Trump's Saudi Nuclear Cooperation Deal Compromises Essential Nonproliferation Guardrails
For Immediate Release: July 23, 2026
Media Contacts: Daryl Kimball, Executive Director (202-463-8270 x107); Kelsey Davenport, (202-463-8270 ext 102)
(Washington-D.C.) The U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia that President Donald Trump approved this week abandons long-standing U.S. nonproliferation norms and could provide Saudi Arabia with technologies necessary to build a bomb, nuclear experts warn.
"This agreement reverses 50 years of U.S. leadership in the global nonproliferation architecture and increases the risk of other countries pursuing enrichment and reprocessing as part of building a latent nuclear weapons capacity,” warned Thomas Countryman, Chair of the Arms Control Association’s Board of Directors, who served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation and led earlier discussions with the Saudis on the subject.
"For years the Saudis have resisted agreeing to an Additional Protocol to the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which both Republican and Democratic administrations have viewed as the strongest and most credible verification mechanism. Surrendering to Riyadh on this crucial issue damages both American and Saudi credibility, and has negative implications for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons,” Countryman charged.
"The proposed deal opens the door to future uranium enrichment in Saudi Arabia without strong, international verification,” according to Kelsey Davenport, ACA’s Director for Nonproliferation Policy. "Congress should press Trump to revise the deal to ensure it meets the strongest nonproliferation standards."
The Saudi deal breaks with previous U.S. policy under Republican and Democratic administrations not to share uranium enrichment and plutonium separation technologies and to require states negotiating nuclear cooperation agreements with the United States to implement an IAEA Additional Protocol.
Under this agreement U.S. and Saudi officials would carry out a two-year study to determine if uranium enrichment is commercially viable in Saudi Arabia. If the study supports enrichment, the United States would build a uranium enrichment facility on Saudi soil using through a secretive “black box” approach to try prevent the technology from being shared with the Saudis.
According to a report by The Wall Street Journal, even if the U.S. administration were to object to enrichment, Saudi Arabia could pursue an enrichment program after 10 years on its own or with assistance from other states.
"The promise of keeping sensitive U.S.-origin enrichment technology in a 'black box' is a mirage,” cautioned Davenport, ACA’s Director for Nonproliferation Policy. "Once the United States has transferred sensitive technology to Saudi Arabia, it risks losing control of those materials,” she added.
“Worse yet, this decision will have ripple effects that undermine global nonproliferation norms. By enabling Saudi enrichment without an IAEA additional protocol agreement, the Trump administration risks other states following suit and pursing fissile material production capabilities without adequate oversight. More immediately, the terms of the agreement could make it more difficult for the Trump administration to negotiate an effective nuclear nonproliferation agreement with Iran,” she noted.
According to the terms of Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, once the agreement is submitted to Congress, it will have 90 days in continuous session to consider the agreement, after which it automatically becomes law unless Congress adopts a joint resolution opposing it.
"The United States has never before contemplated, let alone negotiated and concluded a nuclear cooperation agreement with a state that has threatened to leave the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), as Saudi Arabia’s leaders have done,” noted Daryl G. Kimball, ACA’s executive director.
In a Sept. 20, 2023 interview on Fox News, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, reiterated his threat that “[i]f Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, we must obtain one as well.” In January 2023, Saudi Arabia's energy minister, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, told a mining and industry conference in Riyadh that the oil-laden kingdom plans to enrich uranium stocks to ensure its ability to complete “the entire nuclear fuel cycle.”
The Saudis have also purchased nuclear-capable Dongfeng-3 ballistic missiles from China and are manufacturing ballistic missiles that could provide the means to deliver nuclear weapons against an adversary, according to open source intelligence analysis and U.S. intelligence assessments.
"The warning lights are bright and they are flashing red,” Kimball said.
"Members of Congress in both parties cannot afford to look away. If they care about U.S. and global security, they must exercise their power to stop or modify Trump’s flawed nuclear deal with the Saudi royal family so as not to open the door for nuclear proliferation in the Middle East even wider,” Kimball urged.