"No one can solve this problem alone, but together we can change things for the better." 

– Setsuko Thurlow
Hiroshima Survivor
June 6, 2016
April 1997
Edition Date: 
Tuesday, April 1, 1997

States-Parties and Signatories to The Chemical Weapons Convention

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which the United States signed on January 13, 1993, entered into force on April 29, 1997. The treaty bans the use, development, stockpiling, transfer, and acquisition of chemical weapons, and requires parties to destroy chemical weapons arsenals and production facilities. With entry into force of the convention, the Organization for the Proliferation of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) began formal operations in The Hague to implement the treaty's compliance and verification provisions.

As of April 19, 165 states have signed and 87 have ratified the convention. The table lists each state's date of signature and, where applicable, its date of ratification of the convention. States that have ratified the convention become members of the Conference of States Parties, the OPCW's main governing body. The Executive Council, the administrative organ of the OPCW, also oversees the Technical Secretariat, which is responsible for the inspection, verification, and data reporting provisions of the convention. The members of the Technical Secretariat and the Executive Council will be appointed by the Conference during its first session in May 1997.

Over 20 states possess or may be seeking an offensive chemical weapons capability, according to U.S. intelligence estimates. Although the countries possessing the largest chemical weapons stockpiles - Russia and the United States - have signed the CWC, several states of proliferation concern, namely Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria, have not yet signed the treaty.

Country Date of Signature Date of Ratification/ Accession
Afganistan 1/14/93  
Albania 1/14/93 5/11/94
Algeria 1/13/93 8/14/95
Argentina 1/13/93 10/2/95
Armenia 3/19/93 1/27/95
Australia 1/13/93 5/6/94
Austria 1/13/93 8/17/95
Azerbaijan 1/13/93  
Bahamas 3/2/94  
Bahrain 2/24/93 4/28/97
Bangladesh 1/14/93 4/25/97
Belarus 1/14/93 7/11/96
Belgium 1/13/93 1/27/97
Benin 1/14/93  
Bhutan 4/24/97  
Bolivia 1/14/93  
Bosnia & Herzegovina 1/16/97 2/25/97
Brazil 1/13/93 3/13/96
Brunei 1/13/93  
Bulgaria 1/13/93 8/10/94
Burkina Faso 1/14/93  
Burundi 1/15/93  
Country Date of Signature Date of Ratification / Accession
Cambodia 1/15/93  
Cameroon 1/14/93 9/16/96
Canada 1/13/93 9/26/95
Cape Verde 1/15/93  
Central African Rep. 1/14/93  
Chad 10/11/94  
Chile 1/14/93 7/12/96
China 1/13/93 4/25/97
Colombia 1/13/93  
Comoros 1/13/93  
Congo 1/15/93  
Cook Islands 1/14/93 7/15/94
Costa Rica 1/14/93 5/31/96
Cote d'Ivoire 1/13/93 12/18/95
Croatia 1/13/93 5/23/95
Cuba 1/13/93  
Cyprus 1/13/93  
Czech Republic 1/14/93 3/6/96
Denmark 1/14/93 7/13/95
Djibouti 9/28/93  
Dominica 8/2/93  
Dominican Republic 1/13/93  
Country Date of Signature Date of Ratification / Accession
Ecuador 1/14/93 9/6/95
El Salvador 1/14/93 10/30/95
Equatorial Guinea 1/14/93 4/25/97
Estonia 1/14/93  
Ethiopia 1/14/93 5/13/96
Fiji 1/14/93 1/20/93
Finland 1/14/93 2/7/95
France 1/13/93 3/2/95
Gabon 1/13/93  
Gambia 1/13/93  
Georgia 1/14/93 11/27/95
Germany 1/13/93 8/12/94
Ghana 1/14/93  
Greece 1/13/93 12/22/94
Grenada 4/9/97  
Guatemala 1/14/93  
Guinea 1/14/93  
Guinea-Bissau 1/14/93  
Guyana 10/6/93  
Haiti 1/14/93  
Holy See 1/14/93  
Honduras 1/13/93  
Hungary 1/13/93 10/31/96
Iceland 1/13/93 4/28/97
India 1/14/93 9/3/96
Indonesia 1/13/93  
Iran 1/13/93  
Ireland 1/14/93 6/24/96
Israel 1/13/93  
Italy 1/13/93 12/8/95
Jamaica 4/18/97  
Japan 1/13/93 9/15/95
Kazakhstan 1/14/93  
Kenya 1/15/93 4/25/97
Korea, South 1/14/93 4/28/97
Kuwait 1/27/93  
Country Date of Signature Date of Ratification / Accession
Kyrgyzstan 2/22/93  
Laos 5/13/93 2/25/97
Latvia 5/6/93 7/23/96
Lesotho 12/7/94 12/7/94
Liberia 1/15/93  
Liechtenstein 7/21/93  
Lithuania 1/13/93  
Luxemborg 1/13/93 4/15/97
Madagascar 1/15/93  
Malawi 1/14/93  
Malaysia 1/13/93  
Maldives 10/4/93 5/31/94
Mali 1/13/93 4/28/97
Malta 1/13/93 4/28/97
Marshall Islands 1/13/93  
Mauritania 1/13/93  
Mauritius 1/14/93 2/9/93
Mexico 1/13/93 8/29/94
Micronesia 1/13/93  
Moldova 1/13/93 7/8/96
Monaco 1/13/93 6/1/95
Mongolia 1/14/93 1/17/95
Morocco 1/13/93 12/28/95
Myanmar (Burma) 1/14/93  
Country Date of Signature Date of Ratification / Accession
Namibia 1/13/93 11/24/95
Nauru 1/13/93  
Nepal 1/19/93  
Netherlands 1/14/93 6/30/95
New Zealand 1/14/93 7/15/96
Nicaragua 3/9/93  
Niger 1/14/93 4/9/97
Nigeria 1/13/93  
Norway 1/13/93 4/7/94
Oman 2/2/93 2/8/95
Pakistan 1/13/93  
Panama 6/16/93  
Papua New Guinea 1/14/93 4/17/96
Paraguay 1/14/93 12/1/94
Peru 1/14/93 7/20/95
Philippines 1/13/93 12/11/96
Poland 1/13/93 2/23/95
Portugal 1/13/93 9/10/96
Qatar 2/1/93  
Romania 1/13/93 2/15/95
Russia 1/13/93  
Rwanda 5/17/93  
St. Kitts & Nevis 3/16/94  
St. Lucia 3/29/93 4/9/97
St. Vincent & Grenadines 9/20/93  
Samoa 1/14/93  
San Marino 1/13/93  
Saudi Arabia 1/20/93 8/9/96
Senegal 1/13/93  
Seychelles 1/15/93 4/7/93
Sierra Leone 1/15/93  
Singapore 1/14/93  
Slovak Republic 1/14/93 10/27/95
Slovenia 1/14/93  
South Africa 1/14/93 9/13/95
Spain 1/13/93 8/3/94
Sri Lanka 1/14/93 8/19/94
Suriname 4/28/97 4/28/97
Swaziland 9/23/93 11/20/96
Sweden 1/13/93 6/17/93
Switzerland 1/14/93 3/10/95
Tajikistan 1/14/93 1/11/95
Tanzania 2/25/94  
Thailand 1/14/93  
Togo 1/13/93 4/23/97
Tunisia 1/13/93 4/15/97
Turkey 1/14/93  
Turkmenistan 10/12/93 9/29/94
Uganda 1/14/93  
Ukraine 1/13/93  
United Arab Emirates 2/2/93  
United Kingdom 1/13/93 5/13/96
United States 1/13/93 4/25/97
Uruguay 1/15/93 10/6/94
Uzbekistan 11/24/95 7/23/96
Venezuela 1/14/93  
Vietnam 1/13/93  
Yemen 2/8/93  
Zaire 1/14/93  
Zambia 1/13/93  
Zimbabwe 1/13/93 4/25/97
Sources :
ACA, CIA, Department of Defense and the office of the UN secretary-general.

Senate Gives Advice and Consent; U.S. Becomes Original CWC Party


Erik J. Leklem

PRESIDENT BILL Clinton deposited the U.S. instrument of ratification for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) with the United Nations on April 25, four days before the treaty's entry into force. This lastminute action, made possible by Senate approval of the resolution of advice and consent to ratification, allowed the United States to become an original party to the convention. (See Factfile, p. 41.) The multilateral treaty, signed in 1993, bans the use, production, stockpiling and development of chemical weapons and includes extensive verification measures to enforce compliance with its provisions. Parties are also required to destroy their chemical weapon stockpiles and production facilities.

The Senate resolution, approved April 24 by a vote of 7426, set forth 28 conditions to its advice and consent. (See p. 29.) None of these conditions, however, impeded presidential ratification and deposit of the instrument of ratification with the UN secretarygeneral. Approval of the convention ended 41 months of consideration by the Senate, during which more than 14 hearings were held.

On the day before the Senate vote, retired Senator Bob Dole (RKS) reversed his past opposition to the convention at a White House event. "If I were present in the Senate," he said, "I would vote for ratification of the CWC because of the many improvements that have been agreed to." In the closing hours of Senate debate, Majority Leader Trent Lott (RMS) added his support for the convention, saying there would be "real and lasting consequences" if the United States failed to ratify the treaty, and that "the credibility of commitments made by two presidents of our country—one Republican and one Democrat—is at stake."

In early April the fate of the CWC remained uncertain, due to the campaign by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (RNC) to discredit the convention in a series of hearings. (See ACT, March 1997.) Nevertheless, by midApril, Lott and Minority Leader Tom Daschle (DSD), in coordination with the White House, reached a unanimous consent agreement that defined the procedure for Senate consideration of the treaty. The compromise released the CWC from the Foreign Relations Committee and set April 24 as the date for a full Senate vote.

The agreement established Senate Executive Resolution 75, authored by Helms, as the resolution of ratification for the CWC. The Helms' resolution set forth 33 conditions for Senate approval of the convention; the first 28 conditions were, by agreement, not subject to further action, while the five remaining "killer" conditions (that would have prevented Clinton from depositing the U.S. instruments of ratification) were subject to limited debate and to removal from the resolution by separate majority votes.

As part of the agreement, a separate vote was scheduled on S.495 before CWC consideration. Drafted by CWC opponents, this unilateral, domestic legislation was proposed as an "alternative" to the CWC, which CWC opponents could support in order to avoid being labeled "propoison gas." The bill, which passed by a slight majority, is expected to encounter a presidential veto.

The agreement to discharge the convention from Helms' committee and to bring it to a vote followed months of work by the administration and treaty supporters. In the final weeks of April, the administration made some foreign policy concessions to bring the CWC to a vote, including agreeing to incorporate the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency into the State Department as part of a major restructuring of U.S. foreign affairs agencies. (See p. 33.)

Clinton's campaign for the treaty culminated in an April 23 White House event with Vice President Al Gore, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili, retired General Colin Powell, former National Security Advisor General Brent Scowcroft and Dole. Supporting Dole's comments, Powell said the treaty was "in the best interests of America" and praised treaty provisions that would isolate rogue states.

During the days before the vote, Clinton consulted with Lott regarding convention Articles X and XI, which Lott argued would foster chemical weapons proliferation by facilitating cooperation in chemical technologies. In an April 24 letter to Lott, Clinton wrote that he would "be prepared to withdraw from the treaty" after consultation with Congress if Article X or Article XI were abused by statesparties in a way that "jeopardized the supreme interests of the United States." Lott called this commitment "unprecedented" and "ironclad," and mentioned the letter's importance when he announced his intent to vote for the CWC.


The Senate Debate

In opening the scheduled 11 hours of Senate floor debate on the convention, Helms derided the treaty as "worse than nothing" and said it would put "the American people at greater risk." Biden used his opening remarks to respond, reviewing the history of chemical warfare and the decade of CWC negotiations, and linking ratification of the treaty to "America's leadership in the postCold War era."

Before the final vote, Biden submitted five motions to strike each of the five "killer" conditions, after which all five were removed by majority votes.

The first condition which the Senate struck required ratification by China, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria and by all state sponsors of terrorism before the United States could join the convention.

The second condition prohibited the deposit of the U.S. instruments of ratification until the president could certify that Russia had ratified the treaty, which was highly unlikely prior to the April 29 deadline. Further, the condition required Russia to forgo all activity on its chemical weapons program and required certification of Russian compliance with the 1990 U.S.Russian Bilateral Destruction Agreement.

A third condition required presidential certification that the Central Intelligence Agency had a high degree of confidence in detecting "militarily significant" violations, which were defined as one ton of agent. The administration had previously pointed out the CWC's benefits to intelligence efforts, and said it would not be able to deposit the U.S. instruments of ratification under such an exacting condition.

The fourth condition—eliminated by the margin of 5644—required the president to bar inspectors from states deemed sponsors of international terrorism and from states in violation of U.S. nonproliferation and exportimport law. While technically not a "killer" condition, since parties to the CWC have the right to exclude specific inspectors on a casebycase basis, such a blanket exclusion could have caused diplomatic confrontations.

The last condition stricken by the Senate called for amending the convention by eliminating Article X and changing Article XI to permit trade restrictions on chemical technology exchange and cooperation.

After the first condition was removed, Lott made a statement of support signaling victory for the convention's proponents. He said he had "struggled" with the treaty, and discounted claims that the vote would "determine the fate" of certain senators. Lott said his vote for the convention was based on the advice of "the most senior former and current military commanders" and on the "marginal" benefits of information access granted by the convention.

Lott's position, according to one Republican staffer, provided the needed leadership for some freshman Republicans to vote for treaty ratification. Some Senate staffers, however, emphasized that his most critical role had been in agreeing to bring the convention to the Senate floor.

Twelve states (including China and South Korea) followed the United States in depositing their instruments of ratification before entry into force of the treaty, bringing the number of original statesparties to 87 (of 165 signatory states). The Russian Duma failed to ratify the treaty before its entry into force, citing financial concerns, but indicated that it would take up the issue in fall 1997. Pakistan also stated its intent to complete the ratification process, though no official timetable has been specified.

Attention will now turn to CWC implementing legislation, scheduled for consideration during May in the House of Representatives. The U.S. National Authority for the convention, housed in the Department of Commerce, will finalize preparations for inspections and reporting requirements.

With CWC entry into force, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) begins formal operations in The Hague to monitor compliance under the CWC. The first session of the Conference of States Parties (CSP), the principal organ of the OPCW, will open in The Hague on May 6. The CSP will appoint the Executive Council members and the director general of the Technical Secretariat, additional bodies of the OPCW responsible for treaty implementation and verification.

Summary of the Senate Resolution of Ratification

On April 24, the Senate approved a resolution of advice and consent to ratification (Senate Executive Resolution 75) of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) by a vote of 74-26. The resolution contained 28 "conditions" for Senate approval of the treaty, agreed upon by CWC supporters and opponents, who also agreed to eliminate five "killer" conditions that would have prevented the president from formally ratifying the convention. Several presidential certifications were required by the resolution and were made (in an April 25 message to Congress) before the U.S. instrument of ratification was deposited with the UN secretary general. The text of these conditions, which is almost as long as the treaty itself, is summarized below with explanatory comments in italics.

On April 25, President Bill Clinton informed the secretary-general that the United States would become an original party to the convention by ratifying the treaty before its April 29 entry-into-force deadline (180 days after the 65th signatory deposited its instrument of ratification).

With these conditions, the Senate sought to reassert its constitutional role in the treaty-making process, influence the interpretation of various treaty provisions and provide advice on various policy issues. Numerous requirements were placed on the executive branch, including certifications to be made prior to the deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification and periodically thereafter.

Condition 1: The Senate reserves the right to include reservations in its advice and consent to ratification, notwithstanding the explicit ban in Article XXII on reservations to the convention. Although this right was not exercised in the resolution of ratification, the Senate restates its constitutional right to do so in the future when considering amendments to the convention.

Condition 2: The executive branch is prohibited from providing any payment or assistance (including the transfer of inkind items) to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) without formal authorization and appropriation by Congress. This condition also mandates statutory authorization and appropriation for potential expenses such as the cost of challenge inspections should the treaty's Executive Council assess such a cost.

Despite this condition, under the convention, failure of the United States to meet its financial obligations would lead to the revocation of its right to vote in the organization after its arrears exceed the amount due in the preceding two years (Article VIII, Paragraph 8). Condition 20 (see below) seeks to address this issue, but does not appear to resolve it.

Condition 3: Requires establishment by the OPCW of an independent, internal oversight office by the end of 1997 to investigate and report on the activities of the OPCW and perform annual audits of the handling of classified information and the laboratories designated in the convention's verification annex (Part II, Paragraph 55). This condition mandates cooperation by the OPCW with the oversight office, and an annual evaluation of OPCW compliance with oversight office recommendations. If, after April 28, 1998, the president has not certified to Congress that such an office has been successfully created, 50 percent of the U.S. assessment for the OPCW budget will be withheld.

If this institutional change is not acceptable to the OPCW, the withheld U.S. assessment would eventually lead to the loss of the U.S. vote in the organization.

Condition 4: A costsharing arrangement with the OPCW will be required before the United States undertakes new research or development expenditures to improve CWC verification, and the president shall provide Congress with an annual report on cost sharing.

This reflects Senate concerns that the United States might have to assume the bulk of the cost for improving the verification system, but does not affect unilateral U.S. efforts to improve U.S. verification capabilities.

Condition 5: Before U.S. intelligence is provided to the OPCW, the president must certify to Congress that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), in consultation with the secretaries of state and defense, has established procedures to protect intelligence sources and methods. Periodic presidential reporting to appropriate congressional committees on the implementation of these measures is required. The DCI may ask for a waiver if he deems that providing certain information to the OPCW is vital to U.S. national security.

This condition addresses congressional concerns about safeguarding intelligence sources and methods in cases where the treaty requires disclosure of information to the OPCW for purposes of verification or inspection (Article IX, Paragraph 9).

Condition 6: Requires Senate advice and consent to any amendment to the CWC, in accordance with its constitutional treaty powers.

Condition 7: Requires presidential certification, prior to deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification, that the convention does not require the United States to weaken its national export controls, which are understood to be compatable with all the convention's provisions, including Article XI, Paragraph 2. The president is also required to certify that each member of the Australia Group (an informal forum of 30 states including the United States that have established common chemical and biological weapons export control measures) has informed the United States at the "highest diplomatic levels" of its understanding that its export control measures are compatible with the convention, including Article XI, Paragraph 2, and "its commitment to maintain in the future such export controls and nonproliferation measures against nonAustralia Group members." The president must also make an annual certification that the body "remains a viable mechanism" and that its effectiveness has not been undermined. In the event this certification cannot be made in the future, "the president shall consult with the Senate for the purposes of obtaining a resolution of continued adherence to the convention, notwithstanding the fundamental change in circumstance."

Condition 8: Requires the president to submit to Congress within 180 days a classified review of U.S. policy on "negative security assurances" (assurances that it will not use nuclear weapons against nonnuclearweapon states) in the event that such countries employ chemical or biological weapons against the United States, its allies or third parties. The study will include a determination of the appropriate response to such an attack in the absence of a U.S. retaliatory chemical weapons capability.

Condition 9: Requires the president to certify before the deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification, and annually thereafter, that the "legitimate commercial activities" of the U.S. chemical, biological and pharmaceutical industries are not being "significantly harmed" by convention limitations on access to and production of chemicals and toxins listed in Schedule 1 in the treaty Annex On Chemicals.

Schedule 1 chemicals are advanced chemical weapon agents and their precursors and most are not relevant to "legitimate commercial activities."

Condition 10: Requires the executive branch to offer regular briefings at least four times per year to Senate and House committees to describe all compliance issues relating to the convention and a report on U.S. efforts to resolve them, particularly with reference to actions to be considered by the OPCW. In addition, the president must submit to the Senate and House both classified and unclassified annual reports on compliance on a countrybycountry basis and on steps the United States is taking to deal with any noncompliance issues.

Condition 11: Requires the secretary of defense to ensure that U.S. forces are effectively equipped, organized and trained to carry out military missions in chemically or biologically contaminated environments. It further mandates that the secretaries of defense and state begin talks with key allies and likely coalition partners to determine the necessary steps to ensure that allied and coalition forces, as well as critical civilian personnel, are equipped and prepared to operate in such environments. It also imposes detailed, annual reporting requirements on the administration regarding the progress of these negotiations and on past, current and planned chemical and biological weapons defense activities.

Condition 12: States that nothing in the convention requires or authorizes legislation, or other action, by the United States prohibited by the U.S. Constitution, as interpreted by the United States.

Condition 13: Requires the president to consult with the Senate and take specified enforcement actions¾both unilateral and multilateral¾should he determine that "persuasive information exists" that a stateparty is violating the convention so as to threaten U.S. national security interests. Should the state of noncompliance continue for more than one year, the president shall consult with the Senate about seeking a resolution of support for continued convention adherence.

Condition 14: Requires the U.S. government not to accept any effort by Russia to condition the deposit of its instrument of ratification on U.S. financial guarantees to pay for Russia's chemical weapons destruction obligations under the 1990 U.S.Soviet Bilateral Destruction Agreement or the CWC.

This condition does not affect current U.S. support for Russian destruction of chemical weapons or future support, provided such financial assistance is not linked by Russia as a precondition to its adherence to the convention.

Condition 15: Requires the president to certify to Congress, before deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification, that the United States will not contribute to the voluntary fund for defense assistance in Article X, and will not provide assistance to statesparties that are ineligible for certain types of U.S. assistance (for example, state sponsors of international terrorism as determined by the United States) other than the provision of medical antidotes and treatment.

This condition responds to the concern that the United States would be required to assist states (such as Iran and Cuba) with defensive equipment and capabilities that convention opponents argued would enhance their potential offensive chemical weapon capabilities, or that other countries would take advantage of this provision to assist such states in this manner.

Condition 16: Requires the president to notify Congress whenever he determines there is "persuasive evidence" that an OPCW employee has willfully disclosed confidential U.S. business information that resulted in financial harm to a U.S. entity. If the president is unable to certify to Congress that immunity from jurisdiction has been waived by the OPCW for any such individual, the United States shall withhold the disbursement of half of the U.S. annual contribution to the OPCW's regular budget until the president certifies that such immunity has been waived or that the situation has been resolved.

Condition 17: States the "Sense of the Senate" that the Senate should not approve in future treaties any article or provision that would prohibit the Senate from giving its advice and consent to ratification subject to amendment or reservation. It further states that U.S. negotiators should not agree to any such convention provision in the future, and that Senate approval of past treaties with similar provisions are not precedentsetting.

Condition 18: Requires the president to certify to the Senate, before the deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification, that no samples collected in the United States (for example, soil samples obtained during an onsite inspection) will be "transferred for analysis" to any laboratory outside the United States. Such samples would have to be analyzed in U.S. laboratories.

Condition 19: Expresses the Senate's finding that the CWC would not have prevented the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo cult's sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway, and that in the future terrorists will view chemical weapons with increasing interest.

The condition fails to note that the CWC requires (Article VII) all parties to take steps, including national legislation, to prevent individuals under their jurisdiction from undertaking acts banned by the convention. Prior to the Tokyo attack there was no legislation permitting Japanese police action even though the Aum Shinrikyo cult was suspected of chemical weapon activity.

Condition 20: States the "Sense of the Senate" that the United States should not lose its vote in the OPCW if it is more than two years in arrears in its assessment as required by Article VIII, Section A, since voting is permitted in the OPCW despite financial payments owed, as long as such nonpayment "is due to conditions beyond the control of the member." The Senate's declared view is that U.S. nonpayment would fall under this exception, and the United States should be allowed to vote in the OPCW in the event that Congress does not appropriate the full amount of U.S. financial assessments for the OPCW, since the Congress is beyond the control of the executive branch.

By this condition, the Senate seeks to build a case against U.S. loss of its voting privileges as a consequence of several Senate conditions within the resolution of ratification that require dues to be withheld in certain circumstances.

Condition 21: States the "Sense of the Senate" that the OnSite Inspection Agency (OSIA) of the Department of Defense should provide assistance in advance of all routine and challenge inspections in the United States, with the consent of the owner or operator of the inspected facility.

Condition 22: This provision sets a $25 million financial cap on the regular annual U.S. contributions to the OPCW, adjustable for inflation at three year intervals notwithstanding the provisions on financing in Article VIII, Section A, Paragraph 7. This cap may be waived by a joint resolution of Congress if the president certifies in a statement to Congress that national security interests or the OPCW's ability to conduct challenge inspections are at stake. Costs of U.S. chemical weapons disposal are not included in this cap.

Condition 23: Requires presidential notification, with a subsequent report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, whenever additions to the treaty's list of scheduled chemicals are proposed. The report will detail the impact of the change on U.S. industry, including a costbenefit analysis and an assessment of the impact of the CWC verification process on the United States. The condition also requires the president to consult with Congress as to whether the United States should object to the proposed addition.

Condition 24: Reaffirms the applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally based principles of treaty interpretation that the "shared understanding" between the executive branch and the Senate remains binding and unalterable unless the convention is resubmitted to the Senate.

Beginning with its 1988 ratification of the IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Senate has included this as a condition, termed the "Biden Amendment," in all the subsequent arms control treaties it has ratified.

Condition 25: The Senate declares its intent to consider for approval all international agreements that obligate the United States to reduce or limit the armed forces or armaments in a militarily significant way pursuant only to the treaty powers set forth in the Constitution.

This condition has been attached to major arms control treaties in recent years to discourage the executive branch from using the option for amending the treaty by executive agreements approved by a majority of both the House and Senate.

Condition 26: Requires the president to certify to Congress that the United States is not restricted by the CWC in the use of riot control agents, including against combatants in a number of circumstances, including: (1) the conduct of peacetime military operations when the United States is not a party to the conflict (such as recent use of U.S. forces in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda); (2) consensual peacekeeping operations when the use of force is authorized by the receiving state, including operations pursuant to Chapter VI of the UN Charter; and (3) peacekeeping operations when force is authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

The language of this condition has been crafted in an attempt to avoid a direct conflict with the language of Article I, Paragraph 5, which states: "Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare." This is a gray area and some parties to the convention may question whether this condition is consistent with the convention.

Condition 27: Requires presidential certification prior to deposit of the U.S. instrument of ratification that the United States is continuing to pursue alternative technologies for chemical weapons destruction, "in order to ensure that the U.S. has the safest, most effective and environmentally sound" method to meet its destruction obligations and that the deadline for destruction of chemical weapons, set by previous legislation for 2004, is superseded by the CWC deadline of April 29, 2007. This condition declares that the United States may change its destruction technology at any time, and that the president, after consultation with Congress, may request an extension from the Executive Council if additional time is needed for destruction utilizing alternative technologies.

Condition 28: Requires the president to certify to Congress that a criminal search warrant will be obtained for any U.S. facility subject to challenge inspection, if consent of the owner or operator has been withheld. For routine inspections of declared facilities where consent has been withheld, an administrative search warrant from a U.S. magistrate judge is required.

This responds to concerns that U.S. citizens and businesses might be subject to unreasonable searches and seizures by the OPCW, that would contravene their rights under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.

Clinton Moves Closer to Easing Limits On Arms Sales to Latin America


Wade Boese

THE CLINTON administration appears poised to end a two-decade-old policy of restricting sales of U.S. high-tech weapons, such as fighter aircraft and advanced missiles, to Latin America. During the first week of April, the administration announced that it granted Lockheed Martin and McDonnell Douglas, manufacturers of the F-16 and F/A-18, respectively, authorization to provide technical specifications and marketing information on these aircraft to Chile.

Administration officials insist that although a two-year policy review of the informal ban is not yet complete, the administration did not want to "disadvantage" any U.S. firms in competition for future sales if the policy is eventually altered.

Chile is seeking to modernize its air force with a purchase of at least 20 advanced fighters. To be considered for the sale, Lockheed Martin and McDonnell Douglas were permitted to submit the information to meet a Chilean deadline of March 31, 1997. Chilean interest and expectations concerning the potential availability of the F-16s and F/A-18s increased following the appearance of the fighters at a March 1996 airshow in Chile after their having been excluded from a previous Latin American airshow in 1994. Other aircraft vying for the sale include the Swedish JAS39 Gripen (which is also subject to the restrictions because the aircraft contain a large percentage estimated at 30 percent of U.S.-made components), the French Mirage 20005, and the Russian MiG-29. Brazil is also considering a modernization of its air force in the near future.


The Latin American Market

Although the Latin American arms market is relatively small, competition in the estimated $500 million annual market is intensifying. The region accounted for 3.3 percent of all international arms deliveries in 1995, but this represented a second consecutive year of growth after five years of steady decline. Recent military modernization programs by Latin American nations are responsible for the market's upswing. Despite the unilateral restrictions on high-tech equipment, the United States is still the leading arms supplier to Latin America, accounting for 26 percent of the value of arms deliveries between 1992 and 1995.

Since 1978, the United States has adhered to a policy of "severe restraint" on hightech weapons exports to Latin America. President Jimmy Carter imposed the restrictions in response to widespread human rights abuses by the region's dictatorships and military regimes. One of those dictators, General Augusto Pinochet, still serves as the commander-in-chief of Chile's army. Venezuela's purchase of 24 F-16s in 1981 stands as the only previous exception to the policy.

Support for modifying the restrictions has steadily accumulated during the Clinton administration's policy review. Military contractors, with the support of the Pentagon, have been urging the administration to allow new sales to the region. Their efforts received a boost in December 1996 when then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher, an earlier advocate of retaining the ban, signed a memorandum with then-Secretary of Defense William Perry urging President Clinton to change the policy. Perry's successor, William Cohen, firmly supports replacing the current restrictions with the standard U.S. policy of a case-by-case approach.

Advocates of a policy change contend that the current restrictions are outdated since all Latin American nations, except Cuba, have democratically elected governments and growing economies. A favored justification is that foreign firms will supply the weapons if U.S. firms do not, and that results in the loss of U.S. jobs. This argument prompted 38 Senators and 79 House members to sign a mid-1996 letter to Christopher requesting a removal of the restrictions.

Critics of the proposed policy change say the region's democracies are fragile and remain susceptible to a disproportionate amount of influence from their militaries. Many argue that in a region where one-half of the population lives in poverty, spending approximately $25 million per aircraft is unnecessary.

Another concern is that new U.S. sales could initiate an arms race and destabilize the present security environment. Argentina, a vocal opponent of Chile's impending acquisition, has repeatedly raised the specter of a new arms race. Only last November State Department deputy spokesman Glyn Davies expressed "concern" and "disappointment" over Peru's purchase of 12 Belarussian MiG-29s because it could provoke an arms race. Administration officials have not said whether new U.S. transfers of similar high-tech weaponry could have the same effect.

Most observers agree that the recent developments indicate an impending change in policy. Only very rarely will the U.S. government allow American firms to compete for a sale and then disapprove of it if the firm succeeds in winning the bid. Defense Secretary Cohen said April 15 that he expected a decision to be made within the next "month or two."

Russian Proposal for CFE Adaptation Seeks New Limits on NATO Arms


Sarah Walkling

IN RESPONSE to NATO's initial proposal for adapting the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, Russia released its own working paper on April 22. While both proposals advocate placing national limits on parties' heavy conventional weapons, the Russian "basic elements" of adaptation goes further than the NATO proposal toward strengthening constraints on NATO, and also gives Moscow more flexibility in stationing conventional weapons.

The 1990 CFE Treaty places equal limits on the number of battle tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters deployed between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains by NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries. (The accord now comprises 30 statesparties.) The treaty also draws geographical zones for sublimits on ground equipment, to move concentrations of weapons away from the former Central European front.

The treaty parties have acknowledged a need to alter the basic CFE structure to adjust for the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, tensions in the Caucasus and the impending expansion of NATO. At the December 1996 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe summit in Lisbon, Portugal, they adopted a document defining the "scope and parameters" of the process. Adaptation talks have been ongoing since January 1997 in the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) in Vienna, where NATO presented its February 20 proposal for basic elements of an adaptation agreement. (See ACT, March 1997.)

In a measure intended to constrain the NATO alliance as it expands, Moscow's proposal calls for barring the permanent stationing of foreign treatylimited equipment (TLE) "in areas where they do not exist at present," and insists that "we must not increase holdings in areas where they do exist." Moscow is not satisfied with the concept introduced by NATO of "territorial ceilings," which would limit the sum of national and stationed foreign ground equipment on the territory of a stateparty. It also opposes the creation of additional zonal limits, such as NATO's proposed new Central European zone, where territorial ceilings would not exceed the weapons entitlements of each country.

NATO, in its February proposal, offers significant reductions in its ground equipment. Its call for all statesparties to cut their TLE entitlements has led to a counterproposal from Russia to lower the current equipment ceilings only for a group or alliance (currently, only NATO would be subject to this proposed category) without requiring similar reductions for states that do not belong to an alliance. Russian officials argue that, through such asymmetrical reductions, the current 3:1 disparity between NATO and Russian forces could be reduced. Russia dropped this provision when its Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright discussed CFE adaptation at their May 2 meeting in Moscow, but still plans to push for measures that would help correct the NATORussian imbalance in heavy weapons.

While the Russian proposal states that with the combination of national and alliance limits "zonal limitations in the classical sense would be superfluous," Russian officials emphasize that they do not advocate eliminating the current zonal limits on Central Europe and the treaty's "flank" regions.

The Russian proposal also calls for abolishing the permanent storage site limits and for transferring all equipment located in these sites to active units. This measure would allow Russia to transfer approximately 3,700 heavy weapons from stored to active status. The NATO plan, in contrast, proposes transferring 20 percent of stored equipment to active units and destroying the remainder as a means of reducing overall conventional forces in Europe.

The ongoing JCG negotiations in Vienna are attempting to reconcile the positions of the two sides and to conclude an adaptation framework by summer. Intensive negotiations on basic elements of CFE adaptation are expected to begin after the May 27 NATORussian summit in Paris.

April 1997 Bibliography



Compiled by James Perez


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Larson, Deborah Welch. Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.Soviet Relations During the Cold War, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1997, 329pp.

Military Capacity and the Risk of War: China, India, Pakistan and Iran, Eric Arnett, ed., Oxford University Press, 1997, 367pp.



"Arms Control and the Helsinki Summit: Issues and Obstacles in the Second Clinton Term," Arms Control Today, March 1997, pp.915. (An ACA Panel Discussion With Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., Jack Mendelsohn, John Rhinelander and John Steinbruner.)

Chubin, Shahram. Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Persian Gulf Case, Occasional Paper 33, The Henry L. Stimson Center, March 1997, 45pp. Ph.(202)2235956.

Diamond, Howard. "CD Ends First Session of 1997 Without Mandates for Negotiations," Arms Control Today, March 1997, p.27.

In Praise of Weapons Control," The Economist, May 10, 1997, pp.1516.

Mandelbaum, Michael. "The PostCold War Settlement in Europe: A Triumph of Arms Control," Arms Control Today, March 1997, pp.38.

Mendelsohn, Jack. "Arms Control: The Unfinished Agenda," Current History, April 1997, pp.145150.

Mendelsohn, Jack and Craig Cerniello. "The Arms Control Agenda At the Helsinki Summit," Arms Control Today, March 1997, pp.1618.


Deen, Thalif. "USA Accuses Saddam of Stalling on Scud' Motors," Jane's Defence Weekly, March 19, 1997, p.5.



Dean, Jonathan. The Road Beyond START: How Far Should We Go? The Atlantic Council of the United States, March 1997, 26pp. Ph.(202)7784945.

Erlich, Jeff. "Obstacles Are Ahead For Nuke Reduction," Defense News, March 2430,1997, p.60.

Keeny, Spurgeon M., Jr. "Helsinki: A Pyrrhic Victory?" Arms Control Today, March 1997, p.2.

Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. "It's Time to Break the Nuclear Monopoly," The Christian Science Monitor, April 29, 1997, p.18.

Mann, Paul. "Helsinki Summit Spurs Strategic Partnership," Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 31, 1997, pp.2427.

"Military Can Meet Threat with 2,000 Nukes, But Not Less, Official Says," Inside the Air Force, March 28, 1997, p.12.

Richter, Paul. "U.S. Nuclear Cuts Could Increase Risk to Civilians, Expert Warns," The Los Angeles Times, March 28, 1997, p.9.


"Chinese Submarine to Test Missile Derivative," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 16, 1997, p.15.

Donnelly, John. "China SLBM Can Target U.S. By 2007, Navy Intel Says," Defense Week, April 7, 1997, p.2.

"Russia Scraps 19 Nuclear Missiles," The Washington Times, April 2, 1997, p.A13.



Gerth, Jeff. "Officials Say China Illegally Sent U.S. Equipment to Military Plant," The New York Times, April 23, 1997, p.A1.

Mihollin, Gary. "China Cheats (What a Surprise!)" The New York Times, April 24, 1997, p.A35.



"Army Uses Russian Scuds to Test Patriot Missile Crews," The Boston Globe, May 1, 1997, p.23.

Dornheim, Michael A. "THAAD Second Source Unlikely, Army Says," Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 24, 1997, p.33.

Erlanger, Steven. "White House Defends Missile Accord," The New York Times, March 25, 1997, p.A6.

Erlich, Jeff. "Quick Start Could Stop IsraeliU.S. Laser Effort," Defense News, May 511, 1997, p.1.

Erlich, Jeff. "U.S. To Stand by THAAD Despite Arrow II Success," Defense News, March 1723, 1997, p.30.

Evers, Stacey. "Contractors Join Up on National Missile Defence," Jane's Defence Weekly, March 26, 1997, p.6.

Hughes, David. "Next Arrow Test This Summer After Scoring Direct Hit," Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 24, 1997, p.34.

Janssen Lok, Joris and Barbara Starr. "Japan to Test Ballistic Missile Defence System," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 2, 1997, p.8.

Lara, Belén. ATBM Systems and European Security, UNISCI Papers No.6. Madrid, 1997, 82pp. Ph. 34 1 394 29 24

"THAAD In Need of Major Restructuring," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 30, 1997, p.3.

Ruane, Michael E. "U.S. Looks to Lasers to Destroy Missiles," The Philadelphia Inquirer, April 8, 1997, p.1.

Starr, Barbara. "Extra $50m Is Needed to Fully Test U.S.Israeli Laser," Janes Defence Weekly, May 7, 1997, p.17.



Arkin, William M and Robert S. Norris. The Internet and the Bomb: A Research Guide to Policy and Information about Nuclear Weapons, NRDC, April 1997, 159pp. Ph.(202)2896868.

Diamond, Howard, "U.S. Investigating Computer Exports To Russian Nuclear Weapons Labs," Arms Control Today, March 1997, p.25.

Gertz, Bill. "GOP Senator Hits Clinton Policy," The Washington Times, April 18, 1997, p.A8.

Gordon, Michael R. "Ukraine Decides Not to Supply Key Parts for Iranian Reactor," The New York Times, April 15, 1997, p.A12.

"Israel Reportedly Aided S. Africa With Narms," The Washington Times, April 23, 1997, p.A12.

Opall, Barbara. "White House Resists Tighter Rein on Supercomputer Sales," Defense News, April 28May 4,1997, p.4.

Preston, Thomas. "From Lambs to Lions':Nuclear Proliferation's Grand Reshuffling of Interstate Security Relationships," Cooperation and Conflict, March 1997, pp.79117.



"2 Arrested in Macedonia in Attempt to Sell Uranium," The Baltimore Sun, April 4, 1997, p.2.

PohlingBrown, Pamela. "The Plutonium Mountain: Preventing Diversion," Jane's Defence Contracts, April 1997, pp.57.

Shridhar, D. "India Needs FMCT Strategy," Defense News, March 1723, 1997, p.27.

Wald, Matthew L. "Danger From Uranium Waste Grows as Government Considers Its Fate," The New York Times, March 25, 1997, p.A14.

Woellert, Lorraine. "Nuclear Waste on Wake Island?" The Washington Times, April 14, p.A1.



"Government Plans a Pair Of Underground Blasts," The New York Times, April 5, 1997, p.A11.

Preserving the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Under the Comprehensive Test Ban, CBO Papers, May 1997, 77pp.

Vartabedian, Ralph. "Plan to Build Nuclear Weapons Facilities Is Illegal, Suit Says," The Los Angeles Times, May 1, 1997, p.B5.



Barner, Tim and Jonathan Dean. A Global Treaty For Reducing Conventional Arms and Armed Conflict, Task Force on Peace and Security, Union of Concerned Scientists, February 28, 1997, 27pp. Ph.(202)3320900.

Lelyveld, Michael S. "Bill Backed By Rights Groups Has Weapons Exporters Up In Arms," The Journal of Commerce, April 28, 1997, p.1.

"NATO Forces Destroy Missing' Weapons," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 23, 1997, p.12.

Priest, Dana. "Global AntiLand Mine Coalition Targets Past Producers," The Washington Post, April 18, 1997, p.A26.

"Upcoming Summit Could Put U.S. on Hot Seat Regarding Landmine Ban," Inside the Pentagon, April 3, 1997, p.17.

Walkling, Sarah. "NATO Presents Initial Proposal For Adaptation of CFE Treaty," Arms Control Today, March 1997, p.24.

Walkling, Sarah. "111 States Consider Draft Treaty Banning AntiPersonnel Landmines," Arms Control Today, March 1997, p.23.

Waller, Douglas. "How Washington Works¼Arms Deals," Time, April 14, 1997, p.48.



Dewar, Helen. "Senate Approves Chemical Arms Pact After Clinton Pledge," The Washington Post, April 25, 1997, p.A1.

Evers, Stacey. "U.S. Cities Will Be Aided Against Toxic Attack," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 23, 1997, p.6.

Hockstader, Lee. "Russia Refused to Ratify Chemical Weapons Ban," The Washington Post, April 26, 1997, p.A22.

Karniol, Robert. "China Supplied Iran With Decontamination Agent," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 30, 1997, p.17.

Landay, Jonathan S. "Iran May Pose First Test of ChemicalArms Ban," The Christian Science Monitor, April 28, 1997, p.3.

Lippman, Thomas W. and Peter Baker. "Bipartisanship, But at a Price," The Washington Post, April 25, 1997, p.A1.

Leklem, Erik J. "Majority Leader Emerges As Key To Fate of CWC in Senate," Arms Control Today, March 1997, p.22.

Scarborough, Rowan. "China Helps Iran Develop Chemical Arms," The Washington Times, April 11, 1997, p.A1.

Shenon, Philip. "Weapons Expert Tells of Possible Iraqi Gas Attacks in Gulf War," The New York Times, April 25, 1997, p.A17.

Shenon, Philip. "Rights Group Suspects Yugolslav Army May Have Chemical Arms," The New York Times, March 28, 1997, p.A5.

Starr, Barbara. "CIA Admits Difficulties in Analysing Iraqi CW Sites," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 16, 1997, p.4.




Averre, Derek. "Export Controls and the Global Market: The Southern Vector in Russia's Arms Exports," The Monitor, Winter 1997, pp.17. Ph.(706)5422985.

Brzezinski, Matthew. "SinoRussian Warmth Chills the West," The Wall Street Journal, April 25, 1997, p.10.

Cerniello, Craig. "GoreChernomyrdin Commission Expands Cooperative Measures," Arms Control Today, March 1997, p.26.

Cold War International History Project Bulletin, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. Winter 1996/1997, 422pp. Ph.(202)3572967.

Hockstader, Lee. "Russia, China Sign New Friendship Pact," The Washington Post, April 24, 1997, p.A27.

Yulish, Charles B. "Status of the U.S. and Russian Megatons to Megawatts' Program," The Monitor, Winter 1997, pp.1214. Ph.(706)5422985.


Buhayer, Constantine Tim. "Greeks Go On Alert Over Albania crisis," Jane's Intelligence Rev & Jane's Sentinel Pointer, May 1997, p.2.

Dobbs, Michael. "U.S.Russia Talks on NATO Charter Stall," The Washington Post, May 1, 1997, p.A21.

Dobbs, Michael. "Lobbying for NATO Spot Intensifies," The Washington Post, April 27, 1997, p.A26.

Friedman, Thomas L. "ByeBye NATO," The New York Times, April 14, 1997, p.A25.

Gilman, Benjamin A. "How to Expand NATO," The Washington Times, April 23, 1997, p.A17.

Graham, Bradley. "Clinton Naming Army Gen. Clark as Top NATO Commander," The Washington Post, March 31, 1997, p.A6.

Rosner, Jeremy D. "Nato Enlargement," Armed Forces Journal, April 1997, pp.810.

Schweid, Barry. "Russia Pushes for NATO Guarantees," The Washington Times, May 2, 1997, p.A17.

Sloan, Stanley R. NATO Enlargement and the Former European Neutrals, CRS, February 18, 1997, 6pp.


Arnett, Eric. "Iran Made Rocket Motor Test, Says Israeli General," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 23, 1997, p.4.

"Iraq Is Hiding Weapons, Inspector Says," The Baltimore Sun, April 25, 1997, p.22.

"Israel Claims That Syria Is Making VX Nerve Gas," Jane's Defence Weekly, May 7, 1997, p.6.

"Israel: Iran Could Build Nodong in Two Years," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 30, 1997, p.5.

Finnegan, Philip. "Saudis Study Missile Buy To Replace Aging Arsenal," Defense News, March 1723, 1997, p.3.

Lancaster, John. "U.S. Presses to Put More Arms in Gulf States' Bulging Arsenals," The Washington Post, April 4, 1997, p.A16.

Sayed, Abdulhay. "The Future of the Israeli Nuclear Force and the Middle East Peace Process," Security Dialogue, March 1997, pp.3148.

Steinberg, Gerald M. "Deterrence and Middle East Stability: An Israeli Perspective," Security Dialogue, March 1997, pp.4956.


Bedi, Rahul. "India Urged to Take Agni to its Logical Conclusion,'" Jane's Defence Weekly, May 7, 1997, p.5.

Briscoe, David. "China's Missile Capacity Is Growing, Pentagon Says," The Philaelphia Inquirer, Apri 10, 1997, p.18.

Browne, Andrew. "Defector's Scenario Sees Sea of Flames' for South," The Washington Times, April 23, 1997, p.A11.

Cooper, Kenneth J. "For India, Pakistan, Just Talking Is a Start," The Washington Post, March 27, 1997, p.A35.

Diamond, Howard. "The Korea Deal: Advantage U.S." The Washington Post, April 17, 1997, p.A23.

Faison, Seth. "Gingrich Warns China That U.S. Would Step In to Defend Taiwan," The New York Times, March 31, 1997, p.A1.

Gertz, Bill. "Beijing Creates Military Monster," The Washington Times, April 10, 1997, p.A1.

Gertz, Bill. "N. Korea Could Opt For War, U.S. Told," The Washington Times, April 24, 1997, p.A3.

Gilinsky, Victor and Henry Sokolski. "Korea: How Long Do We Live With Blackmail?" The Washington Post, March 27, 1997, p.A27.

Goshko, John M. "North Korea Again Balks at Resumption of Peace Talks," The Washington Post, April 21, 1997, p.A22.

Hoffman, David. "Border Pact Signed by Asia Powers," The Washington Post, April 25, 1997, p.A31.

Karniol, Robert. "F16s, Mirage 20005s, IDFs Boost Taiwan Force," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 23, 1997, p.15.

Opall, Barbara. "ASEAN Economic Strength Bolsters Security," Defense News, March 31April 6, 1997, p.6.

Sokolski, Henry. "Our OpenEnded' Deal With Korea," The Washington Post, April 24, 1997, p.A24.

Starr, Barbara. "China Could Overwhelm' Regional Missile Shield," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 23, 1997, p.16.

Sullivan, Kevin. "N. Korea Has AWeapons Defector Quoted as Saying," The Washington Post, April 23, 1997, p.A23.

Thornton, Thomas. "Easing India and Pakistan Toward the Table," The Christian Science Monitor, March 19, 1997, p.19.


Bailey Hutchison, Kay. "Policy Lag on Latin America," The Washington Times, April 20, 1997, p.B3.

Cardamone, Thomas A., Jr. Initiatives for South American Conventional Arms Control, Council for a Livable World Education Fund, April 1997, 26pp. Ph.(202)5460795.

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Nicaragua and El Salvador, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, New York: 1997, 244pp.

May, Michael A. "Arms Exclusion Divides Latin Allies," Jane's Intelligence Review & Jane's Sentinel Pointer, May 1997, p.14.

"Reckless Salesmanship on Arms," The New York Times, April 22, 1997, p.A22.

Sims, Calvin. "Latins See Dickering on Sale of Jets to Chile as End of U.S. Ban," The New York Times, April 7, 1997, p.A9.



Graham, Bradley. "Cohen Weighing Three Possible Courses for Shape of Future U.S. Military," The Washington Post, April 4, 1997, p.A4.

Kosiak, Steven M. Analysis of the Fiscal Year 1998 Defense Budget Request, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, March 1997, 40pp. Ph.(202)3317990.

Wilson, George C. "QDR Panel Grows¼Again," The Army Times, April 21, 1997, p.27.



Barber, Ben and Warren P. Strobel. "Consolidation at State Wins Clinton's Support," The Washington Times, April 18, 1997, p.A1.

Cohen, William S. Annual Report for the President and the Congress, April 1997, 320pp. Available through the U.S. Government Printing Office.

Global Focus, A New Foreign Policy Agenda, 19971998, Tom Barry and Martha Honey, eds., Interhemispheric Resource Center and Institute for Policy Studies, 1997, 282pp. Ph.(505)3880208.

DOE Sets First 'Subcritical' Test for June

The Department of Energy (DOE) announced on April 4 that it would conduct the first in a series of "subcritical" experiments deep underground at the Nevada Test Site in June 1997, with the second experiment to follow this fall. The experiments, which will utilize high explosives and fissile materials (including plutonium) but not generate any nuclear yield, are part of DOE's ScienceBased Stockpile Stewardship program designed to ensure the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal under the recently signed Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty. The treaty prohibits "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion." The experiments will, among other things, provide additional information on the behavior of weapons materials and components, allowing for improved computer simulations of nuclear explosions.

The first subcritical experiment was originally scheduled for June 1996, during the final stages of the CTB Treaty negotiations. DOE postponed it at the last minute, however, claiming that more time was needed to assess the environmental implications of such experiments. (See ACT, July 1996.)

The subcritical experiments remain controversial. Some critics have argued that the experiments will undermine the CTB Treaty because they will be perceived by some as an attempt by the United States to qualitatively improve its nuclear arsenal contrary to the spirit of the treaty. Other critics have argued that because they will be conducted underground at the Nevada Test Site, the experiments will complicate future verification efforts by establishing the precedent for continuing activities at former test sites. DOE has maintained, however, that the experiments are consistent with the CTB Treaty because they are not nuclear explosions and the treaty permits continued activities at former test sites.


Clinton Announces Reorganization Plan, ACDA To Lose Independent Status

Jack Mendelsohn

ON APRIL 18 the White House, through the vice president's office, announced that President Bill Clinton had approved a two-year reorganization plan for the nation's foreign affairs agencies. In the words of a White House fact sheet, the plan is designed to bring "an end to bureaucracies originally designed for the Cold War."

Specifically, the plan calls for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) to be fully integrated into the State Department within one year, for the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) to be integrated over a two-year period, and for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to remain a distinct agency but under the "direct authority and foreign policy guidance" of the secretary of state. The overall reorganization of the foreign affairs agencies, of which ACDA's integration is only a small part, is to be undertaken by a group of eight task forces which will have approximately 60 days to complete their work.

The State Department had sought, since the beginning of the Clinton administration, to absorb ACDA, which was created in 1961 under President John F. Kennedy. Earlier efforts (in 199394) to eliminate the agency were rebuffed by a Democratic Congress. But a Republican-dominated Congress and the hostage-taking tactics of Senator Jesse Helms (RNC), who refused to take up the Chemical Weapons Convention until the adminstration had committed itself to reorganize the foreign affairs bureaucracy, resulted in the administration's April decision to disestablish ACDA and USIA.

The framework for ACDA's integration into the State Department was worked out in early 1997 between Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and ACDA Director John Holum and ultimately approved by the president. Holum, who admitted that "the thought of being ACDA's last director is painful," claims that he was "totally convinced that the president's decision will materially strengthen the arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament missions and the entire foreign affairs structure."

According to U.S. officials, the consolidation plan calls for ACDA and the current Political-Military Bureau in the Department of State to be combined and reorganized into two or three bureaus with responsibility for regional security (including arms transfers) and arms control and nonproliferation. All arms control responsibilities currently residing in other State Department bureaus (such as funding for some international agreements, which is handled in the International Organizations Bureau, and responsibility for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty negotiations, which is currently lodged in the European Bureau) are to be transferred to these new bureaus.

The new bureaus resulting from this merger will report to an undersecretary of state for international security, arms control and nonproliferation. The exact title for this undersecretary slot is yet to be determined, but the position is currently held by Lynn Davis, who is leaving the government in the near future. Holum is slated to assume the post on an acting basis pending confirmation.

According to the interagency agreement, the undersecretary of state in charge of the arms control function will have the right, unique in the executive branch, to communicate directly with the president through the secretary of state, to attend all National Security Council (NSC) and principals meetings on arms control and nonproliferation issues, and to voice his opinion on these issues separately from the secretary of state. The intent of this arrangement is to preserve an independent voice for arms control, but critics of the consolidation argue that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to maintain for very long such a role for an undersecretary.

To support the arms control function within the State Department, a verification and compliance unit separate from the State Departments's Bureau of Intelligence and Research will be attached to the undersecretary's office. Other ACDA offices which are duplicative of existing bureaus in the State Department, such as public affairs, administration and congressional liaison, will be eliminated.

To protect the rights, responsibilities and authority of the new undersecretary for arms control, this reorganization will ultimately have to be spelled out either in legislation or in an executive order. But Congress has begun to discuss its own ideas for reorganization in the House International Relations Committee, with the introduction of "The Foreign Policy Reform Act," which is to be taken up by the full House in early June. It is unclear at this writing whether the administration's plan for ACDA integration will be preempted by a congressional reorganization bill.

Of major concern to supporters of arms control is the loss of an independent voice on this issue within the executive branch, as well as the fear that the potentially enhanced arms control function to be created within the State Department will inevitably fall victim to bureaucratic predation or indifference. Lurking in the background is the equally disturbing realization that any congressionally mandated consolidation is likely to downplay even further the role of arms control in the executive branch.


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