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– Hans Blix,
former IAEA Director-General

Press Releases

MEDIA ADVISORY: Head of CTBTO Describes Inspection Option for North Korea Nuclear Test Site

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New Analysis by CTBTO Executive Secretary Lassina Zerbo Published in Arms Control Today

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New Analysis by CTBTO Executive Secretary Lassina Zerbo Published in Arms Control Today

For Immediate Release: Oct. 18, 2018

Media Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, publisher, Arms Control Today, 202-463-8270 ext. 107; Kirstie Hansen, CTBTO Public Information Officer in Vienna, [email protected]

(Washington, D.C.)—Earlier this year, North Korea committed to closing its nuclear test site and invited journalists to view the destruction of test tunnels at its main nuclear test site.

As Dr. Lassina Zerbo writes in a new article in the journal Arms Control Today, “although the declared closure is welcome, those present lacked the skills and necessary specialized equipment to assess the activities that took place.”

The U.S. State Department issued a statement Oct. 7 indicating that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un “invited inspectors to visit the Punggye-ri nuclear test site to confirm that it has been irreversibly dismantled.” To date, it is not clear who would inspect the site and under what terms.

“The CTBTO and its technological tools,” Zerbo writes, “are uniquely placed to provide adequate verification and to monitor an end to nuclear tests in North Korea.”

Zerbo, who is serving in his second term as the Executive Secretary of the CTBTO, describes in detail the technologies the CTBTO can provide to verify the closure of a nuclear test site, and, he explains the value of North Korean signature and ratification of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) for the denuclearization process.

“The path to the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula runs through the CTBT,” Zerbo writes. The CTBT has been signed by 184 states and ratified by 167. North Korea is not yet a signatory.

A large group of foreign ministers issued a joint statement Sept. 27 organized by Japan, Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands urging North Korea “to sign and ratify the CTBT as a matter of priority.”

“It is vital not to miss this opportunity to demonstrate to the world the value of the treaty and the efficacy of one of the most sophisticated and far-reaching verification regimes ever devised,” Zerbo says in the article.

The Nuclear Test Ban and the Verifiable Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” by Lassina Zerbo will appear in the November 2018 issue of Arms Control Today. It is available in advance online here

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Posted: October 18, 2018

Pompeo Must Seize the Diplomatic Opportunity with North Korea

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Hesitation on the part of either side at this point could collapse the fragile diplomatic opportunity that currently exists.

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The stage is set for U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to jump-start the stalled denuclearization and peace negotiations with North Korea. As outlined in the Sept. 19 North-South Pyongyang Summit Declaration, Kim Jong-un has said he is willing to permanently dismantle the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, as the United States takes corresponding measures, such as supporting a joint political declaration on the end of the Korean War.

The Yongbyon complex is North Korea's major nuclear weapons production site. It includes a 5-megawatt research reactor that produces spent fuel; a reprocessing plant that separates weapons-usable plutonium; and a uranium enrichment facility, among other facilities.

A verifiable shutdown of Yongbyon would make it harder for North Korea to further expand its fissile stockpile which could be enough for 16 to 60 nuclear warheads, create momentum for further action-for-action steps, and help buy time for the long and difficult negotiations on further steps on the road toward denuclearization and peace on the Korean peninsula.

As the foreign ministers of Japan, Australia, the European Union, and dozens of other states suggested in a joint statement last week, North Korea should take another denuclearization step: signing and ratifying the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and allowing experts from the CTBT Organization to visit the Punggye-ri test site to confirm its closure.

A joint end of war declaration would ease tensions, build confidence and in no way adversely affect the very strong U.S.-South Korean political and defense alliance, or the ability of U.S. forces in South Korea to deter and defend from any North Korean military provocation.

Hesitation on the part of either side at this point could collapse the fragile diplomatic opportunity that currently exists.

For further information, see the Arms Control Association’s Oct. 3 edition of the “North Korea Denuclearization Digest” available online at https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2018-10-03/inaugural-issue-north-korea-denuclearization-digest-october-3-2018

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Posted: October 5, 2018

The Third Inter-Korean Summit: A Catalyst for Denuclearization and Peace on the Peninsula?

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For Immediate Release: Sept. 17, 2018

Media Contacts: Daryl Kimball, executive director, 202-463-8270 ext 107

This week, South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong-un of North Korea will meet in Pyongyang for only the third Inter-Korean Summit, with a focus on steps to advance their Panmunjeon Declaration and on how to jump-start the U.S.-North Korean talks on denuclearization and peace, which has stalled since the Trump-Kim Summit in Singapore.

Today, the UN Security Council will meet in emergency session to discuss enforcement of sanctions against North Korea designed to pressure Pyongyang to negotiate.

Arms Control Association has several background resources and experts available for interview.


QUICK QUOTES:

  • "President Trump did the right thing, trading in violent rhetoric for an opportunity for dialogue. There are dozens of reasons to distrust North Korea’s approach to negotiations and to doubt the capability of the Trump administration to negotiate a meaningful, verifiable denuclearization of North Korea. But the pursuit of negotiation is far preferable to simply sleepwalking toward war, as we seemed to be doing a year ago.” —Thomas Countryman, former assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation, and chair of the ACA board of directors
     
  • “The Singapore summit communiqué underscores that progress on denuclearization depends on joint 'efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime' on the Korean peninsula. Kim is not going to give up nuclear weapons if he believes doing so will compromise North Korea’s security. Progress on denuclearization steps—such as a freeze on fissile material production and a declaration detailing North Korea’s program— depends on U.S. support for a joint political declaration on the end of the Korean War.” —Daryl Kimball, executive director


NEWS & ANALYSIS:


FACT SHEETS:


EXPERTS AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON:

Contact Tony Fleming, director for communications, 202 463 8270 ext 110/ 202 213 6856 (mobile) to schedule.

  • Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, [email protected], 202-277-3478
  • Thomas Countryman, former Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, and chair of the board for the Arms Control Association, [email protected], 301-312-3445

Posted: September 17, 2018

Addressing the Risks of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Through the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

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Technologies now in development could endow machines with the capacity to search for, identify, and kill humans on the battlefield or to hunt for and destroy an adversary’s nuclear deterrent systems, possibly igniting a nuclear exchange.

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For Immediate Release: September 7, 2018

Media Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, (202) 463-8270 ext. 107; Michael Klare, senior visiting fellow, (202) 463-8270

The widespread deployment of highly autonomous weapons—systems capable of operating with minimal human oversight—is likely to transform the future battlefield, accelerating the pace of fighting and delegating many critical battle decisions to machines. Technologies now in development could endow machines with the capacity to search for, identify, and kill humans on the battlefield or to hunt for and destroy an adversary’s nuclear deterrent systems, possibly igniting a nuclear exchange.

We agree with a growing number of governmental and nongovernmental experts that the unregulated deployment of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) could lead to violations of the Law of War and international humanitarian law and increase the risk of uncontrolled escalation in a major-power crisis.

We call upon responsible states to promptly pursue multilateral negotiations on a legally-binding instrument to ensure meaningful human control over weapons of war and decisions to employ the lethal use of force.

For four years, signatory states to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)—a treaty signed in 1980 with the aim of eliminating munitions deemed excessively cruel or injurious—have sought to assess the potential dangers posed by autonomous weapons and to consider whether new measures were needed to control them. Most recently this investigative task was entrusted to a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), which most recently met Aug. 27-31 in Geneva.

A significant number of governments have concluded that the use of fully autonomous weapons can never be reconciled with international humanitarian law and have advocated the adoption of a legally binding ban on such munitions; others have called for a nonbinding measure incorporating some basic principles on LAWS, like the necessity for ultimate human control; while a small minority, including the world’s major weapons producers, Russia and the United States, argue against any new measures regulating LAWS.

At its most recent meeting, virtually every delegation at the GGE affirmed that humans should always retain ultimate control over weapons systems, but they failed to agree on a path forward other than to continue further expert-level discussions in 2019.

Given the rapid progress in autonomous weaponry research and development and given that many autonomous weapons systems are moving rapidly toward deployment, it is past time for responsible governments to act.

Current policies and practices are clearly insufficient to address the dangers posed by LAWS. The U.S. government’s guidelines, outlined in a 2012 Department of Defense directive, says such systems should allow for “appropriate levels of human judgment” over the use of lethal force, leaving open the question of what constitutes “appropriate.”

The Group of Governmental Experts, which began their deliberations in 2016, has had ample time to investigate the dangers posed by autonomous weapons. Although important technical issues regarding definitions relating to LAWS remain, we believe that the time for discussion is over and that the dangers of deploying lethal autonomous weapons have been sufficiently demonstrated to warrant the initiation of formal negotiations on meaningful control mechanisms.

The appropriate place for these to begin is at the next meeting of the CCW’s High Contracting Parties, set for Nov. 21-23 in Geneva.

We fully recognize that there are differences among member states on what sort of limits to place on lethal autonomous weapons, if at all. But as the U.S. has argued in another negotiating forum, the Conference on Disarmament (which also operates by consensus), negotiations do not assume any particular outcome but allow for careful consideration of competing proposals.

We therefore urge United States to act more responsibly and call upon all governments represented at the CCW to support the initiation of negotiations on autonomous weapons at their meeting in November and to help craft an outcome ensuring continued human control over weapons of war and the decision to employ lethal force.

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Posted: September 7, 2018

First-Ever Study Finds Congressional Attention on Nuclear Security Waning as Nuclear Terrorism Threat Persists

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A new report reveals a concerning loss of congressional leadership and interest in critical efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism.

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For Immediate Release: July 26, 2016

Media Contacts: Nathan Sermonis, Executive Director, Partnership for a Secure America, (202) 293-8580; Jack Brosnan, Program Associate, Partnership for a Secure America, 202-293-8580; Kingston Reif, Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy. Arms Control Association, 202-463-8270 ext. 104; Tony Fleming, Director for Communications and Operations, Arms Control Association, 202-463-8270 ext. 110
 

(Washington, D.C.)—A new report from Partnership for a Secure America and the Arms Control Association reveals a concerning diminution of congressional engagement and interest in critical efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism.

The report, Empowering Congress on Nuclear Security: Blueprints for a New Generation, assesses current congressional staff attitudes about nuclear security and explores the role of Congress and case studies in congressional leadership on this issue. The report also offers action items for lawmakers in enhancing nuclear security efforts and reducing global stockpiles of nuclear materials.

“As the threat of nuclear terrorism continues to loom, America must maintain its leadership of global efforts to keep dangerous nuclear and radiological materials out of the wrong hands,” said Nathan Sermonis, Executive Director of Partnership for a Secure America. “Unfortunately, congressional interest has steeply declined with nuclear security faded from the headlines. We need, however, an all-of-government approach to advance the most effective measures against this threat.”

This joint report, made possible by funding provided by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, comes at a time when national attention on the security of nuclear and radioactive materials is decreasing even as these materials remain at risk from theft and more countries express interest in nuclear research and development.

“Despite significant progress in securing and eliminating nuclear materials around the world and the continued dedicated leadership role of several lawmakers, there is a need for Congress to play a more active role in shaping nuclear security policy,” noted Kingston Reif, Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy at the Arms Control Association. “We provide an important blueprint to build upon Congress’ historic bipartisan achievements on nuclear security and engage a new generation of policy advisers on Capitol Hill.”

To mark the publication of the report, Partnership for a Secure America and the Arms Control Association will be hosting an invitation-only event July 26 on Capitol Hill for congressional staff. The event will feature Ambassador Linton Brooks, Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, and General Frank Klotz.

For more information about the report, please contact Partnership for a Secure America at [email protected] or (202) 293-8580, or the Arms Control Association at [email protected] or (202) 463-8270 ext. 104.

The full report, Empowering Congress on Nuclear Security: Blueprints for a New Generation, is available online.

Posted: July 25, 2018

New Report Assesses the Impact of the Nuclear Security Summits, Yet Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Still Looms

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For Immediate Release: July 17, 2018

Media Contacts: Tony Fleming, Director for Communications and Operations, Arms Control Association, (202) 463-8270, ext. 110; Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy. Arms Control Association, 202-463-8270 ext. 102; Anna Schumann, Communications Director, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 202-546-0795 ext. 2115; Sara Z. Kutchesfahani, Senior Program Coordinator FMWG; Senior Policy Analyst, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 202-546-0795 ext. 2106.

(Washington, D.C.)—A new report from the Arms Control Association and the Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG) found that the innovative use of voluntary national commitment-making during four summits held between 2010 and 2016 led states to take more than 935 actions to significantly strengthen nuclear security.

The report, The Nuclear Security Summits: An Overview of State Actions to Curb Nuclear Terrorism 2010-2016, details the national commitments made by 53 states over the course of the Nuclear Security Summit process.

“The Nuclear Security Summits’ innovative use of national commitment-making significantly strengthened global nuclear security,” said Dr. Sara Z. Kutchesfahani, senior program coordinator for the FMWG and a co-author of the report. “Delivering on national commitments drove states to take critical steps that reduced the risk of nuclear terrorism.”

The summits’ chief accomplishments include the entry into force of a key treaty that sets binding requirements for the physical protection of nuclear material in civilian programs and the removal of all weapons-usable nuclear materials from eight participating states.

Nearly three dozen states passed new laws or updated existing regulations to strengthen nuclear security and states created more than 20 new nuclear security centers to enhance training and culture development. In total, the accomplishments strengthened nuclear security and reduced the risk of nuclear terrorism.

Yet, as indicated by a recent July 3 incident in which a drone was crashed into a French nuclear facility, gaps in the nuclear security architecture remain.

“Despite the accomplishments of the summit, the threat posed by nuclear terrorism continues to evolve,” noted Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy at the Arms Control Association and co-author of the report. “Effective nuclear security requires continuous improvement to address gaps and new threats.”

“States must continue to build on the accomplishments of the summit process to minimize the risk of nuclear terrorism,” said Erin Connolly, program assistant at the FMWG and co-author of the report. “Despite the end of the summit process, states must continue to commit to national actions that will curb nuclear terrorism.”

The full report, The Nuclear Security Summits: An Overview of State Actions to Curb Nuclear Terrorism 2010-2016, is available online.

 

Posted: July 16, 2018

Trump and Putin to Talk Nuclear Arms Control

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President Donald Trump and President Vladimir Putin will meet in Helsinki, Finland July 16 to discuss how to reduce tensions between the nations across a range of issues, including nuclear arms control. The Arms Control Association can provide resources and experts available to shed light on what the two sides can achieve to reduce nuclear risks and what’s at stake if they fail to make progress.

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For Immediate Release: June 28, 2018

Media Contacts: Kingston Reif, director for disarmament policy, 202-463-8270 ext 104; Daryl Kimball, executive director, 202-463-8270 ext 107

President Donald Trump and President Vladimir Putin will meet in Helsinki, Finland July 16 to discuss how to reduce tensions between the nations across a range of issues, including nuclear arms control. It is widely expected that the future of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which will expire in 2021 unless extended by mutual agreement, and the compliance dispute over the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty will both be on the agenda.

In an interview in March, Putin voiced interest in an extension of New START or even possibly further cuts in warhead numbers. The Trump administration is conducting a review of its position on the matter. 

Arms Control Association has a number of resources and experts available to shed light on what the two sides can achieve to reduce nuclear risks and what’s at stake if they fail to make progress.

QUICK QUOTES:

  • "Extending New START would be an easy win for the President. It could help create a positive atmosphere for reducing tensions in the U.S.-Russia relationship without making an unwise or impractical concession to Moscow. Failing to do so, on the other hand, will limit U.S. intelligence on the scale of the Russia nuclear arsenal." —Kingston Reif, director for disarmament policy
     
  • “Without a positive decision to extend New Start, and if the INF Treaty comes to an end, there would be no legally-binding limits on the world’s two largest nuclear superpowers for the first time since 1972, and the risk of unconstrained U.S.-Russian nuclear competition would grow.” —Daryl Kimball, executive director

  • "Should the INF Treaty collapse and New START expire without replacement … the consequences for effective cooperative management of nuclear risks and for nuclear nonproliferation would be severe.” —Thomas Countryman, former assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation, and chair of the ACA board of directors

ANALYSIS:

FACT SHEETS:

EXPERTS AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON:
Contact Tony Fleming, director for communications, 202 463 8270 ext 110 / 202 213 6856 (mobile) to schedule media interviews with any of the experts or authors noted above.

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Posted: June 28, 2018

Trump Team Undermines Climate for Summit and Negotiated Solution

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Successful diplomatic nonproliferation outcomes do not come easily or quickly. But Trump’s top advisors contributed to creating a hostile environment around the summit. North Korea’s reaction was not surprising. Unfortunately, the president got spooked when he should have stayed calm and carried on.

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(Washington, D.C.)—Even before Thursday’s announcement by President Donald Trump to cancel the planned Singapore Summit with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, there was ample reason to believe that the two sides were not on the same page about the pace, scope, and sequencing of steps to denuclearize the Korean peninsula and create a peace regime in the region.

It was also clear that the Trump administration itself was not on the same page about the goals of the meeting, nevertheless, the summit would have been a critical opportunity to test the waters, de-escalate tensions, and launch a sustained, serious diplomatic process on denuclearization.

Whether by accident or by design, Trump’s top advisors contributed to creating a hostile environment around the summit. It is unsurprising that loose talk from National Security Advisor John Bolton and Vice President Mike Pence about “the Libya model” for denuclearization and recent comments from Pence threatening war if North Korea does not agree to a deal triggered a strong reaction from Pyongyang.

The tone of North Korea’s reaction was clearly unhelpful, but it is not surprising.

Unfortunately, Trump got spooked when he should have stayed calm and carried on.

His strongly worded letter to Kim canceling the summit was irresponsible and risks the opportunity for future negotiations with North Korea. His language comparing nuclear weapon sizes only increases the likelihood that the United States and North Korea will return to a tit-for-tat escalation that characterized 2017 and increase the risk of war.

North Korea has long maintained that its nuclear weapons are a deterrent against U.S. "hostile policy." Threatening “total decimation" if Pyongyang does not give up its arsenal only reinforces that belief.

Comprehensive, verifiable denuclearization of North Korea and establishment of a peace regime on the peninsula remains the proper long-term goal. But achieving genuine progress requires a negotiating framework and agreement on the details of phased, reciprocal steps rather than U.S. economic rewards only after full denuclearization is achieved. Such a process requires time and patience and persistence.

Successful diplomatic nonproliferation outcomes do not come easily or quickly.

In the coming days, Trump must resist the urge to abandon diplomacy and make irresponsible threats, which will only reinforce North Korea's incentive to further improve its nuclear and missile activities and greatly increase the likelihood of a catastrophic confrontation. There is no viable military solution to the North Korean challenge.

We urge Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, in coordination with our allies and partners in the region, to continue engaging with his North Korean counterparts to advance efforts to halt and reverse the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs and to reduce tensions with Pyongyang, including by supporting the inter-Korean dialogue.

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Posted: May 24, 2018

White House Should State Opposition to Saudi Nuclear Weapons Threat

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It is bad enough that the Trump administration has violated the Iran nuclear deal and threatened the NPT regime by opening the door for expanded Iranian nuclear capacity. The president and his advisors must not now compound that error by swallowing their tongues when another NPT member state in the region threatens to pursue the bomb.

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For Immediate Release: May 15, 2018

Media Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, (202) 463-8270 ext. 107; Thomas Countryman, board of directors chair, (202) 463-8270 ext 110

We are deeply disappointed by the counterproductive response from the Trump administration to the statements from senior Saudi officials threatening to pursue nuclear weapons in violation of their nonproliferation commitments.

We call on the White House to immediately reiterate the longstanding, bipartisan policy of the United States that it will actively work against the spread of nuclear weapons to any country, friend or foe.

President Donald Trump’s reckless decision to violate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which has blocked Iran’s pathways to nuclear weapons and put in place a robust monitoring system to detect and deter cheating, has not only opened the door to an expansion of Iran’s capability to produce bomb-grade nuclear material, but it has increased the risk of a wider nuclear arms race in the Middle East, which is already home to one nuclear-armed state.

Saudi Arabia's foreign minister Adel Al-Jubeir told CNN Wednesday, May 9, that his country, which, like Iran, is a party to the 1968 nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), stands ready to build nuclear weapons if Iran restarts its nuclear program.

Al-Jubeir also praised Trump's decision to abandon the Iran nuclear deal and seek to reimpose sanctions on firms and business engaging in legitimate commerce with Iran.

Asked what his country will do if Iran restarts its nuclear program, he told CNN's Wolf Blitzer that "we will do whatever it takes to protect our people. We have made it very clear that if Iran acquires a nuclear capability, we will do everything we can to do the same."

Asked to clarify whether that means the kingdom will work to acquire its own nuclear capability, al-Jubeir replied, "That's what we mean."

This follows similar comments by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in a March 15 interview with CBS News that Saudi Arabia will quickly follow suit if Iran acquires nuclear weapons.

When asked May 9 whether Saudi Arabia would “have the administration’s support in the event that that occurred,” White House Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders said:

“Right now, I don’t know that we have a specific policy announcement on that front, but I can tell you that we are very committed to making sure that Iran does not have nuclear weapons,” she stated.

The administration’s nonresponse to Prince Salman’s threat in March and Sanders’ weak response May 9 amounts to an irresponsible invitation for mischief.

They imply that Trump administration would look the other way if Saudi Arabia breaks its NPT commitments to pursue nuclear weapons.

It is bad enough that the Trump administration, by violating the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, has threatened the NPT regime by opening the door for Iran to expand its nuclear capacity.

President Trump and his advisors must not compound that error by swallowing their tongues when another NPT member state in the region threatens to pursue the bomb.

We call on the White House to immediately clarify that it is the longstanding policy of the United States, as an original party to the NPT:

 “…not to in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons …” and “… to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament ….”

We also call on the U.S. Congress to reject any proposed agreement with Saudi Arabia that permits U.S. nuclear cooperation if Saudi Arabia seeks to or acquires sensitive uranium enrichment or plutonium separation technology which can be used to produce nuclear weapons.

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Posted: May 15, 2018

Trump Decision on Iran Deal is Foreign Policy Malpractice

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For Immediate Release: May 8, 2018

Media Contacts: Daryl G. Kimball, executive director, (202) 463-8270 ext. 107; Kelsey Davenport, director for nonproliferation policy, (202) 463-8270 ext. 102; Thomas Countryman, Chair of the Board, 301-312-3445.

(Washington, DC)—Experts from the Washington-based Arms Control Association denounced President Donald Trump’s reported decision not to renew U.S. sanctions waivers in violation of the 2015 nuclear deal between the P5+1 countries (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and Iran, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

“President Trump’s decision to violate the Iran nuclear deal, which has successfully blocked Iran’s potential pathways to a nuclear bomb, is an irresponsible act of foreign policy malpractice,” charged Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the independent Arms Control Association.

"Reimposing sanctions absent Iranian violations is a twofold abrogation of U.S. commitments under the JCPOA* and it is critical that members of Congress and Washington’s P5+1 partners denounce Trump’s actions as a breach of the accord. Not only did the United States commit not to reimpose sanctions, Washington also committed not to interfere with the full realization of sanctions relief,” explained Kelsey Davenport, director of nonproliferation policy for the Arms Control Association.

“Trump’s action today does not kill the agreement, but it jeopardizes the future of the deal unless other partners, particularly the E3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom), take immediate steps to insulate their companies and banks which are engaged in trade with Iran from U.S. secondary sanctions,” warned Davenport.

"We call on the E3, Russia, China, and other responsible states to pursue implementation of the JCPOA without the United States and implement measures that block the application of U.S. secondary sanctions. We also urge Tehran to continue abiding by the limits of the deal. Resuming troublesome nuclear activities limited by the accord will not serve Iran’s interests and risks provoking a deeper crisis,” Davenport said.

"European-U.S. efforts to negotiate a supplemental agreement intended to address Trump's complaints failed to yield results because Trump stubbornly refused to guarantee that he would uphold U.S. commitments under the JCPOA and demanded that Europe help to unilaterally impose major changes to the original terms of the agreement," Kimball said.

“The Iran nuclear deal is a strong nonproliferation agreement that delivers permanent and robust international monitoring of Iran’s nuclear activities, strictly limits its capacity to enrich uranium and prohibits other sensitive nuclear activities. Through his reckless actions, Trump is precipitating a proliferation crisis rather than working with our allies to develop a long-term diplomatic strategy to build on the agreement in the years ahead,” Kimball charged.
 

Relevant sections from the JCPOA on sanctions relief:

Paragraph 26 of the JCPOA requires:

“The United States will make best efforts in good faith to sustain this JCPOA and to prevent interference with the realisation of the full benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting specified in Annex II. The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions specified in Annex II that it has ceased applying under this JCPOA, without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under this JCPOA.”

Paragraph 29 of the JCPOA requires:

“The EU and its Member States and the United States, consistent with their respective laws, will refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran inconsistent with their commitments not to undermine the successful implementation of this JCPOA.”

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Posted: May 8, 2018

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