Restoring the JCPOA’s Nuclear Limits

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A year after former U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and reimposed sanctions on Iran in violation of the deal, Iran began to breach limits under the accord.

Iranian officials maintain that Iran will reverse its activities that violate the JCPOA and return to full compliance if the other parties to the deal meet their obligations under the accord. Iran’s violations of the JCPOA are largely reversible and could likely be undone within 3 months with sufficient political will.

However, several of Iran’s escalatory breaches have resulted in its acquisition of new knowledge and expertise that cannot be reversed. Also, Iran’s decision to suspend implementation of the additional protocol and other JCPOA-specific safeguards measures could create gaps in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s monitoring if Tehran chooses to not share recorded data with the agency upon restoration of the accord, even if Iran otherwise returns to full compliance with the JCPOA.

The following is a summary of the steps necessary to rectify Iran’s current breaches of the JCPOA. The steps are listed in the order of Iran’s violations of the JCPOA, beginning with its first breach in May 2019.

Restoring the stockpile limits on enriched uranium and heavy water

Background: Iran announced in May 2019 that it would no longer observe the JCPOA-imposed stockpile limits of 300 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas (202 kilograms of uranium by weight) enriched 3.67 percent and 130 metric tons of heavy water. The IAEA confirmed that Iran breached the 300-kilogram limit on July 1, 2019, and the heavy water limit in November 2019. As of November 2021, Iran’s stockpile of uranium gas enriched up to 5 percent was about 2,182 kilograms (measured by uranium weight)—roughly 11 times the cap. According to the IAEA’s November 2021 report, Iran has also produced 113.8 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 20 percent, and 17.7 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent. While Iran’s heavy water stockpile has exceeded the 130 metric ton cap, the IAEA measured the stockpile at 131.4 metric tons in February 2021. The IAEA has not had access to Iran’s heavy water production since February 23, 2021, when Tehran restricted IAEA access under the December 2020 nuclear law. In September 2021, the IAEA noted that there were indications that Iran’s heavy water production plant continued to operate after June 24.

Restoring Compliance: Iran can reverse its stockpile violations quite quickly. Tehran can either ship out enriched uranium in excess of the 300-kilogram limit of 3.67 percent gas or blend it down to natural levels. Excess heavy water could be used, shipped abroad for storage, or sold, all of which Iran has done in the past to stay below the cap. To help facilitate Iran’s return to compliance, the Biden administration should issue sanctions waivers allowing Tehran to export excess uranium and heavy water. These waivers were revoked by the Trump administration. The United States could also offer to purchase a quantity of heavy water for U.S. applications. The Obama administration did this in the past after deeming Iran’s heavy water of sufficient quality for U.S. purposes.
Restoring the limit on uranium enrichment to no more than 3.67 percent uranium-235

Background: Iran announced in July 2019 that it would begin enriching uranium up to 4.5 percent, which was immediately confirmed by the IAEA. On Jan. 4, 2021, the agency confirmed that Iran began enriching uranium to 20 percent [uranium-235], and to 60 percent in April 2021 (see below for details). Iran enriched to 20 percent, which constitutes about 90 percent of the effort necessary to enrich to weapons-grade levels, prior to negotiations on the JCPOA.

Restoring Compliance: Iran will need to halt enrichment to levels above 3.67 percent uranium-235 and recalibrate its centrifuges that were being used to enrich above that level. Given that Iran’s enrichment is monitored in real-time using online enrichment monitors (OLEMs), the IAEA will be able to quickly confirm when Iran halts enrichment above the JCPOA limit. As noted above, material produced above the JCPOA’s limits can be blended down or shipped out.

Iran justifies its enrichment to 20 percent as necessary to produce uranium fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), which produces medical isotopes. The United States should re-issue sanctions waivers that the Trump administration let lapse to allow Iran to import the necessary fuel for the TRR, removing the justification that 20 percent enrichment is necessary.
Returning to compliance with advanced centrifuge limits

Background: Iran announced in September 2019 that it would no longer be bound by any research and development limitations on advanced centrifuges imposed by the JCPOA. The deal’s restrictions include a 10-year prohibition on producing enriched uranium using advanced machines and caps on the number and type of advanced centrifuges that Iran can install and operate for testing its designs. Since announcing this breach, Iran has installed full cascades of IR-2, IR-4, and IR-6 machines and is using them to enrich uranium. Iran has also introduced new advanced centrifuges not covered by the JCPOA.

The nuclear deal does permit Iran to design new centrifuge machines, but Tehran must receive approval from the Joint Commission before beginning testing. In what would be a further violation of research limits, a December 2020 nuclear law (see details below) calls for Iranian authorities to install 1,000 IR-2m centrifuges and 1,000 IR-6 centrifuges in 2021. According to the IAEA’s November 2021 report, Iran is operating six cascades of IR- 2m centrifuges (1,044 machines) and two cascades of IR-4s (348 machines) at the main enrichment hall at Natanz. Iran also installed 189 IR-6 machines at Fordow, arranged in two cascades of 166 and 23 machines, and plans to install up to eight total cascades.

Returning to compliance: To return to compliance with the accord’s limits, Iran will need to dismantle and store under IAEA seal the advanced machines that it installed and is operating outside of the JCPOA’s parameters. It will also need to provide the IAEA with information about the new advanced centrifuges using an agreed-upon template designed by the JCPOA’s Joint Commission. The Joint Commission may also consider when and if Iran will be able to conduct any mechanical testing using those machines, as allowed by the JCPOA.

While the machines can be dismantled and stored relatively easily, the knowledge Iran has gained about the performance and capacity of its advanced machines is not reversible. This knowledge might have a slight impact on the overall breakout time of 12 months when the deal is fully implemented, but the IAEA would immediately detect any attempt to remove and reinstall the advanced machines. Iran’s testing of so many separate centrifuges design also suggests that the country has not established a designated successor for future enrichment when the JCPOA’s limits on enriching using IR-1s expire. The knowledge gained about advanced centrifuge performance could, however, be taken into account as the U.S. devises its plans for follow-up negotiations on a longer-term nuclear framework.
Halting uranium enrichment at Fordow

Background: In November 2019, Iran announced it would start enriching uranium up to 4.5 percent at Fordow. Iran continues to enrich uranium at Fordow and, in January 2021, resumed enrichment to 20 percent at the facility. A November 2021 IAEA report confirmed that Iran continued to enrich to 20 percent, using 1,045 IR-1 centrifuges and 189 IR-6 centrifuges. Under the JCPOA, Iran is permitted to keep 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges at Fordow, but the deal prohibits from any uranium-related activities at the site for 15 years. As a result of Iran’s decision to resume uranium enrichment at Fordow, efforts to convert the facility to a medical isotope research and development facility as required by the JCPOA, stalled.

Returning to compliance: To reverse this violation, Iran will need to halt production of enriched uranium using centrifuges at Fordow and remove all uranium from the facility. Iran will also need to remove the piping for the interconnected cascades that it is using for 20 percent enrichment, as that design is prohibited by the JCPOA. Iran may also choose to remove and store centrifuges that had been used for enrichment and replace them with excess IR- 1s currently under storage that are not contaminated with uranium for isotope research and production, which is the intended use of Fordow for 15 years under the JCPOA.

Planned and In-Progress Iranian JCPOA Violations

In an effort to put pressure on the United States and other JCPOA parties to deliver on sanctions relief envisioned by the JCPOA and respond to the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakrizadeh, the Iranian government enacted a law in late December 2020 requiring the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) to take a number of steps to further breach the accord in 2021.

Limits on Uranium Enrichment (in progress and discussed above

Background: Iran is required to produce 120 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20 percent uranium-235 on an annual basis under the December 2020 law. The IAEA confirmed that Iran began enriching to this level at Fordow on Jan. 4, 2021. Iran notified the IAEA of its intentions to increase enrichment levels at that site prior to doing so.

Restoring compliance: Iran could either ship out or blend down its uranium enriched above 3.67 percent uranium-235 and reconfigure the centrifuges being used for enrichment to that level.
Limits on Iran’s Use of Advanced Centrifuges (in progress and discussed above)

Background: The nuclear law requires Iran to install and operate 1,000 IR-2m centrifuges within three months of the legislation’s enactment (late March 2021) and install 1,000 IR-6 centrifuges by the end of 2021. The IAEA confirmed that Iran had installed 1,044 IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz as of November 2021. Iran also installed 189 IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow, arranged into two cascades of 166 and 23 machines, and plans to install a total of eight IR-6 cascades.

Restoring compliance: Iran would need to dismantle and store under IAEA seal the excess advanced centrifuges. While Iran will have gained some knowledge about producing and operating these machines, it does not significantly impact the country’s breakout or proliferation risk, given the relatively small number of centrifuges in question and the IAEA’s ability to immediately detect any attempt to access and install the machines.
Restrictions on Iran’s Implementation of the Additional Protocol and JCPOA-Specific Verification Measures (planned)

Background: Iran suspended implementation of the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement and the JCPOA-specific verification mechanisms in February 2021, in accordance with the nuclear law. Iran continues to implement its comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA), which is required by the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran also continues to record and collect necessary monitoring information for the IAEA, per a Feb. 2021 agreement, and will transmit that data to the agency upon restoration of the JCPOA and after sanctions relief is granted.

Restoring Compliance: Iran can notify the IAEA of its intention to adhere to the additional protocol and the JCPOA required verification mechanisms to restore full implementation of the deal’s monitoring mechanisms. While more intrusive inspections could resume quickly after Iran notifies the IAEA, the time required to return to full compliance with these obligations may depend on whether, and how quickly, Iran transmits recorded data to the IAEA, and the extent to which the IAEA can re-construct a narrative of Iran’s nuclear activities during that time based on the data provided.

The reversibility of this violation also depends on the length of time that Iran is in violation of the obligations and Iran’s willingness to take additional steps/provide information to fill in any gaps that may emerge from the breaks in monitoring. If the measures are suspended for too long, or if Iran chooses to cease the recording and collection of data for the IAEA, or chooses not to transmit it to the agency upon restoration of the JCPOA, it may create gaps in knowledge that could complicate the IAEA’s task of determining if Iran’s nuclear materials remain in peaceful purposes and increase speculation about illicit nuclear activities.
Uranium Metal Production (planned)

Background: The December 2020 law requires the AEOI to “inaugurate the metallic uranium factory” at the Isfahan Fuel Fabrication Plant within five months, or by late May 2021. Iran notified the IAEA of its intentions to begin installing and designing equipment and its plans for producing a new uranium metal fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, which produces medical isotopes. The IAEA verified that Iran produced 2.42 kilograms of natural uranium metal on May 18, 2021. From that, Iran used 0.85 kilograms to produce 0.54 kilograms of uranium in the form of uranium silicide. On October 25, the agency verified that Iran had produced two batches of uranium silicide containing 0.43 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 20 percent. The Agency’s Nov. 17 report confirmed that Iran had completed the four-stage process to produce new fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor and that it had manufactured two fuel plates using uranium silicide containing 0.25 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 20 percent. Iran has produced 17 fuel assemblies for the Tehran Research Reactor, four of which have already been transferred to the reactor, according to the IAEA.

Restoring Compliance: Iran may have produced a limited amount of uranium metal in the past as part of its pre-2003 nuclear weapons program, but it does not appear to have significant experience with the process. Evidence from the IAEA’s investigations and the material Israel stole from Iran suggest that Iran conducted experiments on producing metal using surrogate materials and was in the process of constructing a uranium metal production facility, but the decision was made to abandon it. The IAEA also had evidence that Iran received a document on how to produce uranium metal in shapes relevant to weapons development from the AQ Khan network. While Iran could quickly uninstall any equipment put in place for this project and ship out any uranium metal produced, the knowledge gained is irreversible and relevant if Iran decided to pursue nuclear weapons in the future.
Work on a New Heavy Water Reactor (planned)

Background: Iran announced plans to build a new heavy-water reactor based on the original design of the unfinished heavy-water reactor at Arak. As originally designed, that reactor would have produced enough plutonium annually that, when separated, would be enough for two nuclear weapons. Iran is prohibited from building new heavy water reactors for 15 years under the JCPOA and from separating plutonium for the same time period.

Restoring Compliance: While the AEOI has submitted plans for the reactor, construction has not yet begun, making the decision easy to reverse. Even if Iran were to take steps to begin constructing the reactor, it could be dismantled quickly, or the unfinished reactor monitored to ensure Iran does not continue any building activities until the 15-year ban on heavy-water reactors expires.

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Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy With Iran

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Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, (202) 463-8270 x102

Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, U.S. Secretary of State' John Kerry, and European Union High Representativ Catherine Ashton meet Sept. 25 at the Waldorf Astoria in New York. Iran and six world powers known as the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) reached a historic nuclear deal on July 14, 2015 that limited Iran's nuclear program and enhanced monitoring in exchange for relief from nuclear sanctions. Prior to that, Iran had been engaged in efforts to acquire the capability to build nuclear weapons for more than two decades. Although it remained uncertain whether Tehran would have made the final decision to build nuclear weapons, it had developed a range of technologies, including uranium enrichment, warhead design, and delivery systems, that would give it this option in a relatively short time frame. Tehran maintains that its nuclear activities are entirely peaceful.

What follows is a chronological recount of the most significant developments in Iran’s nuclear program, international efforts to negotiate a settlement to address this controversial issue, and implementation of the agreement reached by Iran and the P5+1 on July 14, 2015.

Skip To: 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022

November 1967: Iran’s first nuclear reactor, the U.S. supplied five-megawatt Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) goes critical. It operates on uranium enriched to about 93 percent (it is converted to run on 20 percent in 1993,) which the United States also supplies.

1970s

February 1970: The Iranian parliament ratifies the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

1974: Shah Reza Pahlavi establishes the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and announces plans to generate about 23,000 megawatts of energy over 20 years, including the construction of 23 nuclear power plants and the development of a full nuclear fuel cycle.

1979: The Iranian Revolution and the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran result in a severing of U.S.-Iranian ties and damages Iran’s relationship with the West. Iranian nuclear projects are halted.

1980s

January 19, 1984: The U.S. Department of State adds Iran to its list of state sponsors of terrorism, effectively imposing sweeping sanctions on Tehran.

1987: Iran acquires technical schematics for building a P-1 centrifuge from the Abdul Qadeer Khan network.

1990s

1992: Congress passes the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992, which prohibits the transfer of controlled goods or technology that might contribute “knowingly and materially” to Iran’s proliferation of advanced conventional weapons.

1993: Conversion of the TRR is completed by Argentina’s Applied Research Institute. It now runs on fuel enriched to just less than 20 percent, 115 kilograms of which is provided by Argentina; the contract for the conversion was signed in 1987.

August 5, 1996: The U.S. Congress passes the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, also known as the Iran Sanctions Act, that penalizes foreign and U.S. investment exceeding $20 million in Iran’s energy sector in one year.

2002

August 2002: The National Council of Resistance on Iran, the political wing of the terrorist organization Mujahideen-e Khalq (MeK), holds a press conference and declares Iran has built nuclear facilities near Natanz and Arak.

2003

September 12, 2003: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors adopts a resolution calling for Iran to suspend all enrichment – and reprocessing- related activities. The resolution requires Iran to declare all material relevant to its uranium-enrichment program and allow IAEA inspectors to conduct environmental sampling at any location. The resolution requires Iran to meet its conditions by October 31^st 2003.

October 21, 2003: Iran agrees to meet IAEA demands by the October 31^st deadline. In a deal struck between Iran and European foreign ministers, Iran agrees to suspend its uranium–enrichment activities and ratify an additional protocol requiring Iran to provide an expanded declaration of its nuclear activities and granting the IAEA broader rights of access to sites in the country.

2004

June 18, 2004: The IAEA rebukes Iran for failing to cooperate with IAEA inspectors. Iran responds by refusing to suspend enrichment-related activities as it had previously pledged.

November 14, 2004: Iran notifies the IAEA that it will suspend enrichment-related activities following talks with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. According to the so-called Paris Agreement, Iran would maintain the suspension for the duration of talks among the four countries. As a result, the IAEA Board of Governors decides not to refer Tehran to the UN Security Council.

2005

February 27, 2005: Russia and Iran conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement in which Russia would provide fuel for the Bushehr reactor it is constructing and Iran would return the spent nuclear fuel to Russia. The arrangement is aimed at preventing Iran from extracting plutonium for nuclear weapons from the spent nuclear fuel.

August 8, 2005: Iran begins producing uranium hexafluoride at its Isfahan facility. As a result, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom halt negotiations with Tehran.

September 24, 2005: The IAEA adopts a resolution finding Iran in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement by a vote of 22-1 with 12 members abstaining. The resolution says that the nature of Iran’s nuclear activities and the lack of assurance in their peaceful nature fall under the purview of the UN Security Council, paving the way for a future referral.

2006

February 4, 2006: A special meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors refers Iran to the UN Security Council. The resolution “deems it necessary for Iran to” suspend its enrichment-related activities, reconsider the construction of the Arak heavy-water reactor, ratify the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement, and fully cooperate with the agency’s investigation.

February 6, 2006: Iran tells the IAEA that it will stop voluntarily implementing the additional protocol and other non-legally binding inspection procedures.

April 11, 2006: Iran announces that it has enriched uranium for the first time. The uranium enriched to about 3.5 percent was produced at the Natanz pilot enrichment plant.

June 6, 2006: China, France, Germany, Russia the United Kingdom, and the United Sates (the P5+1, referring to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany) propose a framework agreement to Iran offering incentives for Iran to halt its enrichment program for an indefinite period of time.

July 31, 2006: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1696, making the IAEA’s calls for Iran to suspend enrichment –related and reprocessing activities legally binding for the first time.

August 22, 2006: Iran delivers a response to the P5+1 proposal, rejecting the requirement to suspend enrichment but declaring that the package contained “elements which may be useful for a constructive approach.”

December 23, 2006: The UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1737, imposing sanctions on Iran for its failure to suspend its enrichment-related activities. The sanctions prohibit countries from transferring sensitive nuclear- and missile-related technology to Iran and require that all countries freeze the assets of ten Iranian organizations and twelve individuals for their involvement in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.

2007

March 24, 2007: The UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1747 in response to Iran’s continued failure to comply with the council’s demand to suspend Uranium enrichment.

August 21, 2007: Following three rounds of talks in July and August, the IAEA and Iran agree on a “work plan” for Iran to answer long-standing questions about its nuclear activities, including work suspected of being related to nuclear weapons development.

December 3, 2007: The United States publicly releases an unclassified summary of a new National Intelligence Estimate report on Iran’s nuclear program. The NIE says that the intelligence community judged “with high confidence” that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003 and assessed with moderate confidence that the program had not resumed as of mid-2007. The report defines Iran’s nuclear weapons program as “design and weaponization work” as well as clandestine uranium conversion and enrichment. The NIE also said that Iran was believed to be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon between 2010 and 2015.

2008

March 3, 2008: The UN Security Council passes Resolution 1803, further broadening sanctions on Iran. It requires increased efforts on the part of member states to prevent Iran from acquiring sensitive nuclear or missile technology and adds 13 persons and seven entities to the UN blacklist.

June 14, 2008: The P5+1 present a new comprehensive proposal to Iran updating its 2006 incentives package. The new proposal maintained the same basic framework as the one in 2006, but highlighted an initial “freeze-for-freeze” process wherein Iran would halt any expansion of its enrichment activities while the UN Security Council agreed not to impose additional sanctions.

2009

February 3, 2009: Iran announces that it successfully carried out its first satellite launch, raising international concerns that Iran’s ballistic missile potential was growing.

April 8, 2009: Following an Iran policy review by the new Obama administration, the United States announces that it would participate fully in the P5+1 talks with Iran, a departure from the previous administration’s policy requiring Iran to meet UN demands first.

June 12, 2009: Iran holds presidential elections. Incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is declared the winner amid many indications that the election was rigged. This sparks weeks of protests within Iran and delays diplomatic efforts to address Iran’s nuclear program.

September 25, 2009: United States President Barack Obama, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that Iran has been constructing a secret, second uranium-enrichment facility, Fordow, in the mountains near the holy city of Qom. IAEA spokesman Marc Vidricaire said that Iran informed the agency September 21 about the existence of the facility, but U.S. intelligence officials said Iran offered the confirmation only after learning that it had been discovered by the United States.

October 1, 2009: The P5+1 and Iran agree “in principle” to a U.S.-initiated, IAEA-backed, proposal to fuel the TRR. The proposal entails Iran exporting the majority of its 3.5 percent enriched Uranium in return for 20 percent-enriched uranium fuel for the TRR, which has exhausted much of its supply. This agreement was later met with domestic political opposition in Iran, resulting in attempts by Tehran to change the terms of the “fuel swap.”

2010

February 9, 2010: Iran begins the process of producing 20 percent enriched uranium, allegedly for the TRR.

May 17, 2010: Brazil, Iran, and Turkey issue a joint declaration attempting to resuscitate the TRR fuel-swap proposal. In the declaration, Iran agrees to ship 1,200 kilograms of 3.5 percent enriched uranium to Turkey in return for TRR fuel from France and Russia. France, Russia, and the United States reject the arrangement, citing Iran’s larger stockpile of 3.5 percent-enriched uranium and the failure of the declaration to address Iran’s enrichment to 20 percent.

June 9, 2010: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1929, significantly expanding sanctions against Iran. In addition to tightening proliferation-related sanctions and banning Iran from carrying out nuclear-capable ballistic missile tests, the resolution imposes an arms embargo on the transfer of major weapons systems to Iran.

June 24, 2010: Congress adopts the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act; tightening U.S. sanctions against firms investing in Iran’s energy sector, extending those sanctions until 2016, and imposing new sanctions on companies that sell refined petroleum to Iran.

July 26, 2010: The EU agrees to further sanctions against Iran. A statement issued by EU member state foreign ministers refers to the new sanctions as “a comprehensive and robust package of measures in the areas of trade, financial services, energy, [and] transport, as well as additional designations for [a] visa ban and asset freeze.

September 16, 2010: The Stuxnet computer virus is first identified by a security expert as a directed attack against an Iranian nuclear-related facility, likely to be the Natanz enrichment plant.

2011

January 21-22, 2011: Following a December meeting in Geneva, the P5+1 meets with Iran in Istanbul, but the two sides do not arrive at any substantive agreement. Iran’s two preconditions for further discussions on a fuel-swap plan and transparency measures, recognition of a right to enrichment and the lifting of sanctions, were rejected by the P5+1.

February 16, 2011: U.S. intelligence officials tell a Senate committee that Iran has not yet decided whether it wants to develop nuclear weapons but is keeping that option open through development of its material capabilities.

May 8, 2011: Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant begins operations and successfully achieves a sustained chain reaction two days later, according to Atomstroyexport, the Russian state-owned company constructing and operating the plant.

June 8, 2011: Iran announces that it intends to triple the rate of 20 percent-enriched uranium production using more-advanced centrifuge designs. It also says it will move production to the Fordow enrichment plant near Qom, which is still under construction.

July 12, 2011: Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov unveils a proposal wherein Iran would take steps to increase cooperation with the IAEA and carry out confidence-building measures in return for a gradual easing of sanctions.

October 21, 2011: EU foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, sends a letter to Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili calling for “meaningful discussions on concrete confidence-building steps” to address international concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

November 8, 2011: The IAEA releases a report detailing a range of activities related to nuclear weapons development in which Iran is suspected to have engaged as part of a structured program prior to 2004. The report raises concerns that some weapons-related activities occurred after 2003. The information in the report is based primarily on information received from other countries, but also includes information from the agency’s own investigation. The findings appear consistent with the U.S. 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran.

December 31, 2011: As part of the fiscal year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress passes legislation that will allow the United States to sanction foreign banks if they continue to process transactions with the Central Bank of Iran.

2012

January 2012: The EU passes a decision that will ban all member countries from importing Iranian oil beginning July 1, 2012. Other provisions of the decision will prevent member countries from providing the necessary protection and indemnity insurance for tankers carrying Iranian oil.

January 29-31, 2012: Following an exchange of letters between Iran and the IAEA, it was agreed that an Agency team would travel to Tehran to begin discussions on the IAEA’s investigations into the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program laid out in the November 2011 IAEA report.

February 15, 2012: Jalili responds to Ashton’s Oct. 21 letter, while Iran simultaneously announces a number of nuclear advances, including the domestic production of a fuel plate for the TRR.

April 14, 2012: Iran meets with the P5+1 in Istanbul for talks both sides call “positive.” They agree on a framework of continuing negotiations with a step-by-step process and reciprocal actions.

May 23-24, 2012: Iran and the P5+1 meet in Baghdad for a second set of talks.

June 18-19, 2012: Talks between Iran and the P5+1 continue in Moscow. Representatives discuss the substance of a P5+1 proposal and an Iranian proposal. Ashton and Jalili announce that will determine if political-level talks will continue after a technical-level meeting in July.

July 3, 2012: Experts representing the six parties meet in Istanbul to discuss the technical aspects of the P5+1 proposal and the Iranian proposal.

July 24, 2012: Schmid and Bagheri meet in Istanbul to discuss the outcome of the technical level experts meeting and confirm that Ashton and Jalili will talk to determine the future of the negotiations.

August 30, 2012: The IAEA reports that Iran increased the number of centrifuges installed at the Fordow enrichment plant and is continuing to produce uranium enriched to 20 percent in excess of its needs for the Tehran Research Reactor.

September 2012: Ashton and Jalili meet in Istanbul to assess “common points” reached at the low-level expert talks held in early July. The meeting was not considered a formal negotiation.

September 27, 2012: In a speech to the UN General Assembly, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu draws a red-line for an Israeli attack on Iran. Netanyahu defines his red-line as Iran amassing enough uranium enriched to 20 percent (approximately 250 kilograms), which, when further enriched, will be enough for one bomb.

November 16, 2012: The IAEA reports that since August, Iran completed installation of the approximately 2,800 centrifuges that Fordow is designed to hold, although the number enriching remains constant. The number of cascades producing 20 percent enriched uranium remains constant at Fordow. The report also notes that Iran installed more centrifuges at Natanz, and continued producing uranium enriched to 20 percent.

2013

February 26, 2013: Iran and the P5+1 resume negotiations in Almaty, Kazakhstan over Iran's nuclear program. The P5+1 offers Iran an updated proposal based largely on the 2012 package.

April 5-6, 2013: Iran and the P5+1 meet again in Almaty for a second round of talks. At the end of the meetings, negotiators announce that no further meetings are scheduled and the sides remain far apart.

June 3, 2013: At the quarterly meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, Director General Yukiya Amano says that the agency's talks with Iran over clarifying the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program have not made any progress.

June 14, 2013: Hassan Rouhani is elected president of Iran. A former nuclear negotiator, he asserts that Iran will maintain its nuclear program, but offers to be more transparent.

August 6, 2013: Three days after his inauguration, Iran's President Hasan Rouhani calls for the resumption of serious negotiations with the P5+1 on Iran's nuclear program.

September 26, 2013: The P5+1 foreign ministers meet with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif on the sidelines on the UN General Assembly meeting in New York. Zarif presents the P5+1 with a new proposal that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry describes as “very different in the vision” of possibilities for the future. Zarif and Kerry meeting for a bilateral exchange after the larger group meeting. Zarif later says he and Kerry move to agree “first, on the parameters of the end game.” Zarif says Iran and the P5+1 will think about the order of steps that need to be implemented to “address the immediate concerns of [the] two sides” and move toward finalizing a deal within a year. The parties agree to meet again on October 15 in Geneva.

September 27, 2013: President Barack Obama calls Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, marking the highest level contact between the U.S. and Iran since 1979. While President Obama says that there will be significant obstacles to overcome, he believes a comprehensive resolution can be reached.

In Vienna, Iran's new envoy to the IAEA, Reza Najafi, meets with IAEA deputy director Herman Nackaerts to resume negotiations on the structured approach to resolving the agency's concerns about the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. Both sides describe the meeting as constructive and agree to meet again on October 28.

October 15-16, 2013: Iran and the P5+1 meet in Geneva to resume negotiations over Iran's nuclear program. At the end of the talks, the parties release a joint statement describing the meetings as "substantive and forward looking." The statement also says that Iran presented a new proposal that the P5+1 carefully considered as an "important contribution" to the talks. The proposal is understood to contain a broad framework for a comprehensive agreement and an interim confidence building measure to be instituted over the next 3-6 months, but no details are given as the parties agreed to keep the negotiations confidential.

Wendy Sherman, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, says after the talks that Iran approached the meetings "with a candor" she had not heard in her two years of negotiating with Tehran. The parties agree to meet again November 7-8 in Geneva with an experts level meeting October 30-31.

October 28-29, 2013: Iran meets with the IAEA to continue discussions over the agency's investigations into Iran's past nuclear activities with possible military dimensions. According to a joint statement, Iran presented a new proposal at the talks that contained "practical measures" to "strengthen cooperation and dialogue with a view to future resolution of all outstanding issues." Iran and the IAEA agree to meet again in Tehran on November 11.

November 7-10, 2013: The P5+1 and Iran meet in Geneva to continue negotiations over Iran's nuclear program. On November 8, with the expectation that a deal is close, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry flies to Geneva to join the talks, as do the foreign ministers from the other P5+1 countries. The parties fail to reach an agreement on a first-phase deal, but announce that talks will continue on November 20 in Geneva.

Secretary Kerry says in Nov. 10 press conference that the parties "narrowed the differences" and made significant progress toward reaching an agreement during the talks.

November 11, 2013: IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano and Ali Akbar Salehi meet in Tehran to continue talks on an approach for the agency's investigations into Iran's past nuclear activities with possible military dimensions. Amano and Salehi sign a Framework for Cooperation Agreement. The framework lays out initial practical steps to be take by Iran within three months, including allowing IAEA access to the Heavy Water Production Plant at Arak and the Gchine uranium mine, and providing the agency with information on new research reactors and nuclear power plants that Iran intends to build. The statement commits the parties to cooperation "aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme through the resolution of all outstanding issues that have not already been resolved by the IAEA."

November 20-24, 2013: Iran and the P5+1 meet again in Geneva to continue negotiations. On November 23, the foreign ministers from the P5+1 join the negotiations. Early on November 24, Iranian Minister Javad Zarif and Catherine Ashton, leader of the P5+1 negotiating team, sign an agreement called the Joint Plan of Action. It lays out specific steps for each side in a six-month, first-phase agreement, and the broad framework to guide negotiations for a comprehensive solution.

The first-phase pauses further developments in Iran's nuclear program, rolls back significant elements like the stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium, and requires more extensive IAEA monitoring and access to nuclear sites. In return, Iran receives limited sanctions relief, repatriation of limited assets frozen abroad, and a commitment that no new nuclear-related sanctions will be imposed on Iran for the duration of the agreement. For more details on the agreement, click here.

The plan will establish a Joint Commission to monitor the agreement and work with the IAEA. The six month period can be extended by mutual consent of both parties.

December 8, 2013: Under the terms of the Framework for Cooperation Agreement the IAEA visits the Arak Heavy Water Production Plant.

December 9-12, 2013: The P5+1 and Iran meet in Geneva at the technical level to begin discussions on the implementation of the Nov. 24 Joint Plant of Action.

December 11, 2013: Iran and the IAEA meet again in Vienna to review progress made on the six actions that Iran agreed to take as part of the Framework for Cooperation Agreement. The parties also begin discussing the next practical steps for Iran to take and initially plan to meet again on Jan. 21 to finalize the measures. The meeting is later postponed at the request of Iran to Feb. 8.

December 30-31, 2013: Technical level discussions between Iran and the P5+1 on implementing the Joint Plan of Action continue in Geneva.

2014

January 9-10, 2014: Iran and the P5+1 meet for a third time in Geneva to discuss implementation. The parties reach an agreement and return to their respective capitals for approval.

January 12, 2014: Iran and the P5+1 announce that implementation of the Joint Plan of Action will begin on Jan. 20.

January 20, 2014: Implementation of the Joint Plan of Action begins. The IAEA issues a report on Iran's compliance with the deal. The report states that Iran is adhering to the terms of the agreement, including, halting enrichment of uranium to 20 percent, beginning to blend down half of the stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium to 3.5 percent, and halting work on the Arak Heavy Water Reactor. The IAEA also begins more intrusive and frequent inspections.

The United States and the European Union also issue statements saying they have taken the necessary steps to waive the specific sanctions outlined in the Nov. 24 deal and release a schedule of payments for Iran to receive oil money held up in the other countries.

February 9, 2014: Iran and the IAEA meet to discuss further actions for Iran to take under the November 11 framework agreement to resolve the agency’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. They agree on additional actions, including Iran’s past work on exploding bridgewire detonators, one of the past activities with possible military dimensions.

February 17-20, 2014: Negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 on the comprehensive agreement begin in Vienna. The parties agree on an agenda and framework to guide the talks

March 17-20, 2014: The P5+1 and Iran meet in Vienna to continue negotiations.

April 7-9, 2014: Another round of talks between Iran and the P5+1 take place in Vienna.

May 13-16, 2014: The P5+1 and Iran begin drafting the comprehensive agreement.

May 21, 2014: Iran and the IAEA announce an additional five actions for Iran to complete before August 25. Two of the activities that Iran agrees to provide information on relate to possible military dimensions.

June 2-6, 2014: At the IAEA board meeting Director General Yukiya Amano says that Iran is complying with the terms of the interim agreement and the agency's investigation into the unresolved concerns about Iran's nuclear program. The agency's quarterly report shows that Iran has neutralized nearly all of its stockpile of 20 percent uranium gas by dilution or conversion to powder form.

June 16-20, 2014: Iran and the P5+1 hold another round of negotiations in Vienna.

July 2-19, 2014: Iran and the P5+1 continue talks in Vienna on a comprehensive nuclear agreement. Early on June 19, the parties announce that they will extend the talks through November 24 and keep the measures agreed to in the interim agreement in place. The parties also announce additional actions that Iran will take, namely converting 25 kg of uranium powder enriched to 20 percent into fuel plates and blending down about 3 tons of uranium enriched to less than 2 percent. The P5+1 will also repatriate $2.8 billion in funds. The parties agree to resume talks in August.

August 25, 2014: Iran misses a deadline to complete actions on five areas of concern to the IAEA as part of the agreement that Iran and the agency reached in November 2013.

September 5, 2014: The IAEA's quarterly report on Iran's nuclear program shows that Iran is complying with the interim deal, but did not provide the IAEA with information about past activities with possible military dimensions (PMDs) by the Aug. 25 deadline.

September 18, 2014: Talks between Iran and the P5+1 resume in New York City on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. Both sides say that little progress was made at the end of the talks.

October 14-16, 2014: Iran and the P5+1 meet in Vienna to continue negotiations. Officials say that they remain focused on reaching an agreement by the Nov. 24 deadline and progress was made during the talks.

November 9-10, 2014: Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif and U.S. Secretary of State Kerry meet in Muscat, Oman to continue talks. P5+1 lead negotiator Catherine Ashton is also present.

November 18-24, 2014: Iran and the P5+1 meet in Vienna to continue negotiations on an comprehensive agreement. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry joins the talks on Nov. 20. French Foreign Minister Fabiusu, British Foreign Secretary Hammond, and German Foreign Minister Steinmeier all join the talks between Nov. 20 and 22. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov arrives on Nov. 23 and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang on Nov. 24.

November 24, 2014: Iran and the P5+1 announce that negotiations will be extended because progress was made on the difficult issues and both sides see a path forward. The parties announce that they now aim to reach a political agreement by March and then complete the technical annexes by June 30. Both sides will continue to implement the conditions of the interim Joint Plan of Action from November 2013. Iran and the P5+1 also make additional commitments.

December 15, 2014: Talks between the P5+1 and Iran continue in Geneva. U.S. State Department officials say the talks are "good and substantive." Parties plan to meet again in January.

December 24, 2014: Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif says in a letter to his foreign counterparts that Iran’s goal remains to reach a comprehensive nuclear deal that assures the world its nuclear program is exclusively peaceful.

2015

January 15-18, 2015: The P5+1 and Iran meet in Geneva to continue negotiations.

January 21, 2015: In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Jan. 21, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken says: "We assess that we still have a credible chance of reaching a deal that is in the best interest of America's security, as well as the security of our allies."

January 23-24, 2015: Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman and European Union Political Director Helga Schmid meet again with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Zurich, Switzerland.

February 18-20, 2015: Talks between the P5+1 and Iran resume in Vienna.

February 19, 2015: A report by the Director General of the IAEA confirms that Iran is upholding its commitments under the interim deal, including additional provisions from the November 2014 extension. The report notes “Iran has continued to provide the Agency with managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities.”

March 3, 2015: Prime Minister Netanyahu delivers a speech to a joint session of Congress. His speech claims that the Iran deal “would all but guarantee that Iran gets [nuclear] weapons, lots of them.”

March 9, 2015: Senator Tom Cotton and 46 other senators sign an open letter to the Parliament of Iran. The letter warns that any deal reached without legislative approval could be revised by the next president “with the stroke of a pen.”

March 17-20, 2015: Talks between the P5+1 and Iran continue in Lausanne. The head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, says to reporters "We have made progress on technical issues… One or two issues remain and need to be discussed."

March 25-April 2, 2015: Negotiations continue in Lausanne. By March 29, all of the Foreign Ministers from the seven countries involved and EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini are present.

April 2, 2015: Iran and the P5+1 announce agreement on a general framework that outlines the broad parameters of a nuclear deal. The United States issues a more specific factsheet on the details. Iran and the P5+1 agree to continue meeting to finalize a deal before June 30.

April 14, 2015: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously passes legislation authored by Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) that will require the President to submit the deal to Congress for a vote of approval or disapproval. According to the legislation, the President will not be able to waive sanctions during the 30 day Congressional review period.

April 15, 2015: Iran and the IAEA meet in Tehran to continue discussing the agency's investigations into the possibly military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program.

April 27, 2015: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif meet in New York on the sidelines of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference. Technical drafting work on the annexes of the agreement is underway.

May 7, 2015: The Senate passes the Corker legislation 98-1 on congressional review of an Iran nuclear deal.

May 12, 2015: EU and Iranian negotiators meet in Vienna to continue drafting a comprehensive agreement.

June 26, 2015: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry arrives in Vienna to continue negotiations on a nuclear deal with Iran and the P5+1. U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz joins Kerry.

July 14, 2015: Iran and the P5+1 announce a comprehensive deal. Iran and the IAEA announce a roadmap for the agency's investigation into the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program.

July 19, 2015: The Obama administration sends the comprehensive deal and supporting documents to Congress, beginning the 60 day review period mandated by the Iran Nuclear Deal Review Act.

July 20, 2015: The UN Security Council unanimously passes a resolution endorsing the nuclear deal and the lifting of UN Security Council nuclear sanctions once key steps are taken in the deal.

August 15, 2015: The IAEA confirms that Iran submitted documents and explanations to answer the agency's unresolved concerns about past activities that could be related to nuclear weapons development.

September 2, 2015: The 34th Senator announces support for the nuclear deal with Iran, meaning that Congress will not have the support to override a presidential veto on a resolution disapproving of the deal.

September 8, 2015: Four additional Senators announce that they will support the nuclear deal with Iran, bringing the total number to 42. This important milestone will prevent the Senate from reaching the 60 vote threshold required for ending debate and moving to vote on a resolution of disapproval.

September 9, 2015: The IAEA announces that is submitted follow-up questions to Iran based on the information provided by Iran on Aug. 15. The IAEA is ahead of its Sept. 15 deadline to submit the questions.

September 10, 2015: A vote to end debate and move to vote on a resolution of disapproval fails to reach the required 60 votes on the Senate floor. The measure fails 58-42. Four democrats joined the 54 Republicans in favor of moving to vote on the resolution of disaproval. Similar votes fail on Sept. 15 and Sept. 17.

September 11, 2015: A vote on a resolution of approval fails in the House of Representatives, 269-162, with 25 Democrats voting joining the Republicans in voting against the measure.

September 17, 2015: The congressional review period ends without passage of a resolution of approval or a resolution of disapproval.

September 20, 2015: IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano and Deputy Director General Tero Varjoranta visit the Parchin site at Iran. The IAEA has concerns about Iran conducting explosive activities there relevant to a nuclear device. Amano and Varjoranta confirm that environmental sampling was done at the site under IAEA surveillance and the agency is now testing the samples.

October 4, 2015: A panel of Iranian lawmakers reviewing the JCPOA release their assessment of the deal. The report issued says that the agreement contains some security threats, such as allowing inspectors access to military sites, but should go ahead.

October 10, 2015: Iran tests a medium-range ballistic missile, the Emad. The Emad is a more precise version of the Shahab-3, believed to be capable of carrying a 750 kg payload over 1,700 kilometers. The test is a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010), which prohibits Iran from testing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.

October 10, 2015: Iran's parliament approves a preliminary bill supporting the Iran deal.

October 13, 2015: Iran's parliament approves a detailed bill supporting the Iran deal.

October 14, 2015: Iran's Guardian Council ratifies the bill approved by the parliament, completing Iran's internal review of the agreement.

October 15, 2015: The IAEA announces the activities laid out in the July 14 roadmap for the investigation into the past possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program has been completed. The IAEA aims to complete its report by Dec. 15.

October 18, 2015: Iran and the P5+1 formally adopt the nuclear deal. Iran begins taking steps to restrict its nuclear program. The United States issues waivers on nuclear-related sanctions to come into effect on implementation day. The EU announces it passed legislation to lift nuclear-related sanctions on implementation day.

October 18, 2015: Iran notifies the IAEA of that it will provisionally implement its additional protocol and modified Code 3.1 to its safeguards agreement as of implementation day.

October 19, 2015: The first meeting of the Joint Commission takes place in Vienna. One of the purposes of the meeting is to set up working groups called for under the deal, such as the working group on procurement and the Arak reactor modification.

October 20, 2015: The Supreme Leader issues a statement endorsing the nuclear deal and bill passed by the Iranian parliament.

October 21, 2015: The United States raises Iran's ballistic missile test as a possible violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1929 at a meeting of the Security Council.

November 21, 2015: Iran tests another medium-range ballistic missile in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1929.

December 2, 2015: The IAEA issues its assessment of Iran's past activities related to nuclear weapons development (PMDs). The IAEA assess that Tehran had an organized weapons program prior to 2003 and that some activities continued, although not as an organized effort, through 2009. The report says that the agency has no credible indication that nuclear material was diverted from Iran's declared program or that any activities continued after 2009.

December 15, 2015: The IAEA Board of Governors holds a special meeting to consider the Dec. 2 report on Iran's weaponization activities. The board passes a resolution terminating past resolutions on Iran's nuclear program and ending the investigation. The board requests that the IAEA continue reporting on Iran's nuclear activities under the nuclear deal and report immediately on any concerns that arise with Iran's implementation.

December 28, 2015: Iran announces that it shipped 8.5 tonnes of low-enriched uranium, including the 20 percent enriched material in scrap and waste, out of the country to Russia. In return, Iran receives 140 tonnes of uranium yellowcake.

2016

January 11, 2016: Iranian officials announce that the Arak reactor core is being disabled. Iranian and P5+1 officials say that implementation day is close.

January 16, 2016: The IAEA verifies that Iran met its nuclear related commitments. Based on the IAEA report, Zarif and Mogherini announce implementation day, triggering the lifting of sanctions. UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council passed in July to endorse the deal and trigger the lifting of UN sanctions comes into effect. Prior resolutions on Iran's nuclear program are terminated.

January 17, 2016: The U.S. Treasury Department issues an announcement that new sanctions will be imposed on 11 individuals and entities involved with Iran's ballistic missile programs. U.S. President Barack Obama says that with implementation of the nuclear deal Iran will not obtain nuclear weapons and that "the region, the United States, and the world will be more secure." Iranian President Hassan Rouhani gives a speech saying that "Iran's nuclear rights have been accepted by all."

January 26, 2016: Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says that Iran and China had signed a basic agreement to formalize China’s assistance in redesigning the Arak reactor during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Iran the previous week.

February 11, 2016: Abbas Qaidaari, director of the Defense and Security Studies Department at the Center for Strategic Studies in the Office of the Iranian President, writes in a piece for the Atlantic Council that “Iran’s strategic defense plan currently sees no justification” for missile ranges greater than 2,000-2,300 kilometers. Qaidaari said that although Tehran is committed to developing its “deterrent conventional defense capabilities,” it will limit its ballistic missiles to that range.

February 26, 2016: The IAEA issues its first quarterly report on Iran's post-implementation day nuclear activities. The report notes that Iran is meeting its nuclear obligations, although it slightly exceeded a cap set on the stockpile of heavy water allowed under the agreement. The IAEA notes that Iran had 130.9 metric tons of heavy water, slightly above the 130 metric ton limit set by the deal, but shipped out 20 metric tons on February 24 to stay below the limit.

March 9, 2016: Iran test launches two different variations of the Qadr medium-range ballistic missile.

March 14, 2016: U.S. Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power says she raised Iran's ballistic missile tests at a Security Council meeting, saying that the tests are inconsistent with UN Security Council Resolution 2231.

March 15, 2016: Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif defends Iran's missile launches saying that the missiles are permissible under UN Security Council Resolution 2231 because the missiles are not designed to be capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

March 21, 2016: Then-candidate Trump delivers remarks to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee’s annual conference, noting his “number one priority is to dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran.”

April 22, 2016: Officials from Iran and the United States meet in Vienna, signing a purchase agreement for Washington to buy 32 metric tons of heavy water for $8.6 million. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif meet in New York to discuss implementation of the deal. In remarks after the meeting Kerry says that Washington is working to clarify confusion amongst foreign banks about the sanctions lifted in January.

May 27, 2016: The IAEA issues its quarterly report on Iran's implementation of the nuclear deal. The report shows Iran is abiding by restrictions under the agreement and inspectors have been able to access certain Iranian sites using complimentary access visits.

July 18, 2016: Iran's research and development plan for advanced centrifuge machines, leaked to the AP, is reported on in the press.

July 29, 2016: In a statement, the IAEA notes it sent a letter to Iran denying it was the source of leaked information about Iranian plans for phasing in advanced centrifuges in 2027.

September 8, 2016: The IAEA releases its third quarterly report since JCPOA implementation day, showing Iran continues to abide by its restrictions under the JCPOA. The report notes that Iran removed 96 IR-1 centrifuges from the storage area at Natanz to replace damaged centrifuges that were enriching uranium.

September 21, 2016: The U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control grants Airbus and Boeing permission to sell planes to Iran. The licenses were made possible by sanctions waived as part of the JCPOA.

September 22, 2016: Iran and the P5+1 meet in New York to review progress on JCPOA implementation and the pace of sanctions relief. The meeting marks the first ministerial-level meeting since the announcement of the deal’s implementation in January. Speaking to the UN General Assembly on the same day, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani expresses concern over the slow pace of sanctions relief and claims the U.S. has been in lack of compliance.

September 26, 2016: Sergei Kireienko, head of Rosatom, the state-run Russian nuclear energy company, announces that Moscow purchased 38 tons of heavy-water from Iran. The material was delivered to Russia in mid-September.

November 2, 2016: IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano expresses concern to Iranian leaders regarding the size of Iran’s heavy water stock. On November 8^th, the Agency confirms that Iran’s heavy water stock, at 130.1 tons, exceeds the 130 metric ton limit outlined in the deal, marking the second time Iran has exceeded the limit. On November 9^th, Iran informs the IAEA of plans to remain in compliance by transferring heavy water out of the country.

November 8, 2016: Donald Trump is elected as the 45^th President of the United States. During the presidential campaign, Trump referred to the JCPOA as the worst deal ever negotiated and pledged to renegotiate it. The U.S.’s European allies in the P5+1 previously signaled they would resist efforts to renegotiate the deal.

November 20, 2016: IAEA releases its fourth quarterly report on Iranian nuclear program since JCPOA implementation day. The report notes that Iran had 130.1 metric tons of heavy water, slightly over the 130 metric tons permitted under the deal. The IAEA report says Iran plans to transfer heavy water out of the country.

December 1, 2016: Congress passes a 10-year extension of the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), which becomes law on December 15^th. Extension of the ISA is consistent with U.S. obligations under the JCPOA, although many of the ISA’s provisions are being waived under Washington’s commitments under the agreement.

December 6, 2016: IAEA verifies that all 11 metric tons of heavy water shipped out of Iran have reached their destination and are in storage, bringing Iran back within the limit on heavy water of 130 metric tons established by the JCPOA.

December 13, 2016: President Rouhani announces Iran will respond to Washington’s extension of the Iran Sanctions Act by researching and developing nuclear propulsion for marine vessels.

December 15, 2016: U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry reissues sanctions waivers early, on the same day that the ISA renewal comes into effect, to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to the JCPOA.

December 18, 2016: IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano visits Iran, meeting with President Rouhani and Ali Akhbar Salehi, head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization. Amano and Salehi discussed issues related to implementation. Further, Amano sought clarification on Iran’s announcement regarding naval nuclear reactor research and development.

December 23, 2016: The IAEA, at the request of Federica Mogherini, circulates decisions made by the Joint Commission set up to oversee implementation of the nuclear deal. The documents contain additional information on hot cells, recovering waste uranium, describing and calculating efficiency for advanced centrifuges, and utilizing the procurement channel.

2017

January 12, 2017: In his confirmation hearing for the position of Secretary of Defense, General Jim Mattis tells Congress that, while he believes the JCPOA is an imperfect agreement, “when America gives her word, we have to live up to it and work with our allies.” His remarks echo a previous statement in April, when he noted there is “no going back” on the deal absent a clear violation of the agreement.

Iran receives the first shipment in an order of 100 planes purchased from Airbus. Sanctions waived as part of the nuclear deal allow Iran to purchase new commercial aircraft.

January 15, 2017: IAEA verifies that Tehran has taken certain steps to remove infrastructure and excess centrifuges from Fordow within the necessary timeframe required by the JCPOA (one year after Implementation Day). Secretary of Energy Moniz releases a statement noting “Iran successfully met the milestone of removing excess centrifuges and infrastructure from Fordow, demonstrating that the deal continues to limit Iran’s nuclear program so as to provide confidence that Iran is not developing a nuclear weapon and maintain at least a one year breakout time.”

January 28, 2017: Iran test fires a medium-range ballistic missile, in defiance of UN Security Council Resolution 2231. The test prompts former NSA Michael Flynn, on February 1, to declare the United States has placed Iran “on notice.”

February 9, 2017: EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini travels to Washington for meetings with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn, and members of Congress. Mogherini notes that the JCPOA is key for the security of Europe given its geographic proximity to Iran.

February 24, 2017: IAEA releases its first quarterly report on Iranian nuclear activity in 2017, reporting on the size of Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.67 percent for the first time. The report notes that the stockpile was 101.7 kilograms. The limit established by the deal is 300 kilograms.

March 23, 2017: Senator Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) introduces a new Iran sanctions bill, the Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017, targeting Iran’s ballistic missile program and support for terrorism.

March 31, 2017: Former Deputy Secretary of State Tony Blinken and six former Obama administration officials release an op-ed in Foreign Policy outlining their opposition to the Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017.

April 18, 2017: Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, in a letter to speaker of the House Paul Ryan, certifies to Congress that Iran is compliant in meeting its obligations under the JCPOA.

April 23, 2017: Iran and China resolve a price dispute and complete an agreement to modify Iran’s Arak reactor. China will work with Iran to carry out modifications stipulated by the JCPOA to reduce the reactor’s output of weapons-grade plutonium.

May 16, 2017: Ambassador Wendy Sherman, the lead U.S. negotiator for the JCPOA, states her opposition to the Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017, noting its potential to undermine the nuclear accord.

May 17, 2017: The U.S. renews sanctions waivers as required by its JCPOA obligations, marking the first time the Trump administration has waived sanctions and taken a proactive step to implement the deal.

May 19, 2017: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is re-elected to a second term. EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini congratulates Rouhani on Twitter and reaffirms the EU’s commitment to full JCPOA implementation.

June 2, 2017: The IAEA releases its second quarterly report in 2017 on Iran’s implementation of the JCPOA, reporting that Iran is meeting its obligations under the nuclear deal.

June 15, 2017: Countering Iran’s Destabilizing Activities Act of 2017 (S.722) passes the Senate by a vote of 98-2. The bill was amended to correct sections that violated the JCPOA, but Iran continued to assert that the bill contradicts the spirit of the deal.

June 20, 2017: The UN Secretary General releases the biannual report on UN Security Council Resolution 2231, affirming that Iran is complying with the JCPOA but raising concerns about Iran’s ballistic missile activity.

July 10, 2017: White House Spokesperson Sarah Huckabee Sanders says that at the G20 summit, President Trump encouraged foreign leaders not to do business with Iran, which Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif later cited as a failure on the part of the United States to “implement its part of the bargain” in an interview.

July 17, 2017: The Trump administration reluctantly certifies Iran's compliance with the JCPOA, delaying the announcement for hours and issuing new non-nuclear sanctions on Iran the next day.

July 21, 2017: The Joint Commission of the JCPOA meets for the sixth time to address the implementation of the agreement.

July 25, 2017: The U.S. House of Representatives passes H.R. 3364, the Countering Adversarial Nations Through Sanctions Act, which would impose new sanctions on Iran, North Korea and Russia.

August 31, 2017: In its third quarterly report, the IAEA finds that as of Aug. 21, Iran’s stock of low-enriched uranium was 88.4 kg (194.89 pounds), well below a 202.8-kg limit, and the level of enrichment did not exceed a 3.67 percent cap. Iran’s stock of heavy water, stood at 111 tons, below the 130 ton limit.

September 20, 2017: The foreign ministers of China, France, Germany, Iran, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States meet on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly for the ministerial meeting of the E3/EU+3 and Iran. In remarks following the meeting, EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini states that all agreed that all sides are implementing the JCPOA.

September 22, 2017: Iran parades its new medium-range ballistic missile tested in January, the Khoramshahr, with a range of about 2,000 km, in a military parade.

October 13, 2017: Trump declares that, as part of a broader new strategy toward Iran, he will not certify under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) that the suspension of sanctions under the JCPOA is "appropriate and proportionate" to measures taken by Iran under the deal. Trump's decertification itself does not violate the JCPOA. However, decertification opens up a window of 60 days where Congress may re-introduce sanctions waived under the nuclear deal with Iran under an expedited process. In his address, Trump encourages Congress to enact legislation against the JCPOA's "sunset clauses" which set dates after which certain restrictions under the deal on Iran's nuclear program will no longer apply. Trump says if his concerns about the deal are not resolved he will terminate the agreement.

Trump also states that he will further sanction the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) for its support for terrorism, but does not designate the group as a terrorist organization.

Immediately following the announcement, UK Prime Minister Theresa May, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron released a joint statement expressing their continued support for the JCPOA.

November 13, 2017: The IAEA issues its fourth quarterly report for 2017 on Iran's implementation of the JCPOA. IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano tells the agency's Board of Governors that the nuclear-related commitments are being implemented and that IAEA inspectors have had access to all locations they have needed to visit.

December 13, 2017: The JCPOA Joint Commission meets for the seventh time to oversee the implementation of the agreement.

December 15, 2017: UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres issues the biannual report on the implementation of Resolution 2231. The report notes that the nuclear deal is being implemented but finds that Iran has violated the arms embargo provisions of Resolution 2231. The report also notes that the secretariat is continuing to investigate allegations that ballistic missiles launched at Saudi Arabia from Yemen were transferred by Iran to the Houthis in violation of 2231. Iran denies the claims.

2018

January 12, 2018: The Trump administration announces that it will re-issue waivers on nuclear-related sanctions on Iran to meet U.S. obligations under the agreement. However, Trump says he will not re-issue the waivers again and will withdraw from the deal unless Congress passes legislation addressing what he describes as flaws in the agreement. Trump says his administration is also engaging with European allies on a supplemental agreement of unlimited duration that would impose sanctions if Iran tests long-range missiles, thwarts inspections, or makes progress toward a nuclear weapon.

January 26, 2018: The UN panel of experts assessing implementation of sanctions on Yemen finds Iran in noncompliance with its obligations under the arms embargo established by Resolution 2216. The report notes that Iran did not take "necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer” of short-range ballistic missiles and other equipment. Iran disputes the report and argues that the evidence is fabricated.

February 22, 2018: The IAEA issues its first quarterly report for 2018 on Iran's implementation of the JCPOA. IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano tells the agency's Board of Governors that the nuclear-related commitments are being implemented and that IAEA inspectors have had access to all locations they have needed to visit. As of Feb. 12, 2018, the quantity of Iran’s uranium enriched up to 3.67% U-235 was 109.5 kg. The report notes that Iran informed the agency of its intention to pursue naval nuclear propulsion in the future.

March 15, 2018: State Department Director of Policy Planning Brian Hook meets with representatives from the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) in Berlin to continue discussions on the JCPOA and Trump's demand for a 'supplemental' agreement with the Europeans that addresses sunsets, ballistic missiles, and inspections.

March 16, 2018: The JCPOA Joint Commission meets to oversee implementation of the agreement.

March 19, 2018: EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini says at a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council that the EU is not considering new sanctions on Iran's ballistic missile activities, amid reports that the E3 are developing such measures.

April 11, 2018: Political directors from the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK) and the United States meet in Washington, DC to continue talks on Trump's demand for a supplemental agreement that addresses sunsets, ballistic missiles, and inspections.

April 11, 2018: China and Iran hold a seminar on civil nuclear cooperation under the JCPOA in Beijing.

April 19, 2018: 500 British, French and German parliamentarians urge U.S. members of Congress to help "keep the JCPOA alive" in a letter.

April 24, 2018: U.S. President Trump hosts French President Emmanuel Macron for his first state visit. Macron reports having very frank discussions with Trump about the JCPOA and said that he and President Trump had agreed to work on a "new deal" that keeps the JCPOA, but incorporates additional measures, including on Iranian ballistic missiles.

May 8, 2018: President Trump announces that he is withdrawing the United States from the JCPOA and signs a presidential memorandum to institute the "highest level" of economic sanctions on Iran. In a statement, Secretary of the Treasury Steve Mnuchin states that sanctions will be reimposed subject to certain 90 day and 180 day "wind-down periods." In an address following Trump's announcement Iranian President Rouhani announces that Iran will continue negotiations with the other states in the agreement in order to try to continue the deal without the United States. British Prime Minister May, German Chancellor Merkel and French President Macron re-state their continued commitment to the deal and pledge to work with all parties to make sure its terms are upheld. EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini states that the EU is committed to the JCPOA as long as Iran continues to implement its nuclear related commitments, as it has so far.

May 15, 2018: EU High Representative Federica Mogherini meets with the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the three European countries and Iran in two separate meetings to discuss future coordinated work following the U.S. violation of the JCPOA. They agree to "launch intensive expert discussions" to find practical solutions to the following issues in the next few weeks:

"Maintaining and deepening economic relations with Iran;
The continued sale of Iran's oil and gas condensate petroleum products and petrochemicals and related transfers;
Effective banking transactions with Iran;
Continued sea, land, air and rail transportation relations with Iran;
The further provision of export credit and development of special purpose vehicles in financial banking, insurance and trade areas, with the aim of facilitating economic and financial cooperation, including by offering practical support for trade and investment;
The further development and implementation of Memoranda of Understanding and contracts between European companies and Iranian counterparts;
Further investments in Iran;
The protection of European Union economic operators and ensuring legal certainty;
And last but not least, the further development of a transparent, rules-based business environment in Iran."

May 17, 2018: The European Commission meets in Sofia and announces that it will pursue a "blocking statute" to ban European companies and courts from complying with U.S. sanctions against Iran.

May 21, 2018: Secretary of State Mike Pompeo presents the Trump administration's new strategy on Iran after the U.S. violation of the JCPOA in a speech at the Heritage Foundation, promising to "apply unprecedented financial pressure on the Iranian regime" and work with allies to deter Iranian aggression. If the United States were to pursue a new deal, Pompeo lists 12 demands for Iran, including stopping enrichment, ending the proliferation of ballistic missiles and the development of nuclear-capable missile systems and allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency to have "unqualified access to all sites throughout the entire country." In exchange, the United States would be prepared to end "the principal components of every one of our sanctions against the regime," as well as re-establish full diplomatic and commercial relationships and allow Iran to have "advanced technology."

May 24, 2018: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that Iran is implementing all nuclear related commitments under the JCPOA in a quarterly report. Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.67 percent uranium-235 is 123.9 kg, below the 300 kg limit set by the accord, according to the report. The report notes that Iran is implementing the Additional Protocol but that “timely and proactive cooperation by Iran in providing such access would facilitate implementation of the Additional Protocol and enhance confidence.”

June 6, 2018: Iran opens a new facility for centrifuge production, an act which does not violate the JCPOA. Reza Najafi, Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA, tells press June 6 that the decision to open the facility is the “preparatory works for a possible scenario” if the JCPOA fails and reiterated that Iran will not start “any activities contrary to the JCPOA” at this time.

The European Commission adopts an update of the Blocking Statute to include extraterritorial sanctions that the United States re-imposed on Iran and an update of the European Investment Bank (EIB)'s External Lending Mandate to make Iran eligible for investment activities by the EIB. "These measures are meant to help protecting the interests of EU companies investing in Iran and to demonstrate the EU's commitment to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)," reads a European Commission press release.

July 6, 2018: The JCPOA Joint Commission meets in Vienna and releases a statement on "the way forward to ensure the continued implementation of the JCPOA in all its aspects following the withdrawal of the United States from the deal."

July 16, 2018: EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini confirms at a press conference that the United States refused a request by France, Germany, the UK and the EU to exempt entities doing legitimate business with Iran from U.S. sanctions penalties.

July 18, 2018: Iran's head of the Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, announces that Iran built a new factory to produce rotors for up to 60 IR-6 centrifuges a day. Salehi says building the facility does not violate the JCPOA.

July 26, 2018: Ten Republican Senators write a letter to the French, German, and British ambassadors to the United States urging compliance with the sanctions reimposed by Trump and warning against efforts to block or circumvent the measures. The letter says it would be "particularly troubling if you sought to evade or undermine American statutes" and doing so "could well prompt Congressional action."

August 6, 2018: In a joint statement the EU, French, German, and British foreign ministers say they "deeply regret the re-imposition of sanctions by the US" and note that they are "determined to protect European economic operators engaged in legitimate business with Iran, in accordance with EU law and with UN Security Council resolution 2231." They reiterate that preserving the JCPOA is a "matter of respecting international agreements and a matter of international security."

August 7, 2018: Certain sanctions measures reimposed by Trump May 8 come into full effect. The measures include restricting Iran's purchase of U.S. dollars, trade in gold, precious metals, aluminum, steel, coal, software, and transactions related to sovereign debt and the automotive sector. Licenses allowing certain foodstuffs to be exported to the United States and Iran to purchase commercial aircraft are also revoked.

August 16, 2018: Secretary of State Pompeo announces the creation of the Iran Action Group, responsible for "directing, reviewing, and coordinating all aspects" of the State Department's Iran strategy and led by Brian Hook with the title Special Representative for Iran.

August 22, 2018: Iran says that the UK will help with the re-design of the Arak heavy water nuclear reactor to limit the amount of plutonium byproduct it produces, a task the United States had committed to under the JCPOA.

Sen. Cruz (R-Texas), along with 15 republican senators, sends a letter to Treasury Secretary Mnuchin urging him to take all necessary steps to ensure the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) disconnects the Central Bank of Iran and all other designated Iranian financial institutions.

August 23, 2018: The European Commission adopts an €18 million package for Iran, the first part of a larger €50 million package, including €8 million assistance to the private sector.

August 27-28: The International Court of Justice hears arguments from Iran and the United States on Tehran's allegation that the U.S. reimposition of sanctions violates the 1955 U.S.-Iranian Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations. The United States contends that the court does not have jurisdiction to hear the case.

September 12, 2018: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that Iran is implementing all nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA in a quarterly report. Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.67 percent uranium-235 is 139.4 kg, below the 300 kg of UF6 limit set by the accord, according to the report. Iran's stock of heavy water is 122.9 metric tons, below the 130 metric ton limit.

September 24, 2018: The foreign ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini meet in New York to discuss the implementation of the JCPOA. The participants decide to establish a Special Purpose Vehicle "to facilitate payments related to Iran's export (including oil) and imports, which will assist and reassure economic operators pursuing legitimate business with Iran."

September 25, 2018: U.S. President Donald Trump speaks at the UN General Assembly in New York. "Iran’s leaders sow chaos, death, and destruction," he says, adding that many countries in the Middle East supported his decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and reimpose nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. "Additional sanctions will resume November 5th, and more will follow. And we’re working with countries that import Iranian crude oil to cut their purchases substantially.... We ask all nations to isolate Iran’s regime as long as its aggression continues. And we ask all nations to support Iran’s people as they struggle to reclaim their religious and righteous destiny."

On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton, U.S. Speical Representative for Iran Brian Hook, and representatives from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Bahrain, UAE and Israel attend the United Against Nuclear Iran summit. Pompeo unveiled a new report by the State Department's Iran Action Group which chronicles "Iran's destructive activities." In his remarks, Bolton warns "there will be hell to pay" if Iran doesn't change its behavior.

September 26, 2018: U.S. President Donald Trump chairs a summit-level UN Security Council meeting, officially about WMD non-proliferation, but which he tweeted would be about Iran. While Trump criticizes the JCPOA in the meeting, nearly every other leader in the council expresses support for the accord and encourages Iran to continue to comply.

September 27, 2018: In his address to the UN General Assembly, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reveals what he describes as a secret nuclear warehouse “storing massive amounts of equipment and material from Iran’s secret nuclear weapons program.” Netanyahu also called on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Yukiya Amano to “do the right thing” and inspect the warehouse “immediately” before Iran finished clearing it out. He charged that Iran removed 15 kilograms of radioactive material from the warehouse in August, but did not specify if the material was uranium, plutonium, or another radioactive source. One intelligence official quoted in Reuters says that the facility has been known to the U.S. intelligence community for some time and it is full of documents, not nuclear equipment. The official says that “so far as anyone knows, there is nothing in it that would allow Iran to break out” of the nuclear deal any faster.

October 2, 2018: IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano says in a statement that the agency does not take any information at “face value.” While Amano did not mention Netanyahu directly, he said that all material, including that received from third parties, is subject to a rigorous and independent assessment. Amano said the IAEA’s nuclear verification work “must always be impartial, factual, and professional” and that the agency’s independence is “of paramount importance.”

October 3, 2018: The International Court of Justice (ICJ) rules unanimously that the United States “must remove, by means of its choosing, any impediments” to the export of food, agricultural products, medicine, aircraft parts, and other humanitarian goods. The 15-member panel concludes that Trump’s decision to reimpose sanctions on Iran was unfounded given Tehran’s compliance with the JCPOA, but the court did not order the United States to remove all sanctions or compensate Iran for damages.

November 5, 2018: The second round of sanctions on Iran following Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA, targeting Iran's banking, oil, shipping and ship-building sectors, come back into effect. In addition to redesignating entities removed from the SDN list under the JCPOA, United States designates an additional 300 new entities. The administration grants temporary waivers to China, India, Italy, Greece, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Turkey to continue importing Iranian oil at reduced levels, as well as waivers to allow nonproliferation projects at Arak, Bushehr and Fordow to continue.

November 22, 2018: The International Atomic Energy Agency reports that Iran is implementing its nuclear-related committments. The IAEA's quarterly report finds that Iran's stockpile of heavy water is 122.8 metric tons, below the 130-ton limit and that Iran's stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.67 percent uranium-235 is 149.4 kilograms, below the 300-kilogram limit.

November 26-27, 2018: EU and Iranian officials meet in Brussels for the third High-Level Summit on International Nuclear Cooperation. The EU and Iran review past nuclear cooperation projects and discuss ongoing modifications of the Arak reactor and conversion of the Fordow facility to a research site.

December 12, 2018: The UN Security Council meets to discuss the biannual UN Secretary-General report on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231. The report welcomes Iran's implementation of its nuclear-related commitments "in the face of considerable challenges" from the U.S. withdrawal of the JCPOA. The report also notes Iranian activities that might violate the ballistic transfer provision in the resolution. At the meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announces that the United States will work with other UN Security Council members to reimpose on Iran the ballistic missile restrictions outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 1929.

2019

January 15, 2019: Iran attempts to launch a satellite using its Simorgh launch vehicle, but the satellite fails to enter orbit. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo characterizes the launch as “continued defiance of the international community and UN Security Council Resolution 2231," although the launch does not violate the resolution.

January 29, 2019: The annual Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community assesses that "Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities we judge necessary to produce a nuclear device." It adds that "Iran’s continued implementation of the JCPOA has extended the amount of time Iran would need to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon from a few months to about one year."

January 30, 2019: IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano reiterates that Iran is implementing its nuclear-related obligations under the JCPOA and states that attempts to "micro-manage or put pressure on the agency in nuclear verification" are "counter-productive and extremely harmful" in remarks to the IAEA staff. Although Amano doesn't name who was putting pressure on the agency, he is likely referencing Israeli and U.S. efforts to persuade the IAEA to investigate what they deem a "secret atomic warehouse" in Iran, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described in his September UN General Assembly speech.

January 31, 2019: Germany, France and the United Kingdom establish a "special purpose vehicle" to facilitate transactions for non-sanctioned trade with Iran, called the "Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges" (INSTEX).

February 13-14, 2019: The United States and Poland host a ministerial summit on the Middle East in Warsaw where U.S. Vice President Mike Pence explicitly calls on “our European partners to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal.” Several European foreign ministers boycott the summit.

March 6, 2019: The International Atomic Energy Agency reports that Iran is implementing its nuclear-related commitments. The IAEA's quarterly report finds that Iran's stockpile of heavy water is 124.8 metric tons, below the 130-ton limit and that Iran's stockpile of uranium enriched to 3.67 percent uranium-235 is 163.8 kilograms, below the 300-kilogram limit.

The JCPOA Joint Commission also meets in Vienna March 6 and all parties reiterate their commitment to the full implementation of the JCPOA.

March 19, 2019: Iran announces that it registered its counterpart to the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX).

March 22, 2019: The U.S. Treasury Department designates 31 Iranian entities and individuals for past involvement in Iran’s nuclear weapons program under an executive order targeting the proliferators of weapons of mass destruction.

April 8, 2019: The United States designates the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

April 9, 2019: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announces that Iran will install a cascade of 20 IR-6 centrifuges at Natanz.

April 22, 2019: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announces that the United States will not issue any additional sanctions waivers for states to continue importing Iranian oil on May 2.

May 3, 2019: The United States announces that it will extend waivers to allow certain nuclear cooperation projects in Iran to proceed, but end others. The United States extends waivers for the Arak reactor conversion, the Fordow facility conversion, the Bushehr nuclear reactor and the Tehran research reactor for 90 days, but ends waivers for the transfer of enriched uranium out of Iran, the transfer and storage of heavy water outside of Iran and the construction of additional reactor units at Bushehr.

May 5, 2019: U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton announces that the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group and a bomber task force are being deployed to the U.S. Central Command region to "send a clear and unmistakable message to the Iranian regime that any attack on United States interests or on those of our allies will be met with unrelenting force.” Some news outlets report that officials in the intelligence community claim Bolton is exaggerating the threat posed by Iran.

May 8, 2019: Iran announces that it will no longer be bound by stockpiles limitations on enriched uranium and heavy water reserves in the JCPOA and could restart construction on its unfinished heavy water reactor at Arak and resume higher level enrichment in the future if the other parties to the agreement do not deliver on sanctions relief. In late April, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif told state broadcaster IRIB that Iran was considering leaving the NPT as one of Iran's numerous choices.

The United States also announces new sanctions targeting Iran's industrial metal exports.

May 9, 2019: EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini and the French, German and UK foreign ministers urge Iran to continue to meet its commitments under the JCPOA and reject "any ultimatums" in a joint statement. The leaders also urge countries not party to the JCPOA "to refrain from taking any actions that impede the remaining parties' ability to fully perform their commitments."

May 20, 2019: Iran announces it will quadruple uranium enrichment output at Natanz and says it will soon surpass the 300 kilogram limit on uranium gas enriched to 3.67 percent set by the deal.

June 3, 2019: U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo says the United States is willing to engage with Iran with no preconditions.

June 6, 2019: Russian President Vladimir Putin says there has not been "a single violation" of the JCPOA by Iran.

June 10, 2019: IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano tells the agency's Board of Governors that he is "worried about increasing tensions over the Iranian nuclear issue." He says the JCPOA represents a "significant gain for nuclear verification" and says full implementation is essential. The IAEA's report on Iran's implementation of the deal finds that Iran's stockpile of heavy water was 125 metric tons, below the 130 ton limit, and that the low-enriched uranium stockpile was 174 kilograms, below the 202 kilogram limit (which is equivalent to 300 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride gas). The report notes that Iran has installed 33 IR-6 advanced centrifuges and says there are technical discussions over the IR-6 ongoing. The report notes that inspectors have had access to all sites and locations they have requested to visit.

German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas travels to Tehran and says Germany will not accept a "less-for-less" agreement on implementation of the JCPOA. An INSTEX delegation travels with Maas to discuss efforts process transactions using the channel.

June 11, 2019: U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA Jackie Wolcott says that Iran is "reported to be in clear violation of the deal," citing the number of IR-6 centrifuges installed.

June 12-13, 2019: Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visits Tehran and delivers a message from U.S. President Donald Trump to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Khamenei says Trump is "not deserving to exchange messages with" and says he will not send a response. Khamenei says that there is no sense in negotiating with the United States after Trump has "thrown away everything that was agreed upon."

June 13, 2019: The United States accuses Iran of attacking two tankers in the Gulf of Oman. Iran denies that it is behind the attack.

June 17, 2019: Iran announces it will breach the 300 kilogram limit on uranium gas enriched to 3.67 percent within 10 days.

June 20, 2019: Iran shoots down a U.S. surveillance drone. Iran claims the drone was in Iranian airspace. The United States says the drone was in international airspace.

June 24, 2019: The United States sanctions the Supreme Leader of Iran and his office.

June 26, 2019: The UN Secretary General's office briefs the UN Security Council on his biannual report assessing the implementation of Resolution 2231. The report expresses regret for the U.S. decision not to renew waivers on nuclear nonproliferation projects and says U.S. actions are "contrary to the goals" of the nuclear deal. The report also expresses regret over Iran's May 8 announcement that Tehran will no longer be bound by the deal's limits on heavy water and low-enriched uranium. The report notes that the Secretary General's office investigated several interdicted shipments of conventional arms and missiles, as well as missile debris, and determined that in several cases that components originated in Iran, but was unable to determine if the transfers took place before or after Resolution 2231 came into effect in January 2016.

June 28, 2019: The JCPOA's Joint Commission meets in Vienna. The chair's statement says that INSTEX transactions are being processed and that there has been positive progress on the conversion of the Arak and Fordow facilities. The statement says that experts will looking to solutions for Iran to transfer heavy water and low-enriched uranium out of Iran now that the United States is sanctioning those actions.

Seven European states issue a statement reiterating their support for the JCPOA and their intention to participate in INSTEX.

July 1, 2019: Iran announces that it breached the 300 kilogram limit on uranium gas enriched to 3.67 percent (202 kilograms of uranium by weight). The IAEA confirms that Iran has exceeded the limit. The White House issues a statement saying that "maximum pressure on the Iranian regime will continue until its leaders alter their course of action" and that the United States "must restore the longstanding nonproliferation standard of no enrichment for Iran."

July 2, 2019: The Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom and the EU High Representative issue a statement expressing regret for Iran's decision to breach the limit on low-enriched uranium. The ministers state that "we have been consistent and clear that our commitment to the nuclear deal depends on full compliance by Iran" and state that they are "urgently considering next steps under the terms of the JCPOA."

July 7, 2019: Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif tweets that Iran will exceed the 3.67 percent uranium-235 enrichment limit designated by the JCPOA, adding that Iran’s breaches of the JCPOA are “remedial” and in response to U.S. “economic terrorism.” Iran shares its new enrichment plans with the IAEA.

July 8, 2019: Iran tells the IAEA it has enriched uranium to “about 4.5 percent” uranium-235 at the Natanz pilot fuel enrichment plant. The Agency releases a report confirming Iran has exceeded the 3.67 percent enrichment cap set by the nuclear deal. Speaking to reporters, U.S. President Donald Trump warns “Iran better be careful.”

July 10, 2019: The IAEA’s Board of Governors meets in Vienna to discuss the Agency’s verification and monitoring of nuclear activities in Iran at the request of a member state.

July 31, 2019: The U.S. State Department issues a 90-day renewal on sanctions waivers to allow certain nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation projects to continue in Iran

The United States sanctions Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif for acting on behalf of the Supreme Leader.

August 24-26, 2019: At the G-7 Summit in France, French President Emmanuel Macron offers a $15 billion credit line to Tehran in exchange for its return to compliance with the JCPOA. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif also attends the summit.

At a joint press conference with Macron, U.S. President Donald Trump suggests there is a “really good chance” of a meeting between American and Iranian officials.

August 30, 2019: The IAEA confirms that Iran continues to exceed the 300 kilogram stockpile limit on enriched uranium (correlating to 202.8 kilograms of uranium) and the 3.67 percent enrichment cap established by the JCPOA and reports that Iran has amassed 241.6 kilograms uranium, including 25.1 kilograms uranium enriched to 4.5 percent U-235. The Agency notes that Iran continues to implement the Additional Protocol and comply with IAEA inspectors.

September 3, 2019: The U.S. Treasury sanctions the Iran Space Agency and two affiliated research institutes under an executive order directed at proliferators of weapons of mass destruction.

September 4, 2019: The U.S. Treasury sanctions a shipping network linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force and Hezbollah, condemning Iran for its “provocative actions to destabilize the region and the world.”

September 5, 2019: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announces a third breach of the JCPOA, stating “all of our commitments for research and development under the JCPOA will be completely removed by Friday,” and adding that Iran’s activities will remain under IAEA supervision.

September 7, 2019: Iran tells the IAEA that it plans to install and test additional advanced centrifuges with natural uranium at the Natanz pilot fuel enrichment plant. The Agency verifies installation of 22 IR-4, one IR-5, and 33 IR-6 centrifuges.

Atomic Energy Organization of Iran spokesman Behrouz Kamalvandi announces that technicians have introduced UF6 to cascades of 20 IR-4 and 20 IR-6 centrifuges, exceeding the number of machines permitted in a cascade under the research and development terms of the JCPOA at that time. Kamalvandi adds that Iran may soon withdraw enriched uranium from its advanced centrifuges and add it to the stockpile of low enriched uranium in breach of the JCPOA.

September 8, 2019: Iran notifies the IAEA of its intention to reinstall equipment needed for additional centrifuge cascades in its pilot plant at Natanz. The Agency verifies preparation for and installation of piping and header connections.

IAEA Acting Director General Cornel Feruta meets with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Ali Akbar Salehi, and other officials in Tehran to discuss implementation of the Agency’s nuclear safeguards. Feruta states that the IAEA’s work requires “full and timely cooperation by Iran.”

September 9, 2019: IAEA Acting Director General Cornel Feruta delivers the opening statement at the Agency’s Board of Governors’ September meeting. He reiterates the importance of Iranian cooperation with IAEA inspections and safeguards implementation and asks that Iran “respond promptly to Agency questions related to the completeness of Iran’s safeguards declarations.”

At a press conference in Jerusalem, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reveals an alleged Iranian nuclear weapons site. Netanyahu claims the site, located near the Iranian city Abadeh, was used to “conduct experiments to develop nuclear weapons,” but was destroyed after Tehran learned of Israel’s discovery.

September 10, 2019: The U.S. State Department reports that President Trump may meet Iranian President Rouhani at the United Nations General Assembly in New York with “no preconditions.”

September 14, 2019: A drone and cruise missile strike damages a Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Aramco) facility in Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia.

September 16, 2019: The Trump Administration blames Iran for the strike on the Saudi Aramco facility after U.S. intelligence findings implicate Iran in the attack.

September 17, 2019: Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei delivers a speech saying “no negotiation whatsoever will be conducted between officials of the Islamic Republic and the Americans” unless the United States comes back into compliance with the JCPOA.

September 18, 2019: Officials in Saudi Arabia claim Iran carried out the Sept. 14 attack on Saudi critical oil infrastructure.

September 20, 2019: The United States deploys additional troops to Saudi Arabia in response to the Aramco attack. Announcing the deployment, U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper condemns Iran for the Sept. 14 attack on the Aramco facility.

The U.S. Treasury imposes new sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran, the National Development Fund of Iran, and the Etemad Tejarate Pars Co., an Iranian company implicated in concealing the military’s financial transactions.

September 23, 2019: The United Kingdom, France, and Germany release a statement condemning Iran for the Sept. 14 strike on the Saudi Aramco oil facility.

September 24, 2019: President Donald Trump delivers a speech at the United Nations General Assembly in New York and threatens to continue the maximum pressure sanctions campaign on Iran if its “menacing behavior” continues.

French President Emmanuel Macron meets separately with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and U.S. President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. Macron attempts to set up a call with both leaders to discuss his proposal for preserving the JCPOA, but Rouhani decides not to participate.

Rouhani later delivers an interview on Fox News and reiterates that Iran does not seek nuclear weapons.

September 25, 2019: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announces that Iran will not engage in negotiations while under sanctions and affirms that talks with the United States will only begin if all parties return to compliance with the JCPOA.

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivers a speech at the United Against Nuclear Iran annual summit, criticizing Iran’s behavior in the region and calling the Saudi Aramco attack an “act of war.” Pompeo announces the imposition of secondary sanctions on Chinese entities implicated in importing Iranian oil.

The White House issues a proclamation suspending entry of senior Iranian government officials to the United States, calling Iran’s government a “state sponsor of terrorism.”

September 24, 2019: Iran begins constructing centrifuge rotor tubes using carbon fiber material not subject to continuous IAEA surveillance, the Agency reports.

September 25, 2019: Iran alerts the IAEA of four additional cascades being configured at the Natanz pilot fuel enrichment plant: one of 20 IR-2m centrifuges, one of 10 IR-5 centrifuges, one of 20 IR-6s centrifuges, and one of 164 IR-6 centrifuges.

The IAEA confirms that the centrifuge cascades already installed at Natanz “[are] accumulating, or have been prepared to accumulate, enriched uranium.”

The IAEA also verifies that Iran continues to install additional cascades of 164 IR-4 and 164 IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz.

September 26, 2019: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom warn Tehran that a fourth violation of the JCPOA will prompt a special dispute mechanism.

October 2, 2019: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani corroborates a report that, with the support of French President Emmanuel Macron, he and President Trump had agreed upon a four-point document at the United Nations General Assembly in September.

The document outlines a lifting of re-imposed U.S. sanctions in exchange for Iran’s agreement to remain a non-nuclear weapons state in perpetuity and to pursue negotiations on regional peace. The agreement also allows Iran to exert full autonomy over its oil exports and revenue.

October 8, 2019: Director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, announces that Iran will increase its uranium enrichment capacity using 30 IR-6 centrifuges.

October 14, 2019: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announces at a press conference that Iran is operating IR-6, IR-4 and IR-2 centrifuges and will soon begin operating an IR-9 centrifuge.

October 24, 2019: Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs Seyyed Abbas Araqchi meets Russian counterpart Sergei Ryabkov in Moscow to discuss the JCPOA. Araqchi says "the Islamic Republic of Iran always welcomes any idea and initiative that can contribute to the peaceful resolution of the crisis," but reiterates Tehran's threat to further breach the nuclear accord if "Iran's demands are not met."

October 31, 2019: The U.S. State Department issues a 90-day renewal of sanctions waivers on certain nuclear cooperation projects in Iran, but it remains unclear which waivers are renewed. As of July 2019, the Trump administration waived sanctions to allow for China, Russia, and the European members of the JCPOA to continue certain nonproliferation activities mandated by the nuclear deal, including conversion of Iran's Arak reactor and Fordow enrichment facility, the transfer of 20 percent enriched uranium fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, and the removal of spent fuel from the Buesher reactor. The July 2019 waivers expired in October.

The U.S. Treasury Office of Foreign Asset Control issues new sanctions against Iran under Section 1245 of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012 (IFCA).

November 4, 2019: Director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, announces that Iran is operating 60 IR-6 centrifuges. Salehi adds that Iran is enriching uranium to 4.5 percent U-235 and that its low enriched uranium stockpile totals over 500 kilograms, breaching the 3.67 percent enrichment cap and 300-kilogram stockpile limit designated by the JCPOA.

November 5, 2019: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announces that Iran will begin injecting UF6 into 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges at the Fordow facility on November 6.

November 6, 2019: Spokesperson for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Behrouz Kamalvandi announces that of the 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges at Fordow, 696 machines will be configured into four cascades and used to enrich uranium up to 5 percent U-235. According to Kamalvandi, the other 348 centrifuges will be used for production of stable isotopes.

Iranian newspapers report the transfer of 2,000 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) to the Fordow facility.

November 7, 2019: Acting-Director General Cornel Feruta convenes a special meeting of the IAEA’s Board of Governors and reported that the agency “detected natural uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at a location in Iran not declared to the agency.”

U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo issues a press statement condemning Iran’s “latest nuclear escalations,” warning that Tehran may be preparing for “rapid nuclear breakout,” and calling on the international community to increase pressure on Iran.

November 10, 2019: Iranian officials announce that Iran has taken a step on construction of the planned nuclear reactor and begun pouring concrete for the unit at Bushehr. Officials add that uranium enriched to 4.5 percent uranium-235 may be used to fuel the reactor.

November 11, 2019: France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the European Union issue a joint statement warning that Iran’s recent decision to begin uranium enrichment at the Fordow facility has “potentially severe proliferation implications” and “represents a regrettable acceleration of Iran’s disengagement from commitments under the [JCPOA]”. Additionally, the E3 “affirm [their] readiness to consider all mechanisms in the JCPoA, including the dispute resolution mechanism, to resolve the issues related to Iran’s implementation of its JCPoA commitments.”

The IAEA verifies that Iran has amassed 372.3 kilograms of enriched uranium, comprised of 212.6 kilograms uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) enriched to 3.67 percent uranium-235 and 159.7 kilograms UF6 enriched to 4.5 percent uranium-235. Under the JCPOA, Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile is limited to 300 kilograms UF6 enriched to 3.67 percent, which equates to 202.8 kilograms enriched uranium. The IAEA also confirms installation and testing of a variety of advanced centrifuges, including of an IR-8, an IR-s, and an IR-9 centrifuge, and reports that Iran shared it would use all advanced centrifuges for uranium enrichment and accumulation once testing is complete. The IAEA further reports that Iran has begun feeding uranium into two cascades of IR-1 centrifuges at the Fordow facility.

November 18, 2019: The IAEA verifies that Iran’s heavy water stockpile has reached 131.5 metric tons, exceeding the 130 metric ton limit designated by the JCPOA.

The United States announces it will no longer waive sanctions related to Iran’s Fordow facility and the existing waiver will terminate Dec. 15.

November 25, 2019: Iran and the IAEA agree to cooperate on four nuclear projects, including nuclear security and waste management.

The U.S. Department of Defense boards a ship in the Arabian Sea and discovers a cache of weapons, including advanced missile components. The Pentagon says that the weapons appear to be of Iranian origin and were being transferred in violation of Resolution 2231.

November 30, 2019: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden join the INSTEX mechanism designed to circumvent U.S. financial sanctions and to allow companies to trade with Iran without penalty.

December 1, 2019: Ali Larijani, Speaker for the Iranian Parliament, warns during a press conference that if remaining members of the JCPOA trigger a dispute resolution mechanism and reinstate sanctions, “Iran would be forced to seriously consider some of its commitments to the International Atomic Energy Agency.”

December 5, 2019: The Russian company Rosatom announces it will suspend cooperation with Iran on the Fordow facility as required by the JCPOA, claiming that “uranium enrichment and the production of stable isotopes cannot be carried out in the same room.”

December 10, 2019: The UN Secretary General releases the biannual report on implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA. The report states that the Secretariat continues to investigate alleged Iranian violations of missile and arms restrictions put in place by Resolution 2231. The report notes that no proposals for exporting dual-use goods to Iran have been submitted to the procurement channel and that the U.S. decision to end waivers for nonproliferation projects are “contrary to the goals” of the JCPOA and “may also impede the ability” of Iran to meet its JCPOA obligations.

December 16, 2019: Iran confirms that a “technical problem” is the reason for Russia’s suspending cooperation at Fordow.

2020

January 2, 2020: The U.S. Department of Defense publishes a press release claiming responsibility for the targeted killing of Iranian Major General Qasem Soleimani, who led the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force. According to the release, “the strike was aimed at deterring future Iranian attack plans.”

January 5, 2020: The Iranian Cabinet releases a statement announcing that Iran will no longer adhere to JCPOA restrictions on uranium enrichment and that Iran will abandon the “last key operational restriction on the number of centrifuges.” The statement says Iran’s nuclear program going forward will be based on “technical needs.”

Tweeting the announcement, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif calls the violation Iran’s “5th & final REMEDIAL step.” Zarif reiterates that all of Iran’s violations are “reversible upon EFFECTIVE implementation of reciprocal obligations” under the JCPOA and reminds that Iran will continue to cooperate fully with the IAEA.

Mikhail Ulyanov, Russian Permanent Representative to the IAEA, tweets that Iran’s announcement to continue compliance with the IAEA was of “paramount importance.”

January 6, 2020: French President Macron, German Chancellor Merkel, and British Prime Minister Johnson release a joint statement condemning Iran’s fifth breach and urging Iran to “reverse all measures inconsistent with the JCPOA.”

French Foreign Minister Le Drian reports that the European members of the JCPOA are considering launching the deal’s dispute resolution mechanism, which could incur a snapback of United Nations sanctions that were lifted in accordance with the deal. “The repeated violations leave us today asking about the long-term validity of this (nuclear) accord,” Le Drian says.

EU foreign policy chief Josep Fontelles says that preserving the JCPOA is “crucial for global security” and that “full implementation” by all parties is “now more important than ever.”

Geng Shuang, spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, at a press conference, advocates for preservation of the JCPOA and stresses that “the hard-won JCPOA, endorsed and adopted by the UN Security Council, is an important outcome of multilateral diplomacy.” The spokesperson reminds that Iran “has not violated its obligations under the NPT.”

Mahmoud Sadeghi, member of Iranian Parliament, reports he will put a bill forward for Iran’s withdrawal from the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty.

January 7, 2020: French President Macron, in a phone call, urges Iranian President Rouhani to “swiftly return to full compliance with [Iran’s] commitments under the JCPOA.”

January 10, 2020: The Foreign Ministers representing European members of the JCPOA hold an emergency meeting in Brussels to discuss Iran's recent breach of the nuclear accord.

January 14, 2020: The E3 (UK, France, Germany) trigger the deal’s dispute resolution mechanism, stating their intent to“[find] a way forward to resolve the impasse through constructive diplomatic dialogue, while preserving the agreement and remaining within its framework.” The dispute resolution mechanism process, if referred to the UN Security Council, has the potential to result in the re-imposition of UN sanctions on Iran that were lifted in accordance with the 2015 deal. However, the E3 reminded “our 3 countries are not joining a campaign to implement maximum pressure against Iran.”

A comment released by the Russian Foreign Ministry calls the E3 trigger of the dispute resolution mechanism “profoundly disappointing and of serious concern.”

January 15, 2020: Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Geng Shuang condemns the E3 trigger of the dispute resolution mechanism and says Chinese officials “don’t believe that it well help solve any problem or ease any tensions.”

At a press briefing, U.S. Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin expresses the administration’s support for efforts to trigger the dispute resolution mechanism, adding that the Trump administration “[looks] forward to working with [Europe] quickly and would expect that U.N. sanctions will snap back into place.”

January 16, 2020: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announces that Iran has exceeded pre-JCPOA levels of enriched uranium production.

January 20, 2020: Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif says that Iran will withdraw from the NPT if Iran is referred to the Security Council through the dispute resolution mechanism triggered by the Europeans to address Iran’s breaches of the JCPOA.

January 24, 2020: EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell Fontelles, announcesthe extension of the 15-day period designated for members of the JCPOA Joint Commission (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China, the EU, and Iran) to resolve issues of non-compliance within the deal’s dispute resolution mechanism. The E3 triggered the dispute resolution mechanism on Jan. 14, and the 15-day period for discussions within the Joint Commission can be extended by consensus, in theory indefinitely.

(For more on the dispute resolution mechanism, see EXPLAINER: The Dispute Resolution Mechanism.)

January 30, 2020: The Swiss embassy in Tehran announces that a channel for facilitating humanitarian transactions facilitated a trial transaction involving the sale of cancer medicine to Iran. The embassy states that the payment mechanism will soon be operational for transactions involving food, medical exports, and pharmaceuticals.

January 31, 2020: The United States announces it will renew, for sixty days, four waivers that allow for European, Russian, and Chinese companies to continue work on cooperative non-proliferation projects with Iran. The United States also imposes new sanctions on the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and its director, Ali Akbar Salehi.

Responding to the U.S. designation, the AEOI tweets that the sanctions “will not in any way interrupt (Iran’s) peaceful nuclear activities and policies.”

February 4, 2020: Josep Borrell Fontelles, EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, reiterates at a press conference in Tehran the EU willingness to preserve the JCPOA. He said that the European parties to the deal agreed to “continuously postponing the dates and time limits” of the dispute resolution mechanism to avoid Security Council referral.

February 5, 2020: IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi tells reporters in Washington, DC that Iran has not taken further steps to breach the JCPOA, and that Iran continues to comply with its safeguards obligations mandated by the deal.

February 9, 2020: Iran attempts to place the Zafar-1 satellite into orbit using its three-stage Simorgh launch vehicle, but the launch fails. A spokesman for the Iranian Defense Ministry says the Simorgh “took [the] Zafar satellite into space with success, but the carrier failed to reach the speed needed to get the satellite into the designated orbit.”

At a press conference in Tehran, the Commander of the Iranian military’s Aerospace Force, Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, unveils a new short-range ballistic missile called the Ra’ad 500.

February 23, 2020: In an interview with The Washington Free Beacon, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo says the Trump Administration will decide in the near future whether to further strengthen its sanctions campaign against Iran. He says the Trump administration may pursue the re-imposition of UN sanctions on Iran and end all sanctions waivers that allow for continued nonproliferation cooperation projects in Iran.

February 26, 2020: The Joint Commission of the JCPOA (the E3, EU, Russia, China, and Iran) meets in Vienna to discuss Iranian non-compliance with the nuclear deal and the status of sanctions relief. There, participants reaffirm their commitment to preserving the multilateral agreement, support for the INSTEX trading mechanism, and backing of ongoing nonproliferation cooperation projects in Iran.

March 3, 2020: The IAEA reports that Iran’s stockpile has exceeded 1,000 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 4.5 percent, and that Iran is enriching uranium using additional centrifuges at the Fordow facility.

The IAEA releases a second report detailing Iran’s noncompliance with the Agency’s investigation into three locations possibly associated with Iran’s nuclear-related activities. According to the IAEA, Iran has not responded to three separate letters from the Agency requesting additional information and access.

March 9, 2020: At the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, Director-General Rafael Grossi notes that “the Agency has not observed any changes to Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA” following Tehran’s Jan. 5 announcement that it is not bound by “any restrictions” of the deal. Grossi adds that the IAEA is continuing its inquiry into three locations possibly connected to undeclared nuclear activity in Iran.

March 27, 2020: The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran announces that a new generation of centrifuges will be installed at the Natanz enrichment facility, and will likely be displayed April 8.

March 30, 2020: The U.S. Department of State announces the renewal of four waivers that allow for nonproliferation cooperation projects on Iran’s Bushehr reactor, Arak heavy water reactor, and Tehran research reactor to continue for an additional sixty days.

March 31, 2020: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom report that the INSTEX trading mechanism has completed its first transaction, and that necessary medical supplies were exported from Europe to Iran.

April 8, 2020: Behrouz Kamalvandi, the spokesperson for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, announces that Tehran planned to display 122 new nuclear achievements on the country’s National Nuclear Day, which was scheduled for April 8 but postponed due to the coronavirus pandemic. Kamalvandi says that Iran is producing 60 new advanced centrifuges each day, and that it plans to significantly increase its enriched uranium output.

April 22, 2020: Iran launches its first military satellite using a new space-launch vehicle (SLV), the Qased. In doing so, Iran also reveals the existence of an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps- run military space program that operates in parallel to the country’s civilian space program.

April 25, 2020: U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo states in a press conference that “Iran’s space program is neither peaceful nor entirely civilian,” and he condemns the April 22 satellite launch. Pompeo calls on other countries to join the United States in rejecting Iran’s “development of ballistic-missile capable technologies” and constraining the country’s missile program.

April 29, 2020: Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant is refueled, as scheduled.

April 30, 2020: In a State Department briefing, U.S. Special Representative for Iran, Brian Hook, comments on the Trump administration’s plan to prevent the October 2020 expiration of a UN embargo that blocks arms sales to and from Iran. The embargo’s expiration date is written into UN Security Council Resolution 2231. Hook says that the administration is prepared to use “every diplomatic option available” to extend the embargo, including by making a legal argument that the United States remains a participant of the nuclear deal in order to exercise a Security Council provision to instate the UN embargo indefinitely.

In an interview, EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell says that, for the European parties to the 2015 nuclear deal, “it’s quite clear for us that the U.S. are no longer a participating member in this agreement.”

May 4, 2020: Over three-quarters of members in the U.S. House of Representatives sign on to a Foreign Affairs Committee letter addressed to Secretary Pompeo that calls on the Trump administration to extend the UN arms embargo through diplomatic means.

In a statement, co-sponsor of the letter and Chairman of the Committee, Elliot Engel (D-NY) says that “this letter, supported overwhelmingly by both parties in the House, represents an imperative to reauthorize this provision – not through snapback or going it alone, but through a careful diplomatic campaign.”

May 9, 2020: U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo remarks on the two-year anniversary of the United States’ withdrawal from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and says that “the United States will exercise all diplomatic options to ensure the UN embargo is extended.”

May 12, 2020: Russia’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Vassily Nebenzia, says that the United States has “no right to trigger” the snapback mechanism included in Resolution 2231 to extend the arms embargo. According to Nebenzia, “Snapback will definitely be the end of the JCPOA… The most intrusive inspections of a country by the IAEA will cease.” Nebenzia says that he does “not see any reason why an arms embargo should be imposed on Iran.”

May 13, 2020: Brian Hook, who serves as the U.S. Special Representative for Iran, publishes an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal claiming that “if the U.N. doesn’t renew the arms embargo against Iran, the U.S. will use its authority to do so.” Hook outlines the Trump administration’s preference for a standalone Security Council resolution extending the arms embargo but states that “the United States retains the right to renew the arms embargo by other means,” namely through Security Council Resolution 2231.

May 14, 2020: China’s permanent mission to the United Nations tweets that “the US failed to meet its obligations under Resolution 2231 by withdrawing from the [JCPOA]. It has no right to extend an arms embargo on Iran, let alone to trigger snapback. Maintaining the JCPOA is the only right way moving forward.”

May 27, 2020: U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo announces the United States will terminate sanctions waivers that allow for nonproliferation cooperation projects to continue in Iran. These waivers cover the conversion of the Arak reactor, the provision of enriched fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, and the export of Iran’s spent fuel. Pompeo notes the waivers will expire after a sixty-day wind down period and clarifies that the waiver covering international support for Iran’s Bushehr reactor will remain in place but can be revoked at any time.

June 5, 2020: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) releases two new reports – one on the Agency’s verification and monitoring in Iran pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA, and one on Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency. The former finds that Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium continues to exceed limits set by the 2015 nuclear deal. The latter lists three sites where possible undeclared nuclear activities may have taken place before 2003, when Iran abandoned its nuclear weapons program, and notes that Iran has failed to comply with IAEA requests for access to two of the sites.

June 8, 2020: The United States sanctions Iranian shipping entities for “repeatedly transport[ing] items related to Iran’s ballistic missile and military programs.”

June 11, 2020: The United Nations Secretary-General releases a regular report on implementation of Resolution 2231, which supports the 2015 nuclear deal and modifies UN sanctions on Iran. The report lists several instances of possible Iranian non-compliance with the arms-related and ballistic missile transfer-related provisions of the resolution.

The Republican Study Committee – the conservative caucus of the U.S. House of Representatives – releases a report that recommends actions to be taken by the Trump administration to strengthen the U.S. maximum pressure campaign on Iran, among other things. The report suggests extending the UN arms embargo indefinitely and applying additional sanctions on Iran.

June 15, 2020: At a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, Director-General Grossi notes “serious concern” about Tehran’s failure to cooperate with the Agency’s investigation into Iran’s past nuclear activities detailed in the June 5 safeguards report.

June 19, 2020: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors passes a resolution calling on Iran to fully cooperate with the Agency’s investigation into possible undeclared nuclear materials and activities from the pre-2003 period. The resolution passes by a vote of 25-2, with 7 abstentions, one country not voting, and dissenting votes by Russia and China.

Iranian Ambassador to the IAEA Kazem Gharibabadi calls the BoG resolution “deeply disappointing and unfortunate,” and thanks Russia, China, and other nations for opposing the resolution.

U.S. Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook, U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA Jackie Wolcott, and Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation Christopher Ford deliver a special briefing on “IAEA Actions to Hold Iran Accountable.” They remark on the Board of Governors’ resolution, thank France, Germany, and the United Kingdom for their role in passing the resolution, and condemn Russia and China for their attempts to “shield Iran from scrutiny.”

June 24, 2020: U.S. Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook and U.S. Ambassador to the UN Kelly Craft virtually brief the UN Security Council on their proposed draft of a resolution to extend the arms embargo on Iran.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani says Iran is open to talks with the United States if Washington apologizes for leaving the JCPOA and compensates Tehran accordingly. Rouhani warns the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to expect a “stern response” from Iran in response to the UN watchdog’s demands for access to sites in Tehran suspected of containing undeclared nuclear material.

The United States sanctions Iranian tanker captains who delivered approximately 1.5 barrels of Iranian gasoline to Venezuela.

June 25, 2020: The United States imposes additional sanctions on Iran targeted at the country’s metal industry. A statement by U.S. Secretary of State notes that Washington “will continue to exert maximum pressure on Iran until the regime decides to start behaving like a normal country.”

An explosion is reported in Iran’s Khojir region, which houses a ballistic missile complex. Iran’s defense ministry reports the explosion was caused by a gas leak.

June 28, 2020: U.S. Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook travels to the United Arab Emirates to meet with officials from the UAE to discuss extension of the UN arms embargo on Iran.

June 29, 2020: U.S. Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook meets with Saudi Defense, Foreign, State, and Investment Ministers in Riyadh to discuss the importance of extending the UN arms embargo on Iran.

Hook meets with Bahraini officials and together they issue a joint statement expressing a strong commitment to “countering Iranian aggression,” and “call[ing] upon the United Nations Security Council to extend the arms embargo on Iran before it expires.”

June 30, 2020: A United Nations Security Council briefing is held on the 2015 nuclear deal and the implementation of Resolution 2231.

U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo reiterates the U.S. call for extending the arms embargo on Iran that is written into the Resolution and is set to expire in October 2020. According to Pompeo, “renewing the embargo will exert more pressure on Tehran to start behaving like a normal nation.”

The European Union delivers a statement noting concerns related to Iran’s reduced compliance with the JCPOA and stressing the importance of preserving the deal. On the prospect of re-imposing all Security Council sanctions on Iran, the EU Representative condemns U.S. claims to participation in the deal and criticizes the U.S. decision to terminate critical non-proliferation waivers.

Germany's Permanent Representative to the United Nations notes that by withdrawing from the JCPOA in 2018, which is "enshrined in the binding resolution 2231," the United States violated international law. Speaking on the snapback of UN sanctions under that resolution, the German Representative continues, "the overarching goal for us is the preservation, continuation, and full implementation of Resolution 2231 of the JCPOA."

Russia and China also voice their opposition to U.S. efforts to extend the embargo.

An explosion is reported at a medical clinic in Tehran, killing nineteen people.

July 1, 2020: U.S. Ambassador to the UN Kelly Craft announces the United States will soon call for a Security Council vote on the U.S. draft of a resolution to extend the arms embargo on Iran.
“We want to give the council the opportunity to talk through the renewal,” she says, but continues that “we will use every measure, every tool, and if that means a snapback, that’s exactly what we’ll do, we’ll be initiating it.”

July 2, 2020: An explosion is reported at the Natanz enrichment facility. According to Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, the explosion occurred “in one of the industrial sheds under construction,” but did not emit any radiation.

During a briefing, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo responds to the German claim that U.S. invocation of the snapback mechanism would further violate international law and says "as a participant in UN Security Council Resolution 2231, we are highly confident that we have the right to exercise that," but clarifies "it is not our first objective."

July 3, 2020: EU Foreign Policy chief Josep Borrell announces he received a letter from Iran triggering the deal's dispute resolution mechanism, citing concerns about the E3's implementation of the agreement. That same dispute resolution mechanism, codified in paragraph 36 of the deal, was first triggered by the E3 in January 2020.

July 4, 2020: Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif tweets that the country triggered the JCPOA dispute resolution mechanism because of violations by the United States and the European members of the deal Zarif says that European members of the deal are failing to fulfill their JCPOA duties and have given in to U.S. “bullying.”

July 6, 2020: Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), announces that construction on the damaged building at Natanz will soon begin. Kamalvandi notes that due to limitations imposed by the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal, the centrifuge assembly facility where the explosion occurred was only operating at limited capacity.

July 7, 2020: Nour News, an online media outlet with close ties to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, releases a commentary on the Natanz explosion calling it “a deliberate attack.”

July 11, 2020: Iran’s Parliament approves a plan to halt implementation of the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement in response to the resolution passed by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors calling on Iran to comply with the agency’s investigation into Iran’s possible past undeclared nuclear activities. Despite this action, Iran continues to implement the additional protocol.

July 14, 2020: On the fifth anniversary of the JCPOA, EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell publishes an article commemorating the deal and addressing Iran’s concerns with Europe’s implementation of the agreement. “Having already established measures to protect our companies against extraterritorial US sanctions, we in Europe can do more to satisfy Iranian expectations for legitimate trade.”

July 15, 2020: In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi notes that if Iran does not comply with the Agency’s probe into its past nuclear activities by the end of the month, it “will be bad.” “I keep insisting on the absolute necessity for us to resolve this issue very soon,” Grossi says, adding, that the issue “isn’t going to go away.”

July 21, 2020: Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, meet to discuss Tehran and Moscow’s commitment to preserving the JCPOA. Lavrov tells Zarif that Russia is “sparing no effort” to “get the JCPOA back on sustainable track.”

July 27, 2020: A Swiss pharmaceutical company sells Iran a cancer treatment drug through the Swiss Humanitarian Trade Arrangement (SHTA), a channel set up to facilitate humanitarian trade with Iran. This transaction marks the channel’s first since the mechanism was declared fully operational in February. The Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs says, “further transactions should be carried out shortly” and notes that “a number of countries have already been approved” for the trade channel.

July 29, 2020: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) demonstrates Iran’s newfound capability to launch missiles from underground during a military training exercise. The firing of Iran’s underground missiles occurs during a large-scale military exercise conducted by the IRGC in the Strait of Hormuz and involving a mock-up of a U.S. aircraft carrier.

August 6, 2020: Elliott Abrams is named the new U.S. special representative for Iran after Brian Hook resigns from the position.

August 14, 2020: In a vote on a U.S.-drafted standalone resolution to extend the UN arms embargo against Iran, the United States is defeated with 2 votes against from Russia and China, 2 votes in favor, and 11 abstentions, falling drastically short of the nine votes needed for extension. The United States and the Dominican Republic are the only two countries to vote in favor.

The United States seizes cargo for the first time from Iranian fuel tankers bound for Venezuela as a part of its maximum pressure campaign against Iran.

August 15, 2020: U.S. President Donald Trump assures a unilateral reinstatement of sanctions against Iran after the U.S. UN Security Council resolution proposing an embargo extension fails to win the necessary votes.

August 20, 2020: U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo delivers a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General and to Indonesia, currently presiding over the Security Council, calling for a resolution to continue the lifting of sanctions on Iran. Citing the text of Resolution 2231, which endorses the deal and outlines the process to reimpose sanctions at the Security Council, Pompeo says “this process will lead to those sanctions coming back into effect 30 days from today.” The resolution stipulates that if a vote is not called for within 30 days then all sanctions are automatically reimposed.

August 25, 2020: The United Nations Security Council dismisses the U.S. effort to re-impose Security Council sanctions on Iran. Representing Indonesia, the current President of the Security Council, Ambassador Dian Transyah Djani says the Council is “not in position to take further action” pursuant to the U.S. request.

August 26, 2020: Iran agrees to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access to two locations that are not part of Iran’s declared nuclear program, to support the IAEA’s investigation into Tehran’s possible undeclared nuclear materials and activities before 2003. Their agreement ends a year and a half-long standoff over the investigation.

September 1, 2020: The JCPOA Joint Commission meets in Vienna to discuss the status of the accord and the U.S. attempt to claim participant status in the deal in order to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran. In a joint statement, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China, Iran, and the European Union conclude that the United States “could not be considered as a participant state” and “cannot initiate the process of reinstating UN sanctions.”

September 4, 2020: After assuming the seat as President of the Security Council, Niger’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Abdou Abarry, says he will continue to uphold his predecessor’s decision to reject Washington’s call to snapback sanctions on Iran. “We’re staying with this decision… that was stated and announced by the president of the Security Council last month,” he states.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) releases its quarterly report on verification and monitoring in Iran pursuant to the 2015 nuclear deal. The report details Iran’s continuous efforts to incrementally expand its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 4.5 percent uranium-235. The report also notes Iran’s continued compliance with IAEA safeguards and with the additional monitoring mechanisms required under the deal. For more on the Sept. 4 quarterly report, see: Iran’s Nuclear Program Remains on Steady Trajectory.

The IAEA also releases a report on its broader safeguards activities in Iran. The report notes that Agency inspectors visited one of the sites that Iran granted access to as part of Iran and the IAEA’s Aug. 26 agreement. The second site is scheduled to be inspected in September, according to the report. For more, see: IAEA Report Notes Progress on Investigation.

September 8, 2020: Ali Akbar Salehi, spokesman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, announces construction on a new centrifuge manufacturing facility “in the heart of the mountains” near the Natanz facility. The new facility will be built to compensate for the damage lost during the attack on Natanz in July. According to Salehi, “due to the sabotage, it was decided to build a more modern, larger and more comprehensive hall.”

September 16, 2020: At a press briefing with UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo states that the United States will snap back UN sanctions on Iran in accordance with Resolution 2231, claiming that, according to the nuclear deal, “there were no conditions, there was nothing else that had to happen… That’s what we will do.”

At a meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, Britain, France, and Germany issue a statement expressing their support for preservation of the nuclear deal. Regarding the U.S. attempt to snapback sanctions, the Europeans say, “we cannot therefore support this action which is incompatible with our current efforts to support the JCPOA.”

September 17, 2020: Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif tweets in response to Pompeo’s September 16 briefing, saying “nothing new happens on 9/20”, and “[the] U.S. is NOT a participant.”

September 18, 2020: Britain, France, and Germany send a letter to the UN Security Council’s president stating that “the purported notification under paragraph 11 of [Resolution 2231] received from the United States of America and circulated to the UN Security Council Members is incapable of having legal effect.” They state that all UN sanctions lifted in accordance with the nuclear deal will “continue to be terminated” following the U.S. deadline.

September 19, 2020: U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo tweets that “virtually all UN sanctions have returned on Iran,” adding that, “we will not hesitate to enforce our sanctions, and we expect all UN Member States to fully comply with their obligations under these re-imposed restrictions.”

The Department of State releases a factsheet detailing these “sweeping measures” to re-impose sanctions on Iran beginning at 8 pm Eastern Time on September 19.

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres tells the Security Council he will not take steps to implement the re-imposition of sanctions on Iran. His statement follows in accordance with thirteen of the Security Council’s fifteen members vote to block the U.S. snapback attempt.

Iran’s Ambassador to the UN Majid Takht Ravanchi tweets that the United States’ “illegal & false ‘deadline’ has come and gone.” Ravanchi adds that the United States is “STILL in violation of JCPOA and [Resolution 2231]” and warns that “swimming against [international] currents will only bring more isolation.”

September 21, 2020: Speaking at a news conference, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo says “no matter who you are, if you violate the UN arms embargo on Iran, you risk sanctions.” Pompeo also announces new sanctions on Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, Iran’s Defense Industries Organization, and its director.

During an event at the Council on Foreign Relations, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif says that Iran will “absolutely not” renegotiate the JCPOA. Appearing to leave the door open for diplomacy, however, he says Tehran has “never been hesitant to negotiate”, and that “it is the United States that has to show that it is committed to the deal – that it will not violate it again, that it will not make demands outside the scope of the deal, that it will compensate Iran for the damages.”

September 22, 2020: In his speech to the UN General Assembly, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani criticizes the U.S. sanctions regime targeting Iran. He notes that the United States “can impose neither negotiation, nor war on us” but adds that “dignity and prosperity of our nation are essential for us; and they are attained through diplomacy relying on national will coupled with resilience.”

October 5, 2020: Iran’s energy minister Reza Ardakanian states that Iran will ramp up its nuclear power generation capacity to 3 gigawatts at the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

October 18, 2020: UN restrictions on Iran’s arms trade expire in accordance with Resolution 2231. In a tweet, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif calls the expiration “momentous” but assures that Tehran will not go on a weapons “buying spree”.

U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo issues a press statement reiterating the U.S. stance that “virtually all UN sanctions on Iran returned” September 19, including the indefinite extension of the arms embargo. Pompeo states that the United States is “prepared to use its domestic authorities to sanction” any state or individual that contributes to the sale or transfer of arms to and from Iran.

October 26, 2020: The Trump administration announces new sanctions targeting Iranian banks and designates several entities related to Iran’s oil sector for terrorism-related activities under Executive Order 12334.

October 27, 2020: IAEA inspectors confirm that Iran has begun construction on an underground centrifuge assembly facility near Natanz, to replace what was damaged in the July sabotage attack. According to IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi, “they have started [construction], but it’s not completed.”

Grossi also confirms that IAEA inspectors have taken samples from both undeclared sites agreed to in the Agency’s August 2020 joint resolution with Iran. Grossi says those samples are undergoing analysis in IAEA laboratories.

November 3, 2020: Iran’s Parliament approves a provisional bill calling on the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran to begin enriching up to 20 percent uranium-235 at the Fordow facility and to take additional steps in violation of the nuclear deal.

November 11, 2020: The IAEA releases a new report on Iran which indicates that Iran’s stockpile of uranium gas enriched up to 4.5 percent uranium-235 equates to 2,443 kilograms, up 338 kilograms from the last quarter. The report also notes that Iran will move three centrifuge cascades from the pilot facility to the enrichment hall at Natanz. The report notes that only the cascade of IR-2m centrifuges has been moved so far. (For more on the Nov. 11 quarterly report, see: Iran’s Accumulation of Enriched Uranium Slows.)

November 14, 2020: The IAEA releases a report on Iran’s nuclear activities. The report states that Iran fed uranium hexafluoride, the feedstock for enriched uranium, into the newly-installed cascade of 174 IR-2m centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment facility. Enrichment using advanced IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz marks a further violation of the JCPOA, which dictates that Iran enrich uranium with only 5,060 first generation IR-1 machines at Natanz.

November 16, 2020: Israel’s ambassador to the United States, Ron Dermer, states that it would be a mistake for the United States to re-enter the JCPOA. Dermer suggests that the administration of U.S. President Elect Joe Biden should instead consult with U.S. allies in the Middle East to forge a path forward. “It will put the U.S. in a much better position to deal with Iran,” he adds.

November 17, 2020: Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif says that if the United States adheres to its commitments under Resolution 2231, Iran will return to compliance with the JCPOA. This can be done without negotiations, he says. Zarif also says that negotiations will be necessary, however, for the formal U.S. re-entry to the nuclear deal.

November 18, 2020: Bahrain’s foreign minister, Abdullatif al-Zayani, says that U.S. President Elect Joe Biden should consult with Bahrain and the other Gulf countries before re-entering the JCPOA.

Speaking at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, Iran’s permanent representative to the Agency Ambassador Kazem Gharibabadi says “the JCPOA can only be saved through joint efforts and actions to ensure that the rights and obligations therein are fully materialized.”

November 27, 2020: Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh is assassinated near Tehran.

November 28, 2020: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani suggests that Israel is behind the assassination of Fakhrizadeh.

December 2, 2020: Iran's Guardian Council approves legislation mandating the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran to increase enrichment levels to 20 percent and to suspend implementation of the Additional Protocol in 60 days, among other things, if certain sanctions are not addressed.

December 4, 2020: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) releases a new report stating that Iran intends to install three additional cascades of IR-2m centrifuges at the Natanz fuel enrichment plant.

December 7, 2020: The European members of the JCPOA – France, Germany, and the United Kingdom – release a joint statement expressing their concern with the IAEA's new report and Iran's enrichment activities. The E3 also address the Iranian Parliament's newly approved law and urge Tehran not to implement the law's provisions, stating that doing so would "substantially expand Iran's nuclear programme and limit IAEA monitoring access" and would "be incompatible with the JCPoA and Iran's wider nuclear commitments."

Iran's foreign ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh says that the Parliament's proposed legislation has yet to be approved or signed into law by President Hassan Rouhani.

The United Nations Security Council completes its newest report on the implementation of Resolution 2231, which endorses the nuclear deal with Iran. The report notes no new allegations of illicit ballistic missile activities and concludes that in one instance of alleged illicit arms transfers the weaponry was not of Iranian origin and in another the evidence was inconclusive.

December 9, 2020: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani says during a cabinet speech that the 2015 nuclear deal can be restored without any negotiations. “We’ll be back where we were,” he states, adding that the new IR-2m centrifuges currently being installed at the Natanz enrichment facility in violation of the deal can be switched off once all signatories to the agreement return to full compliance.

December 10, 2020: In an op-ed published by Foreign Policy, European Union Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell reiterates the importance of full implementation of the JCPOA.

December 16, 2020: The Joint Commission of the JCPOA meets virtually to discuss efforts to preserve the nuclear deal and support effective implementation by all members of the agreement.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei gives a speech saying that Iran should not delay if sanctions can be lifted in an “honorable” way.

December 18, 2020: Satellite imagery reveals that Iran has begun construction at the underground Fordow enrichment facility. The design and purpose of the new construction remains unclear.

December 21, 2020: EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell chairs a JCPOA ministerial meeting. Foreign Ministers from China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Iran emphasize their commitment to preserving the nuclear deal and pledge readiness to support any future U.S. efforts to return to the agreement. The statement also notes the importance of Iran’s cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

2021

January 1, 2021: Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, announces that Iran will resume enriching to 20 percent uranium-235 “as soon as possible” at the Fordow facility. Iran informs the IAEA of its boost in enrichment, adding that it must do so to comply with recent legislation passed by the Iranian parliament.

January 4, 2021: Iran begins enriching uranium to 20 percent uranium-235, and a spokesman for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) relays that agency inspectors are monitoring enrichment activities at Fordow.

The IAEA releases a report confirming that Iran has begun producing uranium enriched up to 20 percent uranium-235 at Fordow.

Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif tweets the news, but adds that “our measures are fully reversible upon FULL compliance by ALL.”

January 3, 2021: Jake Sullivan, who has been tapped to become President-elect Joe Biden’s national security advisor, says in an interview with CNN that the United States will pursue follow-on negotiations to the JCPOA over Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities once it has returned to compliance with the existing deal.

January 5, 2021: European Union spokesman Peter Stano says that Europe is gravely concerned with Iran’s enrichment activities, and notes that Tehran’s actions “will have serious implications when it comes to nuclear non-proliferation.”

Iran launches a series of military exercises testing an array of domestically-produced drones.

The U.S. Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control imposes a new round of sanctions on Iran’s steel industry. Treasury Secretary Mnuchin says in a statement that “the Trump Administration remains committed to denying revenue flowing to the Iranian regime as it continues to sponsor terrorist groups, support oppressive regimes, and seek weapons of mass destruction.”

Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, announces that Iran is in the process of installing one thousand new IR-2m centrifuges that will be used to significantly boost the country’s enriched uranium output.

January 9, 2021: U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo issues a statement falsely asserting that Iran’s new legislation requires “expulsion of [IAEA] nuclear inspectors unless all sanctions are lifted.” Pompeo urges that “Iran’s expulsion of international inspectors must be met by universal condemnation.”

Responding to Pompeo’s statement, the spokesman for Iran’s foreign ministry Saeed Khatibzadeh states that Iran does not plan to expel IAEA inspectors dispatched for regular inspections that occur in accordance with Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement. Behrouz Kamalvandi, the spokesman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, reaffirms Khatibzadeh’s clarification and adds that regular inspections will occur even if Iran suspends its implementation of the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement.

January 11, 2021: IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi says in an interview that “it is clear that we don’t have many months ahead of us. We have weeks,” to restore the JCPOA. Commenting on Iran’s recent jump to 20 percent enrichment levels, Grossi says Iran is progressing “quite rapidly” and will be able to produce about 10 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium per month at Fordow.

The Spokesman of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Abolfazl Amouyee announces that Iran is designing a new IR2M heavy water reactor, similar to the Arak reactor’s original design. According to Amouyee, the new reactor will be installed in accordance with the implementation schedule of Iran’s new nuclear legislation.

January 13, 2021: The IAEA releases a new report detailing Iran’s plans to conduct research and development activities into uranium metal production, seeking to eventually design an improved type of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. That reactor runs on 20 percent enriched fuel. This action marks another violation of the JCPOA, which prohibits Iran from producing or otherwise acquiring uranium metal for fifteen years.

January 16, 2021: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom release a statement condemning Iran’s plans to produce uranium metal. The E3 urge Iran to halt the activity and return to its JCPOA commitments immediately.

January 18, 2021: Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammad bin Abdulrahman al-Thani urges other Gulf Arab states to enter into a dialogue with Iran. Remarking on the possibility for U.S. re-entry to the JCPOA, he says “we want the accomplishment, we want to see the deal happening.”

February 1, 2021: Iran tests a new satellite launcher, which it says will help to achieve its “most powerful rocket engine.” According to Iranian state media, the launcher, dubbed the Zuljanah, is a “three-stage satellite launcher [that] uses a combination of solid and liquid fuels.”

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) releases a report detailing Iran’s installation of a cascade, or chain, of 174 IR-2m centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment facility. According to the report, Iran is in the process of installing an additional two identical cascades, as well as one IR-4 cascade and one IR-6 cascade.

February 2, 2021: During an interview with CNN, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif notes there is a “limited window of opportunity” for the United States to re-enter the JCPOA. He suggests that EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell could help to mediate conversations centered on a mutual U.S. and Iranian return to compliance with the deal and emphasizes that Iran can return to compliance with its obligations “in less than a day.”

Yuval Steinitz, Israel’s energy minister, estimates it would take Iran about six months to produce enough fissile material for a single nuclear weapon.

February 4, 2021: Jake Sullivan, Biden’s national security advisor, says during a White House press conference that the administration is “actively engaged with the European Union right now” in consultations on Iran. He continues that “[those consultations] will produce a unified front when it comes to our strategy towards Iran and towards dealing with diplomacy around the nuclear file.”

February 5, 2021: The White House convenes a National Security Council principals committee meeting about Iran. According to Axios, a main action item of the meeting is to decide “whether to push toward returning to the nuclear deal before the June presidential elections in Iran or wait until after.”

A group of 41 retired military and national security officials sign on to a letter encouraging a swift U.S. re-entry to the JCPOA.

A new report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirms that traces of radioactive material were found in samples taken from two undeclared Iranian nuclear sites in August and September 2020. That ongoing investigation pertains to Iran’s pre-2003 nuclear activities.

February 7, 2021: Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei says during an interview with Iranian state media that “if [the United States] wants Iran to return to its commitments, it must lift all sanctions in practice, then we will do verification… then we will return to our commitments.”

February 9, 2021: Iran’s Intelligence Minister, Mahmoud Alavi, remarks that Iran could seek nuclear weapons if “cornered” by the Western states. His comments diverge from those of other prominent Iranian officials, who maintain that Iran is not interested in pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.

A United Nations Panel of Experts report affirms that Iran resumed cooperation with North Korea on the development of long-range missile projects in 2020. According to that report, “this resumed cooperation is said to have included the transfer of critical parts, with the most recent shipment associated with this relationship taking place in 2020.”

February 10, 2021: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verifies that Iran has started producing uranium metal, and that it succeeded in producing a small amount of metal derived from natural uranium. Production of uranium metal is prohibited under the JCPOA for 15 years.

February 18, 2021: U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken meets with his ministerial counterparts from France, Germany, and the United Kingdom to discuss Iran. A joint statement released that day highlights that “the E3 welcomed the United States’ stated intention to return to diplomacy with Iran as well as the resumption of a confident and in-depth dialogue between the E3 and the United States.”

The United States sends a letter to the United Nations Security Council formally rescinding former President Donald Trump’s request that all sanctions lifted in accordance with the JCPOA be re-imposed on Iran.

A State Department official reportedly indicates the Biden administration would attend a meeting with Iran if it is hosted by the European Union and attended by the other members of the JCPOA – China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom.

February 21, 2021: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Rafael Grossi travels to Tehran to meet with Iranian Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri and Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. They discuss Iran’s planned Feb. 23 suspension of the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement and together reach an arrangement whereby the IAEA will continue its necessary verification activities for up to 3 months.

February 22, 2021: Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei says Iran might enrich uranium up to 60 percent uranium-235. “Iran’s uranium enrichment level will not be limited to 20%,” he says, “we will increase it to whatever level the country needs.”

February 23, 2021: Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif tweets that Iran has suspended implementation of the additional protocol to its safeguards agreement. “Understandings [with IAEA Director-General Rafael Gross] show our good faith. All remedial measures reversible,” he adds.

Zarif also suggests that Iran will consider an informal meeting with the P4+1 and the United States.

A new verification monitoring report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirms that Iran’s stockpile of low enriched uranium continues to grow, and notes that Iran has accumulated 17.6 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 20 percent uranium-235.

A second IAEA report details the agency’s ongoing investigation into Iran’s past nuclear activities and affirms the finding of radioactive particles in samples taken from Iran in August and September 2020. For more on both February 2021 IAEA reports, see: Iran, IAEA Stave Off Monitoring Crisis.

March 4, 2021: Britain, France, and Germany decide not to pursue a resolution censuring Iran for halting implementation of the additional protocol and failing to comply with an investigation into past undeclared nuclear activities at the International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA)’s Board of Governors meeting. For more, see: E3 Put JCPOA at Risk, Luckily Cooler Heads in Vienna Prevailed.

IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi announces plans for technical talks between Iran and the agency aimed to resolve outstanding IAEA concerns regarding the completeness of Iran’s safeguards declaration and its pre-2003 nuclear activities.

March 10, 2021: Antony Blinken, U.S. Secretary of State, affirms that “if Iran comes back into compliance with its obligations under the nuclear agreement, we would do the same thing”. Speaking to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Blinken says “that would involve – if it came to that, if Iran made good on its obligations – sanctions relief pursuant to the agreement.”

March 12, 2021: U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan says the United States is engaged in indirect diplomacy with Iran. He tells reporters that “communications through the Europeans” enable the United States to “explain to the Iranians what our position is with respect to the compliance for compliance approach and to hear what their position is.”

March 15, 2021: Iran begins enriching uranium using IR-4 centrifuges at the Natanz facility.

March 17, 2021: Javad Zarif, Iran’s Foreign Minister, notes during an interview that Iran is “ready to agree to a choreography” to coordinate the steps for each side to return to compliance with the deal.” However, he says a meeting between Iran and the United States is unnecessary, because there is “nothing to talk about.”

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani delivers remarks wherein he states that the delayed removal of sanctions by the United States would constitute “betrayal.”

March 17, 2021: In an interview, U.S. Special Envoy for Iran, Robert Malley, reiterates that the United States still seeks a meeting “in whatever format the Iranian government is comfortable with.” Malley says U.S. maximum pressure has failed, and that the United States wants to “get to the position of lifting sanctions” in return for Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA.

March 19, 2021: Behrouz Kamalvandi, the spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, announces that Iran will soon conduct a cold test of the Arak heavy water reactor, which includes starting the machine to monitor the fluid and support systems.

March 21, 2021: Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei says Iran is “in no rush” to return to the 2015 nuclear deal. Tweeting in reference to the Iranian demand that the United States lift sanctions prior to a restoration of the agreement, Khamenei says, “the US must lift all sanctions. After verifying that sanctions have truly been lifted, we will return to the JCPOA commitments.”

April 2, 2021: The Joint Commission of the JCPOA meets for its first consultative session in Vienna. They establish two working groups: one tasked with outlining which sanctions against Iran the United States must lift to reenter the deal, and the other with what nuclear limits Iran must revert to in order to meet its own obligations under the agreement.

April 9, 2021: The Joint Commission of the JCPOA reconvenes in Vienna.

The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence releases the 2021 Worldwide Threat Assessment, which assesses that Iran has not conducted “key nuclear weapons-development activities that… would be necessary to produce a nuclear device.”

April 10, 2021: Iran celebrates its 15th annual National Nuclear Day, unveiling a total of 133 nuclear achievements, including the IR-9, a new and advanced uranium enrichment centrifuge.

April 11, 2021: An act of sabotage damages the power supply for Iran’s primary uranium enrichment facility at Natanz.

April 13, 2021: Iran notifies the International Atomic Energy Agency that it has begun to boost enrichment levels to 60 percent uranium-235 at the Natanz facility using IR-6 centrifuges in response to the April 11 attack.

April 14, 2021: Britain, France, and Germany issue a joint statement condemning Iran for ratcheting up its uranium production. Their statement notes that “this is a serious development since the production of highly enriched uranium constitutes an important step in the production of a nuclear weapon.” They add that “Iran has no credible civilian need for enrichment at this level.”

White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki says that the “provocative announcement” by Iran calls into question Tehran’s “seriousness with regard to the nuclear talks and underscores the importance of returning to mutual compliance” with the JCPOA.

April 15, 2021: The Joint Commission meets in Vienna to discuss the progress of the two working groups.

April 17, 2021: The Joint Commission meets in Vienna to discuss the progress of the two working groups.

The International Atomic Energy Agency verifies that Iran has begun enriching uranium to 60 percent purity at the Natanz facility.

April 18, 2021: Jake Sullivan, U.S. National Security Advisor, states in an interview that the United States will not lift sanctions “unless we have clarity and confidence that Iran will fully return to compliance” with the deal.

Iranian officials meet with experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency to discuss the agency’s investigation into Iran’s past nuclear activities.

April 19, 2021: Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister and lead negotiator Abas Aragchi says work has begun on a “joint draft” detailing the required steps for JCPOA restoration. He notes there is “agreement over final goals,” but cautions that the path will not be easy.

April 20, 2021: The Joint Commission meets in Vienna to discuss the progress of the working groups. They agree to establish a third working group aimed to consider how the United States and Iran could sequence mutual steps toward compliance with the agreement.

Enrique Mora, the Deputy Secretary-General of the European External Action Service and chair of the Vienna meetings, tweets that “progress has been made over the last two weeks.” He shares his view that “diplomacy is the only way forward… to address ongoing challenges.”

U.S. State Department spokesperson Ned Price tells reporters that the United States believes progress has been made, but there have been “no breakthroughs.” He adds that “we have more road ahead of us than we have behind us.”

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani states that Iran will return to compliance with its obligations after the United States lifts sanctions and Tehran verifies those sanctions have been lifted.

An Iranian government spokesman confirms that the decision by Iran to boost enrichment to 60 percent uranium-235 was “a demonstration of our technical ability to respond to terrorist sabotage at these facilities” and not a hedge toward weapons-grade fissile material. That official adds that “this measure can be quickly reversed for a return to the agreed enrichment level in the nuclear accord if other parties commit to their obligations.”

April 27, 2021: The Joint Commission meets to discuss the findings of the working groups.

May 1, 2021: The JCPOA Joint Commission convenes in Vienna to discuss the progress of the three working groups.

May 4, 2021: U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken meets with Josep Borrell, the European Union foreign policy chief, on the sidelines of the G7 ministerial meeting in London to address the latest developments in the ongoing discussions toward restoration of the JCPOA.

May 19, 2021: The fourth round of Joint Commission negotiations wraps up in Vienna. Enrique Mora, the Deputy Secretary-General of the European External Action Service and chair of the Vienna meetings states that “an agreement is shaping up,” and that he “is quite sure that there will be a final agreement not far from now.”

May 24, 2021: Iran agrees to a one-month extension of the February 2021 temporary bilateral monitoring agreement that allows the IAEA to continue monitoring its nuclear activities in lieu of the additional protocol.

May 26, 2021: The Director General of the IAEA, Rafael Grossi, calls Iran’s uranium enrichment program “very concerning” and emphasizes the need for continued verification measures.

May 31, 2021: The IAEA issues its quarterly report on verification and monitoring in Iran, which outlines Iran’s recent steps to breach JCPOA limits and provisions. For more, see: Iran Nuclear Deal Talks Head to Sixth Round.

The IAEA issues a report on Iran’s NPT safeguards agreement with the agency, which details the status of the agency’s ongoing investigation into Iran’s past undeclared nuclear activities. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi issues a report warning that the failure of bilateral discussions to clarify questions regarding the correctness of Iranian safeguards declarations “seriously affects the ability of the Agency to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.”

June 2, 2021: The fifth round of Joint Commission negotiations wraps up in Vienna. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister and lead negotiator Abbas Araghchi says that the next round of talks, slated to begin June 10, “logically could and should be the final round.”

Enrique Mora, the Deputy Secretary-General of the European External Action Service and chair of the Vienna meetings, says he believes an agreement will be reached during the next round of negotiations.

June 3, 2021: U.S. State Department spokesman Ned Price says in a press briefing that there is “every expectation” that there will be “subsequent rounds beyond” the sixth.

June 19, 2021: Ebrahim Raisi wins Iran’s presidential election. A conservative, he has expressed his commitment to reviving the JCPOA.

June 20, 2021: The sixth round of negotiations adjourns, no deal is reached.

Israel’s new Prime Minister Naftali Bennett criticizes the new president of Iran, and calls on world powers including the U.S. to “wake up” in regards to the dangers of returning to the JCPOA.

In an interview, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stresses the urgency of clarifying the agency’s outstanding questions pertaining to Iran’s previous undeclared nuclear activities. “We are on a ventilator,” he says.

June 21, 2021: The biannual report assessing the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorses the JCPOA, is released. In it, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres voices support for the Vienna talks and appeals to the United States and Iran to return to compliance with the JCPOA.

The IAEA relays news from the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran that the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant was temporarily shut down due to a technical problem.

June 24, 2021: A senior U.S. official says that the U.S. may need to rethink its approach with Iran if differences regarding the deal cannot be resolved “in the foreseeable future.”

The IAEA’s temporary monitoring arrangement with Iran expires.

June 25, 2021: The IAEA demands a reply from Iran regarding a potential extension of the temporary monitoring agreement, originally negotiated in February 2021. Iran says that it has no obligation to reply, and the agreement expires.

June 29, 2021: Iran’s government spokesman Ali Rabiei says Iran is considering extending the monitoring arrangement, but no decision has been made.

July 1, 2021: Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova says that sizeable progress has been made towards restoring the JCPOA and that Russia expects the talks to be successfully completed by July 14, the sixth anniversary of the deal.

Mikhail Ulyanov, Russia’s envoy to the IAEA, says that some parties to the talks need more time before a new round of negotiations begins and that the next round will likely not begin next week.

It is reported that, for several weeks, Iran has further reduced IAEA access to the enrichment facility at Natanz.

July 2, 2021: An unnamed Iranian senior official affirms that Tehran will not share data recorded pursuant to the temporary monitoring arrangement unless the nuclear deal is salvaged, suggesting that the data is still being collected. “If talks succeed Iran will surely show the tapes to the IAEA,” that official says, caveating that “sharing the tapes depends on the way that negotiations will proceed.”

July 3, 2021: Iran’s Ambassador to the UN announces that IAEA Deputy Director General, Massimo Aparo, will visit Iran to conduct routine safeguards pursuant to Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement.

Iran’s Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant resumes operations.

July 6, 2021: The IAEA reports that Iran has initiated the production of uranium metal enriched up to 20 percent. For more, see: New Iranian President May Prolong Deal Talks.

The European members of the nuclear deal, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, issue a statement claiming that “Iran has no credible civilian need for uranium metal production.” They characterize the move as a “key step in the development of nuclear weapons,” and urge a swift return to compliance with the JCPOA.

July 8, 2021: Russian Ambassador Mikhail Ulyanov tweets that a date for the seventh round of Vienna talks has not been set and clarifies that Iran “needs more time for preparations” after the Presidential election. “The sooner the talks resume the better,” he adds.

July 12, 2021: In his report to the parliament, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif notes that the Vienna talks have approached “the framework of a possible agreement to lift US sanctions,” and adds that he hopes “what has been achieved so far will be completed in the beginning of the [new presidential administration].”

July 14, 2021: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani says during a press conference that Iran has the technical capability to enrich uranium to 90 percent purity – weapons grade – but clarifies that Tehran still seeks a revival of the JCPOA.

August 5, 2021: Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi assumes office. In his inauguration speech, he pledges to pursue “smart engagement” with the P4+1 and the United States in order to lift sanctions on Iran.

August 7, 2021: After attending Raisi’s inauguration, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, Enrique Mora, says talks in Vienna between Iran and the other parties to the JCPOA could resume in early September.

August 14, 2021: Iran produces 200 grams of uranium metal enriched up to 20 percent, for the first time. Iran says it is producing the material to fuel its Tehran Research Reactor.

August 17, 2021: Iran accelerates its enrichment of 60 percent uranium-235, the IAEA reports.

August 19, 2021: Britain, France, and Germany release a statement condemning Iran’s uranium metal production and enrichment activities. According to the statement, “both are key steps in the development of a nuclear weapon and Iran has no credible civilian need for either measure.”

August 31, 2021: Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian says that a two- or three- month process will be necessary for the Raisi government to resume negotiations.

September 1, 2021: France and Germany implore Iran to resume nuclear negotiations after the Iranian elections stalled discussions over the summer. The sixth round of talks ended June 20.

September 8, 2021: The IAEA releases its quarterly monitoring report on Iran’s nuclear activities, which includes details on Iran’s growing enriched uranium stockpile, its development of advanced centrifuges, and its production of uranium metal. The IAEA’s report also highlights the agency’s ongoing efforts to recover data from four cameras installed in an Iranian centrifuge assembly facility after Tehran suspended implementation of the additional protocol in February 2021. Iran removed the cameras in June after an attack on the facility allegedly damaged the machines.

The IAEA also releases a report on Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement, which outlines that Iran remains uncooperative with the agency’s investigation into possible undeclared nuclear materials from its pre-2003 activities.

September 8, 2021: Following release of the reports, and ahead of the IAEA’s Board of Governors’ meeting, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi warns the IAEA’s board against criticizing Iran for its nuclear activities, suggesting that rebukes against Tehran could slow progress on talks.

September 9, 2021: German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas says that Iran’s proposed two- to three-month timeline is “much too long for us.”

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, when asked about a deadline to resume talks, says “I’m not going to put a date on it, but we are getting closer to the point at which a strict return to compliance with the (JCPOA) does not reproduce the benefits that the agreement achieved.”

September 12, 2021: Iran and the IAEA reach a special agreement that will allow Agency inspectors to access the remote monitoring equipment referenced in the IAEA’s Sept. 7 report to service the units and install new data storage.

September 14, 2021: At the IAEA Board of Governors’ meeting, U.S. Charge d’Affairs to the UN Missions in Vienna, Louis Bono, says that the United States welcomes the Sept. 12 joint agreement between Iran and the IAEA, and that “the onus must be on Tehran to do its part.”

September 21, 2021: Ebrahim Raisi criticizes U.S. sanctions on Iran during his first address to the United Nations, and says sanctions are a “new way of war” with the rest of the world.

Speaking before the General Assembly, U.S. President Joe Biden says that the United States remains committed to restoring the JCPOA, and to “preventing Iran from gaining a nuclear weapon.”

Iran’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh announces that talks in Vienna to restore the JCPOA will resume within the “next few weeks.”

EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell announces that Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian will not meet with his foreign minister counterparts from the P4+1 countries for a meeting of the Joint Commission during the UN General Assembly. Borrell emphasizes the importance of promptly resuming negotiations in Vienna.

September 22, 2021: During a meeting with German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian says that the Vienna talks are not intended to strike a new deal, but rather to ensure a full and guaranteed return by the United States to the JCPOA.

September 23, 2021: An unnamed senior U.S. official states that the opportunity to revitalize the JCPOA has not yet lapsed.

That same official also says that the United States is working on contingency plans if Iran’s nuclear activities continue to accelerate and the JCPOA is not restored.

September 26, 2021: The IAEA is denied access to the Karaj centrifuge assembly facility, where inspectors were sent to install new monitoring equipment to replace cameras Iran claims were damaged in a June attack. Iran agreed to grant inspectors access to that facility on Sept. 12, according to the IAEA. Iran denies that the facility is covered by that agreement.n The IAEA reports that inspectors were able to replace the data storage for cameras installed in other facilities September 20-22.

October 2, 2021: Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian suggests that the United States should release $10 billion in Tehran’s frozen funds as a gesture of goodwill.

October 3, 2021: Israel’s intelligence head shares his assessment that Iran is over two years away from mastering the weaponization activities which would constitute nuclear breakout. “To the best of our knowledge, the directive has not changed and they are not heading toward a breakout,” he says, “they are not heading toward a bomb right now.”

October 7, 2021: Iran’s Ambassador to the IAEA, Kazem Gharibabadi, announces his term as Ambassador will end October 15.

October 14, 2021: EU Deputy Secretary-General Enrique Mora travels to Tehran to meet with Iranian deputy foreign minister Ali Bagheri Kani and discuss the resumption of negotiations to restore the JCPOA. They agree to a meeting between Iranian and EU officials in Brussels the following week.

October 17, 2021: Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi reportedly tells Iranian lawmakers that that the negotiating team may take an action-for-action approach to restoring the JCPOA.

October 18, 2021: EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell clarifies that no date for a meeting between Iran and EU officials in Brussels has been set. He says that he “made it clear to the Iranians that time is not on their side and it’s better to go back to the negotiating table quickly.”

In a televised interview, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi remarks that Iran is “serious about results-oriented negotiations” and suggests that “for the other side, a readiness to lift sanctions can be a sign of their seriousness.”

October 19, 2021: On a trip to Washington, DC, IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi tells reporters that the IAEA needs access to the Karaj centrifuge manufacturing plant immediately, and stresses that Iran’s failure to cooperate with the agency on this matter has “seriously affected” the IAEA’s monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program.

October 25, 2021: The IAEA reports that Iran is expanding its production of high enriched uranium at the Natanz facility but specifies that Iran is not stockpiling the extra product.

U.S. Special Envoy Rob Malley warns that efforts to restore the JCPOA are in a “critical phrase”.

The European Union announces that Enrique Mora, Deputy Secretary General of the European External Action Service, will meet with Iran’s top nuclear negotiator, Ali Bagheri Kani, in Brussels to discuss the JCPOA.

October 26, 2021: During a phone call, Russian President Vladimir Putin and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson reiterate their shared commitment to preserving the JCPOA.

October 27, 2021: Deputy Secretary General of the European External Action Service Enrique Mora meets with Iranian negotiator Ali Bagheri Kani in Brussels to discuss Iran’s return to JCPOA negotiations in Vienna. “We agree to start negotiations before the end of November,” Kani tweets.

An Israeli public broadcaster, Kan, reports that Israel plans to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities if diplomatic efforts and negotiations fail to revive the JCPOA.

October 29, 2021: U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan announces that President Biden will meet with his British, French, and German counterparts at the G20 summit in Rome, to coordinate a “united” policy on Iran and the JCPOA.

The Biden administration imposes new sanctions on members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, and on two companies involved in the supply of lethal drones to insurgent groups.

October 30, 2021: Following a meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, a senior U.S. official tells reporters the discussion was a “substantive strategic conversation about the way forward” with respect to restoring the JCPOA.

October 31, 2021: Secretary of State Antony Blinken says that the United States is “absolutely in lockstep” with Germany, France, and the United Kingdom on coordinating efforts to restore the JCPOA, emphasizing that all four countries “still believe diplomacy is the best path forward.”

U.S. President Joe Biden promises that the United States will return to the JCPOA so long as Iran does, and assures that Washington will only abandon efforts to restore compliance if Tehran reneges on the deal.

At the G20 meeting in Rome, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov comments on Russia’s support for restoring the JCPOA as it was originally signed, without added obligations or exemptions.

Tehran formally appoints Reza Najafi, who served as ambassador to the IAEA under President Rouhani and helped to negotiate the JCPOA, as deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs. The appointment solidifies Najafi’s place on the Raisi administration’s nuclear negotiating team.

November 3, 2021: The European Union confirms that the seventh round of talks to restore the JCPOA will commence November 29, in Vienna. The sixth session finished in June.

U.S. Special Envoy Rob Malley, who will represent the United States in Vienna, notes his hope that Iran will return to the talks “in good faith”.

November 6, 2021: Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian and his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, call for the JCPOA to be restored. Amirabdollahian confirms that Iran is prepared to comply with the deal provided that the United States does not demand any additional concessions.

November 12, 2021: A statement released by the U.S. Department of State outlines Special Envoy Rob Malley’s plans to meet with allies in the Middle East to “coordinate our approaches on a broad range of concerns with Iran, including its destabilizing activities in the region and the upcoming seventh round of talks on a mutual return to full compliance” with the JCPOA.

November 16, 2021: A report by the Wall Street Journal reveals that Iran resumed production at the Karaj centrifuge component manufacturing workshop.

November 17, 2021: The IAEA releases two new reports on Iran’s nuclear program and its compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement, respectively, highlighting Iran’s activities in violation of the JCPOA and its failure to comply with an IAEA over an investigation into four undeclared locations. For more on the nuclear report, see: Iran’s Failure to Cooperate with the IAEA is Raising Tensions.

It is reported that IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi will travel to Tehran on November 22 and 23 in an effort to resolve an ongoing dispute over access to the Karaj centrifuge component manufacturing workshop, where the IAEA aims to re-install cameras that Iran removed in June following an alleged sabotage attack. The report notes IAEA inspectors have attempted to access the site to reinstall the cameras on three occasions.

A joint statement released by the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council affirms the importance of restoring the JCPOA, following a meeting in Riyadh between senior U.S. officials and members of the Council.

November 22-23, 2021: IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi travels to Tehran to meet with Iranian officials.

November 24, 2021: Speaking to reporters in Vienna, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi says that although talks in Tehran were “constructive” they were “inconclusive” in resolving the dispute between the Agency and Iran over access to the Karaj centrifuge component manufacturing facility. The IAEA is close to the point where the Agency would “not be able to guarantee continuity of knowledge” with respect to Iran’s nuclear activities, he concludes.

A meeting of the IAEA’s Board of Governors meeting begins, in virtual format. In his statement to the Board, Grossi saysthat “the lack of access to the Karaj workshop has meant that restoration of surveillance and monitoring at all of Iran’s facilities and locations in relation the JCPOA could not be completed.” Grossi warns that the ongoing dispute over access to monitor Iran’s nuclear activities at Karaj “is seriously affecting the Agency’s ability to restore continuity of knowledge at the workshop, which has been widely recognized as essential in relation to a return to the JCPOA.”

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian tweets that talks in Vienna were “cordial, frank [and] fruitful.” He writes that “to work out a text, we need work on a few words,” adding that “agreement is possible” and that another meeting between Iran and the IAEA will be held soon.

November 29, 2021: The seventh round of talks to restore the JCPOA begins in Vienna, five months after the sixth round concluded.

Enrique Mora, the EU official charged with chairing the talks, says after the first day of negotiations concludes “ I feel extremely positive about what I have seen today,” adding that the negotiating parties “accepted that work done over the first six rounds is a good basis to build our work ahead.”

December 1, 2021: The IAEA reports that Iran has begun operating 166 advanced IR-6 centrifuges at the Fordow enrichment facility, and is using the machines to produce uranium enriched up to 20 percent uranium-235.

December 2, 2021: Iranian chief negotiator Ali Bagheri-Kani reports that his delegation submitted two suggested drafts, on sanctions and nuclear issues, to the other parties.

December 3, 2021: Negotiating parties depart Vienna to prepare for a second session of the seventh round of discussions, scheduled to begin Dec. 9.

Addressing Iran’s submitted drafts, senior diplomats from Britain, France, and Germany tell reporters that “Iran is breaking with almost all of the difficult compromises reached in months of tough negotiations and is demanding substantial changes to the text.” They warn that “it’s not clear how these new gaps in the negotiations could be closed in a realistic timeframe on the basis of the Iranian amendments.”

December 4, 2021: Responding to news that Iran began operating new centrifuges at Fordow, a senior U.S. State Department official remarks that the United States “[cannot] accept a situation in which Iran accelerates its nuclear program and slow-walks its nuclear diplomacy.”

December 5, 2021: A background briefing released by a senior Iranian official stresses Iran’s view that “all sanctions imposed in the framework of the maximum pressure policy are designed with the clear aim of eliminating the JCPOA, and therefore all of these sanctions are related to the JCPOA” and must be lifted.

December 7, 2021: A senior U.S. official shares concern with journalist Laura Rozen that Iran’s breakout window – or the time it would take for Iran to produce enough high-enriched uranium for one nuclear bomb – could “approach the margin of error” within the first quarter of 2022.

A second senior U.S. official tells Rozen “I think if we get into the latter part of the [first quarter], close to the margin of error, we will reach a decision point,” and “a decision will be made” on whether to continue talks in Vienna.

December 9, 2021: The seventh round of discussions to restore the JCPOA resumes in Vienna.

Ned Price, the U.S. State Department spokesperson, says that the United States is focused on diplomacy and continues to believe a mutual return to compliance with the JCPOA is possible.

After a meeting of the JCPOA Joint Commission, the European Union’s Enrique Mora says that there is a “renewed sense of purpose on the need to work and to reach an agreement on bringing the [JCPOA] back to life.” He warns that we don’t have all the time of the world” to reach agreement on outstanding issues.

Russia’s ambassador to international organizations in Vienna, Mikhail Ulyanov, tweets that the talks will proceed from drafts concluded June 20, but that Iran’s ideas will be “properly discussed and thoroughly considered.”

December 10, 2021: Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, visits Vienna to meet with his counterpart at the IAEA, Margarete Doane.

December 12, 2021: In Vienna, the working group on implementation, tasked with determining the sequence for the United States and Iran to return to mutual compliance with the JCPOA, meets for the first time.

Satellite imagery suggests Iran is preparing for a space launch.

December 13, 2021: Senior European diplomats tell reporters that “to date, we have not yet been able to enter into any real negotiations. We are wasting precious time with new Iranian positions that are incompatible with or beyond the JCPOA.” They warn that “without rapid progress, the JCPOA could soon be an empty shell, given the rapid pace of Iranian nuclear activity.”

December 14, 2021: Mohamad Eslami, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says that the IAEA’s demands for access to the Karaj centrifuge component manufacturing facility are beyond the scope of its safeguards agreement.

December 15, 2021: Iran and the IAEA reach an agreement whereby the agency will replace the cameras at Karaj before the end of the year.

December 17, 2021: IAEA Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi tells a press conference that the cameras installed at Karaj cannot be targeted by cyberattacks, challenging a claim by Tehran that the cameras may have been hacked to aid in a June 2021 sabotage attack against the facility.

Asked by a reporter whether the newly installed centrifuges at Iran’s Fordow enrichment facility were produced at Karaj, Grossi says, “it would be a logical conclusion.”

The seventh round of talks concludes in Vienna, after parties agree to a joint text that will serve as the basis for future discussions on the nuclear file.

Senior diplomats from the three European parties to the deal tell reporters that “we remain fully available, with our teams, to engage in negotiations on all aspects of the return to the JCPOA. This negotiation is becoming ever more urgent.” They say that the decision to pause talks was made by Iran’s team, who requested time to return to Tehran for consultations.

December 21, 2021: U.S. Special Envoy for Iran, Rob Malley, warns that if talks “continue at their current pace, we have some weeks left but not much more than that, at which point, I think, the conclusion will be that there’s no deal to be revived.”

December 27, 2021: The eighth round of talks begins in Vienna.

As talks begin, Enrique Mora, the EU official charged with chairing the talks, warns “we don’t have much time,” but says “we have come a long, long way since the beginning of the negotiation… [and] from the point of view of the coordinator we are exactly at the point where we should be if we want to get the final successful result.”

December 28, 2021: Senior European diplomats tell reporters “it is clear that we are reaching the point where Iran’s nuclear escalation will have eliminated the substance of the JCPOA,” and that “we have some weeks and not months to reach an agreement.”

December 30, 2021: Negotiations in Vienna pause for the New Year’s holiday.

Ned Price, the U.S. State Department spokesperson, tells reporters “there may have been some modest progress at the end of the seventh and beginning of the eighth rounds, but it is too soon to tell if we are making real progress toward an understanding on mutual return to full compliance with [the JCPOA].”

A spokesman from Iran’s defense ministry announces the launch of the Simorgh space-launch vehicle.

2022

January 3, 2022: The eighth round of negotiations resumes in Vienna.

January 4, 2022: Israeli military intelligence chief, Aharon Haliva, says at a meeting of the security cabinet that restoration of the JCPOA is better for Israel than if an agreement is not reached.

January 6, 2022: Iranian chief negotiator and deputy foreign minister Ali Bagheri Kani meets with his South Korean counterpart, Jong Kun Choi, to discuss the Iranian assets frozen in South Korea.

January 7, 2022: The IAEA spokesperson confirms that “by the end of December 2021, the Agency had reinstalled cameras to replace those removed from the workshop at Karaj and performed other related technical activities.”

January 11, 2022: Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, addresses the negotiations in Vienna and implicitly endorses the talks.

January 12, 2022: Rob Malley, the U.S. special envoy for Iran, meets with the Gulf Cooperation Council ambassadors in Vienna to discuss the status of JCPOA talks.

January 14, 2022: Speaking to reporters, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki says, “if we don’t reach an understanding soon [on the JCPOA] … we will have to consider a different path.” She says that, several weeks ago, U.S. President Joe Biden “asked his team to prepare a range of options,” and, “they have done that,” but adds, “obviously our preference is always diplomacy.”

January 19, 2022: U.S. President Joe Biden, speaking about efforts to restore the JCPOA, says, “it is not time to give up,” and, “there is some progress being made.”

January 20, 2022: Antony Blinken, U.S. secretary of state, reports, “there is a real urgency [to restore the JCPOA] and this is really a matter of weeks,” and adds that while “returning to mutual compliance remains possible,” “We are not where we need to be there and if we don’t get there very soon, we will have to take a different course.” Blinken says he discussed with his European counterparts “the steps that we would take together if Iran refuses to return” to the JCPOA.

French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian says, “there is partial, timid and slow progress, but negotiations cannot continue at such slow pace while, in parallel, Iran’s nuclear program advances so rapidly.” He warns that “we will quickly find ourselves in an untenable situation.”

China's customs office reports the first import of Iranian crude oil in a year, in violation of U.S. sanctions.

January 27, 2022: In an interview with Maariv, former Israeli military chief Gadi Eisenkot says the U.S. decision to withdraw from the JCPOA was a “strategic mistake,” breaking from Jerusalem’s typically hostile attitude toward the nuclear deal.

January 28, 2022: The eighth round of talks to reestablish the nuclear pact pauses in Vienna. German, French, British, Russian, Chinese and Iranian diplomats return home for consultations with their governments, according to European Union political director Enrique Mora, who is chairing negotiations, after five weeks of the longest-running talks yet.

Negotiators from France, Germany and the United Kingdom call January the “most intensive period of these talks to date.” In a statement released after the eighth round of talks in Vienna concluded, the E3 say, “Everyone knows we are reaching the final stage, which requires political decisions. Negotiators are therefore returning to capitals for consultation.”

January 31, 2022: Iran relocates its centrifuge production facilities near Karaj to another workshop in Isfahan, according to the IAEA, just weeks after the nuclear watchdog reinstalled cameras previously knocked out in an alleged Israeli cyberattack against the factory. The IAEA says cameras have already been installed at the new workshop, and that the Karaj facility is closed.

February 2, 2022: Following a Feb. 1 meeting of Iran’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, the commission’s spokesperson, Mahmoud Abbaszadeh Meshkini, says “important issues still remain” in talks to return to compliance with the JCPOA but signals conditions are favorable “for a win-win agreement.”

February 4, 2022: The Biden administration reinstates waivers allowing Russian, Chinese and European companies to work with Iran’s civilian nuclear program without penalty of U.S. sanctions.

February 5, 2022: Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian welcomes the Biden administration’s limited sanctions relief, calling it “the good will that Americans talk about,” but says the move is “not sufficient.”

Amirabdollahian tells state media Iran is looking for “political, legal and economic” guarantees in the United States’ return to the nuclear deal.

February 7, 2022: Thirty-three Republican senators send U.S. President Joe Biden a letter warning him to gain congressional approval before inking a new nuclear deal with Iran. They write, “[A] genuinely robust nuclear agreement with Iran would be compelling enough to secure assent from two-thirds of the Senate – and the only reason not to present it for a resolution of ratification is that it is too weak to pass muster. Any agreement related to Iran’s nuclear program which is not a treaty ratified by the Senate is subject to being reversed, and indeed will likely be torn up, in the opening days of the next Presidential administration, as early as January 2025.”

February 8, 2022: The eighth round of talks resumes in Vienna after a 10-day break for political consultations. As the talks begin, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian says negotiators “should enhance the sense of urgency,” criticizing the United States as the “culprit of the Iranian nuclear crisis.”

February 9, 2022: Iran displays a new, solid-fuel missile with a reported range of 900 miles. Later, State Department spokesperson Jalina Porter tells reporters, “Iran’s development and proliferation of ballistic missiles poses a threat to the international security and remains a significant nonproliferation challenge.”

February 11, 2022: Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi says his foreign policy is “balanced” against ongoing talks in Vienna to resuscitate the JCPOA. “We put our hopes on the east, west, north, south of our country and never have any hope in Vienna and New York,” he says. “Looking toward the West has made the country's relations unbalanced, we need to look at all countries and capacities in the world, especially our neighbors.”

February 14, 2022: Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian tells European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, “some hasty moves, repeatedly playing with the text, and a lack of serious will on the part of the West to reach a good and credible agreement in Vienna have led to unnecessary prolongation of the talks,” according to a statement released following the two leaders’ phone call. The statement mentions Iran’s commitment to its “red lines,” which it says, “are based on logic and realism.”

Amirabdollahian tells reporters Iran is “in a hurry” to wrap up talks in Vienna with a successful nuclear deal.

February 16, 2022: In an address to parliamentarians, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian says of nuclear talks with Iran, “We have reached tipping point now. It's not a matter of weeks, it's a matter of days.” Whether or not the needle moves on returning to the deal, according to Le Drian, will depend on Iran’s next steps. “Either they trigger a serious crisis in the coming days, or they accept the agreement which respects the interests of all parties,” he says.

February 25, 2022: State Department spokesperson Ned Price says Moscow and Washington will continue to cooperate in negotiations to recertify the JCPOA despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine making it a “pariah on the world stage.” He says, “The fact that Russia has now invaded Ukraine should not give Iran the green light to develop a nuclear weapon.”

February 28, 2022: Ali Bagheri Kani, Iran’s chief negotiator to the nuclear talks in Vienna, returns from Tehran and meets with Enrique Mora, the European Union-appointed chairman for the negotiations; Mikhail Ulyanov, Russia’s envoy to the talks; and China’s top diplomat in Vienna, Wang Qun.

March 2, 2022: IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi tells reporters the agency will continue investigation into undeclared nuclear sites in Iran despite calls from Tehran to end the probe. “The IAEA will never abandon a process that it launched because of the necessity of clarification of certain situations in Iran because of a political reason,” he says. “This is not how the IAEA works.”

March 3, 2022: The IAEA reports that Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium is about 3,197 kilograms, 33 kilograms of which is enriched up to 60 percent purity and 182 kilograms to 20 percent. This latest measurement is more than 700 kilograms of enriched uranium over the IAEA’s previous report in November.

March 5, 2022: Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov says Russia has "asked for a written guarantee ... that the current process triggered by the United States does not in any way damage our right to free and full trade, economic and investment cooperation and military-technical cooperation with the Islamic Republic,” Lavrov says.

IAEA Director General Grossi travels to Tehran. In a joint statement the AEOI and Iran outline agreed-upon steps to advance the agency's ongoing investigation into the presence of uranium at undeclared locations in Tehran.

March 11, 2022: Talks in Vienna to restore the nuclear deal are paused, according to European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell. Borrell attributes the pause to “external factors” affecting the negotiations.

March 14, 2022: A group of Senate Republican sign a letter criticizing the Biden administration’s progress toward restoring the nuclear deal.

March 15, 2022: Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov tells reporters he has received “written guarantees” about Russia’s role in the nuclear pact with Iran. “They are included in the very text of the agreement on reviving the JCPOA,” Lavrov says, “and in these texts there is a reliable defence of all the projects provided for by the JCPOA and those activities.”

A senior State Department official says Russia would not be sanctioned for its nuclear work as part of a newly negotiated JCPOA. “We continue to engage with Russia on a return to full implementation of the JCPOA,” the official says. “Perhaps it is now clear to Moscow that, as we have said publicly, the new Russia-related sanctions are unrelated to the JCPOA and should not have any impact on its implementation."

March 18, 2022: Two kilograms of Iranian uranium enriched to 60 percent purity has been processed into powder, the IAEA reports.

March 23, 2022: U.S. national security advisor Jake Sullivan tells reporters it’s unclear whether final issues stalling nuclear negotiations in Vienna will be resolved, despite notable progress made toward finalizing the deal in recent weeks.

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian says negotiations are nearly ready to advance to the foreign-minister level. “We believe that today we are closer to an agreement in Vienna than ever before,” Amirabdollahian says.

April 12, 2022: Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei says negotiations are "going ahead properly" and the Iranian negotiating team has "resisted the other party's excessive demands."

April 13, 2022: EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell says in Dohan that "everything is essentially ready and on the table" for a deal to restore the JCPOA.

April 14, 2022: The IAEA says it installed cameras at Iran's new centrifuge production facility at Natanz and Iran begins operating the facility.

April 17, 2022: Iran confirms that the centrifuge production facility at Natanz is now operational. Equiptment for the site was moved from the Karaj facility. Other equiptment from Karaj was moved to a new centrifuge production facility at Esfahan, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran says.

April 2022: The annual State Department report assessing compliance with arms control treaties assesses that "Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities it judge necessary to produce a nuclear device."

May 10, 2022: IAEA Director General Grossi tells the European Parliment that Iran has produced 42 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent and that Iran had not yet provided the necessary information in response to the IAEA's inquiries about undeclared nuclear materials and activities.

May 11, 2022: Enrique Mora, the senior EU official coordinating talks to restore the JCPOA, travels to Tehran.

May 13, 2022: EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell says Mora's trip was "positive enough" to relaunch talks.

May 16, 2022: Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh says that Iran will return to talks if the United States responds to Iran's proposal.

May 17, 2022: State Department spokesperson Ned Price says to conclude a deal to restore the nuclear deal, Iran must decide “whether it insists on conditions that are extraneous to the JCPOA.”

Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz says that Iran is working to produce 1,000 IR-6 centrifuges at its new underground centrifuge production facility at Natanz.

May 25, 2022: Robert Malley, US Special Envoy for Iran, testifies to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Iran could potentially produce enough weapons-grade nuclear material for a bomb "before we can know it, let alone stop it." He says that a restored JCPOA would increase breakout to about 6 months and that the Biden administration will submit an agreement to restore the JCPOA to Congress for review under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA).

May 30, 2022: The IAEA issues two reports on Iran's nuclear program. One report detailing the agency's investigation into undeclared nuclear materials and activities concludes that Iran conducted uranium metal activities prior to 2003 that should have been declared to the IAEA. The agency notes in the report that Iran has not provided technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium at three other undeclared locations and says the uranium may have been caused by third party sabotage. The second report estimates that Iran has produce 43 kilgorams of uranium enriched to 60 percent and 238 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20 percent.

June 6, 2022: Mohammad Eslami, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says that the IAEA's safeguards investigation is based on "fake documents and accounts" and the agency lacks the "will" to find Iran's responses convincing.

June 8, 2022: The IAEA Board of Governors votes to pass a resolution calling upon Iran to cooperate with the agency's safeguards investigation. The vote is 30-2, with 3 states abstaining.U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA Laura Holgate tells the Board that the United States, which co-sponsored the resolution, did not pursue the censure “to escalate a confrontation for political purposes.” She says the United States seeks “credible explanations, consistent with Iran’s safeguards obligations, that can finally put these issues behind us.”

Iran announces it will turn off cameras and equiptment that monitors Iran's enrichment level.

June 9, 2022: Iran announces that it will disconnect 27 IAEA cameras installed in its nuclear facilities.

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi says Iran's decision will be a "fatal blow" to efforts to restore the JCPOA in 3-4 weeks. After that point the IAEA may not be able provide the accuracy required to implement a restored JCPOA, he says.

Germany, France, and the United Kingdom release a statement saying that Iran's “actions will only aggravate the situation and complicate our efforts to restore full implementation of the JCPOA" and casts “further doubt on Iran’s commitment to a successful outcome.”

June 12, 2022: Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi says that the June 8 IAEA Board resolution will not make Iran "take a step back from its positions."

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi confirms in a CNN interview that Iran has disconnected the cameras.

June 16, 2022: The Treasury Department announces sanctions targeting Chinese and Emerati entities engaged in exporting Iranian petrochemical products in violation of U.S. sanctions.

June 25, 2022: EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell travels to Tehran. After meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdhollahian he says that negotiations to restore the JCPOA will resume in the coming days. Amirabdhollahian confirms that Iran is willing to restart talks and says that he and Borrell agreed to “end the tension that has existed in recent days."

June 28-29, 2022: Indirect talks between Iran and the United States resume in Doha.

June 29, 2022: EU coordinator for the JCPOA negotiations, Enrique Mora, says the Doha talks did not produce the progress the EU hoped for.

July 5, 2022: EU foreign policy cheif Josep Borrell tweets that " if we want to conclude an agreement, decisions are needed now." He says the political space to revive the JCPOA may narrow soon.

US Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley says in an interview that the EU negotiators put a detailed outline of a deal to restore the JCPOA on the table in Doha and the United States is "prepared to take that deal" but Iran has not said yes. Malley says the Biden administration's assessment is that Iran has not made the "fundamental decision whether they are interested or not" in returning to the JCPOA.

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi says in a speech in Australia that "the lack of progress in verifying the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program may affect other countries' decisions."

July 7, 2022: The British Royal Navy says it seized Iranian origin missiles and related components in January and February of 2022 that were being shipped in violation of Resolution 2231.

July 9, 2022: The IAEA verifies that Iran is enriching to uranium to 20 percent using IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow. The cascade has modified sub-headers.

U.S. President Joseph Biden says in an oped in The Washington Post that "my adiministration will continue to increase diplomacy and economic pressure until Iran is ready to return to compliance with the 2015 nuclear deal."

July 12, 2022: French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna says there are only a few weeks left to revive the JCPOA.

July 13, 2022: U.S. President Biden says in an interivew that he will use force as a "last resort" to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

July 14, 2022: U.S. President Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Lapid meet in Jerusalem and sign a declaration reaffirming the "unshakeable U.S. commitment to Israel's security," and, as part of the pledge, to use "all elements of its national power" to ensure Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon.

July 17, 2022: Kamal Kharrazi, advisor to Iran's Supreme Leader, says in an Al-Jazeera interview that Iran is technically capable of making a nuclear bomb, but has not decided whether to build one.

Israeli Prime Minister Lapid tells his cabinet that he made clear to Biden that Israel opposes the JCPOA and maintains "complete freedom to act, diplomatically and operationally, in the face of the Iranian nuclear program."

July 21, 2022: Richard Moore, head of the UK's MI6, says he does not think that the Supreme Leader of Iran wants to reach a deal to restore the JCPOA.

July 22, 2022: IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi says if there is an agreement to restore the JCPOA, “it is going to be very difficult for me to reconstruct the puzzle of this whole period of forced blindness.”

July 26, 2022: EU High Representative Josep Borrell writes in an oped for the Financial Times that “space for additional significant compromises has been exhausted.” He says he has “put on the table a text that addresses, in precise detail, the sanctions lifting as well as the nuclear steps needed to restore” compliance with the JCPOA.

July 28, 2022: Mohammad Eslami, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran announces that Iran will build a new reactor to test nuclear fuels. He says the reactor will “complete the chain of research, evaluation, testing and assurance of our nuclear power production.

August 1, 2022: The United States announces new sanctions targeting entities in Hong Kong, the UAE, and Singapore that help facilitate Iranian oil transactions.

August 2, 2022: IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi says the “lack of progress in verifying the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme will have consequences on the regional security landscape.”Those who “truly favour effective safeguards, would never use their cooperation as a bargaining chip, or IAEA inspectors as pawns in a political game," he says.

August 3, 2022: The IAEA releases a report noting that Iran has completed the installation of three IR-6 cascades at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. The report also states that Iran has begun enriching uranium with an additional two cascades at of IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz that were previously installed but not enriching. Iran also notified the IAEA of its intention to install another 1,000 IR-2 centrifuges.

AEOI spokesman Behrouz Kamalvandi says Iran began enriching uranium using the three new cascades of IR-6s.

August 3-8, 2022: Indirect talks between the United States and Iran take place in Vienna.

August 8, 2022: EU High Representative Josep Borrell tweets that he circulated a "final" draft to restore the JCPOA. He says “what can be negotiated has been negotiated,” and that it is time for political decisions to be made in the capitals. The draft includes reference to the IAEA's safeguards investigation for the first time.

August 12, 2022: US Special Envoy for Iran Rob Malley says in an interview with PBS that the US team is “considering the text very carefully to make sure that it lives up to the president’s very clear guidance” that the deal is “consistent with U.S. national security interest.” He says the administration will not pressure the IAEA into closing the safegaurds investigation.

August 15, 2022: Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian says Iran responded to the EU's draft. He says Iran made several proposed changes on the issue of sanctions guarantees. Iran needs to see a “realistic approach” from Washington, he says.

August 16, 2022: State Department spokesperson Ned Price says the Biden administration is studying Iran's comments, but the United States agrees with Borrell that "what could be negotiated over the course of these past 16, 17 months has been negotiated.

August 21, 2022: EU High Representative Josep Borrell says Iran's response to the EU's proposal is "reasonable."

August 22, 2022: Seyed Mohammad Marandi says that "no deal will be implemented before the IAEA permanently closes" the safeguards investigation.

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi says in a CNN interview that the agency will "absolutely not" drop the safeguards investigation and that the IAEA has a "legal obligation" to seek clarity regarding the presence of uranium at undeclared locations in Iran.

August 24, 2022: The US sends its response to Iran's proposed changes to the draft text to the EU. White House National Security Council Coordinator for Strategic Communications John Kirby says that "gaps remain" and "we're not there yet."

Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid says the draft text is a "bad dea" and urges negotiators to walk away from the talks.

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The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at a Glance

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March 2022

Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Director of Nonproliferation Policy, (202) 463-8270 x102; Julia Masterson, Research Associate, (202) 463-8270 x103

Secretary Kerry posed with his fellow E.U., P5+1, and Iranian counterparts at the Austria Center in Vienna, Austria, on July 14, 2015, before the formal announcement of the agreement concluding the Iranian nuclear negotiations. (Photo: U.S. State Department) The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is a detailed, 159-page agreement with five annexes reached by Iran and China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (a group known as the the P5+1) on July 14, 2015.

This nuclear deal was endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2231, adopted on July 20, 2015.

Iran’s compliance with the nuclear-related provisions of the JCPOA is verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) according to certain requirements set forth in the agreement.

The following is a summary of the timeline, key components, and the current status of the multi-year agreement.

Timeline for Implementation

July 14, 2015, Finalization Day: conclusion of the agreement. Finalization day triggers Iran and the United States to begin domestic review processes of the JCPOA. Iran also begins providing the IAEA with information necessary for the agency to complete its investigation into past activities related to nuclear weapons development.
October 18, 2015, Adoption Day: 90 days after the passage of the UN Security Council Resolution endorsing the deal (July 20, 2015). Adoption day triggers Iran and the P5+1 to take steps (outlined below) to meet the commitments to fully implement the JCPOA.
January 16, 2016, Implementation Day: the IAEA certifies that Iran has taken the key steps to restrict its nuclear program and has put in place increased monitoring. The IAEA's report on implementation day triggers U.S., EU, and UN sanctions relief.
October 2023, Transition Day: Eight years after adoption day (or the IAEA reaching its broader conclusion on Iran's nuclear program, whichever is sooner). Transition day triggers the UN to lift missile restrictions, Iran to seek ratification of its additional protocol, the EU to terminate all remaining nuclear sanctions, United States to remove certain entities from the sanctioned list, and the United States to seek legislative termination of certain sanctions.
October 2025, Termination Day: Ten years after adoption day. Termination day terminates Resolution 2231 and the Security Council closes Iran's nuclear file.

Violations of the JCPOA to Date

Despite Iran’s verified compliance with the deal, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, and subsequently re-imposed all U.S. sanctions on Iran lifted by the accord.

Then-U.S. President Donald Trump cited the deal's sunset provisions and its failure to account for Iran's ballistic missile program, among other things, as the impetus for withdrawal from the accord. The United States did not cite any evidence of Iranian noncompliance with the deal when it withdrew and Iran remained in full compliance with the deal for the year after U.S. withdrawal.

In May 2019, the United States further announced the termination of designated sanctions waivers for cooperative nuclear projects detailed in the JCPOA, including the transfer of enriched uranium out of Iran, the transfer and storage of heavy water outside of Iran, and the construction of additional reactor units at the Bushehr nuclear reactor.

The Trump administration pledged at that time to extend (for 90 days) several of the waivers prescribed by the nuclear deal to allow certain nuclear cooperation projects in Iran to proceed, including waivers for the Arak reactor conversion, the Fordow facility conversion, the Bushehr reactor, and the Tehran research reactor. However, over the course of two years, the Trump administration terminated all of the waivers for cooperative nuclear projects, except for the operation of the Bushehr power plant.

Iran began to incrementally violate the agreement in May 2019. Tehran tied its decision to breach the JCPOA’s limits to the deal’s failure to deliver sanctions relief envisioned by the accord and, implicitly, U.S. withdrawal from the deal. Iran is still a JCPOA participant and says it will return to compliance with the accord if its demands on sanctions relief are met.

Below is a summary of Iran’s breaches of the accord as well as additional steps taken by the Trump administration to undermine the JCPOA since the United States formally withdrew from the deal.

First Breach – May 8, 2019: Iran announced it would no longer be bound by limits on heavy water and enriched uranium stockpiles. The JCPOA prohibits Iran’s stockpile from exceeding 130 metric tons of heavy water and 300 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) enriched to 3.67 percent uranium-235. The IAEA verified that Iran breached the uranium stockpile limit July 1, 2019, and the heavy water limit on Nov. 17, 2019. Since that time, Iran continues to produce uranium in excess of the stockpile cap, but its heavy water stockpile has fluctuated and, at times, returned to below the 130-ton limit.
Second Breach – July 7, 2019: Iran announced it would exceed the 3.67 percent uranium-235 enrichment limit designated by the JCPOA. On July 8, 2019, Iran reported it had begun enriching uranium to 4.5 percent uranium-235. Iran’s breach of the 3.67 percent limit was verified by the IAEA on July 8, 2019, and since then, Iran has continued to enrich uranium up to 4.5 percent.
Third Breach – September 5, 2019: Iran announced it would cease to honor the limitations on research and development of advanced centrifuges imposed by the JCPOA. On Sept. 7, 2019, the IAEA verified that Iran had begun to install advanced centrifuges in excess of the amount permitted by the JCPOA. On Sept. 25, 2019, the IAEA reported that Iran had begun to accumulate enriched uranium from advanced machines. Iran continues to install advanced centrifuges and to produce enriched uranium using those new machines, both in violation of the accord.
Fourth Breach – November 5, 2019: Iran announced that technicians would begin enriching uranium up to 4.5 percent uranium-235 at the Fordow enrichment facility. Under the JCPOA, Iran is prohibited from enriching uranium at Fordow for 15 years.. The IAEA verified on Nov. 6, 2019, the transfer of uranium gas from Natanz to Fordow. The IAEA confirmed the resumption of uranium enrichment at Fordow on Nov. 9, 2019. In response, the Trump administration announced on Nov. 18, 2019, that it would no longer waive sanctions related to Iran’s Fordow facility. That waiver expired Dec. 15, 2019.
Fifth Breach – January 5, 2020: Iran announced that it would no longer be bound by any operational limitations of the JCPOA, but that it would maintain compliance with its safeguards obligations under the deal. Since then, Iran has not taken any additional observed steps in violation of the deal, according to IAEA reports.

Then-U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo announced May 27, 2020, that the United States would terminate all remaining sanctions waivers allowing for nonproliferation cooperation projects in Iran. Pompeo said the waivers covering the conversion of the Arak reactor, the provision of enriched fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, and the export of Iran’s spent fuel would expire after a sixty-day wind-down period but clarified that the waiver covering international support for Iran’s Bushehr reactor would remain in place. Those waivers expired in late-July, 2020.

Iran’s New Nuclear Law

On Dec. 2, 2020, Iran’s Guardian Council passed new legislation mandating Iran to significantly rachet up its nuclear activities. The legislation explicitly outlines a series of phased measures to be taken in the months following the law’s Dec. 23 ratification.

Under the new law, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) is obligated to:

Immediately boost enrichment levels to 20 percent uranium-235, and store at least 120 kilograms of 20 percent enriched fuel annually.

Status: The IAEA confirmed in January 2021 that Iran resumed enrichment to 20 percent uranium-235. According to the IAEA’s March 3 report, Iran has produced 182.1 kilograms of uranium enriched to that level. Iran also produced 33.2 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent. Iran notified the IAEA that it would begin enriching uranium to 60 percent in April after an act of sabotage at its Natanz enrichment facility.

Immediately increase Iran’s monthly uranium output and enrichment capacity by at least 500 kilograms.
Within two months’ time, if sanctions relief is not delivered, suspend implementation of the additional protocol to Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement and halt compliance with the additional monitoring mechanisms mandated by the JCPOA. The additional protocol and other monitoring mechanisms allow the IAEA to carry out inspections at non-declared nuclear sites in Iran on short notice to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.

Status: While Iran suspended its compliance with the additional protocol and other JCPOA-specific monitoring mechanisms on Feb. 23, 2021, the IAEA and Iran negotiated a bilateral agreement Feb. 21 allowing the IAEA to continue to carry out its necessary verification activities for 3 months. That agreement was renewed for one month on May 24, and expired June 24. For several months, Iran deniedthe IAEA access to inspect and service monitoring equipment installed in Iran pursuant to the arrangement. However, on Sept. 12, Iran agreed to allow the IAEA access to service the equipment. Tehran denied the agency access to one of those locations, the Karaj centrifuge component manufacturing workshop, on Sept. 26, adversely claiming the site was not subject to the Sept. 12 agreement.

After a months-long dispute over access to the Karaj workshop, Iran agreed on Dec. 15 to allow the IAEA to reinstall cameras at the facility before the end of December 2021. The IAEA confirmed to a reporter Jan. 7 that “by the end of December 2021, the Agency had reinstalled cameras to replace those removed from the workshop at Karaj and performed other related technical activities.”

In January 2022, Iran alerted the IAEA of its intention to close the Karaj workshop and transfer centrifuge component manufacturing activities to a different location, at Esfahan. According to the IAEA’s March 3 report, cameras were installed at the new workshop on Jan. 24, and the Karaj site has been closed.

Within three months’ time, enrich uranium using at least 1,000 IR-2m centrifuges.

Status: Iran installed a cascade of 164 IR-2m centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment facility in Nov. 2020, before the nuclear law was passed. Since the law’s ratification, as of Nov. 17, 2021, Iran had installed five additional cascades of 174 IR-2m centrifuges at the main enrichment facility at Natanz, which brought the total number of installed IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz to about 1,034 centrifuges.

Within three months’ time, enrich uranium with and conduct research and development activities on 164 IR-6 centrifuges. Within one year, increase the number of centrifuges to 1,000 IR-6 machines.

Status: It was reported Feb. 23, 2021, that Iran was in the process of installing one cascade of 135 IR-6 centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment facility, which was transferred from the pilot fuel enrichment plant. According to the IAEA’s latest report, released March 3, 2022, installation of the IR-6 cascade is planned but has yet to begin. Iran is already accumulating enriched uranium from a cascade of 164 IR-6 centrifuges, along with several smaller IR-6 cascades, at the Natanz pilot fuel enrichment plant, totaling to about 200 machines. Iran has also installed two cascades of 166 IR-6 centrifuges at the Fordow facility, but, as of March 2022, only one is operational.

Within five months’ time, inaugurate a uranium metal production facility at the Esfahan fuel fabrication plant.

Status: Iran succeeded in producing a small amount of natural uranium metal Feb. 6. The IAEA reportedAug. 14 that Iran used 257 grams of uranium tetrafluoride enriched up to 20 percent uranium-235 to produce 200 grams of uranium metal enriched to that same level. On Oct. 25, the IAEA verified that Iran had produced two batches of uranium silicide containing 0.43 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 20 percent. In September, the IAEA reported that Iran has nearly completed installation of the equipment for the first stage of the three-stage process to produce uranium metal at the Esfahan Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant. In its March 3 report, the agency confirmed that, while almost complete, only slight progress had been made since the previous quarterly report. The IAEA also observed that the first stage of the process had yet to undergo testing.

Iran maintains that all activities initiated in accordance with the new law, along with all other breaches of the JCPOA, are fully reversible should sanctions be lifted.

US Snapback Attempt (2020)

The Trump administration's maximum pressure campaign came to a head on Aug. 20, 2020, when Pompeo delivered a letter to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and to Indonesia’s Ambassador to the UN, who then presided over the Security Council, calling for the introduction of a resolution to continue the lifting of sanctions on Iran.

In doing so, Pompeo cited the text of Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorses the deal and outlines a process to reimpose sanctions on Iran.. That process, which was drafted to ensure that no veto-wielding Security Council member could block the re-imposition of sanctions, grants named JCPOA participants the right to call for a resolution to continue the lifting of sanctions on Iran which could subsequently be vetoed by the United States, France, Russia, China, or the United Kingdom. Resolution 2231 still names the United States as a participant because the text was never amended to reflect U.S. withdrawal from the deal in May 2018.

Resolution 2231 stipulates that if a vote on a resolution to continue the sanctions lifting is not called for within 30 days of notification, then all UN sanctions lifted on Iran per the nuclear deal are automatically re-imposed.

Pompeo announced on Sept. 19, 2020, that all UN sanctions lifted in accordance with the nuclear deal were re-imposed on Iran. The Trump administration subsequently threatened to penalize any individuals or states that failed to enforce the re-imposition of sanctions. However, UN Secretary-General Guterres and many UN member states—including the remaining parties to the JCPOA—dismissed the US call to re-impose sanctions, citing that the United States withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and is therefore not entitled to trigger the reimposition of UN sanctions on Iran.

On Feb. 18, 2021, the newly inaugurated Biden administration formally rescinded Trump’s request that all sanctions lifted in accordance with the JCPOA be reimposed.

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UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran

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January 2022

Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, (202) 463-8270 x102

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has adopted seven resolutions as part of international efforts to address Iran’s nuclear program, although only one is in effect today. When Iran and the P5+1 reached a comprehensive nuclear deal on July 14, 2015, the UN Security Council endorsed the deal and put in place measures to lift UN sanctions that targeted Iran's nuclear program. The resolution, 2231,retained some restrictions on ballistic missile activities and arms sales. It was passed on July 20, 2015 by a unanimous vote.

The central demand in the first six resolutions was that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment program, as well as undertake several confidence-building measures outlined in a February 2006 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors resolution - including reconsidering the construction of its heavy-water reactor and ratifying the IAEA Additional Protocol. The council initially laid out these calls in a nonbinding Security Council presidential statement adopted in March 2006.

Almost all the resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, making most of the provisions of the resolutions legally binding on Iran, or all UN member states. Four of them included a series of progressively expansive sanctions on Iran and or Iranian persons and entities. The sanctions represented one track in a “dual-track approach” pursued by the permanent five members of the council and Germany (the so-called P5+1), to address Iran’s nuclear program. The other track involved a series of proposals to reach a negotiated settlement. (See History of Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue.) Details on the first six resolutions can be found below the information for Resolution 2231.

UN Security Council Resolutions Quick Links
Resolution 1696 (2006)	Resolution 1737 (2006)	Resolution 1747 (2007)	Resolution 1803 (2008)	Resolution 1835 (2008)	Resolution 1929 (2010)	Resolution 2231 (2015)

Security Council Resolution 2231

On July 20, 2015, the UN Security Council unanimously passed resolution 2231.

The full text of Resolution 2231 is available here.

Resolution 2231's Principal Provisions

This resolution endorsed the comprehensive nuclear deal (known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) reached between Iran and the P5+1 on July 14, 2015, and laid the groundwork for the Security Council to lift nuclear-related sanctions on Iran when Tehran completed key steps under the deal that restricted its nuclear activities. Iran met the requirements in January 16, 2016.

Resolution 2231 retains the arms embargo on Iran for five years after implementation and the sanctions on Iran's ballistic missile program for eight years. Both could be lifted earlier if the IAEA reaches a determination about Iran’s nuclear program known as the Broader Conclusion. These sanctions are "nuclear-related" as they were put in place under Resolution 1929. Iran is also “called upon” not to undertake activities on ballistic missiles designed to be nuclear-capable.

The resolution requests that if states engage in the sale of dual-use materials to Iran, they use the procurement channel application process set up by the JCPOA to regulate Iran's imports of these materials.

Resolution 2231 also requests that the IAEA undertake the necessary monitoring and verification to implement the deal.

Resolution 2231's Monitoring Mechanisms

The resolution also puts in place language laying out the procedure to reimpose UN sanctions.

The Security Council resolution requests reports from the IAEA on implementation of the deal and the agency's efforts to reach a broader conclusion about Iran's nuclear program. The Resolution also requests reports every six months from the UN Secretary General on implementation of Resolution 2231.

Prior UN Security Council Resolutions

Security Council Resolution 1696

On July 31, 2006, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1696 under Article 40 of the UN Charter. Fourteen countries voted in favor of the resolution; only Qatar voted against it.

The full text of Resolution 1696 is available here.

Resolution 1696’s Principal Provisions

In Resolution 1696, the council called on Tehran to suspend its enrichment program and verify its compliance with the IAEA Board of Governor’s requirements. It encouraged Iran to take these steps as confidence building measures.

The resolution expressed the council’s “intention…to adopt appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations” if Iran did not cooperate. However, such measures would not be adopted automatically. The resolution underlined that the council must undertake “further decisions…should such additional measures be necessary.”

The first Security Council resolution to address the Iranian nuclear program, Resolution 1696 did not contain sanctions, but was the basis for future sanctions resolutions Specifically it:

Demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA.
Called on states to follow their existing domestic law and international law to “exercise vigilance and prevent the transfer of any items, materials, good and technology that could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and ballistic missile programmes.”

The resolution warned Iran that its failure to comply by August 31, 2006 could result in punitive Security Council measures, such as economic sanctions.

Resolution 1696’s Monitoring Mechanisms

The resolution called for a report from the Director General of the IAEA by August 31 on Iran’s compliance with this resolution.

Security Council Resolution 1737

On December 23, 2006, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1737 unanimously under Article 41 of the UN Charter in response to Iran’s failure to comply with Resolution 1696.

The full text of Resolution 1737 is available here.

Resolution 1737’s Principal Provisions

The resolution echoed the principal provisions of Resolution 1696, requiring Iran to suspend uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, and to take other confidence-building measures. In addition, Resolution 1737:

Obligated Iran to suspend work on its heavy-water reactor projects rather than just reconsider them.
Called on Iran to ratify the IAEA’s Additional Protocol.

Resolution 1737’s Sanctions

The resolution imposed sanctions against both the state of Iran and Iranian individuals and entities deemed to be providing support for Iran’s proliferation-related activities.

Resolution 1737 decided that all states should:

Prevent the supply, sale, or transfer of designated nuclear and ballistic missile-related goods to Iran to ensure that Iran cannot employ the designated goods in its enrichment-related, reprocessing, or heavy water-related activities, or its development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.
Refrain from providing technical or financial assistance, training, or resources related to certain nuclear and ballistic missile-related goods.
Refrain from importing designated nuclear and ballistic missile-related items from Iran.

Three provisions in Resolution 1737 targeted Iranian individuals and entities by calling on states to:

Exercise vigilance regarding the entry into their territory of individuals engaged in Iran’s nuclear or ballistic missile activities.
Freeze the funds, financial assets, and economic resources of designated individuals who are involved with Iran’s nuclear programs.
Preventing the “specialized teaching or training of Iranian nationals” of subjects that would enhance Iran’s nuclear goals.

The resolution did permit states to export nuclear and ballistic missile-related goods that are not itemized in the resolution’s control lists if: certain guidelines were followed, end-user controls were put in place, and the 1737 Committee was notified. It was also necessary for states to notify the IAEA to export certain nuclear and ballistic missile-related materials to Iran.

Resolution 1737’s Monitoring Mechanisms

Resolution 1737 set out numerous measures to monitor compliance with the resolution. In paragraph 18 it established a Committee (known as the 1737 Committee) to oversee the implementation of the resolution’s key provisions. A subsequent paragraph required states to furnish reports to the Committee detailing their compliance with the resolution.

In addition, the Director General of the IAEA was required to report to the IAEA Board of Governors and to the Security Council within 60 days of the resolution being issued on whether Iran had suspended its enrichment and heavy water-related activities. The UNSC then reviewed Iran’s actions based on the findings of that report. It was then incumbent upon the council to decide to either suspend or terminate the resolution’s sanctions if Iran complied with them. In the event that Iran had not complied with the sanctions, the Security Council was empowered to adopt further measures as it saw fit.

Security Council Resolution 1747

On March 24, 2007, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1747 unanimously under Article 41 of the UN Charter.

The full text of Resolution 1747 is available here.

Resolution 1747’s Principal Provisions

This resolution was adopted as a result of Iran’s failure to comply with the previous two resolutions. It called on Iran to take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors and outlined in Resolution 1737 to verify that its nuclear program has only peaceful purposes. Resolution 1747 also encourages Iran to consider the June 2006 proposals to reach a long-term comprehensive agreement with the P5+1.

Resolution 1747’s Sanctions

The resolution repeated and enhanced some of the key sanctions from Resolution 1737 while also introducing some new measures.

Resolution 1747 enhanced its predecessor’s sanctions by:

Calling on states to exercise “restraint” (in addition to the “vigilance” called for in 1737) regarding the entry of persons into their territory associated with Iran’s nuclear program. Resolution 1747 added further names to the list of individuals entering their territory who must be reported to the 1737 Committee.
Requiring states to freeze the “funds, other financial assets and economic resources” of 28 additional individuals and entities.
Expanding the list of items prohibited for export to or import from Iran to include any arms or related material.

Resolution 1747 also introduced the following new sanctions:

Called on states to “exercise vigilance and restraint” in the supply, sale, or transfer of major military weapons systems and related material to Iran, as well as the provision of any technical assistance, financial assistance, or other service related to the provision of these items.
Called on states and international financial institutions “not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans” with the Iranian government unless for humanitarian or developmental purposes.

Resolution 1747’s Monitoring Mechanisms

Like its predecessor, all states were required to report to the 1737 Committee within 60 days of Resolution 1747’s adoption on the steps taken to implement it. Also within 60 days, the Director General of the IAEA was instructed to furnish a report on Iran’s compliance with the resolution to both the IAEA Board of Governors and to the Security Council.

Security Council Resolution 1803

On March 3, 2008, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1803 with 14 of the council’s 15 members voting in favor. Indonesia abstained from the vote stating that it “remain[ed] to be convinced of the efficacy of adopting additional sanctions” against Iran.

The full text of Resolution 1803 is available here.

Resolution 1803’s Principal Provisions

This resolution was adopted as a response to Iran’s decision not to comply with any of the previous resolutions. It reiterates the council’s desire that Iran halt its enrichment program and urges Iran to comply with the IAEA.

Resolution 1803’s Sanctions

Resolution 1803 enhanced the previous sanctions on individuals and entities involved with Iran’s nuclear program by:

Augmenting the list of people that states must report to the 1737 Committee if they enter their territory.
Requiring states, for the first time, to “prevent the entry into or transit through their territories” of designated individuals involved in pursuing Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
Expanding the number of individuals subjected to frozen funds, financial assets, and economic resources.

Resolution 1803 also outlines sanctions that apply directly to the Iranian state, by:

Broadening the scope of restrictions on the supply, sale, or transfer of nuclear and ballistic missile-related items to Iran established in Resolution 1737 and setting down new provisions to prevent Iran from developing its nuclear program.
Calling on states to be vigilant “in entering new commitments for public provided financial support for trade with Iran,” lest such support be used by Iran to pursue its nuclear weapons ambitions.
Calling on states to “exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran,” to prevent such activities from enhancing Iran’s nuclear program.
Calling on states to inspect cargo going to or from Iran on aircraft and vessels owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, where they have reasonable grounds for suspecting the cargo consists of goods prohibited under resolutions 1737, 1747, or 1803.

Resolution 1803’s Monitoring Mechanisms

Like its predecessors, Resolution 1803 set out a number of reporting mechanisms that states and the Director General of the IAEA were to fulfill to monitor compliance with this resolution. Echoing previous resolutions, Resolution 1803 required states to file reports with the 1737 Committee within 60 days of being issued, detailing the steps taken to implement the resolution.

It also requested the Director General of the IAEA to submit a report to the IAEA Board of Governors and to the Security Council within 90 days of the resolution’s adoption, stating the extent to which Iran had complied with Resolutions 1737, 1747 and 1803. Upon receiving the Director General’s report, the Security Council was empowered to suspend, terminate or extend the sanctions in place against Iran as deemed appropriate.

Resolution 1803 extended the 1737 Committee’s scope from overseeing the implementation of only Resolution 1737 to also overseeing the implementation of Resolutions 1747 and 1803.

This resolution also introduced a requirement that states must report to the Security Council when they inspect the cargo of an Iranian aircraft or vessel. The report must be filed within five working days of the inspection and it must detail “the grounds for the inspection, as well as information on its time, place circumstances, results and other relevant details.”

Security Council Resolution 1835

Resolution 1835 was unanimously adopted on September 27, 2008.

The full text of Resolution 1835 is available here.

Resolution 1835’s Principal Provisions

In contrast to its predecessors, Resolution 1835 was not adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, nor did it set out new provisions that Tehran was required to comply with. Instead, it simply reaffirmed the four previous resolutions, as well as a statement made by the Security Council’s President on March 29, 2006. It then reaffirmed the council’s commitment “to an early negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.”

Resolution 1835’s Sanctions

This resolution did not outline new sanctions against Iran.

Resolution 1835’s Monitoring Mechanisms

This resolution did not outline new monitoring mechanisms.

Security Council Resolution 1929

On June 9, 2010, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1929, with 12 countries voting in favor, Brazil and Turkey voting against, and Lebanon abstaining.

The full text of Resolution 1929 is available here.

Resolution 1929’s Principal Provisions

The resolution reiterated the UNSC’s demands from previous resolutions that Iran halt all enrichment activity and other activities related to nuclear weapons development.

Resolution 1929’s Sanctions

This resolution, the sixth round of sanctions against Iran, included:

Banning Iran from investing in nuclear and missile technology abroad, including investment in uranium mining.
Establishing a complete arms embargo on Iran, banning the sale of “battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems” to Iran.
Prohibiting Iran from undertaking any activity related to ballistic missiles. The resolution requires states to take necessary measures to prevent technology relevant to ballistic missiles from reaching Iran. It also updates the list of items banned for transfer to and from Iran.

Resolution 1929 also subjected Iran to a new inspection regime designed to detect and stop Iranian smuggling. States are:

Called upon to inspect vessels on their territory that are suspected of carrying Iranian prohibited cargo, and are expected to comply with these rules on the high seas, including disposing of confiscated Iranian prohibited cargo.
Required to refuse services to ships that are not in compliance with these sanctions.

Lastly, this resolution included financial sanctions targeting Iran’s ability to finance proliferation activities by:

Subjecting three companies related to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, 15 IRGC-related companies and 40 other Iranian companies to an asset freeze.

Further, states were:

Requested to report any circumventing of sanctions by Iran.
Required to obligate their citizens and corporations to “exercise vigilance” when doing business with Iran or Iranian entities that contribute to proliferation efforts.
Called upon to limit their interactions with Iranian financial institutions.

Resolution 1929’s Monitoring Mechanisms

Resolution 1929 requested that the Secretary-General create a panel of eight experts to “assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate” and “make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or State, may consider to improve implementation of the relevant measures.”

It “urge[d]” states and relevant UN bodies to comply with the recommendations of the Panel of Experts and “call[ed] upon” states to submit a report 60 days after the adoption of the resolution on how they plan to comply with the sanctions regime. It also requested a report within 90 days of the resolution’s adoption from the IAEA on whether Iran had complied with the demands of this and previous resolutions.

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IAEA Investigations of Iran's Nuclear Activities

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August 2022

Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, (202) 463-8270 x102

Ali Akbar Salehi (left), the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and Yukiya Amano, director-general of the IAEA, sign a framework agreement in Tehran on November 11, 2013. (Photo: Atta Kenare/AFP/Getty Images)

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has conducted two investigations into Iran’s past nuclear activities.

The first focused on the military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. The IAEA laid out its evidence and initial assessment of the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program in an annex to its November 2011 report to the agency’s Board of Governors. The IAEA sought cooperation from Iran in clarifying the agency’s outstanding questions about the military dimensions work, but it was not until the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, required Iran to cooperate with the agency’s investigation prior to implementation of that accord, that Tehran provided the IAEA with enough information for the agency to issue a final assessment. The IAEA’s December 2015 report concluded that Iran conducted a “range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and some activities took place after 2003.” The report further assessed that there were “no credible indications” of activities relevant to weaponization after 2009 or any diversion of nuclear materials for military purposes. Following the report, the IAEA’s Board of Governors passed a resolution in December 2015 closing the military dimensions investigation.

The IAEA’s second investigation began in 2018 and is focused on evidence suggesting that Iran failed to declare all nuclear materials and activities from its pre-2003 nuclear program as legally required by its safeguards agreement. As part of the investigation, the IAEA visited three undeclared locations in 2019 and 2002. Environmental samples from all three sites were positive for processed uranium. Iran has yet to provide the IAEA with technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium at those locations. The IAEA was investigating a fourth location, but said it had no more questions for Iran after assessing in a May 2022 report that Tehran should have declared to the agency activities related to uranium metal that took place at the site. While this safeguards investigation is separate from the JCPOA, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi said in August 2022 that the Iran will not return to compliance with the JCPOA until the IAEA’s investigation is closed.

Military Dimensions Investigation (2011-2015)
Safeguards Investigation (2018-present)

Military Dimensions Investigation (2011-2015):

In November 2011, the IAEA released a report with an annex outlining the agency’s evidence that Iran had engaged in various activities related to nuclear weapons development. The report provided evidence suggesting that Iran pursued a structured nuclear program before the fall of 2003, and that certain weapons-related activities continued after that program was dismantled.

In that report, the IAEA divided its questions and concerns into 12 areas: 1) nuclear program management structure, 2) procurement activities, 3) nuclear material acquisition, 4) possession of nuclear components for an explosive device, 5) detonator development, 6) high explosives and associated experiments, 7) hydrodynamic experiments, 8) relevant modeling and calculations, 9) development of a neutron initiator, 10) preparations to conduct a nuclear explosive test, 11) integration of a nuclear warhead into a missile, and 12) studies looking into a prototype Iranian re-entry vehicle

Additionally, Iran was found to have acquired nuclear weapons development information and documentation from an unnamed clandestine nuclear supply network and to have explored development of an indigenously-designed nuclear weapon. The IAEA’s published November 2011 report omits details about the latter two points, but the nuclear supply network is widely believed to have been that of Pakistani physicist A.Q. Khan.

The report, consistent with a 2007 U.S. intelligence assessment, speculates that Iran’s structured nuclear program (known as the AMAD Plan) “was stopped rather abruptly pursuant to a ‘halt order’ instruction issued in late 2003 by senior Iranian officials,” and that certain research and development activities may have resumed. For more on the IAEA’s November 2011 report, see: The IAEA’s Iran Report: Assessment and Implications.

The agency’s 35-member Board of Governors adopted a resolution Nov. 18, 2011, that expressed “deep and increasing concern about the unresolved issues regarding the Iranian nuclear program” and called on Iran to provide the agency with “access to all relevant information, documentation, sites, material, and personnel.”

The IAEA sought answers from Iran regarding concerns raised in the 2011 report, but there was little progress until Iran and the IAEA reached the Framework for Cooperation in November 2013. The full text of the initial Framework for Cooperation and its accompanying annex is available here.

Under the Framework for Cooperation, Iran and the IAEA committed to resolving the agency's concerns through a step-by-step process. An annex to the framework laid out the first six actions that Iran pledged to take within three months.

Iranian Actions to be completed by Feb. 11, 2014	Status
Provide mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Gchine mine in Bandar Abbas.	Completed. Iran facilitated IAEA access to the Gchine uranium mine on January 29, 2014.
Provide mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Heavy Water Production Plant.	Completed. The IAEA visited the Heavy Water Production Plant at the Arak site on December 8, 2013.
Provide information on all new research reactors.	Completed. In a February 9 joint statement, the IAEA and Iran announced that Iran completed the actions agreed to on November 11.
Provide information with regard to the identification of 16 sites designated for the construction of nuclear power plants.	Completed. In a February 9 joint statement, the IAEA and Iran announced that Iran completed the actions agreed to on November 11.
Clarification of the announcement made by Iran regarding additional enrichment facilities.	Completed. In a February 9 joint statement, the IAEA and Iran announced that Iran completed the actions agreed to on November 11.
Further clarification of the announcement made by Iran with respect to laser enrichment technology.	Completed. In a February 9 joint statement, the IAEA and Iran announced that Iran completed the actions agreed to on November 11.

On February 9, 2014, Iran and the IAEA announced a further seven actions that Iran would take by May 15, 2014. Iran completed the initial two sets of actions within the time period specified.

Iranian Actions to be completed by May 15, 2014	Status
Providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Saghand mine in Yazd.	Completed. An IAEA team was provided access to the Saghand mine on a May 5-6 visit to Iran.
Providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Ardakan concentration plant.	Completed. An IAEA team was provided access to the Ardakan plant on a May 6 visit to Iran.
Submission of an updated Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) for the IR-40 Reactor (Heavy Water Reactor at Arak).	Completed. In its March 20 report on the Joint Plan of Action, the IAEA noted that Iran completed an updated DIQ for the agency on February 12. Iran provided follow-up information in response to the agency's questions about the DIQ on March 29.
Taking steps to agree with the Agency on the conclusion of a Safeguards Approach for the IR 40 Reactor.	Completed. Iran and the IAEA met on May 5 to continue work on the safeguards for the IR-40 reactor at Arak.
Providing mutually agreed relevant information and arranging for a technical visit to Lashkar Ab’ad Laser Centre.	Completed. The agency was able to visit the center on March 12.
Providing information on source material, which has not reached the composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched, including imports of such material and on Iran’s extraction of uranium from phosphates.	Completed. Iran provided this information to the IAEA in an April 29 letter.
Providing information and explanations for the Agency to assess Iran’s stated need or application for the development of Exploding Bridge Wire detonators.	Completed. Iran provided the IAEA with information on the detonators at a meeting on April 26 and in subsequent letters on April 30 and an additional May 20 meeting.

A May 20, 2014 meeting resulted in an agreement on an additional 5 actions to be taken by August 25, 2014. Iran completed three of the five actions by the end of August 2014. Two remaining issues related to nuclear weapons development remained unresolved. Iran and the IAEA met several times throughout the spring, and in its May 29, 2015, quarterly report, the IAEA noted that Iran shared information on one of the outstanding issues related to nuclear weapons development. Before all of these actions were completed, this agreement was superseded by a July 2015 agreement that ultimately led to closure of the investigation.

Iranian Actions to be completed by Aug. 25, 2014	Status
Exchanging information with the Agency with respect to the allegations related to the initiation of high explosives, including the conduct of large scale high explosives experimentation in Iran.	Completed. In its May 29, 2015, quarterly report, the IAEA noted that Iran shared information on one of the outstanding issues related to nuclear weapons development. (While Iran did not complete this activity on schedule, it was resolved by Aug. 15, 2015, as part of the new July 14, 2015 roadmap)
Providing mutually agreed relevant information and explanations related to studies made and/or papers published in Iran in relation to neutron transport and associated modeling and calculations and their alleged application to compressed materials.	Completed.In its May 29, 2015, quarterly report, the IAEA noted that Iran shared information on one of the outstanding issues related to nuclear weapons development. (While Iran did not complete this activity on schedule, it was resolved by Aug. 15, 2015, as part of the new July 14, 2015, roadmap.)
Providing mutually agreed information and arranging a technical visit to a centrifuge research and development centre.	Completed. According to the Sept. 5 IAEA quarterly report, IAEA inspectors were able to visit this facility on Aug. 31.
Providing mutually agreed information and managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops, and storage facilities.	Completed. The Sept. 5 IAEA quarterly report said that the agency was able to access these sites Aug. 18-20.
Concluding the safeguards approach for the IR-40 reactor.	Completed. The agency and Iran completed the safeguards approach on Aug. 31, six days after the Aug. 25 deadline.

2015 Roadmap for the Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program

On July 14, 2015, Iran and IAEA announced they reached an agreement to address the agency’s outstanding questions. The agreement, known as the Roadmap for the Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program, laid out a schedule for Iran to address the IAEA’s concerns and the agency to complete its investigation.

The IAEA announced on August 15, 2015, that Iran met the first deadline for providing documents and written explanations to the agency's questions regarding the 12 main areas for investigation as outlined in the November 2011 annex. The agency submitted follow-up questions to Iran on September 9, and on September 20, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano and Deputy Director General Tero Varjoranta traveled to Tehran to discuss the investigation and visit the Parchin site. They confirmed that environmental samples were taken at Parchin for analysis in IAEA labs. On October 15, 2015, the deadline for additional responses, the IAEA confirmed that Iran had responded to its follow-up questions and completed all activities under the roadmap.

The completed assessment, released on December 2, 2015, concluded that Iran had pursued a nuclear weapons program prior to 2003, including a coordinated “range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device,” but did not divert nuclear material from its civilian nuclear program as part of its weaponization efforts.

The report found that although Tehran’s organized nuclear weapons program ended in 2003, some activities continued through 2009. According to the assessment, the “activities did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies, and the acquisition of certain relevant technical competencies and capabilities.” The agency said it found “no credible indications” that nuclear material was diverted to the weapons program or that any undeclared activities have taken place since 2009.

In several areas, like nuclear testing preparations and fuzing, arming, and firing a payload, the IAEA did not receive any new information. In other areas, such as Iran’s work at a uranium mine, the IAEA assessed that Tehran’s activities were consistent with its declaration to the IAEA. However, the IAEA assessed that Iran’s program structure, computer modeling of a nuclear explosive device, and certain types of experiments with detonators were part of a nuclear weapons development program prior to 2003.

Mark Toner, a deputy spokesman at the U.S. Department of State, said on December 2 that the IAEA’s conclusion is “consistent with what the United States has long assessed with high confidence.”

Following a meeting on December 15, 2015, the 35-member IAEA Board of Governors voted unanimously to close the investigation into Iran's past weaponization work while continuing to report on Iran's implementation of the July 2015 nuclear deal with the P5+1.

Iran's ambassador to the IAEA Reza Najafi said that Iran "disagreed" with some of the agency's findings, arguing that the “scientific studies of dual-use technologies have always been for peaceful civilian or conventional military uses” rather than nuclear weapons work, he said.

The full text of the "road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program" is available here. Highlights of the IAEA's findings in each of the 12 areas are below:

Program management structure: The IAEA assessed that, prior to 2003, Iran had an organized structure “suitable for the coordination of a range of activities relevant” to nuclear weapons design. The activities that continued beyond 2003 were not a coordinated program.
Procurement activities: The IAEA had “indications” that Tehran attempted to purchase items relevant to developing a nuclear weapon prior to 2007 and information that Iran purchased materials for its fuel cycle activities through companies not affiliated with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Iran admitted to looking into procuring a high-speed camera for conventional purposes but said it ultimately did not do so.
Nuclear material acquisition: The IAEA assessed that the Gchine uranium mine, previously thought to be a potential source of uranium for undeclared nuclear activities between 2000-2003, would not have produced any substantial amounts of nuclear material before 2006. The IAEA found that the activities at the mine were consistent with Iran’s explanations and declarations. Overall, the IAEA assessed that “any quantity of nuclear material” that would have been available for the nuclear weapons development program “would have been within the uncertainties associated with nuclear material accountancy and related measurements.”
Nuclear components for an explosive device: The IAEA had evidence that Tehran had access to documentation on the conversion of uranium compounds to uranium metal, which is part of the weaponization process, and made progress on reducing a uranium compound into a metal form. Tehran denied that it conducted any metallurgical work for weapons purposes. The IAEA’s final assessment found no indication of Iran conducting activities related to the uranium metal document.
Detonator development: The IAEA assessed that Iran’s work on explosive bridge wire detonators has “characteristics relevant to a nuclear explosive device.” The agency found that some of Iran’s explanations, that the detonators were developed as a safer alternative because of explosive accidents, were “inconsistent” and “unrelated” to the IAEA’s timeframe for detonator development.
Initiation of high explosives and associated experiments: Iran admitted to the IAEA in August and September 2015 that it conducted work on certain types of explosives, but had a “technical requirement for the development” of multipoint initiation explosive technology for conventional weaponry. The IAEA noted that there are non-nuclear weapons applications for the development, but assessed that the work was “relevant to a nuclear explosive device.”
Hydrodynamic experiments: As part of its investigation over the past several months, IAEA officials were able to visit Parchin, a military site where the agency suspected that Tehran conducted hydrodynamic tests in an explosive chamber. Since the IAEA requested access in 2012, Iran conducted extensive construction and renovations. Tehran said in September 2015 discussions with the IAEA that one of the main buildings in question was used for storing chemicals for the production of explosives. An environmental sampling at the site found “chemically man-made particles of uranium” but did not indicate that it was used for long-term storage of chemicals as Iran claimed. The IAEA assessed that its satellite imagery analysis and environmental sampling “does not support Iran’s statements on the purpose of the building” and that Iran’s activities at the site impeded the agency’s investigation. The IAEA did not draw a definite assessment as to what occurred at Parchin.
Modeling and calculations: The IAEA assessed that Iran conducted modeling and calculations related to nuclear explosive configurations prior to 2004 and between 2005-2009. During the agency’s investigation between August-October 2015, Iran maintained that it was not in a position to discuss its work on hydrodynamic modeling because it was for conventional military purposes and not an IAEA concern. The IAEA noted in its report that there are conventional applications for such modeling and that the calculations derived from the modeling were incomplete and fragmented, but assessed overall that Iran conducted computer modeling of a nuclear explosive device between 2005-2009.
Neutron initiator: The IAEA’s evidence indicated that Iran continued work on neutron initiators after 2004, although the agency assessed prior to the July 2015 agreement with Iran that some of the indicators that Iran undertook work on generating neutrons through shock-compression were “weaker than previously considered.” Iran provided the IAEA with information about its neutron research and let the IAEA visit a research intuition in October 2015. Iran maintained that its research in the area was not related to “shock-driven neutron sources.”
Conducting a test: The IAEA noted it has not received any additional information regarding Tehran's plans to conduct a nuclear test since its November 2011 report. The IAEA noted in the November 2011 report that Iran may have undertaken “preparatory experimentation” relevant to a nuclear weapons explosive device and obtained a document on the safety arrangements for explosive nuclear testing.
Integration into a missile delivery vehicle: The IAEA assessed that two of the workshops it identified in 2011 as producing components and mock-up parts for engineering of a Shahab-3 (Iran’s medium-range ballistic missile) re-entry vehicle for a nuclear warhead exist and that the capabilities are “consistent with those described” in documentation provided to the agency on Tehran’s work on a re-entry vehicle.
Fuzing, arming, and firing system: The IAEA report noted in the Final Assessment report that it had not received any new information since the November 2011 report on development of a prototype firing system for a Shahab-3 payload that would allow the missile’s payload to safely re-enter the atmosphere and then explode above a target or upon impact.

Safeguards Investigation (2018-present)

Overview

In 2018, the IAEA began to investigate evidence that Iran failed to declare all of its nuclear materials and activities as legally required under its safeguards agreement with the agency. Since June 2020, the IAEA has provided regular, quarterly reports to the agency’s Board of Governors regarding the investigation, which focuses on four locations in Iran where evidence suggests Tehran conducted undeclared nuclear activities prior to 2003 and stored equipment and materials from that period. The IAEA visited three of the undeclared locations in 2019 and 2020 and samples taken from the sites indicated the presence of processed uranium. Iran has not provided technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium at the sites, even after reaching an agreement with the IAEA in March 2022 on a process for addressing the agencies inquiries. The IAEA concluded in a May 2022 report that activities related to uranium metal at the fourth site should have been declared to the IAEA.

The IAEA Board passed two resolutions, one in June 2020 and one in June 2022, urging Iran to fully cooperate with the agency’s investigation. In August 2022, Iranian officials insisted that text be added to the draft agreement to restore the JCPOA noting that Iran wants the IAEA’s investigation to be closed prior to reimplementation of the deal.

Background

The agency’s safeguards investigation began after Israel stole documents pertaining to Tehran’s past nuclear weapons program from Iran earlier that year and shared the so-called “Atomic Archive” with the agency. Then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also publicly pressed the IAEA to investigate a warehouse in the Turkazabad district of Iran during a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2018.

While the IAEA has not publicly discussed the archive, IAEA officials have reiterated that any information provided by member states is subject to the agency’s review and verification process. Additionally, then U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Andrea Thompson confirmed in March 2019 that the IAEA was evaluating the archival materials.

In November 2019, Acting-Director General Cornel Feruta told a special convening of the Agency’s Board of Governors that the IAEA had “detected natural uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at a location in Iran not declared to the Agency.” It was later confirmed that location was the Turquzabad site, which IAEA inspectors had visited earlier that year to take environmental samples.

Seeking to explain the presence of undeclared uranium, Iranian officials have stated that the warehouse was previously owned by a private company that may have used the facility to store equipment from Iran’s uranium mine. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran suggested that the presence of uranium was due to contamination from the equiptment.

In March 2020, the IAEA released a report detailing efforts by the Agency over the past year to investigate an additional three sites in Iran for evidence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. The report noted that the IAEA requested access to two of the sites in January 2020, but Iran had refused to allow inspectors to visit the areas in question.

In June 2020, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution calling on Iran to fully implement its comprehensive safeguards agreement and cooperate with the Agency. In August 2020, Iran and the IAEA reached an agreement allowing the agency to visit two sites to conduct environmental sampling. It was reported Sept. 30, 2020, that the IAEA completed its inspections of both locations, and that environmental samples were sent to agency labs to test for the presence of nuclear material. The samples confirmed the presence of processed uranium at the two additional sites.

In March 2022, Iran and the IAEA reached agreement on a process for concluding the agency’s investigation by the June 2022 IAEA Board of Governors meeting. However, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said in a May 30, 2022 report that Tehran failed to provide technically credible explanations for the presence of uranium at the three locations. Following the report, the IAEA’s Board of Governors passed a resolution censuring Iran for its failure to cooperate and urging the Tehran to provide credible answers to the IAEA’s inquiries.

In the May 30 report, the IAEA noted that it had no further questions about one of the four locations. The IAEA assessed that Iran undertook activities related to uranium metal at the site that should have been declared to the agency under Iran’s safeguards agreement.

The Four Locations

In its regular quarterly reports to the IAEA Board of Governors, the IAEA has provided details about its preliminary conclusions as to the nuclear activities that occurred at each location. In May 2022, the IAEA identified the locations under investigation. The following is a summary of the IAEA’s evidence and preliminary assessments of the undeclared activities at each location. Additional information is available in the May 2022 IAEA report.

Location 1: Turquzabad

Information available to the IAEA suggests that Iran used the Turquzabad site, previously referred to in agency reports as Location 1, to store nuclear material and equipment, including containers transferred from Varamin (location 3). In January 2019, the IAEA requested that Iran clarify whether the site was used for such purposes. Iran told the IAEA there were no undeclared materials or activities at the location. In February 2019, IAEA inspectors then requested information from Iran about the movement of containers from the site that the agency observed using satellite imagery and requested access to the location. Environmental samples taken indicated the presence of processed uranium.

Iran’s initial responses to the IAEA regarding the presence of the processed uranium were not deemed technically credible. As a result of the March 2022 agreement between the IAEA and Iran, Tehran provided further explanation for the presence of the uranium, saying that there was “the possibility of an act of sabotage by a third party to contaminate the area.” Iran provided no evidence to support that claim, according to the May 2022 IAEA report. Iran also said it could not identify where containers removed from site in 2018 are currently located. The May 2022 IAEA report concluded that the presence of uranium particles at the site “is not clarified.”

Location 2: Lavisan-Shian

The IAEA investigated evidence of an undeclared uranium metal disc that had undergone drilling and processing at Lavisan-Shian, previously identified as Location 2. As part of its investigation, the IAEA visited a declared facility in Iran where uranium metal discs had been produced but was unable to determine if the Lavisan-Shian disc was at that site. The IAEA informed Iran in January 2022 that it “could not exclude that the disc had been melted, recast and was not part of the declared nuclear material inventory.” In its May 2022 report, the IAEA assessed that the activities at Lavisan-Shian “were not declared by Iran to the Agency as required under the Safeguards Agreement.” The IAEA also said it has no further questions about this location.

Location 3: Varamin

Information and evidence available to the IAEA suggests that Iran used Varamin for storing nuclear materials and/or fuel-cycle-related activities. The IAEA’s evidence suggests that materials and equipment from the site were moved to Location 1, Turquazabad, for storage.

The IAEA requested access to Varamin in January 2020, but Tehran denied the request. Inspectors were able to access the site after Iran and the agency reached an agreement in August 2020 and environmental samples confirmed the presence of uranium at the location. The IAEA ask Iran to provide clarifications about the presence of uranium, which Tehran has failed to credibly answer.

In the May 2022 report, the IAEA noted that Iran stated in March 2022 that the location was used for the production of sodium sulphate. The IAEA stated that this explanation does not match the satellite imagery taken from the site and the results of the environmental samples that were collected during an August 2020 visit to the site. Furthermore, it does not explain the presence of the uranium particles. The IAEA reported that Iran offered the additional explanation of third-party sabotage to contaminate the area but provided no evidence to support that claim. In the report, the IAEA offers its assessment of Varamin, that it was an “undeclared pilot-scale facility for the processing and milling of uranium ore and conversion into uranium oxide” and possible UF4 and UF6 at laboratory scale from 1999-2003.

Location 4: Marivan

Informational available to the IAEA suggests that Iran intended to use nuclear materials at Marivan. The IAEA reported that safeguards relevant information suggests that Iran conducted “explosive experiments with protective shielding in preparation for the use of neutron detectors” at one of the areas under investigation at Marivan, previously referred to as Location 4 by the IAEA.

The IAEA requested access to the site in January 2020, which Tehran denied. Inspectors were later able to visit the location and take environmental samples as part of the August 2020 agreement between the agency and Iran. In January 2021, the IAEA requested clarification from Iran regarding the presence of processed uranium found at the site.

In August 2021, Iran provided the agency with some documentation about Marivan and said that one of the areas in question was built to support a mine managed by another IAEA member state until it was abandoned in 1994 and that the bunkers at the site were used for deactivating munitions. The IAEA assessed that some of this documentation was inconsistent with its evidence. As part of the process initiated by the March 2022 process, Iran informed the IAEA that it had never produced the type of material found at the site and that the presence might be accounted for by an act of third party sabotage to contaminate the site. Iran, however, provided no evidence for this claim. During the consultations, Iran also said that some of the photographs of the bunkers were fabricated. The IAEA said in its May 30 report that the presence of the uranium “is not clarified.”

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Implementation of the Joint Plan of Action at a Glance

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Fact Sheets & Briefs

January 2022

Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, (202) 463-8270 x102

On November 24, 2013, Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) reached an interim deal on Iran’s nuclear program. The agreement, or Joint Plan of Action, required Iran and the P5+1 countries to take specific steps while negotiators worked on a comprehensive deal.

The obligations under the interim deal remained in place until October 18, 2015. At that point, each side began implementing the obligations under the comprehensive deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was agreed to on July 14, 2015. For more information about the JCPOA, see The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action at a Glance.

Implementation of the interim agreement, the Joint Plan of Action, began on January 20, 2014 and was to last through July 20, 2014, although it was extended several times and additional commitments for Iran and the P5+1 were added.

During the announcement of the second extension on November 24, 2014, former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said both Iran and the P5+1 implemented their commitments from the Joint Plan of Action. In total, the obligations froze Iran’s nuclear program and rolled back the most proliferation-sensitive elements. In return, Iran received limited sanctions relief and access to frozen assets.

The full text of the Joint Plan of Action is available here. A summary of the key actions is listed below.

Iranian Actions	Status
By January 20, halt production of near-20% enriched uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) and commit to only enrich up to 5%.	Completed According to the January 20, 2014, IAEA report, Iran had halted enrichment to 20% UF6.
By January 20, disable the configuration of the centrifuge cascades Iran has been using to produce 20% enriched UF6.	Completed According to the January 20 IAEA report, Iran had ceased operating its interconnected centrifuges enriching to 20% UF6. The February 20, 2014, IAEA report said that Iran is now using the four cascades at Fordow to enrich uranium to 5%.
On January 20, continue conversion of half of its stockpile of near-20% uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) into uranium oxide powder as working stock for fabricating fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor.	Completed According to the July 20, 2014, IAEA report, Iran completed the process of converting half of its stockpile of 20% enriched UF6 gas (~104 kg) to uranium oxide powder.
On January 20, begin dilution of half of its stockpile of 20% UF6 to no more than 5% enriched UF6 and complete dilution by April 20.	Completed According to the April IAEA report, Iran completed the dilution of half of its stockpile of 20 percent-enriched uranium.
Continue only its safeguarded research and development practices, including its current enrichment research practices, which were not designated for accumulation of the enriched uranium.	Completed In the February 20 IAEA report, the agency verified that Iran was continuing its safeguarded research and development practices at Natanz and was not using the research to accumulate uranium as it tested advanced models.
By April 20, provide the IAEA with:
plans for nuclear facilities	Completed Iran submitted details on site selection for 16 nuclear power plants to the IAEA, its initial plans for 10 future enrichment sites, and a light water reactor.
descriptions of buildings located on nuclear sites	Completed
the scale of operations for each location	Completed
information on uranium mines and mills	Completed According to the May 23, 2014, IAEA report, Iran had visited the Gchine Mine, the Saghand Mine and the Ardakan Uranium production plant.
information on source material	Completed Iran provided the IAEA with information about source material on April 20, according to the May 23 IAEA report.
Submit an updated Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) for the reactor at Arak (IR-40).	Completed Iran submitted at updated DIQ on the reactor to the IAEA on February 12, according to the agency's Feb. 20 report.
Take steps to conclude a safeguards approach with the IAEA for the Arak reactor.	Completed The IAEA and Iran met on May 5 to discuss the revised safeguards approach. According to the June 20, 2014, IAEA report, Iran had reached an agreement with the agency on the safeguards approach.
Allow daily IAEA inspector access at Fordow and Nantanz, including scheduled and unannounced inspections and access to surveillance information on a daily basis.	Completed As of the February 20 IAEA report, the IAEA was able to install surveillance measures at Natanz and Fordow to facilitate daily monitoring and came to an agreement regarding the facilitation of daily access. (Prior to the Joint Plan of Action, the IAEA had accessed Fordow on a weekly basis, and Natanz on a biweekly basis.)
Allow the IAEA to conduct monthly inspections of the heavy water reactor at Arak and associated facilities.	Completed The IAEA was able to make its first monthly visit and access the heavy water reactor on Feb. 12, according to the agency's Feb. 20 IAEA report. (Prior inspections were conducted at the reactor once every three months, and other facilities at the site were not included.)
Provide information to allow the IAEA inspectors managed access to:
centrifuge assembly workshops	Completed The IAEA was able to visit the facility between February 3-7.
centrifuge rotor production	Completed The IAEA was able to visit the facility between February 3-7.
workshops and storage facilities	Completed The IAEA was able to visit the facility between February 3-7.
uranium mines and mills	Completed The IAEA had been able to access Iran's two uranium mines at Gchine and Saghand and the milling facility at Ardakan.
Provide figures that will allow the IAEA to verify that centrifuge production will be dedicated to the replacement of damaged machines.	Completed The IAEA had access to Iran's centrifuge workshops and facilities.
Cap the size of the 5% enriched UF6 stockpile.	Completed The November 24, 2014, IAEA report on implementation of the Joint Plan of Action noted that Iran's stockpile of UF6 gas was 7,400 kg, below January's level of 7,560 kg.
Iran Will Refrain From the Following Actions	Status
Refrain from installing a reconversion line to reconvert uranium oxide powder to 20% UF6.	Complied The January 20 IAEA report said that Iran does not have a reconversion line in place.
Refrain from reprocessing or constructing a facility capable of reprocessing materials.	Complied In a January 18 letter to the IAEA, Iran said it would not engage in reprocessing or construct a reprocessing facility over the six months of the deal. The January 20 IAEA report confirmed that no reprocessing was taking place at the Tehran Research Reactor or MIX facility.
Refrain from making any further advances of its activities at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. (This includes not installing new centrifuges and not feeding UF6 into the roughly half the centrifuges at Natanz that are installed but not yet enriching uranium.)	Complied The IAEA verified in the February 20 report that Iran did not made any further advances and no new centrifuges were enriching uranium.
Refrain from making any further advances of its activities at Fordow. (This includes not installing new centrifuges, not feeding UF6 into the three quarters at Fordow that are installed but not yet enriching uranium, and not interconnecting the cascades.)	Complied The IAEA verified that Iran did not make any further advances and no new centrifuges are enriching uranium.
Replacing existing centrifuges only with centrifuges of the same type.	Complied As of the February 20 IAEA report, the agency did not report any violation of this restriction, and surveillance has been set up to monitor any changes.
Refrain from commissioning the heavy water reactor at Arak.	Complied The February 20 IAEA report said that Iran had not conducted any activities to further the Arak reactor.
Refrain from transferring fuel or heavy water to the Arak reactor.	Complied The February 20 IAEA report said that Iran had not conducted any activities to further the Arak reactor.
Refrain from testing additional fuel or producing more fuel.	Complied The February 20 IAEA report said that Iran had not manufactured or tested any reactor fuel, and the number of fuel rods produced remains at 11.
Refrain from installing any additional reactor components at the Arak site.	Complied The February 20 IAEA report said that Iran had not conducted any activities to further advance the Arak reactor.
Limit centrifuge production to those needed to replace damaged machines.	Complied The IAEA has regular managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops.
Refrain from constructing any new locations for enrichment.	Complied In a January 18 letter to the IAEA Iran said it would not pursue any new uranium enrichment sites during the six months of the agreement.

P5+1 Actions	Status
Pause efforts to reduce Iran’s crude oil sales, allowing Iran’s current customers to purchase their current average amounts of crude oil, including the EU prohibition on providing insurance for vessels carrying Iranian oil.	Complied In a January 20, 2014, press release, the EU Council of Foreign Ministers announced the suspension of sanctions preventing the insurance of vessels. However, not enough time has passed to determine if Iran's current oil customers were importing at their current average amounts.
Enable the repatriation of $4.2 billion of Iranian revenue held abroad on the following schedule:
Feb. 1: $550 million	Completed** Iran received its first installment as scheduled on February 1. These funds were released from Japan.
March 1: $450 million (half of the dilution of the 20% stockpile of UF6 complete)	Completed** IAEA Director General Amano confirmed that half of the dilution was completed on time in his remarks to the IAEA Board of Governors on March 3.
March 7: $550 million	Completed**
April 10: $550 million	Completed**
April 15: $450 million (dilution of the entire stockpile of 20% UF6 complete)	Completed**
May 14: $550 million	Completed
June 17: $550 million	Completed
July 20: $550 million.	Completed
Suspend US sanctions on Iran’s petrochemical exports and associated services.*	Completed In a January 20 statement, the White House announced that the United States would begin suspending sanctions.
Suspend US sanctions on Iran's import and export of gold and precious metals as well as sanctions on associated services.*	Completed In a January 20 statement, the White House announced that the United States would begin suspending sanctions.
Suspend U.S. sanctions on Iran imports of goods and services for its automotive manufacturing sector.	Completed In a January 20 statement, the White House announced that the United States would begin suspending sanctions.
Suspend EU sanctions on Iran’s petrochemical exports and associated services.*	Completed In a January 20 press release, the EU Council of Foreign Ministers announced the suspension of sanctions.
Suspend EU sanctions on Iran's import and export of gold and precious metals as well as associated services.*	Completed In a January 20 press release, the EU Council of Foreign Ministers announced the suspension of sanctions.
License the supply of spare parts and services for safety of flight for Iranian civil aviation and associated services.*	Completed In a January 20 statement, White House Press announced that the United States would begin suspending sanctions. On April 4, Boeing confirmed that it received a license from the Treasury Department for exporting spare aircraft parts.
License safety related inspections and repairs in Iran for Iranian civil aviation sector as well as associated services.*	Completed In a January 20 statement, White House Press secretary said that the United States would begin suspending sanctions.
Establish a financial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade for Iran’s domestic needs using Iranian oil revenue held abroad: food and agricultural products medicine, medical devices, and medical expenses incurred abroad Iran's UN dues tuition payments to universities and colleges for Iranian students studying abroad.	Completed
Increase the EU authorization thresholds for transactions for non-sanctioned trade to an agreed amount.	Completed In a January 20 press release, the EU Council of Foreign Ministers increased by tenfold the thresholds for authorizing financial transfers.
P5+1 Will Refrain From the Following Actions	Status
Not pass new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions.	Complied There were no new UN Security Council resolutions sanctioning Iran.
Not pass new EU nuclear-related sanctions.	Complied On December 16, the EU Council of Foreign Ministers committed not to impose any further sanctions on Iran during the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action.
Not impose new U.S. nuclear-related sanctions.	Complied

Iranian Actions ( to be completed as part of the extension before Nov. 24, 2014)

Status

Convert 25 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium powder from oxide form to fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor

Completed

According to the IAEA's monthly progress report, Iran completed the conversion.

Convert the stockpile of uranium enriched to less than 2 percent (about 3 metric tons) to natural uranium

Completed

According to the November 2014 quarterly IAEA report, Iran completed blending down the tails.

P5+1 Actions ( to be completed as part of the extension before Nov. 24, 2014)

Status

Enable the repatriation of $2.8 billion dollars in frozen Iranian oil revenues held abroad

Completed

Iran received $2.8 billion in repatriated funds.

*Iranian Actions ( to be completed as part of the extension before June 30, 2015)*	Status
Convert 35 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium powder from oxide form to fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor	Completed
Expand IAEA access to centrifuge production facilities to double the current frequency and allow for no-notice or "snap" inspections	Complied
Limit research and development on advanced centrifuges that move the machines to the next level of development including: Iran cannot pursue semi-industrial-scale operation of the IR-2M, and without that Iran does not have the confidence to mass-produce this type of centrifuge, which would be necessary in any breakout scenario. Iran cannot feed the IR-5 with uranium gas, the next step in its development. Iran cannot pursue gas testing of the IR-6 on a cascade level, the next step in its development. Iran cannot install the IR-8 at the Natanz Pilot Plant, without which Iran cannot move beyond mechanical testing and into gas testing. (While most of this pre-dated the extension -- the extension helps plug the gaps and ensure that all models of Iran's advanced centrifuges cannot move to the next phase of testing.)	Complied The IAEA has regular access to the research and development area for advanced centrifuges at Natanz and has noted no violations as of December.
Forgo any other forms of enrichment, including laser enrichment.	Complied

*P5+1 Actions ( to be completed as part of the extension before June 30, 2015)*	Status
Enable the repatriation of $700 million per month in frozen Iranian oil revenues held abroad	Complied

*“Sanctions on Associated Services” means any service, such as insurance, transportation, or financial, subject to the underlying U.S. or EU sanctions applicable, insofar as each service is related to the underlying sanction and required to facilitate the desired transactions. These services could involve any non-designated Iranian entities.

**While the funds were released, there were reported difficulties in transferring portions of the funds to Iranian banks. It was unclear what portion of the funds remained to be transferred.

Strategic Arms Control and Policy

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Read more about Implementation of the Joint Plan of Action at a Glance

Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue, 2003-2013

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January 2022

Contact: Kelsey Davenport, Director of Nonproliferation Policy, (202) 463-8270 x102

Before the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, (JCPOA), there were several diplomatic proposals to address Iran’s nuclear program, several of which are discussed in detail below.

For a full account, see: Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran.

Tehran devised a number of these proposals between 2003 and 2005, some of which included provisions to initially limit operations at its key nuclear facilities and implement transparency measures for its nuclear activities.

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the EU3) also offered Iran several proposals to resolve the nuclear issue during negotiations with Iran in 2004 and 2005. China, Russia, and the United States joined the three European countries in 2006 to offer “P5+1” proposals to Iran.

Below is a list of key proposals from 2003-2013.

2003

According to Tim Guldimann, former Swiss ambassador to Tehran, Iran issued a proposal to the United States in May 2003 calling for negotiations on a variety of contentious issues between the two countries. The document listed a number of agenda items that the two countries would negotiate and proposed the creation of three parallel working groups to carry out negotiations on disarmament, regional security, and economic cooperation. Key among the agenda items were:

Relief of all U.S. sanctions on Iran
Cooperation to stabilize Iraq
Full transparency over Iran’s nuclear program, including the Additional Protocol
Cooperation against terrorist organizations, particularly the Mujahedin-e Khalq and al-Qaeda
Iran’s acceptance of the Arab League’s 2002 “land for peace” declaration on Israel/Palestine
Iran’s full access to peaceful nuclear technology, as well as chemical and bio-technology

The Bush administration dismissed the proposal in favor of placing additional pressure on Iran.

2005

Several months later, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom agreed to discuss with Iran a range of nuclear, security, and economic issues as long as Tehran suspended work on its uranium enrichment program and cooperated fully with an investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, that agreement unraveled the following year when Tehran continued work on uranium conversion, the precursor to enrichment. Iran then agreed with the EU3 in November 2004 to implement a more stringent suspension. Negotiations between the two sides began shortly afterward.

Iran presented four proposals during the course of these negotiations. In addition to Iran’s nuclear program, the proposals covered subjects such as Tehran’s support for terrorist organizations, regional security issues, and economic cooperation.

January 17, 2005

This Iranian proposal to the EU3/Iran Political and Security Working Group outlined commitments on both sides in general terms, including:

An Iranian commitment not to pursue weapons of mass destruction
A rejection of any attacks, threats of attack, or sabotage of Iran’s nuclear facilities
Cooperation on combating terrorism, including intensifying the exchange of information and the denial of safe havens
Regional security cooperation, including on Iraq and Afghanistan
Cooperation on strategic trade controls and the EU removal of restrictions on transfers of conventional arms and dual use goods to Iran

March 23, 2005

The Iranian proposal to the EU3/Iran steering committee in March provided greater detail into the “objective guarantees” Iran was willing to discuss regarding its nuclear program, including:

Iran’s adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol and continuous on-site inspections at key facilities
Limiting the expansion of Iran’s enrichment program and a policy declaration of no reprocessing
Immediately converting all enriched uranium to fuel rods
An EU declaration recognizing Iran as a major source of energy for Europe
Iran’s guaranteed access to advanced nuclear technology along with contracts for the construction of nuclear plants in Iran by the EU
Normalizing Iran’s status under G8 export controls

April 29, 2005

In April Iran’s proposal repeated some of the items in the March proposal, but focused more on short-term confidence-building measures than long term resolutions. Its key terms included:

Iran’s adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol
A policy declaration of no reprocessing by Iran
Continued enrichment suspension for six months
Establishment of joint task forces on counter-terrorism and export control
An EU declaration recognizing Iran as a major source of energy for Europe

July 18, 2005

Hassan Rouhani, then-Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, released a message to France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In his statement Rouhani proposes:

An agreement on initial limitations on uranium enrichment at Natanz
Negotiations for the full-scale operation of Natanz
Arrangements to import material for uranium conversion and the export of UF6
Negotiation of an “optimized” IAEA monitoring mechanism for Natanz

August 2005

The three European countries presented their own comprehensive proposal for a long-term agreement, outlining the following:

Arrangements for the assured supply of low enriched uranium for any light water reactors constructed in Iran
Establishing a buffer store of nuclear fuel located in a third country
A commitment by Iran not to pursue fuel cycle technologies, reviewable after 10 years
A legally binding commitment by Iran not to withdraw from the NPT and Iran’s adoption of the Additional Protocol
Arrangements for Iran to return spent nuclear fuel to supplier countries
EU recognition of Iran as a long-term source of fossil fuel energy
EU-Iran cooperation in a variety of political-security areas, including Iraq and Afghanistan, terrorism, and drug trafficking

Iran rejected that proposal days later, claiming that it did not recognize Iran’s right to enrichment. Tehran proceeded with uranium conversion, breaking the suspension agreement with the EU3 and ending negotiations.

October 2005

In order to support Iran’s talks with the EU, Russia proposed to Iran in October 2005 that Tehran share ownership of a uranium-enrichment plant located in Russia. Following months of discussions on that proposal, Iran ultimately rejected it in March 2006.

2006

June 2006

China, Russia, and the United States joined the three EU3 countries in June 2006 to offer another proposal for comprehensive negotiations with Iran. The proposal mirrored some of the previous offers for negotiations and included the following key points:

Iran’s suspension of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities
The establishment of a mechanism to review this moratorium
Iran’s resumption of the Additional Protocol
The provision of state-of-the-art light water reactors to Iran through joint projects, along with nuclear fuel guarantees and a 5-year buffer stock of fuel
Suspension of the discussion of Iran’s nuclear program in the UN Security Council
Cooperation on civil aviation, telecommunications, high-technology, and agriculture, and other areas, between the United States, EU, and Iran

August 2006

Tehran responded to this proposal in August 2006. It rejected the terms of the proposal due to its requirement that Iran suspend its enrichment-related activities, but noted that the proposal contained “useful foundations and capacities for comprehensive and long-term cooperation between the two sides.” It did not, however, identify what those useful foundations were.

2008

March 2008

In March 2008, the P5+1 agreed to “repackage” the June 2006 proposal in order to specify some of the benefits that they would offer Iran as part of a long-term agreement on its nuclear program and to better demonstrate the nature of those benefits to the Iranian public. This agreement to revise the 2006 proposal coincided with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1803, the third UN sanctions resolution on Iran.

Before that package was formally submitted to Iran, however, Tehran issued its own proposal to the six-country group. While the Iranian proposal also called for comprehensive negotiations leading to cooperation on nuclear energy, and political and economic concerns, it offered very few details regarding the steps Iran would take to resolve concerns related to its nuclear program. Some of its key provisions were:

“Establishing enrichment and nuclear fuel production consortiums in different parts of the world-including Iran”
Improved IAEA supervision “in different states”
Cooperation on nuclear safety and physical protection
Cooperation on export controls
Cooperation on regional security and global economic issues

June 2008

The P5+1 group presented their revised package during a June 2008 meeting in Tehran which included participants from five of the six countries, excluding the United States. During the meeting, the six-countries relayed an understanding that preliminary talks could begin under a six-week “freeze-for-freeze” period in which Iran would halt the expansion of its enrichment program while the six countries would agree not to pursue additional sanctions against Tehran. The proposal also entailed:

The 2006 package remains on the table
Consideration of nuclear energy R&D and treatment of Iran’s nuclear program as any other NPT non-nuclear-weapons state once confidence is restored
Technological and financial assistance for Iran’s nuclear energy program
Reaffirmation of the UN Charter obligation to refrain from the use and threat of use of force in a manner inconsistent with the Charter
Cooperation on Afghanistan, including drug-trafficking, refugee return, reconstruction, and border controls
Steps towards normalizing economic and trade relations, including support for WTO membership for Iran
Further details on the prospect for cooperation on agriculture, the environment and infrastructure, civil aviation, and social development and humanitarian issues

July 2008

Representatives of the six-country group, including the United States for the first time, followed up the June meeting with a meeting in July 2008 in Geneva. At the meeting, Iran issued a non-paper proposing a process for negotiations, highlighting that such discussions would be “based on the commonalities of the two packages” issued by Iran and the P5+1 group in May and June. Both the P5+1 and Iranian proposals called for political, economic, and security cooperation but the Iranian proposal did not address steps that Tehran would take in regard to its nuclear program. The Geneva discussions were inconclusive.

2009

April 2009

Following the election of U.S. President Barack Obama, who sought to abandon the previous U.S. policy requiring Iran to fulfill UN Security Council demands to suspend nuclear fuel cycle activities prior to negotiations, the P5+1 sought to renew their negotiations with Iran. They issued a statement in April 2009 in which the other five countries welcomed “the new direction of U.S. policy towards Iran,” formally inviting Iran to talks once again. Iran did not respond to that invitation until that September, when Tehran issued a revised proposal. Although that proposal repeated several of the provisions of the one Iran issued in 2008, it did not include a section on the nuclear issue. Instead, the proposal covered the following:

Cooperation to address terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, and piracy
UN and Security Council reform
The codification of rights for the use of space
Promoting a “rule-based” and “equitable” IAEA oversight function
Promoting NPT universality and WMD nonproliferation

June 2009

Taheran Research Reactor "Fuel Swap" Proposal

In June 2009, Iran informed the IAEA that it was seeking assistance to refuel its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), a U.S.-supplied 5 megawatt research reactor that produces medical isotopes. Following Iran’s entreaty, the United States proposed that, in return for a supply of 120 kilograms of fuel for the TRR, Iran ship out an equivalent amount of uranium enriched to 4%, totaling about 1,200 kilograms. The 1,200 kilograms accounted for roughly 80% of Iran’s LEU stockpile at that time, a percentage that diminished as Iran continued to produce LEU.

October 2009

At an initial meeting between the United States, France, Russia, Iran, and the IAEA on October 1, 2009, Iranian officials agreed “in principle” to the exchange.

Iran exports 1,200 kilograms of LEU in a single batch before the end of the 2009
Russia further enriches Iran’s LEU to about 20%, a process producing about 120 kilograms of 20%-enriched uranium for the TRR fuel rods
France manufactures the TRR fuel rods for delivery about one year after the conclusion of the agreement, prior to the depletion of the current TRR fuel supply
The United States works with the IAEA to improve safety and control implementation at the TRR

Following reservations expressed by Iran about the terms of the deal, the P5+1 indicated their readiness to take some steps to facilitate the arrangement:

A political statement of support by the six countries to guarantee that the TRR fuel would be delivered to Iran
Financing for the movement of LEU and fuel
An option for the IAEA to hold Iran’s LEU in escrow in a third country until the TRR fuel is delivered

In the months following the initial agreement of the TRR proposal October 1, Iran delayed giving the IAEA and the P5+1 a definitive response to the proposal, with many prominent Iranian politicians voicing their opposition to the arrangement, motivated at least in part by their opposition to President Ahmadinejad. Iranian officials publicly suggested alterations to the fuel swap proposal, including: staggering the export of Iran’s LEU over the course of a year or transporting 400 kilograms of LEU to Iran’s Kish Island to exchange for TRR fuel. These proposals, however, undermined or eliminated the confidence-building nature of the export of the bulk of Iran’s LEU. Tehran began to increase the enrichment level of some of its LEU to 20% in February 2010, ostensibly for TRR fuel.

2010

Brazil, Turkey, Iran Tehran Declaration

Brazil and Turkey carried out a diplomatic initiative in the spring of 2010 to broker the TRR fuel swap with Iran. In an April 20 letter to the leaders of the two countries, President Obama said Iran’s agreement to export 1,200 kilograms of LEU “would build confidence and reduce regional tensions by substantially reducing Iran’s LEU stockpile.” The initiative resulted in the May 17 Tehran Declaration agreed between Presidents Lula da Silva, Erdogan, and Ahmadinejad.

The three countries “recall the right of all State Parties, including the Islamic Republic of Iran, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy (as well as nuclear fuel cycle including enrichment activities)”
Iran transfers 1,200 kilograms of LEU to be held in escrow in Turkey within one month
Pending their approval of the Tehran Declaration, the IAEA, France, Russia, and the United States (the Vienna Group) would agree to provide 120 kilograms of 20%-enriched uranium fuel to Iran within one year
If the terms were not filled by the Vienna Group, Turkey would transfer the LEU back to Iran (which maintains legal possession of the material)

France, Russia, and the United States rejected the Tehran Declaration on a number of grounds identified in a June 9 letter to IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano. The key critique was that the declaration did not address Iran’s production of 20%-enriched uranium and Iran’s accumulation of a larger amount of LEU.

Russian Step-by-Step Proposal

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov first publicly proposed a “road map” to implement the P5+1’s proposed incentives package July 12, 2011 during a speech in Washington. Its key elements were described by former Iranian deputy nuclear negotiator Hossein Mousavian as follows.

Step 1

Iran limits enrichment to Natanz, does not install any additional centrifuges, and halts the production of advanced centrifuges.
The P5+1 suspends some UN sanctions, including financial sanctions and ship inspections.

Step 2

Iran agrees to provide early design information to the IAEA under Code 3.1, caps its enrichment level at 5%, and allows greater IAEA monitoring over its centrifuges.
The P5+1 suspends most UN sanctions and gradually lifts unilateral sanctions.

Step 3

Iran implements the IAEA Additional Protocol.
The P5+1 suspends all UN sanctions in a phased manner.

Step 4

Iran suspends all enrichment-related activities for 3 months.
The P5+1 lifts all sanctions and begins to implement the group’s proposed incentives.

Although U.S. officials said that Washington would study the proposal, and held meetings with Moscow regarding the plan, and Iran publicly welcomed the proposal, it ultimately did not gain traction.

2012

In April 2012, the P5+1 and Iran renewed diplomatic negotiations in Istanbul. Two more rounds of talks were held May 23-24 in Baghdad, and June 18-19 in Moscow. The negotiators decided in Istanbul to adopt a step-by-step process with reciprocal actions, in order to create momentum towards a long-term solution. Two proposals were discussed in the negotiations, one by the P5+1 and another from the Iranians. Both sides agreed to expert-level talks, which took place in Istanbul on July 3, to discuss the technical aspects of each proposal.

Iranian 5 Step Proposal

Step 1 - Guidelines

Iran emphasizes commitments under the NPT and its opposition to nuclear weapons based on the Supreme Leader's fatwa.
P5+1 recognizes and openly announces Iran’s nuclear rights, particularly its enrichment activities, based on NPT Article IV.

Step 2 - Transparency Measures

Iran continues broad cooperation with IAEA and will transparently cooperate with the IAEA on “possible military dimensions.”
P5+1 will end unilateral and multilateral sanctions against Iran outside of the UNSC resolutions.

Step 3 - Confidence Building Steps

Beyond continuous IAEA monitoring of enrichment activities for Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) fuel, Iran will cooperate with P5+1 to provide enriched fuel needed for TRR.
P5+1 will terminate the UN sanctions and remove Iran’s nuclear file from UNSC agenda.

Step 4 - Strengthening Cooperation on Mutual Interests

Parties will start and boost cooperation on: designing and building nuclear power plants and research reactors (Iran’s priorities);
And light water research reactors, nuclear safety and security, nuclear fusion (P5+1 priorities).

Step 5 - Strengthening Joint Cooperation

Parties will start cooperating on: regional issues, especially Syria and Bahrain (Iran’s priorities);
And combating piracy and countering narcotics activities (P5+1 priorities).

P5+1 Proposal

Iranian actions:

Iran halts all 20 percent enrichment activities.
Iran transfers all 20 percent enriched uranium to a third country under IAEA custody.
Iran shuts down the Fordow facility.

P5+1 Actions:

P5+1 will provide fuel assemblies for the Tehran Research Reactor.
P5+1 will support IAEA technical cooperation to modernize and maintain the safety of the TRR.
P5+1 could review the IAEA technical cooperation projects and recommend to the IAEA Board restarting some of them.
P5+1 has put together a detailed package to provide medical isotopes for cancer patients in Iran.
The United States is prepared to permit safety-related inspection and repair in Iran for Iranian commercial aircraft and provide spare parts.
The P5+1 will cooperate in acquiring a light water research reactor to produce medical isotopes.

2013

April 2013

Iran and the P5+1 held talks in Almaty, Kazakhstan April 5-6. The two sides had resumed negotiations in Almaty in February 2013 after a nine-month interval. Each side brought a proposal to the April talks, but failed to reach consensus on a way forward and no further meetings were scheduled.

Iran’s proposal on day 1 of the April Almaty talks was similar to the five-step proposal Tehran brought to the negotiations in 2012. However, after the P5+1 expressed dissatisfaction with this proposal, which it viewed as a step backward, Iran revised its proposal for the second day of talks.

Iranian Proposal

Iranian Actions

Iran freezes centrifuge installation at Fordow.
Iran continues talks with the IAEA.
Iran continues converting 20 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride to uranium oxide.
Iran suspends enrichment of uranium to 20 percent.

P5+1 Actions

The P5+1 lifts all sanctions against Iran.
The P5+1 recognizes Iran's nuclear rights.

The P5+1 proposal was based on the proposal from the 2012 negotiations. The 2013 proposal, however, left open the possibility of resuming activities at Fordow, allowed Iran to keep part of its stockpile or uranium enriched to 20 percent, and provided some sanctions relief.

P5+1 Proposal

Iranian actions:

Iran halts all 20 percent enrichment activities.
Iran transfers part of its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium to a third country under IAEA custody.
Iran suspends all operations at the Fordow facility.
Iran provides the IAEA with information to address the outstanding allegations of possible military activities, commits to the additional protocol and the modified version of the subsidiary arrangement to Iran’s safeguards agreement, known as Code 3.1.

P5+1 Actions:

P5+1 will provide fuel assemblies for the Tehran Research Reactor.
P5+1 will support IAEA technical cooperation to modernize and maintain the safety of the TRR.
P5+1 could review the IAEA technical cooperation projects and recommend to the IAEA Board restarting some of them.
P5+1 has put together a detailed package to provide medical isotopes for cancer patients in Iran.
The United States is prepared to permit safety-related inspection and repair in Iran for Iranian commercial aircraft and provide spare parts.
The P5+1 will cooperate in acquiring a light water research reactor to produce medical isotopes.
The P5+1 will provide sanctions relief on sales of precious metals and petrochemicals.
The P5+1 will not impose any new proliferation related sanctions on Iran.

October 2013

Negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 resumed in Geneva on October 15-16. Iran was represented by its new negotiating team, headed by Foreign Minister Javad Zarif.

Iran presented a new proposal during the talks, which outlined the broad framework for a comprehensive end-state agreement and specific steps for each side to take in a first-phase agreement. On November 24, Foreign Minister Zarif and Catherine Ashton, head of the P5+1 negotiating team, signed the proposal, known as the Joint Plan of Action. For more information, see: Implementation of the Joint Plan of Action at a Glance. The Joint Plan of Action was in place from January 20, 2014 until it was replaced by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, (JCPOA), known colloquially as the Iran nuclear deal. For more information, see The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at a Glance.

Nuclear/Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation

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Read more about Official Proposals on the Iranian Nuclear Issue, 2003-2013

Editorials Supporting an Iran Nuclear Deal, January - September 2015

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A wide-range of newspaper editorials from across the country have noted the challenges facing the nuclear negotiations between the United States, its allies, and Iran over Iran’s nuclear program.

The P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany) and Iran have agreed on a framework for a comprehensive nuclear agreement that will ensure Iran’s nuclear program remains exclusively peaceful.

A wide-range of newspaper editorials from across the country have noted the challenges facing the negotiations, some of which have been dealt with and some of which remain—and the vast majority have expressed support for the emerging agreement. Below is a selection of recent editorials on the issue.

America’s Role: U.S. Leadership is Maintained With the Iran Deal—“All in all, senators who worked to keep the Iran deal on track acted clearly in America’s interests.”—Pittsburg Post-Gazette [9/13/2015]

An Iran Agreement Worth Testing—“This agreement is a diplomatic advance worth testing. And if it fails as critics predict? A supportive United States will be in a much stronger position to lead the response.”—Akron Beacon Journal [9/11/2015]

Iran Deal is a Victory for Effective Global Diplomacy—"If the deal had been blocked in Congress, the sanctions regime likely would have unraveled, and Iran would have continued to be months, not years, from being able to develop a nuclear weapon."—Star Tribune [9/10/2015]

Iran Deal Warrants Approval—"Opponents claim they don't want war. Instead, they say, a rejection by Congress would force everyone back to the negotiating table for a "better deal." Let's get real. That simply won’t happen. America's negotiating partners — Britain, China, France, Germany and Russia — have warned that they won't return to the talks. And why would they, when Congress could simply reject any new deal all over again?"—USA Today [9/09/2015]

Peace Has a Chance With Iran Nuclear Deal—"What opponents have failed to do is consider what would happen if they did succeed in blocking the deal. If the deal fell apart now, the international sanctions regime — painstakingly put in place over years — would collapse as it became clear that the United States was not a serious negotiator."—St. Louis Post-Dispatch [9/09/2015]

A Senseless Delay on the Iran Deal—"The debate has been vitriolic and raw, with opponents waging a multimillion-dollar campaign that relied heavily on distortions and made supporters of the strong and worthy deal out to be anti-Israel or worse."—The New York Times [9/09/2015]

A Cautious ‘Yes’ on the Iran Deal—“It’s not a perfect deal by any means, but it’s better than any alternative that opponents have been able to cite. Congress should support it.“—Montgomery News [9/08/2015]

Sen. Heitkamp Makes Right Call on Iran Accord—“Opponents of the deal have offered no credible alternative (war?). Heitkamp said her decision ‘is about seeking diplomacy rather than conflict.’ She’s got it right.”—The Forum of Fargo-Moorhead [9/06/2015]

Good News on Iran Deal—"Even if President Obama hasn’t tended well to congressional egos, he’s certainly due credit for engineering a political victory on the Iran treaty that’s good for the country. He has ensured the affirmation of a multi-nation nuclear deal with Iran that will prevent that nation from developing a nuclear weapon for years to come."—The News & Observer [9/04/2015]

Deal Assured: The Iran Accord is the Best Option for the Future—"Although squashing for the time being Iran’s nascent nuclear weapons ambitions was the immediate objective of the accord, it and Iran’s resulting contact with other countries should also open up opportunities for that nation to rejoin a world that it left to a great degree in 1979 when the revolution took place. One result could be Iran’s playing a more positive role in the Middle East. All in all, this was the right outcome."—Pittsburgh Post-Gazette [9/04/2015]

Let's Get on With the Iran Nuclear Deal—"But something else has become clear in the weeks of debate about whether Congress should approve this deal. There is not an alternative that would better protect U.S. interests. Rejection of the deal by Congress would likely isolate the U.S. and carry significant risks for this nation's security."—Chicago Tribune [9/03/2015]

Don't Bunker-Bust the Nuclear Deal With Iran—"The international nuclear deal achieved with Iran avoids Plan W — a future declaration of war by the United States in response to an Iran that might be developing nuclear weapons."—The Montclair Times [9/03/2015]

Good Luck, Mr. Biden, Selling Nuke Deal—"It's also worth noting that a majority of American Jews support the deal, 49 percent to 31 percent, according to a poll by the Los Angeles Jewish Journal. We support the deal, too, just as we have always supported Israel's right to defend its people. We know Israel has the most to lose if Iran develops nuclear capability. But we strongly believe this deal will make it more difficult for Iran to achieve that goal."—The Sun Sentinel [9/02/2015]

Casey Right on Iran Deal—"Iran knows how to make a nuclear weapon and there is no scenario where it will lose that knowledge. Mr. Casey’s exhaustive analysis has led him to the correct conclusion: The agreement is the best course available to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions."—Scranton Times-Tribune [9/02/2015]

Follow Merkley's Lead—"Wyden should join Merkley in announcing support for the deal and provide the Obama administration with what could prove the final vote it needs to protect the pact in Congress."—The Register Guard [9/01/2015]

Susan Collins Should Choose the Responsible Path on Iran—"A headline in The Hill newspaper last week called Collins 'Obama’s last hope for GOP support on Iran.' Collins’ vote might not determine the deal’s fate in either direction — President Barack Obama likely has enough support to veto a vote of disapproval and have his veto sustained — but the Maine senator has the chance to send a powerful message when everybody’s listening. That message should be that the deal negotiated with Iran, while not perfect, is the most responsible course of action available both in terms of containing the nuclear capabilities of a state sponsor of terrorism and preserving the United States’ position of leadership in the world."—Bangor Daily News [8/31/2015]

Weighing the Iran Nuclear Deal: Far From Perfect, but the Alternatives are Worse—"We urge members of Congress to vote against the resolution and, if it passes anyway, to support President Obama when he vetoes it, as he almost certainly would do. After that, Congress should press the administration to make good on its promises to counter Iran's dangerous meddling in the affairs of its neighbors and to respond decisively if Iran is found to have cheated on this agreement."—The Los Angeles Times [8/30/2015]

A Cautious "Yes" on the Iran Nuclear Deal—"It's not a perfect deal by any means, but it's better than any alternative that opponents have been able to cite. Congress should support it."—The Denver Post [8/29/2015]

Casey Should Support Deal—"The agreement has been endorsed by leading U.S. nuclear scientists, retired military leaders, several former U.S. ambassadors to Israel, Catholic bishops, many Christian leaders, a majority of American Jews and — despite Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s bellicose opposition — much of the Israeli security establishment. Mr. Casey should join that group in supporting the agreement."—Scranton Times Tribune [8/25/2015]

Don't Toss Aside Iran Deal Lightly—"Reaching an agreement with Iran — not to mention Russia and China — was no small achievement, and the deal should not be lightly tossed aside."—Norwich Bulletin [08/24/2015]

Menendez Opposition to Iran Pact Risks War—"Menendez is no hawk. But he has his blinds spots. He's unreasonable on Cuba, opposing a détente even after a half century of futile sanctions. Derailing the Iran deal could have far more deadly consequences. Our fervent hope is that Sen. Cory Booker does not make a historic mistake by following his lead. Because Obama is right -- rejecting this agreement could put the United States and Iran on a path towards war."—New Jersey Star-Ledger [8/20/2015]

South Florida's Congressional Delegation Should Back Iran Deal—"But sensitive or not, a critical choice is coming up, and the votes of South Florida's delegation could very well affect the result. Elected officials must vote their consciences, but unless they can offer what President Obama calls a "plausible" alternative — and no, we haven't heard one — we urge the undecided members of our delegation to support the deal."—Sun Sentinel [8/18/2015]

The Case for the Iran Deal—“The deal in hand may not be perfect — what agreement ever is? — but it's far better than the alternatives. Those who think we can simply sit back and wait for Iran to come up with a better offer are dreaming.”—The Baltimore Sun [8/12/2015]

Voices of Expertise and Reason for the Iran Deal—“Hard bargaining produced the agreement. Now the deal should be tested, leading scientists and engineers making a persuasive case that it is well worth trying.”—Akron Beacon Journal [8/10/2015]

As Obama Promotes Iran Deal, Hiroshima Echos Still—"The world has to remember and learn and choose a path that might lead to a diplomatic solution in Iran -- and not the destructive alternative."—Newsday [8/5/2015]

Obama Takes on Opponents of the Iran Deal—"President Obama on Wednesday made a powerful case for the strong and effective nuclear agreement with Iran."—The New York Times [8/5/2015]

Iran Deal Critics Sell A Fantasy: Our View—"But those who insist there’s a better deal to be had, if only Congress rejects this one, are gambling that an international coalition, which joined the U.S. to place tough economic sanctions on Iran, can be reassembled. The odds of that happening are about the same as winning the lottery. As President Obama put it in his speech Wednesday, 'Those who say we can just walk away from this deal and maintain sanctions are selling a fantasy.' The fact is, the deal on the table took a decade of painstaking work."—USA Today [8/5/2015]

Republican Hypocrisy on Iran—“The exaggerations and half-truths that some Republicans are using to derail President Obama‘s important and necessary nuclear deal with Iran are beyond ugly.”—The New York Times [8/1/2015]

Iran Nuclear Deal is Better Than Status Quo—“Does the deal improve our ability to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon as compared to the status quo? Clearly it does. Unless critics can offer something better — something that is acceptable to the other nations participating in the imposition of sanctions — they should embrace the agreement as being beneficial, if not perfect.”—Decatur Daily [7/30/2015]

Heated Rhetoric on Iran Deal Does Nothing but Enrich the Few—“There are scads of money to be made anytime the United States wages war on another nation. If Iran is allowed to develop a nuclear bomb, there is no question that Israel will find a way to strike and that action could lead to a conflagration that makes the current upheavals in the Middle East seem petty by comparison. Are we ready to step back into that fray? Or are we willing to let this deal spin out? We choose the latter.”—Bennington Banner[7/29/2015]

Rigorously Enforce the Iran Nuclear Deal—“If Congress kills the deal or significantly alters its terms, America would be blamed for the accord's failure and draw the ire of nations that joined the United States in hammering out an exhaustive pact only to see it crumble. The strong sanctions alliance would unravel and Iran would revive its bomb effort — and Washington's prestige and ability to marshal a global response to Tehran's renewed weapons push would be diminished."—Defence News [7/20/15]

Iran Deal a Gamble, but No Deal Would Be Worse—“Without an agreement, however, Iran already is pursuing its aggression and terror. It is acting outside the sphere of responsible states. This agreement creates a scenario in which that fundamentalist dynamic might change. Is it guaranteed? Not at all. But none of the doubters have offered a better idea. This is what we've got.”—El Paso Times [7/20/15]

The Nuclear Deal With Iran is Better Than the Alternatives—War or No Deal at All—“A country of Iran’s size and sophistication will get a bomb if it really wants one. Nothing can change that. But this pact offers the chance of holding Iran back and shifting its course. The world should embrace it, cautiously.”—The Economist [7/18/15]

Negotiations Produced Nuclear Agreement, Not Iranageddon—“Sanctions brought Iran to the table. An agreement required accepting that the perfect is not possible. Now, Congress should read the agreement, debate the issues involved seriously, and make a final decision in the real world.”—Idaho Mountain Express [7/17/15]

Iran Nuclear Deal is a Path Away From War—“The pact with Iran announced Tuesday is about diminishing the chances of the United States going to war to stop Iran from deploying a nuclear weapon. To that end, the U.S. and its negotiating partners forged a sound deal. President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry should be hailed for a historic achievement."—Savannah Morning News [7/17/15]

Utah Politicians Attack Iran Deal With No Alternative—“If Iran cheats, the very unpleasant question of whether to attack that nation's nuclear facilities will still be before us. But even if the bombers do fly — now or 10 years from now — that would be no guarantee of a nuclear-free Iran. So the pact is well worth trying, if only because it stands to at least delay the threat of another costly and almost certainly pointless war in the Middle East.”—The Salt Lake Tribune [7/17/15]

Agreement Should be Given a Chance to Prevent Iran from Building Nuclear Weapons—“Failure to craft an agreement all but guarantees that Iran will continue to seek nuclear weapons, perhaps igniting a war as the United States and Israel make good on pledges to prevent that nation from achieving nuclear capability. Only two paths are available, neither of them guaranteed to work: military or diplomatic. The Obama administration and other countries involved in the negotiations have chosen diplomacy. It was the right decision – really, the only decision – even given Iran’s behavior.”—The Buffalo News [7/17/15]

Iran Deal a Lesson in the Value of Diplomacy—“Yet even so, here is a profound piece of evidence in favour of talking, of being willing to extend a hand, as US President Barack Obama once put it, if another country was "willing to unclench their fist". It tells us that violent enmities can be improved, and that common interests can be found. It tells us that nothing is pre-ordained – not the antagonisms we presume will last forever, or the conflicts that seem to replay themselves over and over.”—The Dominion Post [7/17/15]

Nukes Deal a Triumph for Iran and US—“The deal agreed this week by Iran and the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany is, therefore, a triumph of perseverance and diplomacy. In one swoop, the prospect of Tehran developing nuclear weaponry has been largely eliminated and the chance of it playing a more constructive role in world, and especially Middle Eastern, affairs has been much enhanced.”—The New Zealand Herald [7/17/15]

Diplomacy, Not War, Goal of Iran Nuclear Deal—“War is the ultimate failure of diplomacy, British politician Tony Benn once said. Right now, diplomacy holds the greatest promise of success.”—Detroit Free Press [7/16/15]

Enough With Netanyahu's Iran Deal Hysteria—“Netanyahu’s pretention to teach the world history has no basis. His previous assessments regarding the materialization of the Iranian threat have proved false. Only five years ago, he objected to the same sanctions whose removal today he calls “a historic mistake.” Had he been given his wish at the time and had Iran’s nuclear facilities been bombed, either by Israel or the United States, the reactors would have been rehabilitated by now and Iran would be closer than ever to obtaining nuclear weapons.”—Haaretz [7/16/15]

Looking at Iran Nuclear Deal—“Perhaps the most important thing to keep in mind is that without a deal, Iran will be free to develop its nuclear program without any restrictions. Iran has everything it needs, including skilled scientists. Informed guesses range from months to years on how quickly Iran could create a nuclear weapon.”—Journal Star [7/16/15]

Iran Deal: Congress Should Think and Listen, Then Maybe Even Read the Agreement—“Republicans understandably oppose the president on many fronts, which reflects honest philosophical differences, as well as party politics. But Obama’s support for something does not automatically constitute a logical reason to endorse its opposite. The Iran agreement is supposed to help keep nukes out of the hands of crazies. Denouncing it without actually knowing what is in it or hearing from military and foreign-policy experts about how it might work is irresponsible and dangerous.”—The Durango Herald [7/16/15]

Diplomacy Creates Hope of a Responsible Iran—“Mr Obama's Republican rivals insist they will tear up the agreement in given the chance. But what is the alternative to a deal? The Herald believes there isn't a viable one. Engagement at least offers some optimism, where before there was none.”—The Sydney Morning Herald [7/16/15]

Iran Deal: the World Becomes a Safer Place— “The agreement, signed after 20 months of negotiations, offers real hope on at least two fronts. First, there are verifiable measures to contain and reduce the threat of Iran's nuclear capabilities for more than a decade. Under the terms of the agreement, Iran will dismantle much of its nuclear infrastructure. The country's capacity to enrich uranium will be be reduced by two-thirds, while its stockpile of enriched uranium will be reduced by 96 per cent. UN inspectors will be able to enter sites where they suspect any undeclared nuclear activity may be occurring. The impact of a successful containment of Iran's nuclear threat in a volatile Middle East cannot be overstated.”—The Age [7/16/15]

Few Seem Happy With U.S.-Iran Nuclear Deal — and Rightfully So—“Yes, it’s a terrible deal, but breaking off negotiations and letting Iran run wild would be even more terrible. It would also likely lead to war, which is the most terrible alternative imaginable. With that perspective, this deal can be viewed as the least-worst of a number of very bad options.”—Desert News [7/16/15]

A Deal With Iran: The Accord Promises a Decade of Containment—“Is the agreement perfect? Certainly not, but it is far better than allowing Iran to fester in dangerous isolation.”—Pittsburgh Post Gazette [7/15/15]

Despite GOP, Israeli Critics, the Iran Deal is a Good One—“But the truth is, this is a good deal. It is not perfect, and it is time-limited (Iran will not be able to build beyond a limit on enriched uranium for 10 years) but it is preferable to war, which seems to be the Republican alternative.”—The News & Observer [7/15/15]

Congress Should Support Deal With Iran—“The Iran agreement helps America's national security, protects Israel and contains Iran's nuclear ambitions. It is a compromise, but that is not a criticism. Nothing except a compromise was possible.”—Sun Sentinel [7/15/15]

Better to See Iran Back Away From Nuclear Weapons—“The president made a choice, one of those difficult calls that arrive in the White House. Worth adding is that he is not alone. Germany, France and Britain joined in the agreement, along with Russia and China. All concluded the greater danger resided in Iran becoming a nuclear power. To their credit, the partners (for this endeavor [sic]) gained a deal that puts clear and formidable obstacles in the path of Iran.”—Akron Beacon Journal [7/15/15]

Iran Deal is Better Than No Deal at All—“After two years of grueling negotiations, the Obama administration has finally pulled off a historic deal with Iran that resolves — at least for the time being — one of the most pressing foreign policy challenges facing the world: concerns that Iran could be building a nuclear bomb.”—The Boston Globe [7/15/15]

Examine Iran Deal Carefully Before Deciding—“So let's not rush to judgment. Before we allow cable news mavens of whatever stripe tell us what to think, let's spend time investigating and having an honest discussion with the goal of giving our government guidance on how to proceed.”—Contra Costa Times [7/15/15]

Outcomes Uncertain on Iran Deal, Political Future—“The historic agreement announced by the United States and its partners with Iran on Tuesday offers the welcome prospect that, for the next 15 years, the Islamic republic will be restrained from producing a nuclear weapon.”—Santa Cruz Sentinel [7/15/15]

Iran Nuclear Agreement Imperfect but Realistic—“Critics have offered no alternative other than a Middle East nuclear arms race among Iran and its rival Sunni states and Israel, and the prospect of a massive regional war. The agreement is realistic, more akin to President Richard Nixon’s outreach to China more than 40 years ago than to appeasement. China remains, in many ways, an adversary. But it is part of the global community and less dangerous than it might have been in isolation. The same prospect now arises relative to Iran.”—PA Citizen Voice [7/15/15]

A Historic Accord on Iran’s Nuclear Program—“Yes, this agreement should be closely vetted. But until opponents come up with a realistic strategy, it is the best option available.”—The Fresno Bee [7/15/15]

Question but Give Fair Hearing to Iran Pact—“Reaching agreement to freeze Iran’s march toward nuclear capability without resorting to war is a credit to the Obama administration’s persistence.”—Miami Herald [7/15/15]

Diplomacy Over War—“[T]he Obama administration has won a victory that prevents another bloodbath. The treaty negotiated by Secretary of State John Kerry will let international inspectors verify that Iran’s nuclear power program is doing nothing that might put an atomic bomb into the hands of suicidal terrorists, or governments.”—Charleston Gazette [7/15/15]

The Iran Deal Cuts the Risk of Another Mideast War—“But critics of the deal tend to ignore two hard realities. One is that Iran is well along on the path to building nuclear weapons, and will surely acquire them if this agreement is rejected. Even if sanctions are kept in place, a nuclear Iran would be far more dangerous.”—The Star-Ledger [7/15/15]

Proponents Need to Sell Iran Nuclear Agreement—“With the next step in the process soon to begin – congressional review of the pact – there'll be plenty of time for questions, but as a start, one should trump all others: Is an imperfect agreement better than no pact at all? That question is at least based in reality. It judges this deal against an actual alternative, not as opposed to some imagined perfect pact.”—The Republican [7/15/15]

The Nuclear Deal With Iran—“To evaluate the agreement, let's keep in mind that the alternatives are not many and that there aren't more favorable [sic] ones if the goal is to control Iran's nuclear ambitions.”—Los Angeles Opinion [7/15/15]

Iran Deal Best One Available—“But anyone who thought that Iran was going to abandon its nuclear capability was unrealistic. This agreement commits Iran to reducing its potential nuclear material stockpile by 98 percent and diminishing its capacity to produce that fuel by about two-thirds, and to allow independent inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The provisions increase the period that it would take to produce a weapon from about three months to about a year.” The Times-Tribune [7/15/15]

Iran Nuclear Deal Needs Careful Study, Not a Political Pie Fight—“Still, an agreement with a reasonable shot at success is worth trying because the alternative is another war, and that should be a last resort.”—San Jose Mercury News [7/15/15]

Is the Iran Deal Good Enough?—“Our preliminary assessment is that, if its terms are strictly enforced, the deal is likely to put nuclear weapons beyond Iran's reach for a decade or more, a significant achievement and probably the best outcome available.”—Los Angeles Times [7/15/15]

For Iran Nuclear Deal, Implementation Will Be Key—“Which is scarier: An unconstrained Iran that already has enough fissile material to build ten to 12 nuclear bombs within two to three months? Or an Iran that's agreed to give up all of its highly-enriched uranium, all of its plutonium and key elements of the technology for achieving a bomb, while accepting intrusive and far-reaching international safeguards and inspections?”—Cleveland Plain Dealer [7/15/15]

Global Effort Needed to Prevent Iran Nuclear Deal From Fizzling Out—“With Iran agreeing to shrink the program, the nightmare of Iran going nuclear has receded. And with the lifting of sanctions by Europe and the United States, Iran will emerge from its isolation that began with the 1979 Iranian Revolution and start rejoining the international community. The possibility of the United States and Iran working together to bring stability to the Middle East has become more real.”—The Asahi Shimbun [7/15/15]

An Historic Deal to Curb Iranian Nuclear Ambitions—“The long-awaited Iranian nuclear deal finalized on Tuesday appears to be the very best — and most certainly the only realistic — shot at preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.”—Chicago Sun-Times [7/14/15]

The Importance of Iran Deal—“If the deal stops "the spread of nuclear weapons in this region," as Obama insisted Tuesday, it will be a magnificent achievement.”—The Denver Post [7/14/15]

Good Faith Needed on Iran Deal—“Given this, Tuesday’s announcement that a U.S.-led effort to strike a deal limiting Iran’s nuclear ambitions is welcome news if — and it’s a big if — all parties can stick to the terms of the accord. Count as a positive anything that puts off full-scale war and offers at least a chance of a more peaceful world.”—The Anniston Star [7/14/15]

An Iran Nuclear Deal That Reduces the Chance of War—“The final deal with Iran announced by the United States and other major world powers does what no amount of political posturing and vague threats of military action had managed to do before. It puts strong, verifiable limits on Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon for at least the next 10 to 15 years and is potentially one of the most consequential accords in recent diplomatic history, with the ability not just to keep Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon but also to reshape Middle East politics.”—The New York Times [7/14/15]

Iran Nuclear Deal Appears Promising—“A seriously flawed agreement is worse than no agreement. But the initial overview of this deal is positive for the nation and for the world. As Congress wades into the details, it should measure them against the present and the possible — not against the perfect.”—Tampa Bay Times [7/14/15]

Is Iran Nuclear Deal Better Than no Deal? Yes: Our View—“So what has been won by these arduous negotiations? First, an option other than war to thwart Iran's nuclear ambitions, one that positions the U.S. as a leader in making the world a safer place with a stroke of a pen rather than at the tip of a sword.”—USA Today [7/14/15]

The Guardian View on the Iran Nuclear Deal: a Triumph of Diplomacy—“Instead of politicians opting for military solutions, this has been a triumph for diplomats and pragmatists, working hour after hour on the detail of a deal that secures a peaceful compromise – and which represents a heartening success in the global quest to halt nuclear proliferation.”—The Guardian [7/14/15]

Pushing Back Iran’s Nuclear Threat—“They may want to nudge back the hands of the Doomsday Clock. U.S. President Barack Obama and other world leaders have managed to rein in Iran’s worrisome nuclear program, granting the Middle East a reprieve from the spectre of war.”—The Star [7/14/15]

Bargaining With Tehran—“Republicans are right that we can't trust Iran, and we shouldn't. That's why the U.S. is insisting on a robust inspection and monitoring regime that can respond promptly to evidence of Iranian cheating.”—The Baltimore Sun [7/14/15]

Give the Iran Nuclear Agreement a Chance—“The nuclear agreement signed Tuesday between Iran and the six world powers is an incredible diplomatic achievement and a historic milestone in the West’s relations with Iran since that country’s 1979 Islamic Revolution.”—Haaretz [7/14/15]

Iran Nuclear Deal is a Path Away From War—“But if Congress succeeded in clearing the high bar needed to reject the pact, our nation would be left with only one viable option for deterring a nuclear Iran. That option is war. And we know where that leads. The pact announced Tuesday is a path away from conflagration.”—The Kansas City Star [7/14/15]

Congress Must Fully Vet Iran Deal—“On Tuesday, the U.S., its international colleagues and Iran reached an agreement that purports to bar Iran from developing nuclear weaponry. Sanctions against Iran will be lifted in return for Iranian promises to be nice. Congress will have an opportunity to assess the agreement. It would be presumptuous to pass immediate judgment when Congress will devote two months to the debate.” Richmond Times-Dispatch [7/14/15]

Give Iran Deal a Chance to Succeed—“This deal wasn’t slapped together with little thought given to the consequences — it was reached after two years of negotiations involving six world world powers with vastly disparate views on Iran. That’s not appeasement, it’s pragmatism.”—The Ottawa Citizen [7/14/15]

A Historic Accord on Iran’s Nuclear Program—“When you listen to the critics, ask yourself: Are they offering any kind of plausible alternative? Without this pact, we’re left with what? More economic sanctions that hurt the civilian population as much as Iran’s leaders? A military strike that may or may not completely wipe out Iran’s nuclear capability, but could spark a wider war in the Middle East, where there is more than enough bloodshed already?”—The Sacramento Bee[7/14/15]

Deeper Opportunities in Iran Nuclear Pact—“Its nuclear program was just one of many strategic aims to enable Iran to lead the Islamic world’s 1.6 billion believers, or 23 percent of the world’s population. Iran (the country) claimed geopolitical reasons for needing to acquire advanced nuclear know-how. But perhaps Iran (the religious revolutionary) decided its secretive, militarized nuclear program was hurting its reputation as the leader of all Muslims. After all, a violent and political version of Islam has lost much support since 9/11 in favor of an Islam that is peaceful.” The Christian Science Monitor [7/14/15]

Carefully Consider All Aspects of Iran Deal—“[I]t is precisely the nature of the regime that makes this accord so important. President Obama, who in his statement said the deal was “not built on trust, it is built on verification,” offered “extensive briefings” to members of Congress. They should take him up on that.”—Star Tribune [7/14/15]

No Need to Rush on Iran Nuclear Deal—“It has always been a long shot, the hope that the U.S. could reach an accord with Iran that would keep that country from building nuclear weapons for many years. Yet the goal is attractive enough to justify the Obama administration's pursuit of such a deal.”—The Denver Post [7/9/15]

Take Time for Verifiable Iran Nuclear Deal—“It’s true that Iran already is fomenting conflict in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and across the region. Iran, however, would be even more of a regional menace – and a global threat – if it were armed with nuclear weapons. Done right, a negotiated deal can stop that from happening for years to come.”—The Sacramento Bee [6/30/15]

Ayatollah Khamenei’s Fateful Choice—“Compromises are part of any negotiation. Any agreement can really be judged only when the text is signed and details are made public. The April framework accord was a solid basis on which to build a credible final deal. Ayatollah Khamenei must decide whether he and his government can live with the economic and political consequences if he sabotages this deal.” —The New York Times [6/24/15]

Rubio on Wrong Side of Iran Deal—“While nothing is perfect, we were disappointed to see Rubio try to scuttle the deal with political gamesmanship. As [Deputy National Security Advisor Ben] Rhodes said, ‘this deal is a far better choice than a military confrontation or a world in which Iran exists as a nuclear weapon state.’ Amen to that.”—Sun Sentinel [5/7/15]

Among Iran Options, One Makes Sense—"To put it simply, Wilkerson believes that it’s important for the good of the world that the United States cultivates a meaningful relationship with Iran. ...The art of diplomacy has marked the forward progress of mankind since the first victim of the first weapon of war fell dead to the ground. Be skeptical of any politician who claims the path to peace must run through fields of blood.”—Concord Monitor [4/21/15]

A Reckless Act in the Senate on Iran—“Congress has formally muscled its way into President Obama’s negotiations with Iran, creating new and potentially dangerous uncertainties for an agreement that offers the best chance of restraining that country’s nuclear program.”—The New York Times [4/14/15]

Israel’s Unworkable Demands on Iran—“[Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s] government made new demands that it claimed would ensure a better deal than the preliminary one that Iran, President Obama and other leaders of major powers announced last week. The new demands are unrealistic and, if pursued, would not mean a better deal but no deal at all.”—The New York Times [4/7/15]

Iran Deal Better Than Expected—“The agreement falls short of achieving the goals initially spelled out by the White House. But it does place enough restrictions on Iran's nuclear program to offer at least some hope its ambitions to produce a weapon will be significantly delayed, if not completely deterred.”—The Detroit News [4/4/15]

Nuclear Deal With Iran is Worth a Try—"Congress and others are correct to be wary of Iran and its intentions. Yet that is no reason not to attempt to negotiate a workable agreement. Who trusted the Soviet Union when Republican presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan both negotiated arms control agreements with the Soviet regime? On both of those occasions, the Soviet Union had many nuclear weapons in place ready and targeted upon the United States and vice versa.”—West Central Tribune [4/4/15]

Critics of Iran Deal are Off-Base—“If a nuclear agreement were a reward for Iranian good behavior across the board — or if it were a clear first step toward a full rapprochement with the Islamic Republic — the critics might have a point. But that's not what the agreement is. Rather, it is more narrowly designed to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, a goal that (if it can be achieved) would serve the interests of the whole world.”—The Los Angeles Times [4/3/15]

Negotiating With Iran—“Months more of hard bargaining will be needed to work out the details of how those principles translate into a final agreement acceptable to both sides. But the fact that negotiators appear to have cleared this first major hurdle is a hopeful sign that the goal of preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons through diplomatic means is achievable.”—Baltimore Sun [4/3/15]

Warmongers Aren't Happy About Iran Nuke Deal, the Rest of Us Should Be—“A nuclear Iran was not an option, and the Obama Administration has succeeded in outlining a comprehensive framework to defang the problem. Yet early criticisms of the plan seem to be rooted in a stubborn ignorance over the level of enriched uranium that is required to build a nuclear weapon.”—Star Ledger [4/3/15]

A Promising Step Toward an Iran Deal—“[T]his framework significantly reduces the risk of Iran covertly acquiring a nuclear weapon. It drastically reduces the number of Iran's centrifuges and the size of its uranium stockpile, dismantles or repurposes some of its most problematic nuclear facilities, places limits on its development of nuclear technology, and imposes a regime of surveillance and inspections that in some cases will continue for 25 years.”—Metro-West Daily News [4/3/15]

In Judging Iran Nuclear Deal Consider the Alternatives—“Would another war have been preferable? That's the simple, straightforward question that must be answered by those who'd dismiss the outline of a pact limiting Iran's nuclear capabilities.”— The Republican [4/3/15]

The Guardian View on the Iranian Nuclear Agreement: Diplomacy Shows Its Worth—“There are stronger reassurances on weaponisation, because – as a condition of getting sanctions relief – Iran has to provide the International Atomic Energy Authority with access to sites and people of interest. All told, it kicks the can down the road. It makes it almost impossible for Iran to go for a bomb in the next decade…”—The Guardian [4/3/15]

Give the Iran Nuclear Deal a Chance—“But Thursday, Iran and the so-called P5+1 — the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany — announced "parameters" for an agreement that were highly specific and, frankly, somewhat reassuring. At a minimum they justify continued negotiations with the aim of producing a final compact by the end of June. In the meantime, Congress should refrain from aggressive actions that could undermine the delicate process.”—The Los Angeles Times [4/3/15]

A Big Step to Stop Iran’s Nuclear Bomb Ambitions—“[M]oving forward on the tentative framework announced Thursday is far more promising than the alternatives – giving up on diplomacy and increasing sanctions, or launching a military strike that could lead to a wider war in the Middle East.”—Sacramento Bee [4/3/15]

A Promising Iran Agreement—“All that said, the framework's scope and strength are promising. Congress should refrain from passing any legislation that would impose additional sanctions and mandates on the talks, or otherwise seek to tie the president's hands.”—Bloomberg [4/2/15]

A Promising Nuclear Deal With Iran—“Over the long run, an agreement could make the Middle East safer and offer a path for Iran, the leading Shiite country, to rejoin the international community.”—The New York Times [4/2/15]

Iran Accord May Be the Real Deal—“The real naivete is among those who think Iran can be pressured into eliminating its nuclear program altogether or say the U.S. must never negotiate with an untrustworthy regime.”—Denver Post [4/2/15]

Outline of Iran Deal Offers the Best Chance to Thaw Relations—“…[T]he concessions made by Iranian diplomats, and the level of specificity offered to the public, show that all sides were negotiating in good faith. It is now up to Congress to give the negotiators the time they need to finalize the deal — and they should do so by refraining from proposing more sanctions that could jeopardize months of hard work.”—Boston Globe [4/2/15]

Iran Deal Watchwords: Distrust and Verify—“…[T]he deal is crafted to block all pathways to a bomb. Iran would not be allowed to enrich uranium to weapons grade and would have to abandon its push toward plutonium production.”—Newsday [4/2/2015]

Give Nuclear Deal With Iran a Chance—“The agreement the United States, other major world powers and Tehran announced Thursday for containing Iran's nuclear program could set the stage for peacefully resolving one of the longest-running threats to global security.”—Tampa Bay Times [4/2/15]

Gazette Opinion: Daines Was Wrong on Iran Letter—“[Montana Sen. Steve Daines’] participation in this half-baked scheme doesn’t just make him look foolish; it has a destabilizing effect on the world and undermines U.S. credibility. In other words, he’s done just the opposite of what should be expected from our leaders: His actions make the world less safe, not more.”—Billings Gazette [3/17/15]

Letter to Iran—“Even in the current Washington environment, writing letters to hostile foreign governments at a time when the State Department is trying to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough seems well beyond the pale. The Republican senators did not serve their country or their party well with this stunt.”—Providence Journal [3/16/15]

With Letter to Iran, GOP Senators Place Spite Before Diplomacy—“[The senators] said as much in a duplicitous, disrespectful letter to Iranian leaders that sought to undermine delicate international negotiations and the authority of the White House.”—The Kansas City Star [3/15/15]

Constitutional Lesson Lost in Letter to Iran—“To the 47 Republican senators who sent that letter to the Islamic Republic of Iran downplaying the significance of any nuclear development deal they might make with President Obama: Boy, did you whiff it.”—Daily Miner [3/15/15]

GOP Senators Demean Office With Letter—“This extreme example of congressional interference in diplomatic negotiations begins with the condescending assertion that the leaders of Iran ‘may not fully understand our constitutional system.’ After providing a brief lesson in American civics, the senators make clear that they ‘will consider any agreement regarding your nuclear-weapons program that is not approved by the Congress as nothing more than an executive agreement between President Barack Obama and Ayatollah Khamenei.’”—The Press Democrat [3/14/15]

Who Needs the Civics Lesson: Ayatollahs or GOP Senators?—“In reality, the letter was an orchestrated attempt to undermine U.S. efforts to negotiate an agreement with Iran on a critically important issue: the use of nuclear materials by one of America's most volatile foreign adversaries.”—The Des Moines Register [3/14/15]

Senate Republicans Should Not Interfere With Iran Negotiations—“…[I]t is astounding that Sen. Marco Rubio and nearly all of his fellow Republican senators would send a letter to Iran looking to scuttle a potential diplomatic deal that could freeze Iran's nuclear program for at least a decade.”—Tampa Bay Times [3/13/15]

Capito Unwisely Joined ‘Rush to War’—“The White House called these actions ‘a partisan strategy to undermine the president’s ability to conduct foreign policy and advance our national security.... The rush to war or at least the rush to the military option that many Republicans are advocating is not at all in the best interest of the United States.’ In other words, Republicans would rather unleash military strikes on Iran and sink America into another Mideast war, instead of letting international inspectors verify that Iran isn’t building nukes.”—Charleston Gazette [3/13/15]

Senators' Iran Stunt Takes Disrespect to New Level—“It’s one thing to criticize the administration’s actions, or try to impede them through the legislative process. But to directly communicate with a foreign power in order to undermine ongoing negotiations? That is appalling. The only direct precedent I can think of for this occurred in 1968, when as a presidential candidate Richard Nixon secretly communicated with the government of South Vietnam in an attempt to scuttle peace negotiations the Johnson administration was engaged in. It worked, and the war dragged on for another seven years.”—The Journal Gazette [3/12/15]

Republican Idiocy on Iran—“Senator John McCain, a former Republican presidential candidate, is now sort of acknowledging his error. ‘Maybe that wasn’t exactly the best way to do that,’ he said on Fox News on Tuesday. He was referring to the disgraceful and irresponsible letter that he and 46 Senate colleagues sent to Iran’s leaders this week that generated outrage from Democrats and even some conservatives.”—The New York Times [3/12/15]

Interfering With Obama on Iran Comforts Our Foes—“The letter sent by 47 Republican senators to Iran's leaders — saying that any agreement the U.S. reached with them without congressional approval could be reversed by the next president "with a stroke of a pen" — is wrong on so many levels that it is hard to know where to start.”—The Commercial Appeal [3/12/15]

GOP Letter to Iran Diminishes World Standing—“The freelance foreign policy overture to Iran's clerics by 47 Republican senators was not quite the treason proclaimed by tabloid headlines this week. Nor was it the first time the party out of presidential power tried to scuttle a foreign policy initiative. But it was a stunning display of arrogance, and it may well have doomed the only chance of peacefully resolving Iran's nuclear status. That is bad enough.”—San Jose Mercury News [3/12/15]

47 GOP Senators Have Wrong Strategy on Iran—“One has to wonder exactly what the Republicans were trying to accomplish. If they were trying to gain support of American opinion, this was a classic fail. If the hope was to derail the negotiations completely, they have likely only offended five other nations who also are working in earnest to control Iranian nuclear aspirations.”—Longview News-Journal [3/12/15]

47 GOP Senators Send Open Letter to Iran—“The 47 Republican Senators who brazenly issued an open letter Monday to Iran’s leaders not only undermine President Barack Obama’s attempts to negotiate a nuclear agreement with Iran, but they undercut their whole purpose of writing the letter in the first place — to achieve Congressional buy-in of any accord.”—Canton Repository [3/12/15]

Our View: Risch, Crapo Antagonize Iran—"This isn’t about good policy. This isn’t about facing the challenges posed when desperate groups with desperate agendas have an interest in the same turf. The 47 Senate Republicans want only the status quo with Iran: continued isolation, which could culminate in escalating hostility and a nuclear state."—Times-News [3/11/15]

Corker, Alexander Refused to Sign Iran Letter. Good.—“The new Senate leadership has decided that instead of allowing experienced professional diplomats to try to negotiate a nuclear disarmament deal with America’s longtime enemy Iran, it should let a freshman senator lead an amateurish and unprecedented effort to undermine U.S. foreign policy.”—The Tennessean [3/11/15]

Senators’ Iran Stunt Off Base—“But [Arizona Republican Sen. Jeff Flake] also recognizes the executive branch has the responsibility for negotiating such agreements: ‘I’m not very bullish on the chance of these negotiations resulting in a good agreement, or an agreement at all, but we ought to explore it. We ought to give it every opportunity to succeed.’ That kind of maturity and restraint is too often missing today in a Washington where vicious sound bites and partisan one-upmanship are valued more than governance.”—The Tampa Tribune [3/11/15]

Republican Letter to Iran Puts Politics Above Nation—“Just seven of 54 GOP senators had the good sense not to sign the letter. The others acted rashly and allowed their passions to rule the day. They imprudently and shamefully put politics above our national interest,”—The Republican [3/11/15]

Outrageous Senators—"The American people do not want to find themselves engaged in a new ground war in the Middle East. Preventing Iran from having nuclear capabilities is a priority for U.S. officials and an imperative for Israel's security.”—The Record [3/11/15]

Republican Senators go Nuclear With Missive to Iran—“But what is most objectionable about the senators' letter is neither its condescending tone nor its legal analysis. It's the fact that the letter injects the senators into ongoing international negotiations that are properly the prerogative of the executive branch — with the obvious intention of subverting those negotiations.”— The Los Angeles Times [3/11/15]

GOP Letter to Iran was Outrageous—“Senate Republicans hit a new low with their group letter to Iran’s leaders encouraging them to reject current nuclear talks with the United States and five other nations. It was a dumb move both in terms of its own cynical partisan goals and, more importantly, in how it might undermine national and global security.”—The Herald [3/11/15]

‘Dear Iran’ Letter Subverts Nuclear Talks—“It’s not every day that you see U.S. senators pressing leaders of a hostile power to help them kill off American-led negotiations aimed at removing a potential nuclear threat to the United States and its allies. In fact, nothing quite like that had ever happened until Monday, when 47 Republican senators wrote a letter to the leaders of Iran warning that any agreement they reach with President Barack Obama to curtail Iran’s nuclear weapons program might be reversed by a future president.”—The Daily Journal [3/11/15]

An Ignorable Letter From 47 Senators—“An open letter to the 47 U.S. senators who signed a letter addressed to Iran’s political leaders: We are struck by your letter that condescendingly attempts to lecture Iran’s leadership on the fine points of the U.S. Constitution while at the same time blatantly trampled on the constitutionally defined roles in foreign affairs of presidents and members of Congress.”—The Anniston Star [3/11/15]

GOP's Political Posturing on Iran Could Ostracize the U.S.—“[Senator Tom Cotton] has since been denounced by members of his own party. Sen. Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.) said it best: ‘We ought to support the negotiations going on,’ he said, ‘and this effort does not do that.’”—New Jersey Star Tribune [3/11/15]

GOP Senators' Dumb, Destructive Letter—“The sanctions that convinced Iran to roll back and freeze its nuclear program and join the talks are enforced by all the parties to the negotiations. The U.S., which has nearly no trade with Iran, depends on those who do – principally Russia and China – to apply the pressure. If these talks fall apart, Russia and China could make the sanctions effectively disappear, and there would be nothing to stop Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Is that what the Senate Republicans want?”—Metro-West Daily News [3/11/15]

Where's Issue in Iran Deal?—“There are, in fact, too many mysteries involving federal lawmakers, presidents and judges to list in this space. But now, we can add another mystery to the list — why would mostly Republicans in Congress not want Iran to agree to forego building a nuclear weapon?”—Lampoc Record [3/11/15]

GOP Senators Need Lessons in Both Civics and Politics—“Everyone wants to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. If diplomacy can delay the day of reckoning for a decade, that is far preferable than a military strike that could spark a wider war in the Middle East.”—Fresno Bee [3/11/15]

A Deeply Misguided Senate Letter to the Leaders of Iran—“The signatories, who sadly include the usually rational Sens. Rob Portman of Ohio and John McCain of Arizona, have lost sight of national interest -- and of how their letter is undercutting it.”--Cleveland Plain Dealer [3/11/15]

Hate Mail: Senators Seek to Sabotage Obama’s Foreign Policy—“America’s partners in the talks are among the world’s most important nations — China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom. They can only be appalled at seeing Secretary of State John Kerry and the president, who are charged with making the nation’s foreign policy, hit from behind by one house of the federal legislature. The senators who signed the letter should be ashamed.”—Pittsburgh Post-Gazette [3/11/15]

47 Senators Stomp on the Constitution—“A member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Flake acknowledges he is "not very bullish on the chance of these negotiations resulting in a good agreement." But Congress nevertheless must give them every opportunity to succeed.”—Arizona Republic [3/11/15]

Burr, Tillis Add Their Names to Outrageous Letter to Iran—“This is one of the most horrid and tangible examples of pure partisanship run amok in modern times. So much do Republicans resent the fact that President Obama has won two terms they’ll now resort to blowing up a negotiation aimed at preventing war in the Middle East.”—The News & Observer [3/10/15]

'Dear Iran' Letter Subverts Nuclear Talks—“It's not every day that you see U.S. senators pressing leaders of a hostile power to help them kill off American-led negotiations aimed at removing a potential nuclear threat to the United States and its allies.”—USA Today [3/10/15]

Republicans Fumble Their Chance to Focus Attention on an Iran Deal—“Congressional republicans are trying to obstruct President Obama from concluding a nuclear agreement with Iran, but the only tangible result of their efforts has been to impede serious debate about the legitimate issues arising from the potential deal.”—Washington Post [3/10/15]

GOP Senators Need a Civics Lesson and Should Stop Meddling in Iran Nuclear Deal—“Everyone wants to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. If diplomacy can delay the day of reckoning for a decade, that is far preferable than a military strike that could spark a wider war in the Middle East.”—Sacramento Bee [3/10/15]

A Stunning Breach of Protocol—“If the treaty is scuttled, there will be no inspection regime to make sure Iran is not cooking up a nuclear weapon. One gets the impression that Netanyahu and his fellow hard-liners want to proceed straight to a bombing campaign without any diplomatic do-si-do preceding it. If bombs fell on Iran, it would likely only forestall the development of a nuclear program there for a few years and further inflame passions in the Middle East.”—Observer-Reporter [3/10/15]

The Real Key to Any Nuclear Deal With Iran—“The risk, however, is sabotaging the multination negotiations and leaving Iran unrestrained in building nuclear weapons. That's a bad path that could lead to use of military force to stop Iran's pursuit of a bomb.”—Newsday [3/10/15]

Letter of Intent—“The letter is little more than a mischievous attempt to throw a monkey wrench into a years-long, multinational effort to obtain a secure, verifiable agreement with Iran to stop its nuclear-weapons program through diplomacy, rather than war.”—Miami Herald [3/10/15]

Was Iran Letter Traitorous or Just Treacherous for GOP Sens. Blunt, Roberts and Moran?—“Obama and the leaders of several other nations are trying to find ways to get Iran to stop its efforts to obtain a nuclear bomb. It’s a reasonable quest. Properly so, even some in the GOP didn’t agree to sign the letter, saying it could backfire on the party. It could make Iran more likely to sign a deal with Obama — one that the Republicans might not like at all.”—Kansas City Star [3/10/13]

GOP Letter to Iran Disgraces America—“America looks weakest when its internal arguments spill over into its international diplomacy — something that has been rare in the nation's history. That it is happening now is a blot on the 114th U.S. Senate; specifically, on the 47 Republican senators who signed an open letter to the Islamic Republic of Iran, a missive whose sole purpose is to end President Barack Obama's ongoing nuclear negotiations with that country.”—Detroit Free Press [3/10/15]

Senate Saboteurs—“A blatant attempt to sabotage the discussions to limit Iran’s nuclear capacity, the letter is signed by by (sic) 47 GOP senators, aligning themselves — President Obama noted ironically — with hardliners in Iran who oppose any deal with the United States.”—Courier-Journal [3/10/15]

Ayotte Signs Up for a Dangerous Political Game—“The Iran nuclear situation is complex and worthy of vigorous debate. In fact, there are plenty of Democrats who are not thrilled with the goal of the talks, namely a 10-year pact that would reduce but not eliminate Iran’s nuclear program. But what they and seven Republican senators who didn’t sign the letter understand is that diplomacy is a fragile art that doesn’t happen in a vacuum.”—Concord Monitor [3/10/15]

GOP Letter to Iran is a Reckless Intrusion Into Nuclear Talks—“Under the guise of an American civics lesson pointedly but also pointlessly aimed at Iran’s already isolated, mistrustful, hostile-to-the-United States leadership, Senate Republicans may sabotage highly delicate negotiations to persuade Tehran to curb its nuclear development program in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions.”—Boston Globe [3/10/15]

The GOP's Poison Pen Note—“That Senate Republicans are so intent on denouncing anything that could possibly come out of the talks — even if it ultimately benefits the U.S. and its allies — suggests they are all too inclined to let the national interest take a back seat to partisan politics.”—Baltimore Sun [3/10/15]

GOP Senators Play Dangerous Game With U.S. Foreign Policy—“The 47 senators seem to be blithely ignoring necessary perspectives from London, Paris, Berlin, Beijing and Moscow, as well as other capitals influenced by these powers. If Iran is able to claim that it was Washington, not Tehran, that torpedoed the talks, the sanctions regime may well unravel without Iran having to compromise on its nuclear program. If so, the next step could include military action, which could spiral into yet another major Mideast war. The GOP senators should be as blunt about this possibility as they are about their opinions on Obama’s diplomacy.”—StarTribune [3/10/15]

The Real Key to Any Nuclear Deal With Iran—“In addition to flexing for their political base, the senators may be gambling that their intransigence will result in a better deal. The risk, however, is sabotaging the multination negotiations and leaving Iran unrestrained in building nuclear weapons. That’s a bad path that could lead to use of military force to stop Iran’s pursuit of a bomb.”—Newsday [3/10/15]

GOP Senators Need a Civics Lesson and Should Stop Meddling in Iran Nuclear Deal—“Everyone wants to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. If diplomacy can delay the day of reckoning for a decade, that is far preferable than a military strike that could spark a wider war in the Middle East.”—The Sacramento Bee [3/10/15]

Sabotaging a Deal With Iran—“After more than a year of negotiations, the United States, Britain, France, China, Russia and Germany can take credit for an interim deal that has sharply limited Iran’s nuclear activities, and they are on the verge of a more permanent agreement that could further reduce the risk of Iran’s developing a nuclear weapon. Congress needs to think hard about the best way to support a verifiable nuclear deal and not play political games that could leave America isolated, the sanctions regime in tatters and Iran’s nuclear program unshackled.”—The New York Times [3/7/15]

Let's Hope Netanyahu Loses—“Netanyahu is it making it impossible to reach a peace deal with the Palestinians by relentlessly expanding housing settlements on the West Bank. He is using Israel's military superiority not just to secure the nation's borders, but to answer the demands of religious zealots and others who are determined to hold onto land that is essential to building a Palestinian state.”—New Jersey Star-Ledger [2/26/15]

Bipartisan Supporters of Israel Should Skip Netanyahu Speech—“In a bald breach of protocol, Republican House Speaker John Boehner invited Netanyahu without informing the Democrat in the White House, who sees negotiations with Iran as the best hope for preventing that country from obtaining a nuclear bomb. The alternative is military action. Like President Obama, we’d rather take a shot at peace first.”—Chicago Sun Times [2/26/15]

An Emerging Nuclear Deal With Iran—“The agreement must be judged on the complete package, not on any single provision. Even if the deal is not perfect, the greater risk could well be walking away and allowing Iran to continue its nuclear activities unfettered.”—The New York Times [2/25/15]

Boehner's Netanyahu Ploy Runs Onto the Rocks—“Even if the ploy succeeds in torpedoing the arms negotiations, it would be a costly win, raising troubling questions about the degree of control Netanyahu has over decisions that could cost American lives. There is no more sensitive task — or a more hazardous one — than trying to keep nuclear weapons out of Iran's hands. Throughout the talks, the six nations negotiating with Iran have shown remarkable unity. It would be a shame if all that effort was lost because of political gamesmanship here or in Israel. Politics, as they used to say, should end at the water's edge.”—USA Today [2/1/15]

Menendez Steps Back From Fight With Obama Over Iran—“If Obama is right about the political dynamic in Iran, Menendez's bill could scuttle a deal. And without a deal, pressure will build for air strikes against Iran's dozens of nuclear facilities. Military experts say such a campaign would require weeks of repeated bombings and lead to significant civilian casualties, since many of the targets are in cities and densely populated suburbs.”—Newark Star Ledger [1/28/15]

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