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Bloomberg News
August 27, 2018
June/July 1997
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Sunday, June 1, 1997

CFE Parties Agree on 'Basic Elements' For Negotiating Adaptation Accord


Wade Boese

ON JULY 23, THE 30 states-parties to the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty agreed on a document outlining the "basic elements" for adapting the accord to the post-Cold War environment, with the goal of achieving a "significant lowering" in the total amount of conventional weaponry allowed under the treaty. Some key issues and details remain unresolved, but the framework is now in place for negotiations that are scheduled to begin in September in the Vienna-based Joint Consultative Group, the treaty's implementing body.

The original CFE Treaty imposes equal numerical limits on NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries (later joined by seven former Soviet republics) in five categories of heavy weapons—battle tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), large-caliber artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters—deployed and stored between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains. CFE parties have agreed to replace the bloc-to-bloc structure with a system of national and territorial ceilings. The concentric zones established by the treaty, which place sub-limits on the amount of ground-based treaty-limited equipment (TLE) in the center of Europe, will be eliminated and replaced by territorial limits, (comprising the sum of national and foreign stationed forces) for each state.

Prior to the opening of the adaptation negotiations, each CFE party will, "in the spirit of restraint," declare a national ceiling for TLE that may equal but not exceed its current entitlements. NATO has already pledged to significantly reduce the level of the aggregate limits on its 16 members. Russia has said it will consider reducing its entitlements to its current holdings—a level approximately 3,000 items less than its entitlements. Because many states are below their entitlements (NATO, for example, currently holds about 20,000 items less than what is permitted by the treaty), moderately lowering the ceilings may not result in actual weapons reductions, but it will diminish the potential for future buildups.

Among the outstanding issues facing negotiators is how to deal with TLE that is currently stored. The original treaty restricts the amount of ground-based TLE that can be deployed with active units and requires the excess TLE to be placed in Designated Permanent Storage Sites. Russia has argued for the elimination of the storage requirement, reflecting the fact that Russia, whose TLE holdings are higher than the allowed active deployment levels, has much more TLE in storage than NATO. Russia proposes transferring all stored equipment to active units and insists the parties committed to this action in the "Final Document" of the May 1996 CFE Treaty Review Conference. NATO has proposed two options: maintain the stored and active categories for ground-based TLE, or eliminate storage allotments by destroying at least 80 percent of stored TLE and moving the remainder to active units.

The adaptation talks will also address the issue of exceptions to the territorial limits. CFE parties have agreed to work on drafting provisions allowing states to temporarily exceed territorial limits (with the express consent of the host) in the case of temporary deployments, notified military exercises and "missions in support of peace," mandated by the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. However, the "definition, modalities, transparency, and verification" for such exceptions must still be negotiated.

In a statement attached to the "basic elements" document, NATO insisted that the territorial ceilings should only apply to ground-based TLE. Though Russia has consistently sought to apply these limits to attack helicopters and combat aircraft, a U.S. official said territorial limits on air power are unlikely because of the precedent set by the existing CFE Treaty, which does not limit air power in the sub-zones.


Regional Restraints

The CFE parties have also agreed to explore the possible development of regional restraints on ground-based TLE. NATO earlier had proposed setting the new territorial ceilings of Belarus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia's Kaliningrad military district, Slovakia, and Ukrainian territory (outside of the "flank" zone) at levels equal to current entitlements. This would require their future national limits to fall below entitlements to accommodate any nonnational forces that might be stationed on their territories. Though the proposal was intended to assuage Russian concerns regarding NATO expansion, Moscow has resisted placing any limitations on Kaliningrad. The parties will discuss this issue and other possible sub-ceilings in the adaptation talks.

Despite their decision to eliminate the treaty's zonal configuration, CFE parties have agreed to retain the "substance" of Article V (as modified by the recent "Flank-Document"), which established specific limitations on ground-based TLE in the northern and southern flanks of Europe. NATO interprets "substance" as the "numerical limitations, geographic scope, scheduled dates, and transparency measures" prescribed in the Flank Document. Russia has said the flank issue will require further work.

Verification and provisions for reallocating or revising national and territorial limits under the adapted treaty were also deferred. Information exchanges, inspection quotas and the transferring of equipment between parties, which are currently based on a bloc structure, must now be adapted to reflect the interests of 30 parties.

Negotiators hope to complete an adaptation agreement by April 1999, when the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are expected to formally join NATO.

Clinton Set to Submit CTBT to Senate; Japan Ratifies


Craig Cerniello

ON JULY 8, JAPAN became the first country to formally ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty among the 44 states whose ratification is necessary before it can enter into force. Two days later, Britain became the first of the five declared nuclear-weapon states—all of which signed the treaty when it opened for signature on September 24, 1996—to begin the ratification process. The Clinton administration has not yet submitted the treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

Japan deposited its instrument of ratification with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the depositary of the treaty. As of mid-July, 144 states had signed the treaty and three others had ratified (Fiji, Qatar and Uzbekistan). The CTB Treaty cannot enter into force until it has been signed and ratified by the five declared nuclear-weapon states, the three "threshold" states (India, Israel and Pakistan) and 36 other states that are participating members of the UN Conference on Disarmament and recognized by the International Atomic Energy Agency as possessing nuclear power and/or research reactors. All 44 key states have signed the treaty with the exception of India, North Korea and Pakistan. India has repeatedly said it will not sign the treaty in its present form; Pakistan maintains that it will not sign unless India does.

In an effort to break this logjam, Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda, during his July 21-23 visit to Islamabad, urged Pakistan to unilaterally sign the CTB Treaty. Not surprisingly, Pakistani President Farooq Leghari told Ikeda that "it is not possible for Pakistan to make unilateral commitments without simultaneous pledges by India to respect regional and international obligations." The Japanese foreign minister also was unable to convince India to sign the treaty during his July 23-25 visit to New Delhi.

On July 10, the British government introduced legislation for CTB ratification in the House of Lords, which may consider any amendments or conditions to the legislation and then decide whether to approve it by a simple majority vote. If approved by the House of Lords, the House of Commons must also approve the treaty before legislation is submitted to the queen for final approval. Some observers expect Britain to complete the ratification process by the end of 1997.

Action by the United States may not be far behind. Senior Clinton administration officials have indicated that the treaty will be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent in the near future, probably in early September when Congress returns from its August recess. Although achieving Senate approval of the CTB is likely to be difficult, the prospects for ratification improved on July 15 when Senator Pete Domenici (R-NM)—a key Republican voice in the nuclear test ban debate—said that he is "leaning strongly" in support of the treaty.

Leaving Behind the UNSCOM Legacy in Iraq

After more than six years as the executive chairman of the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), Ambassador Rolf Ekeus is stepping down to become Sweden's ambassador to the United States. As the United Nations' chief weapons inspector in Iraq, Ekeus has led the international effort to eliminate Baghdad's nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs and proscribed ballistic missile activities since UNSCOM was established by the UN Security Council in April 1991. Ekeus has also directed UNSCOM's program to implement a monitoring system to prevent Iraq from reacquiring any such capabilities in the future. As Ekeus was preparing to turn over the reins of UNSCOM to his successor, Ambassador Richard Butler of Australia, on July 1, Arms Control Today caught up with the Swedish diplomat to ask him about his tenure at UNSCOM and the agency's accomplishments.

During his distinguished diplomatic career, Ekeus has played a major role in a number of disarmament negotiations. Among his assignments, from 1978 to 1983 Ekeus was Sweden's permanent representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In 1984 and 1987, he chaired the UN Committee on Chemical Weapons, and in 1985 he chaired the Drafting Committee at the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty Review Conference. In 1996, Ekeus was a member of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. He is expected to take up his new post in Washington on September 12. The following is an edited version of his comments.

Arms Control Today: In assessing UNSCOM's activities over the past six years, how completely do you believe it has now fulfilled its mandate? How confident are you that Iraq's nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and prohibited ballistic missile programs are not continuing clandestinely?

Rolf Ekeus: The UNSCOM mandate has two major components: the identification and elimination of proscribed weapons and the means for their delivery; and, designing and implementing a system for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq to prevent it from acquiring the prohibited items again.

The latter part of the mandate has been fulfilled as UNSCOM now has in place a fully functioning regime of monitoring supported by a mechanism for export-import control. The monitoring regime was developed by UNSCOM during the summer and early fall of 1991 and approved by the UN Security Council through Resolution S/715 (1991). After years of tense and bitter resistance from Iraq, the regime was declared fully operational in late 1994. Today, more than 100 personnel are working from inside the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Center (BMVC). The core element—around 20 scientists and specialists in nuclear physics, chemistry, biology and missile technology—carry out daily no-notice inspections of relevant facilities. They are supported by the use of cutting-edge technology, such as sensors, detectors and field laboratories, as well as some 150 cameras that monitor major dual-use equipment (for example, machines, production lines and missile test stands) beaming real-time imagery to the operations center at the BMVC. A key component of the monitoring system is the aerial surveillance of Iraq provided by U.S. U2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft and by UNSCOM's own helicopters, five of which are stationed in Baghdad. The helicopters are also used for the transport of inspection teams and for direct operational support of inspections.

The export-import mechanism, adopted by the UN Security Council in the spring of 1996 under Resolution S/1051 (1996), obligates all UN member-states to notify UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of all exports to Iraq of dual-use items listed under the monitoring regime established by S/715.

The accomplishment of the first part of UNSCOM's mandate was complicated because of systematic efforts by Iraqi authorities to prevent UNSCOM from discovering the full extent of the country's weapons capabilities. Examples of these efforts include the secrecy surrounding and Iraq's denial of an offensive biological weapons program; of Program 1728, for producing missiles based on Scud technology; and, of research, development and production of the nerve agent VX. The identification of these ultra-secret programs has been one of the major successes achieved by our scientists and experts, and constitutes a vindication of our methods for inspection and analysis. These results have to be counted on top of the massive destruction of both declared and detected chemical warfare agents (sarin and mustard gas); production equipment and thousands of chemical munitions; most of the Scud missiles supplied by the Soviet Union during the 1980s; missile production equipment and facilities; and components of the ambitious nuclear weapons program.

ACT: What remains to be carried out to assure the complete elimination of these weapons programs? What critical equipment and material do you believe may remain hidden in Iraq?

Ekeus: If the Iraqi leadership had decided once and for all to forgo the option of acquiring weapons of mass destruction, the task of eliminating the remnants of proscribed weapons programs would have been a straight-forward and technical one, which could have been accomplished within a time-span of some six months. A continuation of a policy of hiding and misleading will obviously delay for a long time attaining a full accounting of its programs.

However, the successes over the last few years, in spite of Iraq's obstruction, demonstrate that UNSCOM's investigation methods are effective and that, in turn, gives hope that in due time we shall see the end of the proscribed programs. It appears from documentation and other information that the Iraqi leadership has been trying to retain strategic capabilities relative to all the proscribed weapons categories. This means that the government is striving to retain quantities of high-quality biological warfare agents, some chemical warfare agents like VX, as well as munitions and production capabilities. Furthermore, the Iraqi government is trying to preserve as many components as possible of the disclosed 1728 program and similar activities for the future production of longer-range missiles.

ACT: Given what is known about Iraq's nuclear weapons program, in your opinion, how close was Baghdad to building such a weapon? Is this estimate based on the diversion of safeguarded nuclear material or Iraq's indigenous production of fissile material?

Ekeus: The so-called crash-program initiated by Iraq in August 1990 was aimed at building a complete weapon, not only an explosive nuclear device. The nuclear warhead had to be designed to be small enough in dimension and weight to fit on a missile that would be capable of delivering the weapon to its target at a range of over 600 kilometers. This was a tall order and we know now that the two leading missile project managers were at loggerheads whether this was achievable within the narrow time frame of the program.

The nuclear fuel for the one warhead would, according to the crash program, be made up of the safeguarded fissile material existing in Iraq at the time. The present assessment is that by late 1990, Iraq had a good grasp both of warhead design and of what was needed for the successful enrichment of uranium through centrifuge technology. In 1990, the momentum of Iraq's nuclear weapons program was strong in spite of international export controls of enrichment technology. It can therefore be estimated that Iraq would have had a capability to acquire a couple of usable nuclear weapons well before 1995, had the Security Council not intervened with Resolution 687. The present nuclear threat from Iraq is, in my judgment, linked to the possible import by Baghdad of highly enriched uranium (HEU). You may recall that in late 1993 and early 1994, Iraq's remaining source of HEU—irradiated reactor fuel—was shipped to Russia. The lack of HEU, together with the effective brake that has been applied to the country's missile programs, constitute the real bottleneck for Iraq for the acquisition of a nuclear weapon.

ACT: While UNSCOM has made tremendous progress in eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and their means of production, the Iraqi government has retained the experience and know-how of its weapons designers and producers. How has UNSCOM responded to this remaining component of Iraq's weapons program? What, if anything, could be done to address weapons potential provided by this pool of trained personnel?

Key UN Security Council Resolutions

Resolution 687, April 3, 1991

This Gulf War cease-fire resolution formed UNSCOM, called for the elimination of Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological programs and missiles with ranges over 150 kilometers and authorized inspections to ensure compliance.

Resolution 715, October 11, 1991

Approved a plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's obligations not to acquire proscribed weapons in the future.

Resolution 986, April 14, 1995

Authorized states to import petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq as a measure to provide for humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people.

Resolution 1051, March 27, 1996

Approved the mechanism for monitoring relevant Iraqi imports and exports, pursuant to Resolution 715.

Resolution 1115, June 21, 1997

Demanded full cooperation with UNSCOM and postponed review of sanctions in response to June incidents of Iraqi noncooperation.


Ekeus: It is true that UNSCOM can do nothing about the intellectual insight and institutional memory Iraq has developed in the weapons area, but knowledge alone does not constitute a production line. Therefore, UNSCOM will use its detailed insight of Iraq's production and acquisition methods when applying measures to effectively block weapons developments. UNSCOM has a detailed database of dual-use equipment in Iraq. These items have been tagged by UNSCOM inspectors and are monitored continuously from the BMVC. We have a team of specialists who closely watch ongoing procurement efforts, including payment and transport routes, major suppliers and supplier countries. The export-import control mechanism is improving. UNSCOM is keeping track of those senior scientists and specialists who are known for their involvement in the development of the proscribed weapons programs. All these efforts support UNSCOM's objective of obtaining a complete and detailed understanding of all aspects of Iraq's proscribed weapons.

ACT: How would you assess the effectiveness so far of the export-import mechanism established under UN Security Council Resolution 1051? Are you satisfied with the information UNSCOM has received from UN member-states, which are obliged to report the transfer to Iraq of items that could be used to produce proscribed weapons programs? What improvements would you like to see made to this monitoring system?

Ekeus: The experiences so far are good. Because of the continuing UN sanctions, the mechanism has not been overwhelmed by data, and it has therefore been possible gradually to test different methods and adjust them accordingly, and to familiarize UNSCOM personnel with the potentials of the mechanism. Following the oil-for-food decision by the Security Council, the flow of goods to Iraq is increasing and the mechanism is showing its worth. So far, no major omission in Iraq's notification obligations has been observed. It is still too early to asses to what degree all UN member states will effectively cooperate with the mechanism. It looks promising but it is already clear that one major problem will be the matter of notification of trans-shipments through neighboring countries. Also, some adjustments to the lists of notifiable items will probably be necessary as a result of our early experiences, including the deletion of certain items, which with modifications, acquire the character of general-purpose items.

ACT: Was the extensive nature of Iraq's weapons programs simply a reflection of Saddam Hussein's determination to pursue such programs, or do you believe there are political and institutional factors present in Iraq that might induce a future government to seek similar capabilities?

Ekeus: The systematic pursuit of the proscribed weapons and the huge funds thrown into their development point to a singular mind and extraordinary insistence. The present leader of Iraq has demonstrated that he has ambitions for his country reaching far outside the borders of Iraq. These grand designs of extended influence presuppose access to weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery. Even if there appears to be a commonly held view in the country's military and political circles that Iraq, because of its geopolitical situation, needs a special military capability to balance the presumed extension of Iran's sphere of influence, it is highly doubtful that any alternative Iraqi leadership would continue to pursue a weapons of mass destruction program, considering that the consequences of such a policy would be sanctions, political isolation and loss of huge financial revenues from blocked oil exports.

ACT: You have described UNSCOM as a victim of its own success, in that some members of the Security Council have become complacent because they believe everything is under control in Iraq. Is there a danger that such complacency could lead to a weakening support for UNSCOM's mission? If so, what can be done to counter that trend?

Ekeus: Obviously, some immediate, national financial and political interests may inspire member-states of the UN Security Council to consider a loosening of the controls on Iraq before the weapons provisions of the cease-fire resolution have been implemented. In June, however, when the Security Council had to respond to Iraq's efforts to break out of the control mechanism, all members stood up to be counted in defense of the cease-fire arrangements. The adoption of Resolution S/1115 on June 21 demonstrated that all members, when tested, chose to put their responsibility under the UN Charter and the credibility of the Security Council above perceived national interests.

Admittedly, this splendid result was obtained after a show of strong leadership by the United States. Continued attention from the United States is necessary to maintain international support of UNSCOM. Given the devastating consequences for the world's energy security and for international economic and financial stability were the Gulf region to be brought into turmoil, it is not likely that the United States would lose interest. Awareness of UNSCOM's crucial role for peace and security in the region must be kept high.

ACT: To what degree has the financial and material support provided to UNSCOM affected its ability to fulfill its mission?

Ekeus: Since December 1996, the cash needs of UNSCOM have been covered by a small portion of the revenues generated by the oil-for-food arrangement laid down in Security Council Resolution S/986. UNSCOM does not receive any funds whatsoever from the UN budget; it is completely dependant upon voluntary contributions from UN member-states, based on the presumption that the costs for disarming Iraq should be paid for by funds from Iraq itself. During the more than six years of its existence, UNSCOM, which also has to pay for all the activities of IAEA personnel, has financed its operations through voluntary contributions. It has had to convince member-states to provide personnel, technology and cash on a voluntary basis. As chairman of UNSCOM, I have had to spend an inordinate amount of time on fundraising and recruitment of salaried personnel in order to finance the complex and diversified activities of UNSCOM and the IAEA. However, as long as Resolution S/986 is implemented, my successor will fortunately not be burdened by that task.

ACT: UNSCOM has faced some criticism for the degree of secrecy regarding its findings on the involvement of Western companies involved in Iraq's weapons programs. What has been UNSCOM's rationale for balancing the need to expose publicly those who helped Iraq build its weapons of mass destruction and the need to secure the cooperation of national governments and private businesses in understanding the nature and extent of those programs? Was this decision made by UNSCOM? Was it influenced by supplier states? How concerned are you that the withholding of this information might encourage these or similar companies to engage in trading with other potential Iraqs?

Ekeus: As soon as we understood that Iraq had no intention of cooperating with UNSCOM, we had to design a policy for information gathering from sources other than the Iraqi government. That meant that when we approached the governments of the countries from which suppliers to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs had operated, we had to build a lasting relationship. Some of these governments feared that legislative action by the U.S. Congress would punish those companies that were dependant upon exporting to the United States.

When our inspectors found machines, equipment and weapons components that had been imported by Iraq, it became necessary for UNSCOM to approach the relevant supplier companies to investigate the complete extent of their dealings with Iraq. Most of the companies were reluctant to talk to our investigators, and only insistent requests to respective governments for support could give us direct, or sometimes indirect, access to the company. For that reason, assurances of protection from public exposure had to be given in order to encourage the companies and their governments to accept our investigation of their dealings with Iraqi authorities.

Most of the more mature governments have been helpful to UNSCOM in its investigation of the supplier issue. Thus, UNSCOM has been working under circumstances somewhat like a journalist who has to protect his sources, otherwise they would quickly dry up. Over the years, I have had some quite vigorous discussions on this problem with leading members of the U.S. Congress as well as with representatives of the U.S. administration. My interlocutors never managed to convince me that our policy with regard to supplier data was wrong.

Having said that, I admit that our policy has little deterrent value for potential supplier companies contemplating exports of prohibited items to Iraq. However, my experience is that most Western governments have taken a number of important steps at the national level to punish suppliers for violations of existing rules and to effectively prevent the resumption of prohibited export activities.

ACT: The role of intelligence sharing has become one of the central concerns of international nonproliferation efforts. Are you satisfied with the extent to which national intelligence communities have supported the work of UNSCOM? Are there areas where there can be improvements?

Ekeus: One of our greatest sources of satisfaction has been the success of UNSCOM in obtaining high-quality intelligence data. The early formation within UNSCOM of an "Information Assessment Unit," with the capability to receive, protect, process, store and analyze sensitive data, was a unique feature for any UN organization. This capability of UNSCOM changed the character of the sharing of intelligence data with us from a mere trickle to a broad stream of data, supported by professional and multilayered cooperative efforts. The confidence in UNSCOM's competence in this area has grown quickly over the years so that now several governments allow the sharing of information on a large scale involving high-quality intelligence.

As a consequence, UNSCOM is now much better informed about most aspects of Iraq's activities related to its weapons of mass destruction programs than is any individual government. Critical to this success has been the operation, with the help of the United States, of the high-altitude U2 reconnaissance flights and UNSCOM's full access to imagery obtained from that operation. However, a severe bottleneck in the system remains UNSCOM's limited capability for photo interpretation.

Another key area for UNSCOM is the acquisition of supplier data, both past and ongoing. Although the intelligence sharing in this respect has become a major success, there is ample room for improvement. Governments should understand that the Information Assessment Unit, due to its overview of all aspects of Iraq's proscribed activities, is equipped to deal not only with fully developed intelligence but also partially developed intelligence.

ACT: As a result of the systematic analysis UNSCOM has undertaken of Iraq's so-called "concealment policy," what lessons have been learned that would benefit other non-proliferation efforts?

Ekeus: While searching for concealed prohibited items, UNSCOM is following the institutions and individuals involved in the concealment effort as much as it is following the items. Concealment is a highly sensitive activity and only the government's most trusted and elite organizations and individuals are involved. Furthermore, concealment requires methods and a structured mobility that result in certain patterns. For UNSCOM, it is important to identify and read these patterns; to do that UNSCOM has to make full use of all the technical and analytical resources at its disposal.

CT: Based on UNSCOM's experience in Iraq, what are the lessons learned that can be applied to the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention?

Ekeus: UNSCOM managed to break through the secrecy surrounding Iraq's offensive biological weapons program through a combination of inspections and analytical work. Thus, an examination of the pattern of Iraqi imports of equipment and material, as well as of the quantities imported, in light of the country's declarations with regard to its civilian, non-prohibited programs, showed large discrepancies. For example, the number of fermenters and the quantities of complex growth media imported by Iraq many times surpassed reasonable civilian requirements. In a similar fashion, close analysis of the quantities of dual-use chemical compounds and equipment imported by Iraq provided UNSCOM analysts with enough data to sound the alarm. These are only some examples of detection possibilities. It would require a separate essay to describe fully the lessons that have been learned.

ACT: In your opinion, given the realities on the ground in Iraq, how long do you see a need for UNSCOM's continued monitoring of Iraq's weapons potential?

Ekeus: Even if UNSCOM and the IAEA at a given moment in the future could report that all proscribed items had been identified and eliminated, the monitoring of Iraq's dual-use capabilities would be necessary for many years thereafter. A major reason for that is the know-how available in Iraq through all the personnel involved in weapons development and production. In this context it is interesting to recall Paragraph 14 of the cease-fire resolution, which provides that the arms control arrangements in relation to Iraq could be seen as steps toward the establishment in the region of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. This provision is a reflection of the so-called Mubarak plan.

ACT: Despite the remarkable precedent established by the Security Council with regard to the creation of UNSCOM and the goal of preventing Iraq from reacquiring its weapons programs, do you believe the Security Council is capable of sustaining the political will to support UNSCOM in what could prove to be its very long stay in Iraq? What role can the United States play in this process?

Ekeus: As mentioned earlier, the adoption of Resolution 1115 restated forcefully the Security Council's resolve to see the cease-fire arrangements fully implemented. The unanimity in support of this resolution, however, should not overshadow the fact that some permanent members of the Security Council consider themselves as having important national interests in bringing to an end the economic and political isolation of Iraq. At times I have had a concern that these interests could overtake the international principle of collective action in accordance with the UN Charter. The notable success of the adoption of Resolution S/1115 could not have been achieved without U.S. leadership and a strong personal commitment by President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright.

ACT: In retrospect, or perhaps as a road map for your successor, is there something you would have done differently during your tenure as head of UNSCOM that you believe might have changed the view from where you are sitting right now? Would a less diplomatic approach in dealing with Iraq have been supported by the Security Council?

Ekeus: Obviously, I underestimated from the beginning, both in quantity and quality, Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program and, even more, the degree of resistance with which our efforts would be met. I believe that we adjusted quickly to the unfriendly environment. It is my feeling that, in spite of some missteps, we, in light of what was politically possible, have found a reasonable and balanced approach in our work. It has been possible to keep the Security Council in its shifting political configurations united in loyally defending the cease-fire provisions, which must be considered a success.

In leading UNSCOM, it has been necessary sometimes for me to finesse certain crisis situations by developing political solutions to a problem. But in the final analysis, it is clear to me that only a firm and consistent response to the practically daily challenges from the Iraqi authorities can defend the integrity of this historic mission and lead to the ultimate goal of justice, peace and stability in the region.

NMD Sensor Test Successful

After two aborted test attempts in midJanuary and subsequent delays, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) on June 24 conducted the first flight test of an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle sensor for the Clinton administration's national missile defense (NMD) program. BMDO has characterized the test as successful based on the available data thus far.

According to BMDO, the test sought to assess the ability of the sensor, which was developed by Boeing North American, to track and identify objects in outer space—not to intercept a ballistic missile target. The test involved a modified Minuteman II ICBM carrying simulated targets and launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, and a payload launch vehicle (which contained the sensor) launched from Kwajalein Missile Range in the central Pacific Ocean.

Under its so-called "3-plus-3" program, the Clinton administration is developing the initial elements of an NMD system by 2000, at which time it will evaluate the long-range ballistic missile threat to the United States and have the option of deploying such a system by 2003 if necessary. If the threat does not warrant NMD deployment in 2000, the administration will continue the development of its NMD system while maintaining a rolling three-year deployment capability. The next NMD flight test, scheduled for January 1998, will evaluate a competing sensor built by Hughes Aircraft. Thereafter, two NMD intercept attempts are planned for 1998 followed by an integrated system test in 1999.

Chronology of U.S.-Soviet-CIS Nuclear Relations

The following is a continuation of a chronology of key developments in nuclear relations between the United States and the former Soviet Union that first appeared in the June 1994 issue of ACT


For more information contact ACA:
Telephone: (202) 463-8270; E-mail: [email protected]

August 11, 1995: President Clinton announced that the United States would support a "zero-yield" CTB treaty, which he said "would ban any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion immediately upon entry into force."

September 28, 1995: At a meeting of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC)—which oversees the implementation of START I—the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan signed a joint statement reaffirming that space launch vehicles using the first stages of ICBMs and SLBMs are treaty-accountable and subject to START I limitations.

October 23, 1995: During their summit meeting in Hyde Park, New York, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin affirmed their support for START II ratification, agreed to work together to achieve a zero-yield CTB treaty in 1996 and announced the continuation of cooperative efforts on nuclear security issues.

November 17, 1995: Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Mamedov agreed on a framework for establishing a "demarcation line" between permitted TMD and restricted ABM systems. Under the agreed framework, TMD systems with interceptor velocities of 3 kilometers per second or less will be considered treaty-compliant provided that they are not tested against ballistic missile targets with ranges greater than 3,500 kilometers or velocities above 5 kilometers per second.

December 12, 1995: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously approved the START II resolution of ratification, clearing the way for Senate floor action.

January 26, 1996: The Senate overwhelmingly approved the START II resolution of ratification by a vote of 87-4.

January 29-30, 1996: The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission met in Washington for its sixth session, during which Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary and Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov signed a joint statement extending nuclear material protection, control and accounting (MPC&A) controls to six Russian facilities where weapons-usable nuclear material is stored. O'Leary and Mikhailov also agreed to continue studying the feasibility of converting the reactor cores of Russia's three plutonium-producing reactors, which Moscow previously agreed to shut down by 2000.

April 1920, 1996: Leaders of the G7 industrialized countries and Russia met in Moscow for a summit on nuclear safety and security. Yeltsin reaffirmed Russia's commitment to a zero-yield CTB treaty initially announced at the Hyde Park summit in 1995. The eight leaders also agreed to a program to enhance cooperative efforts in preventing and combatting the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials; called for the strengthening of MPC&A efforts; and expressed their support for the safe and effective management of fissile material no longer required for military purposes.

April 21, 1996: In their bilateral summit meeting, which followed the nuclear safety and security summit in Moscow, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin reaffirmed their support for the START II ratification process and announced that they had made progress toward resolving the ABM-TMD demarcation dispute.

June 1, 1996: Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma announced that Ukraine had transferred the last of the former Soviet strategic nuclear warheads on its territory to Russia, thereby making it the second republic of the former Soviet Union to become completely nuclear-free. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Ukraine inherited roughly 1,900 strategic warheads and 2,500 tactical warheads—the equivalent of the world's third largest nuclear arsenal—although Kiev never had operational control over the weapons.

June 24, 1996: The Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) ended its second session of 1996, during which the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine reached a preliminary agreement to permit the deployment of TMD systems with interceptor speeds of 3 kilometers per second or less provided that the systems are not tested against ballistic missile targets with velocities above 5 kilometers per second or ranges that exceed 3,500 kilometers. In addition, the five states reached preliminary agreement on a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that would formalize the procedures by which the former Soviet republics that would like to succeed to the rights and obligations of the former Soviet Union under the ABM Treaty could do so. The United States and Russia also reached agreement on a series of confidence-building measures to accompany the agreed statement on demarcation as well as regulations to govern the multilateral operation of the SCC.

June 27, 1996: By a vote of 960, the Senate approved the "Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996," a follow-on to the Nunn-Lugar security assistance program. The legislation, commonly known as "Nunn-Lugar II," seeks to enhance U.S. preparedness in responding to incidents involving the use of nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical weapons on U.S. territory; bolster efforts to interdict the possible introduction of weapons of mass destruction to the United States; better coordinate U.S. government policy on non-proliferation issues; and continue on-going measures under the original Nunn-Lugar program to safeguard, dismantle and destroy nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union.

July 14-16, 1996: The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission met in Moscow for its seventh session, during which Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary and Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov signed a joint statement that extends MPC&A controls to four Russian facilities where weapons-grade nuclear material is stored. In addition, they signed a follow-on statement to improve MPC&A measures over nuclear materials during their transportation. O'Leary and Mikhailov also agreed to continue studying replacement power options for three dual-purpose plutonium-producing reactors that Russia promised to shut down by 2000.

September 20, 1996: Russian and Kazak officials announced that all of the SS-18 ICBM silos located in Kazakstan had been destroyed, thereby fulfilling that country's obligations under START I. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Kazakstan possessed 104 SS-18 ICBMs and 40 Bear-H bombers. The last of these bombers was transferred to Russia in February 1994.

September 23, 1996: Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov reaffirmed the preliminary agreement on lower-velocity TMD systems reached during the May 20-June 24 session of the SCC.

September 24, 1996: The CTB Treaty was opened for signature at the United Nations in New York. All five of the declared nuclear-weapon states signed the treaty on this day.

October 16-18, 1996: Secretary of Defense William Perry visited Moscow to urge Russian ratification of START II and promote greater U.S.Russian military cooperation. Addressing some 100 members of key Duma committees, Perry called for prompt Russian ratification of START II to be followed by negotiations of START III. His presentation was not well received, however, as many Duma members expressed serious concerns about various treaty provisions and the eastward expansion of the NATO alliance.

October 25, 1996: Russia announced that it was not willing to allow implementation of the "first-phase" demarcation agreement on lower-velocity TMD systems until a "second-phase" agreement covering higher-velocity TMD systems had been concluded. Opposed to this linkage, the United States called off the October 31 signing ceremony between Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Mamedov in Geneva.

November 14, 1996: The United States and Russia reached an agreement in Moscow that will substantially accelerate implementation of their 1993 HEU purchase agreement. The new arrangement establishes set prices, quantities and terms for the Russian LEU shipments through 2001. At that time, Russia is expected to have converted to LEU the HEU equivalent of about 7,500 nuclear warheads. As part of this agreement, Russia was awarded an advance payment of $100 million against future deliveries of LEU and enhanced transparency measures were established.

November 23, 1996: Belarus returned the last of its strategic nuclear warheads to Russia, thereby completing the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from the non-Russian republics of the former Soviet Union. Four days later, a ceremony was held near Lida during which Belarusan officers placed the last single-warhead SS-25 nuclear missile on a train destined for Russia. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, more than 500 strategic and tactical warheads and 81 SS-25 ICBMs were deployed in Belarus.

December 9, 1996: The Clinton administration announced that the "dual-track" approach was its "preferred alternative" for eliminating excess weapons-grade plutonium. This approach entails immobilizing plutonium in glass or ceramic and burning it as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in civilian nuclear reactors.

January 13, 1997: Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov announced that Moscow would remove by March approximately 4.3 kilograms of HEU and 0.8 kilograms of spent fuel from a former Soviet research reactor located in Tbilisi, Georgia. The United States reportedly has been concerned about the security of these nuclear materials due to Georgia's proximity to Iran.

February 67, 1997: The United States and Russia met in Washington for the eighth session of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. During this session, then-Acting Secretary of Energy Charles Curtis and Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov signed a joint statement that reaffirms each side's commitment to the MPC&A program and includes the Instrument Research Institute (Lytkarino) in the program beginning this year.

March 20-21, 1997: Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin reached agreement on a number of arms control issues during their summit meeting in Helsinki, Finland. In a "Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces," the presidents agreed to extend by five years the deadline for the elimination of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles under START II and to immediately begin negotiations on a START III agreement once START II enters into force. They further agreed that START III negotiations will include four basic components: a limit of 2,000-2,500 deployed strategic nuclear warheads for each side by the end of 2007; measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories as well as to the destruction of strategic warheads; conversion of the current START agreements to unlimited duration; and the "deactivation" by the end of 2003 of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to be eliminated under START II.

In a separate "Joint Statement Concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty," Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin reaffirmed the May 1995 principles for agreement on demarcation between ABM and TMD systems. The leaders also reached an agreement in principle governing the status of higher-velocity TMD systems under the ABM Treaty. Under this "phase-two" agreement, the United States and Russia are permitted to deploy high-velocity TMD systems provided they are not tested against ballistic missile targets with velocities above 5 kilometers per second or ranges that exceed 3,500 kilometers. The agreement, however, prohibits each side from developing, testing or deploying space-based TMD interceptors or components based on other physical principles that can substitute for such interceptors.

March 21, 1997: State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns announced that the United States had cut off approximately $40 million in Nunn-Lugar assistance to Belarus due to its poor human rights record.

April 9, 1997: Aleksei Mitrofanov, chairman of the Duma's Geopolitics Committee, announced that the Duma has "put off" discussion of START II.

May 16, 1997: In Washington, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma announced that Kiev had decided to start eliminating its 46 SS-24 missiles—a measure that would go beyond its obligations under START I. Vice President Al Gore noted that U.S. funds (under the Nunn-Lugar program) would support this effort.

May 22, 1997: Dissatisfied with the state of the Russian armed forces and the pace of military reforms, President Yeltsin fired Defense Minister Igor Rodionov and replaced him with General Igor Sergeyev, then-Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces. Sergeyev has been a consistent advocate of the START process and will have substantial credibility with the Duma as it considers START II.

May 27, 1997: President Yeltsin announced in Paris, during the signing of the NATO-Russian Founding Act, that Russia would remove the "warheads" from strategic nuclear missiles targeted against NATO member states. His aides quickly corrected the "mistranslation" to say that Russia would no longer target its strategic missiles against NATO countries—a less ambitious measure.

June 20, 1997: At their bilateral summit meeting in Denver, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that the United States and Russia would attempt to complete the phase-two demarcation agreement pertaining to higher-velocity TMD systems during the July session of the SCC. Yeltsin also pledged to push for Russian ratification of START II.

Rokhlin Warns Yeltsin on State of Nuclear Forces

In late-June, General Lev Rokhlin, chairman of the Russian Duma's Defense Committee, cautioned that Russia's strategic nuclear forces are not being properly maintained and are "doomed to extinction." Rokhlin's warning sharply contrasts with recent statements made by several high-level Russian officials, including Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and newly appointed Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, who maintain that Russia's nuclear command and control system is safe and reliable. The warning came in an open letter to President Boris Yeltsin and members of Russia's armed forces, in which Rokhlin blasted Yeltsin's government for attempting to institute large-scale military reforms.

Meanwhile, on July 8, Russia flight-tested its single-warhead SS-27 ICBM (designated in Moscow as the Topol-M) for the fourth time. The missile, which will have both mobile and silo-based variants, is now ready for serial production and is expected to be deployed by the end of the year. Commenting on the significance of the test, which was conducted at the Plesetsk test range, General Vladimir Yakovlev, the new commander-in-chief of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, said, "Today it is possible to say that in the 21st century Russia will remain in the ranks of the leading nuclear states, thereby helping to guarantee strategic stability in the whole world." The single-warhead SS-25 and follow-on SS-27 will comprise the backbone of the Russian ICBM force if START II is fully implemented.

June/July 1997 Bibliography


Compiled by James Perez


1996: Disarmament at a Critical Juncture: Panel discussions organized by the NGO Committee on Disarmament, New York: United Nations, 1997, 141 pp. Ph: (212) 6875340, Email: [email protected]

Price, Richard M. The Chemical Weapons Taboo, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997, 233 pp.

von Hippel, Frank. "Paring Down the Arsenal," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1997, pp. 3340.



Deen, Thalif. "New Center Aims to Raise UN Profile on Disarming," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 23, 1997, p. 6.

Stern, Jessica. "Preventive Defense," The Washington Post, June 23, 1997, p. A19.

Yumin, Hu. "The Situation and Prospects of the Nuclear Disarmament," International Strategic Studies, April 1997, pp. 10-18.


PostCold War Conflict Deterrence, Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1997, 227 pp. Ph: (202) 334-3313, (800) 624-6242


Blanche, Ed. "Iraq Heads for Collision With UN Over Weapons," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 2, 1997, p. 15.

Crossette, Barbara. "Iraqis Still Defying Arms Ban, Departing UN Official Says," The New York Times, June 25, 1997, p. A1.

McFate, Patricia Bliss, F. Ronald Cleminson, Sidney N. Graybeal and George R. Lindsey. Verification in a Global Context: The Establishment of a United Nations Center for Information, Training and Analysis (CITA), Arms Control Verification Studies No. 7, Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1996, 44 pp.

Reid, Robert H. "Iraq Blocks UN Teams," The Washington Times, June 14, 1997, p. A7.



"Duma Won't Sign Arms Pact, Russian Says," The Baltimore Sun, July 7, 1997, p. 16.

Nunn, Sam and Bruce Blair. "From Nuclear Deterrence to Mutual Safety," The Washington Post, June 22, 1997, p. C1.

Thomson, David B. The START Treaties: Implementation and Status, CISA, Los Alamos, LA-UR-97-2045, May 1997, 42 pp.

Weiner, Tim. "Panel Urges Deep Cuts in U.S. and Russian Nuclear Arsenals," The New York Times, June 18, 1997.



Starr, Barbara. "Stalemate on Scuds' As Latest U.S.-Kiev Talks Fail," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 23, 1997, p.3.

Waller, Douglas. "The Secret Missile Deal," Time, June 30, 1997, p. 58.



McMahon, Scott. "NMD Can Provide Stability," Defense News, June 30-July 6, 1997, p. 17.


Boman, Shelly and Duncan Clarke. "U.S. Should Put Aid for Israel's Arrow Back in Quiver," Defense News, June 23, 1997, p. 17.

Ebata, Kensuke. "Japan Puts Off Decision on Missile Defence Plan," Jane's Defence Weekly, June 18, 1997, p. 15.



Baker, John C. NonProliferation Incentives for Russia and Ukraine, Adelphi Paper 309, New York: IISS, 1997, 91 pp.

Gerth, Jeff. "Export Limits On Computers Are Rejected," The New York Times, July 11, 1997, p. 9.

Gertz, Bill. "U.S. Names Buyers of Arms That Are Developing Nukes," The Washington Times, July 1, 1997, p. A5.

NonProliferation Agreements, Arrangements and Responses, Andrew Latham, ed., Toronto: York University, 1997, 242 pp. Ph: (416) 7365156, Email: [email protected]

Navarrom, Mireya. "2 Lithuanians, Arrested in Miami, Are Accused of Bid to Sell Soviet Nuclear Weapons," The New York Times, July 1, 1997, p. A15.

Opall, Barbara. "U.S. Lawmakers Deride Export Scofflaw List," Defense News, June 30-July 6, 1997, p. 3.

Ravo, Nick. "Two Men in Iraq Export Case Are Found Not Guilty by Jury," The New York Times, July 16, 1997, p. A18.

Rensselaer, Lee. "Smuggling Update," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, May/June 1997, pp. 52-56.

Rodan, Steve. "Supercomputer Dispute With Israel Shows Vagueness in U.S. Export Law," Defense News, June 30July 6, p. 3.

Smith, R. Jeffrey. "Administration Concerned About Russia's Nuclear Cooperation With Iran," The Washington Post, July 3, 1997, p. A7.

Weiner, Tim. "China Is Top Supplier to Nations Seeking Powerful, Banned Arms," The New York Times, July 3, 1997, p. 8.


Sanders, Ben. "The NPT Steps Into the Future: The Preparatory Committee and the Enhanced Review Process," Disarmament Diplomacy, May 1997, pp. 5-8.



Anselmo, Joseph C. "Dangers Mount Despite Cooperative Efforts," Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 23, 1997, pp. 47-50.

Bukharin, Oleg. "Disquiet on the Eastern Front," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1997, pp. 41-46.

Griffiths, Franklyn. MOX Experience: The Disposition of Excess Russian and U.S. Weapons Plutonium in Canada, University of Toronto, July 1997, 80 pp. Ph. (416) 978-7417.

Scott, William B. "Classification Sensitivities Slow Weapon Dismantlement," Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 23, 1997, pp. 45-46.

Scott, William B. "Scientists Jointly Focus on Safeguarding Stockpile," Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 23, 1997, pp. 36-43.



Broad, William J. "Hans A. Bethe: He Lit Nuclear Fire; Now He Would Douse It," The New York Times, June 17, 1997, p. C1.

Scott, William B. "Admission of 1979 Nuclear Test Finally Validates Vela Data," Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 21, 1997, p. 33.

"U.S. Conducts Nuclear Material Tests," The Washington Post, July 3, 1997, p. A13.


Landay, Jonathan S. "Banned Forever? New Push on Nuclear Tests," The Christian Science Monitor, July 2, 1997, p. 3.

McKinzie, Matthew. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Issues and Answers, Cornell University Peace Studies Program Occasional Paper #21, June 1997, 141 pp.

Walsh, Mark. "Supercomputer Faces Nuke Arms Safety Test," Defense News, June 30-July 6, 1997, p. 13.



Barber, Ben. "White House Close to Ending Arms Ban," The Washington Times, June 17, 1997, p. A1.

"Brazillian Gun Buy Stalled by U.S. Export Law," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 2, 1997, p. 6.

Carter, Jimmy. "U.S. Must Take Lead to Ban Land Mines," The Christian Science Monitor, June 23, 1997, p. 18.

Gerth, Jeff and Tim Weiner. "Arms Makers See a Bonanza In Selling NATO Expansion," The New York Times, June 29, 1997, p. A1.

Lancaster, John. "U.S. Role as Arms Merchant to Kuwait Faces Challenge by China," The Washington Post, July 15, 1997, p. A14.

Lippman, Thomas W. "Revised Treaty Is Outlined for Europe Forces," The Washington Post, July 24, 1997, p. A1.

Mesler, Bill. "NATO's New Arms Bazaar," The Nation, July 21, 1997, pp. 24-26.

Porteus, Holly. "JCS Members, CINCs Issue Letter Opposing Landmine Ban Legislation," Inside the Pentagon, July 17, 1997, p. 1.

Practical Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Measures for Peacebuilding, Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, April 1997, 61 pp.

Ramos-Horta, Jose. "Deadly Arms Sales," The Washington Times, July 23, 1997, p. A17.

Seffers, George I. "Pentagon May Resist Effort to Ban Antipersonnel Mines," Defense News, June 30-July 6, 1997, p. 11.

Towle, Michael D. "Defense Contractors Woo Old Foes," The Philadelphia Inquirer, July 18. 1997, p. 6.

Whelan, Lawrence. "Armscor Explores Idea of Selling to Turkey," Jane's Intelligence & Jane's Sentinel Pointer, July 1997, p. 11.



Baynham, Simon. "Ratification Helps Credibility of CWC," Jane's Intelligence Review & Jane's Sentinel Pointer, July 1997, p. 2.

"India Permits Arms Inspection," The Washington Post, June 27, 1997, p. A30.

Maze, Rick. "Pentagon Ups Number of Troops Exposed to Toxic Weapons in Persian Gulf," Army Times July 21, 1997, p. 2.

Shenon, Philip. "Studies on Gulf War Illnesses Are Faulted," The New York Times, June 15, 1997, p. A18.

Vartabedian, Ralph. "Army Chemical Incinerator Is Unsafe, 3rd Official Says," The Los Angeles Times, June 25, 1997, p. 5.

Weston, Michael. "Giving Teeth to the Biological Weapons Convention," NATO Review, May-June 1997, pp. 33-35.




Drozdiak, William. "NATO and Russia Launch Joint Panel On Security Issues: New Council Holds First Session After Solving Leadership Dispute," The Washington Post, July 19, 1997, p. A15.

Hoffman, David, "Ex-General Warns That Extinction' Is Destiny of Russia's Nuclear Forces," The Washington Post, June 26, 1997, p. A27.

Khripunov, Igor. "Have Guns, Will Travel," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1997, pp. 47-51.

Priest, Dana. "Ukraine Savors New Ties With NATO," The Washington Post, July 14, 1997, p.A15.

Sieff, Martin. "Ukraine's President Seeks Anchor to West," The Washington Times, July 20, 1997, p. A1.


Apple, R.W., Jr. "On NATO Coup, Russia's Shadow," The New York Times, July 9, 1997, p. A8.

Blacker, Coit, Vladimir Kuznetsov and Jack Mendelsohn. "The Question of NATO Expansion: A Panel Discussion," The Commonwealth, June 30, 1997, pp. 2-11.

Cooper, Mary H. "Expanding NATO," CQ Researcher, May 16, 1997, pp. 435-450.

Countdown to Madrid: Public Opinion on NATO Enlargement, United States Information Agency, June 1997, 20 pp. Ph: (202) 619-4490, Email: [email protected]

Dobbs, Michael and John F. Harris. "France Balks at Paying Share of NATO Expansion Costs," The Washington Post, July 10, 1997, p. A1.

Drozdiak, William and John F. Harris. "NATO Invites 3 Former Foes to Join," The Washington Post, July 9, 1997, p. A1.

Kay, Sean and Judith Yaphe. "Turkey's International Affairs: Shaping the U.S.-Turkey Strategic Partnership," Strategic Forum, National Defense University, Number 122, July 1997, 4pp.

Mandelbaum, Michael. NATO Expansion: A Bridge to the Nineteenth Century, The Center for Political and Strategic Studies, June 1997, 36 pp. Ph. (301) 652-8181, Email: [email protected]

Marshall, Tyler. "In Letter, Experts Decry NATO Expansion," The Los Angeles Times, June 27, 1997, p. A4.

Nebehay , Stephanie. "Geneva Delegates Agree to Tackle Land Mines as a Separate Issue," The Washington Times, June 27, 1997, p. A15.

Rogers, Marc. "Challenges Loom Beyond Enlargement for NATO," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 2, 1997, p. 19.

Rogov, Sergey M. Russia and NATO's Enlargement: The Search for a Compromise at the Helsinki Summit, Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, May 1997, 37 pp.

Sieff, Martin. "Rejected Slovenia May Close to West," The Washington Times, July 15, 1997, p. A1.

Starr, Barbara. "New NATO Members To Plan Fighters Together," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 23, 1997, p. 4.

Tigner, Brooks. "NATO Hopefuls Want Promises for Round Two," Defense News, July 713, 1997, p. 1.

Vinch, Chuck. "Lawmakers Question Expansion of NATO," European Stars & Stripes, July 18, 1997, p.1.

Warner, John and Kay Bailey Hutchison. "The Missing NATO Debate," The Washington Post, July 24, 1997, p. A21.

Yaphe, Judith S. "Turkey's Domestic Affairs: Shaping the U.S.-Turkey Strategic Partnership," Strategic Forum, National Defense University, Number 121, July 1997, 4pp.


Eshel, David. "Persisting Powder Keg," Armed Forces Journal International,. July 1997, pp. 30-33.

Opall, Barbara. "Israel Awaits NATO Summit Before Pressing Washington On Russia-Iran Missile Effort," Defense News, July 7-13, 1997, p. 4.

Pisik, Betsy. "Ekeus Expects Sanctions To Last as Long as Saddam's Rule," The Washington Times, June 30, 1997, p. A9.

Toward 2000: Middle East Challenges for the Next Administration, Alicia Gansz and John Wilner, eds., The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996, 70 pp. Ph. (202) 452-0650.


Burns, John F. "India and Pakistan Plan Kashmir Talks," The New York Times, June 24, 1997, p. A6.

Gertz, Bill. "New Chines Missiles Target All of East Asia," The Washington Times, July 10, 1997, p. A1.

Gertz, Bill. "Russia Sells China High-Tech Artillery," The Washington Times, July 3, 1997, p. A1.

Harding, James. "China Looks Abroad for Help in Updating Defense Systems," The Washington Times, July 14, 1997, p. A11.

Jordan, Mary. "80 S. Korean Workers Move to North This Week," The Washington Post, July 24, 1997, p. A2.

Kamil, Anis. "Why U.S. Has Not Signed Protocol To Nuclear Arms Treaty [SEANWFZ]," New Strait Times, June 24, 1997, p. 2.

Karniol, Robert. "Laos Rebuilds Links With Russia in Helicopter Buy, " Jane's Defence Weekly, July 23, 1997, p. 16.

Kremenak, Ben. Korea's Road to Unification: Potholes, Detours and Dead Ends, CISSM Papers 5, May 1997, 76 pp. Ph. (301) 405-7601

Mulvenon, James. Chinese Military Commerce and U.S. National Security, Center for Asia-Pacific Policy, June 1997, 41 pp. Ph: (310) 393-0411 x.7197.

Myers, Steven Lee. "North Korea Agrees to Join 4-Party Talks," The New York Times, July 1, 1997, p. A11.

"Pakistan Missile Firing Triggers Indian Protest," Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 21, 1997, p. 35.

"Prithvi Has Not Been Deployed, Says India," Jane's Defence Weekly, June 18, 1997, p. 4.

Starr, Barbara. "USA, RoK Assess Options if North Korea Collapses," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 2, 1997, p. 3.

Witter, Willis. "Japan Mulls Boost In Military Might," The Washington Times, July 16, 1997, p. A11.



Alvarez, Lizette. "Senate Is Cool to G.I. Mission in Bosnia but Doesn't Cut Off Funds," The New York Times, July 12, 1997, p. A3.

Greider, William. "Fortress America," Rolling Stone, July 10, 1997, pp. 61-73.

Holzer, Robert and Mark Walsh. "Officials Doubt Might of QDR Cuts," Defense News, July 7-13, 1997, p. 1.

Kitfield, James. "Collision Course," National Journal, June 21, 1997, pp. 1270-1273.

Mann, Paul. "Senate Squelches B2 Funding, Upholds Fighter Program," Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 21, 1997, pp. 34-35.

Smith, R. Jeffrey and Bradley Graham. "Administration Considers Changing Mix of Nuclear Warhead Deployment," The Washington Post, June 18, 1997, p. A6.

"U.S. Senate Adds $3.2b to FY98 Defense Budget," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 23, 1997, p.5.



Doyle, Michael W. Ways of War and Peace, New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1997, 557 pp.

Mello, Greg. "New Bomb, No Mission," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 1997, pp. 28-32.

Brazil to Consider Joining the NPT

Brazilian President Fernando Cardoso submitted the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) to the Brazilian congress for ratification on June 20, nearly 20 years after the treaty was opened for signature. Should Brazil accede to the NPT, only four nations (Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan) would remain outside of the regime. In 1990, Brazil renounced the nuclear weapons program it had been pursuing since the 1970s, and, in 1991, it signed an agreement with Argentina to establish a bilateral nuclear accountancy and control system to verify that each state's nuclear activities would be for peaceful uses only.

Brazil followed Argentina in joining the Treaty of Tlatelolco (a nuclear-weapon-free-zone accord covering Latin America and the Caribbean) in May 1994, but continued to resist joining the NPT on the basis of the treaty's discrimination between nuclear "haves" and "have-nots." Argentina acceded to the NPT in 1995.

Neither house of Brazil's bicameral legislature is likely to act on the treaty before fall 1997. Currently in extraordinary session to conclude its normal business, neither the Chamber of Deputies nor the Senate has been able to include the treaty in its agenda. Little domestic opposition to the NPT is expected, since Brazil has already accepted the principle of nuclear nonproliferation through its bilateral agreement with Argentina and the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Congress Considers Tightening Export Controls for Supercomputers


Howard Diamond

FOLLOWING THE transfer of several U.S.made high-performance computers to Russia and China, possibly for use in their nuclear weapons programs, Congress is considering legislation that would tighten supercomputer export controls which were eased by the Clinton administration in 1995. An amendment to the fiscal year 1998 defense authorization bill that is pending in a House-Senate conference committee would require prior written approval from the U.S. government for sales of computers capable of at least 2,000 million theoretical operations per second (MTOPS) to countries of proliferation or security concern.

The amendment, cosponsored by Floyd Spence (R-SC), chairman of the House National Security Committee, and Ron Dellums (D-CA), the panel's ranking minority member, was adopted June 19 in the House by a vote of 332-88. Although the Senate rejected a similar amendment offered by Thad Cochran (R-MS) and Richard Durbin (D-IL), it approved, by a vote of 72-17, a substitute measure offered by Senator Rod Grams (R-MN) that would retain the current system for controlling computer exports, but would require a General Accounting Office study of the issue.

Given the lopsided but contradictory votes in the House and Senate, the future of the Spence-Dellums amendment remains uncertain. Congress will ultimately resolve the issue after the conference committee finalizes the 1998 defense bill when legislators return from summer recess.


'Tier3' Controls

When the Clinton administration relaxed export controls on supercomputers in 1995, it created four "tiers" of states within a system of increasing levels of controls and limits, progressing from almost no controls on sales to close allies such as Canada, Western European countries and Japan in "tier-1," to near total prohibition for Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea in "tier-4." The key concern is the status of export controls on the so-called "tier-3" countries that include China, India, Pakistan, Vietnam, much of Eastern Europe, all of the Middle East and the former Soviet republics.

For "tier-3" countries, computers capable of 2,000-7,000 MTOPS may be sold under a general license without prior approval from the Commerce Department. Sales to military or proliferation-related buyers in this group require an individual validated license from the department, as do any sales of computers operating above 7,000 MTOPS. Sales of computers operating above 10,000 MTOPS may require additional safeguards at the end-user's location.

Critics of the administration's policy have argued that the government, rather than the computer companies, should determine whether a potential buyer is a military or proliferation-related end-user. According to one congressional staffer involved in the issue, computer companies, which are responsible for making this determination under the current system, lack the intelligence information needed to make such judgments, and, as the illegal sales to Russia and China indicate, some companies fail in their obligation to "know their customer."


Congressional Inquiry

Congressional concern about supercomputers was stimulated earlier this year when Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) announced that it had acquired five American-made supercomputers—four from Silicon Graphics, and one from IBM—for use in maintaining the safety and reliability of the Russian nuclear arsenal in the absence of nuclear testing. (See ACT, March 1997.) A modern desktop computer using a 200-megahertz Intel Pentium processor is capable of roughly 200 MTOPS, approximately the same level that was used to define a supercomputer in 1991. In comparison, the machines acquired by Russia's weapons labs under the guise of modeling soil and water pollution, operate at 4,400 and 10,000 MTOPS.

The sales led the Military Procurement Subcommittee of the House National Security Committee to hold an April hearing and prompted the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services to hold a hearing on June 11. Commerce Department Undersecretary William Reinsch said in testimony before the House subcommittee that 1,100 supercomputers worth more than $550 million had been exported from the United States between January 1996 and March 1997, including 46 to China worth $17.5 million and eight to Russia worth $19 million.

Reinsch told the Senate subcommittee that the Commerce Department has taken steps to help exporters comply with the 1995 policy, including consulting with companies if they are in doubt about certain buyers; holding seminars for the few U.S. producers of supercomputers; and, where possible, publishing in the Federal Register the names of buyers requiring an individual license. Despite the three cases under investigation, Reinsch said, "by and large these companies have not had a lot of difficulty figuring out . . . who the military end users are and who [are] not." Reinsch also told the Senate subcommittee that additional names of organizations requiring Commerce Department approval would be made public shortly, though, he said, "we have not done it extensively so far [because] there are intelligence sources and methods issues that come up frequently on this issue." On June 30, the department published in the Federal Register the names of 13 entities in China, India, Israel, Pakistan and Russia which exporters should consider to be military-related, and said more would be added in the future. Prior to the June hearing, the Commerce Department had publicly identified Ben-Gurion University in Israel and Bharat Electronics of India as entities of proliferation concern.

The Justice Department is currently investigating the Silicon Graphics and IBM supercomputer sales as well as a sale by Sun Microsystems to a Hong Kong company that subsequently transferred the computer it bought to a weapons lab run by the Chinese Academy of Sciences.

Clinton, Yeltsin Make Arms Control Gains Before 'G-8' Summit in Denver


Craig Cerniello

ADDRESSING A wide range of economic, global and political issues, leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) industrialized countries and Russia made modest progress on arms control during their June 20-22 summit meeting in Denver. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin also made some gains on key nuclear arms control issues in their separate bilateral meeting on June 20.

According to National Security Council Deputy Director Jim Steinberg, Clinton and Yeltsin discussed the status of ongoing efforts in the Geneva-based Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to establish a "demarcation line" between theater missile defense (TMD) systems and strategic missile defense systems. During the March Helsinki summit, the United States and Russia reached preliminary agreement on a set of basic principles to govern the status of higher-velocity TMD systems (systems with interceptor velocities above 3 kilometers per second) under the ABM Treaty (see ACT, March 1997). The SCC met May 14-June 18 in an effort to codify the principles agreed at Helsinki in a formal "phase two" agreement on demarcation but was unable to complete its work. During their one-hour meeting in Denver, however, Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that the sides would attempt to finish the higher-velocity TMD agreement during the current session of the SCC, beginning on July 23.

In addition, the two presidents reaffirmed their commitment to the START II ratification process. The treaty, which was approved by the Senate in January 1996, has not yet been ratified by Russia. According to Steinberg, Yeltsin said in Denver that he was "determined to give [START II] a real push with the Duma," but it remains unclear at this writing whether the Duma will act on the treaty this year.


Summit of the Eight

At the conclusion of the so-called "Summit of the Eight," the G7 countries and Russia issued an 18-page final communique outlining their agreement on a broad range of arms control issues. In addition to their support for the "early" entry into force of START II and "initiation" of START III negotiations, the eight leaders reaffirmed their "unwavering commitment" to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as their commitment to the "immediate commencement and early conclusion" of a global fissile material cutoff treaty. They also called upon all states to "rapidly" sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty "to ensure its early entry into force," and encouraged India and Pakistan—nuclear-capable states that have not signed—to adhere to its provisions.

The eight leaders also agreed to expand participation in their "Program for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material"—adopted in April 1996 at the Moscow nuclear safety and security summit—to include countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus. In a separate progress report of the foreign ministers, issued on June 21, the eight states also called for enhanced cooperation and information-sharing among their law enforcement, intelligence and customs agencies in an effort to further reduce the nuclear smuggling threat.


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