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"[Arms Control Today is] Absolutely essential reading for the upcoming Congressional budget debate on the 2018 NPR and its specific recommendations ... well-informed, insightful, balanced, and filled with common sense."

– Frank Klotz
former Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration
March 7, 2018
Nuclear Nonproliferation Map Project

The Nuclear Suppliers Group

Body: 
Executive Summary · Report Overview · Resources · Country List
GICNT
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
MTCR
Missile Technology Control Regime
PSI
Proliferation Security Initiative
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers Group
G7
Global Partnership

Formalized in 1978 as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the NSG began as meeting of nuclear-supplier states (Canada, France, Japan, West Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States) in 1975 to coordinate stricter regulations on civilian nuclear trade and dual use technologies. The prior year, in 1974, the states identified trigger list of nuclear materials, technologies, and relevant equipment for developing nuclear weapons.

The NSG expanded the original 1974 list, which was consistent with NPT restrictions, to include access to reprocessing and enrichment technologies – the means for creating the fissile material for nuclear warheads. The NSG guidelines also prohibit the third-party transfer of nuclear-related exports and required IAEA safeguards on facilities as a prerequisite for imports. The NSG guidelines are non-binding, but the member states did submit the guidelines to the IAEA in 1978. The guidelines became an IAEA document known as INFICIRC/254.

Members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Malta is also a member of the NSG, but does not appear on the map.

 

The Guidelines are comprised of two parts, each of which was created in response to a significant proliferation event that highlighted shortcomings in then-existing export control systems. Part I lists materials and technology designed specifically for nuclear use. These include fissile materials, nuclear reactors and equipment, and reprocessing and enrichment equipment. Part II identifies dual-use goods, which are non-nuclear items with legitimate civilian applications that can also be used to develop weapons. NSG members were motivated to adopt Part II in 1992 after discovering how close Iraq came to realizing its nuclear weapons ambitions by illicitly employing dual-use imports in a covert nuclear weapons program before the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

NSG states are expected to refrain from making exports identical or similar to those denied by other members. States are also suppose to notify other members when they deny an export.

At a May 2004 meeting, NSG members adopted a “catch-all” mechanism, which authorizes members to block any export suspected to be destined to a nuclear weapons program even if the export does not appear on one of the control lists. In 2010 the group revised its guidelines on the transfer for enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Prior to the revision, states were to “exercise restraint” when exporting these technologies. The agreed upon text includes criterial to be considered when deciding and export. Members also agreed to authorize exports of enrichment and reprocessing technologies only if the recipient has an additional protocol to their safeguards agreement in place or a safeguards agreement plus regional accounting and control measures.

States can apply for membership, and new states are accepted on a consensus basis. There is no formal set of criteria that a state must meet prior to bidding for membership. Member states supply materials and technologies covered by the NSG guidelines, commit to adhere to the guidelines, enforce export controls domestically, and are in compliance with the obligations of international nuclear non-proliferation treaties, like the NPT and treaties establishing nuclear-weapon free zones. States also commit to support international efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMDs.

The NSG currently is comprised of 48 members.

RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Adopt Membership Criteria Consistent with International Standards:The NSG could adopt a set of criteria that members must meet in order to apply for admission. That criteria should be based on established norms against nuclear testing and proliferation and supportive of disarmament efforts, export controls, and nuclear security practices.
  • Expand Notifications:Under current NSG guidelines, states are encouraged to notify other members when a request is denied. States are also encouraged to notify the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, states are not required to provide notifications of approval. Provision of this information could help member states identify patterns of technology and material acquisition that may be indicative of illicit nuclear activity. Approvals and denials could also be reported systematically to the IAEA, rather than on an ad-hoc basis by participating states.
  • Lifetime Fuel Supply Guidelines:Members that supply nuclear power reactors should consider life-time fuel supply guarantees for reactors sold to countries without enrichment capabilities. Exporting countries should also commit to take back spent fuel for disposition. These steps would remove the justification for countries to pursue domestic enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.
  • Adopt the Additional Protocol as a Precondition for Sale:The NSG guidelines call for IAEA safeguards as a prerequisite for sales of controlled items. The NSG could strengthen the guidelines to require that countries have an additional protocol in place. Expanded IAEA access to information and facilities will help ensure that nuclear programs are peaceful.
  • Coordination with the MTCR:The NSG could share information with the MTCR about denied exports. Coordination between the two bodies could increase the chances of identifying patterns in proliferation behavior or systemic attempts to circumvent export controls.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Map Project - Resources

Body: 

Below is a list of updated resources on each of the regimes. For a list of countries and their initiative memberships, click here.

Executive Summary · Report Overview · Resources · Country List
GICNT
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
MTCR
Missile Technology Control Regime
PSI
Proliferation Security Initiative
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers Group
G7
Global Partnership

GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO COMBAT NUCLEAR TERRORISM (GICNT)

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI)

NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP

G7 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP AGAINST THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Nuclear Nonproliferation Map Project - Report Overview

Body: 

May 12th, 2016

Since the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force in 1970, states have formed voluntary initiatives to compliment the treaty’s goals and objectives. In particular, these coalitions play a critical role in reinforcing the NPT’s efforts to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism and prevent the rise of new nuclear-armed actors.

This mapping project is designed to illustrate and explore the role that several key multilateral initiatives play in bolstering the NPT by securing existing materials and blocking proliferation. The flexibility of these voluntary initiatives and regimes to respond to emerging nonproliferation and nuclear security risks allows groups of like-minded states to address key areas of concern.

The five initiatives examined in this project include the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and the G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (G7). Clicking on the icon for each initiative will show its geographic spread on the map and bring up background material and recommendations. Clicking on an individual country will show its membership across all five regimes.

These are not the only voluntary groups working to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and strengthen nuclear security. These five regimes, however, target crucial areas of concern and offer opportunities for collaboration, which will be critical given the rise of networks of non-state actors with expressed interest in weapons of mass destruction. With the end of the nuclear security summits in 2016, these initiatives will also play an important role in continuing to advance the work of the summits and strengthen the global nuclear security architecture. This is particularly true for the GICNT and the Global Partnership, both of which were charged with carrying out part of the nuclear security summits’ agenda.

In addition to displaying the geographic scope and providing a brief background of each initiative, this resource provides general recommendations that could improve the effectiveness of each in the years ahead. These recommendations are based on open source information about the work of each initiative. In some cases, iterations of these recommendations may be under discussion, or have already been dismissed. Where appropriate, this project also puts forward options for collaboration amongst these voluntary groups to amplify impacts and results. These recommendations are meant to spur creative thinking on the role of voluntary initiatives, as such they do not provide specific pathways for adopting or implementing the ideas put forward.

By consolidating references and recommendations, this website is intended to serve as a resource to better understand the role that voluntary initiatives play in bolstering nonproliferation and nuclear security efforts. It will be updated periodically to reflect the changing membership and priorities of each initiative, as well as additional recommendations for strengthening multilateral efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and acts of nuclear terrorism.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Map Project - Report Overview

Body: 
Executive Summary · Report Overview · Resources · Country List
GICNT
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
MTCR
Missile Technology Control Regime
PSI
Proliferation Security Initiative
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers Group
G7
Global Partnership

Since the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force in 1970, states have formed voluntary initiatives to compliment the treaty’s goals and objectives. In particular, these coalitions play a critical role in reinforcing the NPT’s efforts to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism and prevent the rise of new nuclear-armed actors.

This mapping project is designed to illustrate and explore the role that several key multilateral initiatives play in bolstering the NPT by securing existing materials and blocking proliferation. The flexibility of these voluntary initiatives and regimes to respond to emerging nonproliferation and nuclear security risks allows groups of like-minded states to address key areas of concern.

The five initiatives examined in this project include the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and the G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (G7). Clicking on the icon for each initiative will show its geographic spread on the map and bring up background material and recommendations. Clicking on an individual country will show its membership across all five regimes.

These are not the only voluntary groups working to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and strengthen nuclear security. These five regimes, however, target crucial areas of concern and offer opportunities for collaboration, which will be critical given the rise of networks of non-state actors with expressed interest in weapons of mass destruction. With the end of the nuclear security summits in 2016, these initiatives will also play an important role in continuing to advance the work of the summits and strengthen the global nuclear security architecture. This is particularly true for the GICNT and the Global Partnership, both of which were charged with carrying out part of the nuclear security summits’ agenda.

In addition to displaying the geographic scope and providing a brief background of each initiative, this resource provides general recommendations that could improve the effectiveness of each in the years ahead. These recommendations are based on open source information about the work of each initiative. In some cases, iterations of these recommendations may be under discussion, or have already been dismissed. Where appropriate, this project also puts forward options for collaboration amongst these voluntary groups to amplify impacts and results. These recommendations are meant to spur creative thinking on the role of voluntary initiatives, as such they do not provide specific pathways for adopting or implementing the ideas put forward.

By consolidating references and recommendations, this website is intended to serve as a resource to better understand the role that voluntary initiatives play in bolstering nonproliferation and nuclear security efforts. It will be updated periodically to reflect the changing membership and priorities of each initiative, as well as additional recommendations for strengthening multilateral efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and acts of nuclear terrorism.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Map Country List

Body: 

Below is a full list of countries and the respective regimes of which they are a member. Use these links to jump to countries starting with these letters.
A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V |Y | Z

Executive Summary · Report Overview · Resources · Country List
GICNT
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
MTCR
Missile Technology Control Regime
PSI
Proliferation Security Initiative
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers Group
G7
Global Partnership

AFGHANISTAN

ALBANIA

ALGERIA

ANDORRA

ANGOLA

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

ARGENTINA

ARMENIA

AUSTRALIA

AUSTRIA

AZERBAIJAN

BAHAMAS

BAHRAIN

BANGLADESH

(none)

BARBADOS

(none)

BELARUS

BELGIUM

BELIZE

BENIN

(none)

BHUTAN

(none)

BOLIVIA

(none)

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

BOTSWANA

(none)

BRAZIL

BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

BULGARIA

BURKINA FASO

(none)

BURUNDI

CABO VERDE

CAMBODIA

CAMEROON

(none)

CANADA

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

(none)

CHAD

(none)

CHILE

CHINA

COLOMBIA

COMOROS

(none)

CONGO

(none)

COSTA RICA

(none)

CÔTE D’IVOIRE

CROATIA

CUBA

(none)

CYPRUS

CZECH REPUBLIC

DPRK (NORTH KOREA)

(none)

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

(none)

DENMARK

DJIBOUTI

DOMINICA

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

ECUADOR

(none)

EGYPT

(none)

EL SALVADOR

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

(none)

ERITREA

(none)

ESTONIA

ETHIOPIA

FIJI

FINLAND

FRANCE

GABON

(none)

GAMBIA

(none)

GEORGIA

GERMANY

GHANA

(none)

GREECE

GRENADA

(none)

GUATEMALA

(none)

GUINEA

(none)

GUINEA-BISSAU

(none)

GUYANA

HAITI

(none)

HONDURAS

HUNGARY

ICELAND

INDIA

INDONESIA

(none)

IRAN

(none)

IRAQ

IRELAND

ISRAEL

ITALY

JAMAICA

(none)

JAPAN

JORDAN

KAZAKHSTAN

KENYA

(none)

KIRIBATI

(none)

KUWAIT

KYRGYZSTAN

LAOS

(none)

LATVIA

LEBANON

(none)

LESOTHO

(none)

LIBERIA

LIBYA

LIECHTENSTEIN

LITHUANIA

LUXEMBOURG

MACEDONIA

MADAGASCAR

MALAWI

(none)

MALAYSIA

MALDIVES

(none)

MALI

(none)

MALTA

MARSHALL ISLANDS

MAURITANIA

(none)

MAURITIUS

MEXICO

MICRONESIA (FEDERATED STATES OF)

(none)

MONACO

(none)

MONGOLIA

MONTENEGRO

MOROCCO

MOZAMBIQUE

(none)

MYANMAR

NAMIBIA

(none)

NAURU

(none)

NEPAL

NETHERLANDS

NEW ZEALAND

NICARAGUA

(none)

NIGER

(none)

NIGERIA

(none)

NORWAY

OMAN

PAKISTAN

PALAU

PANAMA

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

PARAGUAY

PERU

(none)

PHILIPPINES

POLAND

PORTUGAL

QATAR

REPUBLIC OF KOREA (SOUTH KOREA)

REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

ROMANIA

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

RWANDA

SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS

(none)

SAINT LUCIA

SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

SAMOA

SAN MARINO

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

(none)

SAUDI ARABIA

SENEGAL

(none)

SERBIA

SEYCHELLES

SIERRA LEONE

(none)

SINGAPORE

SLOVAKIA

SLOVENIA

SOLOMON ISLANDS

(none)

SOMALIA

(none)

SOUTH AFRICA

SOUTH SUDAN

(none)

SPAIN

SRI LANKA

SUDAN

(none)

SURINAME

(none)

SWAZILAND

(none)

SWEDEN

SWITZERLAND

SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

TAJIKISTAN

THAILAND

TIMOR-LESTE

(none)

TOGO

(none)

TONGA

(none)

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

TUNISIA

TURKEY

TURKMENISTAN

TUVALU

UGANDA

(none)

UKRAINE

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

UNITED KINGDOM

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

(none)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

URUGUAY

(none)

UZBEKISTAN

VANUATU

VENEZUELA

(none)

VIETNAM

YEMEN

ZAMBIA

ZIMBABWE

 

    The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

    Body: 
    Executive Summary · Report Overview · Resources · Country List
    GICNT
    Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
    MTCR
    Missile Technology Control Regime
    PSI
    Proliferation Security Initiative
    NSG
    Nuclear Suppliers Group
    G7
    Global Partnership


    The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) is a joint U.S.-Russian initiative launched in 2006 to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism. U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin committed to forming the initiative based on their shared concern that nuclear terrorism is one of the most dangerous security challenges facing the international community.

    The initial 13 countries that attended the first meeting to form the GICNT agreed on a Statement of Principles comprised of eight different points aimed at developing capacities to combat nuclear terrorism on a “determined and systematic basis, consistent with national legal authorities and obligations.” The eight principles include improving the accounting and control of nuclear materials, securing civilian nuclear facilities, detecting illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, strengthening legal frameworks for prosecution of acts of nuclear terrorism, and improving the capabilities of participants to mitigate, respond to, and investigate acts of nuclear terrorism. The GICNT accomplishes these through activities aimed at strengthening the “plans, policies, procedures, and interoperability of partner nations.”

    Members of the GICNT. **Several GICNT member states do not appear on this map. These countries are: Cabo Verde, Malta, Mauritius, Palau, Seychelles, and Singapore.

     

    The U.S. and Russia have remained co-chairs of the initiative since 2006. In 2010, an Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG) was formed to coordinate activities and establish working groups to focus efforts on particular areas of concern to member states. The Netherlands currently serves as the chair of the IAG.

    In 2010-2011, GICNT members formed three working groups to focus efforts on a set of priority areas. The decision to move toward a working group model was intended to solidify the GICNT’s status as a durable initiative. The working groups hold meetings, exercises, and workshops that are generally open to all member states (and on occasion non-members). The working groups have also produced documents outlining a range of best practices, guidelines, and suggested exercises for participating states to adopt and use.

    The three current working groups are:

    • Nuclear Forensics: Chaired by Australia, this working group is developing best practices in nuclear forensics, assisting states in developing core capabilities, and fostering connections between relevant actors in different governments.
    • Response and Mitigation: Chaired by Morocco, this working group is examining and sharing best practices and techniques for responding to a radiological or nuclear terrorist incident.
    • Nuclear Detection: Chaired by Finland, this working group is building national detection capabilities and providing guidance on detection.

    Additional working groups can be created by the GICNT member states.

    In total, the GICNT members have held over 80 workshops or exercises in 30 countries. Any participating state can host an activity or workshop by coordinating with the IAG. Since it was created in 2006, there has been a plenary meeting every 1-2 years. The most recent plenary was hosted by the Netherlands in June 2016. The chairman’s summary from the meeting identified radioactive source security as a priority area for future focus and highlighted the importance of regionally-based exercises and workshops.

    Since 2006, GICNT membership has grown to 86 states. Any state that endorses the statement of principles can join the initiative. Five international organizations are official observers of the initiative; the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, INTERPOL, and the European Union.

    The GICNT was also designated as one of the five successors to the Nuclear Security Summit agenda. At the final summit in April 2016, participating leaders endorsed action plans for each of the five initiatives to carry on the work of the summit process. The GICNT’s action plan included a range of activities to build capacity, host additional exercises, and promote cooperation with observer organizations.

    RECOMMENDATIONS

    • Create new working groups focused on preventative actions: The existing GICNT working groups are focused on response and detection of a nuclear terrorist or trafficking incident. While these areas certainly are critical in the overarching nuclear security and nonproliferation architecture, the GICNT could put additional focus on creating working groups designed to take preventative action. This could include a focus on radiological source security and disposal, cyber threats, or insider threat mitigation. All of these areas fit within the GICNT’s priorities and additional preventative foci could broaden the appeal of the initiative, given that a dirty bomb attack, for instance, has greater relevance for a wider number of states.
       
    • Target regional and/or bilateral areas of focus through exercises and activities: At the 2016 plenary meeting, GICNT members recognized the need for more regional action. Given that PSI also targets regions to develop specific counter-proliferation strategies, GICNT could consider aligning capacity building and workshops that support or align with priorities identified by PSI activities. Focusing on detection architecture, for instance, could compliment export control trainings or interdiction exercises.
       
    • Utilize the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Training and Support Center (NSSC) database for regional trainings: The IAEA’s NSSC network is working on a database of NSSC specialties and capabilities. The GICNT could utilize the network when planning activities to more efficiently use resources or direct trainings and workshops to fill gaps that might be identified by the NSSC’s network.

    Subject Resources:

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