Iran Rouhani.JPG
Outside efforts to pressure Iran would spell the end of conciliatory efforts by President Hassan Rouhani.
(Brendan McDermid/Agence France-Presse)
In the early morning hours of Nov. 24, representatives of Iran, the United States and five other powers announced an agreement in Geneva on a plan for Iran's nuclear program. The first-step agreement is very important because it creates the best chance in years to negotiate a final agreement to guard against a nuclear-armed Iran.
The diplomats’ impressive achievement is in no way diminished by understanding that the next step will be even harder. The framework for a comprehensive solution is outlined in the agreement, but the devil will be in the details that have not yet been filled in.
This historic agreement identified specific elements to be implemented within six months, setting the stage for negotiations on a final step to be taken within a year. The interim phase would verifiably halt and, in some areas, roll back advances in Iran’s most concerning nuclear capabilities and reduce its potential to produce material for nuclear weapons. It would also significantly enhance the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor Iranian nuclear activities.
The first prerequisite for getting to a final agreement is to scrupulously carry out the letter and the spirit of measures specified in the first step. For Iran, this means honoring all of the “halts” specified by the accord and, most important, moving steadily to eliminate the stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium gas, which poses the most serious and urgent “breakout” threat.
For the United States, this means not only moving expeditiously to suspend the peripheral sanctions listed in the agreement, but also to refrain from legislation suggested by Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) and others, which anticipates the imposition of new sanctions.
The next requirement is to jettison the maximalist elements of an ultimate agreement sought by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and many in the U.S. Congress. Demanding that Iran permanently halt uranium enrichment — even for peaceful purposes — is unrealistic. Such a deal would be unsustainable politically inside Iran. It would spell the end of conciliatory efforts by President Hassan Rouhani, dooming prospects for a negotiated agreement and greatly increasing the chance of both war and an Iranian nuclear arsenal.
Instead of seeking Iran’s capitulation at the negotiating table, the six powers need to identify and insist on the elements of an agreement necessary to deliver confidence that Iran’s nuclear activities are peaceful. As recently articulated by former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, this means limiting Iran’s nuclear capacity to plausible civilian uses and to achieve safeguards to ensure that this level is not exceeded.
The U.S. intelligence community has been testifying since 2007 that Iran has the capacity to ultimately build nuclear weapons, should it decide to do so. The goal now, therefore, must be to dissuade Tehran from reaching such a decision.
Accepting some continued enrichment capability and ending nuclear-related sanctions are an acceptable price for limiting Iran’s nuclear activities to peaceful purposes, and for securing intrusive inspection measures that establish confidence in Iranian claims of abjuring the pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Given Iran’s limited need for enriched uranium to fuel power reactors, a reduction in Iran’s overall enrichment capacity — from 10,000 operating centrifuges to 3,000 or fewer — would be sufficient for Iran’s potential peaceful needs. Iran will also have to accept strict limits on its Arak heavy water reactor to ensure that it is not used for an alternative (plutonium) path to a nuclear weapon.
Finally, Iran must allow even more extensive inspections by the international community to guard against a secret weapons program.
These measures will help us prevent both war and a nuclear-armed Iran. If Iranian officials do not deliver everything we want, they at least give us what we need. It is critical that we remember the difference.
Greg Thielmann, senior fellow of the Arms Control Association, is a former office director in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and a graduate of Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.