goodby correctly reports, Eisenhower angrily rejected.

As the Department of Defense staff representative on the study, I agreed with Eisenhower’s conclusion that the United States would become a “garrison state” if it implemented all of the recommendations, which included, among other things, a call for nationwide fallout and blast shelters and a crash buildup of strategic offensive and defensive weapon systems.

Testing Times and Test Bans

Despite pressures for a military buildup and the public shock over the 1957 Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite, which was seen as a proxy for a long-range ballistic missile capability, Eisenhower took the initiative in proposing a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT) with the now increasingly feared Soviet adversary. As Goodby correctly points out, Eisenhower’s military credentials allowed him to propose arms control negotiations and thus helped establish another useful precedent for future commanders-in-chief.

As technical assistant to Eisenhower’s first science adviser, James Killian, I was at the center of the preparations and subsequent negotiations with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom for a CTBT. At the time, Eisenhower appeared to be acting almost alone, with little visible support within his administration in the face of intense opposition from the military, the weapons laboratories, and Congress. Goodby reports that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles supported Eisenhower in the initiative, but that only became public decades later with the release of a classified memorandum. Despite concerted efforts to sabotage the negotiations by U.S. opponents, much progress was made until late in Eisenhower’s administration when President Nikita Khrushchev withdrew from the negotiations after the shooting down of a U-2 spy plane over Sverdlovsk.

President John F. Kennedy, of course, deserves great credit for his personal role in the Cuban missile crisis, which demonstrated the critical importance a president can and must play in avoiding Armageddon. Nevertheless, Kennedy was handicapped by his emphasis during the election campaign on the so-called missile gap. In reality, this gap did not exist, but the belief that it did resulted in a massive ballistic missile buildup.

Still, Kennedy resumed the test ban negotiations, which soon bogged down on the issue of the number of permitted inspections of seismic events that might have been caused by underground nuclear tests. The United States eventually called for seven or eight, while the Soviets offered two or three. My boss, Jerry Wiesner, attempted unsuccessfully to persuade Kennedy and the Soviets to split the difference and propose five inspections, but there were no takers. I thought at the time and still believe that Kennedy did not really want a comprehensive test ban agreement because it had little chance of ratification in the face of rabid military, weapons laboratory, and congressional opposition. I suspect the same was true for Khrushchev, who was facing increasing domestic problems.

The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, which ruled out nuclear testing in space, the atmosphere, and underwater, still permitted underground tests as a mutually convenient way to resolve the diplomatic stalemate. I believe Goodby is overly generous in the high marks he gives Kennedy for this treaty. The agreement did reassure world opinion of improved U.S.-Soviet relations after the Cuban missile crisis. It also put an end to atmospheric testing, which had resulted in extremely high-yield Soviet atmospheric tests with significant worldwide fallout as well as high-altitude U.S. tests that produced alarming effects on satellites, which Goodby fails to note. Fundamentally, however, the Limited Test Ban Treaty simply drove testing underground where many more tests were conducted than before the treaty took effect. It also helped delay the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty for more than 30 years.

President Lyndon B. Johnson, despite his growing preoccupation with Vietnam, rejected out of hand the use of nuclear weapons there. His view of nuclear war was brought home to me by his reaction at the final meeting in 1965 on the military budget to an item listed as DUCCS. In response to his question as to what this was, he was told it stood for Deep Underground Command and Control Site, a facility that would be located several thousand feet underground, between the White House and the Pentagon, designed to survive a ground burst of a 20-megaton bomb and sustain the president and key advisers for several months until it would be safe to exit through tunnels emerging many miles outside Washington. After a brief puzzled expression, Johnson let loose with a string of Johnsonian expletives making clear he thought this was the stupidest idea he had ever heard and that he had no intention of hiding in an expensive hole while the rest of Washington and probably the United States were burned to a crisp. That was the last I ever heard of DUCCS.

Nonproliferation and Arms Control

One of the few key activities Goodby fails to mention was the Gilpatric Committee, which in early 1966 reported to Johnson on nuclear proliferation. The committee’s membership included Chairman Roswell Gilpatric, formerly Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s deputy, and eight former senior government officials who were united in their recommendation for prompt action to contain nuclear proliferation and their support for the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), then in the early stages of negotiation. As staff director of the committee, I participated in the hour-long briefing with Johnson, who was clearly impressed. Subsequently, when some key U.S. allies raised objections that made successful completion of the NPT uncertain, Johnson instructed Secretary of State Dean Rusk to do what was necessary to complete the treaty promptly. Without Johnson’s personal intervention, the treaty would not have been completed during his presidency.

Johnson and McNamara recognized the need to cap the rapid buildup of strategic nuclear arms and to include limits on ballistic missile defenses as well as to maintain stable mutual deterrence. Their thinking on these matters, which was initially introduced to a skeptical Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin at a 1967 summit in Glassboro, New Jersey, became the basis for subsequent negotiations leading to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Although the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968 led to postponement of the initial U.S.-Soviet negotiations tentatively scheduled for September 1968, Johnson believed so strongly in the importance of the subject that he privately sought, up to the last days of his presidency, to reschedule the beginning of the talks in a desperate effort to present incoming President Richard M. Nixon, whose support was uncertain, with the fait accompli of an ongoing negotiation.

Nixon surprised both critics and supporters by vigorously pursuing Johnson’s initiatives on capping strategic nuclear arms and nuclear proliferation. Immediately after taking office, he announced that he supported the idea of talks with the Soviets on a strategic treaty. After having his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, study the strategic situation intensively for nine months, Nixon initiated negotiations that led to the ABM Treaty and SALT I. He also obtained Senate advice and consent to ratification of the NPT even though some key states, including China, France, Germany, and Japan, did not ratify the treaty at that time.

As assistant director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), I participated in the interminable meetings leading up to and backstopping these negotiations. Although it was originally envisaged that ACDA would manage the interagency planning and backstopping process, it was soon apparent that this would not work given the strong opposition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense Department to the undertaking. I was delighted when Kissinger’s increased involvement in the planning shifted the detailed management directly to the White House, as success depended on Nixon’s conviction that it was his own treaty to achieve and defend.

With Kissinger’s participation, the ABM Treaty was successfully negotiated and received the Senate’s advice and consent by an overwhelming vote of 88 to 2, and the SALT I Interim Agreement received strong congressional approval. Remarkably, Nixon accomplished these breakthroughs in arms control as well as the opening to China despite remaining mired in Vietnam for almost his entire tenure and the developing domestic problems that eventually led to his resignation.

President Gerald Ford’s brief term was marked by failure to make progress on SALT II, which was important because SALT I was only an interim five-year agreement. Whatever Ford’s personal intentions, he was unable to rise above the quarreling over nuclear policy among the strong-willed advisers he inherited: Kissinger and Secretaries of Defense James Schlesinger and Donald Rumsfeld. Goodby describes these internecine battles well.

President Jimmy Carter came to office with strong views on the need to step back from nuclear annihilation with a broad and impressive arms control agenda. Despite his excellent intentions and generally sound judgment, unforeseen external events and poor timing conspired to limit severely what he was able to accomplish. At the outset, in addition to efforts to complete the long-delayed SALT II, he launched a fusillade of new initiatives, including a CTBT, a ban on anti-satellite systems, and even limits on conventional weapons.

Although all of these proposals were highly desirable, they were too much for the U.S. bureaucracy and its aging Soviet counterpart to handle in the face of strong, hostile, vested interests. These and other initiatives floundered against the background of the Iran hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Frustrated and angry, Carter decided to withdraw SALT II from Senate ratification. As acting ACDA director, I advised Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to oppose this action, even though immediate ratification was not in the cards, because, I argued, under the circumstances every effort should be made to keep avenues of contact with the Soviet Union open.

While pursuing his broad arms control agenda, Carter was confronted with a number of proposals for major new military programs designed to increase U.S. nuclear deterrent and war-fighting capabilities. He received much unwarranted criticism for correctly canceling or opposing several of these programs, of which the so-called neutron bomb was the best-known example. The neutron bomb, which was touted as a more acceptable way to utilize tactical nuclear weapons in Europe because it killed people with less impact on property, did not in fact differ in any significant way from existing low-yield tactical nuclear weapons. Carter sensibly canceled the unnecessary program when Germany, after originally enthusiastically championing it, refused to permit deployment of the weapons on its territory.

In the closing days of Carter’s administration, I was assigned to head the U.S. delegation to negotiations with the Soviets to explore the possibility of an agreement on Theater Nuclear Forces. My instructions were to discuss anything I wanted except the possibility of mutual zero levels for intermediate-range nuclear missiles, a concept that was then anathema to Germany because it was seen by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt as destroying the “seamless web” of nuclear deterrence. This restriction was discouraging because I thought this was the only basis for an agreement. The Soviets chose not to pursue this option, and the talks ended with Reagan’s election victory.

Reagan’s Astonishing Evolution

Goodby documents how Reagan’s initial negative view of arms control gradually evolved, amazing critics and supporters alike as he became an advocate of radical proposals that went beyond traditional arms control to proposals that cut, rather than merely limited, nuclear weapons. At the outset, he rejected ratifying SALT II and then proclaimed as the centerpiece of his nuclear policy the Strategic Defense Initiative, which had the impossible goal of developing an impenetrable shield that would make nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” Interestingly, he did not call for repudiation of the ABM Treaty but proposed instead a bizarre “broad” interpretation of the treaty that would allow precisely what the treaty was designed to prohibit.

With the passage of time, however, Reagan initiated the negotiation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) to reduce rather than simply cap the number of strategic nuclear systems. He also negotiated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty banning all intermediate-range nuclear missiles, a concept that only a few years earlier had been considered beyond the pale. At a truly remarkable summit at Reykjavik, Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev exchanged proposals to ban all strategic nuclear missiles but failed to agree on the treatment of ballistic missile defenses. One wonders if agreement had been reached at Reykjavik whether it could have actually led to a full-fledged treaty, given the obsession with details subsequently demanded in START I. It is also interesting to ponder what the consequences of such a treaty would have been for international security.

In describing the record of President George H. W. Bush, Goodby leads the reader to the conclusion that Bush accomplished more actual arms control than any other president. Goodby notes that Bush quickly completed and ratified START I and negotiated START II, which called for much deeper reductions of strategic delivery systems. Even more significantly, with the collapse of the Soviet Union looming, he recognized the potential danger of the chaos that might ensue and the opportunity it presented to bring the world a major step back from nuclear disaster.

Bush seized the moment and announced the unilateral withdrawal and elimination of most of the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. This allowed Gorbachev to announce his decision, several days later, to return to Russia the thousands of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons deployed in the territories of Warsaw Pact members and the non-Russian states of the Soviet Union with a commitment to eliminate most of them. Thus, without protracted formal negotiations, both sides vowed to eliminate a significant portion of their nuclear weapons stockpiles, including those tactical Soviet nuclear weapons that were most exposed to potential diversion. He also initiated implementation of the imaginative proposals of Senators Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) to assist Russia and the other newly independent states in complying with the dismantlement provisions of START I and the INF Treaty.

President Bill Clinton was unable to take full advantage of the opportunities presented by the collapse of the Soviet Union because of unrelenting opposition from Congress and to some extent the Russian Duma. He did make a major contribution in persuading Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states and to return to Russia for dismantlement the strategic nuclear warheads remaining on their territories. If this had not been done, Ukraine and Kazakhstan would have become the third- and fourth-largest nuclear-weapon states.

However, on the negative side, succumbing to congressional pressure, Clinton decided to deploy a modest missile defense system consistent with hopefully mutually agreed-on minor modifications to the ABM Treaty. This contributed to START II never entering into force and helped prevent the negotiation of an anticipated START III with further substantial reductions.

Clinton also took the lead in achieving the indefinite extension of the NPT, which was set to expire in 1995 after 25 years, and provided the necessary leadership in completing the long-delayed multinational negotiation of a CTBT. In 1999, however, the Senate Republican majority forced the Senate to reject ratification of the treaty, leaving the treaty in limbo, where it remains today.

In an excellent chapter on George W. Bush, Goodby characterizes the current president’s mindset as believing that “the time had finally come to scrap the old order.” To date, he has been quite successful in this objective. Goodby notes that other presidents helped build up the international nonproliferation and arms control regimes that they saw as supporting U.S. national security. Yet, Bush clearly believes that the United States, as the only remaining superpower, should be prepared to shape the international order unilaterally and has rejected treaties that would in any way restrict U.S. freedom of action. To this end, he withdrew from the ABM Treaty, despite strong Russian objections, and replaced the unratified START II with the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). Also known as the Moscow Treaty, SORT lacks verification provisions, and its limits on future U.S. strategic forces are effectively toothless.

Although Bush has given high priority to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to perceived U.S. enemies, his actions have either been ineffectual or counterproductive. At the beginning of his term, he overruled the decision of Secretary of State Colin Powell to continue very promising negotiations that the Clinton administration had begun with North Korea, thus spurring Pyongyang to advance its nuclear weapons program. Disregarding the precedent followed by previous presidents, he initiated a preventive war against Iraq on the false grounds that it was illegally developing nuclear weapons. Most recently, he has agreed to negotiate a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with India, despite long-standing U.S. and Nuclear Suppliers Group policy to deny such aid to Pakistan, India, and Israel because they have not signed the NPT and are known to have nuclear weapons.

Today, confronted with the difficult problem of Iran’s potential nuclear weapons ambitions, Bush has made clear that all options are on the table if Iran refuses to terminate its uranium-enrichment program. Because UN agreement on effective sanctions is unlikely, rumors abound that Bush is seriously considering military actions in another preventive war. Given the international hostility that his policies have created, it is clear that any such action would have to be carried out unilaterally, with disastrous results to long-range U.S. security.

Goodby’s book demonstrates effectively the critical role that presidents have had in developing nuclear policy and avoiding nuclear Armageddon. Overall, it makes a persuasive case that all previous presidents have performed remarkably well in this regard, despite having to deal with events beyond their control, difficult adversaries, and an often uncooperative Congress.

I strongly recommend the book to anyone interested in the evolution of U.S. nuclear policy or seeking a challenging text for a college course. Our current president might well profit from this book as he contemplates his legacy. In addition, it should be mandatory reading for any aspirant to the presidency in 2008.

Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr. first worked in the Office of the President in 1956 when he served on the staff of the Gaither Committee. Subsequently, he served as a technical assistant to the president’s science adviser under Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson and concurrently as a senior member of the National Security Council staff under Kennedy and Johnson. Under Presidents Nixon and Carter, he served as assistant director and then deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Keeny was executive director and president of the Arms Control Association from 1985 to 2001.

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A Review of At the Borderline of Armageddon: How American Presidents Managed the Atom Bomb by James E. Goodby

Biotechnology and the Challenge to Arms Control

Christopher F. Chyba

Advances in biotechnology pose grave challenges to arms control for the coming decades. The increasing capabilities of the biological sciences and the global spread of the underlying technologies raise the prospect of misuse of these technologies by small groups or individuals with the necessary technical competence. The challenges lie both in the mismatch between the rapid pace of technological change and the comparative sluggishness of multilateral negotiation and ratification, as well as the questionable suitability of monitoring and inspections to a widely available, small-scale technology.

But this is not a counsel for despair. Rather, this international and human-security dilemma should serve as a spur to construct an appropriate web of prevention and response that allows the world to benefit from this technology while minimizing its dangers.

There is now a well-known list of recent experiments conducted by legitimate researchers that illustrate the dangers inherent in modern biological research and development.[1] One such experiment was the synthesis of the polio virus at the State University of New York (SUNY) using readily purchased chemical supplies.[2] Therefore, even if the World Health Organization succeeds in its important task of eradicating polio worldwide, the virus could still be reconstituted in laboratories throughout the world. Another experimental signpost was work at the Australian National University involving genetic modifications of the mousepox virus, a smallpox-analog virus that infects rodents. The researchers spliced into the mousepox DNA a gene for making a signaling protein that inhibits the mouse immune response to viruses. The unanticipated effect was to make the virus deadly both to mice that had previously been naturally immune and to those that had been vaccinated against mousepox.[3] The experiment inadvertently pointed the way for attempts to make other viruses far more lethal.

These experiments illustrate the potential for misuse of work in molecular biology, immunology, and other forefront areas of research. Techniques developed, systems investigated, and manipulations performed for legitimate medical, food security, commercial, or other reasons may also show the way for extremely dangerous modifications that could cause harm to humans, animals, crops, or species in the natural world.[4] Of course, a dual-use hazard has accompanied technology development since the invention of fire and the domestication of the horse. In the last century, the development of nuclear technology likewise married enormous power with enormous dual-use implications. What is different about biotechnology is its exponential growth, the speed of its spread around the globe, its potential for the creation of agents that could reproduce in the natural world, and its increasing availability and utility to small groups or even individuals.

Exponential Growth

The capabilities of biotechnology have increased at exponential rates in recent years, in some ways akin to the evolution of computer power. The capabilities of computers have exploded over the past several decades because the number of transistors per computer chip—a measure of how much computation can be done in a volume of a given size—has doubled every 18 months or so. This is the famous Moore’s Law, after the co-founder of Intel Corp. who first called attention to the phenomenon in 1965.[5] Moore’s law is the reason that a single laptop today contains more computer power than was once found in entire halls of mainframe computers.

Although biotechnology’s growth began decades later than that of computers, what is striking is that the rate of increase, as measured, say, by the time required to synthesize a DNA sequence of a certain length, is as fast or even faster than Moore’s law.[6] Just as Moore’s law led to a transition in computing from extremely expensive industrial-scale machines to laptops, iPods, and microprocessors in toys, cars, and home appliances, so is biotechnological innovation moving us to a world where manipulations or synthesis of DNA will be increasingly available to small groups of the technically competent or even individual users, should they choose to make use of it.

There are ever more anecdotes illustrating the power and pace of the biotechnology explosion. The synthesis of the polio virus, completed in 2002, took the SUNY team three years of work. A year later, a research group at the Institute for Biological Energy Alternatives in Maryland manufactured a virus of comparable genomic length in just two weeks.[7] In 2005 a group at the U.S. Armed Forces Institute of Pathology completed and published the determination of the genetic sequence of the 1918 human influenza virus that had killed tens of millions of people.[8] Using this sequence, a research team from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and three other institutions recreated the complete 1918 virus and used it to infect mice in order to better understand what made the virus so deadly.[9]

Other technologies have appeared almost out of nowhere, moving rapidly from fundamental research to applications. These include RNA interference, which allows researchers to turn off certain genes in humans or other organisms, and synthetic biology, a fledgling field recognized only since about 2002, intended to allow engineers to fabricate small “biological devices” and ultimately new types of microbes.

Between 1990 and 2000, the speed of DNA synthesis increased more than 500 times. Moreover, laboratory processes have become more automated and black-boxed so that less and less tacit knowledge is needed to employ the technologies. By contrast, multilateral arms control treaties can take a decade to negotiate and ratify; a proposed protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) took most of the 1990s to develop, reach the stage of a bracketed text, and have a chairman’s text proposed for final discussion. In the end, no agreement was reached. The BWC protocol was not intended to deal with the biotechnology revolution; the comparison is simply to illustrate that the pace of technological change in some fields is outstripping that of the global political tools available for addressing the resulting implications.

The dilemma is being recognized internationally. Earlier this year, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called the use of biological weapons “the most important under-addressed threat relating to terrorism” and warned of the potential development of “designer diseases and pathogens.”[10] He asserted that an approach is needed as ambitious as the one developed at the dawn of the nuclear age for harnessing nuclear power while minimizing the spread of nuclear weapons. Finding such an approach that makes sense and that does more good than harm is the biotechnological challenge to arms control for the coming decades.

Framing the Issue

Any effort to find solutions to the security dilemma posed by biotechnology should be informed by key features of the biological challenge. The problem requires urgent attention, but those urging action must avoid apocalyptic dramatization, which will attract interest initially but will risk undermining the credibility of the issue in the long term. Gregg Easterbrook has published a sarcastic and garishly illustrated piece titled “We’re All Gonna Die!” as a reminder that scientists can readily make long lists of possible disasters for civilization.[11] The examples of dual-use biological research just mentioned, as well as a comprehensive recent U.S. National Academies of Sciences study of the issue,[12] demonstrate that the problem is real, not hype, but care is required to maintain perspective and avoid stirring opposition to possible solutions when cooperation is badly needed. Besides biotechnology’s exponential growth, there are at least four key aspects of the issue.

Contrast With Infectious Disease

About 14 million people die annually from infectious diseases.[13] Most of these deaths are in the developing world where infectious disease is the leading killer; in the developed world infectious disease typically ranks much lower, well behind heart disease and cancer. Five people died in the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States. Any approach to the dual-use challenge that significantly curtails the use of biotechnology to counter disease runs the risk of being seen by much of the world as sacrificing actual Third World lives in the service of heading off hypothetical risks. An African meeting on these issues in October 2005 issued the Kampala Compact, which declared that although “the potential devastation caused by biological weapons would be catastrophic for Africa,” it is “illegitimate” to address biological weapons threats without addressing infectious disease and other key public health issues.[14]

Few Actual Biological Attacks

For all the attention paid to bioterrorism, there have been very few actual biological attacks by nonstate groups. Apart from the still mysterious 2001 anthrax attacks, there were the nonlethal food poisonings by followers of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh in 1984 and the unsuccessful efforts by Aum Shinrikyo to attack Tokyo with anthrax in 1993. Beyond these, there is evidence that al Qaeda made use of one doctoral-level microbiologist and perhaps several with undergraduate degrees in a quest for biological weapons. It is difficult from the open literature to determine the level of sophistication of their program, but what is currently available suggests it may have been more aspirational than effective at the time al Qaeda was expelled from Afghanistan.[15]

The rarity of modern bioterrorist attacks emphasizes the importance of understanding why there have been so few, the extent to which this has been due to capabilities or motivations, and how we might work to preserve whatever inhibitions have been at play.[16] It is certainly true that modern travel will mean that a biological attack with a contagious agent could rapidly spread the resulting disease globally. Under what conditions this globalization of an epidemic would prove a deterrent to the use of contagious agents is unclear; an apocalyptic group such as Aum Shinrikyo might view global catastrophe as an incentive, whereas others might be reluctant to loose a plague that would boomerang against their own populations. The greatest damage might well be done in the developing world, regardless of where the initial target of the attack was located, because of the weak disease surveillance and response capacity of many developing countries.

It is striking to compare the focus on capabilities in many threat assessments with the tenor of one of the most successful threat assessments in U.S. history, that of George Kennan’s famous “X” article in Foreign Affairs in 1947.[17] Kennan’s analysis was a keystone to the establishment of the successful decades-long Cold War policy of containment of the Soviet Union, yet in re-reading that piece today, one is struck by how little of it addresses Soviet capabilities. Instead, nearly all of it concerns Soviet motives and intentions, informed by a deep knowledge of Russian and Soviet history and culture.[18] Similar sophistication must be brought to the biological threat posed by modern terrorist groups.

The WMD Continuum

In 1948 the Commission for Conventional Armaments of the UN Security Council defined “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) to mean “atomic explosive weapons, radio-active material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb.”[19] This definition has the great virtue of specificity, in contrast to the loose way in which “weapons of mass destruction” and “WMD” are often used today. However, few now would want to include radiological weapons under the WMD label, and lumping biological weapons together with nuclear weapons is greatly misleading.

The strengthened monitoring and inspection regime implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency in the nuclear realm can be reasonably effective because of the significant industrial bottlenecks (barring nuclear theft) through which any would-be nuclear weapons program has to pass: uranium conversion and enrichment or plutonium production and reprocessing. The weaponization of biological agents presents far less severe bottlenecks. The trajectory of advances in biotechnology will only reinforce these differences.

There is an argument among some nuclear experts that tacit knowledge, the real-world engineering experience of actually having worked with nuclear weapons design and explosive materials, is a tremendous asset that mere blueprints or articles cannot convey.[20] However true this claim might be for nuclear weapons technology, the thrust of biotechnological development is to make powerful applications increasingly black-boxed so that key procedures are available to be used by a broad audience. Undergraduates at a ten-week Synthetic Biology Jamboree in 2004 made use of “BioBricks” from an MIT database for students[21] and, in the words of one senior observer, “did world-class work, yet their level of training was embryonic.”[22]

This is not to say that weaponizing biological agents—going from the laboratory organism to a treatment ready to be sprayed or otherwise spread—is not challenging. In fact, Aum Shinrikyo, despite substantial financial resources, ran into trouble in this step, among others. Yet, if the terrorist group’s approach were to create a contagious agent such as smallpox or influenza, sophisticated spray preparations might not be necessary.

Globalization Requires Global Response

The biotechnology explosion is being driven by academic, private, and government research. The allure of biotechnology for public health, food security, and commercial applications is so great that its globalization is unstoppable. Singapore is establishing biotechnology as the “fourth pillar” of its economy; China’s Office of Genetic Engineering Safety Administration approved more than 250 genetically modified plants, animals, and microorganisms for field trials between 1996 and 2000; India claims 96 biotechnology companies; Mexico has established a new Institute of Genomic Medicine; the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission has committed itself to training scientists from Muslim countries in biotechnology; South Africa is working to develop a national biotechnology sector; Nigeria is considering a $5 billion endowment for science and technology, with agricultural biotechnology a major focus; and the list goes on.[23]

To be effective, any attempt to address the dual-use biotechnology challenge must be global in scope and therefore must find common ground among the developed and developing world on the issue. There is simply no way to duck a global approach to this problem, and the fact that many contagious organisms have incubation times longer than international flight times means that isolation is an insufficient strategy.

The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty establishes a bargain between the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states. Under Article IV, the non-nuclear-weapon states have an “inalienable right” to nuclear energy in exchange for living up to their obligation not to pursue nuclear weapons. The dual-use biology dilemma should not be understood as requiring an analogous bargain. Although the BWC’s Article X calls for the sharing of biological science, the convention is an arms control treaty, not a nonproliferation treaty: all signatories are banned from the acquisition of biological weapons. Similarly, all countries have a stake in preventing and fighting pandemic diseases, whether due to natural emergence or laboratory creation. The developing world may have the most to gain from these technologies and therefore the most to lose if misuse or inadvertence leads to biological accidents that then curtail their use worldwide.

Five Categories of Risk

One reason that solutions to the biotechnology misuse dilemma are so difficult is that any proposed response must be attentive to at least five categories of risk. These are naturally occurring diseases; illicit state weapons programs; nonstate actors; hackers; and laboratory accidents or other inadvertent release of disease agents. Particular measures may well address only one or two of these concerns, but they must be judged according to their impact, positive and negative, across the board. This kind of overall strategic assessment is largely missing.

Nor should a measure’s failure to address all aspects of the biological challenge necessarily be held against it. For example, the BWC is primarily an instrument for addressing state programs. The likelihood that inspections will not be a successful strategy against small-scale laboratory genetic engineering does not negate the value of transparency and inspections for the “high end” of large-scale production programs. Attention to preventing the misuse of biotechnology should not compromise the continuing need to avoid a state-based biological arms race. Similarly, so-called science-based threat assessment that explores novel pathogens to determine potential terrorist or state threats must be assessed strategically to weigh defense advantages against dangers of feeding a perception among other governments that something resembling an offensive program is underway, thereby risking fueling the state-program threat even while preparing for other levels of threat.

Within these risk categories, there are important further distinctions. The nonstate actor category, for example, should really be divided into substate actors and nonstate actors. The latter, such as Aum Shinrikyo, receive no state support, in contrast with the former. “Hackers” is used by analogy to computer hackers that launch cyberattacks, for example, by releasing “worms” or viruses over the internet. Bio-hackers could be included in nonstate actors but are separated here to emphasize the possibility that, were dangerous biological manipulations to become sufficiently black-boxed, then careless, mischievous, or hateful individuals might individually pose a substantial risk.

We may not yet have entered a realm where the ability of individuals to do highly consequential biological hacking is widespread. Biological hackers at this point would still need to be sophisticated scientists. In coming years, however, we must worry not only about the rare “evil genius” but also about the intellectual hangers-on. The analogy here is to “script kiddies” in the cyber realm, those who are insufficiently knowledgeable or motivated to create their own sophisticated computer viruses but who make use of online postings of virus computer scripts and then unleash these derivative creations.[24] In the biological case, as the technologies permit increasing ease of use, hackers or nonstate groups will not need to conduct their own sophisticated biological research programs. They will simply have to follow, perhaps with modifications, the steps published by legitimate researchers.

Addressing the Threat

Is it possible to fashion an effective international control regime in the face of exponentially expanding biotechnology? The answer to this question carries important implications for our biological future and also for how the world will cope with other technologies, such as nanotechnology, that may pose similar dilemmas further down the road.

The good news is that there is tremendous ferment now with respect to this question. Scientists, lawyers, policy analysts, scientific societies, international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the UN secretary-general have all weighed in with thoughts on the issue. It would be impossible to survey comprehensively this entire landscape of remarks and proposals, but it will be useful to highlight some of the main threads of the discussion, their weaknesses, and possible paths forward.

An Endless Arms Race?

If an effective global system for security in the face of biotechnology cannot be put in place, the world could enter a kind of endless offensive-defensive arms race, where bad actors, not just state programs, endeavor to engineer around new antibiotics, antivirals, vaccines, or other defenses against disease-causing agents. The arms race metaphor should be used with caution because, unlike the Cold War arms race, the primary driver for the biological arms race is the ongoing advance of biological research. The hope would be that the defenses arrayed against the rare bad actor by the vastly larger biomedical community would prove sufficient. Nevertheless, although the resource advantage will lie overwhelmingly with the defense, defensive measures also require a series of steps—for example, drug development and distribution—that the offense need not master. The words of the Irish Republican Army after it just missed assassinating the British cabinet in the 1984 Brighton bombing should be recalled: “Today we were unlucky, but remember we have only to be lucky once—you will have to be lucky always.”[25] Rather than concede that this grim and disheartening view of the human future is what biotechnology holds for us, the scientific and arms control communities should try to do better.

Formal Treaties

The cornerstones of efforts to control the misuse of biology are the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of “bacteriological methods” of warfare, and the 1972 BWC, which prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, or other acquisition of biological agents for nonpeaceful purposes. The BWC also calls on states to prohibit such acquisition anywhere within territory under their control so that signatories have an obligation to prevent the offensive misuse of biology. Perhaps a major contribution of the BWC besides setting a global norm against biological weapons is its potential for increasing international transparency and decreasing the mistrust that could drive new state-sponsored weapons programs.

Although a verification protocol even for the largest production facilities is not now a realistic possibility, other mechanisms based on the BWC, in particular, mutual declarations and other confidence-building measures (CBMs), would further transparency and should be strengthened.[26] Efforts to maintain transparency between states will be increasingly important if biodefense research continues to expand with an eye to the terrorist threat.

Other Current Multilateral Approaches

There are multilateral approaches outside the BWC process. Most striking among these is UN Security Council Resolution 1540, by which the Security Council required all UN member states to develop and maintain controls over biological weapons materials and their export. It is too soon to be sure of the outcome of this extraordinary experiment in Security Council lawmaking, but it is important that Resolution 1540 not come to be seen as just a hollow set of aspirations. The Australia Group suppliers’ regime and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) are further, more specialized examples of multilateral (but far from global) approaches to biological security. To interdict illicit biological shipments, however, PSI members would need precise intelligence.

Disease Surveillance and Response

Over the past several decades, the world has faced annually a newly emerging disease. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) spread around the world in 2003 but was nevertheless contained despite its novelty and an absence of vaccines or antiviral drugs targeted against it. This emphasizes the great importance of the early recognition of and response to disease outbreaks, whether natural or human engineered. The World Health Organization (WHO) recognizes that its global disease surveillance systems, including its Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network, will be at the forefront of detection and response either to human-caused or natural disease outbreaks.[27]

Despite WHO efforts within its limited budget, there remains great scope for improving international disease surveillance and response. Because flight travel times to the United States are shorter than many disease incubation times, it is strongly in the self interest of the United States to buttress disease surveillance overseas, even apart from humanitarian reasons for doing so.

Yet, the United States has failed repeatedly to act. The Global Pathogen Surveillance Act has been introduced in Congress in 2002, 2003, and 2005, with similar language in the Foreign Assistance Authorization Act in 2004, 2005, and 2006. The current bill authorizes $35 million to be spent to improve capacity for disease surveillance and response in developing countries, through training, improvements in communications and public health laboratory equipment, and the deployment of U.S. health professionals. It is sponsored by Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-Tenn.) and supported by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Despite some success in the Senate, the bill has never passed the House.

Facing a world where novel microorganisms can emerge or be invented, there should be a strong incentive to budget tens of millions of dollars to improve and sustain international disease surveillance and response. Yet, over and over, it seems imagination stops at the border. Although atmospheric sampling within our cities and buildings may prove a powerful tool, recognizing and shutting down disease outbreaks overseas must be a high priority. The failure to pass, then adequately fund the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act is an extraordinary ongoing failure of U.S. national security policy.

Formal International Oversight of Research

The National Research Council has recommended a variety of oversight mechanisms for research conducted with federal research grants.[28] John Steinbruner and his colleagues at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) have proposed a global system of internationally agreed rules for the oversight of potentially high-consequence pathogens research.[29] Of course, devoted terrorists would not likely be captured by such a system. Most nonstate groups are unlikely to conduct forefront research, but they might attempt to implement discoveries and techniques reported in the scientific literature. By overseeing certain high-consequence research and its publication, we might therefore head off some of the worst misuse. The WHO’s international advisory committee that oversees smallpox research provides a limited model of what oversight of the highest consequence biological research might look like. It is important that that committee demonstrate that such bodies are capable of real oversight.

The CISSM oversight system would require an International Pathogens Research Authority with an appropriate administrative structure and legal foundation to set requirements for its states-parties. It is unlikely that such a system could be negotiated and ratified at the present time, although perceptions of what is possible could change rapidly subsequent to a first human-engineered major pandemic.

Yet, careful thinking is better done before an attack. Other international approaches to provide some level of oversight have also been envisioned, including the creation of additional UN bodies or the establishment of an International Biotechnology Agency (IBTA). An IBTA could be established in a modular way, with modest initial goals, such as helping BWC states-parties meet their CBM requirements and fostering best practices in laboratory safety. However, even establishing such a limited body might look too much like an effort to revive some of the BWC protocol and may not be politically achievable at this time.

“Soft” Oversight

At the other end of the spectrum from the CISSM oversight scheme are efforts at what might be called “soft” oversight of potentially hazardous research. Perhaps most common among these are efforts to promulgate codes of ethics, or the more demanding codes of conduct or codes of practice, for scientists working in the relevant fields. Many national and international groups have made efforts in this direction.[30] The issue was also the focus of the 2005 BWC intercessional meeting. Such codes, coupled with education about the prospects for the misuse of scientific research and the national and international legal framework, would help give the scientific community a better capacity to police itself, a kind of “societal verification.” A National Academy panel has gone further, recommending establishing a global internet-linked network of informed scientists “who have the capacity to recognize when knowledge or technology is being used inappropriately.”[31] The scientific community would conduct its own self-surveillance and initial intervention to prevent malevolent behavior within its ranks.

A more specific kind of community surveillance has been proposed by the participants in the Second International Meeting on Synthetic Biology held in Berkeley, California, in May 2006. They note that DNA synthesis is one obvious pathway toward the creation of hazardous biological systems, but most DNA synthesis companies do not systematically check their orders to ensure that they are not synthesizing DNA for human disease organisms or other hazards. Those that do such screening use existing software tools that are unable to identify novel hazards and that have a high false-alarm rate. The participants called for all companies to screen their synthesis orders, including customer validation, and created a working group to create better software screening tools.[32]

Governance Without Treaties

There is a growing body of international relations literature concerned with the mismatch between the importance of global problems and the absence of international mechanisms to address them in a timely and effective way.[33] The World Bank’s J. F. Rischard advocates the creation of “global issues networks” that bring together representatives of governments, NGOs, and business for “rapid norm production and rapid activation of reputational effects.” The networks would quickly reach a rough consensus and then pressure states, through rating systems and naming and shaming, into performing better on the issue in question. The objective is to effect change within years rather than the longer multilateral treaty and ratification process.

How such an approach might work in the biotechnology realm might be seen by analogy to concrete examples from an altogether different field, that of human rights and transnational corporations.[34] The UN Global Compact is the world’s largest corporate social-responsibility initiative, with more than 2,300 participating companies. These companies publicly advocate the compact and its 10 principles in the areas of human rights, labor, environment, and anti-corruption and share best practices.[35] There are other, overlapping initiatives including the Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights.[36]

In the absence of an international organization established by treaty to regulate biotechnology research, an initiative analogous to these efforts might begin to fill the gap. As one concrete example, Harvard biologist George Church suggested that all new DNA synthesis machines manufactured be licensed, tagged with electronic locators, and programmed to forbid the synthesis of dangerous DNA sequences.[37] An initiative analogous to the UN Global Compact could, with the support of governments and civil society, put strong pressure on the still-small number of companies manufacturing DNA synthesis machines to adhere to such principles on the grounds of global security. Broader principles to which all member companies would adhere could be explored, as could expansion to academic, governmental, and other biological research entities. The International Council for the Life Sciences is one newly formed membership-based organization that is beginning to assume this role.

Reasons for Optimism

The biological challenge differs greatly from the nuclear challenge and is unprecedented with respect to the power it will place in the hands of small groups of the technically competent. The pace of technological advance is daunting and risks outstripping the pace of political response, but there are reasons for optimism. The biological science community has a strong tradition of recognizing the potential for misuse of their work and calling for self-regulation.

Whereas the atomic scientists led by Leo Szilard failed in the 1930s to impose self-censorship in the publication of research in nuclear fission, the biologists succeeded in the early 1970s to restrict their own research in recombinant DNA, the predecessor of today’s far more powerful genetic engineering techniques. One reason for the biologists’ comparative success was that from the outset they enlisted support from prestigious scientific academies. This continues to provide a powerful tool.

The greater challenge is for the policy world. Neither Cold War arms control nor nonproliferation treaties provide good models for how to cope with the nonstate aspects of the biotechnology dilemma. It is unclear whether the international system will be nimble enough to respond effectively. If it cannot, we will simply have to cope with, rather than shape, our biological future. Before we accept that outcome, it is time for the creative exploration of rapid and effective international means for addressing the worst dangers.


Christopher F. Chyba is a professor of astrophysics and international affairs at Princeton University, where he directs the Program on Science and Global Security at the Woodrow Wilson School. He served on the staffs of the National Security Council and the Office of Science and Technology Policy in the first Clinton administration and is editor, with George Bunn, of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Confronting Today’s Threats (2006). He has recently been appointed to an advisory group to the United Nations for an upcoming biotechnology initiative.


1. For one such list, inevitably already outdated, see Committee on Research Standards and Practices to Prevent the Destructive Application of Biotechnology, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2004), pp. 24-29.

2. Jeronimo Cello et al., “Chemical Synthesis of Poliovirus cDNA: Generation of Infectious Virus in the Absence of Natural Template,” Science, August 9, 2002, pp. 1,016-1,018. See Steven M. Block, “A Not-So-Cheap Stunt,” Science, August 2, 2002, pp. 769-770.

3. Ronald J. Jackson et al., “Expression of a Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Ectromelia Virus Suppresses Cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic Resistance to Mousepox,” Journal of Virology, February 2001, pp. 1,205-1,210.

4. See Mark Wheelis, “Will the New Biology Lead to New Weapons,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2004, pp. 6-13.

5. Gordon Moore, “Cramming More Components Onto Integrated Circuits,” Electronics Magazine, April 19, 1965, pp. 114-117.

6. See Robert Carlson, “The Pace and Proliferation of Biological Technologies,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, 2003, pp. 203-214.

7. Hamilton Smith et al., “Generating a Synthetic Genome by Whole Genome Assembly: Phi-X174 Bacteriophage from Synthetic Oligonucleotides,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, December 23, 2003, pp. 15,440-15,445.

8. Jeffrey K. Taubenberger et al., “Characterization of the 1918 Influenza Virus Polymerase Genes,” Nature, October 6, 2005, pp. 889-893.

9. Terrence M. Tumpey et al., “Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic Virus,” Science, October 7, 2005, pp. 77-80.

10. “Report of the UN Secretary-General: Uniting Against Terrorism: Recommendations for a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” April 27, 2006, paras. 52-57.

11. Gregg Easterbrook, “We’re All Gonna Die!” Wired, July 2003.

12. See Committee on Advances in Technology and the Prevention of their Application to Next Generation Biowarfare Threats, Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences ( Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2006).

13. World Health Report 2004 , Statistical Annex, pp. 120-121.

14. International Council For Science-Africa, “ Kampala Compact: The Global Bargain for Biosecurity and Bioscience,” October 1, 2005.

15. Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, “Report to the President,” March 31, 2005, pp. 268-270 (painting a more sophisticated picture of al Qaeda’s biological activities than does “The 9/11 Commission Report,” but the conclusions of the former are based on classified documents so are difficult to assess independently).

16. For an argument that “threat inflation” of the biological threat occurred subsequent to the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, see Jean Pascal Zanders, “Book Review: Unmasking a Culture of Death,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2006. For a skeptical analysis of the bioterrorism threat, see Milton Leitenberg, Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat ( Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2005).

17. X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, July 1947.

18. This point is made by the Princeton Project on National Security Working Group on Relative Threat Assessment.

19. See Committee on Advances in Technology Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences, p. 53.

20. Donald MacKenzie and Graham Spinardi, “Tacit Knowledge, Weapons Design, and the Uninvention of Nuclear Weapons,” American Journal of Sociology, 1995.

21. Registry of Standard Biological Parts, MIT.

22. A. Malcolm Campbell, “Meeting Report: Synthetic Biology Jamboree for Undergraduates,” Cell Biology Education, Spring 2005, pp. 19-23.

23. See Committee on Advances in Technology Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences. See also “PAEC to Train Foreign Muslim Scientists,” Daily Times ( Lahore), January 17, 2004; Jim Giles, “Nigeria Ready for Huge Science Spend,” Nature, July 2006, p. 334.

24. Clive Thompson, “The Virus Underground,” New York Times Magazine, February 8, 2004.

25. Art MacEoin, “IRA Bombs British Cabinet in Brighton,” An Phoblacht/Republican News, October 11, 2001.

26. Nicholas Isla and Iris Hunger, “BWC 2006: Building Transparency Through Confidence Building Measures,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2006, pp. 19-22.

27. WHO, “Preparedness for Deliberate Epidemics,” May 2002.

28. Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism.

29. John Steinbruner et al., “Controlling Dangerous Pathogens: A Prototype Protective Oversight System,” December 2005.

30. See Roger Roffey, John Hart, and Frida Kuhlau, “Crucial Guidance: A Code of Conduct for Biodefense Scientists,” Arms Control Today, September 2006. See Committee on Advances in Technology, Globalization, Biosecurity and the Future of the Life Sciences, pp. 246-250.

31. Committee on Advances in Technology, Globalization, Biosecurity and the Future of the Life Sciences, pp. 251-256.

32. “Declaration of the Second International Meeting on Synthetic Biology,” Berkeley, California, May 29, 2006.

33. For key publications in this literature, see Wolfgang Reinicke, Global Public Policy: Governing Without Government? (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998); J. F. Rischard, High Noon: Twenty Global Problems, Twenty Years to Solve Them ( New York: Basic Books, 2002); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2004).

34. For examples drawn from the interim report of the special representative of the secretary-general on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, see “Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,” February 22, 2006, E/CN.4/2006/97.

35. UN Global Compact, found at http://www.unglobalcompact.org.

36. Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights, May 2003.

37. George M. Church, “A Synthetic Biohazard Non-proliferation Proposal,” May 21, 2005, found at http://arep.med.harvard.edu/SBP/Church_Biohazard04c.htm.


October 2006 Bibliography

Of Special Interest

Allison, Graham, Ed., “Confronting the Specter of Nuclear Terrorism,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 607, No. 1, September 2006, 202 pp.

International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor Report 2006, September 2006, 1,230 pp.

International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report 2006, September 25, 2006, 99 pp.

Pearson, Graham S., Nicholas A. Sims, and Malcolm R. Dando, Eds., Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention: Key Points for the Sixth Review Conference, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, September 2006, 281 pp.

I. Strategic Arms

Associated Press, “Chirac says French Nuclear Deterrent Must Adapt to Changing Threats,” September 7, 2006.

British American Security Information Council, Does Britain Need to Replace Trident: You Decide, September 2006, 4 pp.

Fleck, John, “Official Urges Nuke Work,” Albuquerque Journal, September 4, 2006, p. D4.

The Moscow Times, “Nuclear Arsenal Will Be Upgraded by 2009,” September 7, 2006, p. 4.

Taverna, Michael A., “Missile Gap: Upcoming M51 Ballistic Missile Firing Buoys French Nuclear Plans, Despite Cruise Missile Delays,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 25, 2006, p. 42.

II. Nuclear Proliferation

Associated Press, “ Egypt to Start Building Nuclear Power Plants Soon, Minister Says,” September 24, 2006.

Elliott, Geoff, “Threat Remains of a Nuclear Terror Strike,” The Australian, September 11, 2006.

Ezigbo, Onyebuchi, “ Nigeria Affirms Interest for Nuclear Technology,” Nigeria This Day, September 25, 2006.

Ferguson, Charles D. and Potter, William C., “Lining Up to Enrich Uranium,” International Herald Tribune, September 12, 2006.

Handelman, Stephen, “World’s Nuclear Haves and Have-Nots Beginning to Play ‘Let’s Break a Deal,’” The Globe and Mail, September 28, 2006.

Hedges, Stephen J., “Civilian Nuclear Power Effort Widens: Critics Say U.S. Global Plan Could Increase Weapons Proliferation,” Chicago Tribune, September 4, 2006.

Johnson, Tim, “Anxiety Chipping Away at Japan’s Nuclear Taboo,” The Mercury News, September 18, 2006.

Kaplan, Eben, “The Legacy of A. Q. Khan,” Council on Foreign Relations, September 5, 2006.

Katsuta, Tadahiro, and Tatsujiro Suzuki, Japan’s Spent Fuel and Plutonium Management Challenges, International Panel on Fissile Materials, September 2006, 33 pp.

Keinon, Herb and Associated Press, “Olmert Unfazed by Egypt’s Plan to Build Nuclear Plants,” The Jerusalem Post, September 25, 2006.

Laufer, Michael, A. Q. Khan Nuclear Chronology, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Issue Brief, September 7, 2006, 10 pp.

Lyman, Edwin S., The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership: Will It Advance Nonproliferation or Undermine It?, The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, September 7, 2006, 8 pp.

Schlesinger, David and Rhoads, Brian, “Interview: China’s Wen Resists Sanctions Against Iran, N. Korea,” Reuters, September 5, 2006.

Slackman, Michael and Mona El-Naggar, “Mubarak’s Son Proposes Nuclear Program,” The New York Times, September 20, 2006, p. A14.

Suter, Keith, “Islam’s Strangelove Leaves Deadly Fallout,” The Daily Telegraph, September 4, 2006.

The Times of India , “A. Q. Khan Network Still Alive: U.S. Think Tank,” September 8, 2006.


DeSutter, Paula, “The Administration’s Perspective on China’s Record on Nonproliferation,” September 14, 2006.


Associated Press, “Report: India Disproves Capping of its Nuclear Fissile Material Production,” September 8, 2006.

Ferguson, Charles D., “Security is Vital in U.S.-India Nuke Deal,” The Christian Science Monitor, September 19, 2006.

Giacomo, Carol, “Senators Trade Blame over India Deal Delay,” Reuters, September 26, 2006.

Hartcher, Peter, “India Forces PM’s Hand on Uranium,” The Sydney Morning Herald, September 25, 2006.

Hibbs, Mark, “IAEA Governors Opposing Unique Safeguards Protocol for India,” Nucleonics Week, Vol. 47, No. 39, September 28, 2006, p. 1.

Mian, Zia, A.H. Nayyar, R. Rajaraman, and M.V. Ramana, Fissile Materials in South Asia: The Implications of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal, International Panel on Fissile Materials, September 2006, 40 pp.

Sokolski, Henry, “ New Delhi’s message to Washington: Drop Dead,” The Weekly Standard, September 6, 2006.

Subramanian, T.S. and Menon, Kesava, “The Goalposts Haven’t Been Shifted and They Will Not be Shifted,” The Hindu, September 30, 2006.


Agence France-Presse, “Chirac Urges World Powers Not to Refer Iran to Security Council,” September 18, 2006.

Arnold, Martin and Dombey, Daniel, “Chirac Backs UN Compromise on Iran,” Financial Times, September 18, 2006.

Associated Press, “Iran-EU Nuclear Talks to Resume in Germany,” September 27, 2006.

Carpenter, Ted Galen, Iran’s Nuclear Program; America’s Policy Options, CATO Institute Policy Analysis, September 20, 2006, 19 pp.

Center for Strategic and International Studies, Judging the Iranian Threat: 20 Questions We Need to Answer, September 19, 2006, 12 pp.

Charbonneau, Louis, “EU, Iran Plan More Nuclear Talks, No Deal Reached,” Reuters, September 28, 2006.

Der Spiegel, “ Iran’s Atomic Ambitions: IAEA Fears the ‘Iraq Scenario’ in Nuclear Dispute with Tehran,” September 20, 2006.

Duffy, Michael, “What Would War Look Like?” Time, September 25, 2006.

Eisenstadt, Michael, Iran: The Complex Calculus of Preventive Military Action, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 25, 2006.

Giacomo, Carol, “Major Powers Mull Meeting to Break Logjam with Iran,” Reuters, September 16, 2006.

Ignatius, David, “ Iran Ready for a Test of Wills,” The Washington Post, September 1, 2006, p. A21.

Igantius, David, “Bush’s Message to Iran,” The Washington Post, September 15, 2006, p. A19.

Jahn, George, “ U.S. Officials Press for Iran Sanctions Ahead of Last-Ditch Nuclear Meeting,” Associated Press, September 6, 2006.

Karon, Tony, “Why Iran Has the Upper Hand in the Nuclear Showdown,” Time, September 7, 2006.

Katz, Yaakov, “IDF Tackling Iran’s WMD Threat,” The Jerusalem Post, September 19, 2006.

Krauthammer, Charles, “The Tehran Calculus,” The Washington Post, September 15, 2006, p. A19.

Linzer, Dafna, “UN Inspectors Dispute Iran Report by House Panel,” The Washington Post, September 14, 2006, p. A17.

Murphy, Francois, “ France Confirms Iran Said It May Suspend Enrichment,” Reuters, September 15, 2006.

Newsweek, “How Close is Iran to Having Nuclear Weapons?” September 25, 2006.

Perkovich, George, Defining Iran’s Nuclear Rights, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Proliferation Analysis, September 7, 2006.

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Recognizing Iran as a Strategic Threat: An Intelligence Challenge for the United States, House of Representatives, August 23, 2006, 29 pp.

Ramberg, Bennett, “Bomb Tehran Today or Be Bombed Tomorrow?” San Francisco Chronicle, September 6, 2006. p. B11.

Reuters, “EU’s Solana Cites Progress in Iran Nuclear Talks,” September 15, 2006.

Reuters, “U.S. Bars Iranian Bank’s Access to System,” September 9, 2006.

Rubin, Alissa J. and Farley, Maggie, “UN Nuclear Agency Faults Iran,” Los Angeles Times, September 1, 2006.

Sciolino, Elaine, “Highly Enriched Uranium Found at Iranian Plant,” The New York Times, September 1, 2006, p. A10.

Shire, Jacqueline and Albright, David, Iran’s NPT Violations: Numerous and Possibly Ongoing?, The Institute for Science and International Security, September 29, 2006, 5 pp.

Shire, Jacqueline and Albright, David, Iran’s Response to the EU: Confused but Sporadically Hopeful, The Institute for Science and International Security, September 11, 2006, 4 pp.

Slavin, Barbara, “ U.S., Iran Share Interests in Iraq, Khatami Says,” USA Today, September 4, 2006.

Strobel, Warren P. and Walcott, John, “ Iran Debate Echoes Prelude to Iraq,” The Miami Herald, September 18, 2006.

Takeyh, Ray, “The Rising Might of the Middle East Super Power,” Financial Times, September 11, 2006, p. 12.

Wright, Robin, “Khatami Arrives As U.S. Weighs Sanctions on Iran,” The Washington Post, September 5, 2006, p. A16.


Reuters, “West Blocks Arab Bid to Rap Israel over Nuclear Issue at IAEA Meeting,” September 24, 2006.

North Korea

Associated Press, “ Australia Imposes N. Korea Sanctions,” September 19, 2006.

Gregg, Donald and Oberdorfer, Don, “Wrong Path on North Korea,” The Washington Post, September 6, 2006, p. A15.

Inagaki, Kana, “ Japan, Australia OK N. Korea Sanctions,” Associated Press, September 19, 2006.

Kyodo News Agency, “ Japan Announces Sanctions Against North Korea,” September 19, 2006.

Kyodo News Agency, “Kyodo Carries ‘Gist’ of Japan’s Financial Sanctions Against North Korea,” September 19, 2006.

Kyodo News Agency, “China Opposes Japan’s New Sanctions on North Korea,” September 19, 2006.

Parameswaran, P., “Arms Race, Trade Tensions Would Follow a North Korean Nuke Test: Report,” Agence France-Presse, September 3, 2006.

Pinkston, Daniel, “ North Korea’s Foreign Policy Toward the United States,” Strategic Insights, September 2006, 7 pp.

Yonhap News Agency, “ U.S. Nuclear Envoy Hill Could Visit Pyongyang if N. Korea Concedes,” September 21, 2006.

Yonhap News Agency, “ South Korea Denies President Roh Urged US to Defer North Sanctions,” September 19, 2006.

Yonhap News Agency, “ N. Korea Continues to Mention Willingness to Resume Six-Party Talks,” September 18, 2006.


Braun, Chaim, Security Issues Related to Future Pakistan Nuclear Power Program, The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, September 14, 2006, 48 pp.

III. Nonproliferation

Aloise, Gene, Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Safeguards and Other Measures to Halt the Spread of Nuclear Weapons and Material, Government Accountability Office, September 26, 2006, 32 pp.

Burroughs, John, Fulfilling the NPT Bargain for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Next Steps, Middle Powers Initiative Briefing Paper, September 2006, 20 pp.

Costa, Keith J., “ U.S., Russian Officials Sign Liability Protocol for Plutonium Disposition,” Inside Missile Defense, September 27, 2006, p. 5.

Gormley, Dennis M., “Securing Nuclear Obsolescence,” Survival, Vol. 48. No. 3, Autumn 2006, p. 127.

Government Accountability Office, Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency Response Capabilities Could Be Strengthened, September 2006, 39 pp.

Hebert, H. Josef, “ U.S., Russia Resolve Plutonium Dispute,” Associated Press, September 15, 2006.

Hundman, Eric, The Global Threat Reduction Initiative’s First Two Years, Center for Defense Information, September 6, 2006, 3 pp.

Interfax, “Duma Ratifies International Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism,” September 15, 2006.

MacLachlan, Ann, “IAEA to Mull Supply Strategies, but Third World Remains Wary,” Nucleonics Week, Vol. 47, No. 39, September 28, 2006, p. 10.

Parrish, Scott and Potter, William, United States Seeks to Block Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, September 5, 2006, 9 pp.

Steen, Michael, “ Central Asia Declares Nuclear Free Zone,” Reuters, September 8, 2006.

Weir, Fred and Mark Clayton, “US-Russia Effort to Contain Nuclear Experts Fades,” The Christian Science Monitor, September 20, 2006, p. 1.

IV. Missiles and Missile Defense

Associated Press, “Czech Foreign Minister Supports U.S. Missile Defense Base in His Country,” September 6, 2006.

Babbin, Jed, “Reagan’s Vision, Rumsfeld’s Legacy,” The American Spectator, September 5, 2006.

Billingslea, Marshall, “Shielding The Allies,” The Wall Street Journal, September 18, 2006, p. 15.

Coyle, Philip, “What About the Most Recent Missile Defense Test?” Neiman Watchdog, September 11, 2006.

Gertz, Bill, “ U.S. Succeeds in Missile Defense Test,” The Washington Times, September 2, 2006, p. 1.

Herskovitz, Jon, “ North Korea Finds Market for Missiles Shrinking,” Reuters, September, 3, 2006.

Liang, John, “Despite DOD Warnings of Delays, Conferees Lower European Missile Defense Site Funding by $20 Million,” Inside Missile Defense, September 27, 2006, p. 27.

Liang, John, “Fallon: North Korean Missile Test Highlights Small Reaction Time,” Inside Missile Defense, September 27, 2006, p. 3.

Muradian, Vago, “ Russia Resists Polish Missile Defense Role,” Defense News, September 25, 2006, p. 26.

Pons, Sophie, “Czech Gov’t Under Fire Over US Missile Plans,” Agence France-Presse, September 9, 2006.

Scott, Richard, “Test Firing Boosts USN’s SLIRBM,” Jane’s Navy International, September 2006, p. 10.

Sieff, Martin, “Is Ballistic Missile Defense Worth the Money?” United Press International, September 28, 2006.

Spiegel, Peter, “ North Korea’s Strike Range Cast in Doubt,” Los Angeles Times, September 23, 2006.

Talbot, David, “Missile Defense: Hit or Miss?” Technology Review, September 14, 2006.

Wall, Robert, “Designing Defenses: SAIC is Chosen to Develop the International Alliance’s Missile Defense System,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 25, 2006, p. 42.

Wolf, Jim, “ Poland Wants US Pact in Exchange for Missile Silos,” Reuters, September 13, 2006.

V. Chemical and Biological Arms

Grossman-Vermaas, Rita, Brian Finlay, and Elizabeth Turpen, Regulating Access to and Control of Dangerous Pathogens: Implications for the Pharmaceutical Industry, The Henry L. Stimson Center, September 2006, 40 pp.

Litovkin, Viktor, “Moving Away from Chemical Warfare: Third Step,” RIA Novosti, September 8, 2006.

Schneidmiller, Chris, “ Researchers Seek to Counteract Bioengineered Anthrax,”Global Security Newswire, September 5, 2006.

Wolf, Jim, “US faults China on germ weapons, Iran, North Korea,” Reuters, September 14, 2006.

VI. Conventional Arms

Ghattas, Sam F., “ Syria Pledges to Halt Weapons; Will Reinforce Boarder Patrols,” The Washington Times, September 2, 2006, p. A1.

Helly, Damien and Isbister, Roy, “Strengthening European Support for an Arms Trade Treaty,” European Security Review, September 2006, 5 pp.

Hirschman, Dave, “A Raptor for U.S. Allies?” Atlanta Journal-Constitution, September 5, 2006, p. C1.

Karniol, Robert, “ Ukraine Sells Kolchuga to Iran,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 27, 2006, p. 6.

Klug, Foster, “ U.S. Criticizes China Arms Sales,” Associated Press, September 15, 2006.

Murphy, James, “The Rise and Rise of Rosoboronexport,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 27, 2006, p. 32.

Reuters, “ Russia Accuses NATO Nations of Arms Sales to Georgia,” September 29, 2006.

Shadid, Anthony, “In Lebanon, a War’s Lethal Harvest: Threat of Unexploded Bombs Paralyze the South,” The Washington Post, Sept. 26, 2006, p. 1.

Tutu, Desmond, “The Modern Successor to the Slave Trade; No Longer Should the Peace Business be Undermined by the Arms Business,” The Independent, September 13, 2006, p. 29.

VII. U.S. Policy

Belasco, Amy, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11,” Congressional Research Service, September 22, 2006, 40 pp.

Haass, Richard N., “Speaking with the Enemy,” Los Angeles Times, September 23, 2006.

Ikenberry, G. John, and Slaughter, Anne-Marie, Eds., Forging a World of Liberty Under Law: U.S. National Security in the 21 st Century, The Princeton Project on National Security, September 27, 2006, 96 pp.

Wright, Robin, “War Backfiring on U.S., Khatami Says,” The Washington Post, September 6, 2006, p. A6.

VIII. Space

Hillery, John, U.S. Satellite Export Control Policy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 20, 2006, 2 pp.

Huck, Peter, “The Race of the Space Warriors,” The New Zealand Herald, September 23, 2006.

Muradian, Vago, “ China Tried to Blind U.S. Sats with Laser,” Defense News, September 25, 2006, p. 1.

IX. Other

Cordesman, Anthony H. and Kleiber, Martin, Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 7, 2006, 118 pp.

Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Energy: Status of DOE’s Effort to Develop the Next Generation Nuclear Plant, September 2006, 34 pp.

Kosachev, Konstantin, “Role of Russian Peacekeepers in Georgia, Moldova Explained, Justified,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 27, 2006.

Rifkin, Jeremy, “Nuclear Energy: Still a Bad Idea,” Los Angeles Times, September 29, 2006.


Anti-Missile System Scores Test Hit

Wade Boese

The Pentagon’s strategic ballistic missile defense intercepted a test target Sept. 1 for the first time since President George W. Bush ordered the rudimentary system deployed nearly four years ago. The success comes on the cusp of a U.S. decision to extend the system to Europe, although nongovernmental missile defense proponents vigorously advocate a different destination: space.

Just hours after the test, Lieutenant General Henry Obering, director of the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency (MDA), declared the experiment a “total success” and a “huge step” for advancing missile defenses. He also said the outcome gave him confidence that the system had a “good chance” of destroying a missile in a real attack. Nonetheless, the flight test fell short of resembling a realistic scenario, and in one respect, it was less difficult than past tests.

Still, the experiment involved several firsts. It involved the first launch of an interceptor of the same make as the 11 currently deployed at Fort Greely, Alaska, and the two stationed at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. In another departure, both the test interceptor and target missile were launched from new locations.

The test interceptor was launched from Vandenberg. Prior testing involved firing the interceptor from Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. The target missile was launched from Kodiak, Alaska, rather than Vandenberg in order to generate a different trajectory.

Instead of shooting the target missile west over the Pacific Ocean toward Hawaii, the new launch point enabled MDA to fire the target south. That allowed the target missile’s flight to more closely resemble the path that a North Korean missile might take. For some time, the Pentagon has postulated that North Korea represents one of the key near-term threats that the rudimentary defense must be prepared to stop. That premise only appears to have been reinforced after Pyongyang in July conducted a partly successful spate of missile tests, even though the longest-range system failed shortly after takeoff. (See ACT, September 2006. )

In the Sept. 1 flight test, an early-warning satellite detected the target missile’s launch and relayed coordinates to the ground-based midcourse (GMD) system’s fire control center at Colorado Springs, which cued an early-warning radar located at Beale Air Force Base, California, to start tracking the target. Once the radar started tracking the missile, trajectory data was sent back to Colorado Springs, where a “firing solution” was formulated and then electronically fed into the test interceptor at Vandenberg.

The interceptor blasted out of its silo roughly 16 minutes after the target’s launch. After the interceptor’s final booster rocket burned out, it released an exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) in space. This roughly 60-kilogram mass of sensors then received a target update from Colorado Springs and maneuvered into a collision with the mock warhead from the target missile. The collision occurred approximately six and one-half minutes after the interceptor’s launch.

“What we saw today was a very realistic trajectory for the threat…and a very realistic trajectory, a very realistic intercept altitude, and intercept speeds for the…interceptor against the target,” Obering told reporters afterward. In addition, the system’s fire control center was manned by an actual crew of the 100th Missile Defense Brigade, instead of private contractors. Obering concluded that “this is about as close as we can come to an end-to-end test of our long-range missile defense system.”

Still, key elements of the system did not participate in the test. Although tested separately on other occasions, the Cobra Dane radar located at the western tip of the Aleutian Islands could not be used because it is permanently oriented away from the recent experiment’s location. Cobra Dane would be the primary radar for relaying early tracking data on a missile fired at the United States from the direction of Asia.

Another sensor, the sea-based X-band radar, also did not contribute tracking data for the intercept, although MDA reported it operated in a “shadow mode.” The radar is supposed to help the system discriminate between an enemy warhead and any decoys that might accompany it.

Previous systems involved up to three decoys with a mock warhead, but the latest test had none. Roughly one-third of the Sept. 1 EKV’s software and hardware were different from those of previously tested models, so the test scenario was simplified to check if the revamped EKV could perform its basic functions. Indeed, MDA did not officially characterize the test as an intercept attempt, but as a data collection flight test.

A former director of the Pentagon’s independent weapons testing office, Philip Coyle, wrote a Sept. 11 commentary for Neiman Watchdog, a Harvard University online journalism publication, calling the latest test “the simplest flight intercept test ever” because of the lack of decoys. Many scientific critics of the Pentagon’s strategic missile defense say that adversaries will be able to use decoys and other countermeasures to thwart the system.

Obering said he was “confident” that the system could “handle simple countermeasures” and that future tests of the system will add them. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also said in a Sept. 1 statement that the tests will become “more challenging.” Neither specified whether the next intercept test scheduled tentatively for December will involve decoys.

All told, the GMD system has achieved six hits in 11 tests involving targets. Prior to the latest trial, the defense had not scored a successful intercept since October 2002.

Following a December 2002 miss, the system went into a testing hiatus as the Pentagon concentrated on fielding interceptors to comply with Bush’s order that month to deploy an initial system in 2004. (See ACT, January/February 2003. ) MDA resumed testing in December 2004, but technical malfunctions caused the first two attempts to be aborted before the interceptor launched.

This meager testing record was becoming a source of discontent for some lawmakers. Seven Democratic members of Congress, including the ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, Ike Skelton ( Mo.), sent Rumsfeld a letter Aug. 29 pressing for more realistic testing. Similarly, the Senate Appropriations Committee also contended in July that MDA was devoting too many resources to researching futuristic concepts instead of focusing on “adequate testing and fielding of currently available technology.”

Obering told Arms Control Today Sept. 15 that the Pentagon “will continue to request funding that is adequate for both near-term and future missile defense technology development and deployment efforts.” He described both as “essential for current and future national security needs.”

One deployment option that MDA is preparing to embark on is to Europe. The Bush administration contends that Europe-based interceptors are needed to counter a growing Iranian ballistic missile threat. Tehran’s longest-range missile, the Shahab-3, can reach as far as Turkey.

Washington has approached the Czech Republic and Poland about hosting the site, but no agreement has yet been reached. During a visit to Washington, Polish Defense Minister Radoslaw Sikorski said Sept. 13 Poland would want some additional bilateral security arrangements with Washington in return for hosting interceptors.

U.S. lawmakers have not fully embraced the European deployment plan. The House earlier completely eliminated the $119 million requested for the site by the Bush administration as part of the fiscal year 2007 budget, while the Senate fully funded it. In a Sept. 22 compromise, the two chambers agreed to provide $32.8 million for the site and $63 million to begin work on the base’s proposed 10 interceptors, which lawmakers also said could be deployed elsewhere. This amounts to a $23 million cut from the original request.

Meanwhile, a group of nongovernmental missile defense advocates called the Independent Working Group on Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, and the 21st Century is urging limited deployments of ground-based systems and more work toward stationing interceptors in orbit. The group includes Ambassador Henry Cooper, who headed a predecessor organization to MDA that, during the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, focused on developing space-based systems to protect against a presumed onslaught of Soviet ICBMs.

In a report released this summer, the group argued that the Bush administration’s system “provides extremely limited coverage” and leaves unaddressed potential threats from “strategic competitors such as Russia and China,” as well as from surprise missile launches by ships off U.S. coasts. As a remedy, the group advocates the deployment of up to 1,000 space-based interceptors beginning with an initial capability in 2010. Testing of space-based interceptors, they recommend, should start in three years.

MDA has plans to explore placing interceptors in orbit, but at a much slower pace and smaller scale than proposed by the nongovernmental group. The agency intends to start requesting funding in next year’s budget for establishing a “test-bed” around 2012 of less than a “handful” of interceptors, Obering told Arms Control Today last year. (See ACT, November 2005. )

On Sept. 15, Obering told Arms Control Today that MDA still has “plans to conduct technical demonstrations to determine the technical viability of space-based defenses.” But he also noted that space-based missile defenses require “a significant policy debate.”

China and Russia for the past several years have sought to block U.S. missile defense plans for space by getting the 65-member Conference on Disarmament to negotiate an agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. But the conference operates by consensus, and the United States has consistently opposed the Chinese and Russian initiative, arguing that there is no arms race in space. The conference ended its 2006 session Sept. 15 without having started any negotiations, including on the outer space issue.



Books of Note

Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions
By Shahram Chubin, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2006, 244 pp.

Security expert Chubin argues in this sociopolitical study that the roots of Iran’s drive for nuclear capabilities and potentially for nuclear weapons lie less in perceived international threats than domestic Iranian politics. In particular, he says that political hard-liners such as Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad view the nuclear issue as a means of entrenching themselves in power and legitimating the Islamic regime. They also see it as a means of competing with the West for influence in the Middle East. By contrast, he contends, more pragmatic members of the regime view the nuclear card as a means of leverage for normalized relations with the West in hopes of bolstering the Iranian economy. Nonetheless, he says, neither faction is likely to test a nuclear weapon. Even the hard-liners would likely stop just short of such a test in hopes of remaining within the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty regime, Chubin claims.

Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Security
By Kerry G. Herron and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, University of Pittsburgh Press, August 2006, 264 pp.

Texas A&M University professors Herron and Jenkins-Smith explore American attitudes on nuclear security and terrorism since the end of the Cold War. Based on more than 13,000 interviews conducted in the decade since 1993, the authors find that public views about nuclear weapons have remained surprisingly constant despite the changing landscape of threats. Indeed, changing perceptions of foreign threats were found to have little effect on nuclear policy preferences. Rather, Americans’ views on nuclear policy appear to be far more reflective of their ideological preferences and partisan leanings (such partisanship increased dramatically over the decade). Those with more conservative views perceive that increases in foreign threats imply the need for strengthening nuclear deterrence, while those with more liberal views believe that increased nuclear risks require dramatic reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Deterrence as a strategy, however, is declining in public appeal. Perception of what constitutes an appropriate level for U.S. nuclear forces has dropped since 1997.

Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network
By Gordon Corera, Oxford University, September 2006, 304 pp.

BBC correspondent Corera offers a detailed account of the rise and downfall of Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan and his nuclear proliferation network. Much of the book focuses on U.S. and British intelligence failures that allowed Khan both to procure items for Pakistan’s nuclear program and become a proliferator of nuclear equipment and technology to others. Corera details the West’s monitoring of Khan’s activities and argues that the United States did not take action in the late 1970s and early 1980s when it had information about Khan’s procurement activities because of Pakistan’s perceived role in fighting communism. But he also notes the eventual intelligence successes and the new willingness to act on those successes that eventually led to Khan’s downfall.

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Iran's Nuclear Ambitions. By Shahram Chubin, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2006, 244 pp.

Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Security. By Kerry G. Herron and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, University of Pittsburgh Press, August 2006, 264 pp.

Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network. By Gordon Corera, Oxford University, September 2006, 304 pp.


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