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“[My time at ACA] prepared me very well for the position that I took following that with the State Department, where I then implemented and helped to implement many of the policies that we tried to promote.”
– Peter Crail
Business Executive for National Security
June 2, 2022
January/February 2002
Edition Date: 
Tuesday, January 1, 2002

Can China's Tolerance Last?

Bates Gill

Many observers seemed surprised by China’s muted reaction to the Bush administration’s December 13 announcement that the United States would withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. But analysts should not have been surprised. Since early 2001, Beijing had steadily toned down its anti-missile defense rhetoric and over the past year had gradually come to tolerate—while still opposing—the U.S. missile shield effort. The ability of the United States and China to keep a lid on heated and damaging rhetoric opens the door to a more serious dialogue that, if carefully managed, may help avert undesirable outcomes arising from the changing strategic nuclear dynamic between them.

With the ABM Treaty withdrawal announcement past, the questions are, how did China come to this more subdued position, and can it last?

Toning Down the Rhetoric

China’s official response to the ABM Treaty withdrawal was moderate—in many ways even more conciliatory than Moscow’s reaction. It consisted of four main points. First, Beijing maintained its opposition to the buildup of strategic missile defenses by the United States. Second, official Chinese statements noted that the ABM Treaty has served as a cornerstone of strategic stability and that its abandonment risks a destabilizing arms race. Third, Beijing urged Washington to take heed of the international community’s views on this issue, pointing to the November 29 United Nations General Assembly resolution which for the third year in a row called for the strengthening and preservation of the treaty. Finally—an indication of China’s concern with “high politics” and “atmospherics”—the official Chinese statements emphasized the important international role of the United States and China, which share common interests in maintaining global peace and which should find solutions to their differences through constructive dialogue.

It was left to the Foreign Ministry spokesman to issue the “toughest” language, expressing “regret” and “concern” over “worrisome” developments. Although China among the nuclear powers stands to lose the most in the face of U.S. missile defenses, its leaders did not even go so far as Russian President Vladimir Putin, who characterized the ABM Treaty withdrawal decision as a “mistake.” Instead, Chinese President Jiang Zemin took the high ground in his officially released statements, expressing China’s willingness “to work with other countries to make efforts to safeguard world peace and stability.”

The basis for this relatively gentle response had been laid over many months. Beginning in late 2000 and accelerating in early 2001, official and unofficial U.S. interlocutors had sent clear messages to their Chinese counterparts about the likely direction of missile defense plans in the United States, especially with the arrival of the Bush administration in Washington. These messages included the point that, although Beijing was in no position to veto U.S. missile defense plans, Chinese policies and practices—positive or negative—would have some impact on how missile defense affected the U.S.-China relationship.

As for the Chinese side, the outlines of a more “friendly” Chinese approach toward the United States were already in evidence in early 2001, with a more serious, nuanced, and flexible understanding of missile defenses a part of that overall change in tone. During exchanges in the early part of 2001, Chinese strategists identified a number of steps they hoped the United States would take as a way of gaining greater Chinese acquiescence regarding U.S. missile defense plans. In essence, the Chinese response to the ABM Treaty decision was muted because the Bush administration has taken a number of these steps.

First and foremost, the Chinese needed reassurances about the tenor and direction of U.S.-China relations overall and about the intended “targets” of the missile defense system in particular. Symbolism and rhetoric are important to China. Regardless of the impact of missile defense on China’s deterrent, Beijing wished to avoid being characterized as a “rogue state” or being seen as the justification for missile defenses.

The EP-3 spy plane incident notwithstanding, the Bush administration has made important strides to place the U.S.-China relationship on a firmer footing: the administration quietly dropped its “strategic competitor” rhetoric, President George W. Bush made his long-planned trip to China (even though the United States was at war), and the two sides have consistently emphasized the positive in their bilateral ties. The president and Secretary of State Colin Powell have said they wish to “build constructive, forward-looking relations” with Beijing and to have relations that are “candid, constructive, and cooperative.” Importantly, Secretary Powell has repeatedly stated that U.S. missile defense plans are not aimed at China but rather are intended to protect against rogue missiles.

Second, in early 2001 China voiced considerable unease about the provision of missile defenses to Taiwan, both in terms of specific “theater” systems, such as the PAC-3 or the Aegis sea-based air defense system, and the larger concern of substantively “linking” Taiwan with U.S. missile defense components. In April, the Bush administration deferred a decision on providing more advanced missile defenses to Taiwan and modified the controversial yearly arms sales ritual into a more flexible, “as needed” process.

Third, China hoped that it would be treated with respect due a Great Power and a nuclear-weapon state and that its interests would be taken duly into account by U.S. decision-makers. Since last May, the Bush administration has frequently consulted with its Chinese counterparts at the presidential, secretary, undersecretary, and assistant secretary levels, including Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Avis Bohlen’s trip to Beijing in mid-December following the ABM Treaty withdrawal announcement.

Perhaps most importantly, President Bush called President Zemin on December 13, a few hours before the Rose Garden announcement on the ABM Treaty. Informing the Chinese before the announcement and suggesting the need for “strategic dialogue” on the issue not only helped to reassure Beijing, but also offered the Chinese “face” and the appearance of being a player at the Great Power table.

Notably, China’s hopes for reassuring signals from the United States focus primarily on political, as opposed to military-technical, issues. Consistent with past Chinese foreign policy, the most important thing was to “get the atmospherics right” and worry about technical details later. In any event, most Chinese strategists are not concerned about missile defense for what it might mean militarily—believing that the system, even if technologically feasible, is several years off and can be defeated through qualitative and quantitative improvements to China’s missile arsenal. Rather, missile defense for China has been about high politics: what it symbolizes in terms of U.S. strategic intentions toward China and what it means for U.S. commitments toward Taiwan. In the near term, at least, it appears Beijing has been reassured on these points.

Beyond the specifics of bilateral discussions on missile defense, the overall U.S.-Chinese relationship has also experienced an upturn, another contributing factor to Beijing’s restrained reaction to the ABM Treaty withdrawal announcement. While relations have not returned to the levels of 1997-98, when the two sides exchanged high-profile state summit visits, matters are much improved from 1999, when a host of problems plagued the bilateral relationship—from the Cox Committee report and its allegations of nuclear espionage to the inadvertent bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Even the issuance in early September 2001 of U.S. sanctions against a Chinese company for its proliferation activities made hardly a ripple in relations between Washington and Beijing. Firmer footing for the bilateral relationship was only strengthened in the wake of the September 11 attacks: Washington focused its strategic attention on the war on terrorism, and China took a number of constructive steps in support of U.S. efforts.

Russia’s relatively subdued reaction was another factor weighing in Chinese minds. In the past, senior Chinese strategists publicly expressed their confidence that Russia would persevere to preserve the ABM Treaty, and Moscow and Beijing were repeatedly on record at the highest levels in their joint opposition to American missile defense plans. But by late summer, if not earlier, the Cyrillic writing was on the wall, and Chinese policy-makers had little choice but to follow Moscow’s lead. In addition, Putin and Jiang directly conversed prior to President Bush’s December 13 call to the Chinese leader, which probably also helped keep the Russian and Chinese reactions similar in tone.

And lest we forget, China has a number of other pressing issues on its domestic agenda that are more immediate and, for the survival of the Chinese Communist Party, more “strategic” in nature than the more distant and uncertain prospects for ballistic missile defense. With China’s entry into the World Trade Organization on December 11, the Beijing leadership formally added a set of new challenges to an already lengthy list of domestic socioeconomic difficulties. Moreover, China is already well into the intrigues and factional politics leading up to the next major change in Chinese leadership, slated to take place at the quintennial 16th Party Congress in early fall 2002.

In a word or two, Chinese leaders have a lot on their minds, and it is not time to rock the boat. Little was to be gained, and much could be lost, by aggressive confrontation with Washington on this issue. When all is said and done, the United States remains China’s most critical bilateral relationship—economically, diplomatically, militarily—making it very much in Beijing’s interest to downplay differences and seek stable and constructive interactions with Washington.

Thorny Issues Remain

So far, so good, right? Perhaps. While the “atmospherics” are about as good as can be expected, there are many potential difficulties in maintaining strategic nuclear stability between the United States and China.

First, in spite of all the reassurances, China still does not know precisely what Washington’s missile defense architecture is going to look like and what its impact will be on China’s missile forces, conventional and nuclear. The ABM Treaty withdrawal decision does clarify some matters. At least Beijing’s strategists can begin planning for a more robust strategic response than might have otherwise been the case had the ABM Treaty been preserved or modified. But that response will have to be largely reactive as the Bush administration’s framework for missile defense comes into view, piece by piece. Importantly, some of these steps may negatively effect overall U.S. security interests.

The most problematic “architecture” question for China concerns how Taiwan will figure into American missile defense plans. Beijing already presumes that Taiwan will likely enjoy some kind of more advanced missile defenses from the United States, though the specific circumstances under which they might be extended, and in what form, remain uncertain at this point. It appears China will be most vehemently opposed to the provision of systems, such as the PAC-3 or Aegis-equipped naval vessels, that might overtly link U.S. and Taiwanese defense capabilities in what China would view as a revival of the pre-1979 Washington-Taipei mutual defense treaty.

Second, it is unclear what precise steps China will take as part of its ongoing nuclear weapons modernization program. Here again, we can expect Chinese reactions to be partly gauged to U.S. missile defense plans. One thing seems certain: if Beijing is able to deploy even a modestly modernized second-generation arsenal, it will transform the U.S.-China strategic nuclear relationship in significant ways. The expected transition from a largely fixed-site, liquid-fuel arsenal to a land-mobile, solid-fuel force will provide Beijing with a far more reliable and formidable deterrent than it has known in the past. But China’s strategic modernization will probably not stop there. China may succeed over the next 10 to 15 years in deploying a viable “second leg” of its deterrent in the form of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and it may deploy multiple warheads on its ballistic missiles. At a minimum, we should expect an increase in the number of ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads that China fields.

The next decade is also likely to see further improvements in China’s command, control, reconnaissance, and early-warning capability, including the possible introduction of space-based assets to support these functions. It is also likely that China will devote more resources to developing countermeasures, such as decoys, shrouded warheads, and possibly anti-satellite weapons, to defeat missile defenses. Importantly, these development are likely to affect China’s nuclear doctrine, which will transition from a fundamentally “minimalist” posture to a more variegated deterrent: a posture of credible minimal deterrence toward the continental United States and Russia; a more offense-oriented and possibly war-fighting posture of limited deterrence with regard to China’s theater nuclear forces, especially in response to a Taiwan contingency; and an offensively configured, pre-emptive, counterforce war-fighting posture of “active defense” or “offensive defense” for the conventional missile forces.1

These ongoing and likely modernization steps will result in a second generation of far more robust, ready, and survivable nuclear weapons for China. At this point, it is unclear how far and how fast that process will unfold and how it will be interpreted in Washington (let alone other capitals, such as New Delhi, Moscow, Tokyo, and Taipei).

The uncertainties of China’s future proliferation practices will also affect the bilateral strategic nuclear dynamic. Although Beijing seems to have curbed much of the country’s sensitive nuclear- and missile-related exports, significant concerns persist. In some cases, Chinese assistance goes to those countries whose missile programs American defenses will be designed to thwart, such as Iran. It is also possible that Chinese exporters will transfer countermeasure technologies, further complicating the U.S. missile defense effort. China may find itself having to choose between actions that are profitable and actions that will further spur missile defenses.

Finally, the future U.S.-China strategic relationship will remain captive to the significant distrust found just beneath its surface, with plenty to go around on both sides. In the United States, questions about China’s rising power; its political system; its posture toward Taiwan; its proliferation record; and, significantly, whether to accept a situation in which China can hold American cities as nuclear hostages continue to divide the nation and its political leadership, including the current administration. In China, it is not at all clear that the next generation of one-party technocrats is more open, more “globalized,” or less nationalistic than their predecessors, and concerns about American “hegemonism” and global influence have hardly diminished in the wake of September 11.

In short, in spite of the current mood, the United States and China enter a post-ABM Treaty world in which their strategic nuclear relationship will be fundamentally different than what they have known in the past, and many sensitive and complicated uncertainties will persist through this transition period.

Still, the current situation in U.S.-China relations offers some room for confidence. Gauging China’s reaction over the past year, there is a narrow window of opportunity for the two sides to establish a more serious strategic dialogue, come to terms on comfortable offense-defense levels, and inject greater reassurance and confidence into their strategic relationship. A formal, ABM Treaty-like set of agreements or understandings will not be possible in the near term because neither party is prepared to go in this direction as yet. But the newly established “strategic dialogue” process between Beijing and Washington will offer a regular opportunity for the two sides to state clearly that they do not view one another as enemies (which will require the deflection of more hawkish views in both capitals) and to work toward the common cause of strategic stability.


NOTES

1. This argument is fully elaborated in Bates Gill, James Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes, “China’s Strategic Rocket Forces: Transition to Credible Deterrence,” in Richard Yang and James Mulvenon, eds., The People’s Liberation Army as Organization (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, forthcoming).


Bates Gill is a senior fellow in foreign policy studies and director of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution. His next book, Contrasting Visions: United States, China, and World Order, is forthcoming from the Brookings Institution Press.


 

Many observers seemed surprised by China’s muted reaction to the Bush administration’s announcement that the United States would withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. But analysts should not have been surprised.

China Purchases More Russian Destroyers

On January 3, China signed a contract, estimated to be worth more than $1 billion, to purchase two advanced warships from Russia. Delivery of the ships, expected within about four years, will double the number of Sovremennyy-class destroyers that China possesses.

China’s first purchase of two Sovremennyy-class destroyers several years ago received a lot of attention because the warships are equipped to fire the SS-N-22 “Sunburn” anti-ship missile. The Sunburn is a supersonic, sea-skimming missile that can be armed with a nuclear warhead, although China’s Sunburns are thought to carry conventional warheads. The Pentagon viewed delivery of the ships, which has taken place over the past two years, as a qualitative improvement for the Chinese navy but not as a significant change to the military balance in the Taiwan Strait.

Although discussions on China’s possible purchase of the first two destroyers began in 1994, according to an October 2000 report by the Congressional Research Service, China negotiated the deal after an incident in March 1996, when the United States responded to Chinese military exercises opposite Taiwan by sending two U.S. carrier battle groups to the region.

Last spring, the Bush administration agreed to supply Taiwan with four Kidd-class guided-missile destroyers even though long-time Taiwan supporters in Congress were calling for the United States to provide more advanced Arleigh Burke-class destroyers equipped with the Aegis combat system. The new deal between Russia and China could increase congressional pressure on President George W. Bush to authorize transfers of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers to Taipei in the future.

Russia's Strategic Priorities

Celeste A. Wallander

President George W. Bush announced in December that the United States planned to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in six months. For years, Russia had warned that loss of the treaty would undermine the nuclear strategic stability on which the delicate balance of terror had rested during the Cold War. It had claimed that, without the ABM Treaty, other arms control agreements could not stand, including START I and II, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and even the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Russia’s leaders threatened a new arms race that would restore Cold War acrimony.

Yet, sometime between the first serious Russian warnings in 1999 and the December 2001 decision, something changed. Russian President Vladimir Putin responded to the decision by calling it merely a “mistake” and said that it would not harm improving U.S.-Russian relations. Russia has not withdrawn from any arms control agreements; in fact, Russia and the United States are moving forward with discussions for a new offensive arms limitation agreement, perhaps in time for a Bush-Putin summit in early summer 2002.

What has happened to make Russia sanguine about a world without the ABM Treaty? Russia’s priorities have changed, as well as its assessment of what U.S. testing portends for the strategic relationship in the next 10 to 15 years. The political relationship has improved, and the Putin leadership cannot reverse course without closing off vital opportunities for integration and chances to secure resources to solve the terrible problems that plague Russia. In short, what has happened is that the Russian government has bet it will not lose as much from a world without the treaty as it will gain from a United States willing to cooperate. Most of all, Russia’s leaders have realized that U.S. missile defenses will not be a reality for some time and that they can preserve options for responding to potential defenses over the next few years.

The Stakes

The ABM Treaty provided Russia with status, partnership, and security. Status came from locking the United States into a bilateral relationship that no other country shared. The ABM Treaty preserved an aspect of superpower status that Russia could claim even as its conventional forces shrunk to nearly one-fourth their former size and its strategic nuclear arsenal dropped to nearly half of its Cold War high. By the same token, the treaty created a claim for partnership in negotiating strategic stability in the new security environment. Although the Bush administration tried to relegate Russia to a lower priority in U.S. foreign policy in the early months of its term, it found it needed to take Russia seriously to try to find a compromise on the ABM Treaty, if only to reassure European allies that the United States remained a reliable partner.

At the same time, the ABM Treaty provided security benefits. Nuclear deterrence policy is not merely about mutual assured destruction and the threat of being able to launch a few missiles at vulnerable cities. It remains based on counterforce calculations: we hold at risk not merely (or primarily) cities and citizens to deter leaders in other states, but military, defense, and industrial infrastructure.1 By preventing the United States from deploying defenses, the ABM Treaty limited U.S. counterforce capability.

The decision to forego these advantages without vehement objection is due in part to a new leadership style (Putin’s pragmatism vs. Boris Yeltsin’s high drama), but it is more importantly rooted in a shift in priorities. Putin’s foreign policy serves his domestic economic goals: to stabilize, regularize, and restructure the economy to support a 21st century Russian society and cultivate a newly confident Russian state. The Putin leadership wants Russian businesses to produce and invest, not merely strip assets and hide them abroad. It seeks good business relations with export markets and potential foreign investors.

The opportunity for substantially improved relations with the United States is key to Putin’s priority for economic growth and integration. Economic and business relations with Europe are strong, but they are not enough. Russia needs U.S. support for accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), which should expand Russia’s export markets and provide leverage for cleaning up Russia’s business practices. If that happens, Russian businesses would become more competitive, and international investors might become willing to invest substantial amounts of capital into new and reformed Russian enterprises.

On the security front, the biggest problems facing Russia this decade are NATO and instability and terrorism in Eurasia. Russia and the United States now agree that counterterrorism is their central security priority. It does not make sense for Russia to undermine its partnership in a vital security issue by worsening relations over the less immediate concern about missile defenses. NATO’s future as a military alliance in Europe is much more important than future missile defenses because it affects how Russia will reform its conventional military forces. Putin has invested considerable diplomatic effort in reassuring European partners that Russia is a responsible neighbor. One element of Putin’s campaign has even been to propose joint development of European missile defense systems, possibly in the context of NATO. For such a cooperative security posture toward Europe to remain credible, Putin can hardly break off relations with the United States and embark upon a nuclear arms race.

However, these economic and political priorities alone would not matter if the Russian security leadership had not come to the conclusion that the U.S. decision poses no threat to Russia in the short term and does not rule out long-term options to preserve Russia’s nuclear capability. Russian government statements since the decision have repeatedly asserted that U.S. testing is unlikely to result in a successful comprehensive national missile defense system. Therefore, although Russia loses the ABM Treaty, it retains assured retaliation capability for the short and medium terms. Both Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov have stated explicitly that Russia can afford to wait and watch as the United States tests and develops missile defense because it is not expected that even a limited U.S. system—let alone one big enough to negate Russia’s deterrent capability—will be ready for 10, 15, or maybe 20 years.2

Russia’s Strategic Future

Earlier Russian threats to withdraw from a broad array of international and bilateral arms control treaties have largely disappeared. Such actions would be clearly counter to Russia’s own interests. Russia will concentrate on specific measures and capabilities to preserve its assured retaliation capability, not on destroying international treaties simply to make a point about U.S. unilateralism.

Russia’s immediate focus will be the new offensive arms control talks and a potential agreement linking offensive and defensive systems. Numbers for the new agreement are not in dispute. Russia can accept the 2,200-warhead ceiling the United States has proposed, although Russia envisions reductions to 1,500 warheads. Russia prefers a treaty, although Putin might accept a formal executive agreement if that is as far as the United States will go, especially if it includes transparency measures in defensive systems.3

The most important problem is likely to be the meaning of “operationally deployed warheads” in a new treaty. As proposed by the Bush administration, the term would not apply to warheads removed from delivery vehicles that had been removed from launch platforms. Such a definition would mean that the United States would preserve the ability to reconstitute American strategic forces well beyond the 1,700-2,200 warheads being discussed if the new agreement does not mandate destruction of the delivery vehicles and launch platforms. The Russians well understand this, and they are very much opposed.4

If the United States insists on the treaty limiting only operationally deployed warheads and preserving delivery vehicles and launch platforms for a reconstitution capability, Russia will insist on maintaining the same option (if not same capability). This could mean that Russia might preserve warheads in excess of 1,500, as well as delivery vehicles and launch platforms. This would make little economic sense because Russia simply cannot afford to preserve the Cold War Soviet arsenal, even in storage, on a military budget (projected for 2002) of only $9 billion. However, arms control is political, so if the United States is granted the right to preserve a hedge force, any bilateral agreement will have to grant Russia the same rights. Russia may not exercise the right, but such a hedge force would provide Russia with additional options for countering a significant U.S. missile defense system, should such a system be successfully developed and deployed.

The resulting negative nonproliferation implications are clear: if Russia did exercise the right to preserve a hedge force, large numbers of warheads and delivery vehicles would have to be stored, maintained, and secured. A renewed threat reduction effort might be joined to the treaty to provide for safe and secure storage of nondeployed Russian warheads and delivery vehicles. However, having the U.S. taxpayer preserve Russia’s ability to reconstitute its nuclear forces (against the United States) might be a complicated political issue. Even if Washington were willing to pay, Moscow might be unwilling to allow U.S. involvement in creating and maintaining systems to secure a nuclear arsenal meant to be reconstituted against a reconstituted U.S. force. Without some system to secure non-operationally deployed Russian warheads, further arms reductions risk creating a greater proliferation danger.

START I may survive loss of the ABM Treaty with or without new agreements on reductions and defense transparency. Russia has some interest in the treaty as a way to limit U.S. nuclear forces to some degree and (more importantly) to keep the verification regime and attendant Russian claims on U.S. transparency. Russian sources claim that withdrawal remains a possible response if things go badly in the security relationship, especially given substantial discontent with the treaty in the Russian military.5 U.S. sources are skeptical that Russia would give up an international treaty that gives Russia a claim on how the United States shapes its nuclear forces. If a new offensive arms agreement succeeds in creating new limits and a verification regime, START I might not be needed. If the negotiations fail, START I becomes more valuable for the existing transparency and verification system, but also more difficult to preserve if Russia views the failure as due to American bad faith.

Even if START I remains in force, Russia is considering options to enhance its retaliatory capability in the event the United States does successfully test and deploy missile defenses. It is virtually certain that START II will never come into force. The Russian Duma ratified the treaty on the condition the ABM Treaty remain in force. Without START II, Russia can maintain existing MIRVed ICBMs permitted under START I, including SS-18s and SS-24s, considered important by Russian analysts to increase the invulnerability of Russia’s retaliatory capability against an enhanced counterforce capability that would accompany a missile defense shield. Whether Russia would in fact keep these missiles is questionable because they are aging beyond their service life and need to be retired regardless of arms control treaties, but preserving them is one way for Russia to keep its options open.

Russian officials talk most about the option to put up to three warheads on the new SS-27 (Topol-M). Designed in response to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative in the 1980s, the SS-27 incorporates features meant to make it more difficult for a missile defense system to track and destroy. Russia may resume production of 10 SS-27s per year—up from the six per year that production had fallen to in 2000 and 2001 due to budget constraints—although this level would remain well below the 30-40 SS-27s Russia had originally planned to deploy each year.6

In the weeks since the U.S. decision, however, President Putin and Defense Minister Ivanov have both stated that Russia has no immediate plans to MIRV its SS-27s. Although deploying multiple warheads per missile would be cheaper than maintaining more missiles, it would not be costless to deploy fully operational MIRV systems for the SS-27. Clearly, the Russian government plans to maintain the option of MIRVing SS-27s, as well as maintaining existing MIRVed ICBMs permitted by START I in the event the United States does successfully deploy missile defenses. Putin has also said that Russia’s decision on MIRVing will depend on the “quality” of the U.S.-Russia relationship. His criteria are most likely a new arms agreement, U.S. support for Russian WTO membership, and the NATO-Russia relationship.

Russia’s other option is to develop countermeasures, such as decoys and technology to maneuver warheads in flight.7 Countermeasures would be expensive, and a decision to develop them would depend on how threatened Russia believed its retaliatory capability to be by new U.S. defense systems. Russia can live with a U.S. capability to shoot down 20-30 incoming warheads. Beyond that, Russia would begin to explore countermeasure options. The problem of expense for such research and development could well be mitigated by Russian-Chinese cooperation in countermeasures development, which is one reason their joint opposition to U.S. missile defense played such an important role in the 2001 Russia-China Friendship and Cooperation Treaty.8

The Long Term

Putin’s popularity and effectiveness as president remain high. His public opinion support numbers are around 80 percent, and his legislation breezes through the Duma and Federation Council. He continues to move supporters and associates into key positions and has achieved greater control over Russia’s regional leaders. Putin’s decision to support the U.S. war on terrorism and accept the U.S. decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty have not been enthusiastically supported, but they have not caused visible opposition. As long as the Russian economy remains strong, Russian public support for Putin will hold.

The greater risk is that Putin will face opposition within defense, security, and foreign policy circles if he has nothing to show for pragmatic cooperation with the United States. Russian analysts warn that Putin risks being as alone, and vulnerable, as Mikhail Gorbachev was in 1991.9 Putin probably would not be toppled from office, but that does not mean that his problems in Russian defense and security circles would not affect U.S. interests. U.S.-Russian security cooperation, particularly for securing and disposing of Russia’s numerous weapons of mass destruction, requires active support from Russia’s defense interests, not just lack of active opposition.

For example, initiatives to support alternative employment for Russian scientists that used to work on weapons of mass destruction have been sometimes hindered when Russian security officials block access to facilities in which the scientists are working in new commercial enterprises because defense-related work also continues there. Security officials are also sensitive about Western access to information about Russia’s submarine force (nuclear-weapons capable boats as well as those simply powered by nuclear reactors), the dismantling and securing of which is a major U.S. nonproliferation concern. The sensitivity of the issue and influential role of the FSB in limiting transparency is evidenced in the conviction in December 2001 of Grigory Pasko, a journalist who revealed dumping of nuclear waste in the Pacific by the Russian navy, and in the prosecution of Igor Sutyagin, a researcher who relied upon unclassified information to write analyses of Russia’s navy under a Western contract.

In these and other cases, cooperation and transparency are sensitive because American intentions in dismantling Russia’s weapons of mass destruction are questioned. In many instances, concerns have been allayed and cooperation achieved, as evidenced in the impressive achievements of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and related projects for nonproliferation cooperation. But success requires willingness and goodwill on the part of Russian officials at all levels, not merely those at the top.10 As the counterterrorism campaign takes on the threat of weapons of mass destruction, the stakes in how the United States and Russia manage their post-ABM relationship will grow.


NOTES
1. For an excellent and succinct explanation of war-fighting, counterforce, and deterrence, see Bill Keller, “Missile Defense: the Untold Story,” The New York Times, December 29, 2001.
2. “Putin hits at US decision to pull out of ABM Treaty,” The Financial Times, December 14, 2001; “Russian Defense Minister Says Proposed U.S. Missile Defense May Never Happen,” Associated Press, December 18, 2001.
3. Discussion with Russian officials in Washington, December 2001; Fred Weir, “Russia Remains Skeptical of Paperless Disarmament,” The Christian Science Monitor, January 4, 2002.
4. For a Russian analysis of U.S. “downloading” and the implications of warheads that are not “operationally deployed,” see Pavel Podvig, “The End of Strategic Arms Control?” PONARS Policy Memo Series #217 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001).
5. Nikolai Sokov, “Void Left by the ABM Treaty in Danger of Widening,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 2, 2002.
6. For numbers, design characteristics, and capabilities of Russian nuclear forces, see Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
7. Mikhail Khodarenko, “Na povestke dnya-gonka vooruzheniy,” Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, December 21, 2001.
8. Nikolai Sokov, “What Is at Stake for the United States in the Sino-Russian Friendship Treaty?” PONARS Policy Memo Series #200 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001).
9. Aleksei Arbatov, “Dogovor po PRO i terrorizm,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, December 26, 2001.
10. Oleg Bukharin, Matthew Bunn, and Kenneth Luongo, “Renewing the Partnership: Recommendations for Accelerated Action to Secure Nuclear Material in the Former Soviet Union,” report of the Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, August 2000; “Russia ‘Nuclear Regionalism’ and U.S. Policy,” proceedings of a conference held by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies, March 19, 2000.


Celeste A. Wallander is director and senior fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

 

President George W. Bush announces that the United States will withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

U.S. Reinstates Funds for Russian Chemical Demilitarization

Seth Brugger

On December 28, President George W. Bush signed a major defense spending bill that reinstates U.S. funding for the design and construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility in Shchuch’ye, Russia.

The bill’s signing comes after Bush pledged to seek an “overall increase in funding” for the Shchuch’ye project during a December 11 speech in South Carolina. In a December 27 statement outlining the results of an administration threat reduction policy review, the president also said that he would seek to “accelerate” the program. (See Threat Reduction Boosted By Policy Review, Spending Bills.)

As a party to the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention, Moscow must destroy its declared 40,000-metric-ton chemical weapons stockpile. The Shchuch’ye chemical weapons destruction facility is one of three that Russia plans to construct and therefore plays a central role in Russia’s chemical demilitarization effort.

The Russian destruction program has been reliant on international support. However, for the past two fiscal years, the House of Representatives blocked new U.S. funding for Shchuch’ye, citing questions about Moscow’s ability to finance parts of the project that it is responsible for and concerns over the amount of financial support put forth by other countries, among other matters.

A number of factors came together to help win renewed U.S. funding this year. More funding has been promised or received from other countries, and Moscow has recently increased its financing of chemical demilitarization. Domestically, the Bush administration’s support for the project, efforts by Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) to work with his House counterparts, and leadership by Representatives Curt Weldon (R-PA) and John Spratt (D-SC) facilitated fresh project funding, according to a congressional source.

Appropriations for the Shchuch’ye facility are contained in the fiscal year 2002 defense authorization act, which permits Washington to spend up to $50 million on Russian chemical weapons destruction this fiscal year.

However, funding is conditioned upon Russia meeting six requirements. Moscow must provide a “full and accurate disclosure” of its chemical weapons stockpile, demonstrate an annual commitment to allocate at least $25 million to chemical weapons destruction, develop a “practical plan” for destroying its nerve agent stockpile, enact a law calling for the elimination of all its nerve agents at one site, and agree to destroy two particular chemical weapons destruction facilities. In addition, the international community must show a “demonstrated commitment” to fund and build the infrastructure needed to support and operate the Shchuch’ye facility. U.S. government officials say that meeting the first requirement could be difficult.

However, this December the General Accounting Office reached an agreement in principle with its Russian counterpart to conduct a joint audit of the Russian chemical weapons stockpile. In an interview, Comptroller General David Walker said that the two sides have yet to work out the deal’s details. Walker added that the audit is not specifically targeted at helping satisfy the funding conditions for Shchuch’ye but said, “It might be possible to structure the joint audit to help assure that one or more conditions have been met.”

Russian plans currently call for the Shchuch’ye facility to become operational by 2005. According to a Defense Department contractor, construction could begin as soon as the secretary of defense certifies that Russia has fulfilled the funding conditions. Certification is not likely before April, and the United States aims to finish construction in five years, missing the Russian target date for beginning operations, the contractor said.


U.S., Russia Complete START I Reductions

Philipp C. Bleek

The United States and Russia completed nuclear weapons reductions required by the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) on December 5, seven years after the accord entered into force.

Under the treaty, the two countries have reduced their strategic nuclear arsenals by more than 40 percent over the past decade, decommissioning more than 4,000 strategic warheads since exchanging baseline stockpile information in September 1990. Reductions were implemented under a comprehensive monitoring and verification regime that included periodic information exchanges and intrusive monitoring and inspection provisions.

The accord requires Washington and Moscow to deploy no more than 1,600 long-range missiles and strategic bombers and caps deployed strategic warheads at 6,000, using rules that slightly undercount the number of warheads actually deployed. In addition, the countries must meet sublimits on ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Signed by Presidents George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in July 1991, START I was the first treaty to substantially reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the United States and Soviet Union. The accord built on the first strategic arms pact between the two superpowers, an interim agreement that emerged from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in the early 1970s and capped—but did not reduce—the countries’ arsenals.

Shortly before leaving office, Bush also signed a START II agreement with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in January 1993. That agreement would have reduced U.S. and Russian arsenals to 3,500 deployed strategic warheads by 2007, but it has not entered into force, largely due to disagreements over U.S. national missile defense efforts.

In 1997 the United States and Russia also agreed to a framework for START III negotiations, which would have reduced the two sides’ strategic arsenals to 2,500 warheads by 2007. Under the framework, the two parties also agreed to consider measures to destroy their downloaded warheads and to increase the transparency of their strategic nuclear warhead inventories.

START I does not require the destruction of nuclear warheads removed from delivery vehicles; the United States and Russia have stockpiled substantial numbers of warheads as a result. Washington’s strategic and tactical warhead “hedge” is currently estimated at more than 5,000 warheads, while Moscow is estimated to have stockpiled more than 13,000 warheads.

The accord also does not cover nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The United States currently deploys an estimated 200-400 nuclear gravity bombs in Europe and stores, in operational condition, more than 1,000 additional tactical nuclear weapons. Experts estimate that Russia deploys about 3,500 tactical nuclear weapons.

The other three START I parties—Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—all met their treaty obligations well in advance of the implementation deadline. These three states inherited nuclear weapons when the Soviet Union dissolved, only five months after START I had been signed. Under a May 1992 agreement, these states agreed to become parties to START I and to transfer all their nuclear warheads to Russia, a process completed by 1996. However, the three states retained most of the warheads’ strategic delivery vehicles—including both bombers and ICBMs—which the United States has helped them to destroy.

START I will remain in effect until December 5, 2009, during which time the treaty parties can request challenge inspections of suspect activity. The treaty parties also have the option to extend the accord for successive five-year periods if the treaty has not been superceded by another arms reduction agreement.


Security Council Moves Closer To Adopting Iraqi 'Smart Sanctions'

Alex Wagner

The UN Security Council took a step closer to implementing a “smart sanctions” regime in Iraq on November 29 by unanimously agreeing to adopt a once-contentious Goods Review List, which aims to streamline the process of selling civilian goods to Baghdad.

Approved as part of a resolution that renewed the UN oil-for-food program for the eleventh time since 1996, the list contains weapons-related and dual-use items that would require UN approval before being exported to Iraq. The new resolution states that the Security Council intends to adopt the Goods Review List—“subject to any refinements”—for implementation on May 30, when the current phase of the oil-for-food program expires. The list can only be modified with the Security Council’s approval.

Iraqi Ambassador to the UN Mohammed Aldouri signed a memorandum of understanding December 2, accepting the resolution.

Once the list is adopted, Baghdad will be allowed to import—without UN oversight—any civilian, nonweapons, or dual-use items not specifically enumerated on the list. Contracts containing items on the list would need the UN Iraq Sanctions Committee’s approval before export. Proceeds from Iraqi oil sales held in a UN-controlled escrow account would pay for the items.

Under the current regime, all of Baghdad’s nonhumanitarian purchases are subject to UN review. But the arrangement allows Iraq to sell unlimited amounts of oil on the international market, with the proceeds placed in a UN account. The only legal way for Iraq to sell oil is through the oil-for-food program.

By facilitating the flow of civilian goods to Iraq, the “smart sanctions” proposals envisioned by the Bush administration aim to undermine arguments that sanctions are hurting the Iraqi people. It also seeks to tighten the existing sanctions regime to prevent Iraq from using smuggled oil revenues to develop weapons systems.

The planned adoption of the Goods Review List addresses the first point. However, the resolution does not take up the issues of strengthening border controls or cracking down on Iraq’s illegal oil-smuggling relationships with Jordan, Turkey, and Syria. The UN currently tolerates Baghdad’s oil sales to these states, which are conducted outside of the oil-for-food program, because of their importance to these nations’ economies. Iraq can use the revenues from these unaccountable oil sales for weapons purchases because these transactions lack the UN oversight.

A number of proposals for bringing these relationships under UN auspices were included in a draft June resolution put forth by the United Kingdom and backed by the United States, but they were subsequently scuttled by Russian opposition. (See ACT, July/August 2001.) Implementation of such proposals, however, would be difficult because they require Iraq’s neighbors to abandon extremely profitable transactions voluntarily.

Despite the absence of a means to stem Iraqi oil smuggling, U.S. officials appeared satisfied with the resolution. Ambassador John Negroponte, the U.S. permanent representative to the UN, remarked on November 29 that the unanimity with which the Security Council made the decision “should send a signal to Iraq” that the United States is committed to revamping the current sanctions regime. At a December 3 press briefing, Secretary of State Colin Powell said he too was “pleased” with the outcome.

Washington’s key Security Council ally, the United Kingdom, expressed a similar sentiment. On November 30, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw called the Security Council vote “a significant step forward” that demonstrates that the “international community is united over how to apply controls to the Baghdad regime.” Straw went on to say that Iraq is now “free to meet all its civilian needs” while leaving Saddam Hussein “with no excuses for the suffering of the Iraqi people.”

The review list had been the primary sticking point during the Security Council’s consideration of the U.S.-U.K. “smart sanctions” proposal in May and June. At the time, France and China approved the list. But Russia, contesting certain items on the list, refused to endorse the measure and issued a veto threat, forcing Washington and London to postpone the debate to November.

A UN official suggested that, because the revised review list is largely similar to the one proposed in June, Russia’s veto threat had stemmed more from a desire to maintain and possibly expand commercial relations with Iraq than disagreement with the list itself. The official characterized Russia’s turnaround as a “major concession,” noting that the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States had brought Washington and Moscow closer together and focused new attention on the urgency of dealing with Iraq’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.

While not discounting the value of improved U.S.-Russian relations since September 11, a U.S. official emphasized that stronger French and Chinese support for the list had isolated Russia on the issue. The official explained that France and China officially supported the list in June 2001 because they knew that they could hide behind a Russian veto. Since then, however, negotiations with Washington and London persuaded Paris and Beijing to come out in full support for the arrangement.

The U.S. official was “optimistic” that the Security Council would finalize the list by June, although elements of the list are “likely to change.” The official also said that strong Security Council support could allow Russia to pressure Iraq to allow UN weapons inspectors to return to the country.


Special Section: The U.S. Decision to Withdraw From the ABM Treaty

President George W. Bush announced on December 13 that the United States would unilaterally withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has opposed scrapping the treaty, which he said Russia would have been willing to amend to accommodate U.S. missile defense testing. Moscow has warned it may pull out of other arms control agreements in response to the U.S. withdrawal. Congressional leaders and key U.S. allies have also questioned the wisdom of abandoning the treaty and the value of rushing ahead with unproven national missile defenses.

This special section contains three commentariesRussia’s Strategic Priorities by Celeste A. Wallander, Can China’s Tolerance Last? by Bates Gill, and Withdrawal Is Premature by Charles Peña and Ivan Elandexamining the rationale for the U.S. withdrawal and the Russian and Chinese reactions to the decision. The section also includes a transcript of an Arms Control Association press conference on the U.S. withdrawal as well as the text of President Bush’s announcement and the U.S. diplomatic notes on the matter to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. See Bush Announces U.S. Intent to Withdraw From ABM Treaty for news coverage.


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IAEA Physical Protection Meeting Stalls

Alex Wagner

Despite heightened concern since September 11 over the possibility of a terrorist attack on any of the world’s nuclear installations, a four-day International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meeting in Vienna to expand an international treaty on protecting nuclear material adjourned without agreement December 7.

The 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material obligates its 69 member states to implement specific measures to protect civilian nuclear material during international transport. With U.S. support, the IAEA has been seeking since 1997 to draft an amendment to the convention that would extend the treaty’s reach to domestic nuclear protection.

In May, an IAEA group of experts tackled the issue, determining that the agency should draft an amendment that would expand the convention’s scope by requiring member states to pass legislation implementing IAEA guidelines on a range of issues, including how nuclear materials are used, stored, and transported and how nuclear materials and facilities can be protected from sabotage. The group recommended the amendment should also address the confidentiality of information on how facilities are protected and member states’ responsibilities for implementation.

Attended by 43 delegations and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), the December meeting sought to draft the amendment, taking into account the expert group’s recommendations. According to the IAEA, the conference “achieved a complete and detailed review of the scope of the potential amendments.” However, it was unable to conclude a draft amendment. Although a start has been made, there remain “many issues still to be resolved,” IAEA spokesman David Kyd said.

It appears that some EURATOM states—including Belgium and, to a lesser degree, France and the United Kingdom—are reluctant to amend the convention, according to an expert familiar with the negotiations. George Bunn, a former U.S. negotiator of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, suggested that this resistance stems from EURATOM’s historically antagonistic relationship with the IAEA and concern that states would be required to implement unnecessarily stringent safety and security measures at a heavy financial price. However, Bunn believes that EURATOM will “likely come on board, eventually.”

Bunn also noted that, in the past, Russia and China have not been enthusiastic about amending the convention but were willing to hide behind EURATOM’s opposition.

But a European official disagreed that particular EURATOM states were blocking the process. “France, Belgium, and the U.K. actively and constructively participated” in the December meeting and even elected a French chairperson, the official said, adding, “Belgium tabled a specific text for the amended convention, while the U.K. delegation made it very clear that it is also in favor of a revision.”

Kyd emphasized that IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei is “eager” for the delegates to complete the amendment’s drafting so that a formal conference to amend the convention could be convened this summer. However, Kyd cautioned “whether this timetable can be met is unclear.”

Approval by a majority of the convention’s states-parties is required to convene the conference. Adoption of an amendment requires approval by two-thirds of states-parties present. Once approved, the amendment would enter into force for each county upon its ratification. The delegates agreed to reconvene March 11-15.


U.S. Withdrawal From the ABM Treaty: President Bush’s Remarks and U.S. Diplomatic Notes

On December 13, President George W. Bush announced that the United States would withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in six months. Although the United States and the Soviet Union agreed in 1972 that the treaty should be of “unlimited duration,” the treaty included a provision for either party to withdraw if “extraordinary events” jeopardized their “supreme interests” and required six months’ notice of an intent to withdraw, including a statement of the “extraordinary events.” The day of Bush’s announcement, the United States sent the required notice to Russia, as well as to Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The text of Bush’s statement and the notice are reprinted below.

President Bush’s Remarks, December 13, 2001

Good morning. I’ve just concluded a meeting of my National Security Council. We reviewed what I discussed with my friend, President Vladimir Putin, over the course of many meetings, many months. And that is the need for America to move beyond the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty.

Today, I have given formal notice to Russia, in accordance with the treaty, that the United States of America is withdrawing from this almost 30-year-old treaty. I have concluded the ABM Treaty hinders our government’s ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue-state missile attacks.

The 1972 ABM Treaty was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union at a much different time, in a vastly different world. One of the signatories, the Soviet Union, no longer exists. And neither does the hostility that once led both our countries to keep thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert, pointed at each other. The grim theory was that neither side would launch a nuclear attack because it knew the other would respond, thereby destroying both.

Today, as the events of September the 11th made all too clear, the greatest threats to both our countries come not from each other, or other big powers in the world, but from terrorists who strike without warning, or rogue states who seek weapons of mass destruction.

We know that the terrorists, and some of those who support them, seek the ability to deliver death and destruction to our doorstep via missile. And we must have the freedom and the flexibility to develop effective defenses against those attacks. Defending the American people is my highest priority as Commander in Chief, and I cannot and will not allow the United States to remain in a treaty that prevents us from developing effective defenses.

At the same time, the United States and Russia have developed a new, much more hopeful and constructive relationship. We are moving to replace mutually assured destruction with mutual cooperation. Beginning in Ljubljana, and continuing in meetings in Genoa, Shanghai, Washington and Crawford, President Putin and I developed common ground for a new strategic relationship. Russia is in the midst of a transition to free markets and democracy. We are committed to forging strong economic ties between Russia and the United States, and new bonds between Russia and our partners in NATO. NATO has made clear its desire to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action at 20.

I look forward to visiting Moscow, to continue our discussions, as we seek a formal way to express a new strategic relationship that will last long beyond our individual administrations, providing a foundation for peace for the years to come.

We’re already working closely together as the world rallies in the war against terrorism. I appreciate so much President Putin’s important advice and cooperation as we fight to dismantle the al Qaeda network in Afghanistan. I appreciate his commitment to reduce Russia’s offensive nuclear weapons. I reiterate our pledge to reduce our own nuclear arsenal [to] between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons. President Putin and I have also agreed that my decision to withdraw from the treaty will not, in any way, undermine our new relationship or Russian security.

As President Putin said in Crawford, we are on the path to a fundamentally different relationship. The Cold War is long gone. Today we leave behind one of its last vestiges.

But this is not a day for looking back. This is a day for looking forward with hope, and anticipation of greater prosperity and peace for Russians, for Americans and for the entire world. Thank you.

Source: The White House


Text of Diplomatic Notes to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, December 13, 2001

The Embassy of the United States of America has the honor to refer to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems signed at Moscow May 26, 1972.

Article XV, paragraph 2, gives each Party the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.
The United States recognizes that the Treaty was entered into with the USSR, which ceased to exist in 1991. Since then, we have entered into a new strategic relationship with Russia that is cooperative rather than adversarial, and are building strong relationships with most states of the former USSR.

Since the Treaty entered into force in 1972, a number of state and non-state entities have acquired or are actively seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. It is clear, and has recently been demonstrated, that some of these entities are prepared to employ these weapons against the United States. Moreover, a number of states are developing ballistic missiles, including long-range ballistic missiles, as a means of delivering weapons of mass destruction. These events pose a direct threat to the territory and security of the United States and jeopardize its supreme interests. As a result, the United States has concluded that it must develop, test, and deploy anti-ballistic missile systems for the defense of its national territory, of its forces outside the United States, and of its friends and allies.

Pursuant to Article XV, paragraph 2, the United States has decided that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Therefore, in the exercise of the right to withdraw from the Treaty provided in Article XV, paragraph 2, the United States hereby gives notice of its withdrawal from the Treaty. In accordance with the terms of the Treaty, withdrawal will be effective six months from the date of this notice.

Source: Department of State

Bush Announces U.S. Intent to Withdraw From ABM Treaty

Wade Boese

Claiming that the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty prevents the United States from protecting itself against terrorist and rogue-state missile attacks, President George W. Bush announced December 13 that the United States would withdraw from the treaty in six months. Russian President Vladimir Putin, the leader of the only other state-party to the treaty, seemed resigned to the action, calling it “mistaken” but also declaring it did not threaten Russia or imperil future U.S.-Russian relations.

Flanked by his top security advisers at the White House Rose Garden, Bush repeated his administration’s nearly year-long contention that the ABM Treaty, which prohibits Washington and Moscow from building nationwide defenses against strategic ballistic missiles, is outdated because today’s threats differ drastically from when the two superpowers signed the accord in 1972. At that time, the United States and the Soviet Union posed the greatest threat to each other‘s security, but Bush argued that is no longer the case, saying terrorism and rogue states now pose the most danger.

Although agreeing in 1972 that the ABM Treaty should be of “unlimited duration,” Moscow and Washington included a provision for either party to withdraw if “extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.” In such a case, the treaty requires six months’ notice of that state-party’s intention to withdraw, including a statement of the “extraordinary events.”

The United States sent the required note to Russia, as well as to Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, the day of Bush’s announcement. The note declared that some countries and nonstate entities “are actively seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction” and long-range ballistic missiles and that “it is clear, and has recently been demonstrated, that some of these entities are prepared to employ these weapons against the United States.” (See full text of the note.)

To protect against an attack “without warning,” Bush declared in his statement that the United States needed the “freedom and flexibility” to build missile defenses. “I cannot and will not allow the United States to remain in a treaty that prevents us from developing effective defenses,” the president said. Unless Bush reverses his decision, the treaty will no longer be binding on the United States on June 13.

Bush, who reportedly called Putin on December 7 to inform him of an imminent withdrawal announcement, asserted that the U.S. decision to pull out of the treaty should not impair forging closer ties with Russia. In addition to citing continuing cooperation in the war on terrorism and a November 13 U.S. pledge to reduce its deployed strategic nuclear stockpile to no more than 2,200 warheads, Bush said that he and Putin agreed U.S. withdrawal would not “in any way undermine our new relationship or Russian security.”

Speaking the day of the announcement, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested that, with the treaty essentially out of the way, development of a new U.S.-Russian relationship is more likely because the announcement removed “a sticking point that’s just been sitting there for this period of time.” Rumsfeld has been the administration’s most outspoken opponent of the treaty.

Secretary of State Colin Powell, who is thought to have been the least supportive among top Bush officials of a unilateral U.S. treaty withdrawal, dismissed fears of possible arms races with either Russia or China. On December 13, he explained that U.S. defenses are not directed at Moscow or Beijing but at “irresponsible” rogue states. He also said that the United States and Russia would hold negotiations to put the new strategic framework, including the proposed strategic reductions, into “some legal form.”

Reactions From Abroad and Home

Putin assured the Russian public in a national television address the day of Bush’s announcement that the U.S. withdrawal would not threaten Russia because it has “long possessed an effective system to overcome anti-missile defense[s].” The Russian president, who also questioned in a Financial Times interview the same day whether it is even possible for the United States to deploy a system successfully, said he disagreed with the U.S. action and had rebuffed “insistent [U.S.] proposals” for the two countries to withdraw from the treaty jointly.

In the interview, Putin said Russia had been ready to modify the treaty but that the United States limited discussions to ways “to jointly leave this treaty.” Although Rumsfeld said that the United States made a “number of proposals,” he admitted December 13 that “the better part of the year” had been spent trying to find a “mutual basis on which we could withdraw together.”

Earlier in 2001, Putin and other top Russian officials warned that a unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty could lead to the demise of more than 30 other security and disarmament agreements, but Russia has not yet made withdrawal announcements from any other treaties.

Putin, however, implied in his Financial Times interview that Russia would consider START II, which has not yet entered into force and calls for a ban on land-based missiles with multiple warheads, as effectively dead when the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty is completed. He also said Russia “will acquire [the] right” to “multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles” when the ABM Treaty and “all the associated restrictions have been abolished.” But Putin said that Russia might not take advantage of that right.

Putin further described the U.S. rationale for withdrawing from the treaty as “unconvincing.” Neither terrorists nor rogue states “have or are likely to ever have” strategic ballistic missiles, Putin told The Financial Times.

The Russian president also said the U.S. move would not by itself torpedo Russian relations with the United States or the West in general, highlighting the importance of building a better NATO-Russian relationship. Less than a week before, on December 7, the 19-member alliance and Russia committed themselves to create a new council at NATO that would permit the two sides to “identify and pursue opportunities for joint action at 20.” Negotiations on setting up the new council will take place over the coming months.

Kremlin officials said they are concerned that the U.S. treaty withdrawal will set a precedent for other countries. Appearing with Rumsfeld in Brussels on December 17, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov questioned whether other countries would abide by any international agreement, “thinking, logically, that if one country does not abide, why should we?”

Second only to Russia in publicly voicing objections to U.S. missile defenses over the past years, China said little after the Bush announcement. Powell spoke with the Chinese ambassador to the United States the day before Bush’s announcement to explain the president’s action, and Washington has been giving Chinese officials in Beijing briefings about U.S. missile defense plans to calm their concerns that the defense is directed against China.

In response to the withdrawal, a Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson merely commented that China’s position on missile defenses “has always been consistent and clear” and that Beijing hopes Washington “will seriously consider the opinions of the majority of nations on the ABM Treaty.” The Chinese spokesperson appeared to be making reference to a resolution supporting preservation of the ABM Treaty, which the UN General Assembly passed November 29 by a vote of 82 to 5 with 62 abstentions.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed “regret” about the U.S. decision, worrying it could provoke an arms race and undercut other arms control efforts. He called upon all countries to explore “binding and irreversible initiatives” to forestall the possibility of new arms races.

Like Annan, France counseled for “binding international rules and instruments” to help guarantee strategic stability, but did not condemn the U.S. act. Other U.S. allies also said almost nothing critical publicly.

Briefing reporters December 18 after a meeting of NATO’s 19 defense ministers, a senior Pentagon official said no concern or opposition was voiced about the announced U.S. withdrawal. But one European diplomatic source in Washington said the low-key allied reaction reflected “resignation in the face of facts created by the [United States] rather than support on substance.”

Some of the strongest criticism of Bush’s announcement came from two senior Senate Democrats, who argued that the treaty did not constrain any necessary missile defense testing at this time and that pressing ahead with missile defense plans could spur future arms races, particularly in Asia. Both Senators Carl Levin (D-MI) and Joseph Biden (D-DE) argued in December 13 statements that pursuing missile defenses could come at the expense of addressing more likely threats and pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe a long-range missile attack against the United States is the “least likely” threat to U.S. security.

A day before, when certainty existed that the president was going to make his announcement shortly, Biden told reporters he did not feel that the threats the Bush administration often cited met the criterion, outlined in the treaty, that a state-party’s supreme interests must be jeopardized to justify a withdrawal. Biden admitted that it would be a “nice legal argument” to debate but said that he was not sure it would have “any practical political consequence of being able to stop the president.”


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